Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a Regional Power Cycle Author(s): Daniel S.

Geller Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 24, No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics. Cycle de pouvoir et politique mondiale (Jan., 2003), pp. 137-150 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601335 Accessed: 15/08/2010 16:48
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Review(2003), Vol 24, No. 1, 137-150 InternationalPoliticalScience

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Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a Regional Power Cycle
DANIEL S. GELLER

This ABSTRACr. articleexaminesthe implicationsof possessionof nuclear weaponsfor warbetween India and Pakistan.Existingliteraturederived from us-Soviet interactionduringthe ColdWarmayhave little relevance to conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerable nucleararsenals.Applyingpower cycle theorywithin a regionalcontext,
this study explores possible global ramifications of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Power cycle theory suggests that Indo-Pakistani military competition may accelerate shifts in the relative power trends throughout Asia, causing abrupt changes in future foreign policy expectations and security that could ultimately affect the nuclear programs of both Russia and the United States. * Keywords: Indo-Pakistani conflict * Nuclear weapons * Power cycle theory * War

There is an extensive but largely speculative literature dealing with the effects of nuclear weapons possession on the escalation of international conflict. However, most of this derives from us-Soviet interaction during the Cold War and may have little relevance to conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals. With a common border, extremely short aircraft or missile flight times, and a simmering territorial dispute, the incentives for preemptive nuclear attack or escalation from conventional to nuclear war suggest that the us-Soviet experience with successful deterrence may not be replicated by India and Pakistan. In addition, power cycle theory (Doran, 1971, 1991) has recently been applied in a regional context (see the studies by Parasilitiand by Kumar,this issue). Although this theory was originally designed to explain and predict the war behavior of major powers at the apex of the global hierarchy, its potential relevance in regional dynamics may help account for conflict among states at lower levels of international status, wealth, and material capabilities.
0192-5121 (2003/01) 24:1, 137-150; 028622 ? 2003 International Political Science Association and New Delhi) SAGEPublications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA

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Power cycle theory strongly emphasizes a system-wide perspective. Each state compares itself to its principal rivals collectively and simultaneously. India, in its entanglement with Pakistan, for example, is also preoccupied with China. Pakistan, in dealing with India, seeks continual support from China. China, in dealing with India, uses Pakistan as its "securityprot6g6" and ally. The dyadic IndoPakistani military competition, according to power cycle theory, cannot find resolution but in the dynamic systemic equilibrium among China, India, and Pakistan. Structural change within the South Asian region is important not only to political stability within the region but globally as well. Power cycle theory asserts that structural change at the regional level is almost alwaysmore volatile than at the global level (as confirmed empirically by Kumar and by Parasiliti). If this volatility occurs in the context of a highly militarized setting featuring a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India, the region will have difficulty adapting to this structural change peacefully, with consequences that go beyond South Asia. Hence, regional structural volatility can be as damaging to the dynamic global equilibrium as abrupt, unanticipated structural change within the central international system itself. Nuclear Proliferation and World Order What will be the effect of a nuclear weapons capability (Ahmed, 1999; Ganguly, 1999) on the probability of future conflict between India and Pakistan? These states have fought multiple wars in their brief post-colonial history since 1947, and their relations have been punctuated by sporadic, low-level violent interactions. In May of 1998, India detonated five underground nuclear explosions (adding to the one it set off in 1974). Within a matter of days, Pakistan responded with six of its own underground nuclear tests (Diamond, 1998: 22; Synnott, 1999: 54-56). Both states have nuclear-capable strike aircraft and ballistic missiles with ranges encompassing virtually all of the opposing state's territory.Will the possession of nuclear weapons inhibit military engagement between these enduring rivals, or will they be employed in a catastrophic conflict producing effects not witnessed since the end of World War II? This question as well as other issues related to the May 1998 nuclear tests are explored in this study. There is a belief that, since 1945, nuclear weapons have been the principal factor determining both the distribution of power and the dynamics of conflict interaction in the international system. Others believe that power is quite independent of nuclear capability and is more accurately identified with economics and conventional military capability. It is generally assumed that nuclear weaponry provides a military and psychological advantage in some conflict situations. Unarguably, nuclear technology has produced remarkable extensions in the destructive power of modern weapons, and methods for their delivery to targets have improved over the last six decades with regard to speed, range, and accuracy. Snyder and Diesing (1977: 450), however, maintain that the primary effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the behavior of Cold War nuclear adversaries was to create new constraints on the ultimate range of their coercive tactics-a result of the extraordinary increase in the interval between the value of the interests at stake in a conflict and the potential costs of war. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, this interval was comparatively small and states could more readily accept the risk of war or engage in war to avoid the loss of a contested

