Afd 090918 024

AVIATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITYI OK1..AHOMA REPORT No. 06-10

APPENDIX 2
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS REPORT
FOR THE
LARGE AIRCRAFT INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
(LAIRCM) FAA CHALLENGER PROGRAM
1112/07 Page 2-1
AVIATiUN SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLA.HOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVIATION SYsTEM STANDAROS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA
ENGINEERING REPORT 06-22
Structual Analyrts for AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countennl!fl8url!
(LAIRCM) In.tanation In Bombardier Inc. Mode' CL-600-2BI6 (CL-601-JR)
Submi\'te(
Reviewed
Approved
Page 1 oflS
1/22/07 Pa.ge 2-2
AVIA.TION SYSTEM STANDARDS
OXLAHOMA. CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No, 06-10
AVIATION SYS1"EM S-rANDARDS PROGRAM
CITY, Oo<;LAHOMA REPORT NO. 08-22

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1119107
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Approved hy
Iii 9107
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AVlA.TION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
A'.IlAT10N SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKlAHOt.4A CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-22
Table ofColllentll
A. Pulpose .. _. .. , '.. , , , ,.,." 5
B. Synopsis , , ,.. . 5
1. Controllnterface Unit Instalbti{ln .. , ' ' 5
2. Aft Prellwre Bulkhead Pass-through.. .. ' '.. ' _ 5
3. Wing Root Pllss-through.................. . , , S
4. Forwllro Sensor IIllltailation! ,.... . , S
S. Aft Sensor Installations ,_. . 6
6. SlT'.all Laser Transmitter Assembly . .. .. _ 6
7. Proca;:;urlnslalJation......................... , ' 6
8. Transformer Reclifler Unie [nstallation , , , 6
9. Miscellaneous InstallatioIlll..................... .., ' , , , ,... .. 6
C. DiSCWIsiun '........ .. , ,...................... .. , ,.6
I. Control Inlerfat;e Unit (CIU) In!C1llaticln. . 6
2. Aft Pressure Bulkhead Pllss-through .. 7
3. Wing Root PIISSthrOUgh '....... .. 7
4. Forwarrl SCrisor Installations.... . 7
S. An Sensor Installations............ . _......... .. 7
(a) Shear Loading . ,........ . 7
(b) Loading.. , R
(c) Compression Loading 8
6. Small Laser AIl5Cmbly (SLTA) Installation .. R
7. Processor Installation .. , "................................................................. . 9
8. Transformer Rectifier Unit (TRU) Installation 9 d
9. Miscellaneous InstalJalions...... .. 9
D. Anillysis , , ,... . 9
[. Control Interface Unitlnalallation .. ' ' ,........ , 9
2. Aft Pressure B'JJkhead PaRs.lhrough .. 9
3. WingRootPess-through , , " , 10
4. FQJ'WlI.rd Sensor Installations , ,... .. ,........................ , 10
S. Aft Sens.or InsalLations ,............ , , , ' , , 11
(a) Skin Sheaf Lood Calculation!. . , , , , ' '... II
(0) SkilJ Tcnsion AreaOut CIIlculali{lM " "......... . 12
(c) Sensor Ins.fallatioo Analysis.... ,_ ,.. ,_ _... .. .. , 13
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OKLAl-IOUA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORrNo.06-10
AVIATION SYSTEM STANDAADS PROGRAM
Ol<l...AHOMA CITY', OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-22
6. SLTA Installation _ , 14
(a) F()re-Aft Aircraft Structure Tensile Load Calculations " ".. " , l4
(b) SLTA installation Analysis , ,....... ." ".. "." 1:\
7. In&!a[)ation , "." ,.. , , 17
8. TRU Installation. . ,....................... . " 17
9. MisGeJlancous installations , , " " , 17
E. C()l)ClllSion " l!i
1119107 Pagc4
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OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVIATION SYSTeM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-22
A. Purpose
This report sumtanlialeueveral suucCIlral installatiorul associated with installing ANIAAQ-24{V)
Large Airt:l'lIft 111fi-ared Countermeasure (LAIRCMJ system in Bombardier (Challenger) CL-601-3R
flight inspection aircraft. Thet:e installations are accomplished per the directions of the LAIRCM
installation STC and Engineering Order (EO) 05-09-1 0 and numerous associated drawings. It is
anticipated that this syslcm will not be used, and therefore removed, fur a large percentage oflhe
aircraft flight time. It will only be used when pcrforming missions over high-risk areaK, as in some
foreign countries. When not utilized the sensors, rurrel, Illl.d CU:ltrul Interface Unit (ClU)
will be removed. Blanking plates are tllen insralled wh.ere the selUlors, tUlTel, and crn were removed.
Each blanking plale has a dummy plug to attach the wiring hamess cOMeaoT', for aafe lrtowage of
the wiring hlUIlCis. 1be processor a rlummy plug plale in the vicinity to pe:rfurm the same
function. 1'he wiring hamess and othcr minoc willl'emain on the ain::raft, even when Ihe
LAIRCM system is removed.
B. Synopsis
L Controllntertace Unit Installation
A Control Interface Unit (CIU) was imtalled on the pilol'sside fuselage station FS 254
per FAA dlllWing4890454. The CIU (PIN 001-007722:-1102) mounts in an existing equipment
prlnel uring standard Dzw fasteners typical of many airt:ntfi eqUipment installations. The CIU
alloW!> thf: pilot to eontrol Lhc system, provides indlcatinru:; of gy!ttem smtuli, &nd wams of a
missile attack.
2. Aft Pressurc Bulkhead
Penetrations were required to pass wire bundles through the aft pressure bulkhead at FS 62!.
This was ncceBsary to provide I;lecn"ical connections between the forward and aft components.
The ilUllallation was derign8d wilh the: eapacity to p:l.SlI four bundles, although only two were
ill8talted lll'IU utilized for this project. The two enra location;j may be installed later for future
modifications. The penelru.tions were illlt..<ol\eo:I per FAA drawing 4310047.
3. Wing RooLPQss-(hrough.
A penetnl'tion was required on Ihe right side.al FS 409 to pass a wire bllOdle from the: preasurizcd
part of the fuselage to the forward sensors located in the wing roo( leading edge. This was
oecesssl')' to provide electrical connections between the forward senKlTI and the other
compone:utli. This install.ation W813 patterned from 0 nearly idcmical jWII.Jlation on the left aide of
the fu:ilelage for a fuel venlline. The OIlly difference is the new in:naJlation Ll.'Ice a slightly smaller
through-hole than the faetory installation. This penetration was jns!'al!w per FAA dr.awing
4310041.
4. Forward Sensor Installations
TWD fbrward (PIN 00 I..()0767l..()09) were located in left llrld tight wing root leading
edgeK_ These detect a missile and pass guidanCl; information 10 the system. The sensors
are mounted in an aerodynamic fairing molded from typieal eonstmcrion. Thill GroaU
fairing is in tum mounted [(J (he lorge fairing betWec:D the wing and fuselage. Forward
wen: innalled pcr FAA drawing 48'i10463.
1/19J[)7 PageS
1122107
AVIATION SVSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITV, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVIATION SYSTEL4 STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA Cm, OKLAHOMA REPORT No.
5. Aft Sensor Installations
This report substantil!.tes Ilte installation of a pl!.ir of an MWS aD our flr:ct of
Bombardier [nco (Olallenger) Model CL-601 aircraft. hI ordn to in.m.11 the u.nSOTS, holes
roughly 4" wide and 4" tall were cut in the Port lind Starboud aft side skins of the eircrnft. The
holes Ire tOughly rectangular and lilted slightly, i.e. sides nOI parallel to the aircraft:
See FAA drawing 4890460 for details. The holes are roughly c-entered between tha frames at
VS67.5O'Yo lind VSSS.625% lind along Stringers 15R and 15L. The holc:s an:: looatod in an
Wlpn'ssurlzed lIrea. FAA dnlwing 4890459 for Two 0.063" thick
external doublers roughly 11.8" wide and 9.5" lali were installed, one on each side of the
Ilirc....ft to reinforee the &u.rruunding skin and structure.
6. Small La&er Tnmsmitter Assembly InstallaJ.ion
Thill report substanliates the illStallation of a Small Laser Transmitter Assembly (SI.TA) on our
fleel ofBombardier Inc. (Challenger) Model CL-601 tUn:.rllft. In order to install the SLTA, a
14.T' widc by 17.0" long key-shaped hole Viili CUt in the belly skin oflhe aircraft. The bole is
localed in an unpresllUrizcd area. just forward oftha electronics hay door betWeen frames FS 654.5
and FS 6n.2 and centered between 25R and 25L Stringers 26L and 26R were trimmed
forward ofthe FS 654.5 frame. Rcfcn:nce FAA dlll.wing 4R9()459 for detaila. A 0.063" thick
2024-TI (clad) CJtternal doubler tOughly 33" wide and 42" long was inSlalled Co lhc
rurrounding skin and structure.
7. Processor Installation
A proc.essor (pIN 001-007722-1102) was installed on a shelf located in the unpres9Urized
cmpenmge a1 FS 669.2. The: proceuor is the main computer for the entire syslem. Thc pr,xCSSOf
was installed per FAA drawing 4890%1,
8. Transformer Rectifier Unit Installation
A dedicated t....Mformcr rectifier unit (I'RU) Wall installed to provide suffici<'lLlt electrical pcrwer.
The TRU (PIN RTR3360-J A1E-2020) is installed on a shelf in the unpressurized empenNlge per
FAA drawing
9. Mi!l(lcllaueous Installations
Several mi,;cellaneoua ill.'llaiialions were required IiDCh as a teal port, a podcet to hold the
proceuor card, dummy plugs to plug the wire bundlea iDto when thc systc:rn ia nol inabilled, a
junction bOK, and a circuit breaker box. None of these items weigh enough 10 be s[ruclurally
significant, except as part of the aircraft weight and balance. These componenlG are not analyzed
in this repon, but are ineluded in lhe weight and balaJlce calculation for the aircraft.
C. Discussion
I. Conlrollnterfa::e Unit (CIU) Irlsiallation
A 2.5 Ib CnJwas inslaJled on the pilot's side plmd al FS 254 pCI' FAA drawing 4R90454. The
control head is a slandaTd DZU8 rail mounted equipment confonning to MlL-G-678!, Type 1.
The control head usc:.'! four i1l1l1ehing Y..tum per MIL-F-25173 (Dzus) each rated to
200 Jbs in tension and shear. The contral hcad weighs 2.5 lbs. Adding \5% for connectors and
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OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVLATlON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA. REPORT No. 06-22
wiring, for ooDllcrvutillm, only pUIS the weight at than 31h!1. By inspection,
jnstallation m(lC13 the requirements ofFARs 25.301, 25J03, 25.305, 25.307, 25.56 I, and 25.789.
2. Aft Prasure Bulkhead pasHhrough
The aft pre3wre hulkhead paas-througb durahility and damage tolerance is analyzed in a cparate
report, Engineering Report 01-05. A separate report was needed due to thc additiOllal durability
and damage lolerancc analysis and instructions for oontillued airworthincss. The sialic
analysi j provided below. This in.stanation meets the requirements ofFARs 2:'U01, 25.)03,
25305, 2:D01. and 25.365.
3. Wing Root Pass-through
A wire bundle pass-through was installed through tbe pl'\'8SUriud Ilkin of the fuselage on the right
side at FS 409, per FAA drawing 431 0041. This inslallation is nearly idenric.al to II. factory
piWI.through at the same location on thc opposite "The left Illdt: for a fueltant: venting
lir.e (refereoee 11 410904, chapler 28-14-{)O, Jigure 6. dewil D). ThHight side LAlRCM
installation utili7ed a smaller 1.0" dia hole, with a similar doubler as ccmpared to II JA" dill hole
for the original installarion on the left. The new right inllti!.llatioll wlll have similar, hut
slightly less stres levels than !he original instalLatioll em the left side. The durability and damage
101ertlUce capahility can be oonservatively estimaled to be the same M the original left side
intallation. No challge is necessary to the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, or lhe
corresponding inspection program. This install"lion meels the ofFARs 25.301,
25.303.25.305, 25.307, 25.365, 25.571, and 2.t I529.
4. Forward Sensor
The 4.1 lb folWlll'd :K:nson are mounJe(\ in fiberglass fairings that in tum lllOunt to a ccmposile
wing to body fo.iring. Neither fairing reactll any aircraft loading and are installed for aerodynamic
efficiency. The only s1ruelufll,1 requmnent i' for rigidity. The fairings need to be rigid to
prevent the &enaors from moving or \librating in night. Fortunately. by the time these fairiDgs are
made rigid they far aceed the minimum slrengdl requirements. The wing 1.0 body fairing i
ccmposne sandwicll conal ruction. The 4" x 6" recwngulsr hole in the wing to body fairing does
001 appreciably affect the miring strength or rigidity. The smaller sensor fairing is also so rigid
thai it far exeeecls any secondary structural requiremUlts. 1t is atcached by 13 (thirteen)
MS 24693 scR;WS to the wing to body failing. By inspt-elion, lhis ins\.ullation the
requiremalfs of FARs 25.301, 15.303, 25.305, 25.307, 25.561, and 25.789.
5. Aft Sensor Installations
(a) Shear Lilading
The affected area is primarily loaded in shear. Also, the QfCll is art of the forward and mid
SpatS of the vertical stabilizer, hence, won'! sec most of the loada dumped into the fuselage
from the stabilizer. Due to the inherent stability of the curvrd dOl.lbll:l' and to the fllet that
dTeetcd area is primarily loaded in shear, we will not analY7.e the compressive or tensile
lo&d! in grcat detail. Thi" report II sh.:ar analysis of the doubll:l' installaliOJl.
Two 0.063" thick 2024-T3 (clad) exu:mar doublers, roughly Il.g" widc lind 9.5" tail, were
inswl1ed one on e&Ch side of ail":r.rft. Derails of the sensor instalilltion are delineated in
FAA drawing 4890460. This ins,lallation adequately restotes the load c.arrying capability of
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A\IlATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMAClTY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-22
the modified slructun: 10 of the onginol satisfies the requirements ofFARs 25.301,
25.303, and 25.305,
(b) Teilliion Losding
By inspection. the teDlion load in this area is minimal, however, II analysis is shown
fOT The stringers, which endjU.l:t 5" aft inRIaliatinn, are not connected
10 any bulkhl.:ad. Therefore, no tension loads are inlroduced axielly. The only tension
loads are from bending resiatl1nce. They are reacted by tbe numeroU3 stringers. Typically,
as Ihe aft fuselage taper>, dringera liTe dropped to keep the spaei:lg proportional. Because
Ihis doe! not drop stringers llJe spacing 2.5" &1 the aft end and 3.75" at the forward
end of lhc bay. For theBe Iltringers are typically spaced approximately 6" apart in
the fuselas-: area. Scvel1l.l stringers are cut around other skin penctrations such IS APU
The CUIS are not lied strucrurally to rib6 or and cannot cany ti!nsion loads
continuously. In this mea, lhe stringeK are 10 &UP,or1 the skiD a!1d preveet locslized
bnJding. The Inc.ali7.ed bending lost due to cutting one stringer on each is easily
rephtced by !hc aft senaor structure SlId doubler that is attached ahead, behind, and
below the eutouL This installation adequately reston::; the load CllfI)'lng cspability of the
modified structure to that ofthc original and satisfies [he requirement:! of FARs 25.301.
25.303, and 25,305.
(c) Loading
The saml; rl;llSoning used for tension analysis applies 10 tbe compression analysis. By
inspeCtion, the sensor structure and doubler added faT excecds any of load capability or
out ofplane atiffneflS caw;ed by th.e amall cutout. This installation adequately restores tbe
load carryil1g capability" ofthe modified StnIcwre to that of the original and satisfies the
n:quireJl1cms of PARs 25.301, 253m, snd 25.305.
6. Smallu&eI' Transmitter Assembly (SLTA) In.q[allarion
The aftwcd area is primarily loaded in compression, both in flight snd on the grOWld. It can also
ace lIhear loads due to rudder and gust loads on die vertical. These shear losds are not,
however, significant compared to the coTDpresiive loads. The filct!hat the aft electronics bay
door cutoul - a much laTger hole - is immediately sft ofour ulIllallatian. indicates that the skin and
tOl1gcrons can effectively carry the compression losWo in die area. Thc cutout for the aft
eledronics bay door is nOl reinforced, i.e. no ;dditionsl doublel"ll or other structUres were added.
In our inataUation, die cutout is much sTDsllel' IlCId the area is effectively boxed and reinfnreed by
the doubler. support channels, atCllchment Ilcgles, IIDd!he SLTA fitting.. The longerons that pick
up !lIe compressive loads aTOlmd the door also bracket OOf installation. Do to sll tbcsc factors. WI:
need and shall not eonsider compressive buckling of crippling. For eOrLiCrvlltism, we will
aeoomplish s tension area-ollt calculation to show the effective ataric strength of our installation.
Details oftbe modifieation to the belly arc delineated in FAA dnlwing 4890459. A.'l shown in the
analy8is, this illslallation adequately !he low carrying capability of the modified structure
to that of the original and llw ofFARs 2S.JOl. and 2S.30S. The
in6lll1lsrion cae easily sustain me Emergency Landing Condition in 14 CFR
25.561(c)(2).
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AVIATION S'YSTEt.t STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CllY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0610
AVlAnON SYSTEM SrANOAROS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHlJMA, REPORT No. 06-22
7. PTQl;;cssor Installation
The LAIRCM proceSl'ior (PIN 001.007722.1102) WIlS installed on an existing shelf located in the
right side oflhe: empe:nnagc at FS 669 pcr FAA drawing 4890461. The and
correaponding tnIy weighs 37.S IbtI. (',()l\II.c",ative[y, adding 15% for arid wiring puts
the weight at 43.1 Ibs. The procegmr is mounti!d to the shelf utilizing four (4) MS24693 #10
screws. The are the weakC51: compOlleTll in sttaching the processor By gpecification, each
screw is CIIpabJe ofwithsamding 1200 Ibs in lensiun lind 508 Ibs shcar. By inlpection,this
installation meetB the requirements ofFARs 25.301,25.303, 25.305, and 25.307.
I!. Translbrmer Reetjfer Unit CfRU) Inslallalion
A dedicated TRU (PIN RTR3360-1.AJE-2020) was installed to Inlpply :power fot the LAIRCM
!i)'Sf:em. The 1RU was inmlled on an e:dsting shelflocaled in lhe right side of tile empennage
per I' AA dtBwing 4890461. The TRU weighs 21.8 Ibs. ConsCfVali",ely, adding IS% for
and wiring pUlslhe weight at 25.llbs. The TRU is mounted to tbe shelfulilizing fOUf
(4) NAS 1103 bolts. By specification, each bolt is eapllble ofwithstanding 2490 lbs in tension
and 1501 I'M By inspection, this imrtallation meets the requirements ofFARs 25.301,
25J03, 2B05, and 25.307.
9. MiscellancoUll Iuslallalion:l
Several 9m1l11 assemblies wcre in&talled al various locations including a circuit breaker box, a
dummy plug holder, ajunctioll bo'l, a test bflx, and a card holder. The circuit breaker box
(pIN 4890464), dummy plug holder (PIN 1\89047 J -201). card holder (PIN 4890471-4(1), and
junction box (pIN 4890462.201) were inStlllled on all existing slu::lflocated in the right side of the
empennage pcr FAA drawing 4890461. Each componenl weighs less thaD 1 pound and is
substantially faGtened. The loading from eaeh oompolloot is miniscule and does nolllppreeillbly
atkct this alress analysiG. By inspe.ctioo, this inatallation meets the requirements ofFARs 25.301,
25.303,25.305, and 25.307.
D. Analysi9
1. Cuntrollmerfllce UDit lnstallatifln
ND anatycis rt!quirt!d. See discussion above.
2. All PresMw'e Bulkhead Pa:i5-1hnrugh
(a) Smlic Ten&Lon Allalysi9:
Skio Data I: 0.063",'0.043" 2024-TI
Doubler Data: 0.050" 2014-T3(Clad)
Existing and Repair Falltellen;: MS20470AD5
Repair Fastener Allowables: 582 too'
SRM 53_t0-45, Figure j, Plllle 2 - E)(isting faBterlaf holea are in (1.063" thiclc material, while new fa,st'l'Ilen are in
OOCl43" material.
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OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT No. 06-10
OKl..AHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. OSr22
'" 0.043" x (2 x US") j (4 x 0.164"
'" 9,2151Ibs.
= 0.050" x (6.73" - (4 x 0.164")
=(J.J{14 in
1
'" 1B,829 lbs.
'" 20 x 5112 !bs
'" 11,640 lbs.
=(II,640Ibs-9,261Ibs)/9,261Ibs
M.S. 0.25
3. WingrootPa&&-through
No lUIJ:llysis required. See diswssion above.
4. l'orward Sensor Installations
No analy,is See above.
, MMPDS (Melllllic Mll.lcrill.ls and SlwldlmiiJ;lll.ion) TobIe.'; 8. J.2.1 (p) & R.l.2(b).
J KQl.e lhat Il.lllhoe holes and new faslcnen ore in 0.040" Ihick materiaL
TheGC are new slr.Iight holell, so diamtlCr the maximwn allowable hale size per SRM 514211, Figure 4.
MMPDS. Table 3.2.3.0(b,)
Thes.c arc DmIf !lIl1I.ight b.oIC!I, 60 diameter i$lhe It\llJ(imum allowable hale size per SRM 51-42-11, Figure 4.
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OKLAHOMA erTY, Ot<i...AHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
5. Aft Sensor [ostll1l3tions
(a) Skin Shear Load Calculations:
Skill Data 1: 0.063"/0.040" 2024T3(Clad)
Doubler Data: O.06l" 2024.T](Cle.dJ
Existing Skin Splice Fa9tenm: NASM20426AD4
nxisting Fastener Allowables: lS9 lbs. A
Repair t'asteners: NASI097AD4
Repair Fasl:ener Allo\1l!lbles: l881bs. 9
(I) Running L08d Exbrting 10
Running lofld of double row NASM20426AD4 with 0.75" pitch
--2xlR!)lbsIO.75"
=
(2) Running Load Repair 11
Running load of triple row NASJ 097AD4 rivets wilh 0.75" pitcb
=3 x l811 lbs I 0.75"
"" 1,552 lbs/in
(3) Shear Margin of Safety = (1.552(lbsIin) I I ,038{lbslin) - I "" 0,495:::: 0.49
SRM 53-3)-01, Figure I, Page 2, Skin Pal11l1 #4 _N\ltc thaI {w;tcncn; picking up ex.isting 'llinp f8.stener holes
in 0.063" thick mllrel'ial, while in 0.040" matcrilli.
CoIllCl"Ylllively, IlSswning shear criticd, value from MMPDS (MclalJic Malmab Propcrlll'l; Dcvelopmcnllloo
Stllndm:limliOll) Table 8.1.2(b).
I AII\lwablCll are fmm McDonnell DoU8w DCtO SRM, PtIgl' 51-0(1..01, Figure 54.
'f Thil;; YIDUC calc:u.lated using tIw tightul pitl:h of skin splice, in this CilSl: (be splice along Stringer 13.
" value calculald using the widest pitch of the six (6) pertinent las.leller in the doubler.
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CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA RE:PORT No.
(b) Skin Tension Area-Out Calculalions
1l
:
Skin Data ll: 0.063"/I}.040" 2024.T3(Clad)
Doubler Data: 0.06]" 2024-D(Cllld)
Stringer Data: 0.050" 7075-T6(Clad) - Ftu = 75 ksi
Repair F'lijlener5: NAS I097AD4
Repair AlIoW1lble:l: 3118
(I) A_..... QO(] 10 = I,..;" a..to l: CN<.,.... LJ _ + (6 l: Riveth<>lo ..... IR)
0.04{l" x (4.00" - 0.90"+ 6 l: 0.\]2';
=0.156in
1
- 0.063" x 0.90"
(3) ."""'-. Mrl6L& a 19 = 0.093 in
2
= 0.212 in
l
x 62 ksi
= lJ,l44 Ibs. "" 13,150 Ibs.
(5) Agllin, doobkr = 1\oo"I.,.:!O - In..obla X 6 x Rivet..,,&, 001, <l>o. 21
= 0.3460.06]" x 6 x 0.161"
- 0.346 in
2
_ 0.061
= 0.285 in
2
J> Checkcd in direclion oilly since there is no concei ...ble way to induce hoop Sm:s5 in Thill unpressuri:lC'd

