?5^A-M?M.

V A«/ L~*Jc6iUjL ft *•* e

INCLUDING THE

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

AND THE

FORMULATION OF DIRECTIVES

with the Resident and Correspondence Courses.

U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NEWPORT, R. I.

1936

Not to pass out of the custody of officers of the U. S.

Naval or Military Service.

 INCLUDING THE

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

AND THE

FORMULATION OF DIRECTIVES

Prepared at The Naval War College for use in connection

with the Resident and Correspondence Courses.

U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NEWPORT, R. I.

1936
 U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.
1 December, 1936

The original pamphlet, entitled, THE ESTIMATE OF

THE SITUATION, was first published in 1910 under the
direction of Rear Admiral R. P. Rodgers, President of the
Naval War College, for use at the College. Revised editions
have been published since that time under the direction of
Captain W. L. Rodgers (1911-12), Rear Admiral A. M.
Knight (1915), Rear Admiral W. S. Sims (1921), Rear Ad­
miral C. S. Williams (1924), Rear Admiral W. V. Pratt
(1926), Rear Admiral J. R. Poinsett Pringle (1929), and
Rear Admiral Harris Laning (1932). In the 1926 revision
of the pamphlet there was combined with it another War
College pamphlet "THE FORMULATION OF ORDERS,
DOCTRINE, AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION."
The present revision has been undertaken in order
further to develop the Estimate of the Situation as a means
of reaching sound military decision. Certain features have
been added. These are intended to assist in enlarging the
viewpoint and, thereby, broaden the basis of professional
judgment.
The War College Classes, resident and non-resident,
include officers of every commissioned grade of the Line
of the Navy, as well as officers of the Staff Corps of the
Navy, officers of the Army, and of the Marine Corps. The
range of length of service, and of military experience, is
correspondingly wide.
For the benefit of officers of considerable experience
in command, this pamphlet is arranged so that the Details
of The Estimate and the Formulation of Directives are
treated consecutively, beginning with Chapter IX.

E. C. KALBFUS,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
President.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Chapter I Historical 1
High Average in Leadership — Prus­
sian Staff College — Waging War
in Peace — Phases of Theoretical
Training — Need for Study of Past
Campaigns.

PART I. THE BASIS OF A CONCEPT OF WAR.

Chapter II The Armed Forces 4

The Function of the Armed Forces—
Concept of War — The Command
of The Armed Forces.

Chapter III Unity of Effort 8

Chain of Command — Organiza­
tion — Task Organization —Mutual
Understanding — Unity of Effort —
Indoctrination—Doctrine—A Com­
mon Concept of War — Constituents
of Armed Power.

PART II. THE BASIS OF SOUND MILITARY DECISION.

Chapter IV The Military Value of a
Uniform System of Reasoning 16
Natural Process of Solving Prob­
lems — Logic the Basis for Sound
Thought — Uniformity in Reason­
ing— The Estimate of the Situa­
tion— Steps in the Estimate.

Chapter V Principles as Guides to

Logical Thought 18
A Principle Defined — Science of
War —Art of War —The Word
"Principle" Often Misused — So-
called "Principles of War" —The
Principles of Human Effort Stated—
War Distinguished by the Character
of its Factors — Technique.

Chapter VI The Constituents of All

Military Problems 24
The Situation — The Incentive to
Action — The Mission — How Mis­
sions are Derived — The Objective—
Ultimate Objective—Immediate Ob­
jective — Creation or Maintenance
of Favorable Military Situation
Always the Objective.
Chapter VII The Elements of a Favorable
Military Situation 28
The Elements Listed — The Physical
Objective — Relative Position — Ap­
portionment of Fighting Strength—
Freedom of Action.
Chapter VIII The Fundamental Military Principle
and its Practical Application 41
The Fundamental Military Principle
Stated — The Estimate Form a
Flexible Guide —The Nature of
Tasks — The Mission the Governing
Influence — Courses of Action as
Solutions of a Problem — The Scope
of the Decision — Estimates of
Strategical and Tactical Situations—
Military Plans — Contingent Mili­
tary Plans — Essentials of a Military
Directive — Supervision.

PART III. THE ESTIMATE OF THE DECISION

Chapter IX Details of the Estimate 59
The Mission — Survey of Opposing
Strengths — Enemy Courses of
Action — The Commander's Own
Courses of Action — Determination
of Commander's Best Course of
Action — The Decision.

PART IV. THE FORMULATION OF DIRECTIVES

Chapter X Naval Strategical and
Tactical Directives 76
Chapter XI Determination of the Details
of a Directive 78
Conversion of Decision into Direc­
tive — Operations Required — Or­
ganization of Means and Formula­
tion of Tasks — Logistic Support —
Exercise of Command — Preparation
of the Formal Directive.
Chapter XII The Order Form 81
Chapter XIII Plan Forms and Despatch
Order Forms 86

APPENDIX
Outline of Operation Order Form 89
Outline of Operation Plan Form 90
Despatch Order Form 91
Outline of Estimate of
the Situation 92
 CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL
The Prussian armies, under the leadership of Frederick
the Great, were consistent in victory; their organization,
discipline, and methods of training became the models for
all continental armies. After the death of Frederick, in
1786, the same system of training was continued, and was
resistant to all changes for nearly fifty years.
The Battles of Auerstadt and Jena, in 1806, resulted in
disastrous defeats for the Prussian armies, and the Treaty
of Tilsit, in 1807, imposed humiliating terms on Prussia.
Here were grave causes for reflection as to why the system
of training that had brought the earlier brilliant victories
had now resulted in disaster.
There had been no decay in the people of Prussia; her
soldiers were as good, and as well trained, as formerly; those
of the enemy were no better than those who had opposed
Frederick the Great during the period of Prussia's consist­
ent victory. The solution lay elsewhere. A determined
search for the truth brought out the fact that Prussia's
highly-prized organization and system of training needed
the genius of a Frederick the Great to make it effective in
war. Frederick the Great was gone, and no genius had
arisen to oppose the French armies led by Napoleon. But
Napoleon's armies, without the genius of his leadership, ac­
tually suffered defeat more often than they achieved victory.
His Marshals, even after many years of campaigning with
him, were, with the exception of Davout, independently in­
capable of applying those concepts which had made Napo­
leon the outstanding soldier of the age.
The deduction made by the Prussians, from their exper­
ience and study, was that it is safer and wiser to develop by
training a high average of ability in leadership than to trust
to untrained "common sense," or to the possible advent of a
genius.
Scharnhorst pointed the way to future success. Under
his direction, a Staff College was established, where the
study of past campaigns, and the projection, solution, and
discussion of possible future campaigns were instituted.
During the course of study, a uniform and systematic
method of employing logic in the solution of military
problems was developed. Initiated by Scharnhorst, this
system of training was carried on and developed by his
2
pupil Mueffling, and then by Von Moltke. In 1870, the
system was given a test by war. An unbroken series of
victories was secured over the French armies, in spite of
the fact that the French Generals were far more experi­
enced in active operations than were the opposing German
Generals.
Thus there had been evolved and developed a new
technique - that of waging war in time of peace.
This system of training for war embraces three
phases:
1. The Estimate of the Situation. A mental survey
which calls for full play of the reasoning power, and which
leads up to and expresses the Decision, the formulated solu­
tion of the military problem presented to the Commander.
2. The Directive. The authoritative expression of the
will and intent of the Commander in placing in effect the
Decision, or a part thereof.
3. Action. The translation of the directive into action,
the reality of war being simulated, in peace, by Field and
Fleet exercises, and by maneuvers on the strategic chart
and tactical gameboard.
Although study and reflection alone cannot fully com­
pensate for the lack of experience in the realities of war,
it can fortify the mind for facing such realities. The Art
of the Commander is best developed by a wise combination
of the theoretical and the practical.
The Science of War, founded on the campaigns of the
great military captains, makes available to the Commander
of the present day a mass of coordinated and tested
knowledge. Study of the Science of War reveals the
causes of past success and failure, and provides the basis
for the practical application of logic to the solution of
the problems of actual warfare.
That there have been leaders who have performed
great military deeds without the benefit of prior experience
and prolonged study, is merely confirmation of the fact
that genius exists. But genius is rare, and such instances
are few. History, however, amply demonstrates the great
merit achieved by those military leaders who have, through
patient study and reflection, absorbed the teachings of the
past, and utilized them effectively in war.

—2
 PARTL

THE BASIS OF A CONCEPT OF WAR

 CHAPTER II

THE ARMED FORCES

The Function of the Armed Forces. Organized govern­

ment exists for the purpose of bringing into systematic
union the individuals of a State in the attainment of common
ends. Its chief aim is to ensure freedom, prosperity, and
security, in the sphere of social effort. Whatever the ac­
tual form of government, the power and authority of the
State are reposed, temporally, in an individual, or a grouping
of individuals, whatever the process of their selection, whose
voice is the voice of the State. In the prosecution of the
chief aim of organized government, the State crystallizes
the many conflicting desires and views of the people into
policies, internal and external. Internal policies are render­
ed effective by enforcement of the laws of the State.
External policies, if they are to become effective, re­
quire recognition by other States, tacitly or by agreement.
When there is conflict between the policies of one State and
those of another, peaceful means of settlement are usually
sought. If these means, which may collectively be con­
sidered as comprising the field of diplomacy, although cer­
tain of them take the form of collective pressure, finally fail
to settle the point at issue, the State must choose between
abandonment of the policy involved, or resort to war. In
the latter case, imposition of the policy by means of armed
force becomes the objective. Each party to the conflict
seeks thereafter to reduce the hostile will of the other.
The feature which distinguishes war from all other
forms of applied pressure or force, by a State upon another
State, is that, in war, there is resort to physical violence.
War also may employ every other means of pressure known
to man. These other measures, even when accompanied by
physical violence, may not technically constitute war,
although their ultimate effect, as when directed into the
economic field, may be to place the lives of an entire popula­
tion in jeopardy.
By agreement among nations, effort has been made to
discountenance aggressive warfare. But the distinction be­
tween aggression and self-defense is not a matter of agree­
ment. Therefore, war still remains a potential instrument
of national policy. No nation, as yet, is willing to relinquish
the right to employ armed force in resisting aggression, nor
the right to decide what constitutes self-defense. States
4

still retain armed forces as a means of promoting and ex­

panding, as well as of defending, their welfare and interests.
The function of the armed forces is to support and en­
force the dictum of the State, if and when called upon. That
the State may be potentially able successfully to employ
armed force at will is the basis of their retention. Whether
or not war is an ethical institution is not a matter within the
purview of the armed forces.
The broad task which lies before the armed forces is,
therefore, to apply or to threaten physical violence, at
the will of the State. This constitutes the motive of every
military plan of operation, whether it be of a minor contribu­
tory character, carried on by a subordinate commander, or
a major campaign, planned and conducted by the highest
echelon. Since opposition is to be expected, the problem of
the military Commander becomes, primarily, one of applying
power to overcome resistence, or of exerting effort to resist.
The ability to apply power involves initially the possession
of strength, while the actual application of power requires
energy, which is force in operation.
But the effective conduct of war, the final measure
of the ability successfully to employ armed force, is not
assured by the mere arming of the citizenry. The material
factors, arms, munitions, and equipment, indispensable as
they are, are impotent until and unless the human factor, in
its mental, moral, and physical aspects, is employed with
skill. The skillful employment of the human factor in con­
junction with the material, the wielding of the armed
citizenry as an effective weapon, is the goal toward which
the armed forces direct their efforts if their retention is to
be justified.
The effective conduct of war involves the highest ex­
pression of human qualities in the control of the armed
forces, as a whole or in combinations, in executing the will
of the State. It demands a Concept of War, a comprehen­
sive grasp of the general scheme. It requires intimate
knowledge of fundamentals as well as an appreciation of
the capacities and limitations of the Technique, an ability
to fit the practical details into the general scheme in their
true relation thereto.
The Command of the Armed Forces. The need for a
knowledge of fundamentals is not restricted to the hour
of supreme test, when the weapon of the State, the armed
forces, is wielded with hostile purpose. The forging of the
5
weapon, and its preparation for use, are not matters suscept­
ible of deferment until the crucial hour. The exacting re­
quirements of war are essentially such as to preclude the
creation of the requisite intricate instrument by instan­
taneous process. Before war can effectively be conducted,
before the fundamentals can be applied with skill, the mind
of man must have been concentrated upon the problem of
the effective conduct of war. War, while it exists as
a potential instrument of national policy, must be constant­
ly studied by those retained and held in readiness for the
purpose of employing physical violence when the State so
elects.
Organized government recognizes the desirability of
unity of effort in the attainment of purpose, which, there­
fore, requires that Policy and Preparation for the use of
force be coordinated. A Concept of War, by the State, is
essential to such coordination. While military strategy may
determine whether the aims of Policy shall be attained,
Policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or
failure of strategy. Therefore it behooves Policy, not only
to ensure that strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that
the work of strategy shall be allotted adequate means, and
shall be attempted under the most favorable conditions.
The size of the armed forces, in their correct perspec­
tive as a single living instrument, depends upon the reasoned
judgment of the State as to the use which may be required
of the instrument. The character of the instrument is the
special charge of the armed forces. It is their task to weld
the assemblage of armed men supplied by the State into an
harmonious whole, skilled in Technique. The aim is readi­
ness, and the resultant ability to act in unity, unity in pur­
pose and in measure. The initial requisite is an agency
authorized to control and direct. The actual conduct of war
being restricted to its reality, the essential peacetime pro­
cess is training, training of the subordinates in efficient
performance, and, above all, training of those vested with
the authority of the State over the armed forces.
Command directs the armed forces, and is analogous
to the voice of organized government in directing the affairs
of the State. It is vitalized and personified in the Com­
mander, the human directing head, either of the whole, or
of organized groupings, in descending scale of importance.
Its responsibility, during peace, is the perfection of the
instrument to the point of readiness and, during the armed
_ 6 —

conflict, its effective employment.

Effective training for higher Command is necessarily
founded on an understanding of the position occupied by
the Commander, and of the role which he plays. This
understanding is, accordingly, an essential in the study of
that aspect of Command training which has sound decision
for its purpose.
 CHAPTER III

UNITY OF EFFORT

War is a human activity which, although it is

conducted along certain specialized lines, differs in
no fundamental respect from other activities of life which
have in view the accomplishment of definite purposes.
Where individuals are collectively concerned, unity of effort
is the most important single factor contributory to the
common success. The condition sought in a military instru­
ment is that of an harmonious whole, capable of putting
forth combined efforts, intensified in strength because of
the collective feature, and rendered effective by its indivis­
ible characteristic.
Within the limits of human capacity, such an instru­
ment exerts its combined effort with greater effect the more
closely command represents the act of the single com­
petent individual. Authority and responsibility are in­
separably inherent in command and may not be severed, the
one from the other. To divide the supreme command is
to scatter responsibility, and incurs the danger of creating
diffusion of effort at the expense of unity of action.
The dangers of divided command, as when vested in a
body rather than in an individual, have led the military
profession to adopt the method of entrusting command to a
single directive head, while concentrating on the effort, by
careful selection and training of personnel, to ensure that
individuals will be available who are competent for such
duty. While this method is in seeming conflict with the
restriction imposed by the limitation of human capacity,
this difficulty is effectively met through the chain of com­
mand, by means of which the power of authority is trans­
mitted without lessening responsibility.
In the abstract, the chain of command consists of a
series of links, through which authority and power are
transmitted, and by means of which unity of effort is made
possible. The supreme Commander is thus linked with
his successively subordinate Commanders. The forces of
these successively subordinate Commanders are disposed on
a vertical series of steps, conventionally termed echelons.
A Commander, confronted with the need for accom­
plishment of a task, issues a directive, accompanied by the
necessary authority, to the Commander, or Commanders,
of the forces on the next lower echelon, whom he holda

8 —

immediately responsible for its execution without, however,

divesting himself of any part of his initial responsibility.
The directive so issued will involve a task or tasks,
the accomplishment of which will, when combined with the
effective effort of all forces on the same echelon, accomplish
the task of the next higher echelon. The character and
magnitude of the task of the highest echelon involved will
determine the number of echelons required for its accom­
plishment. Whatever the number, a Commander on a
particular echelon occupies the position of an immediate
subordinate to a Commander on the next higher echelon,
and that of an immediate superior with relation to a Com­
mander on the next lower echelon. Within these confines
authority is exercised and responsibilty exacted, both in the
measure calculated to ensure unity of effort.
While there will frequently be found two or more
Commanders occupying coordinate positions on the same
echelon, all with the same immediate superior, nevertheless,
in no case will a Commander be answerable to more
than one immediate superior. Thus is fulfilled the re­
quirement that the command, although relatively narrower
in scope as the scale descends, be reposed in a single directive
head. Coordinate commanders on the same echelon are
rendered necessary when the task of the immediate superior
is of such nature as to require subdivision into component
parts, the accomplishment of all being a requisite to the
accomplishment of the whole.
A chain of command is not created by the subdivision
of the officer corps into grades on a basis of relative rank.
Such subdivision is for the purpose of classification from the
standpoint of potential competency and capacity for respon­
sibility, and carries no authority to command by virtue of
rank alone. Organization, systematized connection for a
specific purpose, is first necessary.
A Fleet, or an Army, is a permanent major organiza­
tion, adminstered and trained during peace for the specific
purpose ofattaining and maintaining readiness to employ
armed force at the will of the State. From the several
grades of the officer corps, a permanent chain of command is
instituted by the process of organization, the supreme com­
mand being reposed in the Commander-in-Chief, the single
directive head. The basis of the permanent organization is
that chosen as best suited to accomplish the purpose, and re­
quires consideration of many contributory factors, such as
9
the types of weapons and vessels, their intended uses and
their capabilities, severally and in combination. Whatever
the basis, the chain of command exists as a distinctive and
essential feature.
The ideal permanent organization would permit of
transition from peace to war without change. Experience
has shown, however, that the armed forces may be expected
to perform a great variety of tasks during war, and that the
range covered by the nature and scope of these tasks will
require that, on occasion, the permanent organization be
temporarily reorganized on the basis of such tasks. The
resultant Task Organizations will be composed of Task
Forces which may include several types of vessels in com­
binations, and of fighting strength commensurate with the
calculated requirements of the tasks. The establishment of
a Task Organization places in effect a chain of command,
applicable to that organization during its continuance and,
in its relationship of authority and responsibility, estab­
lishes the necessary systematized connection for the
accomplishment of the Task in hand.
The chain of command thus provides the necessary
linkage, but does not of itself ensure either that the
command will be adequate, or that unity of effort will result.
The first of these requirements will be met if there be pre­
sent, in the person of each Commander, the ability
to direct the operations of that echelon, together
with an appreciation of the position that he occupies in his
relationship to his immediate superior, on the one hand,
and to his own immediate subordinates, on the other.
If, in each echelon, there be complete grasp of the
involvements of this relationship, the foundation for intelli­
gent cooperation will have been laid and the first step on the
path leading to unity of effort will have been taken. The
goal will have been reached when there shall have been
established a state of mutual understanding, within and be­
tween the echelons, to the extent that each subordinate com­
mander, throughout the chain, will, in the absence of specific
instructions, not only act instinctively as his immediate
superior, if present, would have him act, but will intelli­
gently cooperate with Commanders occupying coordinate
positions on the same echelon. Mutual loyalty, born of
mutual confidence, will be the direct result. Initiative, with­
in the limits of authority and resultant respon­
sibility, will follow, and the acts of the lowest echelon Com­
— 10 —

 mander will be in accordance with the desires of the highest.