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value. In contrast, for states with even small numbers of nuclear weapons, it is far more difficult to conceive of an issue worth incurring a high risk of nuclear war, much less the cost of actually fighting one. Most theories of war and lesser forms of international conflict rest on rational choice. To cite but a few, Morgenthau ([1948], 1967), Blainey (1973), Waltz (1979), Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Gilpin (1981) argue that rational calculations guide decisions of war and peace. Power cycle theory (Doran, 1991, 2000b) holds that foreign policy-making is rational most of the time, but that at critical points in a state's history important elements of nonrationality may disturb the international political equilibrium. As Geller and Singer (1998: 31) explain, "Nonrational models, whether focusing on psychological variables or organizational interests and routines, maintain that decisions are frequently distorted by systematic perceptual, cognitive, or bureaucratic biases." War between nuclear powers may yield outcomes that were rational for neither winner nor loser. For two decades, Kenneth Waltz (1981, 1990, 1993, 1995) has argued that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons will promote peace and reinforce international stability. Using the same logic, Osgood and Tucker (1967: 125) suggest that it was precisely the magnitude of the consequences associated with nuclear war that account for the two most notable aspects of Cold War superpower dispute interaction: the confinement of warfare to localized, non-nuclear forms of combat; and the development, diffusion, and exploitation of tactics involving force short of war. In serious international disputes, states generally are confronted with the problem of winning the dispute (or settling it acceptably) while avoiding war. As Snyder and Diesing (1977: 450-451) argue, bargaining in interstate crises usually entails an explicit or implicit threat (war) to destroy the common interest (peace) so as to coerce an opponent and win the contested value. Simultaneously, there are constraints on the reckless or extreme use of coercive tactics: decision-makers are aware of the dual risks-that the momentum of events may take the dispute beyond control, or that in the coercive maneuvering both sides may irrevocably commit to an unwanted war. If confrontations of this type involve two or more nuclear-armed states, the potential costs of miscalculation rise sharply. As an example of those costs, crude estimates of the effects of various nuclear exchanges between India and Pakistan were calculated some years ago. Bracken 1985 population projections-calculates 850,000 prompt (1976: 3-4)-using fatalities and 2.65 million total fatalities (within one month) from blast, untreated thermal injuries, radiation, and lack of food and shelter (out of a total population of 8,175,000) following an attack on Karachi, Pakistan with four 20-kiloton fission weapons airburst at optimum altitudes. The result of a single one-megaton airburst over the same city would produce approximately 1.6 million prompt fatalities. Bracken's calculations also show that airbursts of four 20-kiloton fission weapons over Calcutta, India (total population [1985 est.] 13,450,000) would produce roughly 1,000,000 prompt fatalities. In another study, Naim (1987) examines possible effects of different types of nuclear strikes in an Indo-Pakistani war inclusive of: limited attacks on military centers; simultaneous strikes against military and economic targets; counter-city strikes; and symbolic attacks. Using population projections (1990 estimates) for Lahore (4,599,900) and Delhi (9,118,600), Naim calculates the long-term fatalities from single one-megaton airbursts over these cities as 4,500,000 and 9,100,000 respectively-close to the entire populations of both urban centers.

