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Frank Sibley and Immanuel Kant are two dead philosophers. The similarity seems to end
shortly thereafter: their ideas about taste, aesthetics, the process of judgments of taste, the nature
of aesthetic properties, and the finer points of each couldn’t be more different. Kant is an old-
school aesthetician who is concerned with identifying and qualifying beauty, while Sibley aims
to turn the world of aesthetics on its head with bold, possibly unsupported, claims. And yet
amidst all this, these two stand on common ground when it comes to remarkably fundamental
Immanuel Kant’s definition of taste is that it is a reflective capacity that relies on the in-
tellect to engage in a certain special kind of thought: one that uses as its drive a feeling rather
than a rational procedure. Judgments made with the exercise of taste, then, differ from the sorts
of judgments one makes with their reason or intellect. For instance, upon entering an animal
shelter, I perceive a great number of small, furry, loud objects. They all have four legs and two
eyes and the like, but some of them will fit into the category of dog, and others will fit into the
category of cat.
This rational comparison of my perception (or, perhaps more accurately, the object of my
perception) to my concept of dog is what Kant calls a cognitive or logical judgment. Much like a
flow chart used by middle school children to identify various types of plants, these judgments are
step-by-step exercises in rationale. This does require a foreknowledge of the conditions that
govern Fuzzy Creature A’s prospective membership in the category of cat or dog, however.
Without this knowledge, or with faulty knowledge, there is no judgment of cat-ness or dog-ness
to be made.
This is all in contrast to the other kind of judgments: the aesthetic. They are not based on
the sort of object-condition comparison that the reason and intellect apply to determine cat-ness.
Rather, they are non-rational judgments which are governed by feelings. These judgments
(which use taste) are aesthetic, rather than cognitive: not only do they have no conditions to
compare either objects or feelings with, but Kant claims there is no analysis or cognition needed.
We only need a feeling to make an aesthetic judgment and exercise our taste: specifically, we
Not just any sort of pleasure, however. There are many different varieties of pleasures
that Kant realizes do not enable someone to make aesthetic judgments about the object in ques-
tion. For instance, he says that “hunger is the best sauce; and to people with a healthy appetite
anything is tasty provided it is edible.” 1 (Kant 207) The starving man can never be relied upon
to provide an aesthetic judgment of food, because his condition of hunger will unduly influence
his feelings, and Kant believes that only the freest of feelings (and, by extension,) judgments
It is to this end that Kant clarifies: a disinterested pleasure is the only variety of pleasure
that will give rise to aesthetic judgments. This kind of pleasure is not the sort that eating a meal,
no matter how delicious it is, will give you, as the disinterested pleasure is not a satisfaction of a
need or desire like hunger. Rather, disinterested pleasure is properly understood as one that is
not dependent on, and indifferent to, the object which we feel pleasure about. Kant claims “if a
judgment about beauty is mingled with the least interest then it is very partial and not a pure
Furthermore, Kant distinguishes three varieties of “liking” and splits them into interested
and disinterested, but these will be largely irrelevant to any comparison or contrast to Sibley and
his views. Suffice it to say that Kant views taste as one’s capacity to make judgments about an
object that are based not in reason, but in a sensation of pleasure derived from perceiving that
object. He subsequently will call the object that produces this feeling “beautiful.”
