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 EUROPE-ASIASTUDIES,Vol. 50, No. 1, 1998, 27-49

The Rise of Organised Crime in Russia:

Its Roots and Social Significance

TANYA FRISBY

IN HISSTUDY'SUICIDE'Emile Durkheim wrote: 'In the case of economic disasters,

indeed, somethinglike a declassificationoccurs which suddenly casts certainindivid-
uals into a lower state than their previous one ... Time is required for the public
conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have
not regainedequilibrium,their perspectivevalues are unknown and so all regulations
are lacking for a time. The limits are unknown between the possible and the
impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those
which are immoderate.Consequently,there is no restraintupon aspirations ...'.1
Although writtenin 1897, this descriptionof social anomie is quite appropriatefor
describing present-day Russia The collapse of the previous system brought in
fundamentalchanges in social and political order which shaped the personal lives of
individualsin the most profoundway. Several years of marketreformswhich changed
the nature of the country's economy also brought with them hyperinflation,a sharp
rise in unemploymentand an overall drop in the standardof living. The feeling of
relative security which was experienced during the Soviet system, despite its many
faults, is gone for ever.
By now most Russians of the older generationhave accepted, to varying degrees,
the fact that their former Motherlandis lost for good. The faults of the new system
and its insecurity are perceived in the light of this loss. The younger generation,on
the otherhand, is more attunedto the new times because their conscious life is linked
not with the past but with the new order.They are much more pragmatic,individual-
istic and success and consumption-oriented-eitherat home or, if necessary, by going
abroad.
Russiansfound themselves in the new geopolitical situationwith vaguely identified
'transparentborders', which in most cases means a degree of political and economic
insecurityvis-a-vis their neighbours,the former Soviet republics.In these new nation
states ethnic Russians (who often sufferedfrom 'big brother'mentalityin the past) are
now treated as unwelcome, second-class citizens who, by and large, are also
unwelcome in Russia itself.
Moreover, within the Russian Federation,Russians are frequentlyresented in the
non-Russianterritories,and there are growing signs of national autonomousregions
seeking more independencefor themselves within the federal structure.The war in
Chechnya is by far the most serious indicator of the animosity that exists between
0966-8136/98/010027-23 ? 1998 University of Glasgow
28 TANYA FRISBY

Russians and non-Russiansin the post-Soviet space, as well as the weakness of the
new Russian state within this space.
Politically the people of Russia are sharplydivided. The polarisationbetween those
who do not accept the capitalist system in general or in the forms in which it is
developing in Russia, and those on the opposite side is clearly manifested in
continuous struggle between the legislative and the executive powers-between the
Duma, dominatedby national communists, on the one side, and the governmentand
the President,on the other. As a traditionallypaternalisticnation, the Russians have
always been inclined to entrustthe solution of all problems to their leader. Yet since
neither El'tsin nor anyone of the democratic leaders have so far succeeded in
impressing most people with their political or economic skills, the political choice
with respect to El'tsin's successors is largely unpredictable.The nation's political
confusion is aggravatedby the growing political pluralism which is the feature of a
society in transitionto traditionaldemocracy. It has produced a plethoraof political
parties and movements, many of extreme types, whose popular appeal is unpredict-
able.
A civil society, which did not develop in Russia throughoutits history, and which
would have provided an individualwith a secure set of normativesocial imperatives,
is still in its embryonicstage. Not a single party or a political bloc representedin the
Duma has given the citizens of the Russian Federationa single positive and unifying
idea which is essential for developing a common national and civil consciousness in
a multi-national state. By far the most serious problem now is the weakness of
governance and regulation on all levels.
The ailing Presidentis seen as ineffective and volatile in his moods and political
allegiances. He has been issuing orders and decrees but out of 'many thousands of
them only about three hundredwere implemented-all concerningnew state appoint-
ments and state honours'.2The governmentup till now had very little control over the
economic situation,and only firm conditions for loans from the World Bank and the
IMF (whether right or wrong) provided strict guidance for action.
Since 1991 the huge impact of Western mass media culture has transformedthe
entire culturalscene of Russia. The linguistic and social dimensionsof this new media
culture, foreign to the indigenous culture, are eroding it and, as it were, creating a
cultural vacuum for most of the population.3Russians, who were a largely isolated
nation throughouttheir history, have become culturally confused and, as a result,
disoriented.Many people began to romanticisethe Russian and Soviet past and the
feeling of nostalgia for bygone days is coupled with irritation with the present
situation.
In the Soviet economic system money did not play the role of a universal
equivalent as it does in the capitalist system. As a result of political coercion,
economic mismanagement,commodity scarcity and grossly unequal distributionof
social advantages,it was personal connections which performedthe most important
functions in the redistributionof goods, services and social opportunities.Alienated
from the system itself, the majorityof Russians relied on primaryunits such as the
family, work mates, neighboursand friends for social support,economic survival and
for moral values.4 Now they often find that these units are quickly disintegrating
under the pressuresof the marketeconomy where money, not mutualhelp, plays the
 ORGANISEDCRIMEIN RUSSIA 29

role of intermediaryfor all social communications.Money quickly depersonalises

social relationships,while creating 'excessive individualism'and the need for extreme
individual consumptionand thus increasing the feeling of alienation among people.5
Moreover, since social guaranteesand job security have become things of the past,
money has acquiredthe role of the sole guarantorof personal security in the present
and in the future.
The speed of the social transformationresulting from marketreforms has created
overnight, so to speak, fantasticwealth for the few and plunged almost a thirdof the
nation below the alreadymeagre level of the official poverty line. Most of those who
had power in the old regime not only retained their material status but very often
improved it considerably.Voucher privatisationof state propertyis considered as a
success by some, but it is viewed by the majorityof people as a corruptionscandal.
Its chief implementors,including the present First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii
Chubais, may well have lost their political popularityin the country for many years
to come.
Despite fundamentalchanges in the social structureof Russia in the past six years,
it is still too early to speak of the existence of a cohesive ruling elite. This makes the
uncertainpolitical situation in Russia even more unstable. The rich are not so much
afraidof the poor (except of being mugged or robbed)as they are of each other. The
rapidprivatisationof national wealth, which is enormous in Russia, created opportu-
nities in these conditions of social disintegrationfor many individualswho wished to
acquire capital in the shortest possible time. Those who have so far accumulated
substantialholdings of wealth are afraidof 'treacheryon the partof their competitors.
They are also afraid of criminals, who take the short cut to wealth throughviolence.
But most of all they are afraid of the state power, which they see as greedy and
capable of depriving them of all their property at the stroke of one state decree'.6
The working class is demoralisedby declining standardsof living, by the lack of
prospects and social guarantees,unemploymentand chronic non-paymentof wages.
The poor on the whole are destitute, disaffected and disillusioned;they hate the state
for betrayingthem and most of them would do almost anythingto avoid poverty. This
is the social context in which the increase in crime may be viewed.
According to official statisticaldata the rate of crime in Russia startedto increase
rapidly in 1990-92; in 1993 there were signs of its stabilisation, and in 1994 the
numberof recordedcrimes fell by 6% in relation to 1993 (Table 1). These figures at
first glance suggest that the peak was over by 1994 and that the overall situation
might improve in the future.But in reality the crime rate was still increasingbecause,
also according to these figures, more people were becoming involved in criminal
activity. As the old Soviet Criminal Code was rapidly becoming outdated and
inadequatefor new forms of crime, many criminal offences could not be recordedas
such. In this sense, crime was becoming latent by naturewhilst involving new social
groups within it.
The law enforcement institutions have become fragmented. While lacking in
coordination they have been unable to cope with the sheer volume of work in
processing all information.The turnoverof investigating staff has been high, techno-
logical provision low and professional level and morale sinking rapidly.7
The wages in these institutions (as well as in many others) were badly eroded by
30 TANYA FRISBY

TABLE 1
OVERALL
CRIME
FIGURES
ANDNUMBER
OFOFFENDERS,
1990-1994

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Overall crime
Total number 1 839 451 2 167 964 2760 652 2799 614 2 632 708
Rate of increase in relation
to 1990 (%) 100 + 18 + 50 + 52 + 43
Rate of increase in relation
to previous year (%) 100 + 18 + 27 + 1.4 -6
Offenders
Total number 897 299 956 258 1 148 962 1 262 556 1 441 568
Rate of increase in relation
to 1990 (%) 100 + 6.6 + 28 + 40.7 + 60.7
Rate of increase in relation
to previous year (%) 100 + 6.6 + 20.2 + 10 + 14.2

Source: Kriminologicheskayaassotsiatsiya,Prestupnost'v Rossii v devyanostykhgodakhi nekotoryeaspekty

zakonnostibor'by s nei (Moscow, 1995), pp. 4-5.