\1 SRM Figure I, Pll8c 2, S":in rantl #4 Note lhat futeners picking up slringc:1' fu8tcncr holes
_ in 0.(6)" thiell mall::rial, wbile new fastener,; are in 0.040" mRlCll'l1.
.. MMPDS (Metallie Mamls Properties Development IIlld Table 3.7.6.0(C])
JJ AUmwblc:s arc (.rom MeDonDeH Doogl:ll1 DC-10 SRM, Page SI--Oll-Ol, Figure Sol.
16 NOlle thllt the 0.90" wide area under tile is 0.06J" {hick, Ill\: relt i.I O,OW'!hick<:,
11 CUtout height derived using AutoCAD. Sc.c fAA drawing 4890460 Cor
II Thl:&(: are new SfTllight holes, so diarnct.cr is the marimum IIlIQwable bQle size per SRM j I-'12-04, Figure 4.
I' STR 261. IlIld 26R are dcfmcd iIII 5-61112 in !he SRM, which ha.ve em lIl"eli ofO.! 100 in
l
apiec.
1'lI Doubler area derived using AutoCAD. Scc FAA dlilwing 4890460 fur detailt.
Width is calCllIlm:d w;ing AutoCAD, skin lllickocs:J. fa&teoc:;r hole dirnen!ion.
1119107 Page 12
1122107 Page 2-13
AVIATION SYSTEM SlANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAI"tOMA CITY I OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVIATION SYSTEM STANOARDS PROGRAJ.!
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT No. 0622
= 0.28S in
1
x 62 l:.si
= 17,570 Ibs.
(7) M,S, = (ppO,douhl.. PIoot, ,Ido) JPled" ...iIl..,...I.,.
= (l7,S70 Ibs - 13, ISO Ibs) J 13,150 100
M.S. ::::;.0.34
(c) Seru;or Installation Analysis:
'llle MWS sensors weigh 4.1 Ibs apiece. Hach senwr is attached to a fiLling {4890460601 (
-602) with four (4) NASM27033-Q8 (#8) screws. Thc fitting.!. in tum, are attached to 'the
Rldn and doubler (4890460-701(-702) with six (6) NASM2703310 (If 10) screws. By
inspection, lhe limihng rlctor will be the four /;If! attachment screws. Since these are the
size fasteners designed l"or by the sen:tQr llUnllf.lcturer, they are almost certainLy adequate.
We do not consider the sensors to be:: items of mILU. They are small, lighl, and cannot
pll&Sibly reach the inside ofIhe in M.y of survivable crash. The srnsors have a
thick outer flange oUllIide the fwe,",gc that is significanlly larger than the hole in the moun I
fitting, doubler, or skin. In of wu will calculate the fastener allowa.bles and
rompare them 10 the Loads imposed by a 92
The shear allowable is calculated using data from MMPDS.
Fbr]o 0.071 2024-T3(Clad) 84 ksi
UllillUl.c Single Shear (7Sksi materiRl) 1:580 Ibs
Unit Bearing Strength 14: 11M Ihs
Bearing Allowable: I 164lbs x (84 ksi 1100 hi)
= 1,024 lblllfanener
p.U_, 1& r........" = 4 fasteners x 1,024 lb&!fustener = 4.096 Ibs
9g Forward Crash Load: 9g x 4.1 \bs = 36.9 lbs
Margin of Safety = Very Large
%I MMPDS (Mt:tallic Prop"rtie8 Oev"loprnent Illld SlandElldiZiltion) Table 8.L5(a)
II MMPDS, Table 3.2.3.O(e,l
x MMPDS. Table S.I.S.1
[J19J07
1122107 Page 2-14
AVIATION SYSTEM STANDAROS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
AV1A.TION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0622
6. SLTA Inllblllation
(a) Fore-e.ft Aircraft Structure Tensile Load Ce.[culalion9:
Skin Data lJ: 0.036" 2024-T42(Clad) __ Fro = 62 hi
Doubler Dala: 0.063'2024.TI(Clad) _ Fro __ 62 ksi 21
Strillga-DlillI: 0.050" 7075-T6(Clllrl) __ Fro = 75 l!
Rivet Data: NASM20426AD4:l9
Single Shear Ultimate Strenglb: 344
= 0.036" X(14.625
K
+ \0 x 0.184")
(2) A""',"":u.L&R:U=2x A.,""SIT
= 2 x 0.1100 in
l
(3) p..... om" = X F",.
"" 0.60 in
1
x 62 ksi
== 37,200 ll>s.
= 16,500 lin.
2> SRM 53-33-00, j, Shut 1, Skin Panel #4
ill MMPDS (Metallic Propenics Dcvclopment and StMdardizatiol\) Tablc 3.2.3.0(C])
>1 MMPDS, Tablc ).2J.O(c,)
a MMPDS, Table 3.7.6.O(Cl)
19 A -variety of fill>tl::l1= WCTe used including NASI097AD4, NAS1091ADS, NASM204UiADS rivcIs. The
NASM20426AD4's wcre chosen fiJr s.implicity. This assumption is als.o cODScrvalivc.
JII ButtaJd of met ill the thinner !loge is the liw..irWg factor, hence, allo...ables aTe calculaled from MMPDS,
T'bles 8.1.2.1(0) & (b). Unit Bearing Sh'CIIgth 462 lbo, Corrccliort Flll:lor = 0.981, and FIlr:t = 761<5;
(MMPDS 3.2.3.0(Cl).
TIle effective di8mctcr is derived U6ing AUloCAD.
II STR 26L 'Dd UiR are de[jnoo1l8 5-6812 in the SRM, which have all MU of0.1 lOCI in
l
apiece_
1119107 Page 14
1Ill/07
AViATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
AVIATION $'l"S'TEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOM.... C1TY, OKlAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-22
= 37,200 \bs. + 16,500
= 53,700 Ibs.
= 0.063" x (11 ,904" 10 x 0, 161")
= 1.027 in
l
1.02 in
2
(7) p _, = AlI"in, _ X FlU,
=J.02in
l
x62hi
= 63,240 lbs.
(8) I':wenee pattern capability 321 rivet!; x 344 lb5lrivcl
= 11 0,4241bs (HenIX:, doubler values will be for M.S. Clllcullll.ions.)
(9) Fore-Aft Doubler minimum Margin of Safety '" 0.19 J6
(b) SLTA An:llY9is:
Since lhe SLTA inst\JLntirm near1y 100 lbs, we are going to analyze it as if it were an
"ilem of mass." Hence, we wlll check it for "Emergency Landing Conditions" as specified
in 14 CI'R 25.561(c)(2), which w'e: 9.0g Forward, 3.0g Upward and 6.0g
Downward, and 1.5g Rearward.
SLTA Weighl: 70.0 Ibs
FjttingWcight)': 11.41w
Flange Weighl ": 4.1 lbs
Fasteners ete.: 4.5 (estimated)
(I) 9.0gForward
We shall aswme that 100% nflbe forward load (90 Ibs x 9g = 810 lbs) will be
elllTied frorn lbe SLTA into the Jk:in and doubler (4890459-2501). The SLTA loads
will be elllTied into the flange (4890459-1601) by seven (7) NAS6204 bolts, and then
II Wid1h is ..alculalcd AutoCAD, 811.(11 thieknC5i, ami fllS1cllcr hole
J4 Width ja. cllleu1Bn:d using AutoCA.D. !kin lhicknC55, ami fa5l.mll:!" hole dilIlCllBion.
l:I Aft Oflbc CQUCTlinc of the area ufm."imllm diameter only, antelU18 wollnt fr.slenca darogllrded. There an: more
flllllmc"s an [he forward side.
" (('3,'l4O Ills -53,080 lhs)! Ib'
17 Weight is calwlalcd uSing AuroCAD dcri"'ed volwnc.
If Weight is elllOllatcd using AutoCAD derived volnme.
1119/07 Page IS
In.yO? Page 2-16
AVlATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOr-lA REPORT No. 0622
carried into the fitting by 20 (twenty) NAS517-4 The..e
loads will then be carried inlo Ihe side support chanuels (4890459-1901 & -1902) by
a total often (10) NAS6203 bolt:5, and then finally from the ehannels inLo the skin
and doubler by a total to 3D (thirty) NAS I097AD4 rivets.
The ten (10) NAS6203 bolts that carry the load from the fitting to the channels are
the weakest link in the chain.
P.ll......N/lS62Ol = Fa5tener allowable in 0.080" 2024T3]9
= 1,540 Ib&'fastener.fll
PrUIol,NAS62ClJ ,. 1I) 1,540 Ib:llfasLenc = 15,400 lbs
Since 15,400 Ibs is much laTgenhan 8J 0 \bs, M.S - Large
(2) 3.0g Upward
The U;rwarrlloads will be carried into the via the supports as in (b) e-bove.
Thc only diffcrenee is Ihal the fow- (4) bolls will be loodcc in tension.
By ;rlApcction, M.S. -l.ar!ZF
(3) 3.0g Sideward
We shall assume that 100% of Ihe sideward load (90 Ibs x 3g = 270 Ibs) will bc
carried from thc SLTA into the FS 654 .. and FS 672.2 frames. The loads will be
carried through to the filling (4870459. 1301) as dcllCriboo above, These loads will
then be c.ll.lTied into the frames via the FS 654.5 and 672.2 supporls (4890459-1801 &.
-170J). Four (4) NAS6203 boilS carry the load:! into the forward support and six (6)
ofthc bolts carry Ihc load into the aft support. Both mpporU are attached to
their rcspective frame with at least 33 NASM2047QAD5 rivets,
The four (4) NAS6203 bolts that carl)-' the load from the fining to fhe forward
suppon are If\e wcake!it link in the ch.ain.
P = Faslener e-ltowal>lc io 0 l25" 2024-1'3
Pol ..... t;/lS620J = 2,400 Ibs/fastener 4Z
l'TOl>!, NA.'l62W '" 4 fa91eoeTs x 2.400 lbslfaste:ner '" 9,600 IN
Since 9,600 Ibs is much larger than 270 Ib9, much less 135 Ibs 'J, M S - I.arge
... "The slrin and doubler are ctl!1JlCch;ld by t1undRds of hence. will be treated a. 8. sillSlc 0.09')" lhid: entity.
Value lU:C11 from Boeing Liaison Engmccr Ma.nUJII, pllge 40.2.9.
0' Tile iUpJlOrts are made ornc5ted 0.06)" 2024B Tbcy will be treated as a $Ingle 0.125" thick angle for
lhi._lylli...
01 Value !.Iken from Boeing Liaison Manual, page4u.2.9.
The fo"",dl'dIlUpport WOllld normally exp=cted to carry roughly h"lfthe total load.
1/19/07 Page 16
lf21i07 Page 217
AVIATiON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRI\M
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT NO. 0610
AVIATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRA.M
OKLAHOI.IA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-22
(4) 6.ng Downward
We shall al\"ume that 100"/0 of [he downward loed (90 Jl. 6g = 540 lbs) will be
carried from !l",e SLTA into the skin vie. compression in the two side chllIlllc]s. Thl;
loads will be CEITried through to the fitting (4870459-1301) ,n descriOcd above. The
fitting top flangc 00315" thick 2024-T3 and is also gusseted. III reality, the loads
will be split between the aide channels and the}lS 654.5 and 672.2 SUppol1S
1801 & -1101), wbich will carry the load into U:eirrespet:tive frames. The
NAS6203 bolts only hold the filtillg ill place. The loads will be carried into the
chlU1nels through oompresBio-n, then into the skin, which is IIlso suppOl1od by the
doubler.
Inspection that the mo-si likely failure mode is buckling. bence, II compression
buckling analysis will be used to show oompJiarx:e, We will do the calculations
lIssuming thai {;Qeh side channel carries fJlllflhe load.
The verticlil web ofeach side channel is 14.3" lang, thick., end 2.20" tall. The
channeLs are madc from 2D14-T3(c1ad).

Ao.nn.l=bxh= 14J"xO.080"= I 144in'<:: I 14in
2
1_ = (b:c: h])112 - 0.00061 ;:::6)( 10"' in
l
p -.J(I."./A)= 0.0231 in
We will consCJVatively assume rhat L' = 1. = 2.2 in
95.2 (Hencc, we lIS!o1lme elastic buckling (L'/p > 80j)
F = (If I (L'/pl) x fi, = / 95.2
2
) x 10 x lif psi "" 10,889.9 p!ii
PCtIJ. T'" Jl. A = 10,889.9 psi x 1.14 in
2
- 12,414 Ibs 12.400 lbs
Since 12,400 Ihs is much larger than (540 Ibs/2), = L.uu.
(5) 1.5g Rearwam
The 3n31ysis in (a) abovc i, valid for the 1,5 g Rearwarrlloads.
1. Processor Installation
No analysis Itquired. See discu.is.ion IIbovc.
8. TRU In,lallation
No- required, See discu&!ion above.
9, Miscellaneous InSfllllatiorJs
No lIoalysis required. See discussion above.
1/19107 Page 17
1122107 Page 218
A V ~ T l O N SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA erN, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-22
E. Conclusion
Every s1ruclul1l.[ modjuclllion satisfies the appropriaIe FAR3 aB liste:d untIe-the Discussion paragrepb
above. Each installation re!l1.on:s the: structural lllll:grity, dUT1lbility, damage tolerance, and
crRShworthiness oflhe unmodified aiI'CI1I.ft:.
1119fll7 Page: 18
1/22107 Page 2-19
OKlAHOMA Cny, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
APPENDIX 3
DAMAGE TOLERANT ANALYSIS REPORT
FOR THE
1122107 Page 3-1
OKLAHOMA CJTY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No, 0610
Aw..T!Cf'I SYsTEM STAN)ARDS PROGRAM
O!.AHOMA Crrv. OKuHoMA
ENGINEERING REPORT
D8.IIUlgt T{}lerant Anillysis for Large Aircraft Inband Countermeasure (LAIRCM)
Wire Bundl2 PilD-tbrough mBombardier CL.-6Ofi..Z1U6
S\1bmitled
Revicwed

Approved
.,
Page J 0(25
1122/07 Page. 3-2
kllAfrON SYSTtM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLI.t..HOt..V. CITY, OKl.AHOMA
REPORT NO. 1D
Il,VIAT1ON SVSTfMSTI\NOAROS PROOP.AM
QKLAHOMACr;y, OKLAHOMA REPORT
-
NO. 07-05
Log

Do,. Pagc.<;
-
j 11011)7 All Orie;innl
-
t
-
-.-
Descripi:OJ;J Approved Ily
-
f-,_
to
-

.---- -
- - -
III [}I07
[/22/07
Page 3-3
OKLAHOMA CrTY, OKlAHOMA REpORT No. 0610
AVlATIQN SYSTEM STANOAROS PROGRAM
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLA.HOMA REPORT NO. 07-05
Table o f C o n t e n l ~
A. Purpose , . , , , , , , , 4
B. Synop&is. , , , ,.... . , , , , 4
C. Discussion . , , , 4
I. Localion................ . , , 4
2. Material Pl'opertil:S , , , ' :5
3. InitiaVDetectable Crack S17.e .. , , j
U. Analysis , , , , _ :5
I. SII"e5sSpectrum , _ , 5
2. BclJi Ca]culs.tion , , ' , , 7
3. Raoridual Slrength Calculatlnns....... . , 9
(a) NetSectlon yield................................................................ . , 10
(b) FrnctureToughness , , , , 10
4. Cnu:k Growth C'.alculations , , _ II
5. Inspection Interval , , , , 12
6. Instructions fur Continued AiIWOI1hiness , ,.... . 13
H . n. Conclusion ................ 13
Append iceB:
A. AFGROW OutpuL , 14
B. FAA CL-601-)R Recorded Cahill PSJD Speclru1'Il , 20
C. Other Cmck Growth Projections , , , , 21
1/10107 Page 3
1122107 Page 3-4
AVIATION SYSTEM S1'ANOAROS PROGRAM
OKlAHOW\, Crrv, OKLAHOMA
A. Pmpose
This repon provides the damage (oleranct evaluation required to ensure the structural integrity of the
Large Airclllft lnm..red Counlermeosure.l (I..AIRCM) system bulkhead pan-through on our fled: of
Bombardier Inc. (Challenger) Model CL-6u I aircraft. In order 00 instalilhe LAIRCM wiring. a
wiring buWlee.d pass-through is cut in the oft prcssure bulkhead and the forward wing box bulkhead.
A doubler ill inctalled to reinforce tbe surrounding skin and lltrucrure.
B. Synopsis
The Damage Tole::rance EVlLluatlOll recullll introduce a nonde!ll.ruclive inspection program for the aft
preSllIJIl: bulkhead web hnle lJfld doubler between WL 130 and WL Right Bt to The
inspection interval for this area is as follows:
Inillal inspection: 12,000 hoUTS
RepeaL inspection: 3,000 hours
The Damage Tolennce l!vllluatioo. results introduce II nondestructive inspection program f('lf the wing
box pass-&rough identical to the:: inspection program for the left-band willg box pa6&-througb.
C. Discussion
Three possible failuTe modes were doubler failuTe from wire bundle hole, web failure from
wire bundl.e hole, and web failure from ourcr moM doubler rivet. Detailed llflalysis of the most rapid
failure mode "douhler from wire bUDdle is documented below, The:: crack growth predictions
for till: othcr potential failure modes nan bt found in the appendicalo thi, repon. The right-hand
wing bax wire pass-through is les' critical then the right.hand fud veat line pass-through, therefore,
no further analysis is required for tlie wing box pass-through.
1. Location
The wire bundle pass-through is installed 8ll shown in Figure I. The dc:sign is lor B ffiIlxiII1LlII1 of
four (4) wire i!tld the ar,alysis is performed for the maximum number of wire b'.wdlel.
Figure 1. FAA Challenger 601 All preswre bulkhead wiring pass-through between
WL 130 and WL 145, Right BL 35 to 4S
1110107 Page 4
1=07 Page 3-5
OKlAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 07-05
The CL-601-JR righi-hand fQrwaro wing box bulkhead Pa.sll-through doubler, FS <l09, is identical
10 the len-hand fui!:l vent line PMS-lhrough. The right-hand poos-through cut oUl diameter is I"
diameter while the left-hllnd cur aut diameter is larger al 'A".
Figure 2. FAA Challenger 601 Cabin forward wing bOl" bullrhe!d pass-through
2. Materiel Propatics
Skin Data: 0.043" 202<l-T<l2(Clad) -. Fty = 38 hi I
Uoubler Data: 0.05" 2024-T3(Clad) LT-- Fty = <l2 k:n
3. Initial/DetectBble Cl1Ick Size
The initilll and detecTable cl1lck lengths for ll. through crad; two lips from a bole &re, 0.025"
ellch sick, lind ........ 0.25" each side. The illitial cl"llck length from a secondary hole in this case
is assumed nOllo exist as it has a negligible impact on the intervals.
D. Analysis
l. StrcM SpfCtrom
The p1eBlIUre spectrum is derived from two FAA Mission Protiles
3
: 25% L::lnl!: Range and 75%
Low Level Flight.
I Mechanical Pmpenies Development Ilnd (MMPDS) Table J,2,}.O(bl)
1 MMPDS Table 3.1.3.0('1;))
J RAs--6tJ j -916 a(JpClldix B
J/JIW7 Page 5
1=07
Page 3-6
--
AVIATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PR.OGRAM
OKIJ\HOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AV",,-TIONSVSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
QKLAHOlolA. CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 07-05
Table I: Cabin Pressure Mission Profile
PRESSURe (PSID) CYCLES PER FLiGfIT MISSION TYPE
'.R 4 Long Range
2.3 1 Low Level
LU 2 Low Level
Figure 3 the cfJ.bin pressure mission profile 10 the Flight Inspection Fleet recorderl
profile. Figure 3 shows the recorded profile is sigIlificantIy less dUIn the established
miS.'lion profile. Therefore, usc of the miMion [JI'ofile is oonscrvalive.
Cabin Pressure Spectrum
for CL-601 Flight Inspection Aircraft
Speclrum "RAS.501:916
-Flight Inspection Fleet Recorded Va.luaa
L.
-
. ...
3,500
,
I
I--
J
!
..,
3,000
2,500
I
j"\.
-
,

"
C----'.

i
...
.. ..
,
it _....
2,000
I
I
,
0

,
I
0
t
,

"
I ..
1,500

,
i
oli
1,000
!
i
""""
,
,
, 500
I
o
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
Cabin PresSlIre (psid)
Figure): ClIbin pressure stress evenls per 1,000 flights
1110107 Page 6
L122/07 Page 3-7
AVIATION SYSTEM STANOARDS PROGRAM
OKl.AHOMA CITY, OKLAHOrAA REPORT No. 06-10
CITY, REPORT No. 07-05
The aft pressure bulkhead stress is (F =L85 x Paid 4, giving the S'.re!lS spectrum in Table 2.
Table 2: SII'Url Spectrum
0 .... (Kr;i) O"ml" (Ksi)
Cycles per
4 FJi"hts
16,28 0.00 1
4.26 0.00 I
1.85 0.00 2
16.28 0.00 I
4.26 0.00 I
1.85 0.00 2
16.28 0.00 I
4.26 0.00
,
UI.'I 0.00 2
16.28 0.00 1
The limit stress is:
tTL/jljr:= 1.8:'ix[(PSi4..AXX 1.1) -I AP
Since the aft preslllTe bulkhead is not subjccllo aerodynamic presrrore the limit is
rJ'u"," =L85x[(8.8x1.l)+O]=17.91 K5i
2. 8m CRlculatlon
The assumed inillll.i flaw size used for this a:nalysis is 0.025" each sidt oftht holt. The effective
finite panel widlh is 6.73"as shown in Figure 4. Figures 5a and 5b represelll the cnLCk growth
models used to taleulille the Ucla vsluCOi, Figure 6 is the Beta eurvea: useft 10 calculate the
resiftual ftacture toughness.
r-
------.-"
. .

-, .
. . , .
.',
0
C)
,
'I
.0
"
.,
U
"
0
.,
7.53
Fig\lrC 4: An Bulkhead doubler
RAS-6ll I -I) 16 IIppcndh:: B
1110107 Page 7
1=07
Page 3-8
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAAOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVIATION SYST'E:1<1 STANDARDS PROGRAM
,
,
,
'
" "
'--
{d
! fill J8
,
,.- ---- 51/- -
Figuro 511.: Phase I, crack growth model used for CL-601 LAIRCM in8rallarion
F'"

"rock 1<;"911'1 lrom
phose :-)ollel
-
(
;

-
"
'0
,
/1",
( ;-+'----+-T
,
',----->
,
"
I , ;:;
1,- J
38
5'-/---
Figme 5b: 2, crs.ck grov,1.h model for CL-601 I..AlRCM installation
1/10In7 Page 8
1122107
--
--
--
--- -
OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0705
Beta Curve
L -Sela Phase 1
4.00
I
3.50
I, . ..
1_..

3.00
,
L
2.50
J!
,l;
..
2.00
I
,
1.50
.
.
1.00
1\
,
\
i
"
r-
I- ----I
,
1
1
l
-ee\8 Phase 2 J
,
.
P
-
f
I c_
f-
I
J
c--e--'-i
,
- .._
lL'
'--;..iii'
' ' -"'
II
-
0.00 0.50 100 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50
Crack Length
Figure 6: !lela (;urve; lor CL--6(1! LAIRCM installalion
3. Strength ClI[cLlllllions
Residual Strength Curve
"",go>
,
-.
rn
,
-
40
j 35
...
- 30

-
....
..

,
25
I
.'
g 20
U>
+--. ii
,
15
-
_I
-
::s! 10
c--- 5
o
I
-1-
!
. -
-
I
1--1
c-F
- - --
I

-
-
-

,
,
,
,
-
,
,--
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50
Total Crack Length
Figure 7: Compari'lOn ofNet Yield versus FraclUre Tougbness residual strength criteria
1/10107
P"" 9
In:l107 Page3-10
AVLATlON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRtW
OKLAHCUA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT No. 06-10
AviATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, Ol<:LAHOMA REPORT No. 07-05
(a) Net Section Yield
Phase I of two pass-through holes in a 6.73" deubler.
Where:
W = effective width of doubler (6.73 inches)
Do = diameter of cut out (1.375 inches)
Dj = diameter oflowe::r Cllt out (1J75 inches)
FlY = yield strength nfpre&!ruT"'C bulkhead doubh::r (42 X&i)
n = limitHlress(lHllUi)
a
o
= 0.555 inches
This critical half-cmck length urromes the twO cracks from the upper pa\.\-through hole
grow at identical ralcs, which in this C&."IC is Therefore, [he !Oral critical cra.ck length
is needed, which is the sum nfthe two cfllcks lengtbll.
A.. = I.ll inches
If the crack propaga1eli to the edge of the .KCond hole prior to re;u:hlng a loral crack length
of 1.1 I inches, tht!n the Phase 2 roodel is n:quired 10 model lhe Cll1ck growth.
Where:
W = effective width of doubler (6.73 inChCll)
D
J
= diameter oflewer cut out (l .375 inches)
Fly = yield !ltrcngth ofpres.rure bulkhead doubler (42 Ksi)
IJ = limil stress (17.91 lUi)
8" = 2.49 inches
(0) fracmre Toughness
Where:
K plane stress toughness of doubler (80 ksi in(lJ2')
n p;
f\(..l = beta as a function of crack length from 6
o limit stress (17 .91 Ksi)
lfl0l07 Page 10
1/22107 Page 3-11
AVJAT\ON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA. CITY, REPORT No. 07-05
4. Crack Growth Calculations
lbe crack propagation software AFGROW is used ta predicilhe crack hehavior of the r.ArRCM
dt ptelisure bulkhead pllSS-tilrough. lbe NASGRO crack: growth TlI.te equation with modified
rclardatioo model is to predict the growth rate. The malerial property values and NASGRO
constants used are lislet! in the following TIlble 3. The crack growth CllTVC is shawn In Figure g
and the AFGROW results are presented in AppendiJt I.
Ta.ble 3: Maleriel propenies and Crack Growth Canstants
VARIABLE DDSCRll'TION VALUBS
Material 2024-T3 sheet AmbieTlt Air
K,
Plane stress 66 ksi
-
"
Poison's Ratin 0.33
E YClung'S 10600 kai
C E,;perirnental mltlerial COD:Ilant 8.29&9
"
Experimental ooostant 3.284
p hxponeot 0.5
q ExpunerJt I
dKtho Thl'e5hold range af :rtn:ss intensily 2.9
f"""
R+cut Cutoff stress ratios for crack growth 0.7
R-cul CutDtl'stress ralios fOJ cnck growth -OJ
Roo Willenborg overload crack growth 23
shui-orfralio
]/10107 Page 11
lf22J07 Page
--
OKtAHOUA CITY, OKlAHOMA
REpORT NO, 0610
AVIATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PRDGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHDMA
REPORT No. 0705
LAlRCM APB Doubler Failure Two PaD-through Holes

_- CdOl""IIbI. _ "'Corl"<:81
3.50 ..--"===_1 .........======L..,
3.25t--
3.00
J

2.50 -i'--...
"I
2.25
]

