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"Species-Being" and "Human Nature" in Marx Author(s): Thomas E. Wartenberg Source: Human Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1982), pp. 77-95 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008832 . Accessed: 04/06/2011 00:25
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HUMAN

STUDIES,

5, 77-95

(1982)

"Species-Being"

and "Human Nature" inMarx

E. Wartenberg

Thomas

Duke University Department of Philosophy

It is generally recognized thatMarx's account of human alienation (estrangement) is dependent presented in the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts upon his notion of a human species-being. Since that concept is almost totally ab? sent from Marx's later writings, it is not generally acknowledged that this concept Marx's writing and, in particular, in his cri? continues to play a central function in of capitalist society. tique In this paper, I shall try to show the full range of implications thatMarx draws . . .and free conscious from his claim that "Man is a species-being activity con? In the first sec? stitutes the species-character of man" (Marx, 1974, pp.327-328). is a tion, I will show how Marx's use of the concept of a human species-being of the philosophic tradition's use of the idea of a hu? radical reconceptualization man essence. Iwill then, in the second section, show how this concept functions ' to ground both Marx s critique of capitalist society as well as his view of socialism as a positive alternative to that society. Finally, in the third section, I will show ' ' 'ahistorial' theo? that this view of the human being leads to a critique of various ries of human nature present in the philosophic and economic tradition. As a re? sult, we shall see thatMarx's conception ofthe human species-being is a genuine theoretical innovation that functions as the centerpiece of Marx's view of human beings and their society.

I Let us begin by asking ourselves what role the concept of a human essence has played in traditional philosophy. At least since Aristotle, philosophers have de? fined human beings as rational animals. By this, of course, they mean to say that the specific feature that differentiates humans from other animals is their rational? ity. In this sense, we can call the human essence our species-character or being. Such a definition seems to be amatter of pure theory. That is, it seems that all that is at issue here is the proper notion ofthe nature of human beings. But such is not the case. For traditional philosophers have held that the proper or most com? plete fulfillment for individual things lay in their specific natures, their species being. Thus, if to be human is to be a rational animal, then it is in the following of 77

78

WARTENBERG

one's rational capabilities rather than one's animal nature that one manages to ful? fill the specific character of one's being, and that one can actualize those capabilities that make one the distinctive type of creature that one is. Aristotle's account of the life appropriate to human beings is exemplary both in its clarity and influence. Aristotle begins his account with a general view of life as entailing certain sorts of appropriate activities.
Each which animal is thought to have a proper pleasure, as it has a proper function, to its activity (Aristotle, 1962, p. 1176a 4-5). viz. that

corresponds

He goes on to identify the proper life for a human being with the pursuit of that activity that is most characteristic of the human being, namely thought.
That which man, is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing: for to reason more than anything else is man (Aristotle, the life according 1178a 5-8).

therefore

1962, p.

And

lest we

have

any uncertainty

as to what

"life

according

to reason"

is,

Aristotle

tells us,

that it should be in is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable If happiness accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best in us . . .That this activity is contemplative we have already said (Aristotle, 1962, p. 1177a 12-18).

What Aristotle presents us with is, in a nutshell, the philosophic tradition's view of the appropriate sort of life to lead. Since reason ismost nearly the human es? sence, a life in accordance with reason is themost worthy life, the life most full of pleasure and fulfillment. But a life in accord with reason requires that we occupy ourselves not just with things that have instrumental values, but things that are * turns out to be the life life" good in themselves. And hence the "contemplative most fitting for human beings. Aristotle's account of the distinctively human life presents us with a paradigm of the role that a theory of human nature or essence played in traditional philo? pro? sophic theories. In such theories, the concept of a human "species-being" vided the basis for a view of the ideal human life. First, a characteristic was pos? a human being from other animals. Then, the ited as that which distinguishes human life was taken to consist of the development of that species distinctively specific character. In the hands of the tradition, this turned into the idea that thought was, in itself, characteristic of humans, and the life of the mind the best sort of life to live.

in the primary sense is contemplation, it is important to recognize that the 'Although happiness term "happiness" in accordance with moral vir? is pros hen equivocal for Aristotle. Thus, activities tues or practical reason also constitute happiness, though in a secondary sense. See Nichomachean Ethics, X, 8.

"SPECIES BEING" AND "HUMAN NATURE" INMARX

79

Marx makes two distinctive moves in his use ofthe concept of a specific human charcter or being. First, Marx generalizes "thought" to "free conscious activity" as the species-characteristic of human beings. Second, he uses this theory as a standard for a radical critique of bourgeois society. In the present section, I will explain the first aspect of Marx's use of this concept. Before doing so, letme make a terminological clarification. The concept which is translated by "species-being" is Gattungswesen. There is an ambiguity in this On the one hand, to say of something that it is a species-creature (inter? concept. * ' preting 'being' as meaning type of thing) is to say of it that it can only exist in a situation with others of its type. Marx certainly believes that the human being is a species-creature in this sense, for he criticizes the atomistic view of bourgeois political theory as not recognizing this. When he uses the con? tradition and its cept in this way, Marx is making contact with the Aristotelian as a zoon politikon. definition of the human being can also mean species-essence But Gattungswesen (using "being" in ameta? physical sense of specific difference). It is important thatwe recognize that this is the predominant use of the concept of human species-being in the context of Marx's remarks about alienation. For the human being is the specific creature it is a specific character, a character which Marx calls its in virtue of possessing species-being. Only in virtue of this species character can the human being be seen as the distinctive type of creature which it is. To establish that this use ofthe con? is indeed central toMarx's theory is one of the aims of the cept of Gattungswesen discussion. following When viewed against philosophic defenses of the contemplative life, Marx's claims about a human species-being stand in radical counterpoint. For Marx is claiming that the distinctively human activity is not thought per se, but rather
"free conscious activity," that is, labor in accordance with one's own conscious

social or communal

deliberation.
It is therefore in his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself to be a, Such production is his active species-life. it nature appears as species-being. Through his work and his reality. The object of labor is therefore the objectification of the in his con? of man: for man reproduces himself not only intellectually, species-life but actively and actually, and he can therefore contemplate himself in a sciousness, world he himself has created (Marx, 1974, p. 329).

