Moving on, the land of Ottoman and Kemalist heritage, is in two directions, an open window and the door

to Europe to Asia. In this sense and in a symbolic way, () this assertion can be tested with only a walk through his old capital Istanbul, also known as Byzantium, Constantinople and Istanbul, which also provide political experience to travel from east to west and vice versa . Methodologically speaking, the analysis of existing literature on the history, the ideological, socio-political discourse and activities of the Turkish Islamist movement, the relationship of Islam and politics in the Ottoman context, and contemporary Kemalist and on theinteraction between the two concepts in the ideological context. To this we add the daily monitoring and subsequent analysis of various materials prepared by various movements, organizations and Islamist political parties in Turkey have been crucial to a historical analysis, political and sociological back, framed in the theoretical studies sociology of power. () On the structure of work, this is divided into three key sections, the first of which deals with the analytical framework of the work. Its content begins with a general introduction to Islamic movements and the notion of political Islam. Likewise, and secondly discusses the specific characteristics of Turkish political Islam, which have been decisive for the development of the current political project that attempts to carry out the Islamist political party in power, Ak Parti (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP .) () The second chapter provides a historical context of Turkey, paying special attention to the Ottoman Empire, in which historical period frames the analysis of the role of Islam in the state, after its decline, would commence in the dialectic between Islam and liberalism policy, highlighting the period of the Tanzimat reforms and the Muslim world's first constitution, promulgated in 1876. The start construction of the modern Turkish identity as a symbiosis of European and Muslim culture was established (after the Young Turk Revolution and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey) Mustafa Kemal Atatrk and enshrined in Islamic matters, not a "de-Islamisation", but in the separation of religious affairs of politicians and political and social basis of a genuine Turkish identity. In this regard, the establishment in 1923 of the Republic of Turkey, project allowed Islam to modernity and at risk of disappearing, imposed a series of rearrangements that transformed permanently.Second, the rural exodus (gecekondu) of the 50's (and later in the 80's back) allowed one hand the birth of political Islam (and later the crisis), and secondly, would Ottoman conflict in the field yet (Sufi) with Kemalist Westernized cities, a continuum that is repeated throughout the history of Turkey today. The death of Atatrk, allowed the entry of traditional political Islam within the Turkish political system, but not continuous and problematic as the constant banning avatars of the same when the military felt that trying to recall the last Ottoman again established an Islamic state. () The third and final chapter discusses in depth the influences present in the political project of "neo-Islamist" conservative Tayyip Erdoan, some of them considered the most representative intellectual figures of contemporary Turkish Islamic thought, such as Necmettin Erbakan, father of Islam "traditional" political Turkish, or Said-i Nursi, reformist Sufi mystical movement achieved by modernizing the social movement nurcu. To those who would add political figures (Turgut Ozal) and religious (Fetullah Glen), which made possible the correlation between a reinterpretation of the Ottoman legacy and sociopolitical liberalism and modernity. The next section in this last chapter provides a more concrete from the sociology of military elite power guarantors of secularism advocated by the Republic. Finally, he examines the political project of Erdoan and the neo-Islamist AKP, which is a sort of pragmatism to keep ambiguous, domestic policy, the balance of power between the military elites, but at the same time, andExternally, back to the Ottoman era, where Turkey had a privileged seat at the table of power. () As we have seen so far, the originality of Turkish political Islam lies especially in its

