Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue G.R. No.

L-78780, July 23, 1987 FACTS: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on December 4, 1987. Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They contend that this constitutes diminution of salary contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the salary of the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law and that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the salaries of judges are subject to tax. RULING: The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David do not apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue GR L-78780, 23 July 1987 GR L-78780, 23 July 1987 Resolution FACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.

HELD: What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS GR 122156 February 3, 1997

Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. HELD: MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities.

Aquino vs. Enrile 59 SCRA 183 Sept. 17, 1974

Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986 FACTS: Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections? HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3 (Cory declared bid for presidency), as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

1935 Constitution Declaration of Martial Law Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 - Validity of Martial Law = SC Held: Political question 1973 Constitution (effectivity date: Jan. 17, 1973) Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 - Sc Held: 1973 Constitution is enforceable; however, Justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion, thinks that the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should be on April 1973 because it would be in connection with the finality of Javellana v. Executive Secretary 1986 Snap Presidential Election Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455 - Challenges the act for snap elections as a violation of the 1973 Constitution; SC Held that this is a political question. People Power Revolt Proclamation No. 1, Feb. 25, 1986 - Aquino assumes office thru the people Proclamation No. 3, Mar 25, 1986 Lawyers League v. Aquino, GR 73748, May 22, 1986 - challenges the legality of the presidency; SC Held: this is a political question In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160 - This is asking for Declaratory relief, but the question is to whos government does the relief is being asked, the Aquino-Laurel or the Marcos-Tolentino? The SC Held: no power for declaratory relief in this case. Freedom Constitution 1987 Constitution In re: Letter of Reynato Puno, June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA - In this case it is being reiterated that the Auino presidency is a Revolutionary government Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 - questioned the effectivity date of the 1987

Constitution? Choices: a. Feb. 2, 1987 (date of plebiscite) b. Feb. 11, 1987 (date of proclamation) Answer: It should be February 2, 1987 since the Constitution itself stated in its provisions (Art. 18, Sec. 27) that it should be effective upon the date when it will be ratified, in this case the date of the plebiscite and not the date of proclamation AMENDMENT PROCESS ( Article XVII ) Amendment vs. Revision Procedure: 1. Proposal a. By Congress b. By a Constitutional Convention Theories on Position of Constitutional Convention c. By the people thru Initiative (Sec. 2) this only applies to amendments RA 6735 (Initiative & Referendum Law) Note: RA 6735 failed to further legislate the provisions of the Constitution on amending the Constitution thru people initiative. Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, GR 127325, March 19, 1997 - Sc Held: that the law, as worded, did not apply to Constitutional amendments (RA 6735); insufficient to implement Constitutional amendments thru people initiative because there is no law that would implement the provisions of the Constitution on People Initiative (Amendments). Sec. 2, therefore, is not self-executing. 2. Ratification Doctrine of Proper Submission Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 Judicial Review of Amendments Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 - upheld the Presidents authority to propose amendments; a product of unusual times

The Schurman Commission also known as the First Philippine Commission was the legislature of the Philippines, then known as the Philippine Islands under the sovereign control of the United States during the Philippine-American War. It was established by United States President William McKinley on January 20, 1899, and tasked to study the situation in the Philippines and make recommendations on how the U.S should proceed. Its final report was submitted on January 3, 1900, and recommended the establishment of a civil government having a bicameral legislature and being financially independent from the United States. The report also recommended the establishment of a system of public education The Taft Commission, also known as Second Philippine Commission (Filipino: Ikadalawang Komisyon ng Pilipinas) was established by United States President William McKinley on March 16, 1900. The Commission was the legislature of the Philippines, then known as the Philippine Islands under the sovereign control of the United States during the Philippine-American War. After the passage of the Philippine Organic Act in 1902, the Commission functioned as the one House of a bicameral legislature until it was supplanted in 1916 by an elected legislature established in 1916 by the Philippine Autonomy Act. William Howard Taft was the first head of the Philippine Commission, a post he filled between March 16, 1900 and September 1, 1901. Taft then succeeded himself as commission head, while concurrently serving as Civil Governor until January 31, 1904. The Philippine Commission was subsequently headed by a number of persons, but is often mentioned informally and collectively as the "Taft Commission". Spooner Amendment, congressional amendment to the Army Appropriations Act of 1901 that called for the end of the U.S. military government in the Philippines. By the terms of the Treaty of Paris (December 1898), sovereignty over the Philippine Islands had passed from Spain to the United States. Filipinos fought the imposition of American rule, and it was believed in the United States that their resistance was due to the harshness of military government. The Spooner Amendment authorized Pres. William McKinley to supplant military rule with civilian government, which was inaugurated in July 1901. Filipino guerrillas, however, continued hostilities for a number of years. The Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Cooper Act of July 1st, 1902, was named after its sponsor, United States representative, Henry A. Cooper. It provided for a bill of rights for the Filipinos, the appointment of two Filipino resident commissioners to represent the Philippines in the United States Congress but without voting rights, and the establishment of a Philippine Assembly to be elected by Filipinos 2 years after publication of a census and after peace was completely restored in the Phliippines.

The Jones Law or the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, also known as the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, replaced the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 that earlier served as a constitution for the Philippine Islands. The Philippines was ceded by Spain to the United States in 1898 and a civil administration called the Insular Government was created in 1901. The Jones Law was a framework for a "more autonomous government" in preparation for the grant of independence by the United States. While the 1902 act provided for an appointed upper house, the Jones Law provided that both houses of the Philippine Legislature would be elected.[1] The Jones Law, enacted by the 64th Congress of the United States on August 29, 1916, contained the first formal and official declaration of the United States commitment to grant independence to the Philippines.[2] The law provides that the grant of independence would come only "as soon as a stable government can be established", which gave the United States Government the power to determine when this "stable government" has been achieved. It aimed at providing the Filipino people (Filipinos) broader domestic autonomy, though it reserved certain privileges to the United States (Americans) to protect their sovereign rights and interests. The Tydings-McDuffie Act (officially the Philippine Independence Act; Public Law 73-127) approved on March 24, 1934 was a United States federal law which provided for self-government of the Philippines and for Filipino independence (from the United States) after a period of ten years. It was authored by Maryland Senator Millard E. Tydings and Alabama Representative John McDuffie. In 1934, Philippine politician Manuel L. Quezon headed a "Philippine Independence mission" to Washington, DC that successfully secured the act's passage in Congress. The TydingsMcDuffie Act authorized and specified a procedural framework for, within two years of its enactment, the drafting of a Constitution for the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The act specified a number mandatory constitutional provisions, and required approval of the constitution by the U.S. President and by the Filipino people. The act mandated U.S. recognition of independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation after a ten year transition period. Prior to independence, the act allowed the U.S to maintain military forces in the Philippines and to call all military forces of the Philippine government into U.S. military service. The act empowered the U.S. President, within two years following independence, to negotiate matters relating to U.S. naval reservations and fueling stations of in the Philippine Islands. The act reclassified all Filipinos, including those that were living in the United States, as aliens for the purposes of immigration to America. Filipinos were no longer allowed to work legally in the US,[citation needed] and a quota of 50 immigrants per year was established. One effect of the act was to pave the way for the Filipino Repatriation Act of 1935.