The central point thatMarx makes is that it is through man beings actualize themselves as human beings. life that constitutes thought per se or a contemplative Rather, it is our ability to structure thematerial world

productive activity that hu? This means that it is not the good for human beings. in accordance with our own

purposes that is distinctive about human beings. Of course, thought is one ofthe necessary ingredients for such self-realization. Marx always talks of activity in accordance with a conscious plan as the specifi? cally human good. But the key aspect of this assertion isMarx's replacement of

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"thought" by "labor" as the central concept for understanding the human good. Rather than seeing labor as only a brutal necessity forced upon human beings by their animal natures that they would be glad to be rid of, Marx sees labor as a "positive, creative activity" (Marx, 1973, p. 614). Indeed, Smith in the Grundrisse, Marx makes this point explicitly identical to that he uses in theManuscripts.
But

in criticizing Adam in language almost

of obstacles is in itself a that this overcoming Smith has no inkling whatever that, further, the external aims become stripped of the sem? liberating process?and and become posited as aims which the indi? blance of merely external natural urgencies, as self-realization, of the subject, hence vidual himself posits?hence objectification real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labor (Marx, 1973, p. 611).

Marx's

use of "labor" as being the distinctive capacity of the human species is striking. It involves not a simple rejection of the tradition's stress on thought, but rather a generalization of that notion. For Marx is claiming that the tradition has focused on one particular form that "free conscious activity" can take, namely that of contemplation. What is required is a generalization of that notion into an appropriate categorial structure that will still provide us with a view of the distinc? tively human character. InMarx's view, here as elsewhere, it isHegel who managed to do this, even if

he conceived
The

of the truth in a mystified

way.

importance

tivity as the moving self-creation of man

dialectic of nega? and its final result?the of Hegel's Phenomenology the and producing principle?lies in the fact that Hegel conceives as loss of object, as alienation and as as a process, objectification grasps the nature of labor and con? the result of this own labor (Marx,

that he therefore of this alienation; supersession ceives objective man?true, because real man?as 1974, pp. 385-386).

Thus, it isHegel who, according toMarx, first sees the human being as essentially a laboring creature. Hegel ismisled, however, because he recognizes "only the '' It remains forMarx tomake the final positive and not the negative side of labor. that will allow this truth to emerge in all its centrality. adjustments In thus identifying labor as constitutive of the human essence, Marx radically tradition's stress on contemplation as the most the philosophic reconceptualizes human activity. By no longer singling out one form of activity as that distinctively of theory. No most fit for human beings, Marx achieves a "democratization" can we see a person as better than another simply because of the type of longer activity he/she chooses to pursue. Rather, we can see conscious activity itself as human and, in an egalitarian assumption, something to be valued for its own sake. of the theory of human nature has, however, a Marx's "democratization" that theory found in economic theory. The notion of eco? competitor?namely nomic rationality is usually taken tomean the maximization of the satisfaction of

"SPECIES BEING" AND "HUMAN NATURE" INMARX

81

one's desires.2 A person will be happy if he/she is able, on the whole, to satisfy a reasonable number of his/her desires. Without attempting a criticism of such a view of the distinctively human life, we can note that its notion of satisfaction is essentially modelled on a notion of consumption. When we have a consumption we reach a state of well good that we desire?a cigarette, for example?then according to this view, by means of the consumption of that good? smoking the cigarette. The model of economic rationality attempts to treat all hu? man activities as consumptive, pleasure producing activities. It then argues that the well-lived human life requires only a satisfaction of a majority of our needs. being, Marx sees this economic view ofthe human being as reductive. While it is true that human life requires the satisfaction of our basic animal needs on something like a consumption model, Marx argues that we acquire fulfillment as human be? ings through productive activities, rather than consumptive ones. The economic view of the human being, while also an equalitarian model, reduces the human being to a pleasure-seeking machine. For Marx, there ismore to the human being than this. People are not just consumers: they are producers.
important thing to emphasize here is only tion are viewed as the activity of one or many moments in which production of one process, The moment that, whether production and consump? individuals, they appear in any case as is the real point of departure and hence

as urgency, as need, is itself an intrinsic also the predominant moment. Consumption . . .The individual an object of productive and, by produces activity indi? it, returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-reproducing consuming vidual (Marx, 1973, p. 94).3

Thus, productive activities are primary for human beings because it is through them that they achieve fulfillment, and since consumption is itself dependent upon production, there is a conceptual as well as substantive flaw in any theory of hu? man fulfillment that treats consumption as the primary mode of human activity. Note that both theMarxian and the economic model share the feature that there is no specific activity or good that is the quintessential human one. Both hold that there are a wide variety of such, and that individuals will differ in what they choose for themselves as constituting their fulfillment. In this sense, both adopt pluralist models ofthe distinctively human life, in contradistinction to the tradi? tional acceptance of a single model. The difference between them lies in the type of activities they see as constituting the distinctively human.
2This view is usually associated with Bentham and Mill. It is also present in Hegel's characteriza? tion of civil society in the Philosophy of Right. Note thatMill's distinction between types of pleasures on his part with the simple satisfaction reflects an uneasiness of desire as constitutive of human well-being. 3In Marx's man for example, fulfillment of the adequacy of the consumptive goods model lies the kernel of much recent thought on the alienating One-Dimensional Man. Marcuse, denial for specifying a notion of hu? character of modern life. See,