the earlier hyperinflationand corruptionamongst staff was becoming widespread.8

Investigating officers preferredto tackle cases with a higher probabilityof solution
and a lower level of personalrisk.9In 1996, accordingto an NTV News reportof 30
April 1997, less than a quarterof the budget allocated for fighting crime was actually
received by the law enforcementoffices.
Under these circumstances,more and more people began to rely on themselves for
their own protection, as well as relying on rapidly increasing private protection
services, a large number of which operatedwithout proper registrationor licences.
Many resortedto taking justice into their own hands, often with assistance from the
criminal fraternity.As a result, a kind of 'shadow justice' appeared,dominated by
criminals and violence. Cases of violent attacksand assaults, shoot-outs, kidnapping,
murders,etc.-when innocent bystandersfrequentlybecome victims-have become
common occurrences,especially in the major cities.
Up until the present,the social changes which have been going on since 1990 have
been conducive to the growth of criminality.A thirdof the Russian populationis still
living below the official poverty line, income differentiation is growing wider,
alcoholism and drug use are still on the increase. In addition most people are
becoming disoriented in a moral and legal sense, and the number of refugees,
homeless and unemployedhas been on the increase.Irregularitiesand open corruption
in the privatisationof state propertyhave become a common occurrence.This creates
general discontent and resentment among ordinary people, resulting in a kind of
social, moral and general apathy. In the meantime, crime has become more wide-
spread and violent, with more victims badly injuredor dead (Table 2). Furthermore,
political terrorism,especially afterthe beginning of the Chechen conflict, is still going
on and is claiming an increasing number of victims.
At the economic level financial fraud, embezzlement of funds and stealing of
public, private and state propertyare becoming more sophisticated,professional and
organised.The illegal appropriationof land is on the increase and criminalreposses-
sion of housing has contributedsignificantly to homelessness, vagrancy and deaths.
 ORGANISEDCRIMEIN RUSSIA 31

TABLE 2
CRIME AGAINST LIFE AND HEALTH OF INDIVIDUALS; AGGRAVATED MURDER, HOMICIDE AND GREVIOUS BODILY
HARM 1990-1994

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Resulted in death: Number 23 981 25 328 36 198 50 968 54 498

CriminalCode Art.
102-107, 108 Increase (%)
from 1990 100 +5.6 +51.0 112.5 + 127.0
Proportionof all above crimes % 25.8 27.6 32.3 37.5 38.2
Grievous bodily harm Number 69 079 66 436 75 922 84 840 88 046
CriminalCode Art. 108, 109-114
Increase(%)
from 1990 100 - 3.8 + 10.0 + 23.0 + 27.0
Proportionof all above crimes % 74.2 72.4 67.7 62.5 61.8
Number of people who disappeareda 13 214 20 035 23 238
Numberof unidentifiedcorpses 2 837 10 718 17 727

aThenumberof victims of crimeamongthose who were foundincreasedmorethanthreetimes over five years.

Source: Kriminologicheskayaassotsiatsiya,Prestupnost'v Rossii v devyanostykhgodakhi nekotoryeaspekty
zakonnostibor'by s nei (Moscow, 1995), pp. 4-5.

Owing to the weakening of state and army control over the vast arsenalsof weapons
accumulatedduring many years of the arms race, more and more arms are entering
private possession?1 and there is a substantial increase in premeditated crime.
Offences in narcotics and illegal substances are also rising dramatically.
Although crime still remains a predominantlymale occupation, more women and
children are becoming involved in it (see Appendix 1). According to a newspaper
reportin Trud,6 March 1997, 68% of all recordedcrime in Moscow city and oblast'
is committed by children and teenagers.11
In the growing criminalisationof Russian life, a stratificationof criminality has
occurredwhich in some respects reflects a similarprocess in society. The polarisation
of crime into 'poor crime' and 'rich crime' has taken place. On the one hand, there
is growing criminality among the 'outsiders', by those who are quickly becoming
destituteand impoverishedand who have no futureprospectsin life. This is impulsive
crime, often committedunderthe influence of alcohol and drugs, caused by anger and
disillusionment. Street children, whose numbers are growing steadily (according to
the investigativeTV reportin 'Dispatches', Channel4, 27 March 1997, in Petersburg,
for example, there are an estimated 30 000) are quickly drawninto drugs and crime.
Youth crime is often instigatedby the desire to obtain expensive Westerngoods and
money for 'a good life'. The growing poverty due to chronic non-paymentof wages
and unemploymentproduces a 'reserve army of criminals'. Many who are still in
employmentsupplementtheir meagre income (or no income at all, owing to chronic
delays in wages) by stealing industrialresources and selling them to criminal gangs,
often in extremely large quantitiesand in collusion with industrialsecurity services.12
The chance to participatein the illegal economy, alongside the difficulties in finding
alternative employment and relocation problems, can be viewed as an important
reason why many people stay in their jobs despite being unpaid. A large numberof
32 TANYA FRISBY

those out of work prefer to find employment in the private sector, whether legal,
semi-legal or even criminal, so long as it pays well.13
At the other end of the spectrum there exists organised crime motivated by the
chances of huge gains of wealth and capital. With this aim in mind, the organised
criminal sector is integratingmore and more into the following sectors: finance and
business, industry and trade, especially in naturaland strategic resources, food and
fisheries, production and trade in alcohol, sport, advertising and leisure industries,
state and public administration,legal institutions, agricultureand even charities.14
More and more wealth comes from launderingcriminal capital both domestic and
from abroadbecause there is no effective legal provision in Russia yet for investigat-
ing the sources of private capital.15In addition, the trade in and production of
narcoticsconstitute an importantpart of wide internationalcriminalconnections. The
economic impact of this has been summarisedas follows: 'The expert survey by
specialists shows that the damage from criminal activity to our economy is compar-
able to the revenue side of the national budget. Our economy has in fact become a
zone of total criminal aggression ... in many respects criminal activity has become
one of the most importantmethods of regulating the present-day economy and a
method for solving economic problems'.16
The numberof organisedcriminalformations,including armedgroups and 'private
security services', has been growing fast. By the end of 1995 an estimated 30 000
individuals actively participated in organised crime. Over 3000 criminal leaders
directedtheir activity; 1011 criminalorganisationshad establishedinter-regionallinks
and 300 had internationalconnections.17
During the Soviet regime, legal institutionswere able to maintain a relative level
of law and order in the streets and control the spread of crime, despite their
notoriouslycorruptnature,the malfunctioningof the InteriorMinistry,the MVD, and
the continuousrivalry between it and the KGB, which often had a disruptiveimpact
on the fight against crime.18Meanwhile, the main structuresof organisedcrime were
already developing within the Soviet system, and the criminal leaders of those days
were amongst the first to anticipatethe coming political changes and act accordingly.
Who were they and how did they prepare themselves for the new socio-economic
order?
The traditionalcriminalfraternityin the Soviet Union dates its formationfrom the
end of the Civil War, when poverty, hunger,destitutionand homelessness, especially
among children and young people, were overwhelming. Crime was the only way of
survival for these people. The majority of them, despite the state's rehabilitation
efforts, enteredthe criminalworld as professionalrobbersand thieves by the time of
NEP. The tightening of the political order in the late 1920s also brought waves of
arrestsof criminal gangs and their leaders. They often sharedprison cells and camp
barrackswith the political prisonerswhose numberswere growing even more rapidly.
In order to oversee and control vast numbersof political detainees, prison and camp
administrationsresorted to recruiting criminals for this purpose in exchange for
privileges.19However, the strict conspiratorialcode of criminal ethics which the
criminalfraternitywas developing at this time (as well as their own criminaljargon)
forbade any involvement in politics or collaborationwith the state administration.
Therefore a sharp rift occurred between those who agreed to collaborate, i.e. the
 ORGANISEDCRIMEIN RUSSIA 33