Frank Sibley adopts an almost entirely contrary position to Kant’s. It is most prudent to
start at the beginning, and I shall: Sibley’s concept of taste is that it is not a reflective capacity,
but rather, a perceptual ability. Not necessarily sensory perception like sight and hearing, but the
ability to discern and observe certain properties of objects. Sibley claims that, with a sufficiently
developed sense of taste, we can perceive aesthetic qualities. This enables us to make aesthetic
judgments about the object of our perception: by observing properties of objects about which we
This is not to say that all properties require taste to ascertain, however. Sibley has deftly
divided all the properties of the world into two categories: the aesthetic, which requires taste to
perceive, and the non-aesthetic, which doesn’t. Any idiot can see that the fire engine is bright red
and shaped like a box, because those are non-aesthetic properties which do not require taste to
observe. However, it takes a certain kind of idiot (one with taste) to perceive that the fire engine
has an aesthetic quality such as gracefulness or delicacy. They both observe the same size,
shape, color, and indeed, each non-aesthetic quality, but only the viewer with sufficient taste will
within the sphere of what might ordinarily (or historically, at least) be called an “aesthetic” qual-
ity. He notes that the traditional standby of beauty is a “thin” concept, which is merely self-
evaluative, and doesn’t actually describe the object which Kant or Hume or whomever is observ-
ing. Rather, it is a statement that declares a favorable or unfavorable reaction to the object. This
is in stark contrast to “thick” concepts, such as graceful or elegant, which relate both qualities
and properties of the object that is being observed. These are both descriptive concepts that are
subject-neutral: that is to say that even if I have an unfavorable reaction to the object, I can still
(provided I have sufficient taste to do so) recognize its gracefulness or elegance. Therefore,
these two, at least, are substantive (thick) concepts that do more than just relate how the subject
With that out of the way, Sibley further describes the function and use of taste. For in-
stance, while we need taste to perceive any given aesthetic property, we do not need it to per-
ceive any non-aesthetic property. This is because the entirety of non-aesthetic properties are
condition-governed; they have specific requirements (conditions) that can be identified and ap-
plied to infer the status of the property in any given object: either present or not. Squareness is a
condition-governed property: it is a necessary and sufficient condition for a two dimensional ob-
ject to have both four equal sides and four equal angles to be a square. The use of logic and ap-
plication of an inference or other faculty of the intellect means that we may safely conclude taste
This is because taste is a perceptual capacity, and so by definition, we use it not to deter-
mine which conditions are satisfied and which ones are not; we use it to observe the presence of
properties: for Sibley, aesthetic properties. The determination of conditions and whether or not
they are satisfied is a task for the intellect, not a perceptive mode of the brain. The very notion
would strike Sibley as ludicrous: it would be like asking the sense of smell to do algebra. This is
not to say that the senses are completely uninvolved, however. We need to be able to observe the
fire engine to see that it is red, just as we have to observe it to see that it is elegant, or use our
other senses to make that judgment. Sibley has not suggested that we are possessed of a sixth
It would seem, then, that Kant and Sibley could not be more diametrically opposed on
their views of the aesthetic and practically everything contained and implied therein. For in-
stance, even where they agree on the necessary involvement of taste in the process of making an
aesthetic judgment, Kant believes that taste is an intellectual capacity of an aesthetic (not logical
or cognitive) nature: a reflection on the sensory perception that we are being fed through our
eyes, ears, and other mucus membranes. Taste is, very specifically, the ability to feel the pleasure
caused by the imagination and the understanding being unable to agree on exactly what we are
seeing. It is a verdictive judgment that does not state anything about the object that is being per-
ceived.
Sibley’s take on taste, however, is as an ability to perceive certain qualities in an object:
the aesthetic properties that are not condition-governed. This is very much a statement about the
object in question: in fact, Sibley explicitly excludes “thin” concepts such as beauty (Kant’s
principle example) from being aesthetic, as a statement like that is only verdictive, and judg-
ments of taste are, by definition, statements about the properties of an object. The two are mutu-
ally exclusive, as a Kantian judgment of taste is a statement about how object O makes you feel,
whereas a Siblian judgment of taste describes the object O and its aesthetic properties.
What’s more, not only do these judgments not describe the same things, they aren’t even
based in the same functions of the brain. Kant claims that the judgments of taste are based on the
experience or sensation of his concept of “disinterested pleasure.” The inability of the imagina-
tion and understanding to come to an agreement about an object causes that sensation, and a per-
son with a developed taste will be able to feel this pleasure. The intellect is by definition in-
volved in this action, as the comparison that the imagination and understanding undergo can be
For Sibley, however, a judgment of taste is the judgment of the presence of a given aes-
thetic quality within an object. The intellect is explicitly left out of this judgment - the brain is
only involved to the extent that the brain is involved in identifying whether the color red is in-
volved in viewing the fire engine, that is to say, the very basic function of processing sensory
no reflection to be had. The act of making an aesthetic judgment is, very simply, grounded in the
Also worth noting is that Kant recognizes no distinction between thick concepts and thin
concepts. This is due in part to the zeitgeist in the field of aesthetics at the time: the focus was on
defining and quantifying beauty. As such, Kant ultimately comes to the conclusion that when we
make a judgment of taste, we arrive at the decision that the object that gives us that disinterested
pleasure is to be called “beautiful.” For Sibley, this would certainly be a thin concept: Kant is
not talking about any specific quality the object has, but rather the feeling that it produces within
him. Kant would probably not even consider Sibley’s thick concepts to have anything to do with
the aesthetic: the idea of aesthetic/non-aesthetic dualism was just slightly after his time, and con-
cepts like graceful and elegant had little to do with the traditional aim of beauty.