This, in effect, will constitute unity of effort brought about
by command vested in a single directive head.
The relation between immediate superior and
immediate subordinate, in the chain of command, is the
ideal medium for the exercise of authority in accom­
plishing unity of effort, that prime requisite of an
effective military instrument. Each echelon, in adher­
ing to its own Purpose, which is the Task of the Decision
of the immediate superior, should be able to do so with
confidence that it is thereby serving the plan of the entire
force. It is by loyalty to its Purpose that each echelon
renders loyalty to the plan.
The incontestable right of a Commander, because of the
responsibility which he shoulders, to deal directly with
any of his subordinates, without reference to the chain of
command, is not challenged because of the existence of this
ideal medium. That circumstances may arise where such
action will be necessary is a recognized fact. The re­
sponsible Commander will, however, be fully aware of the
possibilities of the effect of such action upon unity of effort
and, whenever the state of the emergency permits, will
keep the intervening subordinate Commanders advised of
the action he has taken.
To establish a state of mutual understanding is a
prime obligation of command. Both the necessary process
and the final result are sometimes known as indoctrination.
This is a term which requires circumspection in its use,
as well as recognition of the fact that it covers every phase
and activity of the military profession. In each such activ­
ity, many of which extend into the technical field, a common
viewpoint as to the broad application of fundamentals is an
essential to unity of effort in that specific activity. It fol­
lows that the possession of a common viewpoint, with re­
spect to a particular activity, does not constitute indoctrina­
tion in its broad sense. It is scarcely possible for a human
individual to be indoctrinated with respect to every military
activity.
As the scale ascends, the viewpoint broadens, and
details become more and more excluded, because of the
increased scope of the problems presented. The experience
gained, and the knowledge acquired, during earlier service in
the lower echelons, provide a basis for later expansion of
viewpoint, an understanding of the position occupied by the
— 11 —

subordinate as well as that of the obligations of higher

command which include reliance on the subordinate.
In the higher echelons, staff assistance is. provided
in order that the Commander may be left free to
consider matters in their major aspects. The staff of a
Commander is, however, not a part of the chain of com­
mand, and exercises no independent authority.
The word indoctrination carries the dual meaning of
"the act of indoctrination," and "the state of being indoc­
trinated." In common with the word doctrine, it has its
root in the Latin verb which means "to teach". A doctrine,
in its pure meaning, is that which is taught, or set forth for
acceptance or belief. It does not follow that a doctrine is
necessarily sound, nor that it is founded on conviction reach­
ed as the result of intelligent thought. In the premises,
therefore, indoctrination, to be along useful lines, should be
based upon sound doctrine, which imposes the further re­
quirement that that which is taught flow from sound
'philosophy, i. e., be rooted in fundamentals.
The encouragement of a belief, by means of the spread
of a doctrine, is not necessarily inspired by good motives.
The preaching of doctrine known to be false is a conceivable
procedure. But, whatever the motive and whether the
doctrine be sound or false, the act of indoctrination has as
its purpose consolidation of the opinion of those taught, with
the ultimate end in view of bringing about unity of effort,
and reaping the benefit thereof.
A doctrine, as such, is a teaching on a specific topic,
in either a narrow or a broad field. Doctrine, as distin­
guished from a doctrine, includes all doctrines, primarily
those of all fields and, specifically, those of a particular
field. It is rather important that this distinction be under­
stood because, if the doctrine of a particular field, in the
collective sense, is to be sound, it follows that no single un­
sound nor unrelated doctrine be permitted in the doctrine
of that field. This, it may be observed, requires that
all teachings, all opinions which may be advanc­
ed, be scrutinized, first from the standpoint of their validity
and, finally, with a view to determining the practicability
or usefulness of their application in a particular field, and,
therefore, their right to be included in the doctrine of that
field. In a broad field, made up of several correlated fields,
the total effort will thus more nearly approach a state of
unity if no fallacious doctrines are permitted to creep into,
— 12 —

nor be accepted in, any of the particular fields involved.

The broad field under discussion herein is that of the
conduct of war, in which are concerned numerous particular
fields or activities. If the conduct of war is to be effective,
the parts to be played in each particular field should not only
be effective, per se, but should also bear the correct relation
to the whole, as well as to each other. From these consider­
ations there has followed the common acceptance of the view
that military doctrine, the collective teachings of the military
profession, are properly rooted in a common Concept of War,
a comprehensive view of the general scheme, its purpose,
and its involvements.
From a common Concept of War, the reasoned beliefs
of the military profession, as to the best general methods of
waging a particular war, may be expected more nearly to
approach unanimity. The same applies to the methods to
be pursued in the several phases and operations of the war.
Each will present its own problem, and each is likely to in­
volve forces in combinations. Unity of effort is more likely
to ensue if the general strategical and tactical methods to
be employed by each force, singly and in combination, have
their basis in a common concept of command. Only on
such a basis can unity of effort survive under conditions of
stress, when communications fail and prior specific instruc­
tions no longer apply.
Under conditions such as these, the Commander may
be forced to the conclusion that his assigned Task requires
modification or alteration. Being without communication
facilities, he takes action according to the dictates of his
own judgment and, if he believes it to be necessary, departs
from his instructions. He realizes that, in so doing, he
accepts the gravest of military responsibilities, while
further recognizing the fact that to fail to take the
indicated action will evidence a lack of the higher qualities
of judgment, initiative, and loyalty. He will, of course,
inform his superior of his action at the first available oppor­
tunity but, in the meantime, he will have been enabled to
act intelligently and fearlessly because of the existence of
a common concept.
Military doctrine provides the substance of a common
concept. Of its two forms, the first, instruction, has as its
purpose the existence of the second, knowledge. Indoctrina­
tionf the existence of a common and universal knowledge,
is the goal sought, alike in each particular field and in the
— 13 —
conduct of war as a whole, in order to further unity of
effort. That this indoctrination may be along correct lines,
it is essential that it represent a sound philosophy, i.e., be
rooted in truth. Such indoctrination becomes effective
through the establishment of mutual understanding. This
mutual understanding, initially important to the transmis­
sion of the superior's viewpoint and its absorption by the
subordinate, attains its final aim when, the superior being
unable to act in time, subordinates can be relied on to
cooperate effectively with each other.
The power at the disposal of the armed forces is made
up of moral, mental, and physical constituents.
The moral elements include those qualities of courage,
loyalty, simplicity, and the like, which are reflections of
character. The maintenance of high ethical standards
and the development of military character, while primarily
involving the individual, are distinct responsibilities of
command. No less is this true as to the mental qualifica­
tions for leadership in the effective employment of fighting
power.
As to the physical elements, it is to be noted that, if
the task is to be performed successfully, the problem be­
comes one of bringing physical constituents of fighting
strength to bear upon the enemy at such times, at such
places, and to such an extent, as will accomplish a predeter­
mined end in view. But while an overall superiority in the
physical elements may actually prove to be the deciding
factor in a protracted struggle, its mere possession may not
of itself ensure this. Success in applying power is further­
ed by skillful effort.
A skillful blend, a judicious compound of the moral,
mental, and physical, to a degree superior to that of the
enemy under a given set of circumstances, is the goal to be
sought, in order to ensure successful outcome.
The attainment of unity of effort requires, therefore,
an understanding of fundamentals, a basic Concept of War
which is not only sound but also common to all Commanders
of the chain of command.

14 —

 PART II

THE BASIS OF SOUND MILITARY DECISION

— 15 —

 CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY VALUE OF A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF

REASONING
The normal human being naturally takes deliberate
action only after employing, often insensibly, a
mental process which follows a certain clearly-defined course.
A circumstance, or a combination of circumstances, gives
rise to a perplexity. If, in the digestion of facts and infor­
mation surrounding the circumstances, there is seen to be
necessity for action, there follows a recognition or grasp of
the end to be attained by an effective solution of the problem
Involved. There then begins an evaluation and balancing of
the factors which enter, after which suggested solutions
occur to mind. Following an evaluation of these, the most
promising is selected, and action proceeds on that basis.
The soundness of the conclusion thus reached
Is variously influenced. With a background of adequate
knowledge and experience, ability to solve a prob­
lem is limited only by the native intellectual en­
dowment of the individual concerned. That an individual
falls short is not necessarily an indication that
the limit of native endowment has been reached, but, more
frequently, is because latent powers have not been utilized.
The best means of reaching sound decision is system­
atic thought which employs logic as its machinery. This
process separates the rational from the irrational course,
through the facing of facts and the weighing of values.
By its insistent employment, dormant powers of reasoning
are awakened, and the danger that attends instinctive,
spontaneous, or impulsive acceptance of conclusions is
lessened.
A prime requisite for reaching logical decision is, there­
fore, the calculated utilization of the intellectual powers
bestowed by nature: i. e., a studied development of each step
by which the normal human mind passes from recognition
of a necessity for action to the ultimate conviction as to the
best course to pursue. Through the deliberate practice of
expending meditative, reflective, and imaginative effort in
weighing the factors involved in each step, the faculty of
arriving swiftly at accurate conclusions is strengthened,
and made more readily available for use when time is an
element of immediate concern.

—16 —
 The potential) value of a military organization is
augmented by its capacity to act unitedly. Unity of
effort will be promoted if individual officers adopt a uniform
method of reasoning in reaching their decisions.
The use of a standard form is conducive to uniform­
ity of reasoning. It is designed to focus attention upon
essentials, and to ensure that nothing bearing on a situation
is overlooked. It guides thought along a specific path, and,
through the influence of suggestion, deliberately increases
the expenditure of mental effort, thus stimulating mental
power. '
The Estimate of the Situation provides for formu­
lated logical reasoning. It is technically adapted to the
solution of military problems, and designed to assist the
Commander in reaching a sound decision. It is applicable
both in war and in peace, and differs from the natural men­
tal solution of the problems of every-day life only in its
studied insistence that the factors peculiar to the conduct
of war receive thorough, analytical treatment from, the
professional standpoint. This is a consideration of vital
importance to those of the military profession, upon whose
actions great issues may hinge.
The form contributes to the decision itself only to the
extent that it provides an outline for systematic analysis
and reasoning. On a fundamental basis of earnest thought,
mental ability, character, knowledge, and experience, finally
rests the soundness of decision.
Steps in the Estimate. With the foregoing considera­
tions in mind, there are incorporated in the Estimate of
the Situation six successive steps as follows:
I. The Mission.
II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.
III. Enemy Courses of Action.
IV. Commander's Own Courses of Action.
V. Determination of Commander's Best Course of Action.
VI. The Decision.
At the end of the pamphlet will be found a folder
which, for ready reference, shows the Steps in the Estimate
in expanded form. The Details of the Estimate, together
with preliminary matter which provides the essential basis
of sound military decision, are covered in the succeeding
pages.

— 17 —
 CHAPTER V
PRINCIPLES AS GUIDES TO LOGICAL THOUGHT
In the effort to shape logical thought, the mind instinc­
tively seeks valid guides to assist in reaching its decisions.
Such valid guides are provided by principles.
The word principle, like many others, has several
meanings. It is derived, however, from the Latin prin­
cipiwn, a beginning, and its basic meaning is a source,
origin, or cause.
A Principle, since a cause implies an effect,
therefore establishes a correct relation between cause
and effect. The continuing study of human activities
and their environment, the recognition that these
are governed by natural laws, has established a relation­
ship between certain characteristics, both of living things
and their environment, and a resulting condition or state
of affairs.
In the mathematical sciences it has been made possible
to state the relation between cause and effect in terms of
exact formulae. In other sciences a definite relationship
between cause and effect has likewise, in many cases, been
established, although not always with mathematical exact­
ness. The field is broader, and greater difficulty is exper­
ienced in isolating the cause.
In the mental field there is considerably greater dif­
ficulty in establishing a definite relationship between cause
and effect. The human element has been found not to
lend itself to analysis as readily as is the case in the
mathematical and physical fields. The advance in the
psychological and sociological sciences is not so marked,
and the actions and reactions of the mind of man have not
yet proved to be susceptible of reduction to exact formulae.
Nevertheless, man, in his intuitive search for valid guides
for his own action, has been able, with the advance of time,
greatly to improve his own lot through the medium of the
scientific approach to human problems.
Science is knowledge gained, verified, and classified by
means of observation and correct thinking. The aim is, of
course, to make the result exact, but the exactness of the re­
sult necessarily depends upon the facts which have so far
come to light. Consequently, there is great variation in the
exactness which actually characterizes the various sciences.
If it be maintained that only those studies which have re­

— 18 —

suited in exact conclusions may properly be called sciences,

then it can hardly be said that many sciences, now regarded
as such, exist; for the findings of medicine, biology, chem­
istry, and even physics, are constantly being revised in the
light of new data.
A patient study of the facts associated with the con­
duct of past wars has resulted in a mass of coordinated
knowledge, from which general conclusions have been reach­
ed as to the causes of success or failure. In addition, war
necessarily makes use of knowledge gained through a study
of human endeavor in all other fields. For these reasons,
it is true of war as of many other studies, that its investiga­
tion is a continuing and evolving thing, not a closed book as
to which it may be said that final exact results have been
attained, and that there is no more to be learned.
War, like all other human activities, has two aspects:
the search for, and the classification of, knowledge in regard
to war is one aspect; the practice of war, the application of
this knowledge to meet actual situations, is another. The
assembly of a tested body of knowledge as to war constitutes
the science of war. The application of this knowledge is
war, the art. The purpose of developing the science of war
is to make more effective the practice of the art of war. As
in medicine, or any other practical activity, the more inclu­
sive and dependable the body of knowledge as a basis for
action, the more probable is it that the application of this
knowledge will be characterized by skill.
Since the earliest days, man has linked cause and
effect, for his own benefit, without the knowledge necessary
to justify the enunciation of a principle. His attempt to
formulate such relationship is evidenced by the existence, in
records of great antiquity, of rules of action expressed as
proverbs, maxims, and adages.
Pithy statements, because of their terseness and sim­
plicity, continue to appeal to man. But the trained, inquiring
mind, which substitutes logical reasoning for trial and error,
does not accept such statements until their validity has been
proved, and their universal truth established. When the
relationship between cause and effect has been demonstrated
to be always true, its statement becomes a valid rule, and is
properly accepted as a principle, in the light of the know­
ledge of the day.
The inevitable tendency of man to seek valid guides

— 19 —
for action is not always accompanied, then, by an equal care
that these guides shall express the whole truth. The saying
that "the exception proves the rule" might better be stated
"an exception tests a rule and indicates that it is to that
extent incomplete." To rely upon rules of action/ which do
not express the whole truth, is to court the danger of en­
countering an exception which may entail serious conse­
quences. Consequently, the use of such rules implies the
necessity of recognizing cases to which the rule is not
applicable. But this runs counter to the human conditions,
such as are normal in war, when nervous strain, and the
urgency of events, make rapid and accurate thinking most
difficult.
The value of rules known to be inexpressive of the
whole truth lies in the fact that they present possible meth­
od of action which may sometimes be appropriate. Danger
lies in the fact that they may fail to give proper emphasis to
other methods which may be more appropriate in certain
cases; they may fail, therefore, to present a balanced view
of the entire problem. Such a balanced view of the possi­
bilities involved requires that a valid rule invite attention
to all the factors which may influence the result desired.
The human tendency to condense the essence of several
principles into a single covering word, which is the equiva­
lent of applying general treatment to specific cases regard­
less of circumstances, has been known not only to cause
confusion, but to result in a failure to recognize the
principle.
For example, the single word surprise (among
others) has sometimes been used as the designation of a
principle of war, and misunderstanding has resulted. On the
one hand, it has been denied that surprise embodies a prin­
ciple, the reason being advanced that it is not always neces­
sary, nor even desirable, to employ surprise. On the other
hand, the acceptance of the word surprise, as itself express­
ing a universal truth, has been known to result in the belief
that surprise is always essential to success. Thus there have
resulted distortions of the simple fact that a relationship
exists between the employment of the unexpected, and the
creation of a disadvantage which will hamper an opponent.
The correct formulation of a principle, or of several princi­
ciples, governing the employment of surprise, will result in a
definite statement that its appropriate employment is de­

— 20 —

pendent upon the various elements, or factors, that

make up the situation, the influence of each of which
must be evaluated in each separate situation.
The same observations apply, in general, to other sub­
stantive expressions which, collectively and at the hands of
several independent authorities, have been advanced as
constituting, together with Surprise, an epitome of the Prin­
ciples of War. Subject to minor differences in designation,
these other covering substantives are The Objective, Super­
iority, The Offensive, Economy of Force, Movement, Co­
operation, Security, and Simplicity.
Certainly the list includes no item which, in the
abstract, may not properly be considered as a possibly vital
factor, from the strategical and tactical standpoints. But
that there are no other vital factors can scarcely be ac­
cepted as final. Even if this objection could be removed
by the inclusion of other factors well known to be vital,
the fact would still remain that these expressions, stand­
ing alone, fail to satisfy the real need of indicating,
practically, the utilization of the concepts which they are
intended to imply. In fact, they do no more than provide
a useful point of origin for further inquiry, and, when
understood on this basis, possess great inherent value.
The danger, however, of their application to circumstances,
without due circumspection, lies in the fact that, in any
particular situation, they do not necessarily carry equal
weight. If this view be accepted, it will be seen that
certain of these factors may, after mature deliberation,
be rejected, or relegated to a relatively inferior position,
without violation of principle.
The formulation of a principle consists, therefore, of
the determination of the causes that generate a particular
effect, and the expression of the resultant relationship, as
accurately as possible, as a proportion. In mathematics
the proportion may represent an exact balance; its state­
ment may be an exact formula. In other realms, the pro­
portion cannot be so exact, but the fundamental idea of
relationship between certain results and certain causes is
nevertheless present.
The methods of science, which follow the lines of re­
current analysis, hypothesis, theory, and test, have been the
means of reaching the conclusion that both causes and
results, in general, are made up of a combination of factors.