renegades,and those who refused. Presumablyit was in this period that the term 'Vor
v zakone'-literally 'thief in law' (i.e. fraternitylaw)-began to be applied to those
who remained true to the strict code of the criminal fraternity.It was assumed that
only very strongand 'honourable'thieves could resist the pressuresof the authorities,
so the name also became a title of honour and status in the criminal communityand
was bestowed on the most 'honourable',respected and influentialthieves at special
'coronations'.Needless to say, the demarcationline between the genuine 'thieves in
law' and the 'renegades' (suki) was frequently violated, which resulted in violent
retribution,punishmentand revenge within the fraternity.The control of the criminal
fraternityover political prisonerswas implementedwith callousness and cruelty, and
any attempt to resist was countered with extreme violence which often resulted in
appalling injuries and even death of political detainees.
Since all criminal inmates, to various degrees, directly or indirectly, were serving
the regime of political oppression, they enjoyed many privileges in the places of
detention,thereby securing their survival and expansion of their numbers.Moreover,
the GULAG administration,faced with the ever growing numbers of political
prisoners, became dependent on the criminal world in maintainingorder and work
discipline in the labour camps. This 'unholy alliance' forged corruptlinks between
camp authorities and the criminals which eventually eroded the whole detention
system.
In the 1950s and 1960s, during the period of Khrushchev'sdestalinisationpolicy,
when the number of political prisoners declined sharply, the Soviet state was faced
with the problem of how to deal with this vast criminal stratum.Serious measures
(includingthe re-introductionof the death penalty)20were taken in orderto eliminate
criminalfraternities,but this proved to be an impossible task. However, as a result of
these measures,the strictinternalcode of criminalbrotherhoodbegan to weaken, thus
providinga possibility for many members of the thieves' fraternityto diversify their
activity away from the traditionaltrades of theft. Their attention was drawn to the
so-called 'shadow economy' and 'shadow capital' which were becoming very active
at that time.
Duringthe 1970s and after, the Soviet economy was becoming virtuallyunmanage-
able, inefficient and wasteful, so that the productionof consumergoods declined both
in volume and quality. At the same time, incomes per head began to grow (largely
due to the state printing money and the substantial oil and gas revenues) and
consumer demand grew accordingly. The need for quality and fashion dictated by
Western standardsmade people look for goods on the black marketand not in state
shops. This gave rise to the rapid growth of the 'shadow economy', i.e. the illegal
productionof commodities made with stolen state resources, and the 'black market'.
Many membersof the criminalfraternitybegan to turnto blackmail,extortionand the
protection racket directed at the 'shadow businessmen' (tsekhoviki).21
These leaders of the undergroundeconomy, nicknamed 'sharks' (akuly) by the
thieves' fraternity,in their turnconstituteda close criminalcommunityand by the end
of the 1970s most of them belonged to 'diversifiedcriminal organisationswith quite
extensive regional connections. Such organisations were very conspiratorial and
extremelyhierarchical.They included representativesof the administrationof various
enterpriseswho often were party members and had high positions ... members of
34 TANYA FRISBY

such criminal organisationslived a double life: they all followed a common social
morality, but adhered to a strict code of behaviour, typical for a secret criminal
society'.22 It was reported that in the late 1970s, at one of the meetings held in
Georgievsk, Stavropol' krai, 'sharks' agreed with the 'thieves in law' on an overall
10% protection payment.23The beginnings of an importantpartnershipwere laid
down. Large personalfortuneswere made at that time, and in 1982 in Tbilisi, at their
congress, the 'thieves in law' 'discussed the question of taking political control in the
country in the future. Already by that time the structuresof the organs of power in
many regions in fact became mafia (like) structures'.24
Duringperestroika, when many former 'tsekhoviki'became legitimate, they joined
the ranks of the first business entrepreneurs.Their minders often became their
partners,as well as their competitors.In this period too the so-called 'reformers',the
new generation of criminal leaders, also decided to challenge the state and its law
enforcementinstitutionsby political methods.25
With the development of capitalist relations in Russia and the apparentlyinfinite
possibilities to acquirestate and public wealth, the criminalactivity of these 'partners
in crime' diversified, became more complex and more organised, as well as more
violent.
The 'thieves in law' is probablythe most researchedgroup of the Russian criminal
underworld, although the full picture of this highly conspiratorialstratum would
probablynever be revealed. Recently the names of 266 of the 'thieves in law' were
published.26One can assume that their number is growing. In the opinion of many
experts, control over the activities of the most influential and violent present-day
criminal clans belongs to the most influential 'thieves in law'.
The 'thieves in law' are exclusively male. A large numberof them come from the
Caucasus and CentralAsia. Their average age is 30-45 years although some are 55
and over. One is known to be 73 years old. Overall educationallevel in this social
category is average but there are some people with higher education. Most 'thieves
in law' have had serious previous criminal convictions. Their typical characteristics
are criminalprofessionalism,high organisationalability, communality,loyalty to their
fraternity,to its code and traditions.Most of them nowadays are actively involved in
capital accumulation through integration into the most profitable sectors of the
economy, always by means of corruption, blackmail, intimidation, violence and
murder. In 1992-93 the leadership of the criminal worlds of Astrakhan, Kaluga,
Kostroma,Tambov and other cities were taken over entirely by the 'thieves in law'.
They expanded their activities in the Northern and Central regions of European
Russia, as well as Povol'zhie.27By now they also have established a firm grip over
the 'grey economy' (including the 'shuttle' trade, money laundering,smuggling and
illegal arms trade) which 'according to A. Chubais and other informed sources
reached 50% of the whole economy'.28
In addition there is now a growing new stratumof criminal leaders, the so-called
'Avtoritet'.It is known that a large proportionof these are former military and KGB
officers, the 'Afghan veterans, former (or indeed active) officers of the Ministry of
Interior(MVD) and special troops, well known sportsmenand even former Komso-
mol leaders'.29 The unofficial youth culture of perestroika produced a plethora of
youth groups, some of which were subsequently transformedinto criminal gangs.
 ORGANISEDCRIMEIN RUSSIA 35

Nowadays the activity of criminal organisations spreads not only over the whole
territoryof the CIS but also into formerEasternEurope,the AmericanContinentand
South-east Asia.30
The centre of attention and of the activity of organised criminals is Moscow (as
well as St Petersburg)and the surroundingregions, owing to the concentrationof
finance and business in these areas as well as the wide network of criminal
connections.(Nowadays Moscow has an averagecrime rate that is significantlyhigher
than in Russia as a whole.)31 The overall crime situation is very serious in the
NorthernCaucasus,the Far East, regions in the Urals and Western Siberia, as well as
in Rostov and surroundingarea, and in Irkutskoblast'. The island of Sakhalin has
become an attractive area for the criminal fraternity thanks to its geographical
position, which permitseasy trafficin narcoticsfrom South-EastAsia and the Pacific
regions as well as laundering capital through investment projects in land and oil.
Disputes over spheres of influence and control over businesses and territoriesoften
result in armed clashes between competing gangs, intimidationand violence against
business figures, as well as administrativeand state officials. For example, in 1994,
when the struggle for control of aluminiumproductionentered its 'second stage', in
the Krasnoyarskarea alone 13 businessmenwere killed.32Also by now 'more than a
dozen accredited assistants to various State Duma deputies have been murdered-
proof, according to the Russian public, of close links between the mafia and the
political elite'.33
By the beginning of 1996 'almost 10%of criminalfraternitiescreatedfinancialand
commercial structuresfor legalising their illegal capital. 55% of the capital of the
whole economy and 80% of voting shares are in the hands of criminal clans.
According to businessmen themselves 30 to 50% of all entrepreneurswork for the
criminalfraternity.According to analysts,mafia-likestructurescontrol 400 banks and
exchanges'.34Finansovye izvestiya, 18 February1997, reportedthat 41 000 industrial
companies and over 80% of joint ventures were believed to have criminal connec-
tions.35
In order to integrateinto the economy effectively, organised criminals are heavily
involved in the corruptionof state and public officials, especially on the highest
levels. The ongoing media investigation into the aluminium scandal revealed the
involvementof Oleg Soskovets, formerDeputy Prime Minister,in this affair,together
with the Chernyibrothers,now citizens of Israel,who reportedlyhave close links with
the Russian criminal underworld. It is alleged that over 50% of the aluminium
industrywas taken over by them and the Trans World Group.36
Crime is not only a consequence of social situation.It is also a barometerof social
instabilityand a reflection of the weakness of the state, its legal base and institutions
of law enforcement.The inadequacyof legal mechanismshelps to create a system of
administrativearbitrarinessand corruption.In their business affairs the present-day
creatorsof capitalism,i.e. bankers,entrepreneurs,propertydevelopers,manufacturers,
etc. depend not so much on governmentpolicies and decisions as on the actions of
corruptstate administratorsand organised criminals.
It is well known that corruptionamong state officials has been endemic in Russian
history. This historicallegacy had its share of influence on the developmentof Soviet
bureaucraticcorruption,but the main causes of it lay within the repressive natureof
36 TANYA FRISBY