82 Marx's

WARTENBERG

theory of the human species-being can therefore be seen as serving a double purpose, On the one hand, in contrast tomore traditional notions of human well-being, Marx holds that there is no single activity that constitutes the essence of humanness. In this respect, his theory is a thorough departure from the intellec tualist tradition of philosophy. But it is equally crucial to recognize that it also poses a contrast to consumptive models of human fulfillment, claiming that our lies in our ability to create our lives for ourselves in a conscious species-character
manner.

One of the reasons thatMarxists have sought to deny thatMarx held any theory of the human essence is that it precludes anyone from rejecting historical material? ism on the basis of an inadequate theory of the human being. As a result, we find a ' ' stress on the "scientific' character of Marxism as opposed to the4 'metaphysical' ramblings of its opponents. Such an interpretation of Marx is an error. If anything is true, it is the reverse: thatMarx in his later writings, did not pay enough attention to the idea of a human is a crucial feature of his view of character. His theory of a human species-being is to miss an important the human being in society. To reject it as non-scientific of Marx's aspect thought. Another reason that one might be tempted to reject Marx's theory of species being is that itmight seem tomake social change more problematic. Marx's ' great ' ' insight was to show how much of what we take to be' 'natural' and 'fixed' is the result of the social activities of human beings and therefore is subject to conscious To accept any limitation, such as that of a human species-being, manipulation. be seen as inimical to the entire spirit of Marx's might thought. I think that this is an error. I have already said that the theory of species-being functions to ground a critique of capitalist society. Before exploring that point, however, we need to ask a final question about Marx's use of the concept of
species-being.

stress on "free conscious activity" as the human I have argued that Marx's ' ' involves his use of 'labor' as the central concept for understanding species-being what is distinctive about human beings; and I have also argued that such a view is one thatMarx never retreats from. However, it is significant that, despite the fact thatMarx continues to speak of labor as constituting, at least potentially, a process in his later work, Marx does not speak of such activity as of human fulfillment, constitutive of the human species-being.4 The question thatwe need to face, then, is what the significance of this fact is. Marx no longer explicitly invokes the concept of a human species-being be? cause he thinks that it is unnecessary. He sees the theory of historical materialism as needing only materialist premises. He claims that "the first premise of all hu

where Marx does state that the human being "appears in the Grundrisse 4There is one passage as a species-being" (Marx, 1973, p. 496), but that he/she loses this character in later social originally developments.

"SPECIES BEING" AND "HUMAN NATURE" INMARX

83

man existence and, therefore, of all history . . .is thatmen must be in a position to '" live in order to be able to 'make history. (Marx, 1970, p. 48). Thus, the "pro? duction of material life itself" becomes thematerialist starting point for his theory of social evolution. Although there is still a need to talk of the potential of labor to become a liberating activity in order to give this theory its practical consequences for human social organization, Marx no longer sees the need to begin with a con? cept such as species-being as a metaphysical assumption. This does not mean, that the perspective yielded by that notion is abandoned in any sense. however, One reason thatmight have ledMarx to abandon the use of the notion of a hu? man species-being was his desire to distinguish his own theory from that of Feuerbach. Although Marx took the notion ofa species-being from Feuerbach, he developed it in a radically different direction. Feuerback held that the concept of the human species was something inherent in each human being.
Man is himself at once I and thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this is reason, that to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, an object of thought. (Feuerbach, 1957, p. 2, italics added).

Marx objects to Feuerbach's intellectualized notion ofthe human essence. As we have seen, by giving an activity-based theory of the human essence, Marx is able to indict the philosophic tradition -Feuerbach included - for being unhistorical and asocial. Itwas therefore essential to Marx that his own views not be confused with
Feuerbach's.

Indeed, if we look atMarx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach carefully, we can see thatMarx is objecting to just such a theoretical use of the concept of a human es? sence (Wesen). What Feuerbach has posited, according toMarx, is a notion ofa
human essence where such an essence is conceived of in abstraction from any ac?

tual practical expression. It is only a "dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals" (Marx, 1970, p. 122). Feuerbach's severing ofthe connection between the notion of a human essence and human practical activity is an anath? ema toMarx. By no longer using such a term, Marx is able to distinguish his own as requiring a social mani? theory of the human species-being (Gattungswesen) festation from the ahistorical, individualistic view that he sees inherent in Feuer?
bach's materialism.5

To see thatMarx still saw a need to supplement the viewpoint of historical ma? terialism with a view of labor as a potentially freeing process, consider the follow? ing passage in Volume III of Capital:
In fact, the realm of freedom actually and mundane considerations the sphere of actual material begins only where labor which is determined by thus in the very nature of things it lies . . .Freedom in this field can production. only ceases;

necessity beyond

him. A

5It is important to recognize both Marx's borrowings from Fuerbach full discussion of this must wait for another occasion.

as well

as his differences

from

84
consist

WARTENBERG
the associated their inter? in socialized man, rationally regulating producers change with Nature, bringing it under their common control; instead of being ruled by it . .But it nonetheless as by the blind forces of nature. still remains a realm of necessity. of human energy which is an end in itself, the true it begins that development Beyond realm of freedom, which, however, as its basis. (Marx, 1967, p. 820) can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity

This invocation of a realm of labor that is based upon that inwhich human beings realize the conditions of their physical existence is precisely what Marx earlier talked of as constitutive of the human species-being. He still sees this capacity as a goal of social organization. While he is wary of using that term, for the reasons mentioned above, he still accepts the viewpoint that it opens for him. There is no need, therefore, to resort to any such notion as a radical "break" to explain the absence of that term from Marx's writing, nor its peristence in his thinking.

