IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE )

OF SPRINGFIELD-IN-ILLINOIS, an Illinois )
non-profit corporation, CATHOLIC CHARI- )
TIES OF THE DIOCESE OF PEORIA, an )
Illinois non-profit corporation, and CATHOLIC)
CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF JOLIET, )
INC., an Illinois non-profit corporation, ) Case No.
)

2011M~000254
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. )
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS, LISA MADIGAN, in )
her official capacity as the Attorney General )
of the State of Illinois, ERWIN McEWEN, )
in his official capacity as Director of the )
Department of Children & Family Services, )
State of Illinois, and the DEPARTMENT OF )
CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, State of )
Illinois, )
)
Defendants. )

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY
AND PER'\1ANENT INJUNCTIONS, A WRIT
OF PROHIBITION, AND OTHER RELIEF

Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois, an Illinois non-

profit corporation, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria, an Illinois non-profit corporation,

and 'h~nt;,"< of Diocese of Joliet, Inc" an Illinois non-profit corporation, all of

are hereinattr~r

undersigned attorneys, hereby complain of the defendants, the State Illinois, Lisa Madigan, in

capaCl1ty as In
official capacity as Director of the Department of Children & Family Services of the State of

lllinois, and the Department of Children & Family Services, State oflllinois, as follows:

Nature of the Case

I. Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities social service agencies for three Roman Catholic

Dioceses in the State of Illinois which are extensively involved in the provision of adoption and

foster family services in Illinois, bring this lawsuit in a pro-active effort to avert an imminent risk

of irreparable harm to many thousands of vulnerable and needy children, families, and adults

aeross the State of lllinois, and to avoid the collapse of a critical network of social service

agencies at a time when our State's budget erisis already has stretched vital social services

resources to the breaking point In order to stave off this crisis and avert harmful and potentially

cruel disruption and discontinuity in the lives of so many of lllinois' needy young people,

plaintiffs are asking this Court to resolve an actual controvcrsy that has arisen between them aIjd

the State of lllinois, the Attorney General of the State of lllinois, the Director ofthe DepartmeJt

of Children & Family Services ofthc State of Illinois ("DCFS"), and DCFS itself. The instant

controversy turns on two questions of law. The initial question of law is whether there is an

unavoidable conflict between, on the one hand, (i) plaintiffs' conscientious fulfillment of the

historic, apostolic, and ministerial role of the Roman Catholic Church in providing

compassionate, competent and professional social services - more specifically, adoption and

foster care referral, plaeement and related serviees that strengthen and support individuals,

ldlrull~' and communities, based on the inherent value and dignity of human lite, and by means

and methods that are faithful to the integral and es,;entiai tenets Roman religious

on the defendant AtltoDley np"pf"i' enforcement

reSi,ect to

2
5/101 (A)(12)), which proscribe discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation

andlor marital status by "place[s] of public accommodation" within the State of Illinois.

Plaintiffs are asking for entry of a declaratory judgment in this lawsuit to the effect that the

"place of public accommodation" provisions of the Human Rights Act do not apply to them

because they are "sectarian" and religious and, therefore, they are excluded from the scope of the

Illinois Human Rights Act, which covers only those "adoption agencies" which are "non-

sectarian." PlaintiffS provide vital social services, including adoption and foster care referral,

placement and related services, as part of their religious ministry, rooted in the Holy Scriptures,

and carried on in relationship to the Roman Catholic Church and under the spiritual governance

and practical oversight of each Diocesan Bishop. As a result, plaintiffs plainly do not and cannot

qualify as "non-sectarian adoption agenc[ies]," nor are they otherwise subject to the "public

accommodation" provisions of the Human Rights Act.

2. Even assuming, arguendo, that these explicit provisions restricting the coverage

of the "public accommodation" provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act somehow might be

strctched so far as to cover and bind the plaintiffs, another Illinois statute, namely, the Illinois

Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("IRFRA.," 775 lLCS 3511 et seq), neccssarily would

preclude any such strained interpretation purporting to authorize an application of these

provisions of the Human Rights Act to plaintiffs. Pursuant to lRFRA, defendants' reading of the

Human Rights Act to require the plaintiffs to place children for adoption or foster care into the

HUW';' of same sex or unmarried cohabiting couples would sub'stanti,lIly burden [plaintiffs']

which "'",rm1tN'< that "[tJhe ~.".,~,o~ and enjoyment

no
person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his [or her]

religious opinions ...." Therefore, pursuant to IRFRA, in order to prevail, the defendants would

bear a heavy burden they eould not even remotely satisfy, namely, (a) proving that eoereing

plaintiffs to reeommend, make and monitor sueh placements, contrary to the tenets of their

religious faith, would serve a eompelling governmental interest, and (b) proving that sueh

mandatory placement of ehildren in the households of same sex or unmarried cohabiting couples

would be "the least restrietive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." Even

assuming that forcing Roman Catholics to place children in same sex or unmarried cohabiting

heterosexual households, contrary to the essential tenets of their religious faith, could be said to

serve a "compelling governmental interest," defendants eould adequately serve that interest by a

far less "restrietive alternative" than by foreing plaintiffs to act against the tenets of their faith.

Defendants enjoy a medley of options apart from requiring plaintiffs to process applieations or

recommend, implement or oversee the plaeement of children for adoption or foster care in

contravention of plaintiffs' professed religious faith, as indeed an entire host of other adoption or

foster care ageneies do not share plaintiffs' Roman Catholic religious beliefs and otherwise have

no conscientious objection to such placements. Defendants may easily refer same sex or

heterosexual unmarried cohabiting couples to sueh other agencies. As a result, no couple would

be denied access to legally available adoption and foster care serviees were plaintiffs guaranteed

the right to free exercise of their religious faith. Therefore, defendants' insistenee that plaintiffs

thems,e!v,es make placements is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means by

defendants adequa!ely serve interest nfnn"ntli,,,, adoption or care

"",\/1("'" to san1C sex or COlm!(;S who are is because

applications may be referred to such agencies in the future.