— 21

The factors which are known to have vital bearing upon a

general result, condition, or state of affairs, become fun­
damental considerations when it is desired to arrive at a
generally similar result under a specific set of circum­
stances. This is true because failure to afford due con­
sideration to all such factors may be the means of vitiating
the effort. When, however, each factor is weighed in
connection with other contributory factors which, during
the process, suggest themselves, a conclusion is made
possible, the integrity of which will be conditioned only by
the extent and skillful utilization of the knowledge available.
Human effort to attain an end is governed by the
effect desired, the means to be employed and to be encoun­
tered in arriving at this result, and the conditions that are
likely to be met with during the operation. And, if there
be any choice in the matter, the consequences as to costs will
require consideration.
The following may, therefore, be stated as principles
of human effort to attain an end:
(1) In seeking a desired effect, the nature and
character of the effort required is dependent upon the effect
desired, the means available and in opposition, the condi­
tions existing in the theater of action, and the consequences
as to costs.
(2) The means to be allotted in seeking a desired
effect are dependent upon the character of the effect desired,
the total means available, the means in opposition, the con­
ditions existing in the theater of action, and the conse­
quences as to costs.
From these fundamental principles many others of a
subsidiary or contributory nature may be deduced. The
requirements to be met in formulating such guides are two:
first, that, to be valid guides, they express a condition which
will encounter no exception in the field which they purport
to cover; second, that, to be practical guides, they invite
attention to the factors to be analyzed, if the effect desired
is to be produced.
An operation of war differs from any other human
activity only in the character of the factors which enter.
There is always seen to be an end to be attained. The
means to be employed, and the conditions that may be en­
countered are to be weighed and considered, as are the
consequences of success or failure. But, in the conduct of

— 22 —

war, masses of human beings, equipped with death-dealing

instruments, oppose each other with hostile purpose. The
object throughout is to place the opponent in disadvan­
tageous circumstances through the creation or mainten­
ance, for one's self, of a favorable military situation.
This is the distinguishing feature which injects into the
estimate of a military situation the necessity for considera­
tion of factors peculiar to evolution and maneuver, move­
ment by land, sea, and air, and the demands of the technique
essential to the imposition of physical violence.
Technique. A recognition of the true value
and nature of principles is not, however, in itself sufficient
to ensure correct action in war. There is required also the
ability to evolve appropriate methods for utilizing the means
available. In any particular human activity, the details of
employing the means constitute the technique of that
activity.

— 23

 CHAPTER VI

THE CONSTITUENTS OF ALL MILITARY PROBLEMS

The Situation. As hereinbefore observed, the Esti­
mate of the Situation is the mental process employed in
solving military problems. The problem is embraced in the
situation and the incentive to change or maintain it. The
term situation, standing alone, is the combination of circum­
stances which gives character to the problem. The incentive
is a recognition of the necessity for action. When the
incentive to action has been supplied by the Commander's
immediate superior, the problem may be said to be basic.
In such case, the situation also may be termed basic.
In any situation involving opposing armed forces, the
problem, from the standpoint of either opponent, is a matter
of maintaining existing conditions, or of bringing about
a change, with a definite end in view, an objective,
in both cases. The character of the action taken,
if action is to be effective, will follow lines calculated
to shape the ensuing progressive changes in circumstances
toward the attainment of the end in view. The measures
taken will be ineffective if they do not support the
calculated line of endeavor, i.e., if they are not adequate
forcibly to shape the course of events either toward the
creation of a desired new situation, or the maintenance of
the original conditions.
In broad outline, an actual military situation is always
likely to present a picture of opposing collections of human
beings, each collection possessed of fighting strength, and
each either concentrated or distributed in several localities
which occupy relative positions, each to the other. The
picture thus presented, when coupled with an appreciation
of the end in view, is the basis of an Estimate from which
a Decision is to flow. This Decision determines the nature
of the action to be taken, the extent and duration of the
action being dependent upon the character and import of
the situation, which may be critical or otherwise.
Successive situations may be expected to present
themselves as action progresses, with the enemy exerting
his influence or otherwise, as the case may be.
The concern of the Commander is to control the
unfolding of the original situation, to the end that he may
attain the effect he desires.
This requires that he keep in constant touch with
— 24 —
developments, and presupposes his ability to recognize and
grasp their import. The process becomes continuous if
the Commander customarily keeps a running estimate of
the situation, which may be mental or written according to
the demands of the situation. In those echelons of command
provided with staff assistance, this is the appropriate duty
of the staff, under the supervision of the Commander.
The Mission. When a basic situation is under esti­
mate, the will of the superior, the incentive to action, is
contained in the Mission.
From the broad viewpoint, a state of war constitutes
a situation faced by one nation as the result of a decision
to employ force in order to impose a policy upon another.
To attain this end in view, i.e., to achieve the National
Purpose, it is necessary to reduce the hostile will
to resist. The latter is the National Task. The
National Mission then becomes: To reduce the hostile will
by force in order to impose, or to prevent the imposition
of, the policy in question. Thus, at the first stage, a Mis­
sion, properly formulated, is seen to include a Task, and
also a Purpose the accomplishment of which is served by
that Task.
With the national Mission as a basis, the State now
estimates the national situation and arrives at a national
Decision, which should represent the best method of re­
ducing the hostile will. The Task of the Decision adopted by
the State for the accomplishment of the national Mission
has, as its Purpose, the Task of that Mission, which is to
reduce the hostile will by force.
In accordance with this Decision, all of the primary
subdivisions of the national organization are now assigned
specific Tasks whose sum is designed to achieve
the national Task, as expressed in the Decision.
Each such Task has the national Task as its Purpose and
thus each primary sub-division of the Government is pro­
vided with a Mission.
In like manner, each echelon of the military command
is governed, in its action, by the Decision resulting from an
estimate of the basic situation applicable to that echelon,
which situation narrows in scope as the scale descends.
The basic situation which usually confronts the highest
echelon is that military feature of the National Situation
which requires action by the High Command if favorable
consequences are to be the outgrowth. As in the case of
— 25 —
the State, the Decision of the High Command may be
expected to include the resolution of the major military
situation into more restricted situations, basic for each of
the commanders of the next lower echelon. Each of these
commanders is thus presented with a problem, consisting of
his own situation coupled with the task assigned him. All
of these immediately subordinate commanders have, there­
fore, been provided with Missions, the common Purpose
being the Task of the Decision of the High Command.
As a subordinate, the Commander is thus responsible
to his immediate superior for the execution of an assigned
Task. He may also, however, occupy the position of an
immediate superior to certain Commanders on a lower eche­
lon, and, as such immediate superior, can scarcely expect to
receive, in full measure, the intelligent support of his own
subordinate commanders unless he makes clear to them the
nature of the Task to which he himself is committed, — in
effect, makes known to them the Purpose which is to guide
them.
The responsibility of the immediate superior, in the
matter of ensuring that his subordinate commanders under­
stand the Purpose of their assigned Tasks, is in no respect
less than that which falls upon the subordinate commanders
in the execution of their own assignments. By the very
act of failing to provide his subordinate commanders with a
Purpose, by whatever means, an immediate superior oper­
ates to subject his own Task to risk of failure.
The word Mission is a derivative of the Latin verb
"to send." Its use implies the act of sending, or of being
sent, as an agent for some special duty, a duty imposed by
someone in authority. While it is true that an individual,
who is otherwise free to do so, may select his own Mission
and thereby send himself on a special duty, this is not the
case, except in a restricted sense, where an effective military
chain of command is involved. There, the sending authority
is the immediate superior; the agent, the immediate sub­
ordinate.
The Mission is not to be confused with subsidiary
tasks which may be either self-imposed or assigned during
the progress of operations. The Mission, once assigned,
becomes thenceforth a governing influence of all
actions on the part of the subordinate, unless legitimately
changed or until the Task is accomplished, i.e., until the

26

ultimate objective is attained.

The objective is the effect desired, the end in view, the
result to be attained. The attainment of an objective is
equivalent to the accomplishment of a task. The attain­
ment of the ultimate objective involves the accomplishment
of the Task of the Mission. The attainment of an immed­
iate objective involves the immediate accomplishment of a
task contributory, or subsidiary, to the Task of the Mission.
Whatever the nature of the problem, the soundness of the
Decision of every Estimate of the Situation is dependent
upon an initial clear visualization of the objective.
The attainment of every military objective involves
the creation or maintenance of a favorable military situa­
tion, in whole or in part. It follows that every military
problem is concerned with an evaluation of the factors
which enter if a favorable military situation is to be
created or maintained. A knowledge of the elements of a
favorable military situation is a requisite to intelligent
evaluation of such factors.

— 27 —

 CHAPTER VII

THE ELEMENTS OF A FAVORABLE MILITARY

SITUATION.

In general, a military situation may be regarded as

favorable to one opponent if, with the direction or geograph­
ical trend of his effort definitely established, the position
which he occupies is advantageous in its relation to that of
the enemy; if his fighting strength is so disposed and appor­
tioned as to provide the requisite strength at points likely
to be decisive, without undue weakening of other vital
points; and if his further movements and actions, in seeking
the effect desired, are unhampered by obstacles with which
he is unable to cope.
The elements of a favorable miltary situation and,
therefore, the requirements to be met by the action taken
in establishing such situation, are:
The Correct Physical Objective,
Favorable Relative Position,
Effective Apportionment of Fighting Strength,
The Ensurance of Freedom of Action.
Each of these elements receives separate treatment
in the succeeding pages. It will, however, be realized that
there is an intimate relationship among them, and that
their interdependence may not properly be disregarded in
considering the military situation as a whole. It will also
be appreciated that these elements, singly and collectively,
are dependent upon the universal determinants of the
effect desired.
THE PHYSICAL OBJECTIVE
Hitherto, the objective has been treated as a mental
concept. Military usage, however, assigns to the term objec­
tive an additional meaning, a meaning exclusively concrete.
Results in war are obtained by the actual or threatened use
of physical force, and this prime consideration requires that
effort be directed against something tangible, some physical
element of the enemy's fighting strength. This, the physical
objective, is always at some location in space, while, as
noted above, the objective which indicates the end in view
is a mental concept. The objective being "the destruction
of the enemy battleship," the physical objective is "the
enemy battleship."
Merely to designate the physical objective does not

— 28 —
always constitute an adequate statement of the objective
for the reason that, unless the character of the effort be
included, such designation does not embody a Task. Both
"the observation of the enemy battleship" and "the destruc­
tion of the enemy battleship" are suitable objectives,
depending upon circumstances. Where, however, the attend­
ant circumstances are such as clearly to indicate the effect
desired, the designation of the physical objective may well
constitute the statement of the objective.
As used herein, the word objective, unqualified, means
the mental objective. Where necessary for clarity, the
character of the effort being undefined, the tangible focus
of effort is denoted the physical objective.
The physical objective occupies a sharply-defined
position in warfare in that it establishes the physical basis
of the Task and indicates the geographical direction of the
effort.
It is not unlikely that the Task assigned a Commander
will designate a physical objective. This should have been
judiciously selected by the immediate superior, after con­
sideration of the requirements of his own assigned task,
and will take the form of something concrete which, if
destroyed, occupied, or otherwise dealt with, will further the
accomplishment of that task. It is equally likely that the
Commander, assigned a Task involving a physical objective,
will himself find that the successful accomplishment of that
Task will also involve the selection of one or more additional
physical objectives.
With the understanding that the selection of a physi­
cal objective must initially satisfy the requirements of
the Task, it may be found that the selection of a single
physical objective will not fulfill these requirements. In­
stead, a series of physical objectives may have to be dealt
with in succession, and the selection, therefore, will neces­
sarily include such a series. Such a case might occur where
a campaign has been decided upon and it has been seen that
successive steps or stages are necessary features. The
planned termination of each such step or stage may be
marked by the successful application of effort against a
physical objective.
The specific nature of a physical objective is dependent
upon the character and scope of a particular situation. Its
range will extend from the enemy's organized forces as a
whole to the physical body of an individual combatant, and
— 29 —

in this range will be included all manner of physical con­

stituents of enemy fighting strength, singly and in com­
binations : troops, ships, geographical points, lines^ and
areas, fortifications, supplies, and the like.
Such physical objective may take the form of a fixed
geographical position the occupancy of which, because of
its inherent advantages, may be foreseen as an essential
preliminary to the inauguration of the next stage. Such a
position may initially be merely a point in the ocean, the
occupancy of which may be uncontested, but beyond which it
has been deemed unwise to proceed without further informa­
tion. Not infrequently, the armed forces of the enemy may
constitute the physical objective against which successful ef­
fort must be applied before a further physical objective can
be dealt with.
This latter contingency, that of enemy opposition, may
operate to place the selection of an immediate physical
objective on an indeterminable basis at the time when the
original estimate is drawn, and may require the Commander
to defer his choice until the situation has become more
fully developed. His choice as to his ultimate physical
objective is not, however, necessarily affected because of
this. As is observed elsewhere herein, a Commander is
scarcely justified in projecting his operations, in detail,
any further into the future than his estimate of the basic
situation assures him of freedom of action within reasonable
limits. For instance, his assigned Task may be to occupy a
certain harbor for use as a base. Such harbor is his
physical objective, both immediate and ultimate if there are
no obstacles to prevent or interrupt the operations, but
ultimate only, and not immediate, if delaying obstacles are
encountered. The armed forces of the enemy fall into the
latter category, and may become the immediate physical
objective if they stand as an obstacle to the undisputed
occupancy of the harbor.
It is true that the armed forces of the enemy, until
removed from the path, stand, in war, as an obstacle to
the attainment of the purpose of the State. In this broad
sense they constitute the legitimate and proper ultimate
physical objective of the opposing armed forces. It is also
true that the armed forces of the enemy may be present as
obstacles in the way of any hostile operations, and, from
this viewpoint, are therefore likely to be a proper immediate
objective. But these facts do not restrict the Commander,
— 30 —

in his choice of a physical objective, to the armed forces of

the enemy, nor require him to search out and destroy such
armed forces before directing his effort toward a geographi­
cal objective, the occupancy.' of which will further his
Task, and to which occupancy the enemy is seen to be
incapable of presenting opposition. Thus, while the armed
forces of the enemy may frequently present appropriate
physical objectives, this is not always the case. The aspects
of the situation and The Mission are the determinants.
It will be appreciated that the immediate objective
may change several times during the course of an operation,
and this is particularly to be expected in a naval tactical
engagement of considerable scope. While the enemy fleet,
as a whole, is likely to be the ultimate physical objective of
the opposing fleet when considered collectively, the com­
ponent parts of each fleet, the types of vessels and their
combinations, may, from time to time, find in their op­
ponents a variety of immediate objectives, the particular
identity of which can scarcely be predicted with assurance.
It is here that the importance of correct selection of the
objective stands out in boldest relief.
The Commander may sometimes properly direct
his effort against more than one physical objective, either
simultaneously or successively.
Prematurely to disclose the identity of a selected
physical objective is a military error. By appearing to
operate against more than one objective, the Commander
may lead the enemy to overstrain his resources in the
effort to protect them all, and thus reduce the resistance
to be encountered in dealing with the specific objective
which is already, or finally will be, selected.
RELATIVE POSITION
The theater of a military operation provides a basis
for the movement of the mobile forces concerned,
and exerts an important influence upon the shaping of
events. Island formations may be valuable, to one oppo­
nent or the other, because of the capacity and security of
their harbors. Other localities may have been developed
as repair, replenishment, or supply bases, while still others
may be a source of essential raw materials. Certain points
may be heavily fortified. In general, each natural character­
istic merits consideration as a potential means of facilitat­
ing or obstructing movement, and of providing opportunity
— 31 —

for offense, defense, and support.

Of even greater importance than the inherent military
value of the several features of the theater may be the
relative position which each such feature occupies with
respect to the other features, and to the location of the
mobile forces involved. The logistics of a military move­
ment, of whatever scope, constitutes a problem which begins
when the plan is in process of formulation, and ends only
when the necessity for sustaining the movement, and for
retaining the position gained, no longer exists. Ships
are incapable of providing the necessities of life
and the implements of warfare beyond the capacity
built into them. Naval operations which extend
beyond the limits of such capacity must cease unless
replenishment and support, possible only from land sources,
are provided. From the standpoint of supply, strategic
movements by sea are, therefore, vitally associated with
fixed position^on land* and their relation to the area of
operations.
The same observation applies to the State, which,
because of economic vulnerability with respect to certain
essential raw materials, may be compelled to seek support
from outside sources lest supplies on hand become exhaust­
ed. In both cases, great importance attaches to the
geographical location of a source of supply in its relation to
a required point of delivery.
The relative positions occupied, or susceptible of
occupancy, by the mobile forces, are matters which demand
constant and intelligent attention during hostilities. Being
fruitful sources of advantage or disadvantage, such relative
positions assume primary importance where enemy forces
are concerned, but are scarcely of less importance from the
standpoint of the correct apportionment and stationing of
the several subdivisions of one's own forces. Serious errors
in the latter regard may result in inability to furnish sup­
port where needed and in consequent punishment or isola­
tion of one or more valuable detachments. This feature is
emphasized during periods of actual tactical contact, for it
is then that the successful delivery of the decisive thrust
is greatly furthered by the occupancy and maintenance of
favorable relative position.
Movement is the medium by which changes of position
are brought about. Speed is the rate at which movement
takes place. The elements to be reckoned with are, there­
— 32 —