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Crisis case studies have shown that, in the extreme tension of a dispute between nuclear powers, decision-makers tend toward vacillation in both strategy and tactics as they attempt to contend with the contrary pressures of gaining or protecting contested values while simultaneously avoiding war (e.g., Betts, 1987: 19-20). The desire to win the dispute requires a demonstration of resolve and a willingness to fight, whereas the fear of war demands caution in the creation of commitments and the use of coercive tactics. Obviously,in confrontations between nuclear states, the strain of blending these conflicting objectives is considerable (e.g., Bundy and Blight, 1987/88). Because nuclear weapons have not altered the values at stake in interstate disputes (or the desire to avoid political loss) but rather have increased the immediate costs of war, then in a severe conflict between nuclear powers the decision-maker's dilemma is to construct a strategy to secure political interests through coercive actions that raise the possibility of war without pushing the risk to an extreme level. Some analysts argue that the solutions to this problem entail: (1) a more cautious approach toward nuclear rivals (a reluctance among nucleararmed states to challenge one another even in areas of ambiguous interest) because of the potential costs of miscalculation; and (2) an increase in the "threshold of provocation" providing greater area of coercive maneuver in the threat, display, and limited use of force (Osgood and Tucker, 1967: 144-145; Snyder and Diesing, 1977: 451). Krepon (1998) draws precisely this conclusion with regard to recent events involving India and Pakistan over Kashmir: carriedout nucleartestslast May,hawkish When Indiaand Pakistan strategists would in both countriespronouncedthat overt,offsettingnuclearcapabilities of the however, dividends nucleardeterrenceare hardto find:During Kashmir, July and August-peak infiltration season-Pakistani and Indian troops exchangedmore fire than during their last two warscombined.Nucleartests havegivenfreerrein to unconventional military options (Krepon,1998:A23). According to this thesis, hostile interaction between nuclear powers under this higher provocation threshold can range from verbal threats and warnings, to military deployments and displays, to the use of force short of war. If this logic is correct, then despite the history of military interaction between India and Pakistan and their ongoing territorial dispute over Kashmir,the introduction of a nuclear capability on both sides may serve to prevent another war for this dyad. In fact, Rosen (1977), Feldman (1982) and van Creveld (1993) make similar arguments regarding nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, although Sagan (1995: 48) describes this as the "proliferation optimist" position derived from the logic of rational deterrence theory. Alternatively, escalatory processes from low-level conflict or incentives for nuclear preemption in a severe crisis might lead these states into a nuclear exchange. Conflict escalation tendencies are prominent in this dyad. For example, Leng (2000: 256-257) produces evidence on conflict interaction across four IndoPakistani confrontations which indicates that "each successive crisis escalated to a more violent conclusion than the one that preceded it." Along similar lines, Kupchan (1998: 75) notes that: "The proliferation of weapons technology is also raising the stakes of instability in developing regions. The recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan underscore the potential for dangerous arms racing among
help stabilize their troubled relationship. Across . . . [the] terrain dividing

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developing states." Glaser and Kaufmann (1998/99: 205, fn.12) assert that small nuclear forces are vulnerable to first strikes by nuclear opponents and thereby may provide incentives for war initiation and undermine deterrence. As Huth and Russett (1988: 34) emphasize, the literature about whether nuclear weapons have enhanced or diminished the likelihood of conflict in the contemporary world is both "vast and largely speculative." Quester (1977), Waltz (1981, 1990, 1993, 1995), Intriligator and Brito (1981), Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982), and Mearsheimer (1990) have argued that the spread of secure, second-strike nuclear capabilities may reduce the utility of war-both conventional and nuclear-as an instrument of foreign policy and thereby minimize if not eliminate the probability of war between nuclear powers. The empirical validity of this proposition remains to be established. Moreover, India and Pakistan have small nuclear forces that do not satisfy the assumption of "secure, second-strike nuclear capabilities," and they have not yet elaborated a deterrence doctrine in part because China's nuclear status and foreign policy relationships both within and outside the region have greatly complicated the strategic equation. The Nuclear Capabilities of India and Pakistan Open source estimates of the size of the current Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons inventories vary enormously. In a sophisticated analysis, Jones (2001: 8-13) states that India easily could have accumulated enough plutonium (Pu) and from dedicated facilities (the CIRUS Dhruva reactors) for the construction of about 133 nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The projected annual rate of increase from these facilities is about seven weapons annually. Jones also estimates that Pakistan may have constructed about 43 nuclear weapons by 2000, primarily using highly enriched uranium (HEU) from its gas centrifuge enrichment facilities. Combining the fissile material (plutonium) from the Khushab heavy water reactor that began operation in 1998, Pakistan's projected annual rate of nuclear weapons production, using both uranium and plutonium, is also about seven weapons per year. Given probable supplies of weapons-grade materials (year 2000) of 485 kilograms of plutonium for India and 830 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for Pakistan, these nuclear arsenal numbers are roughly within the boundaries of estimated requirements-4.5 kilograms of Pu and 18 kilograms of HEU-for the production of a 20-kiloton fission weapon at low levels of technology. Both India and Pakistan have aircraft and ballistic missiles for nuclear weapons delivery capable of reaching virtually all of the opposing nation's territory. India possesses 16 Sukhoi 30K/MK multirole fighters (combat radius of 1,500 kilometers), 63 MiG-29 fighters (combat radius of 630 kilometers), 84Jaguar S(I) deep-penetration strike aircraft (combat radius with external fuel tanks of 1,408 kilometers), 135 MiG-27 ground attack aircraft (combat radius with external fuel tanks of 540 kilometers), and 40 Mirage 2000H fighters (combat radius with external fuel tanks of 1,852 kilometers)-all of which are nuclear-capable. These aircraft have the range to effectively cover Pakistan. Pakistani nuclear-capable aircraft are limited to 32 F-16 A/B fighters (combat radius with external fuel tanks of 1,371 kilometers), although 122 Mirage fighter-bombers (combat radius of 500 kilometers) could be adapted to nuclear missions (IIss, 2001: 164, 168; Sidhu, 1998: 23-24, 26).

