Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics Reading Part 1

|Back to Table oI Contents|
BOOK I.
THE END.
1.
In All He Does Man Seeks Same Good As End Or Means.
Every art and every kind oI inquiry. and likewise every act and purpose. seems to aim
at some good: and so it has been well said that the good is that at which everything
aims.
But a diIIerence is observable among these aims or ends. What is aimed at is
sometimes the exercise oI a Iaculty. sometimes a certain result beyond that exercise.
And where there is an end beyond the act. there the result is better than the exercise oI
the Iaculty.
Now since there are many kinds oI actions and many arts and sciences. it Iollows that
there are many ends also; e.g. health is the end oI medicine. ships oI shipbuilding.
victory oI the art oI war. and wealth oI economy.
But when several oI these are subordinated to some one art or science.as the
making oI bridles and other trappings to the art oI horsemanship. and this in turn.
along with all else that the soldier does. to the art oI war. and so on.* then the end
oI the master-art is always more desired than the ends oI the subordinate arts. since
these are pursued Ior its sake. And this is equally true whether the end in view be the
mere exercise oI a Iaculty or something beyond that. as in the above instances.
Online Library oI Liberty: The Nicomachean Ethics
PLL v4 (generated January 6. 2009) 9 http://oll.libertyIund.org/title/903
He begins with "THE END."
People do a lot of things for a lot of
diferent reasons, to a lot of diferent
ends, each of them aiming to achieve
their own good. There are arts and
sciences that teach people to do those
things, so that they can succeed at
achieving their ends, but one science/art
is the master of all of those others...
2.
THE ,+/$0. THE 1((/2$345$6478#'-$0.$!"&.$9+/$0-.$6'&#+'#
:(;&-&'.<
II then in what we do there be some end which we wish Ior on its own account.
choosing all the others as means to this. but not every end without exception as a
means to something else (Ior so we should go on ad infinitum. and desire would be
leIt void and obiectless).this evidently will be the good or the best oI all things.
And surely Irom a practical point oI view it much concerns us to know this good; Ior
then. like archers shooting at a deIinite mark. we shall be more likely to attain what
we want.
II this be so. we must try to indicate roughly what it is. and Iirst oI all to which oI the
arts or sciences it belongs.
It would seem to belong to the supreme art or science. that one which most oI all
deserves the name oI master-art or master-science.
Now Politicsf seems to answer to this description. For it prescribes which oI the
sciences a state needs. and which each man shall study. and up to what point; and to it
we see subordinated even the highest arts. such as economy. rhetoric. and the art oI
war.
Since then it makes use oI the other practical sciences. and since it Iurther ordains
what men are to do and Irom what to reIrain. its end must include the ends oI the
others. and must be the proper good oI man.
For though this good is the same Ior the individual and the state. yet the good oI the
state seems a grander and more perIect thing both to attain and to secure; and glad as
one would be to do this service Ior a single individual. to do it Ior a people and Ior a
number oI states is nobler and more divine.
This then is the aim oI the present inquiry. which is a sort oI political inquiry.*
But, when we do all those diferent
things according to all those diferent
arts/sciences, we are really, ultimately,
aiming for one highest good. In fact, we
do those other things only in order to
attain this one highest good. So, where
we want to do those other things in
order to get this highest good, we want
this highest good only for itself. And
this makes the highest good the most
important good.
Politics doesn't mean the same thing for
Aristotle as it tends to mean for people,
today... Politics typically means
appeasing people, especially wealthy
and powerful people. This is not what
Aristotle meant, as he makes very clear
in the next paragraph beginning
"Since..."
Aristotle here is laying out the purpose
of philosophy, knowledge of what is
universal, what is always true in every
case.
3.
Exactness Not Permitted By Subiect Nor To Be Expected By
Student. Who Needs Experience And Training.
We must be content iI we can attain to so much precision in our statement as the
subiect beIore us admits oI; Ior the same degree oI accuracy is no more to be expected
in all kinds oI reasoning than in all kinds oI handicraIt.
Now the things that are noble and iust (with which Politics deals) are so various and
so uncertain. that some think these are merely conventional and not natural
distinctions.