fore, time and space, and in skillful utilization of these

elements lies the successful employment of relative position
in the creation or maintenance of a favorable military
situation.
Considerations of maximum capacity for speed repre­
sent the maximum of possibilities so far as movement and
changes in position within a time limit are concerned. A
knowledge of maximum speed potentialities, one's own and
those of the enemy, is required if changes in position are to
be made intelligently. A knowledge of the variety of
conditions, preventable and otherwise, which affect or pre­
clude the employment of maximum speed, is likewise a
requisite. Poor material condition, inadequate training, and
incorrect methods of operation are preventable. The limi­
tations on speed which are imposed by logistics, and by
natural obstacles, the hydrography, the climate, the wind,
the weather, and the state of the sea, are susceptible of
maximum possible adjustment to circumstances only by the
exercise of foresight and judgment. All of these consider­
ations indicate the close relationship that exists between
relative position and freedom of action.
The science of geometry, which treats of the mutual
relations of points, lines, and angles, is frequently a valu­
able adjunct in the determination of favorable relative
position. The properties of the circle and curve bring to
light the advantages and disadvantages of interior and
exterior lines. The ellipse provides graphic limitations on
profitable operations under given conditions. The erection
of a perpendicular of given length at the middle point of a
straight line illustrates the relative potential effect of gun­
fire from one line against the other, i.e., the enfilade, cap, or
"tee." Geometry, however, cannot be the final determinant
under conditions where many of the quantities are un­
known, and where human minds are in opposition.
The movement of a force is properly regarded, not as
an even flow, but as a series of steps from one appropriate
position to another. Since the various positions to be
occupied become physical objectives for the time being,
their proper selection is influenced by the same factors as
have previously been noted.
Thus, it becomes necessary to consider, first, whether
the position or positions, once attained, will permit the
accomplishment of the effect desired.
Secondly, consideration is required as to whether the
— 33 —
available means are adequate to attain or to maintain such
positions, due regard being given to opposing means and to
the character of the theater.
Finally, there is to be considered whether the con­
sequences as to costs, in terms of relative fighting strength,
will be such, if the position is maintained or attained, as to
permit accomplishing the effect desired. Also, the effect
of these consequences on future action, whether the attempt
succeeds or fails, merits attention.
In considering the creation or maintenance of a favor­
able military situation from the standpoint of relative
position, there may profitably be included an examination
into:
(a) The relation which may exist, at any time,
between the geographical location of the sub-divisions of
one's own forces, mobile and fixed, and
(1) Those of the enemy,
(2) Fixed geographical positions under one's
own control,
(3) Fixed geographical positions under the
control of the enemy,
(4) Sea areas coveted or in dispute,
(5) Fixed potential sources of supply, one's
own and those of the enemy, controlled or
otherwise.
(b) The bearing of the sun and moon, and the direc­
tion of the wind and sea.
(c) The involvements of time and space incident to
movements necessary to bring about a desirable change in,
or the maintenance of, the initial relation.
(d) The measures incident to the necessary freedom
of action.
APPORTIONMENT OF FIGHTING STRENGTH
The assignment of a Task may reasonably be expected
to carry with it availability of resources in fighting strength
deemed, by the immediate superior, adequate for accom­
plishment of that Task. It remains for the Commander to
whom the Task has been assigned, so to distribute or
apportion these available resources as to provide the
requisite strength at points likely to be decisive, without
unduly weakening other vital points. In effect, he
is charged with a practical adjustment of means to ends,
with effective utilization of means and prevention of waste
nicely balanced.
34
 The relation between the strength to be brought to
bear against the selected immediate physical objective, the
concern of the moment, and that necessary to the attainment
of the ultimate objective, constitutes a fundamental con­
sideration in connection with effecting such a balance.
In effecting a balanced apportionment, there will be
involved not only the physical constituents of fighting
strength, but the moral and mental as well. In the physical
field, numbers and types occupy a prominent position, each,
however, requiring consideration from the standpoint of the
situation under estimate. Forces of appropriate type may
exercise greater effect than numerically larger forces not
so well adjusted to the requirements of the situation. On
the other hand, assuming appropriate types and mental and
moral equality, numerical considerations become predom­
inant.
Considerations of dispersion and concentration are also
involved in apportionment. In the nature of things, a cer­
tain degree of dispersion is necessary in order to meet the
demands of movement and security. Undue dispersion,
however, may result in lack of adequate fighting strength
where required. On the other hand, overconcentration at
one point may not only subject a force to unnecessary loss at
the point of concentration, but cause a lack of adequate
strength elsewhere.
Accordingly, axiomatic advice that it is unwise to
divide a total force, while containing a sound element of
caution, may be not only misleading but inadequate. It
may be misleading in that such division is often necessary
or desirable. It may be inadequate if it does not indicate
when, and in what measure, such division may be necessary
or desirable.
Similarly inadequate, however true as a generality, is
the statement that the requirements of effective warfare
are met by bringing superiority to bear at the decisive time
and place. Such an injunction is of little assistance in
solving the practical problems of war, which are to deter­
mine what constitutes the appropriate degree of superiority,
and to choose the proper time and place.
In like manner, any maxim is faulty which advises the
Commander to seek the solution of his problems by always
bringing to bear his elements of strength against the hostile
elements of weakness: for it may be found, on occasion,
that it is necessary to act with strength against strength.
— 35 —
But it would be equally faulty to maintain that effective ac­
tion seeks always to deal with the enemy by first destroying
his elements of strength; this for the reason that, even when
the strongest opposition can not be defeated by direct action
against its elements of strength, it may still be possible to
deal therewith effectively by first disposing of its elements
of weakness.
Thus, history has shown that success does not neces­
sarily lie in seeking a decision in the main theater; i. e., the
theater where the major forces are concentrated in opposi­
tion. On the contrary, when the strongest elements of a
hostile combination cannot be defeated without undue loss,
but cannot stand without the weakest, consideration may
well be given to an apportionment of fighting strength on
the basis of seeking a decision in a secondary theater. The
decisive theater and the main theater are, therefore, not
necessarily the same, and a relatively small force, at a dis­
tance from the main forces may be the means of attaining
the decision.
In providing for adequate superiority of fighting
strength at the selected points, the Commander may attain
the end in view either by increasing his own strength, in its
physical, moral, or mental constituents, relative to the
enemy's, or by decreasing the enemy's strength through im­
posing restrictions on his Freedom of Action.
Means which are inadequate for the accomplishment
of an assigned Task if used in one effort may sometimes be
rendered adequate by utilizing them in a series of successive
impulses.
To complete the apportionment of fighting strength
for purposes of the particular situation, the Commander
effects an appropriate Task Organization to carry his desires
into effect.
FREEDOM OF ACTION
The possession of Freedom of Action, to an extent
adequate for the attainment of the objective, will enable
the Commander to prosecute his plan regardless of restric­
tive influences. That enemy interference will impose
restrictions on freedom of action is to be expected. Restric­
tions may also be imposed by physical conditions existing
in the theater of action, and by deficiencies and omissions
within the field of responsibility of the Commander to
correct. Even with fighting strength adequate to over­
come enemy opposition and physical handicaps, such
— 36 —

deficiencies and omissions may become effective checks

to further progress unless obviated through the exercise
of foresight. To this end, consideration may well be given
to certain factors, which, if properly exploited, are likely
to promote freedom of action, but which, if neglected, are
likely to restrict it.
With respect to restrictions on freedom of action
that, in a particular situation, may be due to enemy action
or to unfavorable physical conditions, it will at once be
appreciated how greatly freedom of action may depend upon
a correct selection of the physical objective, favorable
relative position, and an effective apportionment of fighting
strength.
To a considerable extent, the Commander has within
his own control the degree of influence which his force
will exert in the creation or the maintenance of a favorable
military situation.
The power that may be applied by a military com­
mand is determined, not only by the potential fighting
strength of its component elements, but also by the degree
of unity of their several efforts in the attainment of the
objective. Whatever his inability to influence the other
aspects of a situation, the perfection of the ability of a
command to act unitedly is a matter largely in the hands
of the Commander.
The two principal methods of providing for unified
action are through unity of command and cooperation.
Assuming competent commanders, and adequate communi­
cations, unity of command is the more reliable method,
but it cannot be obtained everywhere, and at all times,
because of the necessary decentralization of the command
system in areas distant from the Commander. In such
areas, unity of effort may sometimes be assured by a
provision for local unity of command. At other times,
dependence for unity of effort must be placed on spontane­
ous cooperation between adjacent commands of a lower
echelon.
Organization, the mechanism of command, is most
effective when, through the establishment of authority
commensurate with responsibility, and the assignment of
Tasks to commanders with appropriate capabilities, the
highest possible degree of unity of command is attained.
Mutual understanding, which is promoted by indoctrination,
is the necessary foundation for a structure of cooperation.
— 37 —

Thus the command organization and mutual understanding

assume primary importance as means for giving maximum
power to available fighting strength, with consequent
maximum contribution to freedom of action.
By proper training of his command, by fostering its
morale, and by weakening the morale of the enemy, the
Commander may increase his own power and reduce that
of the opposition.
Deficiencies in technical training are inherently capa­
ble of imposing grave restriction upon freedom of action.
Material equipment, even though it may represent
the acme of perfection in design and construction,
will not surely function unless skillfully operated and
protected from deterioration. Even though mobility
and endurance be otherwise assured, the capacity
which they represent is not susceptible of effective
utilization unless the methods of evolution and maneuver
be intelligently planned and developed to a point which
assures potential facility of operation, when in the hands of
a skilled personnel.
Stability of morale, founded upon a sound discipline,
is an invaluable characteristic of fighting strength. Thus
inured against the ill effects of fear, despondency, lack of
confidence, and other weakening influences, a command
may more effectually employ measures calculated to upset
the morale of the enemy.
Of these measures, surprise, when judiciously em­
ployed, is one of the most potent. Surprise is the injection
of the unexpected for the purpose of creating an unfavor­
able ^military situation. To be effective, it must be sur­
rounded by secrecy. It fails of its purpose, however,
unless the advantage gained can be consolidated and made
available for further use. It is used with a particularly
telling effect when it results in disruption of enemy plans,
and thus promotes the execution of one's own.
The raid, a surprise measure swiftly executed and
followed by a withdrawal, is a valuable operation when
employed for tasks within its capacity to accomplish. The
collection of information, the destruction of important
enemy equipment or supplies, the severing of physical means
of communication and transport, and the like, are suitable
objectives. Because it necessarily includes a withdrawal
and cannot, therefore, accomplish the occupancy of ter­
ritory, the raid can only have indirect bearing upon the
— 38 —

final termination of hostilities. Like other forms of surprise,

the raid, injudiciously employed, may serve only to disclose
one's presence, and thus to betray more important future
plans. If it fails to attain its objective, it may even
strengthen enemy morale.
The form which surprise may take is not confined to
the stratagem, the ruse, or the sudden appearance. Any
unexpected display of strength, moral, mental, or physical,
the last-named sometimes assuming the character of new
and especially effective weapons or equipment, is included
in the category of surprise.
Besides a high morale, security measures are neces­
sary in order to minimize or prevent surprise, or to defeat
other efforts aimed at disruption of plans. Security is
protection; its purpose is to conserve fighting strength for
employment against the predetermined objective. Primarily
requiring the exercise of foresight, it may be furthered by
efficient scouting, by appropriate dispositions and formations
within the command, and by the use of protective detach­
ments.
The Commander will be hampered in maintaining his
fighting strength at its maximum unless he has arranged
for, and has at his disposal, adequate logistic support. Be­
cause of its intimate relationship to mobility and endurance,
it is an essential to freedom of action. This requires provi­
sion, not only for supplies and the replacement of unsuitable
personnel and material, but also satisfactory material main­
tenance. Freedom of action is restricted beyond the limits
to which logistic support can be extended.
The initiative is of paramount importance in ensuring
freedom of action. If seized and maintained, the enemy can
only conform; he cannot lead. If lost, freedom of action
is restricted in like measure.
The offensive, properly employed, is a means of
seizing the initiative, and of regaining it if lost. It will
seldom assume practical form unless founded on an offen­
sive mental attitude, which, although offensive action may
be suspended through force of circumstances, ever seeks
the favorable and suitable opportunity to strike. Com­
pletely to abandon the offensive state of mind is to for­
swear victory.
It does not follow that offensive action is possible
or even desirable under all circumstances. Even the most
skillful Commander will scarcely be able, always, to appor­
— 39 —
tion forces in such manner as will everywhere permit the
assumption of the offensive. If the offensive mental
attitude is retained, the calculated and deliberate adoption
of the defensive, for limited periods, may best promote the
attainment of the ultimate objective.
Both the offensive and the defensive have their places
in an operation whose broad character is primarily either
defensive or offensive. In that form of operation which
involves movement over a considerable distance in the
attainment of objective, a combination of the offensive and
the defensive is usually found necessary. The movement
itself is offensive; to insure freedom of action, both defen­
sive dispositions and measures, and also tactically offensive
operations, may be essential. The enemy, primarily on the
defensive, may be expected to seize every opportunity to
employ offensive action against the invader.
Thus, a judicious combination of the offensive and
the defensive has been found to be sound procedure, pro­
vided the general defensive is always viewed as a suspended
offensive. The methods employed and the dispositions in
effect during the period of the defensive are best calculated
to promote freedom of action if they are designed to
facilitate a ready resumption of the offensive.
Accurate previously acquired knowledge of the
physical characteristics of the theater of operations, and
of the strength, distribution, and activities of enemy forces
likely to be encountered, is of primary importance in the
initial promotion of freedom of action. Additions to this
store of knowledge may be made by a continuous evaluation
of new information, obtained by persistent effort.
Therefore, with a given fighting strength, the prom­
inent factors conducive to freedom of action, within the
field of responsibility of the Commander, are:
Efficient measures of Command,
Effective training,
Stable morale,
Security,
Adequate logistic support,
The initiative,
Accurate knowledge.
With these factors established at their optimum level
through the exercise of foresight, the Commander will be
better able to deal with those restrictions on freedom of
action which the enemy may seek to impose.
— 40 —
 CHAPTER VIII

THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE AND ITS

PRACTICAL APPLICATION
In Part I of this pamphlet are set forth the reasons
which underlie the necessity for a common Concept of War.
In the succeeding chapters there has been brought to notice
the fact that the Estimate of the Situation is a formulated
process of logical reasoning adapted to the solution of
military problems. Stress has been laid upon the value of
principles as guides to logical thought, and a fundamental
principle governing all human effort to attain an end has
been stated. The fact that war is a human activity differing
from other human activities only in the character of its
factors, establishes the connection between the problems of
human life and the problems of war.
It has been demonstrated that certain constituents are
common to all military problems, and these have been stated
and discussed. The important position occupied by the objec­
tive has been emphasized. In logical sequence, it was then
shown that the creation or maintenance of a favorable mili­
tary situation, in whole or in part, is, from the broad stand­
point, the objective to be attained, whatever the nature of
the problem. The treatment then focuses attention upon
the essentials of a favorable military situation and discusses,
in some detail, certain important considerations connected
therewith.
Therefore, war being a particular form of human
activity, the operations of war are governed by the prin­
ciples which goven all human effort to attain an end. Since
the creation or maintenance of a favorable military situation
is always, in any military problem, the effect desired, the
essentials of a favorable situation are, in turn, dependent
upon the universal determinants of the effect desired. By
this reasoning, the following is established as the
Fundamental Military Principle:
The Correct Physical The Effect Desired,
Objective, The Means Available
Favorable Relative And Opposed,
Position, are The Character of the
Effective Apportion­ determined Theater,
ment of Fighting by and
Strength, Acceptable Conse-
The Ensurance of quences as to Cost.
Freedom of Action.
— 41 —

 It was set forth in Chapter I that the consecutive

steps employed in the solution of war problems are:
The Estimate of the Situation,
The Formulation of the Directive,
Action.
In succeeding pages will be described the methods
by which the fundamental military principle may be given
practical application in those phases of the solution of
war problems embraced in the Estimate of the Situation
and the Formulation of Directives. The technical methods
to be employed during the Action phase are developed and
tested during Fleet exercises, and chart and gameboard
maneuvers. This pamphlet does not concern itself with
this final phase.
Nevertheless, it should be understood that there are
definite connecting links between the three phases, and that
the effectiveness of Action, the all-important phase,
depends to a great extent upon the merit of the other two.
The effectiveness of the action taken will largely rest upon
the ability of the Commander to express his will and intent
through suitable directives, and upon his skill in super­
vising the action. A realization that he alone is ultimately
responsible, will affect not only the character of his decision,
but also the manner in which he converts decision into
action.
THE ESTIMATE FORM A FLEXIBLE GUIDE
As previously brought to notice, the particular cir­
cumstances which characterize a military problem, coupled
with the motivating objective, determine the general
nature of the decision. The particulars of the decision
finally adopted as the basis of future specific action, can
only be reached after digesting pertinent facts and evaluat­
ing suggested solutions of the problem.
It has been emphasized that a mere random treat­
ment of these features might easily lead to confusion, and
to the omission of essentials. Therefore, a form has been
adopted for the Estimate of the Situation, in which the
various features are set forth for consideration in a logical
manner and order. It is important that the estimator
employ this form in estimating situations, while bearing in
mind that form is never more than a means to an end, and
that sound decision is the true goal.
The standard form is, therefore, to be viewed as a
42

flexible guide. With an understanding of the importance

of form, the Commander usually will make no change in its
details, but modifications may sometimes be desirable in
order to meet the demands of particular problems. A
thorough grasp of the technique of employing the form,
including a correct appreciation of its flexibility, will be a
valuable reinforcement to judgment and experience in
reaching sound decision.
That part of the estimate form comprised within the
"Survey of Opposing Strengths" provides the factual basis,
and is adequately covered in the next chapter. But certain
particular aspects of the Mission, subsidiary Tasks, Courses
of Action, and Decision, and their relationship to each
other, require elucidation in order that the estimator may
more intelligently handle the details of the Estimate.
THE NATURE OF TASKS
In Chapter VI, the Mission was shown to be composed
of two elements, Task and Purpose. The former indicates
what the Commander is expected to accomplish in order
to assist his immediate superior in executing the latter's
Task, as expressed in the Commander's Purpose.
A Task indicates the action to be taken in creating a
new situation, or in maintaining the present one. Since
the creation of the new situation (or the maintenance of
the present one) is invariably the objective, the statement
of a Task always includes the expression of the action to
be taken in the attainment of the objective.
As used in the Estimate, a Task is customarily set
down in the infinitive form; the objective, which visualizes
the completed action, may, when considered alone, be ex­
pressed as a substantive. "To destroy the enemy battleship"
is the form a Task takes in the Estimate; "the destruction
of the enemy battleship" is the corresponding objective;
"the enemy battleship" is the physical objective. When a
Task is assigned in a directive it takes the imperative form,
i.e., "Destroy the enemy battleship." When explicit in its
designation of objective, as in the examples cited, the Task
is said to be expressed in terms of accomplishment, i.e., of
the future creation, or maintenance, of a desired condition.
In a directive, it is permissible to assign a Task either
in terms of the effect desired, as illustrated above, or in
terms of the action to be taken. Action which involves
the employment of organized military forces is accom­
43

plished by means of series of acts, collectively called

operations. Under circumstances where the objective may
be considered to be adequately indicated by implication, and
which leave no room for doubt in the mind of the sub­
ordinate, the Task may suitably be expressed in terms of
an operation. This mode of expression may be the better,
for example, in situations where tactical considerations
are uppermost. "Attack the enemy battleships with
torpedoes" is a proper assignment of Task, if the existing
circumstances indicate the effect desired. Otherwise, it
is preferable to employ terms which clearly disclose this
effect, as, for instance, to say, "Reduce enemy battleship
strength with torpedoes." But if the Commander desires
especially to reduce enemy battleship speed, and it is
possible that his subordinate might aim at reducing
strength rather than speed, the assignment of the Task in
terms of an operation might defeat the Commander's intent.
The requirement to be met is that the subordinate
understand the will and intent of the Commander. The
character and scope of the situation, previous instructions,
and the state of training and mutual understanding, pro­
vide the basis for choice as to method of expression.
THE MISSION THE GOVERNING INFLUENCE
It should be understood that every Estimate has its
source in, and flows from, a particular problem. The
Commander's basic problem is contained in his Mission and
the surrounding circumstances, or situation. The accom­
plishment of the Mission henceforth becomes the ultimate,
though possibly unexpressed, objective of his every decision
in connection with that problem.
The range within which decisions may fall extends
from the instantaneous resolve to meet an emergency, to
the conditional intentions of a distant future. It will,
therefore, be appreciated that, from this viewpoint, a
military decision which provides the basis for the projection
of operations over a considerable period of time necessarily
constitutes the origin of numerous problems subsidiary to
the basic problem. Each subsidiary problem requires
solution, and each, therefore, requires an estimate of the
situation which is involved therein. The mental process
followed in each such estimate does not differ from that
followed in the solution of the basic problem, the variations
therefrom being matters of extent and detail only. Of