3. A second and similar controversy has arisen between plaintiffs, on one hand, and

the defendant Director of the Department of Children & Family Services ("DCFS") and the

defendant DCFS itself, on the other hand, over another new Illinois statute, entitled the Religious

Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, Public Act 096-1513, whose effective date is June I,

2011. Said Act provides, inter alia, for the registration and recognition of "civil unions" in

Illinois between persons of the same sex or between persons of the opposite sex. It further

provides that "[aj party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities,

protections, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether

they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or

criminal law." P.A. 096-1513, Par. 20. In view of the claim by the defendant,lllinois Attorney

General, that her office has had "notice" that plaintiffs are engaged in unlawful discrimination in

their "provision of adoption and foster care services" (Exhibit A, attached hereto), plaintiffs now

also fear that one or more of the defendants imminently threatens to take action against them,

alleging that they are in violation of Section 20 of this Religious Freedom Protection and Civil

Union Act, now that it has become effective, and given that plaintilfs' established religious

praetice is not to entertain or process applicants for adoption or loster eare placements in homes

of unmarried cohabiting heterosexual couples or same sex couples, whose applications may be

and already are adequately processed by other social service agencies. Thus this threatened

action triggers another or co:ntroversv that also turns on a question of plaintHIs

this to adjudicate means declaratory judgment believe

that thcy are cXt~ml)t from coveJ'ap·e under this new statute, equally as they are

ex(tlmled and eX':mplc:a

5
of the Human Rights Act. Plaintiffs cite Section 15 of the new Act which provides, true to the

Act's title. that:

Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or regulate the religious practice of any
religious body. Any religious body, Indian Nation or Tribe or Native Group is
free to choose whether or not to solemnize or officiate a civil union.

As plaintiffs' adoption and foster care services are essential parts of their religious mission and

practice, the new Act is clearly inapplicable to them. Any question concerning the scope of this

express exemption on the face of the new law was put to rest on the floor of the Illinois Senate

on December 1,20] 0, when Senator Koehler, sponsor of the bill which was adopted later that

day, answered specific, explicit questions put to him by Senator Haine, to the effect that the two

sentences in Section 15, supra, are to be read separately so as to refer to "religious practice[s]"

apart and distinct from the decision "whether or not to solemnize or officiate a civil union."

Senator Haine referred to a variety of religious practices on the part of "thesc institutions of faith

of all denominations, Christian and Jewish [which] go to their various agencies providing social

services, retreats, religious camps, homeless shelters, senior care centers, adoption agencies,

hospitals, a wide gamut of things. So, that's covered under the first sentence" of Section 15, he

queried, to which Senator Koehler answered: "Yes. The - certainly the intent of Representative

Harris and I is not to at all, you know, impede the rights that religious organizations have to carry

out their - what their duties and - and religious activities are" (I 36 th Legislative Day, 96 th Gen.

Assembly, Regular Session, Sen. Transcript, p. 81, emphasis added).

4. Nevertheless, on or about May 5, II, plaintiffs are informed and oelle,'e that

defendant, DCFS, wrote to another rellgH)us social «>tV,,-"'" agt'llC'y,

& Family Services Whe;,ton, Illinois (which is not a

procedures to include recognition of Civil Unions [which] may impact potential service delivery

issues for faith-based agencies." The Deputy Director also reportedly wTote that the "Director

will be sending out a letter to all agencies sharing the Department's intention to be inclusive of

Civil Union relationships relative to adoption and foster children." Furthermore, DCFS' Deputy

Director reportedly described the impact of its decision "to be inclusive of Civil Union

relationships" as one that could well end its contractual relationship with Evangelical Child &

Family Services, saying: "The decision to proceed with providing foster care will be yours to

make, not DCFS'," and that, "If the policy changes conflict with your agencies [sic] religious

beliefs, you and your Board can opt out of your foster care contracts," in which event DCFS

would work "to ensure an orderly transition of cases to other service providers," which usually

would take "up to sixty days." While no such letter has been sent to plaintiffs as yet, nonetheless

plaintiffs feel imminently threatened that defendants and DCFS have failed or refused to

recognize and acknowledge:

(a) that plaintiffs are not covered by the new Civil Unions Law but are exempt from it as

the new law explicitly recites that its provisions do not "interfere with or regulate

religious practice";

(b) that any ambiguity arising from the text of the new law was eclipsed by Senator

Koehler's explicit assuranccs on the floor of the Illinois State Senate; and

(c) that the lllinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq., would

require that such substantial burdening of plaintitts' religious practice - coercing

contractual relationsbip

to prc,cc:;s same sex unmarried cohabiting COlJp!,:S applications for foster

care and ad'Jptlon a "comp::ll

 justified by showing this substantial burden on plaintiffs to be the "least restrictive

alternative" narrowly tailored to satisfy that asserted compelling governmental

interest. Furthennore, anyone of defendants' many options for referral of civil union

couples to other agencies willing to entertain and process their applications would

manifestly constitute such a "least restrictive alternative" fully adequate to satisfY any

needs posed by recognition of civil unions, while also fully honoring and preserving

plaintiffs' religious freedom.

Jurisdiction and Venue

5. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to the Declaratory

Judgment provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 235lLCS 5/2-701 (a), as there are

now two actual controversies over the construction of a pair of Illinois statutes, namely, the

Illinois Human Rights Act and the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act,

both of which must be eonstrued and enforced in light of the provisions of a third Illinois statute,

namely, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("IRFRA"), 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq.

More specifically, the dispute between plaintiff'i, on the one hand, and defendants, on the other

hand, is whether 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(12) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which defines the

phrase, "place of public accommodation," to include only any "non-sectarian adoption agency,"

may be interpreted to encompass the plaintiffs, even though plaintiffs do not qualifY as "non-

sectarian" On the contrary, plaintiffs are "sectarian" adoption agencies whose shared mission

and character is indisputably religious. the Court jurisdiction pursuant to Section 20

a ne!rson who;;e bcen

bur,dem,d m vjolati(}n this Act .. may assert that violation as a or in a judicial

 6. Moreover, there is a second actual controversy betwcen plaintiffs and defendants

ovcr the construction of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, namely, whether

the provision in Paragraph 15 of that Act renders it inapplicable to plaintiffs, to the extent that

defendants purport to regulate or interfere with plaintiffs' "religious practice," namely, its

deelining as a matter of conscience to process foster care and adoption applications from same

sex or unmarried cohabiting couples. That controversy, too, implicates the Illinois Religious

Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq., as defendants' threatened action against

plaintiffs would constitute a significant burden on the free exercise of their religious faith,

triggering in tum the imposition of a burden on defendants that they cannot meet, namely, having

to prove that Illinois has a compelling governmental interest in forcing plaintiffs to go against

their fundamental religious beliefs and that said compelling interest could not be adequately

served by a less restrictive alternative than forcing plaintiffs either to suppress their religious

faith or to cease furnishing the vital adoption and foster care they have been providing for years

to Illinois citizens in furtherance of plaintiffs' religious mission. Indeed, defendants' referral of

same sex and cohabiting unmarried couples to other agencies that do not share plaintiffs'

conscientious objections would adequately serve thc defendants' stated interests.