There is a similar uncertainty also about what is good. because good things oIten do
people harm: men have beIore now been ruined by wealth. and have lost their lives
through courage.
Our subiect. then. and our data being oI this nature. we must be content iI we can
indicate the truth roughly and in outline. and iI. in dealing with matters that are not
amenable to immutable laws. and reasoning Irom premises that are but probable. we
can arrive at probable conclusions.*
The reader. on his part. should take each oI my statements in the same spirit; Ior it is
the mark oI an educated man to require. in each kind oI inquiry. iust so much
exactness as the subiect admits oI: it is equally absurd to accept probable reasoning
Irom a mathematician. and to demand scientiIic prooI Irom an orator.
But each man can Iorm a iudgment about what he knows. and is called 'a good iudge
oI thatoI any special matter when he has received a special education therein. 'a
good iudge (without any qualiIying epithet) when he has received a universal
education. And hence a young man is not qualiIied to be a student oI Politics; Ior he
lacks experience oI the aIIairs oI liIe. which Iorm the data and the subiect-matter oI
Politics.
Further. since he is apt to be swayed by his Ieelings. he will derive no beneIit Irom a
study whose aim is not speculative but practical.
But in this respect young in character counts the same as young in years; Ior the
young man`s disqualiIication is not a matter oI time. but is due to the Iact that Ieeling
rules his liIe and directs all his desires. Men oI this character turn the knowledge they
get to no account in practice. as we see with those we call incontinent; but those who
direct their desires and actions by reason will gain much proIit Irom the knowledge oI
these matters.
We can't expect to be able to give exact
rules that apply to every case, only
general rules.
"Read charitably," Aristotle is asking
here.
Here, he is telling us a few things...
Mostly, young people tend towards
egoism, pursue things to excess, or
make other such mistakes due to an
overabundance of feeling coupled with a
lack of wisdom and experience. So,
young people should not study politics,
at least not with the purpose of
practicing politics...
So much then by way oI preIace as to the student. and the spirit in which he must
accept what we say. and the obiect which we propose to ourselves.
We must reason Irom
Iacts accepted without
question by the man
oI trained character.
4.
Men Agree That The Good Is Happiness. But DiIIer As To
What This Is.
4. Sinceto resumeall knowledge and all purpose aims at some good. what is this
which we say is the aim oI Politics; or. in other words. what is the highest oI all
realizable goods?
As to its name. I suppose nearly all men are agreed; Ior the masses and the men oI
culture alike declare that it is happiness. and hold that to 'live well or to 'do well is
the same as to be 'happy.
But they diIIer as to what this happiness is. and the masses do not give the same
account oI it as the philosophers.
The Iormer take it to be something palpable and plain. as pleasure or wealth or Iame;
one man holds it to be this. and another that. and oIten the same man is oI diIIerent
minds at diIIerent times.aIter sickness it is health. and in poverty it is wealth; while
when they are impressed with the consciousness oI their ignorance. they admire most
those who say grand things that are above their comprehension.
Some philosophers. on the other hand. have thought that. beside these several good
things. there is an 'absolute good which is the cause oI their goodness.
As it would hardly be worth while to review all the opinions that have been held. we
will conIine ourselves to those which are most popular. or which seem to have some
Ioundation in reason.
But we must not omit to notice the distinction that is drawn
between the method oI proceeding Irom your starting-points or
principles. and the method oI working up to them. Plato used
with Iitness to raise this question. and to ask whether the right
way is Irom or to your starting-points. as in the race-course you
may run Irom the iudges to the boundary. or vice versa.
Well. we must start Irom what is known.
But 'what is known may mean two things: 'what is known to us. which is one
thing. or 'what is known simply. which is another.
I think it is saIe to say that we must start Irom what is known to us.
And on this account nothing but a good moral training can qualiIy a man to study
what is noble and iustin a word. to study questions oI Politics. For the
Test question alert:
Describe the diferences between Mill's
and Aristotle's accounts of happiness.
Answering this question is the purpose
of this book...