— 44 —

these, the scope and nature of the particular problem are

the determinants.
Since the decision reached in the solution of the basic
problem gives rise to various subsidiary problems, the
solution of the latter will involve the attainment of a
similar number of immediate (proximate) objectives.
These may all be viewed as contributions to the attainment
of the ultimate objective, as designated in the Mission.
While the Mission is, therefore, ever the governing
influence, all estimates do not necessarily flow directly
from the Mission. However, whatever the nature and
scope of the problem, the estimate which is to provide the
basis of its solution begins with a visualization and grasp
of the objective, immediate or ultimate, as the case may be.
COURSES OF ACTION AS SOLUTIONS OF A PROBLEM

As previously indicated, during the process of esti­

mating a military situation, various solutions of the problem
suggest themselves to the mind of the estimator. These
are termed Courses of Action. The estimator will find that
his labor will be reduced if he is familiar with their usual
mode of expression, and also with certain essentials of their
content.
A Course of Action is expressed in the form of a
task, and may include an outline of the general measures
or operations to be employed in accomplishing that task.
It does not include the expression of Purpose. One of its
essentials, however, is that it clearly express the will and
intent of the Commander as to his general scheme for the
conduct of operations by the particular force concerned.
Another essential is that its scope be the same as the scope
of the motivating Task, i.e., that the objective of that Task
will have been attained when the Course of Action has
been successfully completed.
The initial expression of a Course of Action, in the
Estimate, should be as simple as possible, and may merely
express the integrated action to be taken by the force in
attaining the objective. The detailed lines which this
action is to take are later studied, and those which may be
useful for clarity are added. These detailed lines, in their
entirety, disclose the methods as to how, when, and where
it is proposed to consummate the complete action, and
show the nature of the subsidiary action that may be
required of various subdivisions of the Commander's force,

— 45 —

or that may be required successively of the force as a whole.

The Course of Action finally selected for incorporation in
the Decision may be expressed in considerable detail, the
amount of detail varying with the situation, and with the
complexity of the projected operations.
As with other tasks, it is permissible, in the process
of estimating a situation, to express a Course of Action
either in terms of the effect desired, or in terms of an
operation.
THE SCOPE OF THE DECISION
In any estimate, the Decision, like the Mission, con­
sists of two elements, Task and Purpose. The selected
Course of Action becomes the Task of the Decision, whose
Purpose is the Task which has been the originating motive
of that particular estimate. Thus, if the basic situation is
under estimate, the Purpose of the basic Decision will
either be identical with the Task of the Mission, or will
permit of its direct accomplishment. If a problem sub­
sidiary to the basic problem is being solved, the Task which
involves the motivating objective of the estimate forms
the Purpose of the Decision.
The selected Course of Action is a self-imposed Task
for the solution of the problem which immediately confronts
the Commander. As finally formulated, it is carried for­
ward intact to become the Task of the Decision. The latter,
therefore, expresses the action considered necessary for
the attainment of an objective, the methods as to how,
when, and where this action will be carried on, and its
Purpose. To be suitable, the Decision will invariably
cover the full scope, and only the scope, of the problem
constituted by the Task and the situation. The objective
of the Task of a suitable Decision is, therefore, the creation,
or maintenance, of a situation which the Commander con­
siders homologous with the attainment of the motivating
objective. It is not enough that accomplishment of the
Task of the Decision place the Commander in position to
attain the motivating objective; it is necessary that suc­
cessful completion of that Task actually result in such
attainment.
The identity in scope of a suitable Decision with that
of the Task which supplied the incentive for the estimate
may be illustrated by an example. A commander may
have received a Mission: "To gain control of the Caribbean

— 46 —

 in order to interrupt enemy seaborne trade and to protect

friendly sea-borne trade therein." His basic Decision will
not cover sufficient scope if it reads: "To establish this
force at Guantanamo Bay in order to gain control of the
Caribbean," because the establishment of the force at that
port will not of itself give the necessary control. Some­
thing additional is needed. His basic Decision more
properly might be: "To operate this force (in a certain
manner) from a base at Guantanamo Bay in order to gain
control of the Caribbean." The direct result of the opera­
tion of the force is designed to be identical in scope with
the attainment of control. A subsidiary Decision might
well be: "To establish this force at Guantanamo Bay in
order to permit operations to be undertaken from that
position as a base."
The question may be asked as to why the Task which
supplied the incentive for the estimate may not be carried
directly over and become the Task of the Decision itself,
since both are required to have the same scope. It might
seem that this procedure would be simpler than to formu­
late a second Task for the purpose of carrying out the
original Task. The question may be answered by
saying that sometimes this may properly be done, and
sometimes it may not. The test lies in whether or not the
original Task is so expressed that it may, without change,
be used as a practicable basis for the Commander's general
scheme for the conduct of operations by the force involved.
The succeeding paragraphs indicate how this test may be
applied.
Sometimes the assigned Task may be broad and
general in expression, and not be clearly indicative of the
character of the future action. In this case, the Com­
mander's estimate will necessarily include consideration of
more specific courses of action, and the selection of one
that will provide a satisfactory basis for the conduct of
operations. This is likely to be the case in situations of
broad scope where strategical considerations are uppermost,
and when the Commander's immediate superior does not
propose to exercise direct supervision over the operations.
At other times, the assigned Task may be specific in
nature, and itself constitute a suitable basis, possibly the
only basis, for the conduct of operations. In such case,
the Commander accepts his assigned Task as his governing
Course of Action, adds to it the how, when, and where of
47

employing his means, and carries it over to become the

Task of his Decision. The Purpose of the Decision will
then be the same as the Purpose of the assigned Task. This
is likely to be the case in minor strategical situations, or
where tactical considerations are uppermost, and where
several commanders are operating in close concert in the
same area, under the direct supervision of a common
superior.
To illustrate the relationship among Task, Purpose,
Mission, Course of Action, and Decision, and also to indi­
cate a properly flexible technique in the employment of
the Estimate form, the following hypothetical example may
be cited:
The Navy Department, having been requested by the
War Department to assist in the establishment of a military
base at Port X, assigns to Commander A a Task such that:
A's Mission is: "To capture X in order to
permit its establishment as a
base of operations for the
military forces."
A finds that he has a subsidiary problem of protecting
his sea communications with X, and assigns to an immediate
subordinate, Commander B, a Task which gives
B a Mission: "To occupy Y in order that it
may be used as an advanced
naval base for protecting the
sea communications between
home territory and X."
B estimates the situation; his Task, "To occupy Y".
does not form a suitable and definite basis for the conduct
of operations. He therefore may adopt as his Decision:
B's Decision: "To capture Y by landing
operations protected by a
naval covering detachment,
in order to occupy Y."
B then may assign tasks to his immediate subordi­
nates, C and D, such that:
C's Mission is: "To reduce the land defenses
of Y in order to capture it."
D's Mission is: "To prevent enemy naval
interference with landing
operations in order to permit
the capture of Y."

— 48 —
 To C, the Task of his Mission appears to be a
practicable basis for the conduct of operations, and he,
therefore, may make the following Decision:
C's Decision is: "To reduce the land defenses
of Y by bombarding emplaced
batteries and beach defenses,
and by landing operations fol­
lowed by the assault of (cer­
tain) positions, in order to
capture Y."
On the other hand, D's Task is too general to use as a
basis for the conduct of operations; he therefore may reach
the Decision:
D*s Decision: "To destroy enemy naval
forces approaching Y by air­
craft bombing and night
destroyer attack followed by
daylight main engagement,
in order to prevent enemy
naval interference with land­
ing operations."
ESTIMATES OF STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL

SITUATIONS

Every situation in war involves both strategical and

tactical considerations. The nature of the action to be
taken, and the objectives that are to be attained, in the
creation of favorable military situations, may be governed
chiefly by strategical, or chiefly by tactical, considerations.
This fact may frequently introduce variations in the hand­
ling of the details of an Estimate, and particularly affect
the weight to be given the various factors of fighting
strength. As employed herein, the terms strategical sit­
uation and tactical situation will be understood as refer­
ring to situations whose characteristics are chiefly stra­
tegical, or chiefly tactical, respectively.
As usually defined, strategy, the art of projecting
and directing the more extensive military movements and
operations of war, is distinguished from tactics in that the
latter is the art of handling forces in battle, or in the
immediate presence of the enemy. When used in this sense,
tactics is not to be confused with evolution and maneuver.
To attain its objective, strategy must invariably
contemplate the employment of tactics; to be sound, tac­
49

tics must be employed only for the purpose of contributing

to the aims of strategy. While tactics aiways properly
has a strategic background, it is the ultimate method for
making strategy effective. Philosophically, strategy and
tactics are, therefore, inseparable.
Tactics /is the employment of means to gain an
immediate local aim, in order to permit strategy to gain a
further aim. Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly
make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of
struggle. But strategy looks beyond, in order to make
the gains of tactics accord with the final purpose.
It is the function of tactics to ensure that its results
are appropriate to the strategic aim; it is the duty of
strategy to place at the disposal of tactics means appro­
priate to the results demanded. Conversely, strategy should
ensure that the prescribed aim is possible of attainment
with the means that it is able to make available.
Therefore, while the attainment of the aims of
strategy depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy
is initially responsible for the success of tactics. It follows
that it is the sphere of strategy not only to ensure that the
attainment of tactical objectives shall exclusively further
the aims of strategy, but also that the tactical struggle
shall be initiated under conditions favorable for the attain­
ment of the designated objectives.
An estimate of a relatively broad strategical situation
may normally be reduced to writing, because time is usually
available. Frequently, also, time will permit the issuance
of written directives. An estimate of a tactical situation,
on the other hand, because it may at times require almost
instantaneous decision, cannot be given the elaborate form
of an estimate of a strategical situation except when, well
in advance of the event, the estimator bases the estimate
upon various assumptions as to the character of the prob­
able situation. However, as an essential feature of training,
written solutions of hypothetical tactical problems are
desirable, in order that facility in reaching sound decision
may be available in actual emergency.
It has been shown that strategy and tactics have essen­
tially different characteristics, in spite of their dependence
upon each other. Therefore, estimates of strategical situa­
tions are different in an important respect from estimates
of tactical situations. The former leads to a decision as to
whether or not the immediate strategic objective demands
— 50 —

that a battle be fought. The latter leads to a decision as

to the comprehensive scheme to be followed, and the
methods to be employed in the battle, in furtherance of the
immediate strategic aim.
The tactical objective always involves the infliction,
threat, or avoidance of physical injury. Coordinated
tactical action is usually confined to a relatively small area.
The strategical objective involves the attainment or the
maintenance of favorable relative position for the exercise
of control over specified physical objectives. Strategical
action may often be wide-spread.
Therefore, the most important part of the factual
basis in the estimate of tactical situations is likely to be a
detailed comparison of the material strengths and morale
of the opposing armed forces within a small area, and the
physical character of that area. Furthermore, the possibil­
ities of tactical action are restricted by the detailed fighting
capabilities of the individual units present. Consequently,
tactical courses of action are dependent for their expression
upon an estimate of those capabilities when opposed by the
enemy forces present. Logistic questions may often be of
small importance, because it is unlikely that supplies on
hand can be increased during a naval battle.
Estimates of strategical situations are affected by the
aggregate, rather than the individual, fighting strengths
of the various detachments. They also are more concerned
with the probable general, rather than local, movement of
enemy forces, the general physical characteristics of large
areas, political and economic factors, efficiency of informa­
tion services, and particularly with logistics. Strategical
courses of action do not represent the integrated action
within the capabilities of the individual units, but may be
expressed in broad terms, without reference to other than
the general measures to be adopted.
MILITARY PLANS
Before the Commander can undertake the action con­
templated in his Decision, he will find it necessary to embody
his Decision in a Plan.
A plan, in the general sense, is a proposed method of
action or procedure. In its military sense, it is the scheme
which the Commander adopts for the conduct of operations
by his force, for the attainment of a specified objective.
Since the operations are designed to create or maintain a

— 51 —

favorable military situation, the plan will necessarily con­

template arrangements for meeting the main requirements
of such a situation.
A military plan necessarily specifies that the geo­
graphical direction of the effort by the force is to be exerted
toward establishing control over designated physical objec­
tives, whose relative positions, after control has been
established, will then be favorable for maintaining control,
and for supporting future movements. The plan provides
for organizing and apportioning the force with the view,
not only of overcoming expected opposition, but also,
through the collection of information and the provision of
adequate security and logistic support, of ensuring the
freedom of action of the force as a whole.
The selection of objectives, and the general arrange­
ments as to relative position, organization, and detailed
tasks, will have been considered during the process of
estimating the situation. These will, naturally, have been
decided upon after a study of possible Courses of Action in
relation to Mission (effect desired), and with respect to the
Survey of Opposing Strengths (means available and oppos­
ed, and the character of the theater). From the beginning
of the campaign, as well as at all subsequent stages, the
relative losses which the Commander is willing to accept
may determine the possibility of attaining the whole of the
objective, and each of its several parts. Losses will include
not only those features relating to fighting strength, but
also those relating to position, time, organization, and free­
dom of action.
The basis of a military plan is the Commander's
Decision, which includes in its Task the nature of the
action, the designation of the objective, and the
methods of operation to be employed in attaining it. It
also includes, in its Purpose, the relation of this Task to
the Task of the immediate superior. With the Decision
as its basis, the complete plan will require the addition of
arangements for the organization of the command, the
assignment of tasks to the various subdivisions, and
provision for freedom of action, with special mention of
logistic support.
In reaching his Decision, the Commander has provided
himself with the basis of a plan for fully accomplishing his
assigned Task. He may, or may not, formulate this com­
plete plan in writing, or embody it in a formal Directive
52
which will cover the execution of the full Task of the
Decision. He may break up the Decision into several parts,
and provide for executing these parts by a series of Direc­
tives. Whether written or mental, however, the complete
plan will cover the scope of the Decision, and will be the
Commander's scheme for his future conduct of operations.
In war, the Commander may frequently be the only
individual who is conversant with the entire plan. As a
rule, however, he may expect to disclose its scope and
general features to his immediate superior, and the plan in
its entirety to his next junior, or even to all of the com­
manders on the next lower echelon. During peace, in
exercises simulating war, the complete plan is usually
included in a directive and given circulation for purposes of
training.
Where the Commander breaks up the Decision into
subsidiary parts for separate accomplishment, he will
naturally exercise care that, in itself, each part is the suit­
able basis for a complete and homogeneous plan. Successful
execution of all these separate plans should result in the
complete accomplishment of the Task of the Decision.
CONTINGENT PLANS
An actual situation can be correctly visualized only if
the information available is accurate and complete. In
tactical situations, information as to the details of the
fighting strengths of the opposing forces is what the Com­
mander particularly requires as the basis for accurate esti­
mate. But it is in the collection of those details that his
forces, operating against enemy opposition, may encounter
great difficulty. Accurate and timely information of
friendly forces is often missing. Information of the enemy
is usually meagre, and frequently misleading. The Com­
mander is, therefore, handicapped in his attempts to esti­
mate actual tactical situations.
Because he may be unable, at the time, to make a
detailed estimate to meet an actual tactical situation, the
Commander may find it useful to draw up, in advance,
contingent plans based upon assumptions as to conditions
that might conceivably exist at some future time. These
contingent plans may be kept up to date by employing a
running estimate based upon the evaluation of the latest
information. By constantly visualizing tactical probabil­
ities, his contingent plans are more likely to be suitable

— 53 —

when an engagement develops suddenly. Assumed situations

may vary from those of simple character to those involving
the engagement of entire fleets.
The resemblance of an actual to an assumed situation
will thus largely depend upon the amount and accuracy of
the information available to the Commander, and his skill
in evaluating it. It is not to be expected, however, that
any plan based upon assumptions will, in all its aspects,
always be suitable for use in an actual situation.
For instance, a plan for the sortie of a fleet from a
harbor under assumptions that high visibility exists, that
airplanes can fly, and that hostile submarines will be the
only force in opposition, may often be found entirely appli­
cable to actual situations. It will seldom occur, however,
that an elaborate battle plan, based on assumptions as to
the various types, dispositions, and strengths of forces
present, weather conditions, and the intent of the enemy,
can be used without change. But even in problems of large
scope, a plan evolved in advance may be found very useful
as a general basis for tactical action. Even if circumstances
are so different from those previously visualized that the
Commander is forced to discard his plan entirely, his
estimates for the purpose of preparing contingent plans
will have given him a degree of preparation. Thus he will
have laid the foundation for prompt and correct tactical
decision in the circumstances which actually eventuate.
The probability that a contingent plan may prove
unsuitable suggests the advisability of developing alter­
native plans based on different sets of assumptions. A
commander who has available several contingent plans will
be better equipped to undertake an expected tactical engage­
ment, provided his apportionment of fighting strength in
the various plans has been made in such a manner as to
facilitate the change from one to another without disruption
of his forces. But it would be erroneous to believe that all
contingencies can be foreseen, and to be content with any
particular set of plans, which, in the event, may all prove
to be wrong.
Tactical situations differ not only from strategical
situations, but in their chief characteristics they also differ
widely among themselves. There are numerous general
categories of tactical situations, as, for instance, those
concerned with sortie and entrance; defense while cruising
under varied conditions; different forms of both attrition
— 54 —

and major attack; action against enemy forces on shore;

counter-action against surprise attack; and others. All of
these may require special adaptation of the estimate form,
with particular attention to certain factors. For most of
them, the Commander may make contingent plans in
advance. Even if he is unable to do so, he will be able to
deal more effectively with unforeseen difficulties, if through
study and reflection, he has made a conscious effort to
develop the faculty for sound and prompt tactical decision.
While the Commander may be able to draw up con­
tingent plans for the solution of minor strategical problems,
such as scouting, movement, and escort plans, he will find
it necessary to rely upon estimates of actual situations
for the solution of major strategical problems.
ESSENTIALS OF A MILITARY DIRECTIVE
Plans are issued in the form of Directives, which are
formal instructions that govern the execution of the plan.
Directives may be oral or written, or may be transmitted
as despatches. By whatever method communicated, the
essentials of a military directive, explicit or implied, are
that it:
(a) Assign a Task to the whole designated force.
(b) Organize the designated force with a view to the
effective accomplishment of the Task.
(c) Assign subsidiary tasks to the subdivisions of
the force, such that the sum of the subsidiary
tasks equals the complete task.
(d) Provide for coordination between subdivisions,
security, logistic support, the collection and dis­
semination of information, state the conditions
under which the plan is to become effective, and
indicate the relation of the Commander to the
execution of the plan.
In certain circumstances, the greater portion of these
essentials will necessarily find their expression in previous
instructions or mutual understanding. In others, the
directive may include not only these essentials, but also
letters of instruction, subsidiary and contingent plans, and
other material designed to assist in the intelligent accom­
plishment of the Task. In all circumstances, both the
Commander and his immediate subordinates are respon­
sible that a clear understanding of the will and intent of the
Commander has been conveyed and received.

