Hegel's Dialectic and Marx's Manuscripts of 1844

Author(s): Mitchell Aboulafia

Source: Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 33-44
Published by: Springer
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 MITCHELL ABOULAFIA

HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND MARX'S MANUSCRIPTS OF

1844

In inquiring into the nature of alienation for Hegel we must explore the
dialectic. We will concentrate on the Phenomenology of Spirit, where the
movement of the 'selfs' development is observed and actualized. We will
then present Marx's view of this dialectic as found in the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts and attempt to systematize the points of
discord. Finally, we will summarize the problematic through a critique of
the various positions.
Before elucidating the nature of the dialectic in the Phenomenology, let
us see how certain terms will be employed. These terms will be further
clarified within this paper.
Alienation = Ent?usserung: For Hegel, it is the process of externaliza
tion through which 'consciousness' gives itself up so as to open itself, in the
movement of negativity, to otherness. Marx usually uses Ent?usserung for
what has become known as capitalist-specific alienation:

( 1) Human beings are alienated from the products they produce.

These belong to another, i.e., the capitalist.

(2) Human beings are alienated from the activity of production.

This results in alienation from oneself, from nature.

(3) Human beings are alienated from their species-being.

(4) Human beings are alienated from other individuals.l

= For Hegel, it is used to express, "not only

Estrangement Entfremdung:
that the natural self gives itself up, alienates itself, but also that it becomes
alien to itself'2 It should be noted that Entfremdung has a particular
specificity, as developed in the section on The World of Spirit in Self
Estrangement' in the Phenomenology, which will be discussed below.
Marx sometimes uses Entfremdung to emphasize the pervasive charac
ter of Enta?serung within capitalism.

Studies in SovietThought 18 (1978) 33-44. All Rights Reserved

Copyright ? 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

34 MITCHELL ABOULAFIA

= For Marx, "Objectification is

Objectif ication Vergegenst?ndlichung:
man's natural means of projecting himself through his productive activity
into nature".3 "The object of labour is therefore the objectification of the
species-life of man: for man
reproduces himself not only intellectually in his
consciousness, but actively and actually, and he can therefore contemplate
himself in a world he himself has created."4
The above English equivalents will be used throughout this paper. We
may now proceed to investigate the nature of the dialectic in the Phenome
nology.
The concept of 'determinateness'
{Bestimmtheit) is essential for compre
hending Hegel's project. The entire notion of the phenomenological
development of consciousness hinges on the idea that all forms of con
sciousness must expose the differences and similarities that make them
what they are, and thereby determine the essential relations between and
within the forms. The Phenomenology is both the experiences of the
development of consciousness (i.e., consciousness as signifying modes of

being) and the observation of the philosopher who knows the links between
the movements of the moments that will form the totality. The nature of the
experiences, i.e., moments, must be emphasized.

The experience that consciousness works through here is not only theoretical experience,
knowledge of the object; it is the whole of experience. The point is to consider the life of
consciousness both when it knows itself or intends a goal. Since it is the experience of
consciousness in general that is to be considered, all the forms of experience, ethical juridical
and religious, will be included. (Hyppolite)5

Truth (or Being, object, the in-itself) is never static for Hegel and exists in
a dialectical tension with Certainty (Knowledge, subject, the for-itself).
This tension gives rise to the movement of consciousness. Consciousness
'desires' not to be merely
certain but also to be in truth, i.e., to be Subject as
well as Substance. The discrepancy between what appears as truth for a
consciousness and its 'desire' to yield it as certain, i.e., for-itself, creates the
necessary movement between being-in-itself and for-itself which presses
the experience of one moment onto another moment. The constant press
forward to comprehend or be what one is, as opposed to how one appears,
is the work of agents that can make appearances divest themselves of their
'falsehood' and expose the universal elements in them. The agents are the
Subjects, human beings. Possessing Reason, human beings can negate
 HEGEL'S DIALECTIC ANDMARX'S MANUSCRIPTS 35

appearances, i.e.,partial truths, in order to determine the truth. Truth

however has manifested itself in various historical stages. The process of
historical development results in the different moments becoming more
'concrete'. By 'concrete' Hegel means the comprehension of moments not
only as individual but as universal, i.e., as pervaded by rationality, the
logical order of the whole. While this may run contrary to the common
sense view which takes the sensuous as concrete, Hegel maintains that
thought entails all of Being. This is not meant to mean reality is only
thought but that the sensuous immediate presence of objects must be
brought to the level by which we can comprehend meaning through our
relation to these objects, i.e., objects in their universality, not diversity. The
response toMarx's critique of Hegel's abstractness in the Holy Family,
(where Marx states: "It is as difficult to produce actual fruits from the
abstract idea of 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce the abstract idea of 'the
Fruit' from actual fruits")6 might have been found inHegel's Introduction
to theHistory of Philosophy:

That delusive mode of reasoning which regards diversity alone and from doubt of or aversion
to the particular form inwhich the universal finds its actuality, will not grasp or even allow this
universal nature, I have elsewhere likened to an invalid recommended by the doctor to eat
fruit, and who has cherries, plums, or grapes before him, but who pedantically refuses to take

anything because no part of what is offered him is fruit, some being cherries and the rest plums
or grapes.7

We must pass from what Hegel calls the realm of immediate experience
to one inwhich, through negation of existing appearances, we as the
Subject of history recognize ourselves as being able to mediate. To mediate,
very simply, is the process of moving through negation tot the negation of
the negation, where the truth of what was being negated is revealed and, as
a result, what is universal is retained. Hegel:

For mediating is nothing but self-identity working itself out through an active self-directed
process; or in other words, it is reflection into self, the aspect in which ego is for-itself,

objective to itself. It is pure negativity or reduced to its utmost abstraction, the process of bare
and simple becoming.8

There must be a self that can negate, can 'see'what is the opposite of a
in question, i.e., contradictions, become aware of appear
'thing' recognize
ances that were once thought to be the truth. History 'needs' the presence of
36 MITCHELL ABOULAFIA

negation and mediation, the activity of the Subject that can come to know
itself as the substance of'reality' through its own endeavors. 'Something'
can become fully known only after it has entailed its opposite, (so that is has
returned from its 'otherness'), i.e., only after it has been alienated and 're

integrated'. All development hinges on alienation, the ability to become

other, i.e., the opposite of what appears in order to be fully comprehended;
without this process the relations which make something what it iswould
never be fully known. Itmight be said that an unconscious thing' really is
not or only potentially is in retrospect. To be human is to be conscious at
some time. Why is it, though, that Hegel insists on the process alienation,
i.e., otherness and return, for conscious to develop?
experience
In explicating this we shall draw on Plato for some assistance. Itmight
seem strange to elucidate the 'modern Aristotle' with Plato but the
dialectical insights are congruent in certain respects. Of course, the
ahistorical nature of Plato's thought suggests that any comparison of the
Hegelian and Platonic dialectic be treated with extreme circumspection.
The Meno is often regarded as the turning point in Plato's dialogs, where
the supposedly purely 'negative' dialectic of the earlier dialogs begins to
take on a positive dimension. It is usually pointed out that the notion of
recollection is the dialog's great achievement, which leads to the theory of
the Forms. Perhaps, this is not fully the case.
Just before Meno's paradox was presented Meno has called Socrates a
stingray, a fish that makes one numb. Socrates replies by saying that this is
only true if the stingray makes itself numb. Socrates claims to be as puzzled
by his own as others often are.
questions

Socrates: ...So now, what virtue is I do not know, but you knew perhaps, before you
touched me, although now you resemble one who does not know. All the same,
Iwish to investigate with your help, that we both find out what it is.

Meno: And how will you try to find out something, Socrates, when you have no notion
at all of what it is?Will you lay out before us a thing you don't know, and then
try to find it?Or if at best you meet it by chance, how will you know this is that
which you did not know?