the former Soviet regime. The resigned post-Soviet attitudeto state corruptionis well
summedup in the following quotation:'To some extent corruptionin many countries
can serve as a mechanism for economic progress. Without it many nations under
totalitarianoppression could simply degenerate and die from hunger as a result of
stupid restrictionsupon people's movements, trade and privateproperty.As a rule in
such countriesafter the collapse of repressivepolitical regimes most of the population
is quite tolerant to corruption'.
The scale and the nature of Soviet corruptionhave been extensively analysed by
Soviet, Russian and Western authors, especially in the past 10 years, whereas the
corruptionin the new Russian state was discussed in its first two years mostly in the
Russianoppositionpress. However, by February1992 informationconcerningcorrup-
tion in state institutionsbecame alarmingenough for Eltsin to producehis decree 'On
the fight against corruptionin state institutions'(issued on 4 April 1992) in which he
outlined four main prerequisitesfor eliminating state corruption.38Since that time
there were many repeated attempts to curb corruptionbut, by and large, they were
ineffective because they were directed 'towardsthe search for something which had
already been taken or stolen and at controlling those officials who would otherwise
go too far in pursuit of personal gains from privatisation'.39
As distinct from the Soviet period, the currentoverall official informationabout
corruptionis published. From 1993 onwards, the Main InformationCentre of the
MVD of the RF began to collect individual informationon the corruptionamongst
state officials, but this information is classified, despite the provisions for public
access to such informationin the existing Law on State Secrets (introducedin 1993).
It seems that civil servantsin state institutions,as in Soviet times, are very unwilling
to expose their own kind to public scrutiny.
In the opinion of V. V. Luneev of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, if the UN definitionof corruptionstates that 'corruptionis an
abuse of state power for the attainmentof personal gains', it must follow from this
that corruption goes beyond taking bribes. It includes nepotism, appropriationof
public property for personal gain, as well as deliberate concealment of full infor-
mation during the decision-making process.40 Russian statistics list three main
categories of corruptionamongst civil servants,i.e. embezzlement,briberyand abuse
of power, and since 1993 the MVD has also provided data on corruptionoffences
among officials in specific state services (see Tables 3 and 4).
According to expert analysts, although the numbersof recordedcrimes of corrup-
tion have been declining since 1986, this is primarilyexplained by the continuing
weakening of law enforcementmechanismsand the obsolete natureof the legal code
in relationto the present-daycorruptionoffences. Since corruptionby its very nature
is both clandestineand mutuallyagreedby both sides, it is very difficult to detect and
even more difficult to find conclusive proof of its existence. One must also stress that
the legal requirementsfor indictment and the professional skills of attorneys have
become much more decisive in court cases than duringthe Soviet period. 'In all three
types of offences, for every prosecuted offence there are 11 recorded cases of
corruption.In particular:15 for abuse of power, 13 for embezzlementsand 5 for bribe
taking'.41
At present,corruptionamongstRussian officials is often explained or even justified
 ORGANISED CRIME IN RUSSIA 37

TABLE 3
ACTS OF CORRUPTION COMMITTED BY STATE AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RUSSIA 1986-1995

Numberof
recorded Number
Years offences Proportion Trend convicted Proportion Trend

Embezzlement
(art.92, old CC)
1986 57 472 4.3 100.0 26 507 3.4 100.0
1987 57 662 4.9 100.3 15 593 2.7 58.8
1988 52 042 4.3 90.6 8 239 1.9 31.1
1989 47 623 2.9 82.9 6 902 1.6 26.0
1990 44 359 2.4 77.2 8648 1.6 32.6
1991 40 364 1.9 70.2 9749 1.6 36.8
1992 39 851 1.4 69.3 7 222 1.1 27.2
1993 37 306 1.3 64.9 8 070 1.0 30.4
1994 34 904 1.3 60.7 2 747 0.3 10.4
1995 35 460 1.3 61.7
Bribery
1986 6562 0.5 100.0 3 454 0.4 100.0
1987 4 155 0.4 63.3 2008 0.3 58.1
1988 2464 0.2 37.5 812 0.2 23.5
1989 2 195 0.1 33.4 451 0.1 13.1
1990 2691 0.1 41.0 649 0.1 18.8
1991 2534 0.1 38.6 612 0.1 17.7
1992 3331 0.1 50.8 686 0.1 19.9
1993 4497 0.2 68.5 843 0.1 24.4
1994 4 919 0.2 75.0 1 114 0.1 32.3
1995 4 889 0.2 74.5
Abuse of power
1986 4 830 0.4 100.0
1987 3 753 0.3 77.7
1988 2801 0.2 58.0
1989 2436 0.2 50.4
1990 2505 0.1 51.9
1991 2451 0.1 50.7
1992 2 662 0.1 55.1
1993 2 794 0.1 57.8
1994 3 240 0.1 67.1 225 0.02

Source: V. V. Luneev, 'Korruptsiya,uchtennayai fakticheskaya',Gosudarstvoi pravo, 1996, 8, p. 87.

by their low salaries and traditional social attitudes which condone this practice. It
seems, however, that the prevailing social climate of a drive towards quick material
gains and the weakness of legal controls made state and public service into a form of
enterprise for the rapid accumulation of profits. According to the MVD figures for
1994, corrupt officials assisted one out of every seven or eight organised criminal
formations and gained from them 22 billion rubles in bribes. By 1995 almost 50% of
criminal profits were spent on corrupting state officials. In the opinion of experts, 'the
vast spread of organised crime is the most important factor which is slowing down
economic reforms'.42
By all counts, the criminalisation of Russian life has reached serious proportions.
Frequent mass media reports of crime highlight the degree of danger which people
experience in their everyday life. On 1 March 1997 an ORT television talk show
38 TANYA FRISBY

TABLE 4
FIGHT
AGAINST INTHECIVILSERVICE
CORRUPTION 1993-1995

In particular organs

Total State Law State Legal

Types of recordedprocedures number administration enforcement authorities institutions

1993
Overall number 2469 1483 639 92 8
Investigated 2198 1356 566 69 3
Prosecuted 1191 754 293 23 2
Informationon organisedcrime 772 466 112 23
Breachedpresidentialdecree 1453 814 359 133 8
1994
Overall number 2678 1673 807 57 8
Investigated 2227 1367 703 48 3
Prosecuted 1319 842 397 27
Informationon organisedcrime 595 370 184 17 -
Breachedpresidentialdecree 944 486 374 53 7
1995
Overall number 3504 2323 960 120 4
Investigated 4893 3646 969 125 6
Prosecuted 1949 1257 576 72 2
Informationon organisedcrime 1083 849 205 26 1
Breachedpresidentialdecree 1093 652 385 14 3

Source: V. V. Luneev, 'Korruptsiya,uchtennayai fakticheskaya',Gosudarstvoi pravo, 1996, 8, p. 88.

'Crime without Punishment', presented by Vladimir Pozner and timed for the second
anniversary of the assassination of Vlad List'ev, a famous TV journalist (which
incidentally has still not been solved), revealed a tremendous degree of social despair
over rising criminality and the high level of mistrust which people have for state law
enforcement offices.43 On 4 March El'tsin summoned Yurii Skuratov, the Procurator-
General, and ordered him to tighten his control over the Procurator's office. The next
stage in the anti-crime and anti-corruption campaign was inaugurated (see Appendix
2).
The criminalisation of Russian life has been having a profound social effect. Its
destructive influence on the economy, which is already in substantial difficulties,
undermines international business confidence in investing in Russia. Organised crime
is plundering social resources, it is illegally exporting capital (the total volume of
capital flight from Russia over the past 5 years was estimated by Finansovye
Izvestiya, 18 February 1997, at some $60 billion)44 and thus reducing economic gains
which would otherwise be available for industrial restructuring and for social needs.
Peoples' confidence in the financial system, riddled with corruption and embezzle-
ment of savings, is at a very low ebb. The collapse of financial pyramids like 'MMM'
and 'Vlastilina',45 at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars to investors,
undoubtedly contributed to the further hoarding of dollar savings: according to State
Statistical Committee reports, the amount of foreign money which Russians keep at
home is estimated at $20 billion.46 This in itself has a damaging effect on the Russian
economy. Corrupt officials who have suspicious criminal connections are plentiful, a
fact which undermines people's trust in politics and the state. This trust is also
 ORGANISEDCRIMEIN RUSSIA 39