— 55 —
 Experience has shown that military directives are
usually most effective if cast in a standard form well known
alike to originator and recipient. Such a form tends to
ensure against the omission of relevant features, and
minimizes possibilities of error and chances of misunder­
standing. A later part of this pamphlet will describe the
forms of the directives customarily employed in the naval
service.
In issuing a directive, whether written or oral, a
Commander has certain definite responsibilities; these are:
(1) To insure that subordinates understand the
situation by giving them pertinent available
information.
(2) To set forth clearly the Task to be achieved by
the entire force, as well as the Tasks to be ac­
complished by each Subdivision of that force.
(3) To provide each Task Force with adequate
means to accomplish its assigned Task.
(4) To allow subordinates appropriate discretion
within the limits of their assigned spheres of
action. Necessary coordination is never sacri­
ficed to accomplish this. The personality and
ability of each subordinate is a consideration
in determining the degree of discretion that can
be entrusted to him.
The directive itself will be more easily understood,
and will better convey the will and intent of the Com­
mander, if it is clear, brief and positive.
Clarity demands the use of precise expressions sus­
ceptible of but the one desired interpretation. Normally,
the affirmative form is preferable to the negative. The
importance of clarity has been summed up in the saying
that "an order which can be misunderstood will be mis­
understood." If misunderstandings arise, the chief fault
lies with the one who issued the order.
Brevity calls for the omission of unnecessary and
unnecessarily detailed instructions. Terse sentences are
preferable when they convey the meaning clearly. Clarity
is never sacrificed for brevity.
Positiveness of expression suggests the senior's fixity
of purpose, with consequent inspiration to subordinates to
prosecute their tasks with determination. The use of
indefinite expressions leads to suspicion of vacillation and

— 56 —

indecision. They tend to impose upon subordinates respon­

sibilities fully accepted by a resolute Commander.
SUPERVISION
The responsibility of the Commander does not end
with the issue of his Directive. Thereafter, he will have the
duty of supervising the execution of the plan, and, through
the evaluation of new information, of maintaining a grasp
of present progress and future potentialities. He will cor­
rect deficiencies and error in the plan and its execution,
guide the direction of effort toward the predetermined
objective, ensure that his forces continue their movement
in correct relation to each other and to the objective, re­
apportion strength to meet unexpected conditions, and
evaluate his accrued losses with respect to those which he
has anticipated. He will modify his plan in detail as seems
desirable, while endeavoring to retain the integrity of its
larger aspects. He will issue additional subsidiary direc­
tives as may be required from time to time.
As a particularly effective feature of supervision, he
will cultivate the personal relation between himself and his
subordinates, and between himself and his immediate
superior. It is through close personal relationships that
mutual understanding is best developed and harmony pro­
moted, to the end that intelligent and cordial unity of effort
will exist among the personnel of the entire command.

— 57 —

 PART in

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

— 68 —

 CHAPTER IX
DETAILS OF THE ESTIMATE
The successive steps of the Estimate are presented
herein as they apply to the solution of a military problem
of major scope. In solving problems of more restricted
scope, the details will require modification to a commen­
surate extent.
During the earlier stages of training of the individual,
an Estimate may frequently represent the unassisted
effort of a single estimator. In actual service, much of the
data will be supplied and summarized by the members of a
suitably organized Staff for the use of the Commander in
reaching his Decision.
I. THE MISSION
(a) Summary of the Situation. The summary of the
situation is a brief statement of essential facts set forth
at once to assure that the Commander has in mind the
circumstances which characterize the problem. Subsequent
subdivisions of the Estimate should contain all facts
that may influence the final Decision.
Situations rarely remain static. Instead, they are
more likely constantly to change. Therefore, it is partic­
ularly important that the summary include a statement
as to present enemy activity that may affect the Com­
mander's future action, or may change the situation
between the time the estimate is commenced, and the time
its resulting plan is put into operation.
(b) Formulation of the Mission. Except in rare
cases, the Commander will be assigned a Task by his
immediate superior. In addition, the superior will usually
supply essential information, and will disclose the Task of
his own Decision.
This assigned Task, coupled with the Task of the
immediate superior's Decision, constitutes the Commander's
Mission, i.e., his Task and Purpose. A statement of the
Mission assumes, therefore, the following form:
To: (statement of the assigned Task)
In order to: (statement of the Task of the Decision
of the immediate superior, or the fact
of contributing thereto).
It is desirable thus to formulate the Mission at the
beginning of an Estimate in order that, throughout the
process, there may be clear understanding of the ultimate
objective.
— 59 —
 The Commander may not always expect to be provid­
ed with a concisely formulated Mission. Although his
immediate superior will be fully alive to the fact that unity
of effort may fail of achievement if his will and intent are
not made known to his subordinates, circumstances may pre­
vent the issuance of a formal directive. In such cases, the
Commander derives his Mission for himself.
In so doing, he may utilize his knowledge of the
circumstances, and of the general plan of campaign. He
may have been the recipient of letters of instruction, or have
knowledge of such. Or, again, the existing state of mutual
understanding may happily be such as to enable him to
grasp the will and intent of the immediate superior without
recent communication of any kind. In any event the Com­
mander will do well to realize that, unless he has a clear
grasp of the Task of the superior's Decision, expensive
diffusion of effort and disruption of plan may result.
There is another category of circumstances in which a
Commander may not be assigned a Task expressed in a
single, simple phrase. His superior may have entrusted him
with several important undertakings which, while they may
all contribute to the execution of the superior's plan, can
be clearly understood only if expressed as separate tasks.
Under these circumstances, in the formulation of his Mis­
sion, the Commander may properly summarize this series
of separate tasks as a single, integrated whole. This
expression of his full Task will then, to himself, represent
and include all of the several task which his superior has
directed him to perform.
If the problem which is the source of the Estimate is
one that is subsidiary to the Commander's basic problem,
its solution will concern the attainment of an immediate
objective which represents a step in the attainment of the
ultimate objective. In making an Estimate of this restricted
scope, the Commander will first formulate his Mission,
which embraces the ultimate objective, and immediately
following will formulate a Task which involves the action
necessary for the attainment of the immediate objective,
together with the Purpose served by this subsidiary Task.
This statement of Task and Purpose, whether com­
plete or partial, serves in either case to fix the limits of the
Estimate in hand.

60

 II. SURVEY OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS.

Since results in war largely depend upon combat or
the threat thereof it follows that a careful evaluation of the
factors of fighting strength has direct bearing upon the
creation and maintenance of a favorable military situation.
By fighting strength is meant capacity for developing
energy for combat. It is not restricted to the existing
physical strength of the armed forces, but in a major
situation might include all categories of the nation's
resources, which ultimately might affect the strength of
those forces.
Fighting strength is determined by the characteristics
of the means of action, and the characteristics of the theater
of action. These characteristics may be expressed in terms
of certain factors, each of which may influence, or be in­
fluenced by, any or all of the others. Situations will occur
in which certain factors will exert little or no influence.
Yet, in other situations, those same factors may exert a
paramount effect. For example, problems and exercises
in peace tend to minimize the influence of the moral factors;
yet these are often decisive in war. It is, therefore, impor­
tant, in estimating fighting strength, to neglect no single
pertinent factor, for the relative value of each can be deter­
mined only after its influence has been subjected to analysis.
The actual situation determines the extent to which
analysis should be carried. The Mission, or sometimes a
subsidiary Task, being a determinant of the character of
the problem, establishes the limits within which strength
comparisons are profitable.
The list of factors set forth herein is believed to be well
suited to the needs of most estimators. However, each in­
dividual should feel free to expand, or otherwise to adapt, this
list to his own needs, as he may desire. The requirements
of a useful list of such factors are, first, completeness, so
that no factor will be overlooked and, second, simplicity,
so than in so far as practicable all similar data may be dis­
cussed under one heading.
In the analysis of fighting strength, consideration is
given not only to the means under the immediate control of
the Commander and those immediately opposed to him, but
also to those possessed by other friendly forces, and by other
hostile forces which may influence his situation.
Where the nature of the factors permit, it will facil­
itate comparison to place the analyses for the opposing sides
— 61 —

in adjoining columns on the same page. Items marked with

an asterisk may usually be omitted in estimates of limited
scope.
*(a) Political Factors. The prosecution of a war is
directly influenced by such Internal Conditions as the
strength of the national government and its capacity for
unified effort, the ability of that government to maintain a
firm public opinion in support of its war aims, and the
degree to which the government can make the national re­
sources available.
External Relations modify the conduct of war,
and frequently affect military plans. The wartime factors
which influence these relations are the effect of the existing
clash of policy on foreign opinion, the national bias of
interested neutrals and the normal attitude of those
neutrals toward each belligerent. The diplomatic skill of
the opposing governments, and their ability to sway
public opinion abroad may well determine the manner in
which neutrality will be enforced. The international situ­
ation may indicate possible allies, benevolent neutrals, and
strict neutrals.
Where Alliances are concerned, the probable
degree of cooperation of the allies, the divergence of their
war aims, and the harmony or conflict of their peace-time
policies, affect estimates as to the probable political and
military strength of the coalition.
* (b) Economic Factors. Pertinent considerations of
Finance include ability to tax, to float internal loans, to
create foreign credits, and possibly to deny foreign markets
to an opposing belligerent.
The capacity, organization, and mobilization of
Industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which
material may be supplied the armed forces, and the civilian
population as well.
The dependence of a nation upon the continuation
of foreign Trade without the necessity of obtaining new
markets and new sources of supply affects its strength, as
do also the special measures it must adopt for trade protec­
tion.
Assured availability of Raw Materials required
from foreign sources is an indispensable element of economic
power.
(c) Psychologic Factors. The maintenance of a
stable Morale at a high level is a primary concern. Such
— 62 —

stability insures the nation or command against the full

effects of suprise, fear, disappointment, despondency, and
other weakening moral influences.
Training and Experience influence morale, and
play a part difficult to overestimate. They imply a satis­
factory state of discipline. The existence of the skill neces­
sary for the production and the proper use of the material
means of war, and for the control of the living beings which
operate those means, is a psychologic consideration.
Racial or National Characteristics may affect the
estimates of morale and training.
The Personal Characteristics of Commanders
have an important bearing on fighting strength.
The present attitude and past actions of enemy
commanders, and of their commands, may furnish a clue for
correct evaluation of any of the foregoing psychologic
factors.
While only the physical constituents of fighting
strength are susceptible of quantitative comparison,
the commander who fails to take account of mental and
moral factors is guilty of serious error. Nevertheless, in
many situations, such factors must remain relatively in­
determinate until subjected to test. Inferences may be
drawn, and deductions made, on a basis of peace-time obser­
vation and of historical precedent, in which racial character­
istics may figure prominently. History, however, has taught
that, in a conflict between modern industrial and military
nations, it is unwise to entertain any assumption other than
that of moral equality until such time as the conflict shall
have demonstrated the existence and the degree of a differ­
ence, or unless prior experience, observation, and acquaint­
ance unquestionably warrant otherwise.
(d) Character of the Theater of Operations. The
character of the theater of operations exerts an influence,
always important, sometimes paramount, upon the possibil­
ity of attaining the desired effect.
Hydrography, Topography, Weather, Duration
of Daylight, and the Phases of the Moon form part of the
necessary background in the consideration of possible mili­
tary effort. These, as well as the natural geographical forma­
tions and their usefulness for the support of operations, their
Relative Position and Distance with respect to each other,
and their Modification through fortification or development,
occupation by armed forces, or the employment of special
— 63 —

military means, have a varying effect upon the contemplated

operations.
(e) Information. Operations of war are tremend­
ously affected by the information which each belligerent
possesses of the other. It is therefore vital to weigh the
Information Available to Either Belligerent and the effi­
ciency of the belligerents in the employment of the Means
of Obtaining and Denying Information.
There should be considered, under means, such of
the following as may be appropriate: scouting; study of
press, captured documents, and material; reports from other
friendly units; interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters,
inhabitants, and escaped or exchanged prisoners; radio
direction finding; interception of enemy radio, telephone,
telegraph, and mail communications; espionage; censorship;
adoption of secrecy measures.
Communication Facilities include all means of
interchanging thought. Information, however accurate and
appropriate, is useless if it cannot be conveyed in time for
effective use.
(f) Armed Forces. The numbers and characteris­
tics of the vessels of the fleets of the world are generally
known with reasonable accuracy at the outbreak of war.
Important facts concerning land forces will also be known,
but probably to a lesser degree than in the case of naval
forces. The value of a comparison may depend upon
whether or not the information service has improved the
accuracy of these data, maintained them up to date,
and collected accurate information of the forces in the
theater of operations.
1. Composition deals with the Type and Numerical
Strength of the units involved.
2. Material Characteristics embraces Armament, Life,
and Mobility.
Armament covers not only the caliber and num­
ber of guns but also the type, potentialities as to range, and
the amount of ammunition available.
Life is the ability to withstand punishment,
expressed in terms of standards that can clearly be visual­
ized.
Mobility is capability of movement. It is com­
pounded of speed, radius, and the ability to operate under
imposed conditions of weather, visibility, or other possible
obstacles.
— 64 —

 (3) Condition embraces such factors as the efficiency

of motive machinery, the integrity of the under-water com­
partments and other material construction, and physical
endurance. The latter applies not only to material but also
to living things, and involves the ability to withstand the
wasting effects of operations whether due to fatigue, hard­
ship, disease, wounds, or any other causes.
(4) The Disposition of the Armed Forces is concerned
with their basic organization, division into task forces, geo­
graphical location, relative positions, formations, and
present activities.
(g) Logistic Support. Logistic support exercises a
dominant influence upon the fighting power of the Armed
Forces. It is concerned with the Availability and Adequacy
of the following:
Material: fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft,
food, clothing, spare parts, and general supplies.
Personnel: military and civil; numbers and
quality of replacements.
Facilities: bases, major and secondary, repair
facilities afloat and ashore, shelter, hospitalization, recrea­
tion, transportation.
The Limitation Imposed by Logistics upon
operations represents the final limit of a Commander's
Freedom of Action.
(h) Summary of Strength and Weakness Factors.
The purpose of a survey of fighting strength is to
develop, from the information available, the factors of
strength and of weakness of the respective combatants. At
this stage, therefore, a careful study is made of the data
accumulated in the survey of opposing fighting strengths,
and summarized conclusions are drawn as to present and
foreseen points of strength and weakness for each side. If
important uncertainties exist, this fact should be indicated.
These summarized conclusions provide information as
to the means available and in opposition, and as to conditions
that exist in the theater of action. They form part of the
background essential to the intelligent consideration of the
Courses of Action open to each opponent.
Note as to Sequence of Sections III and IV
At this point, the Commander has a
choice of two procedures. He may consider
'irst, the Courses of Action open to the