2.00
------f--
---'---1--I-cL-'-----1
I
j 1.75
--
I
11.50
I
2O,DOO 15,000
---.
5,000 10,000
'.251--
'.00
0,75
0.50
Fligh'lS
figure 8: Craci: growth curve for CL-60 I-JR LA1RCM win: installation
5. Inspection Interval
The threshold and repcat inepectioD periDds are calculated to penni! timely dele..tiOll of structural
damage 10 the r.A[RCM aft pressure bulkhCl).d mod.ification. The variable K I to K4 Ate analytical
variables usl;'(j \0 obtain conservative inspection inwTVtlls by taking into account data lirnif.Htians
and. uncer1a;nnes. The valU1:3 wed are lisloo in HDmb:ndier report MAS-601-J II, The ether
valu.e.s used to clllcula1e inspectioll intervals lire pulltd from Figure 8 and Table 4.
1/10107 Ptlge 12
1/2'))07 Page 3-13
A....IATION SYsre", STANDARDS PROGRAM
Ot.AHDLlA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT No. 07-05
Table 4' FAACL-601
SERlAL NUMBER FLIGHT HOURS FLIGHTS HOURS/flIGHT
5138 (NBS) 4,328 1,968 220
5167 (N86) 4,434 ],912 2.32
5190 (N87) 4,259 1,829 2.33
Fleet Avcragc 4,340 1,9{l3 2.28
N....... = (N..,-NirJl)x hrs/. == (12,215-0)x2.20hrs/. 13,43611rs
KlxKJxK4 /Olght 2xlxl /filght
N.... = JNc,."-N..,,,.. t hrs/. == (16,738-l2,215)x2.20hr;. ;:
K2 >< Kn( K4 /fhght h I x I /fhght
. 6 InstrucciOl1S for Cootinued Ai!worthinCS8
Continued airworthiness iT1lltruaiolls an: required by Code ofFederllJ Regulations (CPR), ]4 CFR
21.50 and 14 CFR 25.1529, and published in accordance with 14 CFR 25 Appendix H. To
comply with the CrR, a Change to this aircraft's CJlisling Mairnenance System mu!lt. be
issued fur lhe damage tolerant LAIRCM sf!. bulkhead Compliance will
n::rull in the t!lnlinued ailWorthineu oflhe aircraft.
EO 0609-13, "LAlR.CM Instal1atitm Ttlstruclions for Continued Airworthine8ll," identifies the
upplemental changes 10 the TIME LIMITS/MATNTENANCE CHECKS (Chapter 5 of the
Maintenance Manual number PSP60IA-5, or equivalent) oftbe aiIplaJle for the damage tolera[lt
LURCM aft pressure bulkhead
E. Conclusion
Bascd on fi:actuTe mechanics lInalysis, the intervals and method of required maintenance
have been determined for the reworl,(txl area of lhe 11ft pressure bulkhead. Therefore, complince with
FAR has been The maximtun iIl!!peCli()tl interval allowed for Lhe CL-601
aireraft i6 15,000 hrs, the aireMllft's llalf-life. The intpoclion intelValR are rounded to an inrelVal
oompalible to Ihe ctJlTcntTime Limits!Mainterlarlce Checks manual.
AftPt-cssure - LAIRCM wire bundle
Using nondeslructive inspcctilln, check: the reinforced and aft. pressure bulkhead area from
Wl r30 and WL 145, Right BL 35 [045 for cracks.
Tbreshnld Inspootion = 12,000 houri
Repeat fnspeGlion = 3,000 hoors
1/10107 Page 13
1/22107 Page 3-14
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No, 07-05
Appendb: A: AFGROW Output
..................
Ven;"",l ClJld:: wire pUllhrough hule 110 hole 2 dr.Ol;Ve JS twi"" mllldJ>;l fm,n 1>1>1& to edge web Q,(IoI,J
doo>t>lcr [lOS
................
AF<JROW>"I.0009. 12:
f.ngli.h Unill [Lenglb(iIl), Stms(l:..li), Telllp.",ture(Fl J
C'Ior" (jrowlh Model aod Spec.rrum lDfuMiltilll\
Tille: LAIIl.C.1rof Bulkb.ead Web ond Doubler
Thidmle:io noso
Wil!lb 3.67S
Hole Dillmel... ; J375
Hole alflel: l..54S
V_pMOOulw-106DD
PIliwm'E blio
Cae([ C1fTbl!l1ll8l &paiL em
wrLLamOJlli dQ-off lJ1i() : 2.300
!lo:lIemlUu: Slate Rulanalically (2 PIBn. it"lI, 6 (,lia.: sll1Iin)
The FClrInIIII_Ncwll1lP-<!.e Kooing_ Henriksen (NASGitD) abcll. growlh rowl;"" if. being UoSed
FocR&lI<O.O, Dcl\JI II: Kmax
hfaJeri.aI.: 1000.9000 ...riell a1umiolllIl, 2a24-T3 AI. [Clad; plL & Ib!; LT 1
pJaD,: ....iD b::twe l1>\Iafu>t...: ]1
Plane SbeSS ht:tute 6(i
F1fa:Ij"" Ii:o_ 10llsJ:!na. fur surlaWeUil'!ieoJly ohoped ",a.k: 46
Fit par-.dC1I (KCvrnu. Thicl<n... !OqIlA'j",,): Ak- I, Bl<=l
Yidd S\lftl;: 53
Lower'.' vallie bnllrldary: -0,]
Upp 'R' YilU() bcl1lldary; 0.7
Exponl:als in NASGRO Equlllion' ,,--U84. pO.S, IF!
fill" U1Iek growth nil: COJlllIIDe 8.29.009
1hIcGblltd stress iDIcrIsily I'I.cl<lr 1Il0ll" 1Il R 0: 2.9
'ThR:sIltJId e""ff..im.l, U
('lone oIc=l.lnliD""".1>Rin! _lor 15
Ralio Gfdl= =>lim,,", Ipp....d ",... 10 the now sueS!: 0.3
Fail..,e;. baoed OIl dle ellUl:nl lead illibe ,pplied $pOCl!\un
CIrigiDIII MiaoiM f'mlile Cabin l'resllllrC
SpcolJum INllliplioWon fiodor: 0.99>46
The Spo:r:tNn> wiU be 1'CJl'U\C>d up 10 999999 limOS
Critical CrKk Lcnglh;.1 b""'; "" In., M.. SpOl:tllon Slrei:l
Cti\iClll crw:I<,,;u in 'C S11llC""2 (Buo:d on Kmax orile,i.) AFGROW "".00090.12; 61512006 15;14
1110107 Page 14
[/21/07 Page
AVLATJON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OI<LAHOMA REPORT No. 07-05
Tille: LAlRCM Bylkhud Web a.ndDouble
Spectrum litle: Oritinal Miso.ion prorde Cob", Pl'CllUJe Spectn.rm.
2020 <-. cn.cl< ll'"Ol1lC1l)' code: Cl1ek &l Hole Slaod!lrd SoluwllI
""'"
,

O.OHO
""'-"
4,IOJ
Sh, SplryUl
,
1,300 0.D:l63 4,090
'0>
',000 0.D:l77 4,076
'"
3,900 4060
""
5,200 0.0309 4.[)44 ."
",00
"00
9,100
0.0327
o.llJ47
0.11J69
4.026
.....
,.,..
'"
"',
70>
10,400 0.11J93 3.963
""
11,100 0,1>419 3.9]8
"" 13,<l00 0.1>448 3.912 1,001
14,300
13,600
"""

0,0513
0.0554
J.UJ
'ill
l.818
1,101
1,201
1,301
l8,2oo
,,,OO
"...
11,100
0,0598
0.0646
0,0699
0-0759
UQ
3.742
1.100

J,401
1,50 I
1,601
1,701
1l,4Oll 0,0923 3.6M I,SOI
24,10ll 0.09%
'''"
26,"
mOO
"...
"""
0.0977
0.1066

0.1273
3.499
3.441
J.J80
3.317
2,001
2,101
2,201
2,JOI
31,200 o1191 3.252 2,4ll1
32,300 0.1515 3 18S 2,501
33,800 0.166.'! 3.117 2,601
35,100 O,lll2S 1049 2,701
36,400 0.1997 29112 2,801
31,700 0.21RJ 2915 2,901
39.000 2 3,001
40,300 0"," 2788 3,l OJ
41,IlOO 0.2li48 2,7U 3,201
42,900 O,Jlll 2,674 3,301
")00

0.3401
0.3124
2,624
2,581
],401
3,S01
46,,800 0.<lO89 2541 3.60!
48,100 II 251i 3.701
49,400 (},502l 2.S29 3,8DI
0,5697 2.587 l,9lJl
32,000 06914 2.93S 4,001
"'"
,
'"
,0>
3D]
'"
601 '"
WI ""
"" 1,001
1,101
1,201
1-"'1
1,401

1,601
1,701
1,1101
1,901
2,001
2,IOJ
2,301
2,'1001
2.'01
"'"

2,101
2,iWI
1,901
3M!
3,101
3,201
3,301
3,401
3,SOI
.1,601
3,701
],801

4,001
I!IlE!IO
,
"'"
800
1,JOO
),600
',000
',"'"
',m
,,,,.
',600
,,'00
4,4Il0
<,m
.
3)00
3,600
'.000
.."
',800
',JOO
,.."
6,600
',"'"

9,200
9,600
10,000
10,400
10,sno
11,200
11,600
12,000
12,400
12,800
lJ,200
IJ,600
14,000
14,41)0
14.800
IS,200
n,lillO
16,000
1110107 Page 15
1122/07 Page 3-16
OKLAHOMA CrTY, OKlAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
Vrtical crackpropagal;QII, OPe ""r'O p.... """"gil hoJ.e ef!ilcliv doubl:r ,u. j, Inin djrl!rolll lO edge 0.04'; daubl... 0.05
.U....h ........ _.
oVGROW vol.00090.12:
Baglish 1Jllin [Lcnjjlh(in), SI{t05S(lt.oiJ,
en.:t Cirowlb Model IIld Sp<:<:tr<mlllllhm:wion
Ti,,,: Lil.IRCM ....... d Web andDD"ld..
l.o.I: ren.iooSII't:D FnC\ioo: I, Delldirq; Slm. FI....ciM: 0, B.wing Strel' F"'i:liM 0
C=.k. M<.>dcl' 10)) SingieThmogll Cta; lllolc - SluDdard Soluu.o..
lbJ2Mn
Widlh B55
HllIcDiamcl..-: 1.375
HDk: Off""" 2.131
'YOIOllll'li Moduhll-I0500
I'oililOG'1 R&CiJ -0.33
Coeff. <>fTho:!1llil1 &pin gl.19c-005
Wll.LENBORO 2.300
Dclmnille SLreY Stall> """""",lically (2 Pion. <lr_, 6 - PI......l<I.i.ll)
Kanir.i- (NASGROJ ""lICk gnllo1b rdli/ion i' beinS used
F", Relf"" (1.0, Ddll K - ](ma.
""'ten..: l00ll--9000 .c:rie.6 _lllmino"" Al, [ Clad: pit &. slu; I.r ]
r.1le 6Irain liacmn: 3..1
'Ir'eu tr-cIW'C IOllghno:..; 6f,
i!lfc:o:tiw: b'ICnmow"gtIlessllll: 'wDcefellil'licuUy lbaped cnd:
Fil TJIU"IIIlICla"I (KC wnu, Thi<:bu:8. Eq... I;OII): I, Br-l
YIdd.r=.s:53
Lower'R' ..
Uppor 'R' value booIad.y: 0.7
Er.pan""'" mNASGRO Equuicm p-(I.5, q-I
8.19.-0:19
ihreobcld!lJeS.i PeMily facio, "II&" olll - 0,
'Ibn:ibllId .".rnCiClll; J.5
r!aWsIrLin ClmSlmint fucIo" J.5
Ilalio "flhc !T\Qimlllll Ipplied .1ll:l> to the ll"w Ille!lIC GJ
Cycl by <}'de tela and .p""trum Cll<:L.llarion
"Sjler:lrurn IufOlmali""
0riaitI&l Mi..ion Profile C.bin Spec\nlm
Spec:mun faclQl':
Tho: llpCcll\IID..ill be repealed up m 99999'J tim""
Cri1ic111 CraI;l- Uni'/Ib is l=ed <Xl lb Mu.imLlll] Slress
ira 'C'dletimr-Ll9215, St<e&'l Sl&.1.0-2 (ll.aled "" ",ilai.)
Jf}Q/()7 Page 16
1/22107 Page 3-17
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0610
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No.
Tille: W\.JRCM Pre_ BuU:hw1 W.b III1d Double
Spe<:tnun liu..: Onp..J. Minion Pr'lfil. C.bin PR:SSun: SpeClIUlII
202(1 <0-_ CKk gco-.')' code: Single IbI'ougllCllek al Hule -1'LandaI'd S"JlIl;<DI
""'"
1,300
,..,
1."
""""""
0.01.10
0.02'8
0.0166
00274
""'-"
U78
3.:57'
3.563

Sb,Sptsmm
,
'"
'"'
10'
'"'""
....
'.'"

0.0183
0.0293
0.0303
0.0313
1.547

3.ll%
3.51
SOl
'"'
'"
'"'
10,4llO 0.0324 3.509
'"'
11,700 0.0336 9>,
13,000 3.487 1,001
14,300 OJU61 3.475 J,IOI
15,600 0.Olo74 3.463 1,201
""'"
o.Olon 3.450 1,)01
'",,00 0.0404 3.431 1,401
0.0420 J,423 J,$OI
20,800 0.0437
"'''
1.601
D,IOO 0.0455 1.701
21,400 0.0474 3.316 1,801
24,100
"19
1,901
26,000 16 3.342 2,001
21,300 0.ClS39 3.nJ VOl
28,600 O.ClS61 Ll04 2,201
0.0389 U8J 2,301.
""""
"
"...
....
3S,ltll
0.0616
O.OG45
0,0675
0.0707
3,26.
3,24<)

J,I9J
2,401
2)01
2,601
2,701
0.0741 1.16J 2,801
31,100
39,000
.,,'"
41,600
...""
44,2llll
"...
46,800
48,100
O.077B
0.OB16
0.OB57
..
......
......
0.1044
.,""
O.JlS4
1 141
3.114
3.086
3,057
3,028
2.997
2.965
2.113)
2.900
2,90 I
3,001
3,101
'>0'
],3Oi
3,401
3,$01
3,601
l,701
49,400 0.1213 2.866 3,801
jO,7IXl 2.832 3,901
,,"000 0.1339 2.797 4,001
""
,
W,
'"
... '"
'"
'"'
'Ol '"'
1,001
1,101
1,101
1,.101
[0401
'"'

1.60\
1,JOl
[,80J
1,901
2,001
2,IOJ
2.101
2)01
2,4<)1
2)lll
2,601
1,7ot
1,801
2,901
J,001
J,101
3,201
3,301
MOl
3,501
3,601
3,701
] ,SOl
1,901
.."'"
""'"
...

SO.
,"'.
1,600
2,000
'MOO
2,8lJ0
3,200
3,600
4,Onl'l
4,400
4,800

',""
6.'"
6,,,",
6.'"
,"'.
'.'"
S.'"
S,,,,",
....
,"'.
9,roo
1O.OOD
10,.800
11,200
il,600
12,000
'"""

12,800
1),200
n,1iOO
.4,000
14,4ll0
'4,1lll0
15,600
""""
16,000
lfl0J07 Page: 17
ImJ07 Page 3-1&
AVIATION SVSiEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT NO. 0610
AIfLATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CI1Y, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 07-05
PHASE 11 . 2nd halo to 'die
............................
Vc:rti';ad Cl'Ilck. JIlUPiIlJlllion, a.... Jl'III IWllllBb hole doubler .ize il lWi"" "'ill Mt froln to edll" web dO\lbLcr
...............................
AFGROW'0'4000:11: 1111312(1)6 16:13
UEngli!JI Unill ..,.(F)]
Cae" GrOWlh Modd aad Sp<<:ln<W InfollDBiioa
Title: lJ.lll00l pl'CSSIlft Bulkhead Web IIlId lJoubl"
l.<>ad: TC/lSiollStteKFlaCIioo: 1, BmdingS!Je,s1 0, B...<iIlll Sm,.. Fnlclicn: 0
Cncl< Modo!: 2020 . SlIla,lt Through Hole Sl.orldllrd S"lu!ioo
]Mhl,urfoa: UOI:k lcr,gr\J (c): Z,3676
Thic;Jc",.", anso
Width 6.1:10
Hole Dilmeltr: J.l7S
Hol.. Off.{: 4.J63

Poisloril :R.olio '"OJ3
C<xfI'.l>fThemJll 1'""-
W1Ll.ENBORG -nff"nnill: 2..\00
Shu< SIal.. IWllmlliI:aJly (1 - Plane .In::!.I, 6 - Plane ,mom)
TIle FamlI\II*""ll1lHle Krning- H.."rlboll!NA5GRO\ crack gnr.>llIlt:lIlinn II being u..d
F... .ltdf< 0.0, DcJll\ K = K:...n
Malerill: 1000-9000 Kri.. alumimun. 2024-n AI, I r>l1 a-.h.f; L-T j
M&. otru f=l.ure lo"ghne:I.&: 33
Plulc JIIU' l'ra.ct4Ire 66
J;ftti.. lim::luA; rooWJlIClI! for !lUrfietielliJY.",olly o.haped.radt; 46
FJt .....,..,1UI -.u. Tbi<:ka... Eq""Lloa); /V:;= 1, I
y",Id_;SJ
UN"" 'R' IIlu lxrundary: -(Ll
U\lper 'R' 'l1li"" hourxlol)': Q.r
l!xpll<llR' in NASGRO Equatio.ll: q-l
PIn!I ll"""'!h rate COIllIIllll.'
1hft:sbDId _ ioto:noity (..,Ia.....oge al It -1)-.1.9
1luUIoldeoemciow: 15
Pllwe l<ln:IWOI1ll;n co",1rIin1 l'acloo. U
RlIIiD oppl;! ,lr"'lD thcl new 0.3
Or..... llo!iSlSian Prol'do Cobin tr"lIIJe Speo(NDl
SpI:cuwl mulriplici.l.im. !ioclnr: 0.99<16
The Ipmrum boo rep<.Bled UJ> Ie time.
Oitic:at ClX/t LCIJIIb if; b.tied on Ml1lmum 5pc<;tnun Sit.....
Crilic.ll CllIclr..<il!C in 'C'direcr.inn-l.4'1J3, SIJlIe=2 (.&..ed DO Kmu.
Ifl0l07 Page J8
1121107 Page 3-19
LAlRCM Bulkhe.d Web Cllld Deubler
Spoell:lIIll Dri&ina/.JoWsio... Prall'" C&hin P"""..... .c:poclNllI
21120 <;- geomell:y oode: Tlu"<Mlgb Crack III Hole - SlIDdanl
.<Ih. l'lP'd[UID
, ,
....
,
Cycla
!::J&ll&lh
BorlBC
1.121 o
L2U ""'"
.,
'" 2.396 1.227
" "
'"
2.411 '"'
2.426 U:34
" 320
'" 1.230 " " '40
"
,,'"
2.4'11 " "
''''' 1.238 <0.
1.242 '" 48. '"
"'" 2.474 1.246
'"
'"
"'
"'"
..
1.490 1.250 '"
'"
'" '"'
".. 1.255 '"
....
1.260 '"
'"
'" 80.
'"
"'"
m '" m
""
2.563 1.271
'90
1040 "'"
2.5&3 1.278
'"
'" '"
,
"'"
...
2.604 1.2H '" '" lJ20
J.2'11
",
'" '"
1200
2,MB
m '"'" '"" 1.302 '" m 1280
1.671 Ul1
.
"
..
"..
..
'"
'" ,'''' ..,
1.321
'M< '"
..,
'm
1.332
'"
'"
1520
,,,,
2,751 U45 '"
..
'"
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1/!O/O? Page 19
112'1107
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPoRT No. 07-05
Appendix B: FAA CL-6ol-3R Recorded Cabin psm Spectrum
(Per 1,000 flights)
Ii...,.. MAPSW MiD P:i.lD
n
0"
1.30 0.00
" UO 0.00
"
2.00 0,00
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"
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8,40 0.00
" uo 000
n"
n 8.60 000
us 8.80 0.00
8.QO 000
"
1/10;07 Page 20
1/21/07 Pagd-2t
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 0610
AVIATION SYSTEM STANOARDS PROGRIoM
Appendix C: Other Crack Growth Projectiolls
LAlRCM APB Wab Failure at Paal-t1\rough Holas
L C Hole -CHole la-Edge -CZndHole to Edge
3.15 ...
3.DO
2.75
2.50
225
f'-'- - 2.00
j
i 1.75 -
o
LC.. ----L 1.50
0." - ...-1
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0.00
o 10,000
Flightt
__ ...
3"
I
3.25 1----- 1 - -
.-+---- -+-- ---11-----'----j.
-.--.-L----'- - I -- L /
--
.50,000
._----1
40,000 30,000
y"------+--,-- --"
'--. J
....
20,000
----1----e---
+-----'-. l' --'--- +---++-,----'- ---.-
f- ----i....---+--'--- - - -
..+------+
,
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-----+--- _--1-r_---+
:
+-.
1110107 I'age 2 [
1(22107 Page 3-22
---- ----
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA RepORT No.
OKLAHOMA CITY, OI<LAHOMA. REPORT No. 07-05
lAIRCM APB Web Failure at Critical Rivet Hole
i---C lellgth rivet to nVBt -Clellglh rival to edge
-CLength rivet to edge ]
2.50
I
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a 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,1i00 50,000 60,000
Plights
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1110107 Page 22
1122107 Page 3-23
- ----- --
- - ---- --
--
---
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA
REPORT NO. 0610
OKLAHOMACI1Y, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 07.oS
LAJRCM APB Doubler Failure at Pass-Through
(recOfded preasure &p&ctrum)
1_ HlJ!eto H ~ e -Hole 10 Edge -2nd Kale to ~ ~
3,00
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o 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000
Flights
1110107 Page 23
\(22107 Page 3-24
--
AVlAnON. SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITYI OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
OKLAHOMA CI1Y, OKLAHOMA RE.PORT No. 07-05
UURCM APB Web Failure at Paee-through
(recarclecl p,....urpectrum]
1-HoIetoHoJe -H:llelofdge ~ 2 n d ttlIelD8jge ]
'\
~
j 1.50
, '.
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1.00
I
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0.50
I V
0.25
+- ,
0.00
o 10,000 20,000 30.000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000
Flights
3.00
2.75
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1110107 Page 14
112V07 Page 3 - 2 ~
---
--
---- -- - --
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 07...Q5
LAlRe., APB Web F.llu... at Crilic:al Rivet HoWt
prel8ure .a.pac:trum)
r
....__,
2_50
225 "-.----+-,- -+---C-, tJ --, --r------H---l
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o 15.000 "Cl.OOO 45,000 15,000 120,000
1/10/07 Page 25
1122107 Page 3-26
APPENDIX 4
ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS REPORT
FOR THE
In.UD? Page 4-1
--
AVlAilON SYSTEM STANDARPS PROGRAM
CITY, OKlAHOMA
.. ...
AVlATION MT!M STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOJ4l CITY, OKLAHOMA.
Eleetrieall.oad Analysis for IDAUlFDR, ELT, MMR, lind LAlRCM InataD&d.oa in
Bombardier Ine. Model CL6002B16
\0
I

1 of 11
Page 4-2
1/22/01
OKl.AHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVIAtION SVS"!'EM STANDARf)'; PROGR,l..M
OKLAHOMA em, OKLAHOMA 06-21
:'og QfRevisioGS
. __..
No.
0"'.
Po...
.
All
-
10llU
'
06 Original rdease

I
Approvcd by
b
I:,C
-
-
Hl/i ()IQ6 Page 2
Page 4-3
lf22107
OKLAHOt-AA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No, 06-10
AVlAlION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA
APwpoo<
Thill report is an electrical load oflhe !lCCUItUJ1alivc clfa:u ofrepbcing the existing Flight
Data Recorder (FOR), replacing the ex.istiog Cockpit VlliCll Recordl":J" (CVR), replacing Ihe existing
Ernergeocy LocaJor Tl'llIWIlitlcr, inltll11ing a Multi-Mode Recei.ver (MMR). and installing lIll Infrared
Missile Defc:J1lle System.
'The Smith's lndustries Fligh.t Data Recording system is being by a Teledyne Controls flight
Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU) and a L3 Comm rlJR.
The Universal CVR-30A is being replaced by a Vlllvenol CVR-120.
A Collins GNLV-93o MMR h being installed.
TheACK Teclmologies, Inc. ELT iB being replaced by allARTEX ELT.
A Northrop Grumman LIU"gl: AircT<lft Infrared Countcnnc.uures (LAIRCM:) System is being installed.
l'he LAIRCM system is powered by a dedicated A'IioDie Inslrumcn19 TClUIsfarmerR.ccliner lInit
ernU),
B. Synopsis
Total change this bus: -0.25 Amps@28VDC
18YDe BATTERY BUS
Equipment Removed
ITFM LOAD (Amp!.!) Protection
.EP1MIS1 S)'lItem 2.71 Amp8 4AC3
f<".qulpmcnt Added
ITEM LOAD (Amp.)
FDAUIFDR l.80 Amps 4ACB
BLT 0.125 Amps lACB
Total change t:hia bus: -0.785 Amp8@28Vne
IOIJ(JJ06
Page 3
1122/07
}'agc4A
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMJ\ REPORT No. 0&-10
AVIATIQH SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGAAt.l
BATTERY DIRECT BUS
Equipment Added
ITEM
ELT ConlIo! Unit
LOAD L P,oI""
0.10 L IACB
Total change UUs bUll: +0.10 Amps@28VDC
l8YnC BUS 1
EquipI!lI:Dt Ad1ed
ITEM LOAD ProtKtloP
MMR 3.00 Arnpa 5ACB
MMRCDU 0.25
'ACB
Total change: this bUll: +3.25 Amps@18VnC
IISVAC IITJI,ITY BUS NO.1
Equipment Added
ITEM LOAD (Ampt) Protectiop
lAlRCM TRU
LAIRCM Syslcm
12-.81 Ampi LAIRCM TRU; ISA 3$ CB
IAIRCM MWSl: SA CB
IAIRCM MWS2: SA CB
LAIRCMMWS3: SA CB
LAlRCM MWS4: SA CB
LAIRCM PROC; 20A CB
LAIRCM XMTR: lSA CB
L__
Total changethill bus: +1281 Amps@ 115 VAC
C. Di!lCU.'l$ion
Thc 28VDC Essentiat Bw, the 28VDC Battery BUll, and the BIIUr::ry Direc.t Blls arc liUpplied
by the Essential Tl1InlIformer-RocJ.ifier (TRUs), which 8lC powcRd by the 115 VAC Eallential
Bus. This load is picked up by the airttaft generators.
The load on the)8VDC Euential TRU. has dccreaiCd by 0.435 Ampi.
The 28VDC Bus No. 1 supplied by TRU No.1, whichi, supplied by the 115 VAC Hus No.1, Ibis.
load is l"eflecled into ai=fl: generlltor rw. I.
Tbe load 00 the lSVDC BUB No.1 haH iDereated by 3.15 Ampi.
10/10106 Page 4
!n1J07
Page 4-5
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT NO. 06-10
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA. REpORT No. 06-21
The 115 VAC U t i l i ~ y Bus No.1 is supplied by the aircBft gCl:ln.tor no. I.
Tbe loaOOB Che 115 VAC Utility Bus No.1 hal iDcrea.ed by 12.111 AmpL
D. Analysis
TRU No.1 and the Essential TRU's No.1 and No.2 Br!.' not overloaded during any flight condition
(see Figure 5). Aircraft generator 1000Wni Ls less than 75% of capacity (sccFigurc 2). 115 VAC
Utility Bus No.1 and the 28VDC Bus No. I an: !bed during single generator opcmtian. After load
sbedding, the electrical load is oot unacceptably high (see Figure 3) and is lower than prior to these
modifiClll.iQns.
Adequate circuit protection aWls for all oomponellls.
E. Conclusion
T'he:se modificatiOn! are within the elecl.ricalloBd limitations orthe aircraft. and circuitry involved and
pose no undue burde1J on lht: ain::raft generating system.
lMOI06
Page 5
1/22107 Page 4-6