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The only nuclear-capable ballistic missile in the current Indian arsenal is the Prithvi, a single-stage, liquid-propellant, mobile, short-range missile. There are two operational versions of the Prithvi, an SS-150 (single warhead 1,000 kilogram payload) ballistic missile with a range of 150 kilometers and an SS-250 (single warhead 500 kilogram payload) ballistic missile with a 250 kilometer range. A third version (SS-350) with a range of 350 kilometers is in development. The current size of the Prithvi force is estimated to be about 100 missiles. In addition, India has under development (since 1979) intermediate-range, surface-based, solid- and liquid-propellant, single warhead ballistic missiles called Agnis. The Agni II (or Agni-plus) is a two-stage missile using solid fuel in both stages. It is believed that the warhead section carries a 1,000 kilogram payload. The range of the Agni II is estimated to be between 2,000 and 2,500 kilometers. An Agni III, which has not yet been tested, is a three-stage missile using solid fuel in the first two stages and liquid fuel in the third stage. It is projected to have a range of 3,000 to 3,500 kilometers and to carry a 500 kilogram payload. India is working on at least two indigenously produced variants of a submarine-launched missile, the Danush, a naval version of the Prithvi ballistic missile, and the Sagarika, a submarine-launched short-range cruise missile. India is also ready to introduce the short-range Russian Klub cruise missile to its new Kilo-class submarines (ane's 1997, 1998; Sidhu, 1998: 24, 27; IIss, 2000: 158;Jones, 2001: 18-23). Pakistan has a number of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in its inventory. For battlefield use, Pakistan has developed the Hatf-1 (500 kilogram payload with a 100 kilometer range) and Hatf-2 (500 kilogram payload with a 300 kilometer range). In the late 1980s, China transferred M-ll (CSS-7/DF-11) short-range, road-mobile, solid-propellant, single warhead (800 kilogram payload) ballistic missiles to Pakistan. The Hatf-2 is believed to be based on the Chinese M-ll. In 1997, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-3, a missile with a 500 kilogram payload and a range of 800 kilometers. The Hatf-3 can reach important strategic installations and military targets in western and central India. Pakistan also has nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with North Korean lineage. In April 1998, Pakistan conducted a test of a ballistic missile that Pakistani authorities called the Ghauri; however, it is believed that the missile is actually a North Korean Nodong-2. The Nodong-2 is an intermediate-range, ground-mobile, liquid-propellant, single warhead (700 kilogram payload) ballistic missile that can cover a distance of roughly 1,500 kilometers. This missile can reach all major Indian cities, nuclear facilities, and strategic installations. Pakistan is also reported to be working on derivatives of the North Korean Taepodong 1 (2,000 kilometer range) and Taepodong 2 (3,000 kilometer range) ballistic missiles, both with 1,000 kilogram payloads. The size of the Pakistani missile force is estimated at approximately 12 Ghauris, a combined number of 18 Hatf-ls and Hatf-2s, and 30 Hatf-3s (Jane's, 1997, 1998; Cheema, 2000: 167-168; IIss,2000: 158;Jones, 2001: 18-23). W.P.S.Sidhu (2000) describes India's nuclear use doctrine as follows:
India developed a de facto doctrine of deterrence ...

that Indiawouldfirstuse its conventional to threats capability countermilitary from either China or Pakistan.If these countriesthreatenedor launched a Indiawouldrespondwithits ownnuclearweaponsin a nuclearattack,however,
second strike .... This doctrine evolved in the absence of clear instructions from political leaders regarding India's nuclear arsenal and against the backdrop of a series of nuclear crises between India and Pakistan in the 1980s.