— 65 —
 enemy (Section III) and, thereafter, Courses
of Action open to himself (Section IV). Or
he may reverse this order. Each of these
procedures has advantages and disadvan­
tages.
To consider enemy Courses of Action
first may present the advantage of making
more complete the Commander's apprecia­
tion of the obstacles to be overcome.
Furthermore, when the effectiveness of his
future action is foreseen to depend upon
what the enemy may do, and when the Com­
mander's Mission requires him to frustrate
present or future aims of the enemy, it
seems essential that Section III be consid­
ered before Section IV.
On the other hand, this procedure
involves the danger that the Commander
may become unduly impressed by the
possibilities of enemy action. He may thus
unnecessarily forfeit the initiative by draw­
ing up plans chiefly to combat such action.
When the relative fighting strength,
coupled with his own Mission, indicates that
the Commander can compel an enemy to
conform to his operations, the Commander
may well desire to consider his own plans
before those of his enemy. In these circum­
stances, the possibilities of enemy action
will affect merely the details and not the
character of the Course of Action to be
selected.
The choice of the procedure to be
followed is a matter which may be left
entirely to the estimator.
III. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
As a Commander rarely has definite information of an
enemy's plan, it is usually necessary to resort to the process
of deduction in order to obtain an insight into the enemy's
mind. In making an estimate from the enemy's view­
point the Commander places himself in the enemy's position
and in sympathy with him, while subordinating his own
hopes and desires. He credits the enemy with good
judgment, and with the resolution and ability to apply with
— 66 —

skill the fundamentals of warfare, subject to the definite

limitations brought to light in the Survey of Opposing
Strengths.
(a) Enemy's Mission. The circumstances affecting
the enemy provide a basis for deciding whether he may
desire to change or to maintain the existing situation.
From the conclusion thus reached, it is possible that the
general motives which will underlie his action may then be
deduced. A recognition of these general motives will be
helpful and may sometimes lead to an accurate deduction
of the enemy's Mission. The reason for deducing the
Enemy's Mission, when possible, is to narrow the scope of
the Estimate concerning the enemy.
The definite formulation of the Enemy Mission, how­
ever, is not always possible with sufficient accuracy to be
of benefit. Moreover, if it appears that a choice of Missions
is open to the enemy, the Commander may fall into error
by choosing one to the exclusion of the others. He may,
therefore, find it useful to set forth several Missions, any
one of which the enemy might reasonably be expected to
adopt.
Consideration of the Enemy Mission, therefore, should
be carried forward to its formulation, or to the point where
the Commander decides and states that formulation is
impracticable.
(b) Statement and Analysis of Enemy Courses of
Action. The Commander now sets forth, tentatively, the
Courses of Action which appear to be open to the enemy.
These Courses of Action may be derived from one or more
of the following:
The Enemy Mission., if the Commander has
decided that a definite prediction is justified.
A number of possible Enemy Missions.
The motives impelling the enemy to action, if
these are evident.
The apparent capabilities of the enemy.
Present or past tendencies of the enemy along
specific lines of endeavor.
The initial expression of each Course of Action should
be worded as simply as possible and may be merely a state­
ment of the nature of the action to be taken in creating or
maintaining a desired condition.
The Enemy Courses of Action are then subjected to
a close scrutiny. This analysis is to determine their relative
— 67 —

advantages and disadvantages by testing them for suitabil­

ity, and so far as it can be done at this time, for feasibility
and for consequences as to costs.
Suitability involves the question of conformity to the
Mission. The test for suitability answers the question:
"Will the Course of Action, if accomplished, completely
achieve the effect desired?"
Courses of Action which will not affect the Com­
mander's future action may be rejected at once. Similarly,
Courses of Action which, even if successful, will not com­
pletely accomplish the Enemy Mission or Missions, are also
rejected. Rejected courses may be included, if desired, to
show the reasons for rejection.
Feasibility takes cognizance of the means available,
the means opposed, and the characteristics of the theater,
and involves the question of practicability. In testing a
Course of Action for feasibility the Commander is weighing
the chance of success and the degree of difficulty that will
be encountered. The test for feasibility answers the
question: "Is there a reasonable chance of success, and what
degree of difficulty will be encountered?"
The Consequences as to Costs involve an estimate of
the probable diminution in relative fighting strength, in the
event either of success or failure. This test requires visual­
ization of the resulting situation and of its effect on con­
tinued action, in the more distant fiiture, toward the
creation or maintenance of a favorable military situation.
In applying the test of Consequences as to Costs, the
prospect of serious losses, alone, may not justify the re­
jection of a Course of Action. In certain situations, the
employment of a course may not be justified, despite the
expectation of relatively low costs. In others, it might
even be correct to adopt a course which requires a complete
sacrifice of the command.
The test for consequences as to costs answers the
question: "If the plan succeeds or fails, what will be the
resulting situation, in terms of fighting strength, with
respect to future action?"
While Courses of Action, both those of the enemy
and of the Commander, when first considered, may be tested
for feasibility and consequences on broad lines, those
retained for final comparison require more detailed
analysis. Provision for this is made in Section V of the
Estimate.
— 68 —
 The analyses by these three tests may develop the fact
that one or more of. the Courses of Action is practicable
only in restricted form. On the other hand, some may be
combined, in whole or in part, to form composite courses.
The analyses in this Section will determine, tenta­
tively, what Enemy Courses of Action are practicable,
and will indicate, at least in some cases, their
degree of desirability from the enemy point of view. In
certain instances, it may appear that but one Course of
Action remains open to the enemy, or that a certain one is
the most likely. While it will be manifestly of advantage if
the field can thus be narrowed, such restriction is justifiable
only if supported by sound reasons.
The conclusions of the Commander regarding the
Enemy Courses of Action will therefore take one of the
following forms:
(1) That only one stated Course of Action is
practicable.
(2) That several stated Courses of Action are
practicable, and that it is possible to ar­
range them in order of priority.
(3) That several stated Courses of Action are
practicable, but that no priority can be
indicated among them
IV. COMMANDER'S OWN COURSES OF ACTION.
(a) Appreciation of the Mission. The Mission was
originally stated in order to promote an understanding of
the ultimate objective, and to confine the Estimate within
certain limits. The Mission is now restated because an
appreciation of all its ramifications, in connection with the
background now established, is necessary if the Com­
mander is to evolve a plan which will meet his full
responsibilities. Where the motivating Task is subsidiary
to the Task of the Mission, it will also be re-stated for the
same reason. To facilitate cooperation, the Missions of
other task force commanders on the same echelon may
also be set down at this point.
The Commander studies the motivating Task and the
Purpose to ensure that he has a working concept of the
problem which confronts him. He not only weighs thought­
fully the implications of his assigned Task, but scrutinizes
the Purpose with equal care because that Purpose indicates
the integrated cooperative effort required of all Task Force
Commanders involved.
— 69 —
 (b) Statement and Analysis of Possible Courses
of Action. The Commander now considers the Courses
of Action open to him. Any Course of Action which it is
immediately apparent will not accomplish his full Task
is rejected. Such rejected courses, however, may
be included in the estimate if it is desired to show the
reason for their rejection.
The initial expression of each Course of Action may
be merely a statement of the nature of the action to be
taken in creating or maintaining a desired condition. Each
Course of Action is then analyzed from a broad standpoint
in order, so far as can be done at this time, to determine
its feasibility and consequences as to costs, in a manner
similar to that discussed in Section III.
Such analyses may develop the fact that one or more
of the Courses of Action is practicable only in restricted
form. On the other hand, some may be combined, in whole
or in part, to form additional composite courses.
The foregoing usually reduces the number of his own
Courses of Action which the Commander will retain for
further development, and for comparison with the probable
plans of the enemy.
Retained Courses of Action are now listed.
V.. DETERMINATION OF COMMANDER'S BEST

COURSE OF ACTION

(a) Analysis and Comparison of Opposing Suitable

Courses of Action. The present subsection of the Estimate
is designed to develop additional possibilities, implications,
and difficulties of retained Courses of Action by comparing
each, in detail, with such Enemy Courses as may be found
to oppose it. The purpose of this comparison is not to
determine, at this time, which of the Commander's
own Courses of Action is the most desirable, but is
to bring out the relative advantages and disadvantages of
each when considered in relation to enemy opposition.
The Courses of Action considered in this section have
satisfied the test of suitability. They have all, also, tenta­
tively proved their feasibility. However, a detailed con­
sideration of opposing operations may develop that certain
Courses, which in their broad aspects appeared feasible, now
must be discarded as infeasible. Such details are mentioned
as are necessary to show the character of the various
courses.

— 70 —
 (b) Final Evaluation of Commander's Courses ol
Action. The foregoing comparison of the Commander's
Courses of Action with those of the enemy has served to
narrow the field of his own desirable Courses of Action and
to bring out the salient advantages and disadvantages of
each. All that now remains to be done is to compare the
relative merits of the more desirable of the Commander's
Courses of Action.
In comparing relative merits of different Courses of
Action, the final tests of feasibility and consequences as to
cost should be applied. Feasibility measures the difficulty
of execution. Comparative consequences are developed
by a survey of the possible costs in terms of losses in fight­
ing strength, time, and disorganization, and with respect
to the value of success or the results of failure. Operations
by the Commander's forces that may be practicable and
effective should be listed and analyzed in considerable detail,
as well as operations that the enemy may undertake to
defeat him. The question here is: "How, When, and Where
will each Course of Action be carried out ?" Operations that
do not contribute to the successful execution of the Course
will be rejected; if the operations necessary for one Course
of Action can not be carried out with the means available,
at least a part of that course will require rejection. The
means available, the operations involved, and the Course
should all form an harmonious whole, and should cost no
more in losses than the Commander can afford.
When the Estimate is concerned with a tactical situa­
tion, the Courses of Action which will accomplish the Task
are necessarily based upon the capabilities of the types of
naval vessels, aircraft, or troops available, when in opposi­
tion to the enemy forces present. The suitable and feasible
Courses of Action or operations of each type should be
studied. Those which will best accomplish their part of
the Task, and which may best be coordinated with the best
courses of the other types, should then be selected. The
Courses of Action selected for the various types will then
be integrated into a single Course of Action for the force as
a whole.
In order to obtain a better and more clearly worded
Course, no hesitation need be felt in changing entirely the
character or wording of any Course of Action from that of
its initial expression. The essentials are that it express
the general nature of the action to be taken, designate the
— 71 —

objective, indicate the method by which it is to be accom­

plished, and cover the full scope of the motivating Task.
When the various Courses have finally been set down
in a manner that discloses all their parts, they may profit­
ably then be compared with historical precedents to develop
previously undisclosed weaknesses.
If the Commander intends to exercise close super­
vision over the execution of his plan, or if it requires close
cooperation between his task forces, he will naturally
consider operations in greater detail than if he expects to
grant wide discretion to certain subordinates.
The analysis of the operations involved requires con­
sideration of physical objectives, relative positions, appor­
tionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action, the
latter including the probable effects of enemy interference.
This comparison leads directly to the selection of the
best Course of Action, which will then become the basis
of the Decision. As previously pointed out, the selected
Course of Action may be designed to accomplish either
the full Mission, or only a portion of it, whichever has
formed the basis of the Estimate.
When the Estimate has been concerned with a very
large undertaking, or even when the Commander's own
Courses of Action are chiefly dependent upon what the
enemy may do, an attempt to visualize the operations
involved in a Course may show that future action can be
projected only part way toward the objective, or that the
objective can be attained only by a series of successive
steps. In such case, these separate steps will be clearly
defined as far into the future as possible, and a Course of
Action selected that, while covering the general aspects of
the entire problem, will be specific as regards only so much
of the future as can clearly be foreseen.
VI. THE DECISION
Its Formulation. The Decision, for purposes of the
estimate, represents the reasoned judgment of the Com­
mander as to the Course of Action that will best accomplish,
completely, the Task which has motivated the Estimate.
It differs from the selected Course of Action only in the
specific form which it assumes, and in the fact that it
includes the Purpose.
The form of the Decision is as follows:
What is to be done: that which is to be accomplished,
— 72 —
in terms of the action required in the attainment of a
particular objective, stated or implied.
How this is to be done: the methods to be employed,
or the general operations to'be carried out, in order to
accomplish the foregoing. The time and place elements of
ivhen and where will be indicated if necessary.
Why this is to be done: this is to accomplish the Task
of the Mission, or the Task which has formed the basis of
the Estimate.
The" Decision is therefore expressed as follows:
To (tuhat to do) by (hoiv, when and where to do it)
in order to (why it is to be done).
The Course of Action finally selected forms the Task
of the Decision. Sometimes it may be used intact. Some­
times it seems preferable to combine several of the
subsidiary courses or operations, in order to express their
relationship more precisely. Sometimes they may be re­
worded to improve clarity. The Decision, as finally written,
will not meet requirements unless it is clear and explicit,
and unless it covers the full scope of the Task which has
formed the incentive of the Estimate.
If the Commander has been unable, mentally, to
project operations throughout the entire space or time,
(or both, as the case may be) included in his selected Course
of Action, naturally the how, when and where of his
Decision can not envisage all of the details (nor, possibly,
even all of the separate steps) necessary in the attainment
of the ultimate objective. With the immediate and
ultimate objectives sharply defined, the Decision will,
in such case, indicate so much of the general
nature of the various steps as the Commander may deem
wise, and will clearly set forth the measures he elects to
adopt in the first step. Then, by retaining the Estimate in
a fluid state, and modifying it in accordance with eventual
information and developments, he will be prepared, at any
future time, to make decisions for meeting a more clarified
situation.
Its Execution. It now remains for the Commander
to provide for carrying the Decision into effect by making
the necessary plans, and issuing the necessary Directives.
In these Directives, he need embody only such parts of his
Decision as he may desire. It follows that he will, at the
beginning, employ no more of his Decision than is sufficiently
definite as to form a practicable basis for the operations
— 73 —

which he may wish to undertake at the start. If the

Estimate has concerned hypothetical situations, and if
several contingent Decisions have been reached, each will
be set down with the assumptions associated with it.
Therefore, it seems proper for the Commander, for
his own future reference, to indicate at this juncture,
whether or not he will immediately give effect to his full
Decision, or only to parts of it. If he decides to embody only
certain parts in several subsidiary plans, he may now
profitably formulate these parts into subsidiary Tasks, and
indicate, by appending a Purpose, that each is contributory
to the Task of the full Decision.
The Estimate of the Situation has now been com­
pleted. It is for the benefit of the Commander, whose
responsible judgment will dictate the extent to which it is
to be disseminated.

—74 —

 PART IV

THE FORMULATION OF DIRECTIVES

— 75 —

 CHAPTER X

NAVAL STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL DIRECTIVES

The principal strategical and tactical directives are
termed: Basic War Plans, Campaign Plans, Operation Plans,
Operations Orders, Battle Plans, and Battle Orders. Begin­
ning with the Basic War Plans, the objective of each direc­
tive becomes more immediate. The objectives of the War
Plans are those to be achieved by the war. Each Campaign
Plan has an objective which marks a distinct stage in the
prosecution of the war and contributes to the accomplish­
ment of the objectives contained in the War Plans. The
Operation Plans or Orders provide for the attainment of
the successive objectives of the campaign. Battle Plans,
including contributory Plans for Approach and Deployment,
and Battle Orders cover the immediate objectives of combat.
Minor directives are Sortie and Entrance Plans, Cruis­
ing Plans, Scouting Plans, Communication Plans, Logistic
Plans, and Movement Orders.
Basic War Plans delimit the Principal and Secondary
Theaters of Operations, designate the forces assigned to
these theaters, and assign broad strategic Tasks to these
forces. They form the origin of all war operations.
Campaign Plans. A campaign, as initially visual­
ized, is a clearly-defined stage of a war. A campaign, after
it has passed into history, sometimes bears the name
of a leader, or a seasonal or geographical designation. It
may consist of a single operation, or of successive or con­
current operations. The operations of a campaign have a
definite objective, the attainment or abandonment of which
marks the end of the campaign.
A Campaign Plan is the schedule of strategy which
the Commander intends to employ to attain his objective.
Such a Plan indicates the phases into which he proposes to
divide the campaign, indicates their sequence, and outlines:
(a) The general tasks involved in each phase, with
the order of their accomplishment, and usually,
(b) The forces to be made available for the first
phase.
The Campaign Plan is not primarily for promulgation
to the subordinate commanders, but is mainly for the
guidance of the Commander himself. When necessary for
information or approval, it is forwarded to higher author­
ity. To provide the necessary background, it may some­
— 76 —
times also be furnished to the principal subordinates. In
any case, the interests of secrecy demand that its distribu­
tion be extremely limited.
Operation Plans. An Operation Plan may cover
projected operations, or may be contingent upon the occur­
rence of a particular event, or combination of events. It
may be issued in advance of the event, and placed in
operation by special order. It provides for a single
operation, or for a series of operations, which may be
carried out in successive steps. It is prepared for dis­
semination to the command.
Usually, an Operation Plan covers more complex
operations than does an Operation Order, and projects
operations over a greater time and space. It is likely to
allow more latitude to subordinate commanders, and to
provide for a somewhat less direct supervision by the
issuing officer.
To provide for possible eventualities, the Commander
may formulate alternative Operation Plans, each of which
is based on stated assumptions.
Operation Orders. An Operation Order deals with
an actual situation, usually of limited scope, in which the
Commander considers that he possesses sufficient freedom
of action to complete the projected operations. The Opera­
tion Order, unless it contain a proviso to the contrary, is
effective upon receipt.
Battle Plans. A Battle Plan sets forth methods for
the coordinated employment of forces during action. If
prepared in advance, it usually is indicated as contingent,
and therefore states the assumptions upon which the Plan
is based.
Battle Plans may merely include provisions for a
particular combat, or they may include provisions for a
connected series of separate or coordinate combats, possibly
culminating in a general engagement, and all directed
toward the early attainment of a specified tactical objective.
Such combats may range, in scope, from engagements be­
tween single vessels to engagements between entire fleets.
Battle Orders are generally limited to the despatches
required to place a Battle Plan in effect, and to direct such
changes in plan as may be necessary during the progress
of battle.
The titles of the minor directives previously listed
indicate their general nature.
— 77 —
 CHAPTER XI

DETERMINATION OF THE DETAILS OF A DIRECTIVE

The Decision is the basis of the Commander's formu­
lated scheme of action for the accomplishment of his
assigned Task. If he decides that he can accomplish the
intermediate steps of his assigned Task by overcoming the
intervening obstacles, he may draw up a detailed plan to
carry through to attainment of the ultimate objective as
set forth in his Decision. Otherwise, he is not justified in
projecting his operations, in detail, any further into the
future than his Estimate of the Situation assures him of
freedom of action within reasonable limits. Under these
circumstances, he may decide to attain the objective of the
Decision in successive stages.
Each such stage will have an objective which con­
tributes to the attainment of the ultimate objective. Prior
to the complete attainment of his ultimate objective, the
circumstances may be so altered from those originally
envisaged as to require a new Estimate. From this
Estimate the details of the later stages will flow. This, in
broad outline, is the usual procedure involved in the conduct
of a campaign.
The conversion of a Decision into a Directive requires
the addition of the essential features not included in the
Decision, or that part of it selected for immediate execution.
It requires consideration of numerous possible operations,
and the selection of those which seem best under the
circumstances.
The size of his force influences, of course, the nature
of the details of execution which fall to a Commander to
determine; but however small the force, even though it be
a single vessel or a small unit, there will be details of execu­
tion to settle. Their number and complexity will neverthe­
less vary widely, and not all of the elements indicated here­
inafter will necessarily apply in all circumstances.
The Directive of a force which is to operate by sub­
divisions includes not only the Task of the force as a whole,
but also a number of subsidiary Tasks, one for each such
subdivision. Each such subsidiary Task is so drawn as to
give the Commander of each subdivision a clear outline of
his objective, his sphere of activity, and the manner in
which he is expected to operate in order to contribute most
effectively to the accomplishment of the Task of the entire
force.
— 78 —
 The Commander who is engaged in converting his
Decision into a Directive, therefore, finds useful a logical
system for evolving, from his Decision, those subsidiary-
Tasks which, assigned to his subordinates, will in their
sum accomplish his own Task.
The formulation of a Directive thus requires consid­
eration of the following: Operations Required, Organization
of Means and Formulation of Tasks, with particular atten­
tion to cooperation and security, Logistic Support, and
Measures Required for Exercise of Command.
Operations Required. The objective of the Decision, or
the intermediate objectives selected by the Commander,
determine the major features of the operations. Other
features flow from a consideration of the measures neces­
sary to ensure freedom of action. The character of the
theater, the total means available to the Commander, the
possible strength and type composition of the opposition,
the relative positions of the forces, and the effect desired,
determine the character of each operation, and the com­
position of the forces assigned thereto. Measures necessary
for cooperation, security, and the collection and dissemina­
tion of information are carefully considered. Finally, each
operation is tested to assure that it contributes to the entire
plan in the manner desired.
Organization of Means and Formulation of Tasks. In
determining the operations required, the Commander has
decided on the effect desired from each operation. This leads
directly to the formulation of Tasks. Each Task, as formu­
lated, is subjected to the tests of feasibility and of conse­
quences as to costs, both in the event of success and of fail­
ure. The tests establish the most desirable Tasks in each
case.
The formulation of each Task is intimately interwoven
with the apportionment of strength for its accomplishment.
The effect desired, the character of the theater, the probable
enemy opposition, and the Commander's total means avail­
able determine the means that he assigns to each of the
operations. A Commander ensures that the means assigned
to each operation are adequate for accomplishment of the
assigned Task. He then considers the special measures
that may be required for cooperation between the sub­
divisions of his force. He draws up tasks whose accomplish­
ment will provide security for the force, and thus conserve
its strength for expenditure in the attainment of the
— 79 —
designated objective. He also decides upon measures
necessary for the collection and dissemination of informa­
tion.
The assignment of means to each operation creates
the Task Organization. This involves the designation of
the appropriate title for each Task Force, the statement of
its composition, and the detail of its Commander. The
capabilities of his principal subordinates are considered in
deciding upon the commanders of the various Task Forces.
This necessarily affects the assignment of units to the
subdivision of the force.
The Logistic Support required for each operation of
the plan is next determined. This may include such matters
as the place and time at which required supplies are to be
available, units to be served, the operations of the Train,
and provisions for its security.
Exercise of Command. The measures necessary to
the exercise of command are now considered. They include
the plan of communication, the zone time to be used, assign­
ment of rendezvous, and determination of the location of
the Commander during the operation.
Preparation of the Formal Directive. After consid­
eration of the features mentioned, the Commander prepares
a Directive, using a standard form if it is suitable. If not,
he modifies it as necessary, taking care to include all essen­
tials, but being sure to follow the sequence of the form.
The Order Form, the simplest form which includes all the
essentials, is the model on which other types of Directives
have been patterned.