7. These controversies between plaintiffs and defendants are real, actual, and

imminent, far from remote, and none is hypothetical or speculative in the slightest. On or about

March 8, 20 I ]. the defendants, through the office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois,

wrote to Catholic Charities the Diocese of Springfield in Illinois, as well as to each of the

stating inler had "re,celvc,d n,n!t,,·y'

m Vj(,latlon Homan Rights

"understanding" that Catholic Charities "has requirements for potential taster or adoptive parents

that are not required by Illinois law - for example, requirements about religious beliefs - or

refuses to provide serviees to potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of Illinois law - for

example, refuses to provide services based on the marital status or sexual orientation of a

potential laster or adoptive parent." The defendants' letter went on to request that Catholic

Charities respond to a detailed request for "information and documentation," relative to

plaintiffs' "Foster Care and Adoption Practices," including:

• All contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS);

• All policies, procedures and manuals relating to services provided pursuant to

contracts \Vith DCFS;

• All policies and requirements for (a) foster parents; and (b) adoptive parents;

• All services provided by the Organization and location(s) where each service is

provided;

• The Organization's financial statements, including, but not limited to (a) IRS Form

990; (b) Illinois Charitable Organization Annual Reports filed with the Illinois Office

of the Attorney General; (c) Annual Reports; and (d) all other financial statements

regardless of whether or not they are audited;

• The Organization's by-laws or articles of incorporation;

• lbe Organization's mission statement or other documents regarding the purpose of

• All dO(;Ulllents ",ftB,rcli,Hf the relationship Organization to the lLatr'O!i'C

or

10
 • All employee handbooks;

• All documents concerning complaints of discrimination against the Organization that

were filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights or in any state or federal

court, including but not limited to complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of

race, color, religion, national origin, marital status or sexual orientation; and

• State whether any court, commission, department, including but not limited to those

listed in Request Number 10, has found that the Organization was or was not liable

for discrimination and, if so, produce a copy of the judicial or administrative order or

decision.

8. Plaintiffs were given until Friday, March 25, 2011, to submit the responsive data

and documentation. Plaintiffs sought and obtained a 30-day delay of that deadline, and after

which meetings were sought with one or more of the defendants. But there was no response up

to and including June 1,2011, when the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act

became effective. Nor was any meeting or offer to meet received before June 1sl. Plaintiffs,

therefore, feared and continue to fear an imminent effort by the defendants to enforce the

foregoing requests, pursuant to Section 10-104(A) of the Human Right Act, 775ILCS 5/10-

I04(A), which provides inter alia that

(1) Whenever the Illinois Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe tbat
any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination prohibited by this Act, the Illinois Attorney General may
commence a in the name of the People of the State, as parens patriae
on behalf of persons within the State to the provisions of this Act in any
m111ml'lnate cmom! court.

Prior to initiating a civil action, the Attorney General sball conduct a

prt:lllllmmy im:es:llg,"tl(m to determine IS cause to

dlspul:e can
 resolved without litigation. In conducting this investigation, the Attorney General
may:
(a) require the individual or entity to file a statement or report in writing under
oath or otherwise, as to all information the Attorney General may consider
necessary;
(b) examine under oath any person alleged to have participated in or with
knowledge of the alleged pattern and practicc violation; or
(c) issue subpoenas or conduct hearings in aid of any investigation.

(3) '"

(4) '"

(5) ...

(6) If any person fails or refuses to file any statement or report, or obey any
subpoena, issued pursuant to subdivision (A)(2) ofthis Section, the Attorney
General will be deemed to have met the requirement of conducting a preliminary
investigation and may proceed to initiate a civil action pursuant to subdivision
(A)(l) of this Section.

9. Plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodations provisions of the Illinois

Human Rights Act and, therefore, they need not comply with defendants' request for such

voluminous data and documentation, to the extent that it is predicated on those provisions related

to public accommodations. Nor do plaintiffs believe in the slightest that they are illegally

discriminating, within the meaning of the public accommodations proscriptions of thc Human

Right Act, as contended by the defendant Attorney General and State of lllinois, by virtue of

their faithful religious practice in connection with adoptions and foster care. The parties are,

therefore, caught up in an actual controversy that is fully justiciable and ripe for adjudication,

and which they properly bring before this Court, asking that it resolve the clear cnt legal issues

nart"" lltn:!ll, as to Court is emno'welren to a 01OU1Olg

declaratory jurlgrnerlt.

10. IS no requirement that plain!Jitfs extlaust any .qtlrllini,lt·~tivp rtmH:dy betore

)
 the Human Rights Commission, because there is no such remedy. The Illinois Human Rights

Act provides that defendants' claims of pattern or practice discrimination be adjudicated before

the Illinois circuit courts, "whether or not a charge has been t1led" beforc the Commission. 775

lLCS 5/10-1 04(A).

II. Plaintiffs also are informed and believe, based on defendants' prior

communications to them about the Human Rights Act and defendants' communications with

Evangelical Child & Family Services with respect to the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil

Union Act, Public Act 096-1513, that should they continue to abide by their religious faith and

practice in declining to process same sex and unmarried cohabiting couples' foster care and

adoption applications, DCFS and its Director and perhaps also the Attorney General threaten to

take adverse action against them which may include plaintiffs' having to relinquish and cease

their contractual relations with the State of Illinois, pursuant to whieh they have been providing

these vital social services for many years. This again poses a dilemma, in light of which

plaintiffs are forced to choose between abiding by their religious beliefs and commitments, on

the one hand, and complying with defendants' invalid and overbroad interpretation of a new law,

the Religious Frcedom Protection and Civil Union Act, which became effective as of June 1,

2011, by which plaintiffs do not believe in good faith that they are bound, on the other hand.

Plaintiffs, therefore. seek entry of another declaratory judgment herein to the effect that they are

not covered and exempt from that law, too, in performing adoption and foster care social st."fVices

the people Illinois. This controversy as well is actual, imminent, and fully

justiciable.