II is free conscious I have shown thatMarx's claim that the human species-being of the standard view of human be? activity involves a radical reconceptualization tradition. What I would now like to do is to ings advocated by the philosophic show how this claim functions as a pivotal assertion from which various aspects of Marx's more general views can be deduced, in particular, as the ground for a cri? tique of capitalist society. The first thing that we need to note is thatMarx sees such creative activity as the human species from all other forms of the form of activity that distinguishes animal life. "It is true," he writes, "that animals also produce. They build nests and dwellings, like the bee, the beaver, the ant, etc." (Marx, 1974, p. 329) But such productive activity is categorically distinct from human productive activity because animals are constrained to proceed in accordance with naturally given needs. Human beings, on the other hand, are able to produce in accordance with their own plans, even in the absence of any physical need. Indeed, Marx claims that the human being "truly produces only in freedom from such need." (Marx, 1974, p. 329.) Thus, Marx sees human freedom as dependent upon our ability to produce objects according to our conscious plans. Once again, this view of human labor as involving conscious plans is a view thatMarx never abandons. In the chapter on "The Labor Process and the Valori? 1 of Capital, Marx characterizes labor as assuming a zation Process" in Volume form that is specifically a human activity.
We human character? it is an exclusively labor in a form in which presuppose . . .At the end of every labor process, a result emerges which had already been hence already existed ideally. The worker conceived by the worker at the beginning, a change of nature; he also realizes of form in the materials not only effects istic. (verwirklicht) his own purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordi of, it determines

"SPECIES BEING" AND "HUMAN NATURE" INMARX

nate his will condition to it. (Marx, ofthe metabolic . . .is the universal The labor process. 1976, pp. 283-284) between man and nature, the ever? interaction (Sto?wechsel) and it is therefore independent of condition of human existence, to all forms of society in which

85

lasting nature-imposed or rather it is common every form of that existence, human beings live. (Marx, 1976, p. 290)

Although Marx is here engaged in a different analysis than that of theManu? scripts, he still views labor as "free conscious activity" and sees it as a necessary condition of human existence. Further, he sees such an activity as distinctive of the human species or, to use the more socially oriented language of Capital, the human social formation.
and a bee would put A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what the worst architect from the best of the bees distinguishes it in wax. cell in his mind before he constructs (Marx, is that the architect 1976, p. 284) builds the

many

that Again, the upshot of this passage is identical to the claim of theManuscripts the specific character of human productive labor, in distinction from all other spe? cies of animal life, is its being undertaken in accordance with a conscious plan. Although Marx here stresses that labor is a natural constraint upon all forms of human society, he still maintains his stress upon the liberating potential as such a capability, as the quotation from Volume III of Capital makes clear. is that it requires an A second feature of this view of 'he human species-being ' as the matter or "stuff upon which human beings are able to ac? objective world it is his constant focus on this tualize their purposes. As I have already mentioned, as necessary for human existence, that allows Marx to deny pri? material element, macy to pure thought as the distinctively human activity. Iwill now show that it is from just such amaterialist point of view thatMarx is able to achieve his first deci? sive split with Hegel's philosophic categories. Like Aristotle, Hegel had sought to discover the distinctively human life. How? ever, Hegel had inherited from Kant the idea thatfreedom was the goal that human beings alone among natural creatures could attain. In Kant's view, the human be? ing could attain freedom, because of its peculiar status as both a natural and a ra? tional creature, by acting morally,
We see now world that when we as members

that is, in accordance with

its rational nature.6

ligible

consequence?morality. the intelligible world?that dom,

as free, we transfer ourselves into the intel? of will the autonomy its recognize together with . . .Hence, . . .qua I am subject to the law of intelligence is to the reason which contains this law in the idea of free? think of ourselves and of will?and therefore I must look on the laws of the

and so too the autonomy

is only an idea of reason and we can only believe in our freedom, not 6Strictly speaking, freedom solution of the third Antinomy in the Critique of Pure prove its reality. See, for example, Kant's Reason.

86
intelligible world as imperatives (Kant, 1948, p. ple as duties.

WARTENBERG
for me and as the actions which 121) conform to this princi?

Thus,
morally.

according

the key to the possibility of human beings attaining freedom and autonomy, to Kant, was their acting in accordance with the dictates of reason, i.e.