— 80

 CHAPTER XII
THE ORDER FORM
Being the model, the Order Form will be described
first. This will be followed by indicating wherein the Plan
Forms differ from the Order Form. For reference, outlines
of the forms of Operation Orders, Operation Plans, and
Despatch Orders follow Chapter XIII.
The following clerical details should generally be
adhered to, since, although not a matter of principle, they
have been in use for some years and are known to the Naval
Service:
(a) All numerals are spelled out, except as follows:
those in the Heading; the paragraph numbers;
and the communication index numbers.
(b) All geographical names and names of vessels are
spelled entirely with capitals.
(c) A narrow left-hand margin is left abreast the
Heading and the Task Organization and a
wider margin is left abreast the paragraphs.
(d) The main paragraph numbers are indented in the
wider margin.
(e) Task Force titles, wherever occurring, are under­
lined.
The sequence in which the subject matter is presented
is a logical arrangement which experience has shown to be
effective. Since every item has a definite place
in the Form, formulation is simplified and ready reference
by the recipient is facilitated.
In a written order, the prescribed paragraph number­
ing is always followed, even if no text is inserted in certain
paragraphs. This is done to indicate that the omission is
intentional. This practice serves as a check to the formula­
tor against accidental omission, and as confirmatory evi­
dence to the recipient that such omissions are intentional.
For example, if there is no new information to be dissemi­
nated, the paragraph number " 1 " is written in its proper
place, followed by dashes or such words as "No further
information."
When the subject matter to be presented under any
one paragraph is voluminous, it may be broken up into a
number of sub-paragraphs. Except in paragraph 3, these
sub-paragraphs are unlettered.

— 81 —
 The Heading contains:
In the upper right-hand corner in the following sequence:
(1) The title of the issuing officer's command, such
as Northern Scouts, Advance Force, etc., pre­
ceded in ascending order by the titles of all the
superior echelons in the chain.
(2) The name of the Flagship, as U. S. S. AUGUSTA,
Flagship.
(3) The place of issue. For example, NEWPORT,
R. I.; or Lat. 34°-40' N., Long. 162°-20' W.
(4) The date of issue: that is, the day, month, year
and hour of issue; for example, 12 July, 1935;
1100.
In the upper left-hand corner in the following sequence:
(5) The file notations and classification (Secret or
Confidential.) These are repeated on succeed­
ing pages.
(6) The type and serial number of the directive,
such as Operation Order No. 5.
The classification and type of directive are
underlined.
These are repeated on succeeding pages.
The Body. The Task Organization is the beginning
of the body of the order and consists of tabular enumeration
of the Task Forces into which the command has been di­
vided, the composition of each such Task Force, and the rank
and name of its commander. It is customary to omit the
name of the issuing officer from any Task Force command­
ed by him. Any unit included in a force named in the Task
Organization is, by virtue of that fact, directed to act under
the command of the Commander of that force.
The Train is not listed under the Task Organization
unless it accompanies, or acts in concert with, combatant
forces.
Each Task Force named in this table is preceded by a
separate letter, (a), (b), (c), etc. and its assigned Task is
set forth in a similarly lettered sub-paragraph in Para­
graph 3.
Paragraph 1 is the Information paragraph. It con­
tains such available information of Enemy and Own Forces
as is necessary for subordinates to understand the situation
and to cooperate efficiently. Paragraph 1 is devoted exclu­
sively to information, and contains no part of the Plan nor

—82 —

instructions of the Commander. Information of Enemy

and Own Forces is usually set forth in separate unlettered
subparagraphs. To promote cooperation, the principal
Tasks of the next adjacent forces of the same echelon may
be included. Where the immediate superior has prescribed
particular methods for cooperation and security, these may
also be set forth as a matter of information.
In this paragraph the distinction is definitely
drawn between information which is based upon established
facts, and that which is only conjecture. A Commander's
conjecture regarding the enemy may be essential to a proper
understanding of his own plan. Such conjectures, how­
ever, should be stated to be conjectures, and used with
discrimination.
When writing their own information paragraphs, sub­
ordinate commanders do not necessarily copy verbatim the
information contained in the order of their superior. Good
procedure calls for them to digest that information, select
what is essential, and present it with any additional infor­
mation considered necessary. Care is taken to include
necessary information of coordinate Task Forces.
Paragraph 2 states the Task of the force as a whole.
It expresses, in broad outline, the nature of the action to be
taken, and designates the objective. It may include the
methods of executing the Task, and its Purpose. The
amount of detail given in this paragraph is sufficient to
ensure a clear comprehension by the subordinates as to
what is to be accomplished by the force as a whole. It is
customary to begin with the words, "This force will"
followed by the pertinent part of the Decision showing (1)
WHAT is to be accomplished, and, when necessary for
clarification, (2) HOW, WHEN, WHERE it is to be done,
and (3) WHY it is to be done.
Paragraph 2 may, or may not, include the entire Deci­
sion reached in the Estimate. This paragraph may never,
properly, be left blank.
Paragraph 3 assigns individual Tasks to the sub­
divisions of the force. When necessary, measures for
security, cooperation, and the collection and dissemination
of information applicable to the individual subdivisions are
included.
The paragraph is divided into as many sub-paragraphs,
(a), (b), (c), etc., as there are Forces enumerated in the
Task Organization. Each sub-paragraph commences with
— 83 —

the designating letter in parentheses, followed by the title of

the Task Force, underlined. The principal Task which has
been formulated for each Task Force is stated first in each
sub-paragraph; minor Tasks follow in the order of
their importance or sequence of execution. After the state­
ment of the Tasks, these sub-paragraphs conclude with such
detailed instructions as are necessary.
Where two or more Task Forces have identical task
sub-paragraphs, those sub-paragraphs need be written but
once after the title of the Task Forces concerned, thus:
(a) Right Flank Force,
(b) Left Flank Force, followed by the common sub­
paragraph.
In order to avoid repetition in each of the sub-para­
graphs, any orders or instructions which apply to all Task
Forces, or which pertain to the general conduct of the
operation, are embodied in a final sub-paragraph, designated
as 3 (x). It is particularly necessary that the measures
required for cooperation, security, and the collection and
dissemination of information applicable to the force as a
whole, be included.
Paragraph 4 is the Logistic paragraph. It contains
the broad instructions concerning the logistic support neces­
sary for the success of the operation. It sets forth the
availability and location of services and supplies. If the
logistic instructions are too comprehensive, they are placed
in a Logistic Annex, to which reference is made in this
paragraph.
Orders for vessels of the Train engaged in non-com­
batant services are included in this paragraph, or in the
Logistic Annex. This paragraph should also prescribe the
measures to provide security for the Train.
Paragraph 5 is the Exercise of Command para­
graph. It contains the instructions which are considered
necessary for the control of the command during the opera­
tion, such as the plan of communication, zone time to be
used, rendezvous, and location of the Commander during
the operation.
The Ending consists of the signature, the list of
annexes, the distribution, and the authentication.
The Signature of the Commander issuing the Order,
with his rank and command title, is placed at the end, for
exampel: "John Doe, Vice Admiral, Commander Northern
Scouts."
— 84 —
 Annexes consist of amplifying instructions which are
too extensive, or-of such a character as to make them unde­
sirable, for inclusion in the Order itself. They contain de­
tailed instructions, in written form or in the form of charts
or sketches. Special Communication, Logistic, Sortie, Move­
ment, Cruising, Intelligence, Scouting, Screening, Approach,
and Deployment Plans are usually disseminated as annexes
to an Order. Letters of instruction may also be annexed.
Annexes are referred to in the appropriate paragraph of
the body of the Order, and are listed and serially lettered in
capitals at the end near the left-hand margin, immediately
below the body and the signature, and above the distribution.
Distribution indicates to whom the Order will be
transmitted, the medium of transmission, and as an essen­
tial feature of the Order, records this distribution for the
information of all concerned.
Standard distribution may be indicated, as "Distri­
bution I, II", etc.
Authentication. Each copy of the Order distributed
is authenticated by the Flag Secretary, who affixes his
signature, rank, and designation below the Distribution:
for example — "Richard Roe, Commander, Flag Secretary".

— 85 —

 CHAPTER XIII
PLAN FORMS AND DESPATCH ORDER FORMS
Campaign Plans, if promulgated, are usually in the
form of a letter of instructions. If it is found desirable to
employ the Order Form, the latter is modified as follows:
Heading. No change.

Task Organization. Not used.

Paragraph 1. In addition to the information to be

furnished, a statement is given of the

Assumptions forming the basis of the
Plan, if the Plan is contingent.
Paragraph 2. No change.
Paragraph 3. This shows the phases into which the
campaign has been divided; the differ­
ent Tasks which must be undertaken
in each phase, and the order of their
accomplishment; and usually the forces
to be made available for the first
phase.
Paragraph 4. No change.

Paragraph 5. No change.

Operation Plans and Battle Plans follow the Order

Form with the following modification: Paragraph 1 sets

forth, after Information, the Assumptions upon which the
Plan is based, if the Plan is contingent; Paragraph 2,
particularly if the Plan is complex, contains additional
instructions in order to clarify the will and intent of the
Commander; Paragraph 3 (x) directs the manner in which
the Plan is to be placed in execution.
The Despatch Order follows the Order Form except
that only the body of the Order is transmitted, and the Task
Organization is not set forth separately at the beginning of
the body. The title, name of the commander, and composi­
tion of each Task Force are set down at the beginning of
the sub-paragraph which contains the tasks and instructions
of that force. The main paragraphs are indicated by their
names, thus, Information, General Plan, Tasks, Xray,
Logistics, Exercise of Command. Each paragraph after
the first is further separated by the insertion of the word
Paragraph before its name.
If the Despatch Order is to be sent by radio, it must be
entirely recast in conformity with the requirements of radio
security.
— 86 —
 Minor directives may be cast in special forms, suit­
able for the particular kind of operation involved. How­
ever, they will include the essentials of all Directives.
Usually, the material follows generally the sequence of the
material of the Order Form. The special forms of minor
directives will not be discussed in this pamphlet.

- 8 7

APPENDIX

— 88 —

 OUTLINE OF OPERATION ORDER FORM.

File Notations TITLES OF THE

SECRET (or CONFIDENTIAL) SUPERIOR ECHELONS,
TITLE OF THE FORCE,
NAME OF SHIP, Flagship.
Operation Order PLACE OF ISSUE,
No Date and hour of issue.
TASK ORGANIZATION.
(a) Task Force Title, Rank and name of its commander.
Composition of Task Force.
(b) (Similarly enumerate other Task Forces after appropriate
letter (b), (c), etc.)
1. Information of enemy and own forces that affects the
Order and is needed by subordinate commanders. If no
further information is available, the statement "No further
information" is inserted. Indicate the tasks of adjacent
forces of the same echelon, and general measures prescribed
by the immediate superior for cooperation and security.
2. The General Task for the whole force for meeting the
situation covered by the Operation Order, and, if desired,
the methods of executing it, and its Purpose.
3. (a) Title of Task Force (a), followed by a statement of
the principal task, minor tasks, and detailed instructions
for the particular Task Force. Include directions as to
cooperation, security, and the collection and dissemination
of information, if necessary.
(b) Title of Task Force (b), followed by a sub-paragraph
of similar substance and arrangements as in (a) above.
(x) Instructions that apply to all Task Forces and that
pertain to the general conduct of the operation. Include
particularly measures for cooperation, security, and the
collection and dissemination of information.
4. Broad instructions concerning logistic support necessary
to the operation, orders to vessels of Train engaged in
non-combatant service, reference to Logistic Annex, if
one is prepared in connection with the operation, and
measures to provide security for the Train.
5. Provisions necessary to the exercise of command, such as
plan of communications, zone time to be used, rendezvous,
location of Commander during operation.
(Signature)
Rank,
Title of Command.
ANNEXES.
A. (Name)
B. do
Distribution.

(Authentication)

— 89 —
 OUTLINE OF THE OPERATION PLAN FORM

Pile Notations TITLES OF THE

SECRET (or CONFIDENTIAL) SUPERIOR ECHELONS,
TITLE OF THE FORCE,
NAME OF SHIP, Flagship.
Operation Plan PLACE OF ISSUE,
iMo Date and hour of issue.
TASK ORGANIZATION.
(a) Task Force Title, Rank and name of its commander.
Composition of Task Force.
(b) (Similarly enumerate other Task Forces after appropriate
letter (b), (c), etc.)
1. Information. Statement of information of enemy and own
forces that affects the Plan and is needed by subordinate
commanders. Indicate the tasks of adjacent forces of the
same echelon, and general measures prescribed by the
immediate superior for cooperation and security.
Assumptions. Statement of the assumptions upon which
the Plan is based, if the Plan is contingent. If not, the
notation as to assumptions is omitted.
2. The General Task for the whole force for meeting the
situation covered by the Operation Plan, the general
methods to be employed in executing it, and, if desired,
its Purpose. If additional matter is needed to convey
clearly the will and intent of the Commander, it may be
added.
3. (a) Title of Task Force (a), followed by a statement of
the principal task, minor tasks, and detailed instructions
for the particular Task Force. Include directions as to
cooperation, security, and the collection and dissemination
of information, if necessary.
(b) Title of Task Force (b), followed by a sub-paragraph
of similar substance and arrangements as in (a) above,
(x) Instructions that apply to all Task Forces and that
pertain to the general conduct of the operation. State­
ment of the manner in which the Operation Plan is placed
in execution. Include particularly measures for coopera­
tion, security, and the collection and dissemination of
information.
4. Broad instructions concerning logistic support necessary
to the operation, orders to vessels of Train engaged in
non-combatant service, reference to Logistic Annex, if
one is prepared in connection with the operation, and
measures to provide security for the Train.
5. Provisions necessary to the exercise of command, such as
plan of communications, zone time to be used, rendezvous,
location of Commander during operation.
(Signature)
Rank,
Title of Command.
ANNEXES.
A. (Name)
B. do
Distribution.
( Authentication)
— 90 —
 DESPATCH ORDER FORM.

FROM: OFFICER ISSUING ORDER.

TO: EXECUTING RECIPIENTS.
INFORMATION: OTHERS AFFECTED BY ORDER.
0105 INFORMATION PARAGRAPH GENERAL
TASK PARAGRAPH TASKS TASK FORCE TITLE
COMMANDER COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE
TASK FORCE TITLE COMMANDER
COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE PARA­
GRAPH XRAY PARAGRAPH LOGISTICS
PARAGRAPH EXERCISE OF COMMAND
PARAGRAPH OPERATION ORDER
(serial number) 1200

Caution: If the Despatch Order is to be sent

by radio, it must be entirely re­
cast in conformity with the
requirements of radio security.

91 —

 Outline of III. Enemy Courses of Action.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (a) Enemy's Mission. (Page 67)
(b) Statement and Analysis of Enemy Courses of
I. The Mission. Action. (Page 67)
(a) Summary of the Situation. (Page 59)
(b) The Formulation of the Mission. (Page 59) IV. Commander's Own Courser of Action.
II. Survey of Opposing Strengths. (a) Appreciation of the Mission. (Page 69)
(To include only such of the following factors as
appear to be necessary background for the (b) Statement and Analysis of Possible Courses of
later reasoning in Parts III to V.) Action. (Page 70)
*(a) Political Factors. (Page 62) V. Determination of Commander's Best Course of Action.
1. Internal Conditions.
2. External Relations. (a) Analysis and Comparison of Opposing Suitable
3. Alliances. Courses of Action. (Page 70)
*(b) Economic Factors. (Page 62) (b) Final Evaluation of Commander's Courses of
1. Finance. Action. (Page 71)
2. Industry. VI. The Decision.
3. Trade.
4. Raw Materials. (Page 72)
(c) Psychologic Factors. (Page 62)
1. Morale.
2. Training and Experience.
3. Racial or National Characteristics.
4. Personal Characteristics of Com­
manders.
(d) Character of the Theater of Operations.
(Page 63)
1. Hydrography, Topography.
2. Weather.
3. Duration of Daylight.
4. Phases of Moon.
5. Relative Positions, Distances.
6. Modification of Natural Formations.
(e) Information. (Page 64)
1. Information available to either bellige­ , „
rent \t
2. Means of obtaining and antr denying v
information.
3. Communication Facilities.
(f) Armed Forces. (Page 64)
1. Composition.
Type and Numerical Strength.
2. Material Characteristics.
Armament.
Life.
Mobility.
3. Condition.
4. Disposition.
(g) Logistic Support. (Page 65)
1. Availability and Adequacy.
2. Limitation imposed by Logistics.
(h) Summary of Strength and Weakness Factors.
(Page 65)
•Usually included only in an estimate of broad scope.
— 92 —
 COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

FORT EAVENWORTR KS

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