12. IS !JnJPe;rly as both plaintiff; Cathcllie Charities the 01.DCllse of

Spring:field m
Sangamon County, which encompasses the city of Springfield, the capital eity of the State of

Illinois.

The Parties

13. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois is an Illinois

non-profit corporation with its principal plaee of business in Springfield, Sangamon County,

Illinois.

14. Plaintiff Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese of Peoria is an Illinois non-profit

corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Peoria, Peoria County, Illinois.

15. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet is an Illinois non-profit

corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Joliet, Will County, Illinois.

16. Defendant, State of Illinois, is a political entity amenable to suit in this Circuit

Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois, the seat of Illinois' State

Government.

17. Defendant, Lisa Madigan, sued herein only in her official capacity, as the

Attorney General of the State of Illinois, has a principal office within the city of Springfield,

Sangamon County, Illinois.

18. Defendant, Erwin McEwen, sued herein only in his official capacity, as the

Director of the Department of Children & Family Services, State of Illinois, and defendant,

Department of Children & Family Services, both have a principal offiee within the city of

Springfield, Sangamon lllinois.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT!
(Declaratorv Judgment - Sectarian Adoption Agencies Exempt from Human Rights Act)

14
 1-18. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 18 inelusive hereof with the same force and effect as if fully set forth

herein.

19. Defendant, the Attorney General, acting in her official capacity on behalf of the

defendant State of Illinois, has asserted that plaintiffs are bound by the public accommodations

provisions of the lllinois Human Rights Act, as set forth supra and as evidenced by Exhibit A,

attached hereto. Said defendants also have alleged that they have "received notice" that

plaintiffs are discriminating against lllinois citizens based inter alia on marital status and sexual

orientation in their provision of adoption and foster care services. More specifically, said

defendants have focused on plaintiffs' "requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that

are not required by Illinois law ... or refus[al] to provide services to potential foster or adoptive

parents in violation of Illinois law - for example, refuse[al] to provide services based on the

marital status or sexual orientation of a potential foster or adoptive parent." ld.

20. Furthennore, said defendants appear to have invoked 775 ILCS 5/1 0-1 04(A) of

the Human Rights Act, which empowers the Attorney General of Illinois to conduct

investigations "to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or

group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practiee of discrimination declared unlawful by this

Act," to make sweeping requests for the production of information and documents from the

plaintiffs, indicating that the defendants believe that the "discrimination" on the part of plaintiffs

of which purport to "n,,"'·"'· is indeed widespread and systematic.

21. n11I,II" nn!lCV emlb()clH~cl m minois Hllmfltl nl!411" Act

m(~luljmlg discrimination on the of marital status and sexual orientation.

estate tranS<lctlorls. acccss to uoamlJal

credit, and the availability of public accommodations." Operation of an adoption agency, as

carried on by plaintiffs as part of their social services ministry, fits none of the first three

categories just mentioned - emploj1nent, real estate transactions, or access to financial credit.

The public accommodations provisions are pertinent, however, and the question is squarely

posed here whether those provisions apply to the plaintiffs, who operate sectarian adoption

agencies.

22. Before the 2007 amendment of the Human Rights Act, that Act defined a place of

public accommodation as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or

transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities,

privileges, and advantages of accommodations arc extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made

available to the public." 775 ILCS 5/5-IOI(A)(l). The Act provided, hy way of examples, a

lengthy laundry list of "place[s] of public accommodation," including "facilities of thc follo\\ing

types," as follows:

inns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors, taverns,
roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores, shoe
stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks, public golf conrses, public
golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or
rooms, railroads, omnibuses, buses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral
hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water, or air,
public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation and
amusement. 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(2).

In 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Board of Trustees ofSouthern lllinois Univ. v, Dep't

ofHuman Rights, 159111.2d 206, 210-13 (1994), that the D<ollartmcntofHuman Rights lacked

to ~mH'am complaints discrimination in

public llniver',it;", The high Court stated that the definition

set at l) to m
examples given at 7751LCS 5!5-101(A)(2)(Bd. a/Trustees. supra, 1591112d at 211), applying

the maxim of statutory construction known as "ejusdem generis." Under that maxim,"when a

statute lists several classes of persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the

class of unarticulated persons or things will be interpreted as those 'others such like' the names

persons or things." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court noted that the terms "institution of

higher education," "education program," and "classroom" were not contained anywhere in the

list provided in the Act (again, this was before it was amended in 2007).Id. Further, the Court

observed, "the examples listed in the Act are fundamentally different from institutions of higher

education, which administer educational programs." Id. at 212. Instead, the Court explained,

"[t]he cited establishments are examples offacilities for overnight accommodation,

entertainment, recreation or transportation." Id. "The definition specifically requires that the

'services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations [b]e extended, offered, sold, or

othernlse made available to the general public." Id. (citation omitted). As a consequence, "what

was anticipated by the General Assembly is a restaurant, a pub, or a bookstore," but not "an

academic program of a higher education institution." ld. Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme

Court held that the conduct alleged by the Department of Human Rights did not fall within its

jurisdiction. ld.

23. The reasoning of the high Court in Board of Trustees ofSIU was followed in

several Appellate Court decisions, which held that the term "place of public accommodation" did

Ilot include a business offering scuba diving cl2lSs,~s which required nh"ci'-'nl and other standards

to be met 'I ofHuman RilZhls,

did it encompass a company offering health insurance (CUI 'n Dried Saloll v,

"
I (1" it mclude a

7
(Baksh v. Human Rights Comm 'n, 304 IlLApp.3d 995,1002-06 (1" Dist. 1999». Plaintiffs

contend that, under this line of authority, it is clear that an adoption agency would not be

regarded as a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the Human Rights Act.

24. In 2007, the Human Rights Act was amended, and by that amendment the

definition of "place of public accommodation" was deleted. Replacing the definition was a

detailed list of speci fie examples, some of which had been held not to be "places of public

accommodation" under the pre-amended wording ofthc statutc and the cases decided under that

prior wording of the Act (e.g., insurance offices, the professional offices of health care providers

and certain educational institutions). See, 775ILCS 5/5-101(A)(l)-(l3). But with respeet to the

issue posed in this litigation, the list of examples of "public places of accommodation" now

includes "a scnior citizen center, homeless shclter, food bank, non-sectarian adoption agency, or

other social service centcr establishment."." 775 ILCS 5/5-101 (A)(l2)(emphasis supplied).