Socrates: I understand what you wish to say, Meno. You look on this as a piece of chop

logic, don't you see, as if a man cannot try to find either what he knows or what
he does not know. Of course he would never try tofind what he knows, because
he knows it, and in that case he needs no trying to find; or what he does not
know, because he does not know what he will try to find.9
 HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND MARX'S MANUSCRIPTS 37

Of course, Socrates does not accept the paradox and the dialog then
moves on to the explanation of how learning is recollection. Itmay seem as
if Plato is only emphasizing the notion of learning as recollection when he
tries to show Meno how the slave boy appears to recall the answer to the
problem with which he is presented. Discussion of this 'slave boy' section of
the dialog has often centered about whether Socrates proves the notion of
recollectionusing the slave. The full thrust of Plato's Refutation of Meno's
paradox lies not in the theory of recollection per se, but in showing that
what appears to be true turns out to be false. Several times the slave boy
thinks he knows but at Socrates' questioning he sees that he did not know.
This parallels the ironic manner with which Socrates states Meno knew
what virtue was but now does not: of course, it is quite clear that Meno only
thought he knew, just like the slave boy thought he knew. One must be
numbed, i.e., feel the sting of negativity, of opposition, of denial, and
finally aporia, in order to develop.
The answer toMeno's paradox reveals basic aspects of the Hegelian
dialectic. For Hegel, the individual 'spirit' has within himself the spirit of
the age, i.e., participates in a 'collective awareness'. Ifwe did not reflect the
'truth' or in it, Meno's would hold, i.e., we would never
participate paradox
be able to be certain of truth when we came across it.Meno's paradox is
sound unless one avails himself of the dialectical position which under
stands negativity as destroying appearances which have been taken as
truths but can no longer maintain such a status once critiqued. Another
way of phrasing this from a Hegelian perspective might be: we cannot find
what we do not know but we actually do know, because each individual is a
manifestation (to some degree) of the truth (of an age). Appearances must
not merely be assumed as untrue in an undialectical manner, but the truth
inwhich they participate must be recognized (realized). To merely negate
or replace one appearance with another is sophistry. To actualize how
appearances are part of the truth is to think in a dialectical manner.
In discussing 'recollection', Hyppolite summarizes the nature of the
movement of consciousness. After a consciousness learns itwas 'false' the
new

Experience thus seems to consciousness to be a discovery of new worlds. And this is so because
consciousness forgets the course of those worlds. Like skepticism, it sees only the negative
result of its past experience. Facing its future and not its past, it is unable to understand how
38 MITCHELL ABOULAFIA

its past experience was a genesis of what for it is a new object.... (For the moment) the content
is, indeed, for it, but the origin of the content is not. // is as though consciousness forgot its
own development, which has made itwhat it is at every particular moment.10 (My emphasis)

The moments can be seen as held together by an observer,

however
someone who has 'passed' through them, the philosopher. But, each must
climb 'the ladder' and it is only through development that each becomes
aware of its 'forgetfullness'.

Socrates: Then if the truth of things is always in our soul the sould must be immortal (For

Hegel, immanent); so that what you do not know now by any chance - that is,
what you do not remember - you must boldly try and find out and remember. ''

As Hegel states in the Preface to the Phenomenology: "What is familiar

ly known is not properly known just for the reason that it is familiar".12
Alienation, from an epistemological point of view, seems necessary to
the dialectician.Unless one can negate, so as to become 'Other' (in others
words, 'alien'), the familiar, i.e., the seemingly immanent, is always the
plausible untruth, and Meno's paradox prevents the search for actuality.
To summarize: The negative is the power through which thought can
negate the falsity of the seeming. It is not arbitrary that Hegel speaks of
death in the same breath as he does knowledge. To think is to alienate; not
to alienate is to be an immediate being, not capable of experiencing life.
Hegel:

... the life of the mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it endures
death and in death maintains being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn
asunder.13

In this light the radical nature of the Hegelian dialectic is obvious. Itwas
an understanding of the principle of negativity that allowed others to
critique Hegel's own later conservatism. To the degree that his own
Philosophy of Right represented the appearance of what the state might
be, and not the reality of what the state was or was becoming, Hegel's own
method would insist that it be critiqued so that the truth of the new age
might be comprehended. The claim made here is that only a being that can
alienate (make other, what seemingly is), can truly comprehend a period in
history. This is asserted as the fundamental condition of knowledge for
 HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND MARX'S MANUSCRIPTS 39

Hegel. Each of us is not merely a mirror of an age, but a prism that can
differentiate the nature of an age into a spectrum that refracts and relates its
parts in order to comprehend the age, as opposed tomerely appearing as
white light, i.e., as an undifferentiated totality.
Marx's basic claim in regard to alienation is that it is, of course, capitalist
specific. It is as a function
of being social that human beings find
themselves We produce objects whether they be chairs or
objectifying.
ideas. These objectifications are only alien when the producer of the object
finds that it is no longer his production. The capitalist system is the specific
historical form inwhich this alienation of human beings from fundamental
'social relations' takes place. Since we do not intend to describe or critique
Marx's well-known theory of alienation under capitalism, we will assume
that alienation under capitalism has the results mentioned above in the
definitions of the various terms. The question here centers on whether