:5
Q
a

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"'
CANADAIR MODEL 6013R ELECTRICAL LOAD ANALYSIS
FIGURE 1
ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCE EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS
IDENTIFICATION
INTEGRATED DRIVE
GENERATOR AUXILIARY
POWER UNIT
TRANSFORMER RECTIFIER
UNrr
ITEM AC GBtleralor COnverter Battery N.t Driven Generator
Number Of Units 4 1 1
Rating 30KVA 100 Amps 43AH 15KVA
Voltage 1151200VAC 2BVDC 24VDC 155f200 VAC
Freql,lencv 400HZ 400HZ
Power Factor 0.75 {Lagging)-1.00 0.95 0.75 (Lagging}-O.9
Configuration WYE W'fE
Manufacturer Sundslrand Corp. ape SAFT Sundslilmd Corp.
ModelHo. MS1797&-2 4078 15ERGS01
Interval Rating Refer To Generalor 150 Amps-5 Min. 20 KVA--&SECS.
LOAD LIMITS 2150 Amps--1 Min.
Voll Regulation 1 V +/ 26.531.2 VDC 5 V +1
Freq. Regulation 4 HZ +/ 20 HZ +1

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FIGURE 2
TOTAL GENERATOR; LOAD ANALYSIS
CONDITIONS
ADG APU START TAXI TAKEOFF CRUISE N-
CRUISE "- LAND
NIGHT GRDlFLT NIGHT NIGHT NIGHT 11..J6K 45Kn NIGHT
KVA KVA KVA KVA KVA FTKVA KVA KVA
TOTAL Generator Capacity 15 30 eo eo .0 00 50

DTAL Existing Loads 30.857 32.153 32.18 21.175 2'.115 30.17
TOTAL
25.641 28.53 '26.3813 18122 16.122 24.46
lAtter Removals Loads
mAL
32.324 33.e24 32,89 21.382 21.382 31.54
fter Added Avionic loads
TOTAl
.... 26.8127.3 36.14 382 36.1g3 28.716 28.718 36.827
:Iter Added FIA$ Load
TOTAL LOAD
,... 26.8127.4 40.923 43.3%82 43.38881142 31.93801 31.Q3801 41.899
(After Interior Mod)
75 % Of Generator capacity 45

37.5 45
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FIGURE 3
SINGLE GENERATOR LOAD ANAlYBIS
CONDITIONS
START lIlJO TAKEOFF CRUISE N CRUISEN lAND
NIGHT NIGKT NIGHT it-35K FT 415K FT NIGHT
KVA KVA KVA KVA KVA KYA
TOTAl G",neralDr Cspaclty 30 3D
'" '"
25 30
OTAL Exisling loads 30.058 31.341 31.355 16.258 16.258 30.032
OTAL
After Removals Loads
25.641 26.53 26.388 16.122 16.122 24.481
TOTAl
Me; Added Avionic loads
30.767 31.Q39 31.933 20.406 20.406
"'.-
TOTAl
Alter Added FIAS Load *
28.284 29.4Q6 29.... 20.eS7 20.957 28.12
TOTAL LOAD
(After Inl2rior Mod)
28.697 29927 29.920 21.387 21.387 28.552
75 % Of Generator Capacity 24 24 24 24 20 24
NOTE 1, APU Compor.erns are not included Trley lnl inoperable during single genBl"B\or operatlon,
- NOTE 2: Loads prior to manual load shed. For manual load shed lisl, see FigUl'e 4.
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- FIGURE 4
3
MANUAL LOAD $HfD

-:
og

CONDITIONS
TAXI TAKEOFF CRUISE CRUISE LANDING
NIGHT NIGHT .....KFT NUJHT NIGHT
KVA KVA KVA KVA KVA
Single Generator Capacity JOKVA 30 KVA 25KVA 'OKVA
'" KVA
00% of GenenJtor Capaaty 24KVA 24 KVA 24 !<VA 20KVA 24KVA
TOTAl LOAD AFTER AUlD LOAD SHED 29,9 KVA 29.9KVA 21.4 KVA 21.4 KVA 26.6KVA
MANUAL LOAD SHED REQUIRED TO REDUCE TO 80% 5.9KVA 5.9KVA NONE 1.4 I<:lIA 4.6 K'lA
LOADS THAT CAN BE SHED: TYPE AMPSJKW
.,. Wing Inspecboo Lights 2.B 0.10 0.10 DC 0.10 NotReq.
Wing Lights DC 3. 0.10 0.10 NotReq. 0.10 0.10
Land'ngITQxI L&R Lights AC 1 KW 1.00 0.10 Not Req. 1.00 1.00
Nose Landing L&R Lights AC 0.6 KoN 0.10 0.50 NotReq. .50 .50
FMS No.1 DC 0.18 0.10 Not Req. 0.18 0.18
6.'
R Windshield Heater (Anti-Ice System) 2.52KW 2.B5 AC 2.66 0.10 Not Req. 2.65
l Windshield Healer (Anti-loe System) 2.65 AC 2.52 KW 0.10 NotReq. 2.65 2.65
R Window Heater (Antl--lce System) .84 0.64 AC 0.84 KW 0.10 NotReq. ..84
l Window HeaCer (Anti-loe System) O.84KW .84 0.10 .84 0.84 AC NotReq.
FtAS UNSW Grov.th 0.10 DC 12.0 0.42 . 42 0.42 NotReQ.
FIAS UNSW Growth AC 0.345 KW 0.10 Not Req. .3B
,.
.3B .3B
FD No. 2 DC 0.10 0.12 Not Req. 0.12 0.12
,.'
MFD No.2 DC 0.10 Not Req. 0.10 0.10 0.10
APU Fuel Pump DC 10.0 .J5 NotReq. . 35 0.10 0.35
HYO Fuel Pump 3A 1.8 t<N'i 3.45 AC 3.45 0.10 NotReq. 3.45
OTAl 13.66 13.68 13.68 AC KVA 13.66 0.00

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FIGURE 5
TOTAL DC LOAD ANALYSIS
"
i
;
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CONDITIONS
CAPACITY START TAXl TAKEOFF CRUISE CRUISE lAND
BUSITRU NIGHT NIGHT NIGHT N11-35K FT N45KFT NIGHT
AMPS AMPS AMPS AMPS AMP' AMPS AMP'
Bus NO.1 50.00 34.63 305.63 35.13 31.91 31.91 34.13
TRU NO.1
Utility BUB No.1 50.00 43.13 43.13 43.13 43.13 43.13 43.13
TOTAl 100.00 78.76 75.04 1726 77.76 76.26 75.04
Bus No. 2 31,65 31.05 50.00 31.65 31.65 31.05 31.65
TRU NO. Z
Utility Bus No.2 50.00 47.97 47.97 47.97 47.97 47.97 47.97
TOTAL too.OO 79.62 79.62 79.62 79.02 79-62 79.02
ESS Bus 50.00 20.335 19.230 19.230 19.230 19.230 19.230
ESS TRU NO.' Battery Bus 60.00 19243 19.589 19.588 19.586 19.643 '9.733
TOTAL 100.00 39.578 38.963 38.819 38.818 38.618 38.873
19.23(l ESSBus 50.00 20.335 19.230 19.230 19.230 19.230
ESS TRU NO.2 Battei)' Bus 50.00 19.243 19.589 19.733 19.588 19.588 19.643
TOTAL 100.00 39.576 38.819 38.963 38.616 38.618 38.873

00

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OPERATIONAU
REMAINING
MAINTRU
OPERATIONAlJ
REMAINING
ESSTRU
Revi.ionA
Revision B
Rwi$ion C
FIGURE ..
TOTAL DC LOAD ANALYSIS
ABNORMAL CONDrrtoN
CAPACITY
BUSlTRU
AMPS
START
NIGHT
AMPS
TAXI
NIGHT
AIIIPS
TAKEOff
NIGHT
AMPS
CRUiSE N
11-S6K FT
AIIIPS
CRUISE H
4SKFT
AMPS
LANP
NIGHT
AIIIPS
Bus No.1 50.00 34.63 35.63 35.13 31.91 31.91 34.13
utility Bus No. 1
BU5 No.2
50.00
50.00 31,65 I
(DIscOnnected When Crosstie Is Inibaled)
31.65 I 31.65 I 31.05 I
31,01) 31.65
Utility Bus No, 2
OTAl
50.00
100.00 66.28
(DiscoOl1ected When Crosstie 1$ loiliated)
67.28 66.18 62.96 62.96 6&.78
ESSBus 50.00 39.280 37.070 38.46(1 38.460 38.460 40.560
B8ttery Bus 50.00 37.701 38.391 39.406 38.391 38.391 38.501
TOTAl 100.00 76.9B1 75.461 71.1l66 76.851 76.851 79.061
12/13f2002 STC 09475 and 09418
311612005 IR Gam8r;i1 and Updat8
9/2212006 FDAUIFOR, lA1RCM, MMR
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OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
APPENDIX 5
LIGHTNING AND HIRF ANALYSIS REPORT
FOR THE
LI22/07 Page 5-1
REPORT No. 06-10
AVIATION $VSTEM STANDAROS PRoGRAM
OKLAHOMA CIT't'. OKLAHOMA
HIRFfLlghtning CODlLlderatioDs for Large Aircraft Infrared CODlllerDle8Sure
(LAJReM) SY!ltem,. ANJAAQ-24(V) Miss.Ue Defente System
Reviewed
R ~ i c w c d
Approved
Page 1 of3
Page 5-2
AVIA,ION SYSTEM STANDAROS PROGRAM
OKLAHotJlA CITY, OKLAHOMA
REPORT No. 06-10
AIIIATIONSY5TEtJ STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAI-o'OMA. CITY, OKLAHOMA No. 07-G9
V..g ofRevisi01l!l
-
i
No"
Date
P""
DesariJ)tioll Approved bU
-
" 1/12101 All releal':e
b-t.
"
0
1I12!{l7
1122/0'1 Page 5-3
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 00.10
OKlAHOMA. CITY, OKLAHOMA
REPORT No, 07-09
A. High Intensity Radiation Field (HIRF) and Lightning
This equipment is classified as nonessential and ncm-llight criticaL The s)'5lem is iDsIallcd in
accordance with manum.t:turcr's iDlitruc!iOns, Reference !nlcrfsce Control Document (lCD) for
(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Counlerme:a!JUJC8 (LArRCM) Ins\alllltion on FAA CL-600
Flight wpcctioo Aircraft, document. number 094-014642. All S)'Slem wiring ill: placed in double
ahieldiog, Wiring I1ln:> and LRU. are isolated from critical aircraft system! and wiring. The weMB
an: grounded at ail tennilLlltion System LRUB are grounded to the aircraft atnletute and
a dynamic impedance oflcss than 2 milliohms.
B. Conclusion
Afttt oon.&idering poo:lib1e HffiF and Lightning effecUl, it i!I wncllldcd that miniOlllI burdens lUI:
placed upon otht:r aircrs.ft tIIYIi[cmS or slnJCl1lrI2 by these effects.
1112f(l?
Page 3
1122/07 Page 5-4
AVIATfON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
APPENDIX 6
ICING ANALYSIS REPORT
FOR THE
1122107 Page 6-1
A\JlATION SYSTEM STANDArtDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAl-lOMA
REPORT No. D6-10
AV\A.TION SYSTEM SiANDARD& PROGRAM
OKlA.HOWi CliV, OkLAHOMA
Idag C<lusidtnttiona Aswn:iated wltb tbe Large Aircraft InfMll'ed
(LAIRCM) Inlltallatinn in Bombardier Inc. Model CL600-2816 (CT.-661-3Rl
SUbmitted.
14paStll (including Appendix)
1/22/07
AVIATjON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKVHOWlA
REPORT No. 0610
AVIATION SYSTEM STA\lDARDS PROGRAM
.Q.KlAHOMA. CITY, OKLAHOMA. REPORT NO. 0711
rNo. Date
I
lil9J07 All
..
-
L-.
L
I
-=L.
-
Desc _____r--A.pprovoo. by I
I Original n:Jease
. _. Lb-lP I
.
Ii I \l/07
Page 6-3
In2l07
AVIATION SVSTe.M STANDARDS PROGRAM

A. PulpOse ,_ , " . . , , 4
B. Synopsis , , .. _ _ _ _ 4
C. niscussion .. . , 4
O. Analyllis , " , , 7
1. Airflow disruption over ljft and flight cor.lrol surfaces " 7
2. Engine damage due to icc . , 8
E. Conclusion , 9
Appendices:
A. FAA CL601 LAIRCM Ill8ta\ll1tion CFD Analysis atMno and Mli .. , A-l
1119107 Page 3
1/2'1107 Page 6-4
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-'0
OKl...AHQMACITY, OKLAHOMA
A. Purpose
The purpoge of this repolt is (0 evaluate the impact that icing will have on the AA Bombardier
(Challenger) CL-6l)i Flight Inspecrion aircraft B.!I a ofthe installation of the Northrop Grumman
AN/AAQ-24{V) Large Aircrefl. Infrared Countenm:a5ure (LAlRCM) System.
B. Synopsis
report preseots a qualilative analysis or the impact of and rhe porentia! for aircraft icing as a
re9ult oftile LAIRCM installation. This qualitative analysis is intended to determine impact of
any resulting ice accumulation and its on the aircraft's FAR 25.1419 certification,
C. Diseusgion
The LAIRCM !ystem ia a state of the Irt electronic C<luntenneasurc s)'stt:rn, which uses laser enetgy
to defeat heat-seeking direcled at the aircraft. The LAlRCM system for this modification
consists of four Cl(lernal sensors 10 detect approaching missiles aod an exrerna\ rotating turret
containing an additional sensor Ind lager. The installation of the LAlRCM system 00 the FAA
ChallengC1 601 am:raft requires external modificatian5 to the aircraft. These external modifications
are exposed to the airstream throughout aU pha.scs of aiK:raft flight. The petmanenl ei\leITlllI
modificatiMls consist offonr permanent external fairings. A unique feature ofthis modificatirm is
Ibal it is provisional. The LAlRCM system is removable and only intended for installation and use
when the system i. required. When the LAIRCM system ill iMtalled on the aircraft. the ex:temal
sensors and Small Laser Tnm:rnitter Assembly (SLTA) arc mounted on the excerior of the airframe
and expooed tIl the nutside 8irfiow. Two of the four sensors arc instaJled in pcrmanent forward facing
external fairings located below the wing leading edge at the wing rool. The remaining two sensors
am installed in aft mcing fairings located on lhe orlhe rear fuselage below flnd bclJind the
C!lgines. The SLTA is installed in the toil of the aircraft on the bottom oftbe fuselage juat forward of
Ihe aft equipnent entry hatch. Reference flgureil 1 Ihrough 3 for a detailed view of the LAmCM
.system inslJlllation. II i9 important to nnte thLl the LA.IR.CM: genllors arc heated to prcveJ1l ice
accumulation from interfering with thr:.ir proper function. In addition, the SLTA rurret contains
internal heat sources and rotatlls during nonnal opcretion. When the LAlRCM system is nol in!ttalled.
the sensOfS 1IIld SLTA src n::movcd and blanking plale.i are Il cover the opening//. The only
remaining external changes to the aircraft arc the sensor fairing!:. Reference figures 4 and 5 for
detailed views oflhe sensor and SLTA blanking plate insllliialions.
1119107 Page 4
\122/07 Page 6-5
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0 6 ~ 1 0
A\MTION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
Figure I
Figure 2
1/19/07 Page 5
1/22101 Page 6-6
AVlATiOO SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKlAHOMA CIT\'. OKLAI10MA
Figure 3
Figure 4
1119107 Page 6
1f22JO? Page 6-7
OKLAHDt.lA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
OKLAHOIIAA. CrTY, OI<LAHOMA REPORT No. 07-11
Figure :'i
D. Analysis
An 8IIalysis of the external airflow changes n:suiTing from the LATRCM inslalJalion has
bCCl1 performed. This IlIU1lysis was in the form ofcomputlilional fluid dynamics (CFD) a[llllysis
conducted by the ain..'Taft manufacturer Bombardier Aerospace. The results of tbe CFD analysis
clearly iltustnlte the airflow patterns atOlllId the ain::rnft prior lD and sUhllequent to the LAIRCM
modificalioll. Reference appendbo; A. The re;;ulls of the CFD analysis have been vaJidtited through
high-speed flight-testing in compliance with FAR 25.25 l(b).
The aircrtlft safety concerns regarding ice accumulation are: I) airflow disruption over lifl and flight
control awfaces, and 2) engine damage due to jet:
1. Airflow disruption over lifl. and flight control surfaces
An examination of the edemal modiflctltior\; to the Challenger ain..'Taft re\lulting from tlu:
LAIRCM (ns,all.lIrion clearly fincls the only potential for dismrnion ofairflow over lift or fligllt
control surfaus is fCOlO the fOIWard IlCrulOr fairing installatiol1. The forward sensor tairings are
located on the wing to body fairing, below the leading edge of the wing. An examination of
figures 8 and 9 (Appendix A) of the Bombardier CFD 6I"lalysis cleorly shows tbat tbe airflow over
the wil1g ill not disrupted by the fOlward fairing instaJlalion. The CFD analysig .11150 &hows the
airfloW surrounding the fOIWard jensors lind their El6-Soeiate fllir.ngs 10 pass below IhI:: wing. For
lhiJ rellSOn, a disruption of the air!law due: to ice accumultlting on the forward sensor fairing will
11IlJer the wing atlhe wing root Ilnd therelvre not considered ID be 3 huard to flight.
Refer to figures 4 and 5 fur detailed vie'WS of the forward fairing insl.alllliiall in relation to the
wing leading edge.
1/19107 Page 7
tn2l07 Page 6-8
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
AVlAnON SYSTE.M STANOAROS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA Cln', OKLAHOMA REpORT No. 07-11
2. PJlgine damage due 10 ice ingeslion
An eJt.Il.mination of Ihe external modifications to lhe Challenger aircraft resulting from the
L,AIRCM inst2.Ltalion shows Ihat the only jlOleJllia.l cause for engine damage due to ice
ingelllion is from the rorwa-rd sensor fairing installation. The forward sensor fairings are loca-ted
on the wing to body fairing, bdow the leading edge of the wing. An examination of figures 8 and
9 (Appendix A) orthe Bombardier CFD ana-lysis clcllI]y shows that airflow !lIlrrounding the
forward sensors and weir associate fairin81l passes below the wing. The shedding ofiee as a
result of ice accumulation on the fOTWllId seNor fairings will therefore also pan below the wing
and pose no hlt'l.lrd 10 the engines. Refer tv figures 6 and 7 ror detailed views of the forward
rairing instllllation in n:lation to the aircraR
Figure 6
1/19107 Pagc 8
1122107 Page 6-9
AVlAiK>N SVSiEU STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKlAHOMA CITYI OKl..AHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVIATION SVSTEIor1 STANDARDS PROGRAM
FiSU"" 1
E. ConclusioD
The ll:presentoo by IhiG report cODcludes there i5 no incn:lIscd hazllI'd 10 safety of flight due
to icing as a refiult of modifications made to the Challengewo 6nl llircmflllffect.ed by fhe LArRCM
JnodiliClllion.
1/19107
1122/07 Page 6-10
A v r A T I O ~ SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKL.AJ-lOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
APPENDIX 7
INITIAL EVALUATION FOR COMPATIBILITY WITH
PREVIOUS ALTERATIONS AND AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
FOR THE
lfl1J07 Page 7-1
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT No. 06-10
APPENDIX 7
INITIAL EVALUATION FOR COMPATIBILITY WITH
PREVIOUS ALTERATIONS AND AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
FOR THE
1/2'))01 Page 7-1
AWIl,TION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKI.AHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPQ,"nNo. 0 6 ~ 1 0
AVJ,ItoTlON S1STEM STANlJARoS PROGRAIA
OKLAHOMA CITY. Ol<[AHOM'A
ENGINEERING REPORT C7-1C
Compatibility ofSTC Sl096411AC.D with Other AJtentions
8uhmitted ,
1<eviewcd
/1/4/d17
Date
Page 7-2
1/22/{}7
--
AVIA..:ION SYSTEM STANOAR.OS PROGRAM
OKLAHCtflA CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
AVlAnONSYSTEM S-:-ANDARo$ Pf{OGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKL.At:lMA
-
I No. Om, Pllg...
r
1/19/07 An ,