Plaintiffs contend that thc obvious and unavoidablc implication of this amended language is that

a sectarian (i.e., religiously-based) adoption agency is not a "place of public accommodation,"

and, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the Human Rights Act, nor within the

jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission. By the samc token, scctarian nurseries, day care

centers, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, postgraduate or other places of education are also

implicitly excluded. See, 775 lLCS 5/5-101(A)(lI).

25. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs pray that the Court declare and adjudge that

as plaintiffs arc sectarian agencies engaged in rendition

co,nnc,cti,on with adoption care~ cannot as a matter sut>1ec:ted to

a statute wh""" coverage is explicitly confined to "non-sectarian

 WHEREFORE, pursuant to Count I, plaintiffs pray that the Court issue a declaratory

judgment to the effect that plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodation provisions of

the Illinois Human Rights Act, nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the Human Rights

Commission with respect to those provisions, nor are they bound to comply with any "pattern or

practice" investigation on the part of the Illinois Attorney General, pursuant to the public

accommodations provisions ofthe Human Rights Aet; and that the Court grant plaintiffs all other

relief to which they may be entitled on the premises pursuant to Count I hereof.

COUNT II
(Declaratory Judgment - Claim that Plaintiffs Are Also Exempt from the New
Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act)

1-25. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs I through 25 inclusive hereof of Count I with the same force and effect as if fully set

forth herein.

26. As is hereinabove alleged, plaintiffs are informed and believe that, on or about

May 5, 2011, the Deputy Direetor of the defendant, Department of Children & Family Services

of the defendant State of Illinois, wrote to another religious social services agency, Evangelical

Child & Family Services of Wheaton, Illinois (not a party to this lawsuit, nor represented by

counsel for plaintiffs herein), citing the new Illinois statute entitled, "Religious Freedom

Protection and Civil Union Act, " Public Act 096-1513, due to become effective on June 1,2011.

In his letter to Evangelical Child & Family Services, the DCFS' Deputy Director reportedly

that the Department revising policies and procedures to include recognition of

may !!Ht'ael potential delivery

DepUity Director IS r"r,m1!"d to wrrlT"n that the defendant Director of DeI'S "will

out a ag:eneles "urmu the n"nn,1m"nl s intiention to

Union relationships relative to adoption and foster children." It was further stated in said letter

that DCFS' decision to be so "inclusive of Civil Union relationships" in connection with

adoption and foster care might well have a dispositive and terminal impact on that sectarian

adoption agency's future relationship with DCFS. Specifically and pointedly, the Deputy

Director observed that, "[I]fthe policy changes conflict with your agencies [sic] religious beliefs,

you and your Board can opt out of your foster care contracts," and in that event, DCFS would

work "to ensure an orderly transition of cases to other service providers," usually taking "up to

sixty days."

27. Plaintiffs have not as yet received any such letter from DCFS, but the reported

contents of this early May letter to another sectarian adoption agency pose an imminent threat

against plaintiffs, equally as against the letter's addressee, inasmuch as it reflects a settled,

specific viewpoint on the part of defendant DCFS and its current leadership that would somehow

deem plaintiffs subject to and bound by the provisions of the new Religious Freedom Protection

& Civil Union Act. This threat had been foreshadowed by a March 2, 20 II, story in the Chicago

Tribune to the effect that "Attorney General Lisa Madigan, Gov. Pat Quinn's legal team and the

Department of Children and Family Services are carefully researching the lIlinois Human Rights

Act, the Civil Union Act and the lIlinois Constitution to determine whether they prohibit

agencies from considering sexual orientation as a factor in foster care and adoption in lIIinois,"

etc. FurthernlOre, the same newspaper story quoted Kendall Marlowe, identified as "a

spc,ke,sm,m lor DCFS, to the that, intervention as adoption and practices

Illinois as a state grown on

as evi,jenced union legislation). Adoption law and practice should reflect the valucs

thc pco,plc
 28. Plaintiffs believe, tberefore, that there is also an actual controversy between them

and the defendants as to whether the new Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act

applies to them at all, let alone whether it requires that they betray their religious commitments

by refusing to take into account whether foster care or adoption applicants are same sex couples

or unmarried cohabiting couples. Examination of the text of the new law plainly shows that it

does not purport to, and expressly disclaims any intent to, "interfere with or regulate the religious

practice of any religious body" (supra. p. 6).

29. Moreover, the legislative history of the new law's passage back on December 10,

2010, absolutely confirms - through the words of its sponsor on the floor of the Illinois Senate -

that this critical wording in Section 15 of the text of the Act stands alone and should be read

separate and apart from the reference in the ensuing sentence to the freedom of any religious

body to abstain from solemnizing or officiating at a civil union ceremony (id.). Rather, the

reference to the law's not regulating or interfering with the religious practice of any religious

body should be read to refer to "a wide gamut of things," encompassing religious practices such

as "social services, retreats, religious camps, homeless shelters, senior care centers, adoption

agencies, hospitals," and so forth (emphasis added). In response to Senator Haine's listing these

types of religious practices and inquiring whether they were all covered by the disclaimer of any

intent to regulate or interfere with them in Section IS, Senator Koehler answered unequivocally,

The - certainly the intent of Representative Harris and I is not to at all, you know, impede

the rights religious organizations have to carry out their what their and and

(l

p. 81 .. emlJhaf;is added; p.6).

other
is a central, critical element of their "religious practice" is patent. Catholic Charities' mission is

said to fulfill the Church's role in giving charitable aid to anyone in need by providing

compassionate, competent and professional services that strengthen and support individuals,

families and communities based on the value and dignity of all human life. Catholic Charities'

agencies around the entire United States form a network, which includes the plaintiffs herein,

comprising more than 1,700 agencies and institutions, involving thousands of programs, over

62,000 staff memhers, and more than 240,000 volunteers. Essential features of Catholic

Charities agencies mark them as indelibly Roman Catholic:

• Catholic Charities' ministries are deeply rooted in the Scriptures, including the

Hebrew scriptures in which the very heart of the biblical concept of justice was the

care of the widow, orphan, and stranger - the gauge of whether one understood his or

her relationship to God and to one another. Catholic Charities' contemporary work

continues to focus primarily on these same groups: women who are poor; children

who are poor; and individuals who are marginalized, including foreign workers,

immigrants, refugees, racial minorities, disabled persons, those afflicted with

H1V I AIDS, or other conditions that set them apart. All these needy and vulnerable

human beings are children of the one God who is passionately concerned for the least

among us. This was Jesus' teaching, as in the judgment scene in il,rlatthew 25, where

Jesus tells his followers that the world will be judged by how they treat the hungry,

imprisoned, and poor.