based on the premise

& GELLER: NuclearWeapons theIndo-PakistaniConflict Consequently, like most professional militaries, the Indian military took the initiative in the early 1980s to develop options to deal with a nuclear scenario. These options included plans for a conventional preventive war that would target the adversary's nuclear weapon capability. India's own nuclear weapon capability, which was in place by the late 1980s, was not, however, fully integrated into conventional war plans because civilian leaders and nuclear technocrats opposed giving control of nuclear weapons to the armed forces. The resultant no-first-use doctrine reflects these command and control arrangements (Sidhu, 2000: 157).

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In a speech delivered to the Indian Parliament on December 15, 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared that his government "will maintain the deployment of nuclear weapons, continue development of ballistic missiles and reserve the right to produce more bomb-grade material." This declaration marked the first public statement that India may have deployed nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister noted that he was asserting India's sovereign rights in rejecting any externally proposed restraints on weapons deployment, missile development, and production of weapons-grade fissile material, and that such strategic defense A senior Indian official decisions are not subjects open to negotiation. commenting on the remarks by the Prime Minister stated that "India's short-range Prithvi missile ... [is] a battlefield weapon ready for nuclear duty" (Cooper, 1998: A37). Cheema (2000) discusses Pakistan's nuclear doctrine of use as follows: Pakistan has not formally announced a nuclear doctrine. In practice, however, it is pursuing a doctrine of minimum deterrence and conventional defense. Pakistan's plans to miniaturize nuclear warheads, develop several types of ballistic missiles, assemble a small nuclear force, and address the asymmetric strategic equilibrium with India by relying on nuclear weapons, suggest the outline of an emerging nuclear doctrine .... Pakistani officials have not stated explicitly whether nuclear weapons would be used to deter a conventional military attack by India, to overcome early setbacks in a conventional war, to counteract an emerging strategic disadvantage, or as weapons of last resort. Pakistan's rejection of India's suggested bilateral "no-nuclear-first-use"pledge suggests, however, that nuclear weapons are integral to its defense and deterrent doctrine .... Pakistan's political and military leaders are increasingly mindful of the need to maintain a constant vigil to ward off preemptive air or missile attacks by India either to decapitate Pakistan's command and control The proximity of potential systems or to destroy its nuclear forces .... combatants, little early warning time, and a lack of strategic depth might induce Pakistan to alert its nuclear forces to prevent their destruction if a crisis develops. The situation injects an element of instability in the deterrent relationship between India and Pakistan .... Pakistan's political and military leaders might opt for preemption rather than be the victims of an Indian preemptive attack (Cheema, 2000: 175-178). Estimated flight times from Indian and Pakistani missile launch sites to Islamabad and New Delhi are about 4-5 minutes. There exist a number of speculative but plausible avenues along which a nuclear war between India and Pakistan might begin. For example, one scenario involves escalation, beginning with the use of conventional military forces in a

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struggle over Kashmir. Such a military engagement could escalate to the nuclear level if one side found itself losing the war on the conventional battlefield. The introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons could be a tactic for manipulating risk or be pursued as a last, desperate means of avoiding defeat. A second possibility involves crisis-generated preemption. In the case of a crisis, one side, fearing a first-strikeby the other during the confrontation, launches a preemptive nuclear attack on its opponent's nuclear forces thereby hoping to minimize damage to itself. A third scenario involves preventive war.A "bolt out of the blue" attack could be initiated by either side not as the result of some provocation or crisis, but rather as the outcome of an expectation that war will inevitably occur at some future date, and, given a calculation that war now-under current circumstances-is preferable to war later under circumstances which may be less favorable, a decision is made to strike against the opponent's ungenerated forces. It should be noted that all of these war scenarios (escalation, crisis-generated preemptive attack, and preventive war) were considered plausible, to varying degrees, by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moreover, neither India nor Pakistan has yet instituted secure command and control systems for their nuclear forces. Under such conditions, the possibility of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. Of course, these are merely possibilities. However, Sagan (1995) notes a reported incident in 1990 that is strikingly similar to the outlines suggested in these scenarios: [I]t has been widelyreportedthat us intelligenceagencies believedPakistan assembledits nuclear weapons and began to load them onto alerted F-16 aircraftduring the 1990 crisis over Kashmir;Soviet intelligence agencies also reportedly pickedup similarsignalsof initialIndiannuclearweaponsalert activities duringthatcrisis(Sagan,1995:122). Sagan also discusses preventive war in the context of India and Pakistan: now than later" war The "better logic of preventive is likelyto be underserious considerationwheneveran existing nuclear power sees a rivaldevelopinga
nuclear arsenal .... [R]apid development of a Pakistani operational nuclear arsenal could create a temporary nuclear superiority over India .... Military

biases in favor of preventivewar have been highly influentialin the past in Pakistan (1995:62-63).