I
-
vescription
Ori$i.rml -1
g:!:,"h'l
-I
I
I
I I
lil9107
1/22/07
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REeORT No. 06-10
AVIATION SYSlEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKt-t.HQMA CITY, OKlAHOMA REpORT No. 07-10
A. PllIPOse
This report addresses compatibility of Northrop GnlrfUMn Large Airc:rafl. Infrared Countermeaaure
(LAlRCM) System, AN/AAQ-24{V), a1taration Lmder STC ST0964l)ACD with
previPus alanllolL!l end ainllorthiness diR:Glives applicable to BombardierInc. ClAiOQ-2D16
(CL-6QI) Flight Inspection ain:rafl.,
B. DillCllSlilln
Thill is the:first installation of the Northrop Grumman ANfAAQ-24(Vl Large Airc.raft Infrared
System on a Bombardier (Challenger) aircraU.
An anal)'llUl hal> been perfOl'IJ1Lld to dcu:rmine lhe compatibility oflhe Northrop Gnmllnan ANfAAQ
24{V) Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure System instabtiOll with all FAA flight inspec.ti<ln
Challcngn CL-601 airaafl. syst=, and ell previDus altcnr.tions and airworthiness directives. The
compat.ibility anslyais \Vll.8 performed to eatabli,h compatibility with the ab:nft listed on the
ll'lI:Idification imtrud..ions. Eogincc.ring Order (EO) 0509-10, "Luge Airt:raft Infrared
CoU11terTnetlsure (LAIRCM) AN/AAQ-24(V) Defense In<;lftlbrtion." A p:ev:ious STC
SA91768C-O and Bulletin 6010537 are affected by this alteration. The accomplishment of
00 06..{19-O9, "'Empennage She.[ves," and EO 06-09-10, ''Rt::loc.ate Auxiliary Air Conditioner Pallet,"
addrCllSeS all compatibility issues illillociated with the !lCCOIllpliahment of EO 05-09-10.
C. COJlC\U&:ion
The I..AIR.CM altemtion, as iostatlod WJdl2" STC STIl964()ACD, i' compatible with all previoul
alteratiONl and alt aircraft system.;; on the aircraft listed on the Modificalicm InlitrUctions,
EO 05-09-10.
1/19107 Page 3
lmi07
Page 7-4
OKLAHOMA CITY> OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
OKLAHOMA Crrv, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0711
APPENDIX A
1119/07 Page A-l
1112/07 Page 6-11
AVjATJON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKi.AHQt\rlA REPORT No. 06-10
AWHION SYSTEM STANOAROS PROGRAM
OJ<lAHOUACrTY, OKLAHOr.'A REF'ORT No 07-1 r
BOMBARDIER
MEMO
DAn Nov, 20, 2000
SUPCT FAA CL601 i.AIRCM Installation CFO Analys'rs at M"o and MJ
FROM
TO
REffR!NCf AA!Cl15D :jD6-()1/;iW
CC
IC-V' _
Referenees
1) AlAA-ZiJ01-0553, Uft & Mcment Estimatas of TransoniC using Itle NaVier
Stokes !:qu!ltlorrs", S. Klausmeyer
Introduction
This merro documents the CFD anafysis of a LAtRCM (Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures) equipped Challenge.r CL"501 1n support of co'TIpllance to FAR25.251(b)
VlbratlOn and Buffet. As illustri!ted in R9ure 1 the mollifications 011 the aircraft g&lmetr)' indude
two fol'VRlTCl (on the flnet) and J:w(l aft (on the side of the aft: sensor fairings, as well
as a certral (uncer the ,-oar fuselese centered at BLO, FS86S). The wrret has a cirwlar
base. in diameter, and protrudes normal to the surfare in its :l'Iinimum drag
configuration. The analySis was tor Cl-t01 maximum operatIng and dive Mach
l"umhel" flight colloit:ions provided by the Fligh: SCiences Group: M"1O:=:/J.85; imd
Mo==O.90, n ",LEo .. tan altitc.lde of ft.
_.
The CAD surfaces were derive-J from points of the sensor fairings and me turret
\\fI'llct1 we. r&eived from Malk Whittington, Mechanical 5y5terns PAS of !:tie FAA, in an e-mail
dated Oct 27, lODe. The: points were converted intD 3D surfolces In CArrA V4 by tI1e
f'1amrli."IE'S" Group (With the CLOUD function) (Fig 2 3). FOr tt1e turret ony, 2D drawing;; we
also used 10 get a better definition of the surface C"igure 4). The mesh was gel'erated uslng the
com!T'l8rda1 mesM generatlon package lCEMCFD-TetJ"aJPris11 conslsrs of 7 million nodes
"dt'! rafincment around t,"\e sensors and the turret as illustrated in Figure S. The
we.Te COMl.lcted using NSiJ3D CFO code, Th:S is a Reynolds-averill;eQ solver
,hat U2S k-[,) or Spalart-Allmaras turbulence model!ng with an unstructured grid that can be
tailored to provide a high definitiDn of the flow cha'acteristics arolJnd small details of a
rnnfiguration. The code sho",,'S good. agreement beDNeell and measured pressure
rlistriblJt!ons and as documented in Ref. :. The code has bean usee e'>rtensively
or Qttie:" Bombardie.r akcraft to model high-speed conditbns witt'l fiOlN separation. Fig. 6 shows
P>lgeA-2
W210J Page 6 1:2
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKI.AHOMA R6PORT NO. 07-11
the NSU3D solution on the CL604 wing-body-nacelle configuration ;n buffet, with extensive
shock-Induced flow separation. Also shown is a correlation of the NSU3D wing pressure
distribution at mid-span with wind tunnel data. The code shows good agreement with the
meilSllred data, even in the separation zone. Fig, 7 shows good correlation between NSU3D and
wind tunnel pressures on the fuselage for the Global Express wlng-body-natelle, In the present
analysis, the geometry is a Challenger CL-601 Wing body engine configuration (dean wing flap
0) with LAIRCM sensors and bJrret. The model 'Nithout sensors and turret was use<! as baseline
for canparison to verify the differences in aerodynamic characteristics. Moreover, resu1,ts at Mo
are compared to those at Mmo to verify the in aerodynamic flow properties with the
LAIRCM components. For this analysis, NSU3D was used with Spalart-Allmaras turbulence
modeling.
Results
Aerodvnamir; forces: NSU3D predicted an insignifICant change in the J[ft and pitching moment
coefficients between the clean and the LAIRCM equipped aircraft foc both M"", and Mo, We
e51:imalE the cruise drag to be 15-20 aircraft drags counts higher for LAIRCM eQuipped aircraft
compared to the baseline CL-601.
Shock Formation and Flow seoaration: Pressure distributions and the skin friction lines show
that:
1. Local flow separation is pretlicted on t'rle forward sensor fairing with no significant
disturbance (impact) on the inboartl 'hing at MIIKI as 'NeU as at Mo as illu5trclted in Figures 8
and 9.
2. The aft sensor fairing produces a separclted region behind it The trace of the flow
disblrbaoce downstream does not vary Significantly between MillO and Me (Fig. 10 and 11).
3. The central turret produces a large horseshoe vortex for txJth Mil' and Mocases. The trace
of this vortex is somewhat larger on the M=o.9 solution (Fig. 12). The pressure distribution
on the shows a leading edge suction spike terminating in a shod: follO'Ned by a
shock-induced sepal<lt:ed flow rE:{jion behind it (Ag. 13-16). The now reattaches about 45
In downstream on the fuselage as illustrated in Figure 15. The peak Mach number over
turret is 1.36 and 1.42 for the M"", and Mo case, respectively (Fig. 14). The recirculation
l"I!9ions around the turret are slightly bigger at MD compared to MIl\lI, hQINever the now
strudure is similar (Fig. 16),
Arlodynamic Forces:
Vibration and buffet certification of the LAIRCM installation Will be based on a flight test .
demonstration to Mach 0.875 (Le.; mid way between Mmo and Mo) and CFD comparisons of the
flow conditions with and without the LAIRCM installation at M"", and Mo,
Based on the CFD analyses presented, t:f1e forward and aft sen5Ol' fairings should nat
significantly effect aircraft vibration and buffet. The fairings are predicted to have a modest
effect on the local flow and the predictions at M"", and Mo are quite similar. The horseshoe
vortex and shock: induced fiow separations predicted ror the central may generate :some
vibration and buffet However, the location of the bJrret should minimize the effect on the
1/19107 Page A-3
1122107 Page 6-13
AVIATION SYSTEM STAl'JDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT No 06-10
AVIATION SVSTE!J STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CI1Y QlQ.AAOMA. REPeAT No. 01-11
airctaft and ttl!'!. predicti<ms Mrm and M) are. similare. Any vibTi3tion and buffet can be sensIbly
eS5ed ':,y the. propose.c flight dBlTlonstratlon to Macn 0.875.
candusJons
The. Q.llTent CFD analyses confirm tha: a test demonstration b:l Mach 0.875 Will suffice to
et'lllfal:\"eri"e any vibration ,!rid buffet that may be caused by tile LAlRCM installation.
Group Leader l.oiIds 81Symlms: Sllppo1:t
Adv!mr.ed Ae;"OOyn$m!cs
Princlpol Engln.. PJinclpal EngineerIng Spedallst
Advanced AerodVllBn1lcs Oynamlcs
3
111 '1/07
P"-.81l A-4
1!2YQ7
AVIATION SYSTEU STANDAFWS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHQrAA REI'ORTNo.0711
Figure 1: LAIRCM equipped ChaliengerCL-601
1/19107 Page A-5
1/22107 Page 6-15
OKLAHONA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0610
AVlATlON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGIW.l
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA.
Figure 2: Picture of fcr.vard sensor falTlng (Top and the zoom bottom left)
and the CAD model (bottom right)
1119107 PllgeA-6
Im/o? Page 6 16
OKLAHOMA CITYI OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
Figure 3: Picture or the aft sensor fairing (top and Ihe zoom lop right) end the CAD model (bottom)
1/[9107 Page A-7
1/22107 Page 6-17
OKLAHOMA CrTY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0610
AVIATIOIII SYSTEM STMlDAROS PROGRAM
Figure 4: Picture of the turret (lop and the zoom top right) and the CAD moclel (bottom)
1/19/07 P:l.geA 8
[/22107 Page 6-18
AVIATION SYSTEt.I STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK1AHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
AVIATION SVSTEJ.1 STANOARDS PROGRAM
OKlAHOMA. CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 07-11
Figure 5: Surface mesh of CL-601 WBN configuration with rafif'lemenl around sarlsors and lurrat
l J l ~ 1 0 7 PlIge A-9
1122107 Page 6-19
AVlA.TION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
AVIATION SYSTEM STANOAROS PROGRAM
QKL..AJ.)MA CITY, OKLAHOMA. REPORT No. 07-11
;
(
, I
\. .
,.._, '.,'
l \, \ '
'\\ \
:;,' ;
\' ;
_-us

p.,.
Figure 6: NSU3D Correlatiol"l on CL604 COl"lfiguration
I
;
, I
,-'-+.....--
. ,+ .
. _-,-.:-_L. _._, .;-=-:r :: 'L:..
'" '"
I
___-I
,----_.- ._-------
Figure 7: NSU30 Correlation on Global Express Configuration
1/19107 Page A-IO
1/22J07 Page 6-20
OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
AVIATION SVSTEU SrANDAROS PROGRAM
OKLAHOtM. CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 07-11
Figure 8: Inboard wing pressure and skin friction lines withDut and with the sen50r al M
mo
Figure 9: Cl--601 Inb08.rd wing prassura and skin friction lines without and wilh tha sensor at M
D
1/19107 Pagt:A-ll
1/22107 Page 6-21
AVIATION SYSTEM STMOARDS PROGRAM
OKlAl-lOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0 6 ~ 1 0
OKl..AJ1QMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 07-11
Figure 10: CL-601 tailcone pressure and skin friction lines without and \lfllh the sensor at M"",
Figure 11: CL6I)1 tailcone pressure and skin friction lines without and with the lOensQ\' at M
o
lJI9J07 Page A-12
1/22107 Page 6-22
OKLAHOMA CITY, O\<L.AHOMA REPORT NO. 06-10
OKl.AtK)MA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0711
Figure 12: P!'&SSute distribution and skin friction lines at M".., (Jeflligures) and at Mo (right figures)
1119/07 Page A-13
1122)07
OKLAHOMA CITY, OI<lAHOMA REPORT NO. 07_1, 1
:r ..
Bl:.dtA .
Ifu'i'li ..' t .1iOplitJ'
:t:
. .,"
I .
.J
"M
,Ui '"
-r,(J 't--:------T- !
.

'<
,.

,
'.
',-'
'>'\iil<'
,
Figure 13; BLO Pressure Cuts at M
mo
(left) and MD (right)
Figure 14: Mach number distribution in of symmetry al M.,.., (IBft figure) and Mo (right figure)
Jll9/07 Page A_14
1122/ffi Page 6-24
A.VlATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OI<l.AHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0711
Figure 15: Symmetry plane $l((!6Ill lin&.! at Mono (black) and M
o
(red)
Figure 16: The flow around (hEl turret at M"., (tett) and at Mo (right)
Jll9107 Page A-1S
1121107 Page 6-25
OKLAHOMA CITY I OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
APPENDIX A
HAZARD LOG WORKSHEET SUMMARY
A-1
Ifl.2I07 Page 1-34

,
I,
SYSTEM!
Su'aSYstEM
fUN'll
Prooessor.
CIU, MWS,
SlTA

CIU.MWS,
SLTA
'"
"
.,. "

SYSTEM
EVNT
......E
,
Openltion,
MainlenanoCe.
& Test
Operll\ion,
Malnlilnancl",
T""
HAZARD ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
HAUIU) IIEVEBIIX
I CATABTRDl"HIC
II CRIJICAL
III MMOINAl
IV NEGLIGIBLE;:
, HAZARD'
;EF'F.ECTS "ft" , '".IN!T.
dES'ORIJ?'nO.N
,'SvS'rE:M HAZ" twZ.'
, . "
i'
0"'
unlt
TIIlnpenl!urel damage If not
Loss f)1 Cooling protected at
critical
loaJliOllIl.
Pow", I PotllnIiel
Transients! da/nflge 10
Anomelies equlpmenl
from powef
mmslenlsJ
anomali..",
$!i;;V" ';I;>RO
cAT.: B
II 'Ie
'"
c
HP"'D PROBAlll!IY
A FREQUENT
., PIlOIlABLE
C OCCo\SIONAL
D N!MOTE
IMPI'O&ABU!
HAZARa
CONTRO)..8,
PrClCe$1;DI lRU contains two fans for oooling
and ovel1emp switch. SLTA contalns three
overtemp llwilchGli. Viper laser
one fan and two seosors. MWS
oont1lk'ls IntemallhermiS1Dr.
AIrcraft circuit b,ellw", proVIde prime
lJVIIroul1llfl! prot,,::tiorl.
IfJll!flllll Processor lRU low voitaga po.._
Is monllonld: fault cin::uilry perfortlVl
sl'MJldlJ'Ml ror penislerrt oul-of-tolenmC8
c;ondlliollG. Shuld<Joloon Us BYi::lanlllJ "Ircrew
via CIU dlsplBy.
CIU eonlai/ls EMI fillers and protBcl:ion
circuilry.
- SLTA contains Iranslem. pruJSclion. (MIf
vollagl! rTlQf1i1onng, and ahort circuit
ITIQnllPJiOll. Shutdown upon failure Is
eWl",fIlltl ";rel'eW via CIU display.
" SLTA Viper Laser l:OfltaiO$
cirouilry against inpul pc:r.Nllf and intemat
power oonditlons. Shutdown upon failure
eYidenllo alrcrew Via CIU display.
"HAZ.. j HAl.
,SEV. PROS'
WITH Wl'rH
COtfr _ ,CoNT,
R""
'ASsess
"""
MEO
"ED
"
'"
E
E
STATUS
0
j!SS

>'"
-

..
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<:
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'"

\l
"
m
"
"
"l
3 I OELETEO
A-2

0

MAlMQ ft!.lll!!RITY HMARQ P8QBAII' rrx
I CATAllTROf'tiIC A fRlQUINT
n CRITICAL II PkOBHIL.I
UI MAROINAl. C OCCAItIOtrW..
IV NI!GUGIBL!! fI RiMDTI
IE IMPR08AElLE
' ' ':, "D ' HAl-

"SYSTEM .. i;HAlARQ 'EFFECT8 QIIt
..
INIT;"
NO. .
SY$.TEM, . HAZ. '
,I UNIT Pt(ASE
., SEV..' PRO
,
cAt'.
,'8 '
4 PtOOe$SOl", Operalil>n, /1ot Syrf8ces PllIel'llial minor In D
MWS, SLTA Maintenance, injury 10
T6$1 & penlOnnel.
H..-..:Iling
I
,
,
I
,
,
Processor, IlWIllIIatlon. liftingfHandling Potential U C
SLTA
Uo" dam9ge-1O
H'ndling, '"
LRU{,) if
Tl'llnspor1 acclderollilly
dropped
potenUal Injury
10 personnel ir

imDro

Prooossor, Operation Noise Leyels Po\tIr.\ial minor
'V D
SlTA ocClJpiltlon;a1
OOilrir1g e'fIat:ll5
to personnel
from exoessiYe
noise levelS.
,

.' '
'. ,:.
SLTil. 8ml MWS are ooDlIl(j by air
ctmwedkm. lrd9mally mount"d lRU,.
ina:npcnrte oooling I&Jl3 lind over1ll11lP
_nslng cll1;uitry. Upon fallyrll 01 MWS
window heawr t1rc:uIlry, MWS 'MndOw tI'Ia)I
roaoh exlBmillllemPflre!yre
17"C """'" ambient. Umer fhi, c:ondnlon,
1he window may reach II 11lmP0lDIuro of
42"C i1111fl ambient 1Bmper'll'\Ure,oI 25'C,
which 1. below the MILHD8K-454 end Mll_
lhreehllld6 ofc:onoem. BlIlIed on
pl9llious. worst-t&$IIl! assumptions (temp. up
to 16aoc).lhe MWS window is silkscnened
.,.,.;111 a 'Window May 8e Hoi" warning.
HRZard oommunlcatlon and pnlCllvtions are
also feflacted in T.O,s basltd.m "reYlOllS
Bupplie, estimate 01 hlgher-lempllfalure
window,
Two handl,s j)J'CI'Iilled on Pf0C8lllO<' LRU.
MuRiple hnndling "'lVII' on SLTA h3l1ldling
fixture, LRU weights 8nd handiing limits an>
lBbeled: on the LRU. Suitable
are provided In T,O.6
P,ak noiee lev!:'! has been meal;tJred at81
dB(A}, well below the OSHA action
level of85 dB(A). No further is
nBC8&BIIIY

-
w

A-3
HAZ-. STAniS ..... HAZ
.....,
PROB SEV
' level
.CONT
WITH WITH'
CONT
,V E LOW
,
U D MED
E
'V .LOVV:
,

S:>
:I::::!
00
",Z
>m
, -<
go>
........
--<
Om

Z
I

"' 'tl
;n
o
'"

'!\
z
p

o

tlAZN!O 'm8rry IWARP PROIABR.IJY
I CATAlTROI'HIC A fAEQUENT
II CRrrlC.AL 8 PROIlMLE
"I WlRQINAl. c:: OCI:M1ONAL
IV Nf.GLIG.l.f (I _ ..OTE
I' IMPROBABLE
I'lAZ. 'sYSTEMI 'SYSTEM HAmlD :INlT: WIT
NO. SUBSystEM EVENT' DESCRIPTION SYSTEM HA2. "'HAl..
l'liiIJrr PHAsE
,
SEIi.' "PRO'
'CAT. B"
,
Processor. Operation. Contac1 With PDtenlial minor III 0
SlTA Maintenance. FI!lI''' inju.ry to
Blades pelTilXlnel dUll
10 acdd!llf1lal
cDJllacl.
8 Processor. Maintenance, Eledroalatic PoIl'fllilll III C
CIU.MWS,
'''''',
DI,oolllge dllrnllge to
SLTA (ESO) IIquipmllnl
Packaging & II\Ilj' occur due
Handling to &lillie charge
from personnel
handling t,lnils

9 ProcellSOl'. Inst8Ualion, Connection Poteotial
damage to !
III 0
CIU,IolWS, Maintlmance & MI'COlVlllction
SLTA TK' I ,
i \OofIhout
ilppropri!de
,
keying. ,
I"Proceuor, I Installation. Sharp Comers! Potential mloor III D
CIU,IolWS, ' Maintenance, Pinch Areas , Injury 10
SLTA ' ManufacturinG, I personJ1!l1 I'mm
Test &
ishilrp
Hand6ng.
Iedges/pinch
arelilli.
'HAZARD'
'; contRoLS
Inlet lind outlelll:Craens plltVam pllrsormel
RCalSS.
CIU. MWS SlInsor, and SLTA LRUs are
labeled with ESO cautlon label. ESO
protective caps lira plllided on delivgred
Internal SRL19 BIB labeled wiIh ESO
symbol. Generill shop prac1ice TO",
provide iRrormBllon 011 h,Jndli"" prtl"AuliofMl
and procedureB ESDllen"';ve de....
All connectors oHM! kind ..re keyed
uniquely. LRU chassis conl..ln toIlneoctor
refe/'el1oo designator in the viDinity D1' ellCh
connector. Cables contain CIIble
end deslgllation. T.O.s renact ronrec1ion
iJVIlnJclion.
AI! LRU edges are cl1amf9rlld sufficignUyto
evoid II ..llIlTl' edge hl!lZard. tW
pif1ch polm except llI5Sociated wit'" moving
lurrel (Jllferenoe Hazard Log Sequence
#23).
.:> '"

,
-

A-4
HAl:.
SEV.
WITH
.CONT
III
HAZ RISk
PROS: -

WITl-l,
l"'"
CONt.
E "ED
,
'STATUS'
III 0 "ED
III E "ED
III E MEO

00

'"'Ul

- "
Om

"'0

>0
'" "0
D
g

m
'"
0
"
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a
,
a

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51

d:: ""

w

HAZARP BEVUUfY HAZARD PRQI....LlTI
I CATAIn'RCFtlIC A I'1'l:lUEJfT
II CRITICAL D PIllO&A8LE
III .....ROIlJIAL C OCCA&10111AL
IV NEGLIG_Ul! D REMOTE
E IMPROBABLE
HAL SYSTEM! SYSTE.t.A" ' , 'HAZARD,..' El;FECTSON QNlT. IN!T
NO. SUBSVslEM EvENT _[)ESCRI.PTICN": '. SY$TEM , "HAZ. 'HAz.'
I UNIT ' PHASE
,-",.' ','.
SfV'>
,,'0

GAT:
"
Proco:ssor, tnslalaijon. Mainle"""ce Pult!"tial mloor
'"
C
CIU..'\4WS. Main1Bnenca,
"'-
""'",,,
dama.gelO .
SLTA Test &

I
,
I
I
,
,
HNZAAO ,
..

The Pracesoor, CIU. MWS Sensors, and
SLTA units are ttl minimize the
I pmbablTIly of rnairoll'lUIInce induced damage
by; T) providing modullilr de5illll 01
assemblies b _ oflTl.lllil1lell3l"U,:1.)
kel'ing connectors which prevenlllimprop8f
irl8Brticn lind pruvElI1Ill potentilll damage III
equipn1E!nt. 3) IdentillcallolllBbeling of LRU
COfWlllo1iPll". 4}lilbgl5locirtlld on equjpmenl
Indicaling wlue.s to ensure the proper
IOIllUC Icr im.tall&1ion of h.n:lloft;lre i&
perfOrmed, end 5) for bnl mainled'lance 11M
results, ft Is Iha u,,,or
follow mchnical manual pro:e::lUtl!S VIitIlDUl.
from them for the mailltenar>cll of
tI'lc LAIRCM LRUs. Informillion nole 19
plOlo'ided on lhe LRU Indicating
Iorqua for LRU COVBr
Pnltecijve caps are prOYtded lor
LRU Alsc, T.O.s COfIlElin
WIImk1llS BrId caullarul to follow when
performmllllllf1llflll ma;nla1l1nce and
cleaning op8o'ftOl'lB to rMuc:e risk of
maintellllnee Induced dllm

. HAZ. STATUS HAZ.
, ASS8&G SE.V.' PROS
"'"
wm<
"'... ,
CONT CONT
'"
0 MEO
I
I
A-5

"
>1;
00 "'

-iii
.=< "
0",

50

"

f1I
0
"
"l
Z
0
'"
0

0
0
srA11J$' HAL --HAl "'.'1'.", HAl..A80" i]NIT' SYSTeM;' SYSTEMI HAZ.

".yARO .maITY ttmIID PROBtdllllII'
I CATABTl'loPlilC A FREQUENT
'I CRITIC,I,L 8 PROBABLE
'I lMfCOllW.. C OCCASIONAL
rv NEGLIllIBL..E 0 Kl!1I01l!
E IIiPROBABLE
NO. sUSsYsTi;M
"I UNiT:
, EVENT'
:.':PHASE

':,;

HAz.
SEV
CAT.
-:1: 'I'
PRO, '
.'
.' oNTROLS SW
wnH
caNT
P'ROB
WnH
, CONT
Assess

"
Proressor. Flight Exolo$fue Potential fuel o - Elltplo:'lJ:iW8 atmosph....e le!:llifl9 E
CIU,MWS, OperaliOn Almo.6pt>ere lind fuel qualfficatlon testing was performod per 'I MEO
SLTA
""""
Northrop Gtumman dot:'.IlTltmt #093-012126
oon\8leting 11M! uUna MIL-STD-810E, MaltllX1511.3,
eQuipment Proceou.e I, The ProcesllQr, C1U, MWS
OO'"ll SensMI and SlTA have suo::essfully
operation. lhull PB1lBlld tI!lsling in an GJlPb&Ive
. caulling alm<lSphere enYlr<;>M1en1,
perterrtlal The PllXlessor qUIlIil'"IC,lIion
j C<lledn;lphic II';S!;nll willi cov,,", removi!'d using n
I l3'I'lInts to HI!ll<arll'. The CIU completed
I iliraaft and testllll remOll8d ullng n-4-lli!l<llne
PtIt80nneL and BulB100 The ,lAWS SE!I'>8OI'll 8I'E'
hennelicilly en.I qualificaUon le611llll
ualng n-liexanB. Thl1l.1:WS SeMOrtl we,e
0pllraled making and llreaking all el"elrlcal
oonlRcls
Thl'l SLTA Tn.>n5lTlitlerunlb IIro
9Elllled and qUillifica!iol'
I85led In an e;lplD6lYe ratl11QBpheJ'e
en'f'ironment wtItl ro'l'lCN'Od lUling
Butane and H_ne expll>Slwe fuel. Tile
SI..TA COOlllUla II seel (().rIng) between
lhese uRb 10 providll II
from e:.tIt!o....,\ elemerolB. Relel'enee'
EnvironmGlltal Qualification Test Flnlll
RQPOrt for VIper I..ascr SRU 001-007907
ckIQJment number 3lM..ool:20 I. Aooenr:lix J.
"
MWS.SlTA
''''''
Waler Intrusion Potemial 111 o Tha SlTA units are envirunmentally sealed. III E MEO
Opef'll\\()n in d\lmege to The MWS Sensors are I;llaled.
Rain .demel The SLTA lind MWS SeI1SOIS are designed
J1lOIJnled to prevent molstUl'e. rain or water spray from
"CIU!pment, enhlring t/>eo unit. Tt>e SLTA and MWS
Sensors are qUIIIlNcalion I85led 101"
?
I I I I I I rairv'waterproof-nBS!l. I I I
"'

Ae

,,
r>
>..,
H
>cn

-..,
::im
<: .
0",

<:,. 0"
>2

"1

o

::?