Additionally, Kant declares the connection between taste and the ability to experience the
pleasure associated with viewing an object to be very necessary. He does not claim that having
taste necessarily requires that one ever experience this disinterested pleasure, just that we have
the potential to experience it. Sibley, however, maintains a subject-neutral position with regard
to any sort of feeling or pleasure associated with the observing the object. His claim is that per-
ceptual capacity that we call taste does not involve any sort of pleasure or displeasure, and that
it’s entirely possible to observe something with an aesthetic property which does not arouse any
disinterested (or interested) pleasures within us. The judgment of taste for Sibley is merely a
perception that object O has aesthetic property A: this is no more dependent on a pleasure than
the observation that object O2 has the non-aesthetic property of redness. And I note that these
are not necessarily separate, either; if the observer has a fondness for red, it’s entirely possible
that there be a connection. Sibley simply calls this connection contingent (on some fondness for
Yet despite this seemingly unending parade of contrary arguments, definitions, and postu-
lations, Kant and Sibley do stand on some common ground. For instance, Sibley says that an
aesthetic property can never be condition-governed: the rational, logical mind takes no part in the
evaluation of the satisfaction of any qualifications for object O to have aesthetic property A;
more accurately, there are no such qualifications. Likewise, Kant claims that there is nothing the
rational, logical part of the brain can investigate or participate in with respect to the appraisal of
the aesthetic. Rather, it is precisely the dumbfoundedness of the understanding (and the useless-
ness of the imagination in assisting) in identifying object O that produces the feeling which Kant
will need to use his taste to reflect upon and judge for its aesthetic merit.
Therefore, Kant is committed to the belief that there can be no conditions that govern the
aesthetic value, because to have any would contradict the clause about aesthetic judgments not
utilizing the cognitive, logical parts of the brain. Likewise, Sibley commits to the same concept,
but only because he has separated the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic groups of qualities, and
It’s not exactly a prerequisite, but once he makes the first move to separate the aesthetic
from the non-aesthetic properties, keeping them separated involves removing the logical, rational
parts of the brain from the process of the aesthetic judgment. If he doesn’t, Sibley’s claims about
aesthetic judgments fall through, because aesthetic properties are supposed to require a special
ability called taste in order to perceive. So this separation makes sure that the aesthetic proper-
ties require taste, and not ‘taste or rational capabilities to evaluate condition-satisfaction.’
Lastly, and not entirely least, both Kant and Sibley believe that judgments about the aes-
thetic are necessarily universal. For Sibley, this is because any aesthetic judgment is descriptive:
it is a statement about the object O that has aesthetic property A. Since this is a real property of a
real object, it’s impossible that its aesthetic property A could be anything less than universal, and
likewise, the judgment about this object would similarly have to be universal. To claim subjec-
tivity within Sibley’s view is to claim that the properties are permitted to exist for some observ-
ers and not for others: can a fire engine appear red to me, and not red to you? We’re certainly
incapable of comparing our individual concepts of “red,” but to say that one of us is able to per-
ceive a quality that the other can’t is to posit a very ontologically pessimistic world.
For clarification, this could happen if one of my senses is defective: the blind man’s per-
ception of the fire engine is certainly permitted to differ from mine with regard to color. Like-
wise, my perception of the fire engine is allowed to not completely coincide with yours if my
taste is unrefined or similarly malfunctioning. These are differences in perception, but whether
or not a property is perceived, it still exists. That much is a universal aesthetic for Sibley.
Kant argues in favor of what he calls “subjectively universal” aesthetic judgments: he
claims that when we believe something is beautiful, we do not hold that belief as an opinion, but
rather as a universal imperative. It’s not that we think everyone else should defer to our judg-
ment, but that everyone ought to agree with us because we are correct. This specific kind of be-
lief that not only are we right, but everyone else is obligated to recognize this is proof enough for
Kant that while our judgments are subjective, they may also be regarded as universal, provided
In conclusion, Kant and Sibley are still very dead. They are also very much different in
their philosophies of taste, judgments of taste, aesthetic judgments, and the distinction (if any)
between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. It’s all too easy to examine their philosophies
and see nothing but the glaring differences in just about every conclusion they reach. But even
these two can find some common ground on the conditions that govern aesthetics (or lack