Hegel also sought to describe the path to the attainment of freedom, but re? . ." jected the Kantian answer. "In every philosophy of reflection, like Kant's. he says, "freedom is nothing else but empty self-activity." (Hegel, 1952, p. 15) Kant's view was limited because it only comprehended freedom in a negative sense. Positive freedom, according to Hegel, requires a further development.
. . .This a will and free. that the will is genuinely It is only as thinking intelligence itself through thinking as essentially human, and which apprehends self-consciousness thereby frees itself from the contingent and the false, is the principle of right, morality, and all ethical life. (Hegel, 1952, p. 15)

To attain positive freedom, Hegel holds that the will must posit itself as thinking. In order to do so, the will needs to transcend the alienation inherent inKant's con? ception of a duty oriented morality, and ascend to a more adequate grasp of itself
as rational The consciousness.

the object as an implic? determinations establishes totality of its [consciousness's] when itly spiritual being, and it does truly become a spiritual being for consciousness is grasped as a determination of the self. (Hegel, each of its individual determinations 1977, pp. 479-480)

the alienation inherent in any distinction between itself and Only by overcoming its object can the will be free, for Hegel, and thus the standpoint of idealism is a is the necessary condition of freedom. Only by realizing that any objectification attain freedom in a positive sense. itself can consciousness work of consciousness It is precisely this feature of Hegel's thought thatMarx criticizes, for he sees as taking a fact about life in a capitalist society to be constitutive of the con? Hegel ditions of human life in general. It is this false inference from the empirical condi? claim about life itself that tions governing a particular society to a metaphysical causes Hegel's philosophy-despite its appearance of taking a critical stance-to ul? '' ' ' ' and an 'equally uncritical idealism. timately be both an 'uncritical positivism' This fallacious inference from empirical conditions tometaphysical reality blinds to the fact that objectification is not in itself alienating. Indeed, as we have Hegel in free conscious activity that constitutes seen, it is precisely such objectification Marx. InHegel's philosophy, however, according to the human species-being for in precisely the reverse way. Marx, things are conceived
It is not the fact that the human tion to itself, [i.e. Marx's view essence itself in an inhuman way, in opposi? objectifies itself in distinction of alienation] but that it objectifies

"SPECIES BEING" AND "HUMAN NATURE" INMARX

to abstract thought, which constitutes the essence from and in opposition as it exists and as it is to be superseded. (Marx, 1974, p. 384)7 of estrange?

87

ment

the idea that the human species-being consists in activity directed upon a material object provides Marx with a standpoint from which to criticize given, Hegel's idealism. Indeed, it is just this standpoint that can be said to characterize consists in his acceptance of Marx's philosophy as materialist. His materialism thematerial world as a reality that human beings are able to transform out of ne? cessity and desire, in order to live and realize themselves.8 is not exhausted, however, The importance of the concept of species-being with its role in Marx's critique of Hegel. It also grounds a criticism ofthe capitalist Thus, form of economic organization different in kind from others also present in Marx's This critique asserts neither that capitalism will inevitably fall apart, nor writing. that it is unfair insofar as it is based upon exploitation ofthe worker, although it is arguable that such critiques are also present inMarx's writings.9 The best meta? phor for this aspect of Marx's criticism of capitalism is that it stunts development of the human species, reducing the human being to a mere animal. We have already seen thatMarx sees freely chosen productive activity as the human species-character. Contrary to Hegel, he holds that we are able to achieve freedom through the engagement in freely chosen projects of objectification, and not by means of any denial of objectivity itself. But it is precisely these sorts of projects that capitalism, with its system of alienated (estranged) labor, prohibits from the worker. Since the worker is forced by the capitalist10 to labor for an en? tire day in order to earn enough money to meet his/her basic animal needs, the human capacity for freedom becomes a slave to our basic animal natures.
labor reverse the relationship [between our human and animal life activity] Estranged so that man, just because he is a conscious being, makes his life activity, his being for his existence. [Wesen], a mere means (Marx, 1974, p. 328)

Without going into the exact nature and development of the capitalist social rela? tions that allow the capitalist to perpetrate such a feat, the nature of Marx's claim is clear. Under capitalism, the human species-being is not allowed to realize hu
7Colletti discusses London, This 1973. Marx's of Hegel at great length in his Marxism

philosophic

critique

and Hegel,

is a very different sense of the term "materialism" than that current in the analytic tradition. In fact, Marx's theoretical viewpoint is not a reductive materialism of the sort often attributed to him. It has more in common with the idealism of Hegel than is generally recognized. 9See, for example, Capital I, Chapter 32 for the former criticism and Chapter 9 for the basis of the a debated second. Let me note that the presence of a "moral" critique of capitalism via a is theory of exploitation ' issue. See Allen Wood, 'TheMarxian Critique of Justice," inCohen et al., 1980, pp. 3-41. ,0That the capital-labor is a coerced rather than a free exchange of Marx's theory. Here I simply assume it. exchange is one of the central

claims

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man freedom, but functions merely to keep the worker alive. Whereas the satisfac? tion of our animal needs for food, clothing, and shelter ought to function as the means toward a realization of our specifically human natures, under the capitalist A worker uses form of social organization, this relationship is reversed?inverted. all of his/her human capabilities for labor simply in order to stay alive, and to re? produce him/herself. Let us recall that the concept of an essential nature of the human being func? tioned within the philosophic tradition to ground a specific form of activity as that most appropriate to the human being. While Marx does not accept a particular form of activity as the distinctively human, he does claim, as we have seen, that freely chosen conscious activity is our specific nature. And, following Hegel's lead, he sees such activity as possible only within a certain form of social organization.
The work can achieve this character [as "attractive work, the production (2) when it self-realization"] only (1) when its social character is posited, is of a scientific and at the same time general character, not merely human exertion as a harnassed natural force, but exertion as subject which appears in the pro? specifically duction process not in amerely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating of material individual's all the forces of nature. (Marx, 1976, pp. 611-612)