'HAZ,
'NO.
SYSTEMI
SUBSYSTEM
I UNIT
SYSTEM
EVENT
PHAS'
. Ol:SCRIPIJON'
14 Processor,
ClU,MWS,
SLTA
Ground
Maintenance,
Hilrd Landing
Impact Oamaoe
I
"
Pr00B6S0r,
CIU, MWS,
SLTA
Qpel<l\iOrl 'MI
I
I
"
MWS,SLTA low le.et
Flighl
OperatIOn,
Takeoff and
Landing
fO'
MWS
SLTA&
I
"
MWS, SLTA Flight
Operation,
Oro"'"
M..lnlllll8l1oo
lcingonSLTA&
MWS Windows
H.t.ZA8D 'EIlERT!! HAZARD PRptwIlLrTY
I CATASTROPHIC A I'RmWNT
II CRITICAL 8 PROBABLE
III MAAGINAL C OCCASIONAL
IV NEGUOIDLE 0 RtlolOTf:
I! IMPROILlEIU::
':IiF.fECTS 0fj
, 'SYJiTEM
" ,i"
POlential
dllmegeto
equlpmflnl.
Degradation of
LAIRCM or
otIwr aircr:aft
elE!mems fi"om
EMI,
INIT ' INIT:':
liAZ," :HAl:'
',,,"RD.
cAT,',.
rr C
HI C
I
I
HAZARD
.. CONTROLS
. . ,-,
- The Prooessor, CIU, SL TA and MWS
Sensors have passlld vibratiorl and shock
qualific:atlorl tesl!l, Thll performarllOe
spet:ific;rtion for openrtioolll $/lock Is E)
and fur c::rnh ShOCk IS 30 G's. TJ\i5 i;;
as epecjfgj In dorumanl1lO93-o12121'L
- Reference: Envirl:lrlmental QualtllCiilllon
Tesl FInllI Repon 10>1 VIper LalO8r SRU 001
007901 dowment number 394--001201,
Aooendi,l( I<.
- The legacy PlOCll$$Or. ClU. SlTA
units iIIld /oGoNS are
deelgned to meet lIle re.quiremllnle of Mil"
E"8051 Of' MIL-STD-1g1a as appropriate.
The Eleclfoma9nellc COmP8\lblilly (EMCj
emission 3l'ld &U6ceplibililV requiremenl5 or
MIL-STD-461D sod 4620 leSI melhods as
taiklred: CE102. CS10t, CS1 1<11, CS115,
CS116, RE102. RS103.
- Reference: VIper Laallr EMI qualifil2litlll
reslllb parthe Envlronrnenllol
QlllililiC6\iQn Test Fiool Report forY';II"r
laI!er SRU document number
394-001201 endix G.
HAZ
SEV.
W>TH
c.oillT
rr
Irr
HAl.
PRQe
WriH
CONT
0
0
..
./I$$M$ ,

"'0
"'0
,STAl1JS
Polenllal
damage 1(1
",,,,,,,1
mounled units,
Potentiel
degredlltitln of
equjpmOOl.
ef!Icism'y.
'"
IV
C
C
The SLTA alld MWS Sen$Ol'$ I1ave passed
vibraUolI, shod<, and ImPllcl qualificalion
te!lb, external mounting deslon
placement of the SLTA and MWS 3lmBOrs is
deperldent uPOrl v.tIere flll Group A
oorllrac:tor osillollli Ih"&.e unilll.
- During flight op...-ali<ln, thll SlTA arid MWS
SeJ\SDrli cQl1Ulm healing elements, which
walks to providl! Iloll-icing on the windows.
HI
W
0
0
M'O

':':"i
A-7

H

.:;1 i::
Den

I
O

"
8

i
z
o
"m
-o
,

'"

-
...
HAZ. SYSTEM!
NO.
IUNIT
"
Pm_,
CIU, MWS,
SLTA
19 DELETED
2D SLTA
2DA SlTA

EVENT, '
.'
Flight and
GroUI'lO
Operation
I
,
Ground
OperatiOll,
Maintenance,
T'"
Flight lind
gl(Jl,lnd
opflrslion

DEscRIPTION
.', "
lightning Strike
u.ar Radislion
- SLTA
Ignitor'> of
Ignitable
due to laser
radiQtion
SLTA
,
i
HAZARD SEVVIITY HAZARD PRQlWllllIY
I CATASTkOPtllt': " FJUlQUEWI
J
""'
SEV,
wtrn
CONl'
II
III
II
HAl.
PRQB
WITH
OONT
E
D
D
'Ri"= I
Level
MED
I
MED
,
MED
STATUS

::1m
- "
0",
e>!
IE3
j1jj
"g

m
"
2:
'l

o

II CRITICAL
JU MARGINAl-
IV NEClIUOIBl..E

'
't,'
DalTlllg" 10
lAlRCM lRUs
by lightning
ind...ce<l
llIGdn'cal
on
IflHIlQURl!11y
tx)nded
equlpmenl
Potential injury
ro pel1ionnlll
Potelltial flre
,,"w",
lNiT
HAZ
'SEV.
CAT.
"
II
"
"INIT
J1AZ
'pRO
C
C
C
I
,
A-B
e PROBABl.E
C OCCASIONAl.
D Rl!MOTE
E IMPROIM.IR.Ii:
, ' HAZARD',
-':" CONtR,OLS '
. ,{'
By1hll UlIll of ad9QualS bonding techniques
to lInsuru a direcL and omni-directlonal patti
for lightning OJlT9nt w;11 pruvlS\I ttl" wrrenl
from cBUl!iing damage 10 the "ldemal SLTA
and MWS se,...,or&,
Edemallaser radiallon Is restricted 10
condlllOl"t (or OIfflrr!dGj,
- Nominal ZOO8& hIIV8 bee"
6llIllbll8hed, and lIhould be ltlnected ir,
T.0.5
- NHZ,B to be demllrked Md
conlmlled d...ring welllht-oFF-wtleels ground
checkoul or1hll LAlRCM system.
- la...... !'l'E'wear requirements
have boon ostlblishlld snd must bB
communiC3hMl.
Dl,lring WBight-CFF-lllheelll grolJnd lest
opel<ltions, establish IllnllkJn hlJZ3I'1
distar'lCe \\Ilthill 40 feet of any transmlnl!r.
Area shOUld bs dear of ignitable
mlll&rtaI, Iiufficientto support $Ustalned
ignitioo.
Alternate hazard control may Include
01 t150Br I1ldfalion
8hlOUdll,
Firs extlngulshlng aquipment sho"ld be on
hand, sultZlble 10 lhe nabJre of
po611ible ignilablp Bl,lbstancee w;lhil\ the
nilion hallltd Brea,

'"
'i'i

b
21 I SLTA, MEON
Testar
HAL "I'
'NQ. SUi3SYSTEM
, , I uNiT -
20B FOELETEO
20C SL TA
t!AZNW SMRITY HAZARD PBOBAfIUTY
I CATASTROPIHC A FIU!QUE/rfT
I' CRn'1CAL iii PROBABLE
1M 1IMC01'l'..... C OCCASIONAL
IY NE:I;O\.MiJlJLE IJ REIlIcm!.
IE IMPRCIIIIlIILE
HAzAAO.
. SYSTE,M., _.
- EF;FECTS ON,] .. , ,'NIT..
.' 'CQNTRqLS, '
.S!';\!" ;PRO
'.'CAt..: B
PotllOliaol iire
hSl8rd
"
Polenliallfljury
10 persOllnBl,
"
LLU
o I La1l8f equipmw1t tasting has dimonstrllled
thisl ignition 01 f1ll1!1mllble liquids Is unlikely
unless solid ignitable {e,g. plIper) Ie
invotvlld.
Avoid p"llIienal 01 f1ammabla liquids wlIIIln
wom-co.... paper ignition di$lanoes
per HlIZilrtl Log Worlulh""" 112(lA
Alllltni!M hUlUd <;>(Introl may InelLJde
physicol Bhie\dil1g 011"981' r9dlation will1
shroLJds, bafllelO. "Ie
Fire 8Xlinguil:lling 8l1Uipment !lhoutd be on
hand, euilable In !he natlli'e l1t'
I
possible ignllBllle wiltlin!he
illl1iticm h"....rd area.
c I - MEON lBslor is designed!Oslimulaie
LAIRCM system
Hazan:! """\1:015 idootiosllo thos!!
IIIImmarized under HeWd Log SequenCli
"".
- A new WARNING has been communlcel&ll
fllr incorporal;on il'l\O l8ctlI'\ICIl\
Mcumenlllllon end training
"WARNING:
l
I Th.MEDNO"',"'",""",,,,...,,,
Incl'l!.' rhtt hu.rd or Yl8W'lld '.'K
radiatIon. In,lury may occur ifthll
LAlRCM rue, i. vi..,lI'CI with th8l1ight.
00 not view the LAJRCM lucr beam wiltl
Ihis lIIighl within 132 ",elers of. LAtRCM
TI1l:l'll5mllhw."
HAl:. HAl. ,:J ,RIsk I' STATUS
SEV. . PROB
WI1H WIn! .,Level
-col'll' CONT
MED
"
E
D MED
'"
I I I I
A9

n-<

6
0

"'
i1
g

z
i'
-o
SyStEM
EVeNT
PHASe
Fright and

operation
Operation,
MainteoenC\',
T,"
.,_ HAZARD'
' bE:SCRIPTiON
of
nammable
Ilquide dU810
lall8r radiali>r'
SLTA
laser Radiation
from SLTAdU8
10 MEON
stimulus
I

HAURDsmlVU HAZAM PROBABILITY
I CATASTRO,"",IC A FREQUENT
II CArrlCAl B PROBABLE
III MIIRGII'IlAL C OCCASIONAl..
IV NElJUGllIl. D RlI!MOTE
f: IMPROlAlIL

'<l

A-10
o SYSTEMI HAL ,4NIT') "'11'f1T HAZAAll HAZ. HAZ: RiSk SrAWS
SYSTEM .'I . :,
' SUBSYSTEM NQ. EVENT _' ' PESCRlPTl9N 11,lg, _" ,HAl, CONTROLS SEV., PROB A99e!l5
IUNlT
',."
.-, '; SEV, 'PliO PHASE' ' ,:,,:-'.',.:, ' " WrfH WITH levlll
, '" ','-, CAT:-- a
,CONT CONT
22 MEON Tester Alignment IRlUV Radiation Pohmlilllll\jllry C III - Safaly an.alysis against the MEON lamp D
"EO
Taaling , - MEON Tesler l(I per80nMI llOUrceS has been conducted k> the '"
Within the of ANSIIIESNA RP-27.3-96. All IR lamps
, danger "",nile fall under eXeMPT GrHella. UV source 1aJ16
a/the MEON unl)er RISK GROUP, tl1I8ria lOr .clinlc: UV
Tester oulput, hlWlrd lit 20 em exposu.!! distance. A! 1
meter expOSUI'fl distance. tne U\f SDurr:e
liI"1 under !he EXEMPT eJtposure limit
MEON Operator'. Manual contalns
,
;
waming .. POlWonnel are aol'i$e(l
hov.wer not totoole oll'8Clly at, or focus on,
the fl'OJlt faCG (If an operational MEON Test
Sat at dlstaflCBS below 1 metre:
"
SLTA llllitaJlatfon, Conladwltll f'QIenUll1 minor C Appropriele warnings an(j Ilroo;adures are III iii 0 "ED
Mllln\lllnance, Moving SLTA Injury ro recommel'ld8d in technical pul>iieaLons, lest
Testing Turret p$ISOflnel due do<;UmeJT!ltion and training PltlQram.
ro aecidBnllll
contact at Ih6
flight fine or
dUllng
malrrtllnanaa
ac:t..Ki.... (rom
!
\he filI,t moving
Tralll!rniltllr
TlJ(rtiI!
(elevlllion
rnoti(1l Only).
Processor. Flighl Failure of LRU Potential LRU Eaeh LRU lS seaJllld with lijlec:ifieally I D
"
MED
CiU, M'NS. llfnUon, d"'rnage PI" not designed mounts BOO mc>unling hardware
"
Structural
Ta'l<9aft. .-1,
,
preventing Inadvert"nt.oh!l8S8 of aU
LllOdiolj
SLTA Altac:hment
sucurtild, mounted LAiRCM LRlJs during operation
and vi!lmtioo.

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HAZARD AfY'U;11Y HAZARD PftOWIl.!TX
I CATA8TROI"HIC A fRHIUENT
II CflITICAL B PROBABLE
III MARGINAl. c: OCCASIONAL
IV NEGLIGIBLE D REMOTE
t: IMPROBABLE
I;IAZ. SYSTEM! SYSTEM
'.
f:FFECTSON '
-,
lr
1
Jr
. I lNIT'
NO. SUBSYS1EM SYSTEM HAZ. HAt.
fUNIT SEV. : PRO
'CAT.
:>.s MWS,SLTA D,.,. Electrical Shock EleclriCilI

,
D
Maintenance shock to
"ne! Test personnel
during
Inalnlenanc:e
Bnd Iesl:
at:tMlles.
"
CIU,MWS. Maintenance 6 General
Proce."ISOr. Manul3t:1uril'l(l. HBZMat- Pot""'ial minor
'V
,
heal1tl MzllrllS
SLTA
"'''''''''
MI'I8lIillee 10 p",monnel
dU910
or
lnedvertent
eye..skln
conlac:t.
inogelition.OI
inr,alali"n
expOIlUTIil.
SLTA- Maintenance. HalMat - Silica minor
"
Trilnsmit\olr Gel Desiccant occopatioJ1olllI '"
D
Haoolmll. heBlh hilzard.
DiSposal
,
2B SLlA- Main\tloance. HazMal- POtential minor III D
T!ansml!k!r MlInu18cl\.1ring, Aotlvaled oc:eupational
Handling. and Carbon hSllftk hazard.
Disposll\
" .'.
'. HA,ZARD:,' ,
,.""" '
CONTROLS
."",< ' I:.
The PrcQe5S(lr. CIU. MWS Sensors, and
SLTA units Opltrtll8 from low voltage +28
VDC. A cautiCWlIElbel is located on lIle MWS
Sensors sIBling "1 15 VAC'. i' for the
internal window-hea1ing element Wamlng,
liS should be put into lectln;"",1
manuals lind truining matelials.
The safe uuat these materialS Is controlled
by manufilclurilllib'Jild and
general shop sllfety Pl1lctiCIK. Material
SafQty Data Sheets (MSDS) 8re kept at
NGC and lire available 10 manulaclureJ
repair personnel.
Only II smllli qUIl1'Jlity of Desiccant material
Is patf;;itgSd wlth each DQl;io::all::U''I'' cartridllll.
ssaled into individual wntalnel"'l. T.O.s
warning Irrfurma1lOll on proper and
ssfe handling lind disposal. MSDS Is
a...allabla for h9UIrd communicalion
"
,=.
A smuliamDunt of activated calton Is
pactlagfld In II fillur cartridge naiad in II
oontalnsr. T.O. pID'd:Ie warning
Infommtion on prcper and safe handijng and
dlspos.nl. MSDS Is available for llazard
oon.-nunioation purpa&8S.
A-11
HAl. !' i1AZ.
SI'V. PROe
WITH I
CONT CONT
R..
""""
'""'"
ST"ruS
, ,
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tiAZMP'MRITY ftAZAJllQ PROIABIUTY
I CATASTROPHIC " FREQUEHT
II CRITiCAl B PROBABLE
III IIMGINAL C OCCASlOMAL
IV tI REIIIOn
E IMI"IIlOBABLI.
!
'NO.
SYSTEM!

SYSTEM

'HAZARD !Eff,:r;o:fS'.ON.
;': ',;
'JNIl:,: ;IN!!

"',,"
_'.

'CONTROLS.
JiAZ.

HAL"

Risk

SrATlJS
,,," "", ":".i'_." CAT.' B',, :CONT cONI '
29 Processor. Menufacturil19. HazMlIt- Due to 100 III 0 SlTA Viper laser (X)nlaill5 tlYo B!lf)'Illum III E MED
SlTA Depot
Aetjl'ities.

alTlo!l!J
qUllnli1ieS, ollly I
Oxide shims. Beryllium ClJpper alloy is
commonly us.ellln oonneckmi and connector
Handling, am l'ldrerne minor oontilc1ll. NO perliOl1rwl VllipOliUI1l is
D"lsjXlSal he8'lh iMue anliciplll8d as long 93lhe lXlmpcmenb are
may affect not ground or machined.
personnellr
I
!hE!)' come Into
cotIraet wilh
the duS'!
! particles.
30 SLTA- Manufacturing HiltMal Due to the IV 0 The SLTA - Trlll\6miltM FTS Sen,or Array IV E . lOW
TmnBlTlill:er and DllI'ot MertuJ)1 amouJ'llof ccntairas EI V'!lry of
Cadmium material, iI is Gadmiu""Mercury Amalgam. n.6 S6nsor
n'" artilclpatea ......ay II .,nQlo"",d ...nlhirl tht FTS, IItllcllls ,
llJ b" II healtt1 tnOOSed ....tlhln lhe SLTA_TlBI'llill1rl1...:_
hllZanj II unil& _No ltE.!I.96 or l'ldvel"!lt efIects .. :.;
breakage anticipated even If bflflOllkage OCCLlI'S, MSDS '.;"
OCC'JI'5. is for hiWIrd oommunloalion
ur es.
32 DELETED
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HAZARD YSIS WORKSHEETS
HAUJm '!i"!IU HAZARP rapMlIUTY
I CATMTMlPHIC A P"REQUfKf
II CIUTICAI. B pROllML.E.
III MAROlIUU. C OCCAeIONAL
'V Hl!GUDIBL.E. D REMOTE
I! I_ROIIAIlI..!.

-

A-13
SYSTEM ,INIl' SYSTEM,! HAZ. Srl\rUS HAZARD . _
--iNll'
HAl ':II'.L.
"'k
NO. SUBSYSTEM EVENT 'rfra;C1lIPTIOJll ,SYSTEM CONTR0lS PROS HAZ. sev. HAt.
. . ,.:.
p- WIl}l I UNIT Wo><

':PIW
CON; CON!
HezMat ,V 33 SlTA Manufaclurinll, Due to IIle 0 The SLTA fine Sensor(FTS) coillains W E LOW
Gae !Imount 01 o Cryogllnic Cooler lIlal contains
Activities, Ha9umGas, II approximately 50 wblc cellllmeters of
""""
ShippIng, .... not Helium Gas <tt280 PEii. Total Htlium m1il38
I
llfltldpatad ID Trsr1llport Is approximately 0.0002 kg, ApPl'o:Qmale
I
be II health volume is 953 cc al5landard
t\8Ulrdlf temperature " so esphy.d.Uon
breakage huard 16 negligible. Tho Halium is
oo:urs. nallld lXllYllllned In lhe Crmm1c
,
Cooler. The malflrial is II non...CJ:I<i<;
ftalT1lTlBble ga. Amount and lIS'" of Hejium i
9a9 may be shipped lIS "RfJlrilleraling
mecNnell: ID numbo' 2851. 0lId III nOi
OI!lerMse subject 10 U.S. DOT Of lATA
HAZMAT lI'aJ1llportolion Ginee
1tltI amount of Helium reIr1gerant laolla i)\!low
lhe12kglhreshold. SLTAMSOSis
pl'OYided h.JlIin for oommun;mdion
DELETED
,
"
MEONTesler
34
Minotto Nickel Cadmlum batteries do not INk
"
MEO
CadmIum negligible '" electrolyte uoder ",,::urnal
Shipping.
HazMal Nk::kel 0 In E Manu!acWrinll
Impact Severely eherged or abused battene$ may
T/'ilnspol1 leek SfTlilll amounts of elllClroly\ll. MEON
I per&Onnel
""""" : sHeeting
Use'" Manual contalns a now advising thai
di6pQsallOhould oomply with local
regu13tiofl5. MSDS Is Ilvllllable for haurll

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SYSTEM/
SUBSYSTEM
I UNIT
SY$TEI\l
mNT
,PHASE
36 MEONTester Operation,
Maint"nance,
T
37 SLTA Flight
"""km
W'
39
DELETED
Prooossor.
SLTA, MWS,
CIU
Manufacturing
and Depot
Activities
'"
Processor,
SLTA,MWS.
CIU
MlIOufacturing
elld Oepol
A&lMlles
I HAZAI;ID
.
,
..
laser R8dlBtlon
- Range Ander
(MEON).
Unaided \/iewl'lg
FAA Challenger
Airborne
Opera/ion
Ur.M' Radiali::m
HazMlIt
Cadmium
I
H:1l:dllllt
Chromium
l1AZA8P HYUlTY HAZARD PRQBABILIIY
I CATUTlIO'tUc; "fREQUENT
II CRITICAl. e PROBAI!LE
III MAItOINAL C OCCASOHAL
IV NfiGUl)IBl..E D REMOTE
E
Q!'I:
'"
-HAl. HAL
R.,
STATUS ,,- ';.
'.
SE,V. PROB A_ SYSTEM' HM!.; HI\Z:
.' ;,
", SEV.':,PRO:" ,
.. WITH
"'TH
La.....1
,. -' !G"A'L ',:8, l'
.
CeNT CONT
Negligible IV 0 The MEON Tm"" oonlllini II Lll$ef Range IV
,
LOW'
lmpect on Ander that laser radlatlall at a
pllf1lOnnel wavelellgtt'o of 905 nm lIrd no:ninBI power 01 I
113m1CfOW.r\Il. El(itQpe:rtl.Ireof25 mm is '
au1Tlclently IIlIrgelh811M device rTJIiMltlI Class
1 I_la far lI;dad or unaided ".jewlng.
Howewtr, B!l B!l'I8tIer 01 practice. lase,
vlewad with
collectln 0 tiCS.
f>otentillllnjury
"
0 " Nom,,.., hazard zone for ground tostls IV
,
M'O
,
i 10 pel3Onnel. established based on AFRL Initial
,
evaluation. T.O.1i rufloct thatthl;l NHZ
I
be demilrked lAIRCM ground
checkout with wei ht-on-wheels O'Ierrtdden.
DUB to the IV D ca.::lmlum is commonly wood f..". QOrTOSlo:l IV 0 tOW
amounteml prevention on oomedo"l 'IIIld <.J\har
form of hardware thaI may be upolled \D the
malarial. Ills environment. EllPOSUl\l1o ClKImium ex its
rd. antlclpatud OIlide mEr)' be pa!isibl" If the ltum '1,
to bIIa 1'leefth grinding or machining. 5\.1<70 operalian,
hazard 1II iong should be avoiOed uriel'S suitable prolcdiYlt
......,',
lIll the \.Inll I, provision& ara in pla09.
nal ma""'inerd
. .
Queto the IV 0 Chromium Is an 06sental elemant used in W 0 LOW,
amountlll'1d many Alum"'um and within the
\>
form of oofTlllQBltlon of corrrelon-rlllllstJrog iirteel.
materiel, it is Cllromale d'wmlcal nlm is used within .
not anOdpate<l \i1vm'Gal CCII'NlInsion for protecton ",.
lif:!'"
10 be a heafth AI"minum parl!l.
heun:l as long
all tha unll 18
not mechll'lUd.
A-14

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APPENDIX B
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET (MSDS)
.-1
1/22/07 Page 1-48
l
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA
REPORT No. 0610

May be used to complywilh OSHA't1 Hllzard Communication :, Occupatlonal saraty and Health Administration
Z9 eFR 1910 120C. must tie consulted fel (NotIMandatory Form)
I
; lSPeCffi(: requlremenll3. FOlTI\ Awl'llved
, , OMB No. t218.Qll72
IOENTrrY (as Used an-iai;;TancTDst) ..._-,-Nol6: Biink
- applicabla or 00 infomralion is aVllitable, the f>pt>ce
must b6 malted Indlcalillha/
Smalllllller Tran.mllter Assembly (Iamp"'.a)
Part Number D01.(107915A0301, D01.007915A0301

8-2
1122/07 Page 1-49
Oilih
N_ii1i7.......... Are- Ial;- This -hllZ8rd l
if !he shlpp"'l)Q:;l1llllllner Is mil opened Dt ruptlJred
-----lmP?-wA-- i lARCQOjjOll,"_"?
b
__ .. .. .. . ._ _. . _
i - ea.-.. 6 .....11\' "",,,_d Of NGIlG_

,
.. __"" =-
NlA ---.....---- =-
I .-. - ---- - ------ --- ---- ---------
1. Darn.lgllClll1ld8ll anellor CO{"JLfllnere bol evalustsd arid di9posiliorllld tJi qualllied personnel laking ne0ll8llery
1, prBeautiol"lll lc prr.-onl further damll:Q6 or 8xpll11Ure at persOI1l1ellc hazardcua ta'ldNono>,
::':S.:ro;:ld bEl returned III the . . __
-----.

NIA ' -,0 '" "Should be worn to prtrteclllllalntit 8IJlasUlll to
!ph\'lljC31 hazards during t>andllne of prllllllllrized
I
, f cryo-eooler Ilarmvare.
f it ._......... -. ---------- --.- .....-.-.
NiA- ._________ .__._---'
N"ntuop GrUIl\llWl Corpor8li"" h"" compiled the inloonoll,," and .""'OmmandeUcms conlalned In lhls t.IIo\eo1al safety Data $t\e&t
from sourCl>$ blllievOO to be leliablB snd lI:l '\lpresenl1he mOoSI current opinIOn 00 lhl,! sublect WIllm trle Wll.<
NO WBmlntall. llWrMlee. Dr 1$ made as to the "'''''''''''ns or sufficiency 01 Ill" ink>'malion. The u..,rQ!
_ poodud rnlJSl decide for ll&ell ..... IpIldfio ulery m6Uura. ar" nBCel<Sary 10 U8e this prOdUOI, en..." alen. or t1
cornbRfljoo wilh OIroar prod<lcla.
.-3
1f22J07
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA.HOMA REPORT NO. 0 6 ~ 1 0
APPENDIXC
AIR FORCE
MILITARY LASER EXEMPTION LEITER
co,
1122107
AVIATIOO SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
Ol<lAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0610
--,---
DEPARTMENT OF T}If AlA FORCE

j,jI' .....OOUA'1'T!:!l:i AIR f'0Il0E
WAl1"lllolo.TO}l OC
FROM; AF'MONCV
ItA. tu\:t ROQln 40:;
BollingAf13, DC 200:\2-7fJ:ro
SU.Bmcc FDA Dcmptir.>1'1 {or liIlXc.Ail\;rnr: Jnfmrct MeQ;lITe.i (IAIRCM).SYlo1ur,
Th... Alt Foroa Notthrop GrummM reqv",u forfiP!'llctJ1ton ,M Ptuti Mid Dmg
"'w:hnlTli51mtiOJl (iDA) Mlllllll'Y&:c'mpriml, mltodln [lie
1:llls0XIIltJt'l.iOlt lipan 1tO to Inl<tedlrl C01Jlp<ll1tlllB.,
dc.1i.gI1, or output OftlJellllCtpl1ion ofthl"5 (kvfu..
the AitPO\'tlell:C'!"llMo::lI uPoratory. T\mtialion.BnmCl (JUlRIAffiDO)
{he r A!lsenbly (SITAi, NSN 586S.0J.3<l6.32S5. The SeTA.ilI
Of.1 ViP/'T 101 p!linr.:dtnlckol.TII1l1tJI_
1'1)/\ 52 tf(ntmI<llIJftlnrel"$ vioJalef-r:demllaw if WriUlUl
l):pa(\!OO.1l of lll'lt ll;I otln.I'UA c!>mplilIm
de?jce:s. This leli.llr 3nd lne o'IRcheo<l l.a.'1rn' E--.:amptiGfl N"<ltiU'-'lllwn I;/JIllIlitules thOl ",-iu.cu
nf'1lro'l'al.
!( you hltYe llny plc't'itl C:lptaio. Cllli!R.cfAA:;ll. !&M01l:/SOZR, ll'tl
-(\)5. Dulling AI-11;.i)C ",;en] 1(1.5(\. tv: viii lWT'I'loi[.

