Republic of the Philippines v.

Court of Appeals

131 SCRA 532 Facts:

The lot subject matter of this land registration case is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay. It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili. The Deed of Sale evidencing the purchase was recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was declared for tax purposes and realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died, the subject parcel passed on to his son Santos del Rio. Santos del Rio filed his application for registration of said parcel. It ws opposed by the Director of Lands claiming that said parcel of land is part of public domain and therefore not registerable. On the other hand, private oppositors allege that they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they have been in possession of the same for more than 20 years. The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the applicant private respondent has a registerable title to the land. Held: Yes. Applicant asserts ownership over the parcel and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor of his father. Tax receipts and declarations become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of property. The applicant and his father has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years.

The applicant having satisfactorily established his registerable title over the parcel of land, is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

BALBIN V. REGISTER OF DEEDS FACTS: Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owner s certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being legally defective o r otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owner s duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner s copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution. ISSUE: W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper? HELD: YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity may be affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If different copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be available. Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance. Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties. Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio s civil status, character of land and validity of conveyances are in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and parties may protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens. DOCTRINE :Where several co-owner s duplicate of certificates of titles are issued, a voluntary instrument cannot be registered without surrendering all the copies to the Register of Deeds so that every copy of thereof would contain identical entries of the transactions affecting the land covered.

EN BANC

DECISION

March 31, 1965 G.R. No. L-18725 JOSE MA. LEDESMA, petitioner-appellee, vs. FELIX VILLASE OR, movant-appellant. Sicangco, Estino, Sison and Associates for petitioner-appellee. Gabriel Benedicto for movant-appellant. Makalintal, J.: Felix Villase or, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Eusebio Villase or, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to enjoin the Register of Deeds of the same province from registering a deed of sale by which the deceased conveyed to Jose Ma. Ledesma two lots registered in his name, to wit, Lots Nos. 2532-C and 2533-B of the Cadastral Survey of Bago, Negros Occidental. The reason given for seeking injunctive relief was that the deed of sale was fictitious and that the signature of the vendor was forged. The court issued a writ of preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. The vendee, Ledesma, who had not been impleaded as a party-defendant, intervened in the case. On October 3, 1960 the court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. Two days later, on October 5, Ledesma filed his own petition in the cadastral record of said lots, asking that the Register of Deeds be ordered to register the aforementioned deed of sale. The ground alleged in the petition was that Civil Case No. 5662 had been dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued therein had been dissolved. On the same day the court, without notice either to the Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis of the allegations in the petition, issued the corresponding order for registration. In compliance therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two certificates of title in the name of the deceased Eusebio Villase or and issued new ones in Ledesma's name. On October 8, 1960, again upon Ledema's petition, the court ordered the cancellation of the certificates thus issued and the issuance of still new ones, also in his name. Villase or moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected this appeal upon their denial.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed from because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to appellant or to furnish him copy of the petition; (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil Case No. 5662 and not in the cadastral proceeding; (3) the court had no power to order the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale in question when the same was being contested as fictitious nor to order the issuance of titles in the name of the supposed buyer; and (4) if, as appellee points out, the Register of Deeds had improperly refused to register the deed of sale, the proper remedy should have been a suit for mandamus. We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to it. To be sure, when the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5662 was dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant's petition the obstacle to the registration of the deed of sale was removed. The effect of the dissolution was immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been perfected from the order of dismissal (Watson v. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 480; Sitia Taco v. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497). But that is only as far as the Register of Deeds was concerned, his duty under the circumstances if the document was on its face registrable being administrative and ministerial. The lifting of the injunction, however, or even the dismissal of the petition, was no authority for the court in the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice to the Register of Deeds or to appellant, considering that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final. The court knew of the pendency of that case and of the fact that the relief sought therein by appellant was precisely to prevent registration. Irrespective of the propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued, that is, whether or not mandamus should have been resorted to, the least that the court a quo should have done was to afford appellant proper notice and hearing, so that he could reiterate his objections to the registration and present evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court's attention to the fact that the question had not yet been definitely settled in the civil action since the order dismissing it was not yet final. It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial duties under the law, to register an instrument which in his opinion is registrable, and quite another thing for the court itself to order the registration. The former does not contemplate notice to and hearing of interested parties such as are required in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of a court judgment. The court a quo, in anticipating the action of the Register of Deeds, unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands and at the same time preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil action filed by appellant zm5YOOoBM1.

The orders appealed from are hereby set aside, with costs against appellee.

Republic v. Umali

171 SCRA 647

Facts:

The land in question was originally purchased from the government by a certain Florentina Bobadilla who transferred her rights in favor of Martina, TOmasa, Gregorio and Julio Cenizal. The assignees purportedly signed a joint affidavit for the issuance of a certificate of tile over said land which was subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The Director of Lands then filed a complaint for reversion on the grounds of forgery and fraud since two of the assignees were already dead when the supposed affidavit was executed. Respondents Miclat and Pulido, the registered owners following several transfers contend that the government had no cause of action because the subject land was already covered by the Torrens System and they were purchasers in good faith.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent s title was affected by the fact the original acquisition was fraudulent.

Held:

No. The land being now registered under the Torrens System in the names of the private respondents, it is no longer part of the public domain, hence, the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of the land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. The private respondents are transferees in good faith and for value of the subject property and the original acquisition although fraudulent, did not affect their titles and these are valid against the whole world.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee. CASTRO, J.: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962: 1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property; 2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but 3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958). To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their father. In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence the present appeal by Almirol. The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.1 Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953). . . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183). Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows: Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts. ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
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