S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000711 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O.

12958: DECL:

09/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, EAID, PINR, RS, MD SUBJECT: EX-PRESIDENT VORONIN

PREPARING FOR REPEAT ELECTIONS IN 2010

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) REFS: (A) Chisinau 685; (B)

Chisinau 694

1. (C) Summary: In a September 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Ex-President Vladimir Voronin

said that his Communist Party (PCRM) would participate in Parliamentary committees, and would

support issues related to European integration and neutrality, while eschewing extremism and

separatism and fighting against Romanian influence over the country. He predicted that the four-

party Alliance for European Integration (AIE) would be unable to work together, and vowed that

his party would not vote for an Alliance-proposed Presidential candidate -- in fact, the PCRM

would begin preparing for early repeat elections. Voronin acknowledged that there was a split

within the PCRM.

2. (S) The ex-President also confirmed what Democratic Party leader Lupu had told us earlier that

the two had met privately twice (Refs A and B) and that Voronin had proposed forming a "left-

center" coalition government with Voronin as Speaker, Lupu as President, and Greceanii as Prime

Minister. Although Lupu had refused -- Voronin suspected due to pressure from abroad -- Voronin

told the Ambassador that this offer was still open. The Ambassador told Voronin that the USG

had neither financed nor supported formation of the Alliance (as Voronin had claimed in a recent

interview), but was dedicated only to supporting democracy and transparency in Moldova. End

Summary.
Voronin's Resignation According to the Law

3. (C) In a September 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Ex-President Vladimir Voronin explained

that he had resigned from the Presidency on September 11 in a "strictly legal" way by sending

his resignation letter to the Secretariat of the Parliament. Voronin noted that he could easily

have waited until a new President was sworn in, as Article 88 of the Constitution says that the

President holds his position until a new President is elected, but said that with the new political

configuration in Parliament, he did not want to remain. He said that after resigning, he had left his

office in the Presidential building to avoid any possibility of using state resources that no longer

belonged to him.

PCRM in Parliament

4. (C) Voronin said that the PCRM had decided to participate actively in the work of the

Parliament, including accepting the four committee chairmanships and the four seats in the

Permanent Bureau designated for the party. However, he said the PCRM would not accept the

Deputy Speaker position which had been offered to the party, in order to avoid being in a position

of leadership in the government. The party would participate in those bodies that were considered

internal management of the Parliament and other parliamentary activities, such as delegations to

Europe, or NATO, he said, while doing their best to function as a constructive opposition.

5. (C) Voronin also said that, while in Parliament, the PCRM would support progressive resolutions

pertaining to European integration, neutrality, or settlement of the Transnistria issue. The PCRM

would support the independence of Moldova, but would eschew nationalism, extremism and

separatism. They would fight against Romanian influence in the country, and would not support
any measures aimed at unification with Romania.

Voronin Acknowledges Split Within the PCRM

6. (C) Voronin acknowledged a split within the PCRM. He said that after the party's victory in

CHISINAU 00000711 002 OF 003 2005, it should have been a homogeneous party. However, he

said, one can now notice a split -- it is as if there were two parties. One, he termed, the "party

of power," those people who had come into the party when it was the ruling party, in order to

get government positions, posts, and medals. Though his thought trailed off, and he did not

specifically name the other wing, presumably he meant those who had been with the party for

longer, and were the more loyal, more ideological members of the party. Now, he said, it would be

clear who was who.

Alliance Will Fail: Early Elections in 2010

7. (C) Voronin noted that the Alliance had come to Parliament, not as one team, but as four

separate teams. Though the Alliance parties were currently successfully working together, Voronin

predicted that later on they would "face difficulties" because their leaders were unable to work

together. The Alliance had a narrow majority of 53 seats, and Voronin noted that it will be difficult

for them to ensure a voting majority present at every session.

8. (C) Furthermore, Voronin said his party could not support any candidate for President

nominated by the Alliance. The PCRM would refuse to participate in the presidential election on

principle, he said, regardless of the individual nominated. Thus he said, from that day on, he would

be preparing the party for early elections in 2010. (Voronin also added that the Constitution did
not provide a clear understanding of when exactly early elections should be held, but only said

that the elections could not be held more than twice in one year.)

