De Castro vs Yap [G.R. No.

167707, October 08, 2008] Facts: AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 [3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land. G.R. No. 167707 On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) and later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial and they declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. And under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. Trial court ruled in favour of respondent-claimants. OSG filed motion for reconsideration but was denied. OSG appealed to CA, but CA affirmed trial courts decision. CA held that held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. OSG filed motion for reconsideration. It was again denied; hence the present petition. G.R. No. 173775 In 2006, during the pendency of the first petition (for confirmation of imperfect title over parcels of land in Boracay), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064: 1. classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable); and 2. providing for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Petitioner-claimants filed original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proc. No. 1064 contending that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. [32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. OSG opposed contending that petitioner-claimants do not have vested rights because (1) Boracay is an unclassified public forest pursuant to Sec 3 of PD705, (2) It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands and (3) there is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

Issue: In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws. Held: In deciding the matter, the Supreme Court extensively discussed the Regalian Doctrine and traced various laws governing land ownership and registration. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. In this case, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Supreme Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. . Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. [ If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. It was Proclamation No. 1064 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. There was nothing invalid or irregular, much less contrary to the Constitution, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. There are two requisites that must be complied with: 1. open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and 2. the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The second requisite (alienable and disposable land) is absent because, as discussed, the island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. The private claimants may not also apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945. The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island. . Nevertheless, the private claimants may resort to the following: 1. those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. 2. They may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law. 3. More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide. WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: (1) The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. (2) The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Facts: Petitioner's late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land1cralaw located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976. 2cralaw She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237) 3cralaw in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain. Significantly SC already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes 4cralaw that the property subject of Garcia's application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and void. Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia's favor in a decision 5cralaw dated July 1, 1981. The Republic eventually appealed. In its decision penned by Justice Vicente V Mendoza , The CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioner's case as it involved the same property. During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz. 8cralawPetitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement and the parties ultimately entered into a compromise. On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner's favor. However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation. On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and assailed the validity of the Mendoza alleging that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion was denied. 14cralawThereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari 15cralaw in this Court. It was denied for raising factual issues. 16cralaw She moved for reconsideration.17cralaw This motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting a modification of the Court's resolution. The Court then ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc .19cralaw The Court denied20cralaw it considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself. Held: By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus, before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded thatapproximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest.x x x Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141. Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership. Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) 34cralaw coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the

thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were used as grazing land. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. The mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

Benin vs Tuason G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974 Facts: On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal and that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin; In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, and that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara. In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same; had said lands declared for taxation purposes. The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements. They made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; They allege that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate) They contend that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration. The lower court rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiffs. A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal. 7 The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965 Issue: W/N the LRC had jurisdiction to render the decision for the reason that the amendment to the original plan was not published.

Held: The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application and the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911. On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681. November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain. On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. In compliance with the, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration submitted a stating that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously included in the original plan. The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act). We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. . If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. 11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case. , when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication

be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan. 22 The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far but only in so far as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.

Republic vs Sarmiento Facts: Restituto Sarmiento through his brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno Sarmiento filed an application for registration of a parcel of land located at Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through donation under a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988 executed by his father, Placido which lot formed part of Lot 535 that was allegedly inherited by Placido from Florentina Sarmiento andfurther claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The subject lot was a portion of the parcel of land previously declared for taxation purposes in the name of its original owner Florentina Sarmiento under Tax No. 4995. Upon the death of Florentina Sarmiento, a portion of said land was inherited by Placido Sarmiento, the father of the herein applicant Restituto Sarmiento, while the other portion went to Placidos sister Teodora Sarmiento. On July 16, 1988, Placido Sarmiento transferred the portion of the parcel of land inherited by him from Florentina Sarmiento to his children, namely: herein applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Magdaleno Sarmiento and Conigunda Sarmiento by virtue of a deed denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob" On April 24 and June 25, 1998, Magdaleno Sarmiento, among others, caused the survey of the entire area of the parcel of land x x x According to the said plan, the said survey is inside alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry. METC granted application. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner now comes before the SC on a petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Held: It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the Public Land Act, one of the means by which public agricultural lands may be disposed. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073,32 provides: an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove that (a) the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry. Menguito v. Republic36 teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain. For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.