plurality and dynamism, and has, as weakness and wealth at the same time (see Ulemaguilds conflict or persecution at the time Alevi ottoman). For more than nine centuries the "laboratory Turkishness" has been at the crossroads of several cultures, see Arabic, Persian, Central Asian and European, which would have been the scene of the development of various streams of Islam. Although currently be the most secular country which has always described political Islam as the worst enemies of modernity and democracy by refusing to admit that Islam can accept the rules of political engagement. The main objective of the research is to propose to demonstrate the opposite scenario. First, Sunni Islam, the majority in today's Turkey, became incarnate in caliph Ottoman sultan to reign in the minds of all Earth's Sunni Muslims, tainted one of the first waves of Islam until the demise of the Empire or put another way, in charge of organizing and transmitting knowledge through the madrasas (Madaris) and imparting justice through ar'ay custom, would only be provided by doctors of religion, the ulema. The other three schools just have equivalence in the rest of the Middle East. It is true that the second of the streams, tarikat or religious brotherhoods have their origins in the Arab and Persian, although the development of sociability because, as with the Ottomans, was not allowed in the above-mentioned. Mainly because the Turkish Sufi religious brotherhoods did not represent a single, monolithic Islam, but involved a variety of interpretations ranging from heterodoxy Baktashiya provided by the guild, to the strictest heterodoxy Nakibendi represented by the guild. The subsequent rebuilding of the ancient guilds in new orders (cemaat) religious as Nurcu or Fethullahc, offered a new reading of the Koran and their spiritual leaders provided a new vision of spiritual guidance. Finally, the third stream of Islam is the treacherous Turk, Muslim or Sunni or Shiite, who was least affected after the founding of the Republic. () As I mentioned earlier, the domain model cemaat Turkish political Islam since the establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) in 1969 to Happiness Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) in 2001. You could even add that one of the most remarkable events of the twentieth century was the crisis in Turkey that Islam, who failed to bring its political project with a framework of a secular state and find it a balance of power with the Kemalist establishment. The creation of the ruling Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) in 2001, mean response and symptom recognition that Islam, as the construction of the AK Partisi is based on the "reject" the model of brotherhood (used purely electoral reasons) and a review of democracy in the field of Islamic movements, as, in turn, the party was presented with an identity of "conservative democrat", or rather, as a " Muslim democracy "similar to that developed by the European Democrats. () To conclude and to finish, the hypothesis about the viability of the ideological reference in the path of the AKP, has been confirmed, and that policy development in government (adding the approval by referendum on 26 constitutional amendments) that abound in the democratic concept of the state as a goal. While pragmatism used by the AKP has taken away "purity" to their Islamist ideological label, it has favored the establishment of a more or less natural reference of Islamic democracy as a dynamic element present in the Turkish political and secondly, the progressive limitation of space army interference in politics expanding the spaces of democracy. Political pragmatism used by the AKP is the result of historical experience and ideology of political Islam in Turkey and the sociopolitical and cultural situation which has been to a real understanding, not mere improvisation, and the moment Turkish reality global historical and ideological synthesis which amalgamated the political experiences and religious influences moral reference, with particular attention to the inspiration nakibendi. This statement serves to highlight the failure of traditional Turkish political Islam before the AKP, as personified by the figure of Necmettin Erbakan. () Even there is a clear intention behind the AKP government in search of a new space for

regional and international leadership, without disturbing them (especially Israel), with the clear objective of increasing its role and achieve well a country's relative autonomy in relation to other powers in the region. More than a symbolic break with the past in reference to the Ottoman Empire, the AKP government aims to develop a change in tactics but with the same objective: to ensure that Turkey is an active and influential actor in the international field of multipolarity with Brazil, to set an example. In conclusion, exposing a future perspective on the Turkish socio-political scene by the presence of an actor "Islamist", "neo-Islamist" or "Muslim-Democratic" solid as the AKP among elites primary for the first time in history modern Turkey. On the one hand, limit its Islamic reference speech but on the other and according to circumstances, could scale up the presence of Islam in the public sphere, where its presence is manifest in the social sphere, ever the politician, and that the latter could again be perceived as a threat to the pillars of the Republic by the secular elite and military.() However, some facts can call that scenario, as happened in early 2008, when Erdogan's government was accused by the Constitutional Court for possible crimes against the secularism of the Republic, which means that events like this, including the possible banning of the party would involve the return of the old repressive regime of Islam as a political option, that is, if not restricted his freedom of action, the establishment is still very wary of taking concrete decisions on measures that could be seen as imbalances in the network of power between secularists and Islamists, in turn, could serve as justification for further military intervention in politics.