Here we see Marx positing the possibility of a society organized in such a way so 4 as to realize human beings through labor, rather than one that consumes their 'be? ing" simply in order to let them "exist." This vision of an alternative form of social organization requires the development of the labor process made possible for the sake of human beings. by capitalism, but it harnesses such development is crucial, therefore, not only in pro? The concept of the human species-being viding us with a critique of capitalism as a form of social organization, but also in order to grasp the outlines of a form of organization that would allow for the full realization of human freedom, something both Kant and Hegel deemed the central task for humanity, and which Marx sees as the central goal of a communist soci? ety. One feature of such a form of economic and social organization would be that the amount of time an individual had to labor simply would be minimized. As a result, there would be a maximum of time during which individuals, free of the demands of subsistence, could undertake their own projects of objective self realization. As Marx puts it in a passage whose real content has often been over? looked by commentators:
And the division of labor offers us the first example of how, as long as man finally, the particular that is, as long as a cleavage exists between remains in natural society, but naturally, and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, an alien power opposed to him which enslaves him divided, man's own deed becomes instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into sphere of activity, which is forced upon being, each man has his particular, exclusive a shepherd, or a him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood;

"SPECIES BEING" AND "HUMAN NATURE" INMARX

while nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general accomplished production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomor? rear cattle in the evening, criticise fish in the afternoon, row, to hunt in the morning, in communist society, where each can become after dinner, just as I have a mind, or critic. (Marx, 1970, p. 53) without ever becoming hunter fisherman, shepherd

89

Although it is undoubtedly true that this vision of society has an idealistic-Utopian component to it, this should not blind us to the vision it does contain. Ifwe bypass the claim that we will be free to engage in any activity we would like at any time we like, and think about Marx's insistence that the free engagement in such activi? ties is central to human development, we will be able to see the nature of Marx's claim. For what Marx here posits is a society inwhich people are able to engage in a maximum of self-realization because of the social character of production. Al? though a great deal of attention has been focused on the distinction between the social and private control of production and the resulting difference in the charac? ter of the activity of labor, there is a second aspect of Marx's claim that has been the time in which people would have to participate in neglected. By minimizing activities whose sole aim was the reproduction of society and life, such a socially organized society would allow people the time for just such projects of self realization. Marx's concentration on economic organization can be seen as including the project of demonstrating that this is not an idealistic, Utopian vision, but a concrete possibility that can be grounded in economic reality. therefore see that the claim that the human species-being consists in free activity functions as the fixed point for a general perspective that is inMarx's work. I have tried to show a number of consequences of this perspective. In particular, I have tried to show how this view of the human being allows Marx to articulate a forceful critique of capitalist society, a critique that also posits an alternative vision of society as a possibility. Thus, the concept of a human species-being plays a central role inMarx's entire philosophic project. We conscious embodied

in So far, then, I have established the view that the concept of a human species-being Marx's thought and in his view of capitalist society. Even in plays a central role in his late works, where the term no longer plays an explicit role, Marx still treats labor as the specifically human process of self-realization, the same claim he had to make. Rather than simply rejecting earlier used the concept of species-being this concept, Marx continues to use the perspective it provides in his more detailed investigations into the development and structure of capitalist society. But what of those texts inwhich Marx explicitly rejects the notion that there is a fixed, ahistorical human essence? Don't these texts show thatMarx's rejection of the notion of a human species-being is complete? Indeed, does not the theory of historical materialism stand in contradiction toMarx's earlier point of view?

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What Iwant to suggest is that, in rejecting the notion of a fixed human nature, Marx is following a basic claim of Hegel's social theory, the claim that the form in which individuality is conceptualized or instantiated in a given social structure de? pends upon that very structure itself. Marx accepts this view of human individual? then he turns it upon those theo? ity as historically and socially conditioned?and rists, both philosophers and political economists, who accept a particular stage of " human development as definitive of4 'human nature. In amove similar to the one he makes this time following Hegel's lead?Marx argues that against Hegel?but such views of a fixed, ahistorical human nature treat a particular form of that is empirically accessible?as development?one yielding a metaphysical truth about the world. Such an argument does not affect Marx's own claims about a human species-being. Indeed, we can even argue that it is based upon them.

To begin, let us turn our attention to Hegel once again. It is one of Hegel's central claims in the Philosophy of Right that the form which individuality takes that it has reached. Al? depends upon the stage of logico-historical development we can speak of the will as the object of all discourse concerning right, the though particular form that the will takes depends on the particular sphere in which it is trying to actualize its freedom. Thus, after having will, Hegel considers its first concrete manifestation introduced the notion of a free in the sphere of abstract right.

The universality of this consciously free will is abstract universality, the self-conscious but otherwise contentless and simple relation of itself in its individuality, and from that 1952, p. 35)11 point of view the subject is a person. (Hegel,

On Hegel's view, the concept of a person is a specific form that the concept of an individual takes, and it is therefore dependent upon a particular point of view, namely that of abstract right. The crucial point is that this sphere determines the form inwhich the individual's existence is posited. On Hegel's view, our particu? larized notion of individuality is relative to the logical or historical sphere we are talking about. This view becomes relevant to our problem once Hegel turns his attention to civil society. For what Hegel claims is that only at that stage of social develop? ment do we encounter individuality in the form of man.
In [abstract] right, what we had before us was the person; in in civil society the family-member; subject; in the family, . .what we have bourgeois. Here at the standpoint of needs. idea which we call man. Thus this is the first time, and indeed speak of man in this sense. (Hegel, 1952, p. 190)12 the the sphere of morality, as a whole, the burger or before us is the composite properly the only time, to

excellent translation is rendered otherwise "I have restored Hegel's italics. Knox's quate by his failure to include these italics which show the central concepts in the logical of Hegel's argument. ,2Perhaps this is an appropriate time to note that I have simply left all the uses of the as they have appeared in the texts I have cited (with the exception of one construction). I have never used that term. I can see no other way out of the bind presented by writing, of that concept within this tradition.