(For the power cycle theory position against preventive war, see Doran's article in this issue.) Whether the joint nuclear capability possessed by India and Pakistan serves to deter conventional and nuclear conflicts between these states-or if it only increases the amount of destruction in a future war to unprecedented levelsremains to be determined. The Power Cycle and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict As Doran (this issue) argues, "whethera state has yet to develop economically or is already developed, whether a state is an importer of security or a great power, whether a state primarilyviews the system through a regional or a global lens, ... it is traversing a 'cycle of relative power and role' vis-a-visa system of states, both regionally and globally." Moreover, according to power cycle theory, a

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state's "expectations and anxieties regarding its future security and foreign policy role" are based on the future trend of change (tangent) on its power cycle in that system or subsystem. But there are four critical points of non-linearity on the cycle, representing abrupt and massive structural change in the system, where the state must suddenly confront an altered perception of future security and foreign policy expectations. Power cycle theory argues further that these critical points represent times when the probability of the state's involvement in major war is greatest (Doran, 1971, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1991; Doran and Parsons, 1980). Kumar's empirical study in this issue traces the power cycle trajectories of India and Pakistan in the South Asian regional subsystem (including China), and his findings show a remarkable association between the occurrence of critical points and the onset of major war among the members of the system. Here it is asked whether the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Asian subregion affects the assumptions and applicability of power cycle theory. Doran (1991: 24-25) poses the generic question "Is power cycle analysis relevant to the nuclear age?" and argues strongly in the affirmative because power cycle theory identifies critical intervals when "the structural controls on force use disappear, when the rational becomes the nonrational in foreign policy decision making." Theoretically, then, "because the power cycle explanation for major war deals with the collapse of structural certainty and inversion of normal force expectations, it is unusually well-placed to account for major war in a world of armed nuclear states." As Doran sees it, "this explanation for how and when the rational can becomethe nonrational is the only circumstance in the modern world where war using thermonuclear weapons can become thinkable." As already argued here, the presence of nuclear weapons and increasingly longrange and accurate missiles in a setting where most of the players do not have second-strike capability against each other means that the incentives for surprise attack increase. According to power cycle theory, at critical points on the regional power cycles of India, China, and Pakistan, the stakes are much higher than in the past and the cost of political uncertainty in terms of foreign policy decisionmaking is potentially much more grave. Since, as both the Kumar and Parasiliti articles demonstrate, the periodicity of the regional power cycles is shorter and the amplitude is higher, military-strategic volatility is likely to be even greater at the regional level than at the global level. Thus power cycle theory warns that nuclear weapons make adjustment to structural change in the South Asian subsystem much more difficult. Will that structural change include India as a new superpower? Tammen et al. (2000: 176, 178) make the case that "India will be a significant factor in the international system if its internal growth dynamic continues." India currently has the fifth largest economy in the world, and it has not yet experienced accelerated growth rates as in China. But India's middle class is "larger than the entire working class of the United States," and "it has more scientists and engineers than any country but the United States." According to power cycle theory, notwithstanding these aspects of India's internal growth dynamic, its relative power trajectory (both regionally and in the great power system) will depend as well on the growth rates of other states (the denominator of the relative power ratio). Moreover, such a structural change involving India's relative power would be accompanied by major structural shifts involving China and other states. In power cycle theory, structural change creates expectations, and inverted