underminedby the constant mutual accusations of corruptionand criminal connec-

tions which state officials and politicians widely use in their power struggle.47The
violent acts of political terrorism coming from Chechnya, despite some recent
successes in controlling them as claimed by the law enforcement organs, increase
public insecurity and aggravatesocial tensions.48The intimidatingeffect of criminal
terroracts as a form of social control and censorship underminingthe work of the
media, the state, and financial and legal institutions. The apparentlyunpunishable
nature of Russian crime corruptsthe young generationby showing that crime pays
and thatit signifies real power.49While the formerSoviet moralitycondonedviolence,
even of an individualkind, in supportof the collectivity (in defence of the Revolution,
the Fatherland,etc.), the present social ethos encourages individualistic violence in
supportof rapid propertyand capital accumulation.The Russian language has also
been under the strong influence of this criminalised environment.In recent years,
criminal slang has been penetratingincreasingly into everyday language and many
aspects of Russianpopularculturenow reflect the presentcriminalisedsocial milieu.50
The official response so far culminatedin the following measures. In his annual
presidential address to the Federal Assembly on 6 March 1997 El'tsin called for a
decisive crackdownon crime and corruptionbecause by now 'the criminalworld has
openly challenged the state and launched into open competition with it'.51 In his
address he especially emphasised the need to protect the economy from corruption
and crime. The leading role of the procuracyas a permanentcoordinatingcentre for
fighting crime and corruption was ominously omitted in his speech.52Moreover,
mentioned in this address for the first time was the urgent need to create a legal
regulationgoverning the surveillanceof the real, declaredand undeclaredincomes of
state officials. One of the punitive measures for criminal offences perpetratedduring
official duties was to be the 'confiscation of personal property'. He urged the
governmentto introducethis and other anti-corruptionbills for adoptionin the Duma
before 1 July 1997.
This latest anti-corruptiondrive was markedby the first of many promiseddecrees:
'On urgentmeasuresfor preventingcorruptionand for cutting budget expenditureon
the organisationof state purchasingof produce', issued on 8 April 1997. It contained
certainpoints which indicatedthat this time the anti-corruptioncampaignmight prove
to be more effective than on previous occasions. According to analysts, 'now the
basic principlesof combatingcorruptionhave been turnedup side down, i.e. to create
a rationalmechanismwhich would leave as little space as possible for committingan
offence ... and corruptionmust be looked for primarilynot among small officials but
in places were big money is involved'.53
On 30 April 1997 First Vice-PremierBoris Nemtsov presented to El'tsin for his
signature a whole package of anti-corruptionmeasures which legally oblige state
officials (while also 'encouraging' their wives, Duma deputies and other public
employees) to declare their real incomes and savings as well as their sources.
Moreover,at the initiative of Nemtsov, measureshave been introducedto make state
officials use Russian cars for their official duties.54The anti-corruptioncampaign
gained furthermomentumwhen, on 19 May, the Military Procuracyissued an order
for the arrestof General KonstantinKobets, Deputy Defence Minister, who is being
charged(togetherwith 18 othergenerals)with gross embezzlementof armyfunds and
40 TANYA FRISBY

corruption.On the following day he was dissmised from his post by the Presidentand
the day after he was arrested.On 22 May, at a meeting of the Defence Council, the
Defence Minister Igor Rodionov and the Chief of the General Staff, General Viktor
Samsonov, were dismissed for gross inefficiency in implementingarmy reforms, for
maintaininga high level of income provision for high-rankingofficers, for worsening
the conditions of army service for ordinarysoldiers and for widespread corruption
among the general staff.55
The general anti-corruptionspirit of the State Duma was always more convincing
than the willingness of state institutions to combat corruption.The anti-corruption
measures have been supported by the special Duma committee in the Federal
Assembly, headed by Vladimir Semago, for investigating the facts of corruption
among state officials. It has no legal status, and must thereforecollect informationon
corruptionfrom different sources, including press and media, prepareparliamentary
hearingsand, guided by the Duma decision, send its findingsto the organsof the State
Procuracy.In passing it is worth noting that investigationsinto corruptionby General
Kobets were startedat the initiation of Lev Rokhlin, a Duma deputy from the NDR
party and Chairmanof the Duma committee on defence.
What makes this anti-crimeand anti-corruptioncampaign more promising is that
now there exists a strong legal foundationfor combatingit. The New CriminalCode
which was introduced on 1 January 1997, despite the controversies it has already
caused, contains many importantlegal provisions.56Bribery, for example, is treated
as a criminal offence not only in state offices but in all other institutions, whether
private or public. However, many legal specialists have pointed out that although
'theoreticallyit might be easier to catch bribe takers,in practicalterms our investiga-
tors will not gain much: it is well known that investigations into bribery are very
difficult, they depend heavily on statementsof witnesses and thereforeoften collapse
in court'.
Article 210 CC RF, on the other hand, on 'Legal responsibilitiesfor organisation
of criminal fraternities', quite clearly paves the way for effective struggle against
organised crime.58In addition, on 14 May 1997 the Duma passed the first witness
protectionlaw in Russian history. The law was approvedby the FederationCouncil
on 10 June and, at its very minimum, it would guarantee the anonymity of all
witnesses in criminal cases, as well as their personal security, the absence of which
has been a major impedimentin criminal investigations. However, the weakness of
law enforcementinstitutionsin the implementationof new legal provisions was again
illustratedby Anatolii Kulikov in his reportto the governmenton 13 July 1997, it was
reportedby NTV news on the same date. According to this report,by now 100 000
members who belong to 9000 organised criminal formations are currently under
surveillanceby the law enforcementoffices but they cannot be arrestedbecause there
is insufficient evidence for their indictment. Most of these groups are active in the
banking and legal sectors.
It is important to note that the latest campaign against crime and corruption
coincides with the measures which are being implemented for eliminating chronic
delays in paying wages, for solving the budget deficit through tightening fiscal
policies and tax regulationsand for curbingthe powers of naturalmonopolies. Young,
active and experiencedpoliticians who did not belong to the elite power structuresin
 ORGANISED CRIME IN RUSSIA 41

the former Soviet regime are being brought into the current presidential administra-
tion, ministerial cabinet and the Security Council.59 They have strong links with the
banking and financial sectors and they declare unequivocally their reformist inten-
tions. All this is taking place at a time when political and social unrest in the country,
due to chronic non-payment of wages, decline of industrial output, the rise in
unemployment and the further erosion of social provisions, is becoming very serious.
Undoubtedly, these urgent measures are aimed at increasing popular support and
reducing social tensions.60 They also manifest the intention on the part of the state to
re-establish its control over many important political and economic issues in the
country.
The rapid privatisation of state and public property resulted in substantial capital
accumulation by large banks and other financial institutions as well as in the business
sector. Many individuals are now property owners and the volume of savings in
private hands is quite considerable. There is an urgent need now to create a strong and
efficient system of law enforcement based on the new legal foundation which would
guarantee strong state protection of private property and the indisputable right of
citizens to own it. At this decisive stage in the transition to a capitalist economy it
is essential that the state should be committed to the preservation of those positive
changes which have been achieved as a result of the past six years of market reforms.
The adoption of the Law on Privatisation with its firm legal provisions, which was
passed by an overwhelming majority in the Duma on 24 June 1997 and approved by
the Federation Council on 3 July, is the most important step in this direction.61
However, the legal vacuum which appeared as a result of the disintegration of the
previous Soviet legal system (as well as the state itself) and the rapid redistribution
of wealth in Russia also created basic preconditions for primitive accumulation of a
criminal kind.62 This process is still going on and is a real obstacle in the path of
Russia's future development.63 The effectiveness of the law enforcement institutions
vis-a-vis crime and corruption will depend, to a large extent, on the speed of
transformation of property relations in Russia towards a stable economic environment,
the growing political consensus, as well as the more equal distribution of administrat-
ive and legislative powers between the centre and the regions in the Russian
Federation.

IREES, University of Glasgow

1 Emile Durkheim,Suicide.A Studyin Sociology(Londonand Henley;Routledgeand Kegan

Paul, 1979), pp. 252-253. The following are some recent books on crime in Russia: Evgeniya
Evelson, Sudebnyeprotsessypo ekonomicheskim delam v SSSR (London,OverseasPublications
InterchangeLtd, 1986); StephenHandelman,ComradeCriminal.The Theftof the SecondRussian
Revolution, (London, Michael Joseph, 1994); Andrei Konstantinov,Banditskii Peterburg (St
Petersburg;Bibliopolis, 1995); AndreiKonstantinov,KorrumpirovannyiPeterburg(St Petersburg;
Folio-Press,1997); V. Maier& L. Sharov,KratkayaVorovskayaEntsiklopediya(Moscow;Novyi
Vek, 1995); AleksandrObolonsky,Sistemaprotiv lichnosti(Moscow;InstitutGosudarstvai Prava,
RossiiskayaAkademiyaNauk, 1994); Fedor Razzakov, Bandity vremen sotsializma (Moscow,
EKSMO,1996); FedorRazzakov,Bandityvremenkapitalizma(Moscow;EKSMO,1996); Arkadii
Vaksberg,Soviet Mafia (London;Weidenfeldand Nicholson, 1991); Phil Williams (ed.), Russian
Organized Crime.TheNew Threat?(Londonand Portland,OR; FrankCass, 1997).
2
VladimirSokolov, 'Chei budetdom-Rossiya?', Cheloveki zakon, 1996, 3, p. 16.
42 TANYA FRISBY