l'lirPlIrcc Mc.diClll OpllJQlio1\oli Agency
DroGe. of lit<'. SllTV.;:,n Gtlfll:T<lt
AlIllChmoCllt
fuaropljoll
C-2
1122/07 Page t 5:2
OKlAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT No. 06-10
USER EXEMPTION NOTlFlCATION
Itl ll:.t<1rdMcc wilh ,"'c. 16a..-olDOD, inued to the!lepal1.lllCM 01 Oclt'D1e
(1)00) 0Jl July 26, 19?6, llJ \Itc C(lmll'lilsiollcr of Pood lb1d Dro&" tile- foUowir\: clcetrnnic
prodncl Iw been CllClllpte'lI rrom FlJOd 4Ild Drug .... (F'fJA) radiation Nlf'Cl:y
{ll:I1annance $1alll1nrds prescribed irI the C:0Utt of kq,>ulaliOtll, Tille 21, CIIaplllt I.
SubcbllplCl' 1
EU,nJptiotl QuaJlfkmion (check J!lu1 ikatcbe)".
CAUTION
p'odLlCl. N.sbean Hom FD.... rad.ialiotl
etandnnls pre.&aibcd In lile Code offc.1cr-dl Regullllicu...., TIlIl! 21, a,.lllCr I, Subchapler 1,
{DlQLl::lt"- to fumnpliau No. 7t.UJ...-{l IDOD 01\ JUly26. 1976. Thit! prodl,li;l; sboliid Ill;K I;>t:.
used witlimn allequ;l(( protecd't'l: devices or procedUfe:\., ThiA proll.lK:l J, for the cxclw;ivc u:c by
DOD ilttlvitlu lmd u mit m be wId at" l\Y.lJl.ed to OIhm.
----- .--_._.. _--_.- ----_._- .._
C-,
[122107 Page 1-53
OKLAHOMA CITYI OKLAHOMA REpORT No. 06-10
APPENDIX D
FAA LEITER OF NON-OBJECTION (MMAC)
0-1
1122/07 Page I-54
AVIA :tON SYSTeM STD.,NO,"..RJS P!'l.OGRAM
OKU HOMA CITY. OI<l..AHOMA No. 06-10
J:'O 1'OIt/ll ;<'I'l':lL<l't'."I:IOlI.
''III':U N. ,..,;.
<li:,1H
OM.
,o"'""'"r.o, "" '.,r.:;, '>.';;,
,
'l5l,1l!l::!5 M)
l .. "Til
1;7 !?(l!!'ramS'l'fl Il[)"n
!$}f,I!lI'l[;>MO(i'1IL OCJRS"'i' ITt,s .g,:'li
ilNH'E'J
1'hH'I,,, to Ol.::kr,<:rl"'<:'g'.J cf c",nl) .Jt<m' :tn, 'Zoos.
'I!<l(ll'! ',,(1ft I'll"d ':" "her 1l!kl4,n,J,Ilt.I:,.<:4"""
".-,4 er'lf",,<,:olllonl: Q( C<lnl:."."). t'<>z l'"",J.I:J, $<lflll:y lout
of .n. (...,d", of !-'a.gu;'ll.Uo!W, Sltb<:olllolpl.:'llil' .11 1\:<l
,!-,,.r,:,,,:'n ,0 \""1111.' p"c---tl"ctlj ,o/l""ll" ..,.,<'l.l",....l ,:I",,1.:;:"l'I-).
"lAS lW MICf",ssl:ct-l 01;-
MJD '1M; !lit'll!>! ct,....l'I-'H.l"'tyn 1\1'l e (lair' ia:l J, ()'lltl'a",...,.-r-
s,.,,"tk:'1'l lOC7,.l:l or I,ll" .. :'D.<l"'''1
!i"".rlO-h.''-l:", tlw. ].1"'''' ..."",i!f""' em 1.n,(O)",nll. allhje(!t l:.\.1o.i-l!!
."r ! T..:LTH\{.I (;l11 IN(3N-Mmlt'.J.1.I, I'$;r
l,1.sr!1'< Il.MmliR f"NnF:i'l. iF0fl K':t. 1.<tPj.'
'I'llll? nGl',Jl 1107" lIPPll.OVlll, DF 'rHB
1",;" "'.1..1.:'. '_'OI1<-;><,,,.,-,,,j U: ,,<Ii' '1,",<':'-"":.1"': or

'rh"nk yr.>u tt"t Vtlm-: .I:.' yvv f1<l'"'' q'-"-IlI:i.CI'llA a ...
'l'6 '!'HZ ABOVE- (lil (;A.l.L
r,1"r.C:<R0flIT(''')0.')Q.tlC'l'S BPMCll
m,J:(sIO.'-l Of' OfMf,1'T'\' 1>1/[)
1".1<'>11'''Tm> PiIOl./"."t!IlI
C(,''';::,-,: 01:" E!l(lC'J\T,flll,
lOlJ'l;lHJI':'J;IJf'
1I22fQ7
Page
AVIATION SVSTEU STANDARDS PROGRAM
APPENDIX E
MEON REGISTRATION and
ASSIGNMENT OF CDRH ACCESSION NUMBER
E-1
Ifl.2/07 Page I-56
AVIATION STANDARDS
OIC.LAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REFORT NO
.-- .... ""1m ;"loIllIIOl:.>fl
1', _,m: ., 0
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,'1 f'<:,f,:TClir,'B'I'I1R nMl:'.
[)(lP.Si:'!.' lat'il
TM'I'.w l{Ir(<::OQH
Th-i.!l ;, ... rr.> "'d:tI"""l"d"l" ... of yllllT DA'MlD JUMll :N, 21lQ5.
."... .:1 fHtc! i:lUTc<uanc 1'0 1,11<-. C'lloK ..
and e"f"'''GlmIonl. Dr t:h", Rao:\htbn C';'Jn:r./\,- 'Of' !-lu:ll'b -on,i bl!lll'Jly 1l.<!(.
lTttlp. 2;, Ccd'" of ;n
they tv t.!.Sl<T !=,toductf.l ["'lecr_'pt """'1.,,,,,,,1
"OUll !lOCUM!!''',. HAS w at' 051'11la:l.
lUIS CU',1;SIS1U AS 3. (jni ... i,,(l). (yu.auant: r;()
S'!!Cl;l= .. L\' cf .. rer.t"I'Cllc!!d
I'"drth"r, ""bll\l( arlei!i,\ltQ t 1t: ,.:.
,,! "i'RODUC7' i(POItT /UiI1Ttllr,l t.Mit I""WBUC'm 1lo101II-lfE!)lCM,), l'\)fl
t .... "LlR l"1:Nlif;f:, (F01', L'It.."
1HUS tiDT Mi'Pl:NA!, CI' 'fliS
!e>u ....i..'ll hi. ;.r: any q'--,C!'sciQl,,, or .ri"f> ''''''''''U:'';'D.f)
y::llll':
'('"hank'1<)1l fot y,mr '.-;:vp'n:-",iou, H IUJU bi!lll'" 0'<: "00_"-';11,
'i'O \io!z w:lDAi;m; ""1.0'1<1> (1Jl (;';ot())
Si:f:<;TF:.OI.rI(' all.Alt>:l1
ilIV-Xs:tOl1 Q!' MI\.(o\I'OGPJI,flllY OOAL:ri'i
lVlDIJ\::'WI1
Gr'","',!.'..'];,' Ol"
AAUI1I7l(lr.- Pll<X-IRAj>IB
E-2
P::tge 1-57
1122107
AV!AT'-ON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAt-J,OMA CITY, Oi<LAHOMA
~ y . t e m Safety A....'m.nt for tile ANIAAQ-24(V) Larga Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures (LAIRCM) System Installatioll Oll tbe Bombardier Inc. Model
Cl,-601l-2B16 (CL-601-3R)
SubmiUtd
Reviewel
bolo
Reviewe'L
is? Pages (iuc1ucling AppQndiceli)
--
AVIA--rON SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
Lng of Revisions
Approved by Date Dc.'\Cription Pages
- - f-
\121107 All Original release
b-lR
-
,
-.
,
-t
-,.,
--".,
1122/07 Page 2
AVIATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGAAM
Table of ContenIs
A. Purpose " ,.", ,., ".4
B. Synopsis "., , , ".. , " ,.. " , ".. , , , 4
C. Fault [ndicatlons " ,.. "" ,.. ,.. , ,., .. "._, .. , ".. , ".. , 9
D. Electrical Power ., " , , ".. " ".. ,.. " " , , ,., ', 9
E. High [nten:!lity Radiation Field (ffiRF) and Lighting Considerations 9
F. Icing Considerations " , " , , , ,.. , , 9
G. Functional I:Iazard Assessment, ".. " , ,., " , 9
H Structural Consi.derntions , _ , , " 9
1. Conclusion _ lO
Appendices:
1. Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) for tlIe Challenger CL-60l with LAIRCM 1-1
2. Structural Analysis Report for the Large Aircraft Infrared (LAffi.CM) FAA
Challenger Program " 2}
3. Damage Tolerant Analysis Report for the Large Alrcrnfl. Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)
FAA Prograro _ 31
4. Electrical Analysis Report for the Larse Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIR-CM) FAA
Challenger Prognun , 41
5. Lightning and IURF Analysis Report for the Large Aircrafllnfrared Countermeasures (IAIRCM)
FAA Challenger Progr9Jn 5-1
6. Icing Analysis Report for the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) FAA
Challenger Prognun 61
1. miLial Evaluation for Compatibility with Previous Alterations and Airworthiness Directives for the
T.arge Aircrnft Infrared. Countermeasures (LAIRCM) FAA Challenger Program , '1
1121107 Page 3
A. Pmpose and Description
This report presents an analysis on the insLallatiOD of military equipment added to enhance aireraft
and crew safety oftbe Bombardier TncModel CL-600-2B16 (CL-6013R) aircraft. The addC{\
equipment consists of the Northrop Grumman Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure (LAIRCM)
S)':!item, ANJAAQ-24(V). Failures and fault analysis modes were examinc{\ and analyzed with regard
to we operatioD. HIRF and Lightning requirements are also considered. The primary function of the
equipment is to provide added protection from heat-seeking missiles.
B. Syn0]l8i8
This aircmft alteration entails structural modifications to allow for the optional installation oftbe
AN/AAQ-24(\T) LAIRCM system components, the permanent installation of wiring, and a dc{\ieated
TransformCI' Rectifier Unit (TRU) to provide 28 volt DC power to this system. The electrical
interface to existing aircraft systems is through the aircraft utility bus and is isolated by a dedicated
15amp circuit breaker. The system COnsiHts offour detection sensors, two rorward. and two aft. The
forward sensors are itl$taUed in the unprcssurized forward wing lo fuselage fairings. The aft sensoIS
are iTUltalied on the sides of the fuselage in the unpressucized aft equipment bay. A system proccssor
unit and a transmitter tulTet are imtalled in the unpressuri:red aft equipment bay. A control head is
installed in the pilot's side panel in the cockpit The installation wiring requires the permanent
in.ttaUation of a wire bundle pass-ilimugh in the aft pressure bUlkhead and in the cabin f01'W'81'd wing
box hulkhead of the fuselage. The atl and forward wing box pressure bulkhead wiring
poinls are the only pressure vessel penetrations. Each component ofthe system is isolated. frOIIl the
sys1emTRU by a dedicated circuit breaker. Tndication systems for the system consist ofthe display
on the face ofthe control indication unit and two annunciators loeated in the glareshield master
caution display. System indication indicates jamming and missile location after the engagement is
complete. See:ligures 1 thru 9 below for system component identificatkm and system location.
SLTAn tI
Figure I. FAA Chall enger 601 LAIRCM External Component LocatiDn
1I2'}J07 Page 4
REPORT No. 06-10
" ~ - .. --:----
~ ~
La
....
MWSSENSORS
..-
"
, - y
.. '."
I ~ - - ~ l
-.'
, - ,.
PROCESS DR:
CONTROL.
INDICATOR
UNIT
Figure 2. FAA Challenger 601 LAIRCM Components
Figure 3. FAA Challenger 601 J,AJRCM Ex.ternal Inslailalion
1/22107 Page 5
AVlA.T10N SVS7'EM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA CITYI OKLAHOtv'A REPORT No. OB-.10
Figure 4. FAA Challenger 60lLAIRCM External Tnstallation
Figure 5. FAA Challenger 60 I Fonvard Sensor rairing fnstallation
In2l07 Page 6
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHO\olA REPORT No. 06-10
Figure 6. FAA Challenger 601 LAIRCM System Amlunciatot II'IStallatioll.
Figw-e 7. FAA 601 LAIRCM Cockpit Control fudication Unit Installation
1122107 Page 7
AVtATIQN SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
REPORT NO. 06-10
Figure 8. FAA. Challenger 601 LAIRCM Cockpit Circuit Breaker Panel Installation
Figure 9. rAA Chalknger 601 LAIRCM System Annunciator Installation
1/21107 Page 8
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT No. 0610
C. Fault Indications
Builtin Self Test (BIT), the LAIRCM BIT is perfonned at system power up and the system status
and faults ace indicated to the f.ight crew through the display on the conttol indication unit (CIlI).
The syslem alllO perform.s a continuous automatic Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) level Bit to provide
constant system status 10 the flight crew through the ClU display.
Annunciators on the cockpit master caution panel indicate the Transfonner Rectifier Unit (TRU)
status. The presence of a TRU fault is indicated to the flight crew with the illumination of an
overheat or fault annunciat.or light on the DlBster caution display.
D. Electrical Power
The LAfRCM system obtains. aircraft electrical power from the aircraft: 15 volt 400Hz utility
through a dedicated TRU, which converts the supplied electrical power to 28 VDC. The TRU iF;
isoJl1l1.xJ fram aircraft ptJwerwitll a dedicated 15 amp ci.rcu.it breaker am:! the lAIRCM system
componenls are each jSCllated with appropriated sized dedicated eircuit breAkers.
E. High IntensilY Radiation Field (IDRF) aad Lighting Considerations
7his equipment is classified a:> noll-essential. The is installed in a.ccordance with
manufacturer's instructions. Rcfetence Interface Contro: Document (TCD) for AN/AAQ24 (V)
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) lnslaUalion on FAA Flight Inspection
AirGndl., dtx.-ument number 094-0 14642. All system wiring is placed in double shielding and is
isolated from critical airrn.ft systems. (Reference Engineering Report 0709 founD in AIPcndix S.)
F. Icing Consideratiolll'!
An analyRis: has determined there to be no increast:d hazard to safety of flighl due to icing as a re.sult
ofrnodifications madc to the Challenger 601 aircraft affected by the LAIRCM mQdificalion
(reference Appendix 6).
G. FunctiOnAl HiZaId Assessment
A Functional Ha:zard Assessment has dctcnnined that all failur\': conditions are cwsified as "'min()r."
A componenllevel System Safety Hazard Analysis has been conducted by the system manufacturer
hazard probabilities to be remote or impwbable and is attached lrefcrenee Appendix 1). An
Electrical Loads Analysis hW'J determined the electrical load on the aircraft to be within the electrical
load limil!ltions of the aircraft and circuitry invoht'ed. This installation poses no undue burden on the
aircraft generation system (reference App<;ndix 4). EngineeIIDg Repcllt 07-10 has found the
installation of the LAIRCM installation on fAA CL-600 Flight Inspection ain:raft is compatible with
all previoW! alterations (reference Appendh 1).
H. Structural Considerations
Two st:rw:tural arutlyses assessmenls hElvr;: determined thaI the appropriate FARs have been aa.tisfled
and that no additional banrds are imparted to the struetural safety of the aircraft as a result of this
modification (reference Appendix 2 and 3).
1122J07 Page 9
AVlATfO,," SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM
OKLAHOMA. CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 0610
The LAlRCM inslallation on the FAA Challenger 601 aircraft is inslalled as mission only equipment
and classified as non-essential. The equipment has been installed in ll.ccordanl,;e with manu[ll.cturer's
instructions. Faults in the instal1lltion, equipment failure, cr total system failure, will not affect
eontinued ::;afe flighland landing.
1122107 Page 10
ENGINEERING REPORT 0921
Hystem Safety A s s e s ~ m e n t for the AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared
COtlntermeasure (LAIRCM) System Installation on the Bombardjer Inc.. Model
CL-600-2B16 (CL-604) Aircraft
SUbmi,ied
I/l-O/O"l
Date
Pagl;) 1 of68
QKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 09-Z1
Lng DC Rc..... isimlS
Date Pages
I-
1120109 All Original
r
,
...
I
Page :2
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKlAHOMA REPORT NO. 09-21
Table Gf CGntcnls
A. PurpGse 4
B. Synopsis , _ 4
C. FaultIndications ,.. , 9
D. Electrical Power , _ , 9
E. High Intensity Radiation Fteld (HlRF) and Lighting Considerations 9
F. IcingConsidere.tions , 9
G. Functional Hazard AS6essment , , 9
H StmcliJral Considerations 9
1. , , 10
Appendices;
I. Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) for the Challenger with LAlRCM 1-1
Referenced Documents:
Engineering Rcport 09-10, "Structural Analysis for AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasure (LAlRCM) Installa\ion in Bombardier Inc. Model CL600-2B16 (CL-604),"
No Revision, or subsequent
Engineering Report 09-12, "Damage Tolerance Evaiuation ofLAIRCM Installation in
Bombanlier Inc. Model CL-600-2B16 (CL604) Airplane," No Revision, or subsequent
Engineering Report 09-13, "Damage Tolerant Analysis for Large Aircraft InfrRrcd Countenneasure
(LAJRCM) Wire BlUldle Pass-through in Bombardier Inc. Model CL-6002BI6 (CL-604)
Airplane," No Revision, or subsequent
Engineering Report 0918, "ElectricaL Load Analysis for UHF,IFF, CVR, TACAN Display, illld
LAIRCM Installations in Bombardier Inc. Model CL-600-2BI6 (CL-604)," No Revision, or
subsequent
Engineering Report 07-11, "Icing Considerations ASllociated with the LargcAircraft Infrared
Countermeasure (LArRCM) Installation in Bombaniicr Inc. Model CL-600-2B 16 (CL-6013R and
CL-604)," Rev. i, or subsequent
Engineering Report 09-22, "Compatibility of STC ST09640AC-D with Other CL
M
604 Alterations,"
No Revision, or subsequent
Northrup Grumman Document Id. No. 094-014642, "InlCr[acc Control Document (lCD) for
AN/AAQ
M
24 (V) Large Aircraft Infrared Counlenncasures (LAlRCM) Installation on FAA
CL-600 Flight Inspeclion Aircraft," Rev. 2
1/20/09 Page 3
OkLAHOMA CITYI OkLAHOMA REPORT No, 09-21
A Purpose and Description
This report presents an analysis on the installation of military equipment added to enhance aircraft
and crew safety of the Bomba.rdier Inc Model CI.-600-2B16 (CL-604) aircraft, The added equipment
consists of the Northrop Grumman Large Aircmft Infrared (LAIRCM) System,
AN/AAQ--24(V). Failures and fault anwysis mode,<! were examined and analj"T.ed with regard Lo safc
operation, HIRF and Lightning requirements are also considered, The primary function of the
equipment to provide added protection from hcat-seeking mis&iles.
B. Synopsis
This alrcraft alteration ent:ll.ils structural modifications to allow for the oplional installation of the
AN/AAQ-24{V) LAIRCMsystem eomponents, the permanent installation ofwiring, and a dedieated
Transformer Rcctifier Uail (TRU) to provide 28 volt DC power to this sy&tem. The electrical
interface to existing aircraft systems is through the aircraft utility bus and is isolated by a dedica.ted
15 amp circuit breaket'. The system crm,,,isls of four detection sensors, two fOTWlI.Td, and two aft. The
forward sensors are installed in the fOJWard wing to fu."elage fairings. The aft sensors
are installed on the sides of (he fuselage in the unprcs.surized aft equipment bay. A system processor
urnl and a turret are installed in the aft equipmenl bay. The control head is
installed in the te.cfwician's console on the CL-604 (reference figure 1). The installation wiring
requires the pennancnt installation of a wire pass-through in the aft preRSUte bu1khead and in
the cabin forward wing box bulkhead of tbe fu.'ielage. aft and forward wing hox preRsure
bulkhead wiring pass-through points are the only pressure vcssel pcnetration,g. Each component of
the system is isolated from the system TRU by a dedicated circuit breaker. Indication systems for I:he
system consist of the display on the fuce of the control indication unit and two annunciators loeated
on the instrument panel, left ofEleetronic Standby fndiealor (ESt) (reference figure 6). Symem
indication indicates jamming and missile location after the engageml.'D.t is complete. See figures 1
thru 9 below fOT system identification and system location.
SI.:....Tr
......
Figure I. FAA Challengcr LAlRCM Edemal Component Locll.tion
1120/09 Page 4
----
... .-=1
.....:1-11:.: I

CONTROL
INDICATOR Sm,lI Tnon,mlU"l
UNIT With L.uer Top Ccve.r
L
Figure 2. FAA Challenger LAIRCM Componcnbi
PROCESSOR
MWSSENsoRS
---ll
Figure 3. FAA Challenger LAIRCM ExternAl Iostalb.tion
1120/09 Page 5
OKLAHOUA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT No. 09-21
Figure 4. FAA Challenger LAIRCM External Installation
Figure S. FAA Challenger Forward Sensor Fairing Insrullation
1120/09 Page 6
Figure 6. FAA Challeoger 604 LAIRCM System Annunciator Instal!ation
Figure 7. FAA Challenger 604 LAmCM Cockpit Control fudicator Uait Installation
1120/09 Page 7
OKl.Al-IOMA CITYI OKLAHOMA REPORT No. OB-21
Figure ll. FAA Challenger 604 LAIRCM Cockpit Circuit Breaker Panel InstallatioD.
Figure 9. FAA Challenger 604 LAIRCM System Installation
1120109
Page 8
C. Fault Indications
Built-in Self Test (BIT), the LAIRCMBIT is performed at system power up and the system !iIBtus
and faults ate indicated to the flight crcw through the display on the control indication unit (Cill).
The system also performs a continuous Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) level Bitto provide
constant system status 10 the flight crew through tbe cm display.
Annunciators on Ihc inslrument panel. Icft orESI (reference figure 6) indicate the TraIUiformer
Rectifier Unit (TRU) status. The presence of a TRU fault is indicated to the flight crew with the
illuminatinn ofan overheat or fault annunciator light on the instrument panel, left ofESI (reference
figure 6).
D. Electrieal Power
The LAIRCM syslem obtains aircrafi elcctrical power from the Bircrafll15 volt 400Hz utility bus
thrQugh a dedicated TRU, which converts the supplied electrical power to 28 VDC. The TRU is
isolated from aircraft. power with a dedicated 15 amp circuit breaker and the LAIRCM system
components are each isolated wilh appropriate Si2ed dedicated circuit breakers (reference Engineering
Report 09-18).
E, High Intensity Radiation Field (HTRF) and Lighting Conside!B.tions
This equipment is classified as non-essential and non-flight critical. The system it; installed ill
accordance with manufacturer's insfructions. Reference Interface Control Document (lCD) for
AN/AAQ-24 M Large Aircraft Infrared (I .AIRCM) Inljtll1ation on FAA
Flight Inspccliol1 Aircraft, document number 094-014642. All system wiring ill pliiced in double
shielding. Wiring runs and LRUs arc isolated from critical aircraft systems and wiring. Thc shields
are grounded at all terminalion points. The transmitll..:r turret is completely encased in metal and
bonded to the fuselage, providing no aperture for lightning intrusion. System LRUs are grounded to
the aircraft !i'tructure and demonstrate a dyrwnic impedance of less than 2 milliohms.
After considering possible HIRF and Lightning effects, it is concluded that minimal burdens arc
placed upon other aircraft systems or structures by Ihelie effects.
F. icing Consideratiuns
An analysis has determined tbere to be no increascd hazard to safety of flight due to icing as a result
ofmodificatiollS made 10 tbe Challenger 604 aircraft affccted by the LAIRCM modification
(referenee EngillCering Report 07-11).
G. Functional Hazard Assessmcnt
A Functional HlI.2'Jl.rd Assessmenl hali determined that all failure cOlldi(iol\S are classified as "minor."
A component level System Safety Hazard Analysis bas beeu condueted by the system manufacturer
ahowing hazani probabilities to be remote or improbable and is attached (reference Appendix I). An
Electrical Load Analysis has determined the electrical load on the aircraft to be within the electrical
load limitations of the aircraft and circuitry involved. This installation poses no undue burden on the
aircraft: generation system (reference Engineering Rt:port 09-1 S). The LAIRCM installa1ion on FAA
CL-604 Flight Inspeclion ain.. '1:aft is compatihle with all previuus alwratiQos (reference Engineering
RJ,port 09-22).
1120109 Page 9
H. Structural Comiderations
Thref'. structunJ analyses assessments have detennined thal ilic appropriate FAR.s have been satisfied
and that no additional hazards are imparted to the structural safely of the aircraft as a result of this
modification (reference Engineering Reports 09-10, 09-12, and 0913).
1. Conclusion
The LAIRCM installation on the FAA Challenger 604 aircraft is installed as mission only equipment
aDd classified as non-essential. The equipment has been installed in accordance with manumcturer's
instructions. Faults in the installation, equipment fuilure, or total system failure, will not affect
continued safe flight and landing.
1120/09 Page 10
APPENDIX 1
FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT (FHA)
FOR THE
CHALLENGER WITH LAlRCM
1120/09 Pagel-I
SYSTEM SAFETY HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT
For The
CONTRACT F3365701C-2093 P00080
NonCDRl Data
Prepared for:
ASC/GRISAFETY
AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER
2590 LOOP ROAD WEST, BLDG 558
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, OH -4543371-42
Pl'1lpared by:
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION
Defensive Systems Division
600 Hicks Road
Rolling Meadows, IL 60008-1098
Document Id. No.: 499-Cl01375
Revision: A
Date: 14 September 2006
OlSTRI6UTIOH STATEMENT 0; Oi61ribllUon Iluthorlzed 10 tho Departmlln\ (;If Dttftlnse and U.S. 000
codraclorB OfIly: (Qilloal Techrdogy); (15 Jun 01). Olhp.[ Il!questtl mlJ51 blIll!{BrJ13d to A$CfGRI,
25&0 loop Road Wm. BLOG 558, WrightPatlerson AF6. OH ~ 5 4 3 3 - 7 1 ~ 2
1120/09 Page 1-2
--
Effective Datlt
April 2006
September
2006
Revision
.
A
-
I
CHANGE HISTORY
Change
In!liaf Release
,
\. Update platform throughout
2 Indude FAA leller of non-objection in Appendix D.
Basis laser hazard probability n;: leaer ground inhibit
4. Additional discussion on lasar ha:t81'O distances-
including unaided and viewing th.rough lypical glass
e.. ConJ.rotTower wil1Q"o.....
-
_._.
-
ii
1I20!fYJ Page 1-3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragl'1lph
1.0 INTRODUCTION 1
2.(1 SCOPE 1
3.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 1
4.0 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT 2
4.1 OnAircraft Mainten8l"lce , ,.. , ,., " ' ,., , 2
4.2 Off-Alrcraft Mainten8l"lCB ., ,.. , , , ,. , , " ' 3
4.3 SUpport Equipment ", _ , 3
5.0 LAIRCM SYSTEM _ _, .. 5
5.1 LA1RCM System Configuration for FAA Challenger " " '" 5
5.2 Processor " _.. _ , , , ,., ,6
5.3 Controllndicalor Unit ,............... . " , , 7
5.4 Small Laserrrransmittar AsBembly '.' , 8
5.4.1 , , ,. . , , ,._ 8
5.4.2 TranSlniHflr ,. . _ ,.. ,.. , " ,.. ,., 8
5,5 MWSSensor " .. " ,.. , , , , '0
&.0 SYSTEM &AFETY PROCESS , " 11
6.1 Hazard Severity .. '., , , , " ,._ ,.. , 11
6,2 Hazard Probability __ " _.11
6.3 Risk Assessmenl Matrix , , ,.. , _ , , 12
7.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS RESULT8 " 13
7.1 SLTA Laser , , ' ' " ., " ' 13
7.1.1 LaserEyewear , 15
7.1.2 SLTA Stray Rediation................ ..._ , ' 15
7.2 MEON Optical Hazards , "" " _ ,.................. . 17
7.3 HeavyUnits _..... .., 18
a.o HAZARDOUS MATERIALS _ 20
9.0 GROUND TEST SAFETY 22
9.1 Laser Hazard Distance _, ,., .. ,.. , , , , 22
9. f. f Laser Hazard Distance ThrouQh Window GlaS8 , , 23
9.2 Laser G&neraled Airborne Conlamitlants (LGAC)... ...,., , 24
9.3 Laser-Induced Fke Hazard 24
9.4 FAA Requlremenb .. 25
9.5 Environmental Considerations (Laser) , , 25
9.6 Diffuse Viewing. . 25
10.0 LAIRCM HAZARD LOG 28
11.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS , _ 28
iii
1/20/09 Psgc 1-4
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMI\ REpORT NO. 09-21
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. FAA Challenger LAIRCM System Units... . ,.. ,., 5
Table 2. Hazard Severity Definitions , ,......... . 11
Table 3. Hazard Probability DefjnitiOl\s ,., .. , , , 12
Table 4. Hazard Risk AsSEl661Tlenl Ma!rix . " , 12
Table 5. Hazafd Risk Acceptance Levels , ,......... .. 13
Table 6. MILSTD1472 LitllCarry Umits (mixed populatlon)........ . ,_ 11)
Teble 7. LAIRCM lRU uti Limitations , ,... . ,.. .., 19
Table 8. List of Pnoriti:z.ed Hazardous Malerials , , ,.............. . 20
TClble 9. Summery of Nominal Hazard Distances ' 22
Table 10. FAA Challenger LAIRCM System Hazard Log ,. . ,." , '. 21
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. MEON TM-ter , , ,.... . 4
Figure 2. Transmitler Holding Fixture ,... . , , 4
Figure 3. Hokling Fixture 'Miltl Container , , , , , , 4
Figure 4. LAIRCM System Configuration for FAA Challenger 5
Figure 5. Processor." ,.. , ,.............. . 6
Figure 6. Controllndicalof Unit, ,...................................... ... 7
Figure 7. Smslllaser TrnnsmiUer Assembly... . 9
Figure 8, MWS Sensor , , , _.10
Figure 9. 013.()01596, laser DANGER labeL ' 14
Figure 10. 013-001595, Laser Aperture Lebel..... . ................................................ 14
figure 11. 013.0015$4, Laser Exemplion Label 14
figure 12. Location of laser Labela ,. ..' 15
fiQuse 13. lAIRCM SLTA. Hot Spots........... . 16
Rgure 14. Hot Spot Measurement., , , , , 18
Figure 15. Groond Laser Inhibit - Probability of Failure , , 11
Rgure 16. MEON Identification/Certification Label , , , , 18
Figure 17. LAIRCM NHZ on FAA Challen'ler. , , 23
1120/09 Page 15
_O_KLAHOMA CITYI' OKLAHOMA
LIST OF APPENOICES
Appendix
A
B
C
o
E
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COM
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System HazarciLog Worksheet Summary . " A1
Material Safety Oats Sheet (MSOS)...... . B-1
Air Fon:e MUilary Laeer Exemption. . >0 ,........ C,
FAA Leller of NonObJeclion (MMAC).......................... .01
MEON Registration and Assignment of CORH Acx:ession Number .... E-1
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Alraall Charal;lllflUlion ModOJle
Mtriulh
1lllrj\1'"m Ollld.
Builtin Tlsl
Cir<:Uil C",d Alumbly
CO()lracl\Y Oats Li51
Coda (II F9\ienII
ContrOl IndICl!l:l' UnH
DQI;lbolls (A Welghled)