• Catholic ministry has been au integral part Catholic for

apostles appointed seven dnacons whose first

to that was reflected

22 33
 that poor widows and children received care. This ministry of care was

institutionalized and flourished in the great monasteries of the first millennium as the

religious communities cared for the widows and orphans, sick, elderly, wayfarers, and

the poor. Later in the cities, religious orders established orphanages, homes for the

sick and elderly, hospices, and other centers for health and social services. Lay and

religious groups, such as those begun by St. Vincent de Paul, expanded and deepened

this work, and throngs of saints were known for ministries to the poor and vulnerable,

including St Francis of Assisi, St. Clare, St. Peter Claver, St. Catherine of Siena, St.

Martin de Porres, and St. Elizabeth Seton. The Ursuline Sisters of New Orleans

pioneered the institutionalization of this vital work in the New World, starting in New

Orleans in 1727 where they built an orphanage, home for women, and health care

facility. By 1900 there were more than 800 Catholic charitable institutions in the

U.S., and now staff and volunteers serve almost 7 million persons a year with group

homes, elderly residences, family counseling centers, hospices for HlV/AlDS

patients, soup kitchens and homeless shelters, among a vast array of social services.

Plaintiffs' Catholic Charities agencies alone serve thousands of children in foster care

daily, helping children heal from abuse such as trauma and neglect, stabilizing their

lives by avoiding multiple moves among different foster homes, resolving problems

that led to plaeement, and finding stable, lasting relationships for traumatized

children.

• the ,"nclilv and the di unitv

'" 0
human

some people bet:au:se sickm:ss, disahility,

 reaches out to them with respect for their human dignity, a sacred concept at the very

root of Catholic social teaching. Jesus Christ rcjected no one from his healing touch,

and enjoyed tellO\vship meals with tax collectors and sinners. Among Catholic

Charities' ethical standards and values that shape their work is the preferential option

for the poor articulated by the late Pope, Blessed John PaulH.

• Catholic Charities are authorized to exercise their ministry by the diocesan bishop.

All three plaintiffs herein have a formal Catholic identity in relationship to the

Church and their respective Diocesan Bishops, each of whom is charged in Church

teachings and canon law with responsibility for the apostolate within diocesan

confines.

• Catholic Charities respect the religious beliefs of those whom it serves through its

various ministries. This respect for persons of other faiths or no faith stems from a

determined position to serve the entire community, a custom going back as far as the

fourth century and, again, in this country to the Ursuline Sisters in New Orleans in

1727. In the pattern of Christ Jesus, Catholic Charities feed the hungry, homeless,

depressed, troubled, and frail - regardless of their religious beliefs. Thus Jesus cured

the Canaanite woman in Matthew 15 and the Centurion's servant in Luke 7. On April

18, 1997, the Pope, John Paul II, directed that: "Actions of aid, relicf; and assistance

should be conducted in a spirit of service and free giving for the benefit of all persons

the ulterior m,"l'W of eventual tutelage or proselytism."

• Catholic rcc:og11l2:e that some "",\/1<::<'< require attention to on'VSH:aL menta.!,

AdldH:tlcm treatment rmw,"m

a hmh"" fluweL In
 such programs as well as in marriage and family counseling, grief ministries, and

other services it is appropriate and necessary to recognize and respond to the physical,

mental, and spiritual needs of those whom Catholic Charities serve.

• Catholic Charities have a special relationship to the Catholic diocese and to Catholic

parishes within the diocese. Catholic Charities agencies often have formal programs

which support and encourage Roman Catholic parishes in their ministry to the

community and its needs, assisting parishioners in the exercise of their baptismal

commitment to the poor and needy.

• Catholic Charities work in active partnership with religiously sponsored charities and

the civic community, reflecting the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, as

Catholies are mandated as well as willing to work hand-in-hand with other religions

and other people of good will to serve the needs of the larger civic community.

• Catholic Charities support an active public-private partnership with government at all

levels. The Church has a long and strong tradition of teaching about the

responsibilities of government in promoting the common good and proteeting the

least among us. Catholics are also charged with a responsibility to support their roles

as citizens and taxpayers and to actively participate in civic life. 111ese teachings

have impelled and authorized Catholics to seck out and accept partnerships with

cities, counties, states, and the federal government to facilitate and insure the

community that are judged to be consistent

thc own !1l1"I'Ull. lation5lhijlS are sornetimlEs contractual

relatlon,shlps, as he1IW"en lair,tWls and DCFS, to ",,"VPC partlclllar as

care aPl)!H:all.on m("",,,i,,,, pla,ceJments

 They also may involve voucher payments from government, such as Medicaid, or

government funding of construction, such as housing. The Church provides

additional funding, volunteers, efficiency, values, community credibility, and

dedication to service for the henefit oflocal communities and their needy families.

• Catholic Charities blend advocacy for those in need and public education about social

justice with service to vulnerable and needy individuals, families, and communities.

Consistcnt with its special concern for the poorest and most vulnerable human beings

among us, over the last century the Church has been increasingly outspoken about the

need for economic and political change. Following the lead of the Vatican and the

U.S. bishops, Catholic Charities have made working for a more just society an

integral part of understanding their mission of service.

31. Nor could plaintiffs' observance of their conscientious religious obligations be

held, in any event, to violate any provision of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union

Act. The core protection embodied in the new statute is set forth at Section 20 thereof, which

provides:

Section 20. Protections, obligations, and responsibilities. A party to a civil

union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and
benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether
they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other
source of civil or criminal law.