... the of private property as the appropriation of human life, is therefore

positive supersession
the positive supersession of all estrangement and the return of man from religion, the family,
the state, etc. to his human, i.e., social existence. {My emphasis)^

Marx's point is not to be understood as simple futurology; and it is

important to clarify this at an early stage. Nor is this paper asking whether
in the future 'alienation' is going to continue in some peculiar capitalist
form, because alienation as it is known under capitalism cannot be gotten
rid of. What this paper seeks to investigate iswhether the condition of
'alienation', as used in the Hegelian framework, is essential for the
understanding of the nature of alienation which may exist at present, but is
not capitalist specific; in the sense that our relation to the means of
production, as the 'cause' of alienation, is not the sole basis of alienation. In
other words, parallel to the bourgeois mode of production there is actually
a 'desire' to be alienated which is not the result of capitalism. This
'alienation' is not merely the reflection of alienation in the estranged world
of abstract philosophers (who do not recognize how the capitalist mode of
production causes them to be abstract and alienated), but is perhaps an
essential aspect of'historical knowing'.
A further point should be mentioned here: Marx never claimed that the
process of objectification, even hypothetically under communism, might
not be 'painful'. The question of alienation is not one of whether pain will
40 MITCHELL ABOULAFIA

continue 'after the revolution', so to speak, as a of 'life'; as certain

'property'
existentialists might claim. Marx was well aware that the process of
objectification is human:

To be sensuous, i.e., to be real, is to be an object of sense, a sensuous object and thus to have
sensuous objects outside oneself, objects of one's sense perception. To be sensuous is to suffer
(to be subjected to the actions of another).
Man as an objective sensuous being is therefore a suffering being, and because he feels his

suffering, he is a passionate being. Passion isman's essential power vigorously striving to

attain its objects.15

So the question seems to be whether "the philosophical mind is nothing

but the estranged mind of the world thinking within its self-estrangement,
i.e., conceiving itself abstractly"16, or whether the process of thought is not
merely abstract because of its alienation, and can be concrete in the sense
that it experiences through its alienation the worldas it actually is and not
merely as abstract?
An examination of Marx's critique of Hegel's dialectic should prove
enlightening. Marx's accusation in theManuscripts that the Hegelian
dialectic is an alienated reflection of the world rests firmly on his belief that
'Absolute Knowing' is the only reality which is valid for Hegel, and
therefore Hegel's total dialectic is abstract because the resolution is in the
realm of abstract ion.This is not the only criticism but it is the main one in
the Manuscripts.

Finally mind, which is thought returning to its birthplace and which as anthropological,
phenomenological, moral, artistic-religious mind is not valid for itself until it discovers and
affirms itself as absolute knowledge and therefore as absolute, i.e., abstract mind receives its
conscious and appropriate existence. For its real existence is abstraction.17 (My emphasis)

Marx's claim is that Hegel argues that all of the 'experiences of

consciousness' have no validity of their own, i.e., their validity lies only in
the Absolute. Hegel's claim would have been that the different moments
have experiential validity in their own spheres; mind is the absolute because
the history of these moments has come together to form a totality. Each
historical period, though, has been a totality; it reflected the truth' in its
own right.
 HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND MARX'S MANUSCRIPTS 41

... the latest, most modern and newest philosophy is the most developed, richest and deepest.
In that philosophy everything which at first seems to be past and gone must be preserved and
retained, and itmust itself be a mirror of the whole history... This, as may at once be remarked,
is no mere pride in the philosophy of our time, because it is in the nature of the whole process
that the more developed philosophy of a later time is really the result of the previous
operations of the thinking mind; and that it, pressed forwards and onwards from the earlier
standpoints, has not grown up on its own account or in a state of isolation.18 (My emphasis)