quite

inade?

development term * ' 'man'

In my own the sexist use

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91

Thus, Hegel claims that the notion of the individual as having a set of needs that he/she is seeking to satisfy is what we mean by the concept of "man." This is a form of individual existence that is peculiar to civil society. It is this claim thatMarx accepts and turns against those whose social theories hypostatize certain features of human beings in capitalist society into a fixed con? ception of human nature. For such theories presuppose that the form inwhich the human being exists in a particular historical period, i.e. under a capitalist form of ahistorical essence of the human is simply human nature?an social organization, being. it Perhaps the central concept that is taken as definitive of human nature?when that is only, according toMarx, a feature of individuals in a capitalist society?is of competitiveness. It is often held that individuals are innately competitive and that any social theory must, at the risk of appearing unrealistic or Utopian, accept this fact about human beings. Hobbes is a good example of a theorist who held such a view of human beings. It is well known that Hobbes's political theory is based upon the notion of a state of nature in which all individuals compete with
one another. it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power Hereby is called war; and such a war, them in awe, they are in that condition which 1930, p. 252) (Hobbes, every man, against every man. to keep as is of

In In such a state of general competitive war, the quality of life is minimal. Hobbes's famous phrase, "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and '' short. What Hobbes then tries to show is that it is rational for individuals, when faced with the threat of such a situation, to opt for the imposition of a common power over them in order to better their situation in life.
that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are The passions to commodious necessary living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And rea? son suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agree? ment. 1930, p. 257) (Hobbes,

InHobbes's view, such a social contract will be one inwhich individuals alienate all their rights to a sovereign who has absolute power over them. Only in this way will individuals, according to Hobbes, be able to ensure themselves a life of peace. Thus, Hobbes hopes to have shown that rationally self-interested individu? als ought to opt for such a social situation, and that all such society "is either for gain or for glory; that is, not so much for love of fellows as for the love of our? (Hobbes, 1949, p. 24) seem that Hobbes's theory of political obligation is highly realistic. the fact that human beings are highly competitive, he shows that there Accepting reason for them to engage in social intercourse. Such intercourse is not dic? is still tated by some benevolent principle of "love of fellows" but the rational self interest of competitive individuals. As such, we seem to have paradigm of the use of a theory of human nature to ground a theory of political obligation. It might selves."

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As C. B. Macpherson has shown, however, Hobbes is unable to do what he claims to be doing. In order tomove his "scientific" conception of human beings to his claims about their "natural" social relations, Hobbes needs to introduce certain social assumptions.
Hobbes moved to the conclusion from his original physiological that all men postulates that are valid only for power over others, by introducing assumptions market societies. 1962, p. 68)13 (Macpherson,

seek ever more possessive

Thus Hobbes

is able to provide a deduction of political obligation only by introducing certain social assumptions into his view of human beings, for exam? their welfare." 1962, ple, that they "seek rationally tomaximize (Macpherson, p. 54) But this means that we no longer can see the competitive struggle of all against all as a fact about human nature. It needs to be acknowledged as a feature

of human beings that is dependent upon their being in a possessive market society. If we fail to acknowledge the social nature of such assumptions, we will have hy? a capitalist social relation into a feature of human beings per se. postatized But this is just what Marx claims previous philosophers had done. They had ' ' accepted as 'human nature' features of human behavior, such as competitiveness and the exclusivity of self-interest, that are the product of a specific form of social organization. These philosophers took the competitive nature of life in a capitalist society as definitive of human beings. That this view of human beings as essentially competitive?a view that under? lies an entire tradition of philosophic and economic thought and which finds its first clear articulation inHobbes?is indeed one focus of Marx's attack on the no? tion of a fixed human nature, and can be seen explicitly in Marx's attack on
Proudhon. Proudhon's anarchism was an attempt to let the economic structure of

society function in such a way so as to provide an ideal society. In criticizing Proudhon's vision, Marx sees Proudhon as falling prey to precisely the sort of hy that we have found present in the work of Hobbes. postatization
M. not understanding that the establishment Proudhon, the actual development ofthe men ofthe eighteenth a necessity of the human soul, in partibus infidelium. of competition century, makes (Marx, was bound up of competition 148)

with

1963, p.

Here we see Marx specifically attacking the view of human beings as necessarily competitive by nature that I have claimed is central to the tradition of philosophic and economic thought going back to Hobbes. What Marx claims is that such a view fails to notice that this feature of human beings is a specific historic develop? ment, one that took place in the eighteenth century with the rise of capitalism. In discussing Utilitarianism, Marx broadens the scope of his attack.

conclusion it to possessive market so? by relativizing 13Macpherson's attempt to validate Hobbes' cieties fails to pay enough attention to his own claim that Hobbes also needs to assume that there is no to such a society other that anarchy. See Macpherson, alternative 1962, p. 87.