Catholic Charities' religiously grounded practice of declining to entertain or process applications

for care or adoption on the part of same sex or unmarried cohabiting couples, together with

ii"r"nii3int, OjJ:ti0l1S to such applicants to and to aCi;ofnffiodate

not cven rernotely . benefit" to a civil union couple that would be

avali,lme to a
policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law." Couples in civil unions-

same sex or opposite sex - remain perfectly free to contact and obtain all relevant services from

other adoption or foster care agencies or to make private adoption arrangements, all without the

slightest interference of obstruction on the part of plaintiffs or any hindrance arising as a matter

oflaw. Thus there is no underlying predicate for any application of the new Religious Freedom

Protection & Civil Union Act against plaintiffs, even if plaintiffs were not deemed exempt as

provided on the face of the Act itself, and also as recited in the statute's own text.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Count II, plaintiffs pray that the Court issue a declaratory

judgment to the effect that plaintiffs are not covered by the new Religious Freedom Protection &

Civil Union Act, but exempted by its text, as confirmed by its legislative history, and that in any

event plaintiffs' assertion of their conscientious religious objections, together with defendants'

capacity for referral of same sex or unmarried cohabiting couples to other agencies which do not

share plaintiffs' religious objections and may provide all requested social services in connection

with adoption or foster care, does not deny any civil union couple or unmarried cohabiting

couple any legal benefit whatsoever; and that the Court grant plaintiffs all other relief to which

they may be entitled on the premises pursuant to Count II hereof.

COUNT III
(Declaratory Judgment - Claim Under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq)

1-31. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in

ac"."h, i through 31 inclusive Count 11 hereof with the same force and as if set

"""/SiU"O Freedom Restoration Act, ILCS et was

in l:nm!,ml1('n! I!VIWln V.
U.S. 872 (J 990), which articulated a narrow, compound test for evaluation of constitutional

claims asserting infringements of the First Amendment freedom to exercise one's religious faith,

and in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which struck down an attempt by Congress

to overrule Smith by legislation. Both of these U.S. Supreme Court cases are referenced in the

findings and purposes of the lllinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra, 775 ILCS

3511 O(a)(4),(5).

33. Section 15 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775ILCS 35115, provides

as follows:

Government may not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even

if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling interest.

34. "Exercise of religion" is defined in turn to mean "an act or refusal to act that is

substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or

central to a larger system of religious belief." 775 ILCS 3515. And "government" includes "a

branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of

law) of the State of Illinois or a political subdivision ofthe State, including a horne rule unit."

Id.

35. Pursuant to Section 20 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS

35120:

If a of religion has been burdened in violation of that

VJC,iatlOll as a or in a and
obtain appropriate a government. A party an
to the Act against a government is entitled to recover attorney's
costs incurred the claim or defense.
respective religiously based adoption agencies, under penalty of law, to act in a way that directly

contlicts with their sincerely held, fundamental religious convictions with respect to the morality

of sexual cohabitation outside of marriage, including homosexual conduct, and the morality of

placing children for adoption or foster care in the homes of unmarried cohabiting couples

(regardless of their heterosexual or homosexual oricntation) would, indeed, "substantially

burden" their constitutionally protected rights to frce exercise of religion. Accordingly, pursuant

to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, it would be incumbent on the State (or state officers

or agencies) to demonstrate that the burden, as applied to plaintiffs, their directors and staff

members, was the "least restrictive means" of furthering a "compelling governmental interest."

775 ILCS 35115.

37. Plaintiffs further contend that there is no "compelling governmcnt interest" in

burdening religiously based moral objections on the part of plaintiffs to placing children in the

homes of unmarried cohabiting couples, whethcr homosexual or heterosexual, or whether vel non

they may have entercd into a civil union. Nor may the defendants rely on the anti-discrimination

provisions of the Human Rights Act as a predicate for deeming that alleged governmental

interest "compelling," when that statute clearly exempts from its "public accommodation"

proscriptions sectarian adoption agencies such as plaintiffs. The Human Rights Act also has

been held repeatedly to represent an "exclusive remedy" for anyone in Illinois who claims to be a

victim of "discrimination," and as shown supra (Count l) it affords no remedy at all to those

"11,,,,,,,,11 v aggrieved by acts Of omissions of sectarian adoption agencies, such as plaintiffs,

IndieC'}, the nnom,,' bound in the

clause ,'Oflstitu1:1011, Article L Se<;!JC>!1 3, must be taken into consideration and at

cleerrled a
dictates it a "compelling interest" to coerce its citizens under penalty oflaw to disregard their

own sincere, deeply held, conscientious religious objections to what they deem immoral

misconduct and endangerment of children,

38, Nor could the defendants argue that there is a "compelling interest" in suppressing

plaintiffs' rights to pursue their religious practice by urging that serious hann would flow trom

plaintiffs' declining to entertain or process adoption or foster care applications, etc, when

defendants command a host of options for referral of those applicants to other social service

agencies which provide foster care or adoption services - whether those other social services

agencies are sectarian or not - and which are willing to accept and process such applications,

Indeed, defendants' undisputed capacity for making such referrals represents the "least restrictive

alternative" to placing such a substantial burden on plaintiffs' free exercise of religion, Referral

to other providers would assure the proper and adequate handling of everybody's applications,

while not trampling on plaintiffS' conscientious objections and permitting plaintiffs to continue

to practice their religious faith through social ministry within our religiously pluralistic

democracy,

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Count III, plaintiffs pray that the Court issue a declaratory

judgment to the effect that, in the event the Human Rights Act proscriptions that apply to places

of public accommodation are held to apply to plaintitIs and/or the Religious Freedom Protection

& Civil lInion Act is held applicable to plaintiffs, plaintiffs' right to free exercise of religion

under Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution 1970 would substantially burdened by

a ,,:aum!; the Human Rights Act that force them to adoption

or care in horn loS same sex couples or heterosexual couples who are cohabiting but not

or a new to to
them and restrict their religious practice, for which there is no compelling governmental interest,

and that defendants' many options for referral of such applicants to other adoption agencies

willing to entertain and process their applications represent the least restrictive alternative to

burdening plaintiffs' free exercise of their religious faith, pursuant to the Illinois Religious

Freedom Restoration Act; that the defendants' imminently threatened effort to coerce defendants

into going against their conscientious religious scruples and commitments would constitute a

violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; and that plaintiffs be granted all other

relief, pursuant to Count III hereof, to which they may be entitled on the premises, and pursuant

to said Act.

COUNT IV
(Claim for Emergency, Temporary & Permanent Injunctive Relief & Writ of Prohibition)

1-38. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs 1 through 39 inclusive of Count 1Il hereof with the same force and effect as if fully

set forth herein.

39. Plaintiffs have pled several causes of action herein upon which they have a

substantial likelihood of prevailing, or at a minimum a fair chance of prevailing.