3After 70 years of almost total isolation, the collapse of the USSR suddenly made possible
wide communication with the rest of the world. In addition, recent advances in communication
technology have made a huge impact on Russian social and linguistic culture. According to Professor
Nikolai Komlev (quoted by L. Vostryakova in Kapital, 10-16 April 1996, p. 2) 'from the beginning
of perestroika the Russian language acquired about 10 000 neologisms of mainly American English
origin'.4
This aspect of Soviet life is discussed by James O. Finckenauer, Russian Youth. Law,
Deviance and the Pursuit of Freedom (New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers, 1996).
Finckenauer links the process of legal socialisation of Soviet/Russian children and teenagers to the
particular nature of primary groups and family units.
5 Durkheim sees the
emergence of 'excessive individualism' as a result of disintegration of a
'cohesive and animated society' with 'a constant interchange of ideas and feelings from all to each
and from each to all, something like a mutual moral support, which instead of throwing the individual
on his own resources, leads him to share in the collective energy and supports his own when
exhausted' (see Durkheim, p. 210).
6 Sokolov, p. 15.
7
General Vladimir Alferov, First Deputy Chief of the Criminal Investigation Department of
the MVD of the RF, 'Istina vsegda odna', Militsiya, 1996, 6, pp. 22-25, points to the fact that
'176 000 criminal investigations were completed long after their legally permitted time'. Among the
most important reasons for this he names 'insufficient professional level of investigating staff' (only
50% have legal training) and their inability to process the ever growing volume of work, serious
deficiencies in the work of forensic departments, high turnover of staff (60% of investigating officers
worked less than 3 years in the system).
8 V. V. Luneev, Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences, 'Korruptsiya,

uchtennaya i fakticheskaya', Gosudarstvo i pravo, 1996, 8, p. 88, states that 'in the structure of
corrupt officials, there is a great predominance of those working in the institutions of state power
(66.3%) and law enforcement (27.4%). Of the latter 95% or more are workers in the organs of internal
affairs. This fact compelled the MVD to create its own internal security service in the form of an
internal inspectorate at the end of 1995'. According to the NTV News report of 29 May 1997, MVD
General Svyatoslav Golitsyn stated in an interview with the press that over 20 000 MVD officers had
been dismissed for corruption and criminal connections since the establishment of the MVD internal
inspectorate. However, only a quater of suspected criminal offences within the MVD were solved.
9
According to Alferov, in 1995 'more than 400 internal security officers were killed in police
operations and over 1500 were wounded (including investigations)'. 'Rossiiskii pinkerton', Chelovek
i zakon, 1996, 2, p. 45.
10 Colonel Mikhail Kiree, professor at the Academy of the Russian MVD, writes that 'despite
all measures undertaken by the state, control over the spread of guns, ammunition, explosives and
poisonous substances has practically been lost. At present Russians and illegal immigrants, at a rough
estimate, possess illegally about 2 million guns, including the most up-to-date types. 'Pod pritselom
terrorizma', Militsiya, 1996, 6, p. 38. The law on private possession of weapons, adopted on 1 July
1997, which allows citizens to keep small arms for self-defence and hunting, will result in an even
bigger proliferation of guns among the population.
n OMRI
Daily Digest, 10 March 1997.
12 Aleksandr Kondrashev
reported that according to the Department of the Interior of
Kaliningrad oblast', in 1994 '39 organised criminal groups with 159 participants who specialised in
the illegal sale of amber were uncovered but in the first half of 1995 their number almost doubled'
... According to the Head of the Kaliningrad Office of the Federal Security Service, Boris Levenkov,
nowadays amber is being stolen not in kilos or even hundreds of kilos but in tons. Everyone from
simple miner to director is involved in it. According to specialists from the Department for economic
crime of the Kaliningrad Interior Office, nearly a ton of amber a day is being smuggled across the
Russian border. 'Po yantarnoi trope' Militsiya, 1996, 6, pp. 25-27.
13
There is an overall public tolerance to petty economic crime in Russia, itself a legacy from
the Soviet regime. Finckenauer suggests that 'because of the unique confluence of circumstances and
characteristics, ... the USSR produced a people uniquely socialised to facilitate their involvement in
widespread deviance. Their common heritage included the Soviet command economy that produced
massive shortages as well as widespread bribery and thievery, ... no area of life in the Soviet Union
was exempt from universal corruption' (p. 94).
14 The 'Results of
operational and investigative activity of the Organs of Internal Affairs and
combating activity of the Interior Troops of the MVD in 1995 (report to the citizens of Russian
Federation)' were published in Militsiya, 1996, 4, pp. 4-24. Also in 'Invalidov obokrali', Chelovek
i zakon, 1996, 1, pp. 35-44.
 ORGANISED CRIME IN RUSSIA 43
15
Patricia Rawlinson points to the Western complacency vis-a-vis the activity of organised
Russian criminals in illegal export of capital. She explains this not so much by the lack of regulations
in the West as by the fact that 'implementing regulations is not only difficult but requires the will to
follow through what is often only a hunch and would anyway result in a profit loss for the
organisations involved'. 'A threat to Europe?', Criminal Justice Matters, 27, Spring 1997, p. 11. On
9 July 1997 the Central Bank of Russia issued its first package of firm regulations for commercial
banks in order to curb money laundering practices.
16 General Dr Pavel Ponomarev, Professor and Director of the MVD Research Institute, 'Chtoby

prognoz ne opravdalsya', Militsiya, 1996, 8. In the same article he also points out that 'the danger
to society from economic crime is growing thanks to the increasing use of highly skilled specialists
in criminal activity, such as economists, lawyers and financial experts, and due to the implementation
of the most sophisticated technology' (p. 19).
17 Dr
Vyacheslav Razinkin, Head of the MVD Department of the RF, 'Vory v zakone, kto oni?',
Chelovek i zakon, 1996, 1, p. 90.
18 According to Boris Rudenko, 'Operatsiya-ochishchenie', Chelovek i zakon, 1996, 2,
pp. 34-46, as a result of purging operations instigated by the KGB against the MVD in 1983-86, by
1987 80 000 officers of the militia had been sacked and 100 000 had resigned. In 1990 the average
working experience of militia officers was 3-4 years.
19 The notorious GULAG was created in 1929. The instruction of the State Security Service
(OGPU) of 8 March 1931 recommended involving all those who were of social classes not hostile
to the proletariat and the peasantry in the struggle against political enemies of the workers' state. In
practical terms this meant that the use of criminals for controlling political prisoners in places of
detention was officially sanctioned.
20 In the Criminal Code of the USSR and its Republics of 1958, the death penalty was viewed
as a provisional and extreme form of punishment for especially aggravated crimes. Since the October
Revolution the death penalty has been abolished three times: in 1917 (reintroduced in 1918), in 1920
(reintroduced in 1932) and in 1947 (reintroduced in 1961).
21
Vitalii Eremin, Vorovskoi orden (Simferopol, Tavrida, 1994), p. 115, explains that during the
1960s and 1970s, when sentencing for all criminal offences became quite severe, the criminal
fraternity decided to rob those who would be afraid to complain to the authorities, i.e. underground
businessmen.
22 Aleksandr
Gurov, Krasnaya Mafiya (Moscow, Samotsvet,/Kommercheskii Vestnik, 1995),
p. 13.
23 Ibid., p. 14.
24
Georgii Podlesskikh & Andrei Tereshok, Vory v zakone (Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya
Literatura, 1994), p. 27.
25
Ibid. According to the authors, in 1988 a letter from an influencial 'thief in law', Tengiz
Chichnadze, addressed to the criminal world, stated that 'while the Reds are fighting between
themselves it is time for us to take power in the country and in the first instance by forcing law
enforcement organs to obey the commands of the criminal world' (pp. 168-169).
26
Ibid., pp. 239-253. However, various sources differ greatly in their estimated numbers of
'thieves in law'. For example, Eremin quotes the MVD figure of about 500. Other leaders of criminal
gangs are estimated, in this source, at 20 000 (p. 132).
27
Razinkin, pp. 86-91.
28
Kriminologicheskaya assotsiatsiya, Prestupnost' v Rossii v devyanostkykhgodakh i nekotorye
,aspekty zakonnosti bor'by s nei (Moscow, 1995), p. 35. On the 'gray economy' see the section
'Statistika', Kommersant, 8 April 1997, pp. 50-51.
29
Colonel Vyacheslav Korolev, Head of the State Department of the Russian CID, 'Ne zhelaem
zhit' po drugomu', Militsiya, 1996, 7. He points out that this new type of criminal leaders are, 'by
and large, young men of below 30 who had no previous criminal record and were not in trouble with
the law' (p. 11).
30 The recent conviction of a notorious 'thief in
law', Vyacheslav Ivankov (alias Yaponchik), in
New York for extortion (Ogonek, No. 18, May 1997, pp. 15-20) or the arrests in Italy of Russian
criminal leaders (The Times, 8 March 1997, p. 12) as well as the arrest of a criminal leader, Grigorii
Lerner, in Israel on 13 May 1997 (NTV News report), for alleged murders and racket committed in
Russia and Israel, are good examples of this development. For full information see Williams (ed.),
Russian Organized Crime, pp. 227-270.
31 According to General Nikolai Kulikov, Head of Moscow Department of Internal Affairs, this
is largely due to the fact that 'our officers have to risk their health and their lives while being grossly
underpaid. Hence in the Russian system of internal affairs we (in Moscow) have the biggest number
of unfilled vacancies- 11% or 8000. In the CID 400 jobs remain unfilled. The Traffic Police and the
44 TANYA FRISBY