Aristotle, as we shall see, thinks that
happiness is very diferent from what
most people (the "masses") would think
is happiness.
Remember Mill here on two counts:
1- his account of happiness looks a lot
like this one, and 2- he says that,
ultimately, it is the people who 'say
grand things above their comprehension'
who should tell them, the masses, what
is actually good...
This is Plato/Socrates, especially...
Test question alert.
undemonstrated Iact is here the starting-point. and iI this undemonstrated Iact be
suIIiciently evident to a man. he will not require a 'reason why. Now the man who
has had a good moral training either has already arrived at starting-points or principles
oI action. or will easily accept them when pointed out. But he who neither has them
nor will accept them may hear what Hesiod says*
'The best is he who oI himselI doth know;
Good too is he who listens to the wise;
But he who neither knows himselI nor heeds
The words oI others. is a useless man.
5.
The Good Cannot Be Pleasure. Nor Honour. Nor Virtue.
Let us now take up the discussion at the point Irom which we digressed.
It seems that men not unreasonably take their notions oI the good or happiness Irom
the lives actually led. and that the masses who are the least reIined suppose it to be
pleasure. which is the reason why they aim at nothing higher than the liIe oI
enioyment.
For the most conspicuous kinds oI liIe are three: this liIe oI enioyment. the liIe oI the
statesman. and. thirdly. the contemplative liIe.
The mass oI men show themselves utterly slavish in their preIerence Ior the liIe oI
brute beasts. but their views receive consideration because many oI those in high
places have the tastes oI Sardanapalus.
Men oI reIinement with a practical turn preIer honour; Ior I suppose we may say that
honour is the aim oI the statesman`s liIe.
But this seems too superIicial to be the good we are seeking: Ior it appears to depend
upon those who give rather than upon those who receive it; while we have a
presentiment that the good is something that is peculiarly a man`s own and can scarce
be taken away Irom him.
Moreover. these men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured oI their
own excellence.at least. they wish to be honoured by men oI sense. and by those
who know them. and on the ground oI their virtue or excellence. It is plain. then. that
in their view. at any rate. virtue or excellence is better than honour; and perhaps we
should take this to be the end oI the statesman`s liIe. rather than honour.
But virtue or excellence also appears too incomplete to be what we want; Ior it seems
that a man might have virtue and yet be asleep or be inactive all his liIe. and.
moreover. might meet with the greatest disasters and misIortunes; and no one would
maintain that such a man is happy. except Ior argument`s sake. But we will not dwell
on these matters now. Ior they are suIIiciently discussed in the popular treatises.
The third kind oI liIe is the liIe oI contemplation: we will treat oI it Iurther on.*
As Ior the money-making liIe. it is something quite contrary to nature; and wealth
evidently is not the good oI which we are in search. Ior it is merely useIul as a means
to something else. So we might rather take pleasure and virtue or excellence to be
ends than wealth; Ior they are chosen on their own account. But it seems that not even
they are the end. though much breath has been wasted in attempts to show that they
are.
Remember Mill, again, here...
Rousseau has something to say about
this...
And, Socrates maintains this... As does
Kant.
Main diference between Mill And
Aristotle: Mill takes up much of
Aristotle's program, sans the virtue
aspect, and also without the emphasis
on any 'good in itself,' rather
emphasizing utility, which is that which
is good for other things...
6.
Various Arguments To Show Against The Platonists That There
Cannot Be One Universal Good.
Dismissing these views. then. we have now to consider the 'universal good. and to
state the diIIiculties which it presents; though such an inquiry is not a pleasant task in
view oI our Iriendship Ior the authors oI the doctrine oI ideas. But we venture to think
that this is the right course. and that in the interests oI truth we ought to sacriIice even
what is nearest to us. especially as we call ourselves philosophers. Both are dear to us.
but it is a sacred duty to give the preIerence to truth.
In the Iirst place. the authors oI this theory themselves did not assert a common idea
in the case oI things oI which one is prior to the other; and Ior this reason they did not
hold one common idea oI numbers. Now the predicate good is applied to substances
and also to qualities and relations. But that which has independent existence. what we
call 'substance. is logically prior to that which is relative; Ior the latter is an oIIshoot
as it were. or |in logical language| an accident oI a thing or substance. So |by their
own showing| there cannot be one common idea oI these goods.