This Totality (Hegel's) was the experience of the philosopher in concept

ual form but itwas also experienced artistically and religiously (morally) by
the age, because Hegel's own age 'contained' all of the moments of past
history, as does any age, for that matter.
Marx conflated the moments of the Phenomenology in a way Hegel did
not. Differentiation is not lost, but maintained; Marx treats the movement
of Hegel's dialectic as if it is all abstract because it ends in an Absolute
Abstraction. It should be noted that here we are not trying to defend
Hegel's notion but, we are trying to understand how
of the Absolute;
thought was concrete for Hegel, and how Marx misunderstood the way it
was concrete due to his misconception of the teleological aspect of Hegel's
thought. This misconception led him to pass over the epistemological
problem of alienation because he understood it as the abstract reflection of
an alienated mode of production.
Perhaps a more concrete example would be helpful. Again, to quote
from Marx:

When, for example, Hegel conceives wealth, the power of the state etc. as entities estranged
from the being of man, he conceives them only in their thought form... They are entities of
thought, and therefore simply an estrangement of pure, i.e., abstract, philosophical thought.
Therefore the entire movement ends with absolute knowledge, (my emphasis)19

to go into a lengthy discussion here of the section in

It is not essential
Hegel's Phenomenology referred to above, but it is necessary to show that
the movement of the dialectic in that section is the opposite of what Marx
thought itwas. This section, 'Culture and its Realm of Reality', begins by
presenting the 'world of culture' that the individual (consciousness) finds
outside of himself. He seeks to become part of that culture and in so doing
thinks he must give himself over to the process of acculturation. This
'consciousness' does not realize that it is actually the 'creator' of culture
through its own actions. The dialectic entails the opposition between
 42 MITCHELL ABOULAFIA

wealth and state-power. This estranged consciousness at first thinks that

gaining 'culture' by becoming part of the state through service is good,

while to become cultured through wealth is bad. The realm discussed here
is a particular cultural organization, usually interpreted as beginning with
the rule of Louis XIV in France. 'Good' and 'Bad' are abstractions for
Hegel and they will or can interchange. The concrete iswealth and state
power; this is the realm inwhich this 'consciousness' exists. The 'pure
consciousness' of the abstractions, 'Good and Bad', will be transformed
after this section when, in the world of'pure consciousness', 'Faith' will
struggle with 'Enlightenment'. That struggle will be in the realm of'pure
consciousness', estranged from the actual world of culture, i.e., Power and

Wealth as culture from its own self through the individuals

is estranged
who do not recognize they are the culture. State-power and Wealth are the
actualities that control this mode of experience. Hegel explicates how the
egoism of each to gain personal riches is supposed to be for the benefit of
all. He is describing here what has come to be called Civil Society, where
private interests when permitted to go their own way end up supposedly
being for the benefit of all. Now at this level of development, obviously,
Civil Society cannot be known for what itwill turn into, but it is at least
known as the world of the estrangement of individuals in a form of
society inwhich state-power and wealth have become one. Eventually the
consciousness which strives for wealth,

... for its own sake is and that wealth comes to signify the pre-condition of
cynically admitted,
being-for-itself....In this relation of self-consciousness to wealth the impossibility for the / to
discover itself as a thing appears. The /"sees that its self-certainty, as such, is that thing which
ismost empty of essence; it sees that its pure personality is absolute impersonality". Thus, it
arrives at the infinite judgement that 'wealth is the self, an opposition that ismuch more

deeply felt than the opposition that was expressed in the phrase 'L'Etat c'est moi'. (Hyppolite
commenting on and quoting Hegel)20

- "It sees its

Hegel's statement pure personality is absolute impersonali
- does not sound like the of individuals who are merely
ty*' description
"entities of thought and therefore simply an estrangement of pure, i.e.,
abstract philosophical thought". It is of utmost import in this regard to
stress Hegel's contention that this dialectic of estrangement will seek to
resolveitself in 'pure-consciousness' which is a realm of abstraction for
Hegel. The struggle between 'Faith' and 'Enlightenment' will eventually
 HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND MARX'S MANUSCRIPTS 43