Department for economic crime have the same problems'. 'Prestupnyi bal na stolichnykh ulitsakh',
Chelovek i zakon, 1996, 3, p. 32.
32 Elena
Vrantseva, 'Trans World Group: alyuminievaya krysha dala tech', Kommersant, 18
March 1997, p. 42.
33
James Meek, 'Only the guilty are murdered in Moscow', Observer, 30 March 1997,
p. 16.
34 Razinkin, p. 90.
35 OMRI Daily Digest, 19 February 1997.
36 Kommersant, 18 March 1997,
pp. 42-43.
37 Roman
Sergeev, 'Prezident prikazal chestno zhit' ', Kommersant, 22 April 1997, p. 9.
Finckenauer suggests that 'preconventional level of reasoning' and 'legal immaturity' which would
contribute to law breaking behaviour are 'the product of the kind of legal system which dominated
in the Soviet Union. The prevaling legal environment throughout Soviet history ... was one in which
lawmaking was very much an exercise in power politics.... That context was one in which you would
expect that obeying the law would have been motivated primarily by fear and deterrence perhaps
resulting in a kind of enforced preconventional level of legal reasoning' (pp. 150-151).
38 It was pointed out by Sergeev that this decree was directed exclusively against petty

corruption and listed four requirements for state employees: attestation, banning any business activity,
declaration of incomes and state provision of special social guarantees (pp. 10-11).
39
Ibid., p. 10.
40 Luneev, pp. 81-82.
41 Ibid., p. 86. The corruption among high-ranking state officials has been widely discussed. The
same source also reported that in 1993 '55 such cases of corruption were discussed in the former
Supreme Soviet, 41 of which were confirmed after investigations but not a single one has been
indicted. There were no criminal charges made against the officials who, by using their official
positions of power, stole 1000 tonnes of gold in 1991, which was reported by the former Prime
Minister, Egor Gaidar, in the State Duma in 1995. The facts about the theft were already published
in 1991' (p. 85).
42
Prestupnost'v Rossii v devyanostykh godakh, p. 31. Aleksei Kudrin, Chief of the State Control
Department (GKO) in the Presidential administration, Kommersant, 11 March 1997, p. 11, stated that
'the most important case for his department this year was the investigation into the MVD of Russia
which resulted in 30 criminal indictments against its officials. In 1996, after investigations by GKO,
the Head of the Social Insurance Fund of Russia, The Director of the Federal office for Employment,
the Director-General of the joint-stock company Dalenergo, as well as appointed (not elected) chiefs
of Amur, Bryansk and Vologda oblasti were dismissed'.
43
The programme also reported that in 1996 there were over two-and-a-half million recorded
criminal offences. These included over 22 500 murders and over 90 000 assaults on individuals
(40 000 with grievous bodily harm). The suspicious deaths of 150 journalists have not been solved
up till now.
44
OMRI Daily Digest, 19 February 1997. Also, the First Deputy Central Bank Chairman,
Aleksandr Khandruev, announced on 5 June 1997 that $12-15 billion flowed out of Russia illegally
every year. This estimate does not include capital funneled out through what he called semi-legal
'gray schemes'. Newsline, 6 June 1997. For full information see Vladimir Tikhomirov, 'Capital Flight
from Post-Soviet Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 4, June 1997, pp. 591-615.
45
According to the NTV programme 'Den'gi', 7 May 1997, by that date 1360 financial
companies and 450 banks had ceased operation.
46 AFP
report in OMRI Daily Digest, 4 March 1997. The NTV News on 7 July 1997 reported
the figure of $30 billion.
4 It has been claimed by Viktor Kondratov, the first Governor-General (FSB) appointed by the
President in order to bring the current political crisis in Primor'e and its insubordinate Governor,
Evgenii Nazdratenko, under the Kremlin control ('Gubernator popal pod nadzor FSB', Kommersant,
10 June 1997), and by Aman Tuleev, recently appointed Governor of the turbulent Kemerovo oblast'
in place of pro-communist Mikhail Kislyuk ('Geroi dnya', NTV, 2 July 1997) that organised
criminals have been involved in political destabilisation in Primo'e and in Kuzbass coal mines
through corruption and intimidation of senior public and state officials and through control over the
mining, distribution and pricing of coal.
4 Oleg Trubetskoi, 'Terror pered otkrytym zabralom', Kommersant, 6 May 1997, p. 11, quotes
Deputy Chief of the Security Council Boris Berezovsky, who speaks of complete inadequacy of the
Russian anti-terrorismprovisions: 'In the Security Council now there is no system which would allow
the construction of a mechanism for combating terrorism. In this respect we are the most unprepared
country in the world'.
 ORGANISED CRIME IN RUSSIA 45

49 Razinkin reports that these days a kind of romantic aura surrounds criminal activity:
'It became normal and even prestigious for young people to be either a racketeer or a prostitute'
(p. 89).
50 Linguistic specialists point out that while in the 1960s and 1970s the language of newspapers
was influenced mostly by military, sport and technical terminology, nowadays it is readily absorbing
youth slang and criminal jargon. They point out that 'the Russian language has always provided
space for criminal jargon, but never before was it so overwhelmed by it as now. The reason is
that criminal words reflect and express the essence of social, economic and power relations which
exist in society today'. E. A. Zemskaya (ed.), Russkii yazyk kontsa 20-go stoletiya (1985-1995)
(Moscow, Institut Russkogo Yazyka, Rossiiskaya Academiya Nauk. Yazyki russkoi kul'tury, 1996),
pp. 83-84.
51
OMRI Daily Digest, 6 March 1997.
52
Up till now the procuracy has been the most powerful, influential and impregnable institution
in the Soviet criminal justice system. Even during perestroika it survived several attempts to
undermine its position. 'The law on the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office, passed on 17
January, 1992, basically confirmed the existing powers of the procuracy, with few if any restrictions'.
Finckenauer, p. 55.
53
54
Sergeev, p. 10.
This initiative is seen by some observers as an exercise on Nemtsov's part to increase his
public support and build up his image at a time when he has to implement firm measures of state
control, as a principal shareholder in natural monopolies. According to Elena Vrantseva, 'Mnogo
gazu iz nichego', Kommersant, 8 April 1997, p. 29, the running costs of Russian cars in state
institutions are considerably higher than those of Western cars due to their inferior quality and higher
petrol consumption. She quotes Pavel Borodin, Chief of the Administrative Department to the
President, who stated that 'for three years of running service one needs six Volga cars or one foreign
car'.
55 The dramatic televised dismissal of
Igor Rodionov and Viktor Samsonov, which was
broadcast by the NTV News programme, is viewed by many commentators as a performance which
was well prepared in advance by El'tsin and his new appointees in the government. Rodionov's
dismissal was considered to be only a matter of time after he requested 106 trillion rubles per year
for the army reforms to commence in 1997. Yurii Baturin, the Head of the Defence Council,
requested only 10 trillion in his proposal (Dmitrii Solopov, 'Prezident sekonomil na ministre',
Kommersant', 3 June 1997, pp. 18-20).
56 The main criticism of
legal analysts concentrates on the fact that 'the New Criminal Code has
become outdated even before it began to act. Its completion took too long'. Evidently the changes
in social and economic developments were much too fast to be fully and properly integrated in
this Code. Elena Vrantseva & Lev Tolstykh, 'S nastupayushchim vas Ugolovnym Kodeksom',
Kommersant, 24 December 1996, p. 23.
57
Vrantseva, 'Mnogo gazu iz nichego', p. 24.
58
This article consists of three main parts. A subject is criminally responsible for: (1) creating
a criminal organisation or criminal group, or being a leader of such an organisation or group, or any
part or section of such an organisation or group; (2) for being a member of criminal organisation(s)
or group(s); (3) for acting in the capacity stated in (1) and/or (2) and utilising for this purpose the
advantages of official duties. This article also provides comprehensive definitions of different types
of organised criminal formations. L. Gaukhman & S. Maksimov, 'Otvetstvennost' za organizatsiyu
prestupnogo soobshchestva', Zakonnost', 1997, 2, pp. 12-18.
5 At
present, of all previous top government ministers only the Prime Minister, Viktor
Chernomyrdin,Anatolii Kulikov, the Minister for Internal Affairs, and Evgenii Primakov, the Foreign
Minister, still occupy their posts.
60 The
conjectural character of the present anti-corruptioncampaign has been commented upon
by many politicians. Sergei Stankevich, a former aid to El'tsin, who is now under threat of being
extradited to Russia from Poland on charges of corruption, stated in an interview in 'Geroi dnya',
NTV, 23 May 1997: 'In the last few years there has been a need on the part of the state to stage an
anti-corruption show trial. Russia has a bad memory of such trials. There are people in Russia who
are experts at organising them. What they had to find was a suitable victim. Who is more suitable for
such a role? A person who has not entered any of the present financial groups which are holding
political power'.
61 The first
legislation on privatisation of state and municipal property in 1991, followed by
presidential decrees and government regulations, provided a weak legal basis for privatisation, which
made it susceptible to abuse and corruption. On 5 June 1997 the Duma condemned the government's
privatisation policy of 1992-96. By now 57% of all enterprises are in private hands.
46 TANYA FRISBY