Voronin Offered, but Lupu Refused.

9. (S) Voronin told the Ambassador he had met twice recently with Democratic Party Leader

(PCRM defector) Marian Lupu, in private tete-a-tete meetings. Voronin said that he had pointed

out to Lupu that with the PCRM's 48 votes and Lupu's 13, the two together could elect a President,

and then directly proposed a joint government with Voronin as Speaker, Lupu as President and

Greceanii as Prime Minister. According to Voronin, Lupu had "looked lost," but said that he could

not accept such an offer. Voronin did not verbally admit that he had offered a bribe to Lupu

(reftel), but in response to the Ambassador's question about what the president had said at that

meeting, Voronin laughed broadly, made facial gestures and gave a thumbs-up gesture that

without words seemed an unspoken confirmation that he knew we knew, though since it was all

non-verbal we cannot be sure. Voronin said he had further proposed bringing Urechean into the

coalition; adding Urechean's seven seats would give Voronin's left- center coalition a total of 68,

enough to make Constitutional amendments.

10. (S) Voronin also said he believed that Lupu was under the influence of "an external power,"

although he said he did not know whether it was "Russia, Romania, or the United States."

Otherwise, Voronin could not understand why Lupu would refuse his offer. Voronin noted that

Lupu had recently met with former Romanian President Iliescu, and that Lupu had also visited

Moscow twice, where he had met Russian President Medvedev's Chief of Staff. Regarding the

Russia visit, Voronin said he was surprised that even given Russian advice, Lupu had refused his

(Voronin's) offer. Asked if he was sure that the Russians had said this, Voronin made the sign of
the cross to swear and said that he had personally told the Russians to do so.

11. (S) Even though Lupu had refused, said Voronin, this proposal was still open. Voronin said he

continued to believe that forming a left- center coalition with Lupu and Urechean was the ideal

scenario, and predicted direly that if Lupu did cooperate, he (Lupu) would become a "political

CHISINAU 00000711 003 OF 003 corpse."

Ambassador Sets the Record Straight on USG Role

12. (C) Responding to Voronin's statements in Echo Moscvi the day before that the USG had

financed the Alliance's electoral victory (and to Voronin's suggestion that the USG might be

controlling Lupu), the Ambassador explained that throughout both rounds of elections, the USG

had only one desire: that the process be fair and transparent. He underscored that the U.S.

played no role in forming the Alliance. The Ambassador also told Voronin that he believed the ex-

President was receiving wrong information from his advisors.

Concerns About Alliance Government

13. (C) Voronin acknowledged that the government had to change, but said that he was concerned

about the Alliance and their ability to run the country. He said he was bothered by what he

termed as their "hunger for positions of power," noting scornfully that the country was not run by

just by the President and Speaker, but by professional specialists. Voronin said that if this group

ran the country for four years, without any idea of what to do, this would be more dangerous

for Moldova than early elections. Voronin was particularly concerned about the potential role of

Romania, suggesting that if Romania would support this Alliance, it would be "a tragedy."
14. (C) Voronin claimed to be particularly concerned that an Alliance government would lead to an

increase in corruption and that the distribution of positions in the new government would itself

be based on graft. During the years in power, the PCRM had fought against organized crime, he

said, but now according to information he was receiving, those structures were returning. Voronin

claimed that entrepreneurs were now being visited by people saying that these businesses had not

paid (protection money) for some 6-7 years, but that it was now time to start paying again.

15. (S) We note that Voronin's account of his meetings with Lupu tracks with what Lupu told

the Ambassador about these meetings, which raises our confidence level in the honesty of both

interlocutors in their relations with us. We also note that it appears that Voronin is still hoping

to lure Lupu back to the fold and split the Alliance. However, although used to calling the shots,

Voronin is now an ex-President with diminished ability to influence events. The only real card he

holds now is denying the Alliance the eight votes they need to elect Lupu as President, and thus

forcing repeat elections. However, this is a dangerous gamble for Voronin, since most analysts

at this point predict that PCRM is likely to have an even poorer showing in any future round of

Parliamentary elections. CHAUDHRY