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expectations, that will require adjustments by many governments both regionally and globally (Doran, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2000a). Doran (this issue) contends that, according to power cycle theory, a "dynamic equilibrium" is necessary "to ensure security in the midst of so much structural change" and with such lethal weaponry as exists today in the South Asian subsystem: This dynamicequilibriumdoes not just rely on the flat "balanceof power" chessboardof alliancebehaviorsuch as that between Pakistanand China or between India and Russia.A dynamicequilibriuminternal and external to South Asia must take into account the movementup and down the power cyclesof each state and the impactsuch movementhas on the foreign policy security,can order managementinternaland externalto South Asia arrange for such adjustment and adaptationin terms of foreign policy role? (Doran, this issue:44). In the concept of "dynamic equilibrium," the system-wide nature of power cycle theory is paramount. In this view, the India-Pakistan dyad achieves its fullest strategic interpretability only in the context of the inclusion of China. The nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India is catalyzed on both sides by the relationship of each country to China. Hence, developments associated with the India-Pakistan dyad are reciprocally related to China. Indeed, power cycle theory suggests that changes in the distributional shares of the total capability pool among these three states could have important consequences for South Asia, Asia, and beyond. For example, China and India have fought one war (in 1962) and are perceived by each other to be a security threat. Pakistan has received military and technological support from China in preparation for its conflicts with India. A nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan leading to an expansion in the Indian nuclear arsenal will be viewed as a major threat to China's security and could result in additional increments to the Chinese nuclear stockpile. An expansion in Chinese nuclear capability would be viewed as undermining Russian security and could well provoke a Russian response in decisions involving the size of its nuclear arsenal. If Russia decides to maintain intact a larger proportion of its nuclear stockpile, this could have serious negative effects on the United States and its efforts to reduce the numbers of both American and Russian nuclear weapons. Of perhaps equal importance, an increase in India's share of the Asian capability pool may move China to the first inflection point on its power cycle-a point associated with international conflict and war. In sum, Indo-Pakistani military competition may produce shifts in the distribution of capabilities throughout Asia-pushing China through a critical point in its power cycle-and may ultimately affect the nuclear programs of both Russia and the United States. Conclusion The eleven nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May of 1998 demonstrated a nuclear weapons capacity for two states that have fought multiple wars since 1947. Both nations have nuclear-capable strike aircraft and ballistic missiles with ranges encompassing virtually all of the opposing state's territory. If
role each government is attempting to play .... While defending territorial

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these weapons are used in a future conflict between these countries, they will produce a level and type of destruction not witnessed since the end of World War II. As Siverson and Miller (1993) note, little systematic quantitative research has been done on the effects of nuclear weapons possession for dyadic-level conflict interaction. In one of the only large-scale quantitative studies on the subject (Geller, 1990), an analysis conducted on the 393 militarized disputes that occurred between 1946 and 1976, utilizing Correlates of War Project data, concluded that conflict escalation probabilities are significantly affected by the distribution of nuclear capabilities. The findings in that study pertaining to escalation patterns between nuclear states were consistent with the "competitive risk-taking" theses of Kahn (1962, 1965), Schelling (1960, 1966), Osgood and Tucker (1967), and Snyder and Diesing (1977). They indicated an actual increase in the provocation threshold for war and an expansion in the use of coercive tactics-threats, military displays, and force short of war-for achieving political objectives in nuclear disputes. Both the military engagement of May-July 1999 between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001 to June 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Specifically, both sides initiated troop mobilizations and general military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-area villages. However, the outcome of such confrontations for India and Pakistan may not follow the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Factors are present in this dyad that are largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and that make the escalation to war more probable (Geller and Singer, 1998: 27-28). Among these elements are the presence of a contiguous border between India and Pakistan, a history of rivalry including multiple wars, and an ongoing territorial dispute. Such factors increase the likelihood that a future Indo-Pakistani confrontation will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons. Moreover, power cycle theory suggests that the implications of an IndoPakistani nuclear arms race may transcend the relationship of these two states. Among the possible consequences are a growing mutual security threat between India and China, the passage of China through a critical point in its power cycle followed by an increased probability of international conflict, and cascading pressure on the size of the Chinese, Russian, and American nuclear arsenals. In sum, Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition is likely to have dangerous ramifications on a global scale. References Nuclear Weapons Program:Turning Points and Nuclear S. (1999). "Pakistan's Ahmed,

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Biographical Note
is DANIEL GELLER Professor of Political Science at the University of Mississippi S.

and a consultant with the us Department of State. He has written on such subjects as nuclear weapons and the escalation of interstate crises, conventional capability balances and the outbreak of war, and the power status of states and patterns of international conflict. His latest book, coauthored with J. David Singer, is Nations ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, University, MS 38677-1848, USA[email: psgeller@sunset.backbone.olemiss.edu].
at War:A Scientific Study of International Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 1998).