Secondly. the term good is used in as many diIIerent ways as the term 'is or 'being:
we apply the term to substances or independent existences. as God. reason; to
qualities. as the virtues; to quantity. as the moderate or due amount; to relatives. as the
useIul; to time. as opportunity; to place. as habitation. and so on. It is evident.
thereIore. that the word good cannot stand Ior one and the same notion in all these
various applications; Ior iI it did. the term could not be applied in all the categories.
but in one only.
Thirdly. iI the notion were one. since there is but one science oI all the things that
come under one idea. there would be but one science oI all goods; but as it is. there
are many sciences even oI the goods that come under one category; as. Ior instance.
the science which deals with opportunity in war is strategy. but in disease is medicine;
and the science oI the due amount in the matter oI Iood is medicine. but in the matter
oI exercise is the science oI gymnastic.
Fourthly. one might ask what they mean by the 'absolute: in 'absolute man and
'man the word 'man has one and the same sense; Ior in respect oI manhood there
will be no diIIerence between them; and iI so. neither will there be any diIIerence in
respect oI goodness between 'absolute good and 'good.
FiIthly. they do not make the good any more good by making it eternal; a white thing
that lasts a long while is no whiter than what lasts but a day.
Even iI there were. it
would not help us
here.
There seems to be more plausibility in the doctrine oI the Pythagoreans. who |in their
table oI opposites| place the one on the same side with the good things |instead oI
reducing all goods to unity|; and even Speusippus* seems to Iollow them in this.
However. these points may be reserved Ior another occasion; but obiection may be
taken to what I have said on the ground that the Platonists do not speak in this way oI
all goods indiscriminately. but hold that those that are pursued and welcomed on their
own account are called good by reIerence to one common Iorm or type. while those
things that tend to produce or preserve these goods. or to prevent their opposites. are
called good only as means to these. and in a diIIerent sense.
It is evident that there will thus be two classes oI goods: one good in themselves. the
other good as means to the Iormer. Let us separate then Irom the things that are
merely useIul those that are good in themselves. and inquire iI they are called good by
reIerence to one common idea or type.
Now what kind oI things would one call 'good in themselves?
Surely those things that we pursue even apart Irom their consequences. such as
wisdom and sight and certain pleasures and certain honours; Ior although we
sometimes pursue these things as means. no one could reIuse to rank them among the
things that are good in themselves.
II these be excluded. nothing is good in itselI except the idea; and then the type or
Iorm will be meaningless.*
II however. these are ranked among the things that are good in themselves. then it
must be shown that the goodness oI all oI them can be deIined in the same terms. as
white has the same meaning when applied to snow and to white lead.
But. in Iact. we have to give a separate and diIIerent account oI the goodness oI
honour and wisdom and pleasure.
Good. then. is not a term that is applied to all these things alike in the same sense or
with reIerence to one common idea or Iorm.
But how then do these things come to be called good? Ior they do not appear to have
received the same name by chance merely. Perhaps it is because they all proceed Irom
one source. or all conduce to one end; or perhaps it is rather in virtue oI some
analogy. iust as we call the reason the eye oI the soul because it bears the same
relation to the soul that the eye does to the body. and so on.
But we may dismiss these questions at present; Ior to discuss them in detail belongs
more properly to another branch oI philosophy.
And Ior the same reason we may dismiss the Iurther
consideration oI the idea; Ior even granting that this term good.
which is applied to all these diIIerent things. has one and the
same meaning throughout. or that there is an absolute good apart
Irom these particulars. it is evident that this good will not be anything that man can
realize or attain: but it is a good oI this kind that we are now seeking.
It might. perhaps. be thought that it would nevertheless be well to make ourselves
acquainted with this universal good. with a view to the goods that are attainable and
realizable. With this Ior a pattern. it may be said. we shall more readily discern our
own good. and discerning achieve it.