62
EduardRossel, the controversialGovernorof Sverdlovskoblast', interviewedin 'Geroi
dnya', NTV, 6 May 1997, advocated'an amnesty'for illegal capital if it was invested in legal
businesses.In his opinion,this wouldbringlargeadditionalinvestmentto the ailingindustrialsector
andwouldhelpthe ownersof illegalcapitalto rehabilitatethemselves.He also statedthatregionslike
his oblast' must be given more autonomyto make their own laws. Many of Rossel's ideas find
supportamongRussianpoliticians.On the extent of organisedcrime in Sverdlovskoblast' see K.
Dmitriev& G. Rozov, 'Krutyei mertvye',Kommersant,6 May 1997.
63
Accordingto the reportof FirstDeputyInteriorMinister,VladimirKolesnikov,to the Duma
on 5 June 1997, crimesrelatedto privatisationrose by 60%in 1996 comparedwith 1995. Crimesin
real estate,schemesinvolvingfraud,briberyand even murdercontinuedto proliferate.Newsline,6
June 1997.

Appendix 1. Crime Figures, 1995 and 1996

Selected data from 'Results of operationaland investigative activity of the Organs of Internal
Affairs and combatingactivity of the InteriorTroops of the MVD in 1995 (reportto the citizens
of the Russian Federation)

Total number of recordedcrimes: 2 755 700 (+ 4.7% from 1994).

The biggest growth of criminality was in Buryatiya, Mari El, Jewish Autonomous oblast,'
Kostroma,Ivanov, Kaluga, Novgorod, Yaroslav, Chita and Pskov oblasti (14-27.3% increase).

Total numberof aggravatedcrimes: 1 633 400 (or 59% of all crimes).

Decline in murdersand grievous bodily harm: - 6.2% (- 1.8%, - 8.8% respectively).

Street crime: recorded 173 500 (overall decline by 4.8%. Increase in more violent crimes:
murders + 6.9%, rape + 1.9%) (in Moscow + 12.8% and + 31% respectively).

Solved crimes: + 10.6% from 1994 (+167 000) (from 1575471 to 1742471). 837000
perpetratorsof serious crimes were found guilty.

Over 900 000 criminal cases remained unsolved.

Unsolved crimes: about 25% of murdersand attacks with grievous bodily
harm;
40% of aggravatedassaults;
most of all contract murders(zakaznyeubiistva).

Two-thirds of most crimes in 1995 were crimes against property.

Organisedcrime and armed Solved: 23 800 cases (including 60 contract murders);

attacks: 386 participantsconvicted;
3 800 organised criminal groups were investigated and
members charged;
14 900 of their leaders and active participantswere
prosecuted.

Narcotics: Recorded:79 900 cases linked with narcotics (+ 6.9%

from 1994);
5900 drug offenders convicted.
 ORGANISED CRIME IN RUSSIA 47

Criminalisationof the economy: Recorded: 211 800 cases of crime;

139 000 (+ 12.5% from 1994) of these were especially
harmful for national economic security.

Criminal activity in banking Up by 140%.

and finance: Under investigation:500 financial pyramids (300 in
Moscow).

Theft and illegal export of Recorded: 15 800 cases

strategic resources:

Over 30% of all economic crime is in consumer trade and services.

Crime in transport Recorded:67 500 cases (- 16% from 1994).

(and services): 568 criminal gangs broken up.

Private security services: Found unlicensed: 1400 security services and 7000
individuals (out of overall 7700 services and 82 000
individuals).

In 1995 722 300 people were in prison (incl. 32 500 women) (+ 6.8% from 1994), almost
21 000 in corrective labour colonies (about 3000 inmates passed juvenile status during
incarceration);
295 200 are held under investigation;
25% of all inmates in corrective institutionsare serious offenders;
60% of all inmates in corrective institutions are recidivists.

Source: Militsiya, 1996, 4, pp. 4-24.

Selected data from the Report of the Minister of Interior,General Anatolii Kulikov, to the
Meeting of the Collegium of MVD of Russia, 29 November 1996.
Crime figures by that date:
Unsolved: murdersand especially aggravatedcrimes - 16 000
armed robberies and armed attacks -61 000
burglaries -479 000
as well as tens of thousands of other crimes.

72 300 dangerouscriminals are still at large.

Of these: over 100 wanted for banditry;
5000-for murderand rape;
6300-for burglariesand armed robberies.
Situation is especially bad in Ingushetiya, Astrakhan,Moscow, Magadan, Perm, Pskov and
Chita oblasti, and in Moscow, where 47-79% of offenders are still at large.
By that date over 24 000 citizens were recorded as missing.
48 TANYA FRISBY

Narcotics: at least 4 million people (mostly young) tried narcotic drugs;

2 million use narcotics regularly;
400 000 chronic users.
34 000 tons of narcotics had been seized by 29 November 1996.

Highway robberies:by the above date over 1500 registered,a thirdof these in the Moscow and
St Petersburgareas.

Theft of cars: 16% (on average) of car thefts were solved.

In Adigeya, Tuva, Udmurtia,Primor'e, Kaluga and Novgorod oblasti, St Petersburg,Moscow
and Sakhalin only 5-12% of car thefts were solved.

Street attacks and muggings: only 4% of street crime is solved in Altai, Khakasia,Mordovia,
Penza, Belgorod, Kursk and Orenburgoblasti.
Source: Militsiya, 1997, 1, pp. 6-14.

AFP report of 17 January 1997: General Anatolii Kulikov, Minister of the Interior.
1996: Recorded crimes- 2 620 000 (down from 2 750 000 in 1995).
Real number (Kulikov's estimate)-almost 7 million;
9700 murdersand attemptedmurders(2000 down from 1995);
450 estimated contract murders(60 solved);
200 criminal groups were broken up by police;
10 000 InteriorMinistry employees were prosecuted or dismissed
(including 3500 for serious offences).

Source: OMRIDaily Digest, 20 January 1997.

Appendix 2. Some SignificantDuties

February1992. Presidentialdecree on the struggle against corruptionforbiddingstate officials
to be involved in business activity, use their influence in promotingsuch activity or take part
in its management.
8 October 1992. Decree 'On measures for public protection, support of law and order and
increasingthe fight against crime'. A special Commission in the Security Council for fighting
corruptionand crime was created.
19 January 1993. Meeting in the Kremlin on the increasing fight against crime.
12 February1993. The President spoke at the All-Russian conference on the struggle against
crime and corruption.
April 1993. President El'tsin spoke in Novokuznetsk at a meeting with miners where he
declaredthat the fight against corruptionwas intensifying and three deputy ministershad been
arrested.This informationwas not confirmed. His decree 'On intensificationof the struggle
against corruptionand crime due to their rise and growing threatto the state' declaredthat the
President was taking the work of the Commission under his general control.
 ORGANISED CRIME IN RUSSIA 49

May 1993. At the meeting of the joint Commission of the Security Council on the struggle
against corruptionand crime El'tsin demandedmore decisive action from the MVD and MBR
(Russia's Security Ministry). He named organised crime and corruption as major state
problems.
23 June 1993. The presidentialdecree 'On improvingthe work of the joint Commission of the
Securitycouncil for the fight against corruptionand crime' announcedthe creationof a special
steering departmentfor the Commission (35 members).
August-September 1993. El'tsin chaired meetings of the Commission several times.
November 1993. The President discontinuedthe work of the steering department.
March 1994. At the meeting of the Security Council, El'tsin approvedthe Federalprogramme
for combating crime.
April 1994. At the All-Russian meeting of the FSK El'tsin declared the struggle against
corruptionto be one of the main functions of the FSK (FederalCounterIntelligence Service).
10 July 1994. At a press conference El'tsin admittedto corruptionin the Russian government.
May 1995. A new joint Commission in the Security Council was formed for the 'Provision of
public safety and fight againstcrime and corruption'which unitedtwo independentcommittees.
December 1995. The Presidentrejectedthe law on the 'Fight against corruption'and 'Changes
in the Criminalcode' approvedby the Duma and the Council of the Federation.
Spring 1996. El'tsin included fightingagainstcrime and corruptionas one of his 10 main points
of state development in his election campaign.
July 1996. At the meeting of the collegium of the FSB (Federal Security Service) El'tsin
declared that fighting crime and corruptionwas the third most importanttask of the FSB.

Source: Kommersant,22 April 1997, p. 11.