lead to the Reign of Terror. This Reign of Terror is the culmination of

cultural estrangement. In other words, it is in the escape from social and
political realities that actual abstraction takes place, a point with which
Marx surely would have agreed.
Marx compounds by jumping to the conclusion that the
his misreading
entire process of Hegel's dialectic must end in an absolute knowing which
overwhelms all else. Misconstruing the nature of absolute knowing has two
immediate consequences: ( 1) It takes one's attention away from the depth
of the dialectic which works through alienation, which is of course Marx's
intention in this case, and (2) Itwill probably lead us to interpret Hegel's
Absolute as somehow being the final resolution of history for all time. A
careful reading of Hegel's Philosophy of History or History of Philosophy
would show the latter clearly not to be the case.
It isMarx'scourse to emphasize above all else, in theManuscripts, the
'taking back of the Other' that ultimately takes place inAbsolute Know
ledge. Marx's concentration on Hegel's absolute knowing avoids the
essential question: is alienation as well as objectification the pre-requisite
for development? Marx claims that it is the desire for the return from
otherness which creates, "Thought overreaching itself in thought (Feuer
bach). This aspect is present in so far as consciousness as mere conscious
ness is offended not by estranged objectivity but objectivity as such."21 The
argument keeps returning to the question of the nature of the teleological
for Hegel. Marx assumes that Hegel held to the notion that all objectivity
as objectivity must be somehow done away with, that all contradiction
would finally resolve itself once and for all in absolute knowing; but this, as
a matter of fact, was never Hegel's position; one might even argue that it
was closer toMarx's position to somehow see a point in history when
contradiction ends. As for Hegel, his position (in the Lesser Logic) is as
follows:

All unsatisfied endeavor ceases, when we recognize that the final purpose of the world is
accomplished no less that ever accomplishing itself... Good, the final end of the world, has
being, only while it constantly produces itself. And the world of spirit and the world of nature
continue to have this distinction, that the latter moves only in a recurring cycle while the
former certainly also makes progress. (My emphasis)22

The Idea is eternal for Hegel but it is surely not a static transcendent
Its very nature assumes never process.
eternity. ending
Because of the way inwhich Marx understood Hegel's concept of
44 MI TC HELLA BOU LA FIA

absolute knowing he believed Hegel had confused objectification and

alienation. But as we have tried to show, itwas not only because of the
Absolute that alienation was insisted upon by Hegel (i.e., so it could be
totally overcome through thought), but also because thinking itself,
whether attaining the Absolute or not, requires alienation.
So itwould seem that Marx's insistence that (non-capitalist specific)
alienation ismerely objectification entails the claim that thought is a form
of objectification. This runs contrary to what was concluded earlier in this
paper, i.e., alienation is essential to reason or for the development of the
understanding of reality. Why can objectification not become a substitute
for alienation? Perhaps it can, but then thought would seem to lose the
power of negativity; thought requires the condition of alienation to 'really
know'. In other words, if thought cannot experience alienation it can no
longer claim to be critical.

Boston College
NOTES
I Karl
Marx, Early Writings, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (tr. by Living
ston, R. and Benton, G.), Vintage, N.Y., 1975.
2 Jean Genesis and Structure Evan
Hyppolite, of Hegel's Phenomenology, Northwestern,
ston, 1974, p. 385.
3
Marx, op.cit., p. 431 (translator's note).
4
Marx, op.cit., p. 329.
5
Hyppolite,op.cit., p. 10.
6 Karl on Philosophy
Marx, Writings of the Young Marx and Society, The Holy Family,
Doubleday Anchor, Garden City, N.Y., 1967, p. 370.
7 G. W. F. Humanities
Hegel, The History of Philosophy, Press, N.Y., 1974, p. 18.
8 G. W. F.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, Harper Torchbooks, N.Y., 1967, p. 82.
9 W. H. D. Rouse
(Tr.) Great Dialogues of Plato. The Meno Mentor, N. Y., 1956, p. 41.
10
Hyppolite, op.cit. p. 25.
II
W.H.D.Rouse,o/?.ri/.,p.5L
12
Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 92.
13
Hegel, ibid., p. 93.
14
Marx, Early Writings, p. 349.
15
Marx,/?/of, p. 390.
16
Marx, ibid., p. 383.
17
Marx,/?/?., p. 384.
18
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Humanities Press, N.Y., 1974, pp. 41-42.
19
Marx, op.cit., p.-384.
20
Hyppolite, op.cit., p. 409.
21
Marx, op.cit., p. 392.
22
Hegel, Lesser Logic, Oxford Press, London, 1975, p. 291, Section 234, Zus?tze.