O<niation
E1edm CompaUblIlty
Eledro InlMefe<l""
Environmanl.al P",lecliM Ager\CY
El<Ietro Discha,ga
Foreign (Jbjecl Damage
FIne TrIlCX Sensor
Ground Supp<:<t Equlpmenl
Hazar'dOIl81.1_1a1
Huardolls Materiills R"IIulalion,
InlemMlonal Air Tral'6port ....lIQC\mtjon
Inlemational Era"" ...Tachnic81 Co.,Hnlssi\lf1
lnlmrod
Larg. AirI:ruf\ lntnlrad Counlerm casures
LI"" Unit
Low VOIl8D'" PaNe, Suoply
Mul\i.F'lJrpose El8ctrcJ.()pIlcal Eml,...EI'I(! T"-"1'"
Mo."".MII Permissible bpo",.
r-talel\Sl Wony Delli St-I
W.....i"J SystDm
Grulll\llM
"'"",i""l Hazard lm<>
0::1l1BJ Hlmltl Dis..,"""
De",,]!\'

P6r\od1caJlV Poled Lilhiu'" Niob.....
PmDaa",r
F'lJIt!e F.cq..,,,,,y
Pwnd. Sql.lal1llnch
P\lIM Wldll1l.l"dulill.".
Red'" FlIl'lllMCy
Sla18ftWlnl or
:>)'1110>'" Sll!ety Analysis MIfl'C'\
SyIm", 5irI\!ty ",ogram
Standard
U...., Os:.. 1ioI""'""'Y
UIl",VloIBt
0" W1Jee1s
1/20109 Page 1-6
OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 09-21
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This System Safety Hazard Analyl5il5 Repcrt (SSHAR) is generated for the Directional
Infra;ed Counlermea&u!VS (LAIRCM) Sy&tem fOI' the FAA ChaH6r\ger
aircraft) Program. This SSHAR is prepared using Dala Item Description Dl-SAFT
801016 (System Safety Hazard Analysis Report) and MIL-8TD-882D (Standard Practice
for System Safsly) as a guide.
2.0 SCOPE
This System Saf&ty Hazard Analysis Report (SSHAH) provides a comprehensive safety
assessment for the LAIRCM System configuration tor the FAA Challenger aircraft
Hazard probabiiity and hazard severity crileria, and risk a5SeSSrTlent criteria. is basad on
Mll-STD882D Appendix A, for implemen/aUM of OJ safety Efrort.
3.0 APPllCABLE DOCUMENTS
The rollowiC1g documenls ere applicable to the LAIRCM Syslem Szety Program (SSP)
to the extent specified herein,
Program Documents
093-0121268
Nomenclature
Environmental Requirements Specificati::H'I
093-0121278 SpeciflCalion for General Hardware Design Standardization
Requirements
394-001201 EnvironmMtel Qualification Test Report, Fiosl
Report for Viper"" Laser SRU 001-007907
399-001B04 LA\QCM, Lase! Anal')'sis Report (classified report)
499-000:3.58 Slatomonl of Woril for the Le.rge Aiwt:lfllrfi!l.red
Countermeasures Program
EUOO101-03-TM MEON Flight line Test Sel Oparators Manual And
Maintenance Instructions
Goyemrn8!'1t Standerds Nomeodatur2
MIL-E-6051D System Electrorragnetic Compatibility
Requirements
Mll-STD-454N Standard GenelilJ Requirements tor Electronic Equipment
MIL-STD-461D Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility Requiremenls
for the Control ofElectromagnelic Interference
1120/09 Page >7
Govemment Standard!! Nomenclature
MIL-STD-462D Measurement of Electromagnetic Inlerferance Characteristics
MIL-8TD704D Air::raft Eleciric Power Charac1eri5t!c8
MIL.-5TD810E Environmental Test Methods
MIL-5TD-B82D System Safety ProQrem Requirement6
MIL-5TD-1425A Safely Design Requirernents fur Military lasefS And
Associated Support Equipment
MIL-STD-1472 Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems,
Equipment, and Facilities
MIL-STD-1666 ESD Conlrol Program for Protection of Electrical And
Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment
21 CFR Part 1040 Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (21 CFR) Performance
Standards for Light-Emitting Products
49 CFR Perts 171-180 Tille 49 Code of Feder;al Regulations (49 CFR) Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR)
ANSI Z136.1-2000 American National St;anderd for S;afe UN of Lasers
ANSI Z13S.6-2005 S;afe Usa of Lasers Outdoors
lATA Dangerous Goods Inb<lmationel Air Transport Assol:iation (tATA) Dangarous
Regulations Goods Rellulations
ANSI/ISENA RP-27.3 Recommended Practice for Photobiological Safety for lamps
96 - Risk Group Classlncalion ;and labeling
4.0 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT
The LAiRCM System is supported under an on-aircraft and off-eircrafl maintenanca
concept. The1le levels consist of (On-Aircraft) end depot (Off"'8ircmfl),
which am briaflY expanded upon in the paragraphs.
4.1 On-Aircraft Maintenance
For tt\e O.....Aircraft maintenance level, systam Faull DatactionlFault Isolation (FD/FI) [0
the fai'ed LRU(s) is performed using internel BuHtln-TClst (Bll) designed into the system
and each LRU. The failed LRU is displayed on tna Controllndicalor Unit (ClUj for
oparalor inter;aclion at this level of maIntenance. BIT is Lha primary means of
performance evaluation and integrated diagnostics for the system. Failures detected by
the LAIRCM system BtT are recorded interneUy in nnnvolatile memory in the system BIT
Log located in ProceS&Cr LRU, and ara also recorded in the inlemBI BIT Log of
2
1120109 Pagc 1-8
OKL.At-lOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 0921
LRU. System repair is accomplIshed by replacement 01 the faulty lRU with a known
goad 9pBre LRU. The failad LRU is U1en sent to off-aircraft main\er13nce for further
diagnostics.
4.2 Off--Aircraft Mainttlnance
For Off-Airua.'1 maintenance, LRU fault isoll'llion is performed at depot Northrop
Grumman Corporation (NGC). The Processor is repaired a1 NGC depot The MWS
Sensor is a hermetically sealed unit, end repair (as required) is performed by NGC. The
SLTA lRU is sent to NGC depot The Viper"" Leser Shop Replaceable Unit (SRU) is
removed from the Transmit1sr for repair al NGC depot. The Transmittar is repaired at
Se[ex Corp. (fllctory repair), ana rtItumed to NGC lor mating""';U1 the Viper"" Laser sR'J.
The CIU is repaired hy BAE Systems depot. Upon repair completion of any LRU(fi), it is
raturned into U1e pipeline for installation at organizationel maintenance.
4.3 Support Equipment
The primary 10cus of the LAIRCM program i5 to minimize test and support eqUipment to
the I1'IaJUmum exlent possible. It hes been determined thai some specific test and
support equipment is raquired to suppon ei1har aliijnment or organizational maintenance
activities. These include the MUltiple Electro-optic End-to-End (MEON) Tester,
Transmitter Holding Fixture, Transmitter Tools, and Common Hand Tools. Each of
these items is described below.
MEON Tester: MEON Tester is an eJ\d-to-end confidence taster used to
verify the free space perfolTTlAnce of U1a \nstaled system during elignment. It
is used to stimUlate the LAIRCM system energy, and to measure the energy
transmitted by the system. Figure 1 provides e pict.ure of the MEON Tester.
Transmitter Holdklg Fixture: The SlTA is shipped in e special container with
the Holding Fixture. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the Transmitter Holding Fixlul'\),
and Fixture v.ilh Transmitter, respectively.
Transmitter Toola: SeverallCoIs will be used for installation and removel 01
the Desiccants end Hydrocarbon Filter. These include a lorque kit, spinner
handle, insertiorVextraction tool, end adapters.
Cammon Hand Tools: Common Hend Tools are used lot installation and
removal otthe LAIRCM equipment on the ~ r c r a f l
3
1120109 Page 1-9
Figure 1. MEON Taster
Figure 2, TransmillEll' Holding Fixture
Figure 3, Holding Fixturo w[lh ContainQr
4
1120109 Page 1-10
5,0 LAIRCM SYSTEM
5.1 LAIRCM System Configuration fer FAA Challenger
The LAIRCM System for the FAA CI1aUenger program includes ene Processor, one
Control Indicator Unit (CIU), ona Small Lasar Transmitter A!lssmbly (SLTA) and !bur
Missile Warning System (MWS) Sensors. Also, smart cards arB usad with Ihe system,
whk:h includes tha User Dala Memory (UDM) and Malnter1ance UDM (MUDM) in the
CIU, and an AIrcraft Ct1aracterization Module (ACM) within the Processor. Table 1
provides Ihe quantities and pert numhers for the LAIRCM System on the FAA
Challenger aircraft. Figura 4 provides the LAIRCM System configuration for the FAA
Challenger.
I
Nom.nClature Quantity Base Part Numtler
Processor 1 001-007722-1102
CIU 1 001-007678-103
Laser
1 001007915All301
001-007907-0006

- Transmitter 0010C7914A0301
MWS Sell60r 4
001-0076711==j09

LACM Smart Card r= 152-001478-002
Table 1. FAA Challooger LAJRCM System Units
Figure 4. LAIRCM System Configuralioo for FAA Challenger
5
1/20109 Page 1-11
OKLAHONA CITY, OKLAHOMA REpORT No. 09-21
5.2 Processor
The Procellsor (FJgure 5) is the main electrical/signal interface between the major
elemenls of the LAIRCM system. It controls and monilolli the LAIRCM system. System
mode and operation commands are recaived from the CIU. It controls and receives
threel dab from ltle MWS Sensors and SLTAs. It also determines !he aircraft's attitude.
The ProCt'lSSor front panel contains a Persona! Computer Memory Card International
AssociatilYl (PCMCIA) interface port. The PCMCIA port aceepls ~ n ACM smert card
tantaining aircraft specific information. This is used by Ihe ProDessor to verify installation
end C9llmize system pel1ormance. The Processor contains 5 connectors (J1-J5) end 2
handles on the front panel. Connector J1 receives -+28 VDC aircraft prime power.
Connector J2 provides MWS data interfacE! and CJU command interface. Connector J3
pl'O'IIides Transmitter Turrel control. Connector J4 (labeled TEST) provides the RS-232
lest ir1terlace. Conneclor J5 provides Transmitter R5-422 interface. The nominal weight
of the Processor is 36.4 pounds. The dimensions are 20.3" Depth x 7.T' Width x 7. r
Height
Figure 5. Proocssor
6
1/20/09
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT NO, 0921
5.3 Control Indicator Unit
Tile cru (Figure 6) provides tM display of LA',RCM system control functions. The main
operator interface is with the AMC. The CIU is designed for use ' ~ n d e r normal cockpit
illumination or Night Vleion Goggle (N'IIG) conditions. It arso communicates with lt1e
LAIRCM system via a MILSTD-1553 bus. To operate lhe LAIRCM syslem In different
modes,the CIU is fitted with a PCMCIA port for operational end mainlenance purposes.
The CIU contains a rear connector J1 (signal and power receptacle) end front penel
COnnector J2 (provides an RS232 compatible test interface). The CIU front panel
contains a faii mdicetor, Ughl Emitling Diode {LED) display, pushbLlton switch,
volumelbrightness control knob, end a moda select switch. The mode select switch
canlains differenl modes: OFF, Slandby (STBY), CODE, BIT, Inhibit {INH), Operale
(OPR), Bnd Operata with Flares (OPRlF - not used for the FAA Challenger aircraft).
Tt\e nominal weight of the CIU is 2.4 pounds without the UDM installed, 2.5 pounds with
tM UDM in&talled. The dimensIons ere 8.2" Depth x 5,4" WJdlt1 x 1.9" Height
Figure 6, Controllndicatol Unil
7
1120/09 Page 1-13
OKLAHCMA CITY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 09-21
5.4 Small Laser/Transmitter AasBmbly
The SlTA (Figure 7) consis15 of e Viper'" Laser and Transmitter. AA O-ring seal is
prolJided between tha Vlpar Laser and Transmitter optics where the laser radiation is
emllted. A Mid-lnfn;I.I'Eld (IR) output from the Viper"" Laser is injected directly through the
acceflS hole on the top 6Ur1B09 of the Transmitter. The beam is rouled through l1'Ie
opllcal chain in Ihe Transmitter and exits through the Tran&miUer'e Fille Track Sensor
(FTS) window. For U.S. Air Force applicstions, lhe LAIRCM SYitem is specifically
exempled 1rom full compliance with the Food and Dr'Jg Adminislration (FDA) radiation
safety performance standards prescribed in the Code of Federal Regulations, Tille 21,
Chapler 1, SUbchapter J. Appendix C contains the Laser Exemption Notiflcation.
5.4.1 Vlper
tN
Laser
o
The \I"lperT.II laser consists of lt1e laser head (beam modulalion components end optical
elements necee&ary 10 form, modu/81e and direct the IR outpul), complementary power
conversion, 8ectro Magnetic Interference (EMI) &uppression, temperature stabilization
end COlltrol cift;uitry. The leser head is a diod"",pumped, solid-state souroe end optical
parametric oscillalo1 thet generates mu/Uple wavelength mid..jnfrared optical energy. The
laser head produces laser energy allhe presaibed Pul&e Rate Frequency (PRF) when
the Q-swltch is sent a modUlated Radio Frequency (RF) signel from \t1e LaBer Assembly
electronics. The Viper"" Laser contains two oulkhead One receives aircraft
28 VDC power, and the other provides the interface signals with the Processor. The
nom[nal weight of lhe Viper
TIII
Las.ar is 10 pounds, and its approximate dimensions are 2"
Heighl x 610' Diameter.
5.4.2 Trensmitter
The Transmiller coo&isls of a steerable turret &ystem capable of directif1g a laser beam
towards an approaching target. Dasiccators aTe used to ensure the FTS sightline
remains clear of humidity.induced fog. A hydrocarbon !ilter absorbs any fuel V8por thai
may become present wiUlill the Transmitter LRU. A humidity indicater provides lJisual
indication of presence 01 moisture within the Transmitter. At power-on, Ihe Transmitter
performs salf-initialization, internal processor/momory ct1eckB, and initiales
communication wilh the Procetior. The Transmitler Ulen commences its warm-up
Ie, whiCh takes approximetely 6 The Cryogenic Cooler:s required to reach
a certain temperature prior to operatinn. At of warm-up, Ihe Processor
places the LAIRCMsystem into ready mode. The Transmitter is now ready Ie respond
to slaering commands received frnm the PrOCEl&SOI. These command& ere derived from
MWS sensor dala. Once the Transmitter has slewed \0 the convnended position, the
FTS acquires the and provida& data to the Processor. This data is
processed to provide Azimulh (Al.) end Elevation (EI) information aUowing the Processor
to close a tracking loop around the FTS. The Transmitter contains 4 connectors.
Connector J1 is used for IUfret control. Connector J2 is used for input power "+-26 VDC.
Connector J4 ia used tor fine 1tBcl<. control. Connector J5 is used for the RS-232 lesl
interfaca. The nominal weighl of lt1e Transmitter (with Vlper
TlO
Laser) is 66 pounds.
8
l120109
Figure 7. Small Laser Transmitter Assembly
9
1120/09 Page 1-15
OKlAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA REPORT NO. 0921
5.5 MWS Sensor
The MWS Sanson; (Figure 8) provide detecUon and tracking of missile event data.
Multiple MWS Sensors are placed in slretegic locations al (he exterior of the aircraft:.
The MWS Sensors detect the missile's Uhra Violet (UV) signature and provides tracking
data 10 the Proce$SOr Unit where it is processed to derive spatial data about the mIssile.
This data is used to initially sleer the Tr6l1smitter turret towards the approaching three.l
The MlNS Sensor conlsins a window that is sapphire-coettld inputs aperture tor
collection of MWS event data. The MIJVS Sen$Clr coniains connector J1, whicl1 provides
high-speed data and difSCrele sensor con(rol interface with the Procassor. It also
receives +28 VDC switched powar and 115 VAC to the window hester. The nominal
weight of eech MWS Sensor is 4.2 pounds. Approximate dimensions are 6.1" Height)(
4.75" Diameter.
figure 8. MWS Sensor
10
1120/09 Page 1-16
OKLAHOMA CtiY, OKLAHOMA REPORT No. 09-21
6.0 SYSTEM SAFETY PROCESS
The following paragraplls refieclille hazard severity, hazard probability and ha...ard risk
assessment classification definitions extracted tram MIL-STD-8B2D in order to esteblish
the degree of risk for each idenUfied potential hazard, specific to the LAIRCM system
COIlfiguration.
6.1 Huerd Severity
Hazards are asseued in terms of the worst crecible mishap that. could be caused by a
specific hazard. The following hazard severity categories are defined to provide a
me9EIure of the worst polMUel mishep resulting from personnel error, feilure modes,
environmental conditions, design charadBrislics, procedural deficiencies, el'.d hardware
reilureldegradation. The suggested hazard severity definitions rrem MIL.-5TD882D
Appendix A are reftected below in Teble 2. Th:5o hazard severity assessments are
combined from these stanr:lards to ensure II complete hazard analysis essessment is
accomplished appropriate hazard severity classifications assigned.
Cate 0 Environmental, Safety, and Health Result Criteria
cataslmphic

I COuld result in death. permanent total disability. loss
exceeding $1M, or irreversible severe environmontai
dam-';c-e that violetes law or regulation.
Critical
,
II Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries 0
occupetional illness that may result in hospitalization of at
leas! three personne\. Io!lS exceeding $200K but lells
$1 M, or reversible environmental damage ceusing e "'"'
violation of law or
Marginal III Could result in injury or occupetional illness resulting
one or more lost work days(s), loss eltceeding $10K
iess (han $2<lOK, or mitigat;,ble environm8l'\tal dameg
v1ola,tior, of law or regulalion where restorelio
activities cRn be accornnlished.
Negligible IV Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a losl work
II day, Joss exceeding $2K but less UlBn $10K, or mini mal
elwJron.mental damage not or
Table 2. Hazard Severity Definitions
6,2 Hazard Probability
The hazard probability of a potential hazard is evaluated in terms of how Dften thia
hazard may be experienced in its lifetima based on the mission end intended use The
following hezerd probebility defuli,lions are probability of occurrance oondilionslevents
assocIated with the potential mishap during tha plenned life expectancy of a system.
The hazard probability la USUally descibed in potentiel occurrences per unillime,
OW(lts, popUlation, ilems or activity, Tho suggested hazard probability categories
pro\lidad in MILSiD-882D Appllndix A are retiected in Table 3,
11
1/20109 Page 1-17
Oneri Ion Level SDecific Individual Item Fleet or lnventorv
Frequent
I
A Ukely to occur often in the life of an
item. with a probability of occurrence
I Neater than 10.
1
in that life.
Conti nuously
experienced_
Probable B Will occur several limes in the life of
an rtam, with a prObability of
occurrence Jess then 10-\ bU19realet
than 10.
2
in that life. __
Will occur frequently,
Occasional c Ukely to occur some lime in the life
of en item. with a probability of
occurrence less than 10..2 but greater
than 10--.l in thetMa.
Will oCl:ur several
times.
Remote D Unlikely but possible to occur in the
life of an item, with 9 probabilily of
occurrence less than 10.
3
but greater
than 10
5
in that lifo.
UnliKely, but can
reasonably be
expected to occur.
Improbal:lle E So unlikely, it can be assumed
occurrence may not be experiem:ed,
with a probability of occurrence less
than 10-
6
in thai life.
Unlikely 10 occur, but
possible.
Table 3. Hazard Definitions
6.3 Risk Assessment Matrix
The hazard risk matrix is 8 qualitelJve tool used for hazard risk assessmel1t for each
identified potential \'Iazard. This matrix serveS sa e tool in ranking potential hazsn:!ous
oondilions end is used in comparing hazarn significance. The hazard risk assessment is
obtained by CC1mbining the Hazard S9V9rity level and the HlWIrd Probability, and is
considered \0 be the risk idenlified for each identified potential hazard source. The
hazard risk assessment matrix end hazard risk levels derined in MIL-STD
8820 is reflected in Table 4 end Table 5, respectively.
SEVERITY Catastrophic Critical Marginal Nagllglble
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
PROBABILITY
Fre uent
Probabl!! ,
Occasional
Remote
1m robable
13
16
111"' ,"
1'1;);_" ;:i-:
Table 4_ Hezerd Risk Assessment Metrix
12
1/20/09 Page 1-18
AVIATION SYSTEM PROGRAM
Risk AccePtimce I ..
Assessment Value Level
1 - 5 Component Acquisition
Executive
6-9 Program Executive Officer
10 -17 LAIRCM Program Manager Medium
18-20 'low' LAIRCM Program Manager
Table 5. Hazard Risk Acceptance Levels
7.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS RESULTS
The LAIRCM hazard Icg is used 10 document and track tne identification, oon1ro',
redudiOl1, and/or eliminalion of a hazard throughout the program. Tha initial hazard
summary and risk assassmen\ associated with !he LAIRCM 5y$tam is reflectad in l'
An overview ofsignilicant LAJRCM hazards and hazard conlrol is summarized in this
paragraph. Detailed discussiOll is presented in the Hazard Lng (AppendiX A hareln)
7.1 SLTA Laser
To assess ocular and skin hazards associated with exposure to Itle LAIRCM Vipef
110l
laser and to recommand laser safely precautions when WDo'king with Ihe Viper
1M
laser,
an analysis was performed 'oy lhe Department of Ihe Air Force, I-Jr Force Resoarch
Labcmtory (AFMC) Optical Radiation Brench (AFRLlHEDO), Brooks City-Base, TX. The
final resulls of this analysis are provided in consult!l1ive letter AFRL-HE-eL-2004-OO19,
Lassr Safety Summary of the Large Ain:mR Infrared Counlflrmeasura (LA/ReM) Viper
Lass/; Phsse 1. This final analy$is provides the Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE),
Laser Class, Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance (NOHD), and Oplk.al Density (OD) for
laser eyewear. Current anelysis far one SLTA NOHD is 43 maters (141 feet).
Verb:lus laser labals ara included 00 the SLTA in order 10 sstisfy MIL.STD-1425A
requirements for an Exemption Label and laser DANGER label (Figure 11 and Figure 9,
respectively), Marking is elao included to reflect 'Leser Aperture' rTlar1ting 21 CFR
1040,10 (Figure 10). Label locelien on the SLTA Is identIfied in Figure 12.
1120/09 Page 1-19

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AVIATION SYSTEM STANDARDS PROGRAM

OKLAHOMA CITYI OK1..AHOMA REPORT No. 06-10

:>.s MWS,SLTA D,.,. Electrical Shock EleclriCilI

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