There certainly is some plausibility in this argument. but it seems to be at variance
with the existing sciences; Ior though they are all aiming at some good and striving to
make up their deIiciencies. they neglect to inquire about this universal good. And yet
it is scarce likely that the proIessors oI the several arts and sciences should not know.
nor even look Ior. what would help them so much.
And indeed I am at a loss to know how the weaver or the carpenter would be
Iurthered in his art by a knowledge oI this absolute good. or how a man would be
rendered more able to heal the sick or to command an army by contemplation oI the
pure Iorm or idea. For it seems to me that the physician does not even seek Ior health
in this abstract way. but seeks Ior the health oI man. or rather oI some particular man.
Ior it is individuals that he has to heal.
Aristotle is telling us here that he isn't
interested in some abstract idea of what
is good, but in the good that is
practically realizable by practical
people...
7.
The Good Is The Final End. And Happiness Is This.
Leaving these matters. then. let us return once more to the question. what this good
can be oI which we are in search.
It seems to be diIIerent in diIIerent kinds oI action and in diIIerent arts.one thing in
medicine and another in war. and so on. What then is the good in each oI these cases?
Surely that Ior the sake oI which all else is done. And that in medicine is health. in
war is victory. in building is a house.a diIIerent thing in each diIIerent case. but
always. in whatever we do and in whatever we choose. the end. For it is always Ior
the sake oI the end that all else is done.
II then there be one end oI all that man does. this end will be the realizable good.or
these ends. iI there be more than one.
By this generalization our argument is brought to the same point as beIore.* This
point we must try to explain more clearly.
We see that there are many ends. But some oI these are chosen only as means. as
wealth. Ilutes. and the whole class oI instruments. And so it is plain that not all ends
are Iinal.
But the best oI all things must. we conceive. be something Iinal.
II then there be only one Iinal end. this will be what we are seeking.or iI there be
more than one. then the most Iinal oI them.
Now that which is pursued as an end in itselI is more Iinal than that which is pursued
as means to something else. and that which is never chosen as means than that which
is chosen both as an end in itselI and as means. and that is strictly Iinal which is
always chosen as an end in itselI and never as means.
Happiness seems more than anything else to answer to this description: Ior we always
choose it Ior itselI. and never Ior the sake oI something else; while honour and
pleasure and reason. and all virtue or excellence. we choose partly indeed Ior
themselves (Ior. apart Irom any result. we should choose each oI them). but partly
also Ior the sake oI happiness. supposing that they will help to make us happy. But no
one chooses happiness Ior the sake oI these things. or as a means to anything else at
all.
We seem to be led to the same conclusion when we start Irom the notion oI selI-
suIIiciency.
There are ends to human actions, not all
of which are nal, and not all of which
are good in themselves, but they are all
good, and of them all, happiness is the
most nal and the most complete.
To Iind it we ask.
What is man`s
iunction?
The Iinal good is thought to be selI-suIIicing |or all-suIIicing|. In applying this term
we do not regard a man as an individual leading a solitary liIe. but we also take
account oI parents. children. wiIe. and. in short. Iriends and Iellow-citizens generally.
since man is naturally a social being. Some limit must indeed be set to this; Ior iI you
go on to parents and descendants and Iriends oI Iriends. you will never come to a stop.
But this we will consider Iurther on: Ior the present we will take selI-suIIicing to
mean what by itselI makes liIe desirable and in want oI nothing. And happiness is
believed to answer to this description.
And Iurther. happiness is believed to be the most desirable thing in the world. and that
not merely as one among other good things: iI it were merely one among other good
things |so that other things could be added to it|. it is plain that the addition oI the
least oI other goods must make it more desirable; Ior the addition becomes a surplus
oI good. and oI two goods the greater is always more desirable.
Thus it seems that happiness is something Iinal and selI-suIIicing. and is the end oI all
that man does.
But perhaps the reader thinks that though no one will dispute the
statement that happiness is the best thing in the world. yet a still
more precise deIinition oI it is needed.