"SPECIES BEING" AND "HUMAN NATURE" INMARX

The all the manifold of people in the one apparent stupidity of merging relationships abstraction arises from the fact that, relation of usefulness, this apparently metaphysical in practice to the one ab? in modern bourgeois society, all relations are subordinated stract monetary-commercial relation. This theory came to the fore with Hobbes and . . .It is to be found even Political 109-110) earlier, of course, economy, as a tacit premise. 1970, pp. economy among writers on political is the real science of this theory of

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Locke.

utility_(Marx,

Here we see thatMarx sees all of political economy and the tradition of political philosophy springing from Hobbes as embodying a similar theory of human moti? vation. This is the same theory that I have been talking about by means of the con? as being "natural" to human beings. What cepts of self-love and competitiveness abstraction" due to the nature of bour? Marx claims is that this is a "metaphysical a metaphysical of bourgeois hypostatization geois society. I have called this into a theory of human nature, but the upshot is identical. social-relations But it is not only those thinkers who tried to justify a possessive market economy who fall under the criticism thatMarx directs at Proudhon and Hobbes. For even those who rejected such a conception of human nature as essentially self interested and competitive often did so in a way that gave too much validity to the basic model Hobbes proposed. Even Rousseau, whose own account of the devel? opment of needs by civilization was pivotal for both Hegel and Marx, fights Hobbes on grounds that give up too much. What Rousseau asserts is thatHobbes's theory is inadequate because it fails to acknowledge a feeling that is just as much a part of human nature as self-love, namely the feeling of pity.
There is besides another principle that has escaped Hobbes, and which, having been on certain occasions, the ferocity of self-love, or the desire of given toman tomoderate, self preservation previous to the appearance ofthat love, tempers the ardor, with which he naturally pursues his private welfare, to see beings suffer by an innate abhorrence that resemble him. I shall not surely be contradicted, in granting toman the only natural

the most passionate detractor of human virtues could not deny him, I virtue, which mean that of pity, a disposition suitable to creatures weak as we are, and liable to so 1967, p. 201) many evils. (Rousseau,

For Marx, this entire debate between Hobbes and Rousseau takes place at the level. These two conceptions of human nature both take certain principles wrong of human motivation that apply within different spheres of human activity and hy? them into a fixed human nature. On Marx's view, we need to see that postatize are dependent upon social circumstances. No one such feelings or dispositions would deny either that individuals engaged inmarket transactions act out of self love in such a way so as tomaximize their profits, or that individuals in a family are motivated by compassion for their family members. In both cases, however, it is the social and institutional context that allows these feelings to function as prin? ciples of action. It is not in virtue of some fixed human nature, but social institu? tions that human beings act in the ways that they do.

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The importance of this point is that it allows Marx to argue that there is no a priori restriction, based upon a theory of human nature, that would prohibit the formation of a society governed by an overall identification of people with one another as fellow beings. There is no apriori rejection of communism as failing to accept human nature, because human nature is itself a social product. But neither is there a failure to grasp social relations for what they are. Com? mon toHobbes and Rousseau is a failure to see the relations of capitalist society as the product of human interaction. The theory of human nature functions to limit the sense of possibility that is present in the entire tradition. All co-operation is seen on a particular, historically conditioned model of cooperation.
up till now (by no means an arbitrary one such as is expounded for exam? in the Contrat social, but a necessary one) was an agreement upon these conditions, ple . . .This within which the individuals were free to enjoy the freaks of fortune. right to of fortuity and chance has up till the undisturbed enjoyment, within certain conditions, Combination now been called personal freedom. These conditions of existence are, of course, only the productive forces and forms of intercourse at any particular time. (Marx, 1970, pp. 85-86)

Again, we see Marx arguing that philosophers have failed to see that the basic no? It tions they are using are based upon a particular historical stage of development. is precisely this that he sees as the crucial failure of all those philosophers who tried to construct a theory of society upon inadequate understandings of human beings as social creatures. The result is that they treat social conditions of human truth about the human creature. existence as a metaphysical Marx's recognition thatmany aspects of a so-called human nature are in reality nothing but hyposatized features of human social relations under capitalism be? comes a forceful tool in his attack on social theorists who oppose horn. The failure of treating capitalist social relations as if they were both natural and eternal is com? mon to a wide range of thinkers. Following Hegel's lead, Marx is able to develop a broad strategy of critique. It is this strategy thatmotivates the slogan, "there is no fixed human nature." But one could still ask whether this critique isn't ultimately destructive of Marx's own attempt to posit free conscious activity (labor) as the essential charac? the case is essentially the reverse: Marx's criti? ter of human beings. Actually, cisms of theories that posit a fixed human nature are based upon a view of the hu? man being as having a social character?a in the first sense species-being mentioned above (p. 79). It is such a social character that allows a human being to adapt him/herself to the various social structures within which he/she existed. The or self-love, are such as competitiveness idea that certain human characteristics, themselves the results of human beings existing within a social setting presup? poses a view of human beings as having a character that can be affected in such a way. As I have tried to show, this is precisely the sort of claim thatMarx does of his theory of free, conscious make by means activity as the human
species-being.

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In this paper, I have explored a particular theme inMarx's writings, namely the theme of the nature of the human being. I have tried to show that, under the con? ceptual guise of the notion of a human species-being, Marx presents a theory about the nature of human beings that is a revolutionary one. In this theory, it is the ability of human beings tofreely shape thematerial world in accordance with a consciously adopted plan that proviHes the essential conditions for human fulfill? ment. I have tried to show that this theory is amarked departure from other theo? ries of human fulfillment in both the philosophic and economic traditions, and that it plays a crucial role in the development of Marx's general theory of the human being in society that is known as historical materialism. Finally, I have tried to show thatMarx's own claims about human nature and social relations do not viti? where ate the validity of his own theory of human beings, but rather place that theory it ought to be: as an attempt to understand the human being as a creature in society, faced with naturally imposed conditions of existence, but capable of an incredible breadth of response to those very conditions. As such, Marx's theory of the human being is an important one that needs to be considered with greater pre? cision by both his admirers and critics.

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