40. Plaintiffs lack any adequate remedy at law to redress the irreparable injury they

would be likely to suffer if the defendants were not enjoined from taking adverse action against

plaintiffs pursuant to either the place of public accommodation provisions of the Illinois Human

Rights Act, which do not apply to plaintiffs, or the newly effective Religious Freedom Protection

& not to plaintiffs, plaintiffs' rights

pursuant to Freedom Restoration Act, as alleged herein supra.

mcludlc inter an legal rights to

maintain the status quo ante, to continue its religious practice and ministry to those birth parents,

prospective foster parents and adoptive parents, and those children whose vital interests plaintiffs

arc serving now in fulfillment of their religious mission, on which thcir Church has been

embarked for millennia.

41. There would be no legally cognizable harm to defendants or to third parties were

this Court to enter the injunctive relief, either emergency, temporary and permanent rclief, which

plaintiffs seek herein to protect their vital legal rights and continue to carry out their religious

mission on the safe side of the law. Same sex couples and unmarried cohabiting couples'

applications for adoption or foster care referrals could be fully and adequately serviccd and

accommodated (as they are now) by defcndants' referring them to other providers which do not

share plaintiffs' conscientious religious objections. On the ofher hand. the harm to plaintiffs and

to the poor, needy and vulnerable third parties whom they serve, should no injunctive relief

issue, would be severe and, given the patent merits of plaintiffs' claims herein, even

unconscionable. The balance of hardships weighs decisively in favor of plaintiffs and those who

are beneficiaries of plaintiffs' vital social services.

42. A writ of prohibition should properly issue in favor of plaintiffs and against the

defendants, as said defendants are bereft oflegal authority to press their threatened actions

against the plaintiffs. Said defendants have not been endowed with legal authority or otherwise

clothed with statutory jurisdiction to enforce any public accommodation provision of the Human

Rights Act or provision of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act against the

plaintifIs, to extent that plaintiffs are now im:mll1erlllv threatened.

Granting equitable relief and/or any writ of prohibition in favor of plaintiffs

 WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray pursuant to this Count IV that this Court enter emergency,

temporary, and permanent injunctive relief, protecting the plaintiffs' rights and the vital interests

of the persons whom they serve, by continuing the status quo ante, and barring defendants from

regulating or interfering with plaintiffs' free exercise of their religious faith or otherwise

violating plaintiffs' rights in the premises; that the Court also issue a writ of prohibition,

precluding and prohibiting the defendants, and each of them, from any new or continued effort to

enforce the restrictive provisions of the Human Rights Act that are incumbent on places of public

aceommodation against the plaintiffs and/or to so endeavor to enforce the restrictive or other

provisions of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act against them, as defendants

lack any legal authority or statutory jurisdiction to enforce either of said statutes against these

plaintiffs; and that plaintiffs have all other relief to which they may be entitled on the premises

pursuant to Count IV hereof

•

Of Counsel: Attorneys for Plaintiffs,

Thomas Brejcha
Peter Breen
Paul Benjamin Linton
Thomas alp
Marian Haney
Jason Craddock
Tyler Mark
Thomas More Society
29 South LaSalle St. - Suite 440
Chicago, IL 60603
Tel31 782-1680-Fax31
Graham & Graham, Ltd.
1201 South Eighth Street
Springfield, IL 62703
omas More Society
-~,,:,~~_u.~!(.,,='---c::-=-c---,-:::-=----:--
Pe r Breen, one of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Executive
Director Legal Counsel, Thomas More Society
~~' J-
k .. -.... ,;. ~ ~&)
Paul Benjamin~~ one of the Attorneys f~amt1ffs,
oJ
Spe~'al counrl'.}fo ~1pre s.ociety
1887
' 0l \ A/ \ N\ \h
=--__'U""-.-:"'~D<"'<c::---'\~"b'i__'"L_._)L<+"~+__~~~---
Bradley Huff, Attorney for Catlio arities for the
Springfield, Illinois
I
 EXHIBIT

I~

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ILLINOIS

Lisa Madigan
l,,:rl"oR"EY t;E-"'EltAL
March 8, 20 II

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL

Steven E. Roach
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfieid-in-Illinois
1625 W. Washington
Springfield, IL 62702

Re: Foster Care and Adoption Practices

Dear Mr. Roach:

The Civil rights Bureau of the Office for the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Lisa
Madigan, is charged with the responsibility of investigating all violations of laws relating to civil
rights and undertaking the necessary enforcement measures when such violations are established.

lbis oflice received notice that Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois (the
"Organization") discriminates against Illinois citizens based on race, marital status and sexual
orientation in its provision of adoption and foster care services. Specifically, we understand that
the Organization has requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not required by
Illinois law - lor example, requirements about religious beliefs - or refuses to provide services to
potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of Illinois law - lor example, refuses to provide
services based on the marital status or sexual orientation of a potential foster or adoptive parent.

Please be advised that the Illinois Human Rights Act ("lHRA") makes it a civil rights violation
for any person to "dcny or refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods,
and services of any public place of accommodation" on the basis of unlawful discrimination.
ILeS 5(5·102(;\). Unlawful discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of "race.
sex, national origin, ancestry, age, order of protection status, marital status,
mi li!al'V status, sexual or discharge
corme·ct!tffi the " 775

" ;
Roach Letter
Mareh 8, 20 II
Page 20f2

2. All policies, procedures and manuals relating to services provided pursuant to contracts
with DCFS.

3. All policies and requirements for: (a) foster parents; and (b) adoptive parents.

4. All services provided by the Organization and the location(s) where each service is
provided.

5. The Organization's financial statements, including, but not limited to: (a) IRS Form 990;
(b) Illinois Charitable Organization Annual Reports l1led with the Illinois Office of the
Attomey General; (c) Annual Reports; and (d) all other financial statements regardless of
whether or not they are audited.

6. The Organization's by-laws or articles of incorporation.

7. The Organization's mission statement or other documents regarding the purpose of the
Organization.

8. All documents regarding the relationship of the Organization to the [Catholic Church or
other religious body].

9. All employee handbooks.

)
10. All documents concerning complaints of discrimination against the Organization that
were tiled with the Illinois Department of Human Rights or in any state or federal court,
including but not limited to complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, marital status or sexual orientation.

IL State whether any court, commission or department, including but not limited to those
listed in Request Number 10, has found that the Organization was or was not liable for
discrimination and, if so, produce a copy of the judicial or administrative order or
decision.

Please submit the information and documents responsive to our request by Friday, March 25,
20 II. If you have any questions or would like to discuss this matter, please contact me.