This will best be gained. I think. by asking. What is the Iunction oI man? For as the
goodness and the excellence oI a piper or a sculptor. or the practiser oI any art. and
generally oI those who have any Iunction or business to do. lies in that Iunction. so
man`s good would seem to lie in his Iunction. iI he has one.
But can we suppose that. while a carpenter and a cobbler has a Iunction and a
business oI his own. man has no business and no Iunction assigned him by nature?
Nay. surely as his several members. eye and hand and Ioot. plainly have each his own
Iunction. so we must suppose that man also has some Iunction over and above all
these.
What then is it?
LiIe evidently he has in common even with the plants. but we want that which is
peculiar to him. We must exclude. thereIore. the liIe oI mere nutrition and growth.
Next to this comes the liIe oI sense; but this too he plainly shares with horses and
cattle and all kinds oI animals.
There remains then the liIe whereby he actsthe liIe oI his rational nature.* with its
two sides or divisions. one rational as obeying reason. the other rational as having and
exercising reason.
But as this expression is ambiguous.f we must be understood to mean thereby the liIe
that consists in the exercise oI the Iaculties; Ior this seems to be more properly
entitled to the name.
OBVIOUS test question here...
What is the ultimate purpose of the
human life?
Resulting deIinition
oI happiness.
The Iunction oI man. then. is exercise oI his vital Iaculties |or soul| on one side in
obedience to reason. and on the other side with reason.
But what is called the Iunction oI a man oI any proIession and the Iunction oI a man
who is good in that proIession are generically the same. e.g. oI a harper and oI a good
harper; and this holds in all cases without exception. only that in the case oI the latter
his superior excellence at his work is added; Ior we say a harper`s Iunction is to harp.
and a good harper`s to harp well.
(Man`s Iunction then being. as we say. a kind oI liIethat is to say. exercise oI his
Iaculties and action oI various kinds with reasonthe good man`s Iunction is to do
this well and beautiIully |or nobly|. But the Iunction oI anything is done well when it
is done in accordance with the proper excellence oI that thing.)|
II this be so the result is that the good oI man is exercise oI his
Iaculties in accordance with excellence or virtue. or. iI there be
more than one. in accordance with the best and most complete
virtue.*
But there must also be a Iull term oI years Ior this exercise;f Ior one swallow or one
Iine day does not make a spring. nor does one day or any small space oI time make a
blessed or happy man.
This. then. may be taken as a rough outline oI the good; Ior this. I think. is the proper
method.Iirst to sketch the outline. and then to Iill in the details. But it would seem
that. the outline once Iairly drawn. any one can carry on the work and Iit in the several
items which time reveals to us or helps us to Iind. And this indeed is the way in which
the arts and sciences have grown; Ior it requires no extraordinary genius to Iill up the
gaps.
We must bear in mind. however. what was said above. and not demand the same
degree oI accuracy in all branches oI study. but in each case so much as the subiect-
matter admits oI and as is proper to that kind oI inquiry. The carpenter and the
geometer both look Ior the right angle. but in diIIerent ways: the Iormer only wants
such an approximation to it as his work requires. but the latter wants to know what
constitutes a right angle. or what is its special quality; his aim is to Iind out the truth.
And so in other cases we must Iollow the same course. lest we spend more time on
what is immaterial than on the real business in hand.
Nor must we in all cases alike demand the reason why; sometimes it is enough iI the
undemonstrated Iact be Iairly pointed out. as in the case oI the starting-points or
principles oI a science. Undemonstrated Iacts always Iorm the Iirst step or starting-
point oI a science; and these starting-points or principles are arrived at some in one
way. some in anothersome by induction. others by perception. others again by some
kind oI training. But in each case we must try to apprehend them in the proper way.
and do our best to deIine them clearly; Ior they have great inIluence upon the
subsequent course oI an inquiry. A good start is more than halI the race. I think. and
our starting-point or principle. once Iound. clears up a number oI our diIIiculties.
The exercise of faculties in accordance
with virtue over the course of a full
lifetime = happiness.
The philosopher and the average person
require diferent accounts of happiness,
of right and wrong, and so forth...

Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics Reading Part 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics Reading Part 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

|Back to Table oI Contents|

You might also like