pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
CHAPTER 1
Kinds of Memory
HENRY L. ROEDIGER III, ELIZABETH J. MARSH, AND STEPHANIE C. LEE
Memory is a single term, but refers to a mul-
titude of human capacities. There are many
different kinds of memory. Philosophers have
analyzed memory for 2,000 years; psychol-
ogists have studied the topic experimentally
for 115 years; and neuroscientists have ex-
amined the neural bases of memory for the
past 70 years. All these attempts have re-
vealed much about phenomena of memory—
our understanding has increased in leaps and
bounds—but there remains no generally
agreed-upon classification of the kinds of
memory that exist. Many categorizations do
exist, but the difficulty is that experts dis-
agree on which classification is best. Analyz-
ing this problem in 1972, Tulving remarked:
“In a recent collection of essays on human
memory edited by Norman (1970) one can
count references to some twenty-five or so
categories of memory, if one is willing to
assume that any unique combination of an
adjectival modifier with the main term refers
to something other than any of the refer-
ents of other unique combination” (Tulving,
1972, p. 382). Many more adjective-noun
combinations exist in 2002 than in 1972
(implicit memory, flashbulb memory, and
working memory, to name just three terms in-
troduced since then), but a universally
accepted categorization scheme does not
exist. There is no periodic table for types of
memory.
1
The foregoing considerations make it
difficult to write a chapter on “varieties of
memory.” However, they should not be cause
for undue alarm. Yes, the field of inquiry into
human memory is in flux and full of healthy
disagreement. But to say that there is no uni-
versal agreement on a categorization scheme
for types of memory is not to say that there
is no agreement. In this chapter we present
a set of categories that reflect current theo-
rizing for many (and maybe most) psycholo-
gists who study human memory. The typology
we present is not perfect, as we will see, and
some would disagree with it; nonetheless, we
see the categorization system we describe here
reflected in many articles, chapters, and text-
books. Briefly, we consider types of memory
ordered generally by their persistence, begin-
ning with fleeting sensory memories and then
moving on to short-term or working mem-
ory (holding information in mind and work-
ing with it). We finally turn to the many types
of long-term retention. This scheme implies
sharp boundaries between the length of time
information is held by these various types of
memory, but in truth the differences are more
shades of gray; one type of memory blends
into another. Still, the framework is useful.
The chapter begins by considering grounds
for distinguishing among types of memory.
The next section presents some broad distinc-
tions between different classes of memory or
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
2 Kinds of Memory
tests of memory, such as explicit and implicit,
which have proved useful to the field. Next
we consider a brief overview of the typology
of sensory, working, and long-term memories.
The remainder of the chapter fleshes out these
different types of memory.
GROUNDS FOR DISTINGUISHING
TYPES OF MEMORY
We present four different bases for distin-
guishing among types of memory: phenom-
enology of memory, differences among
memory tests, dissociations between forms of
memory, and different neural systems under-
lying memory.
Phenomenology of Memory
Philosophers have often proposed distinctions
among forms of memory chiefly on the basis
of the types of experience or the language
of expression to which they give rise. For
example, the philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949)
distinguished between declarative memory
(making declarations about the past) and pro-
cedural memory (carrying out actions based
on past learning) in part on the basis of differ-
ent language forms. He argued that these two
types of knowledge are accompanied by dif-
ferent verbal expressions. People say “I know
that . . .” when accessing declarative knowl-
edge, but “I know how . . .” when referring to
procedural knowledge: “I know that Ottawa
is the capital of Canada,” but “I know how to
tie my shoes.”
Similarly, Tulving (1985a) argued that
distinct forms of memory are accompanied
by different types of mental experience. For
example, episodic memory (memory for epi-
sodes in specific times and places) is accom-
panied by the experience of remembering,
or mentally traveling back in time and, in a
way, re-experiencing the events. Tulving re-
ferred to remembering as reflecting autono-
etic (self-knowing) consciousness. Semantic
memory (the general knowledge of facts) is,
he argued, accompanied by noetic (knowing)
consciousness. (We remember salient events
of our lives; we know Napoleon was a French
emperor). Finally, procedural memory in
Tulving’s system is anoetic (not knowing) in
its state of conscious experience. That is, com-
plex, practiced procedural skills (riding a bi-
cycle, tying one’s shoes, serving a tennis ball)
are executed with little conscious mediation
and control once the action has been started.
Other forms of memory, such as flashbulb
memories, have also been advanced largely
on phenomenological grounds. For example,
flashbulb memory refers to the quality of
vivid recollection that exists for some memo-
ries of particularly highly charged emotional
events that are often discussed later in one’s
life (Brown & Kulik, 1977).
All these forms of memory and others are
supported by differences that most people
experience and to which they can relate. How-
ever, psychologists have repeatedly found that
introspection alone is a poor means for mak-
ing and defending critical psychological dis-
tinctions. Usually, experiential differences are
taken, at best, as a starting point for mak-
ing distinctions among types of memory that
need to be verified by other means. For ex-
ample, Tulving (1985a) proposed a technique
that led to a program of research to vali-
date his distinction between remembering and
knowing the past (see Gardiner & Richardson-
Klavehn, 2000).
Differences among Expressions
of Memory
Psychologists have devised a large number of
ways to assess a person’s knowledge and to
test memory. Of course, there are standard-
ized tests of general knowledge or facts, such
as the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT), and
there are other standard tests specifically for
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
memory of recent experiences such as the
Wechsler Memory Scale. However, psycholo-
gists studying memory have created a plethora
of memory tests for both laboratory study and
life that test many different abilities. In the
lab, people may study a long series of words
or pictures. Tests for these materials can in-
clude free recall (recall the items in any order
on a blank sheet of paper), cued recall (what
presented item was associated with lemon?),
serial recall (report the items in order), or
recognition (pick old or studied items from
new, nonstudied items). There are many other
forms of testing for stimuli presented in a lab-
oratory context, as well as tests of knowledge
acquired in life, too (such as the test of TV
shows that lasted only one season in Squire &
Slater, 1975).
No one has ever proposed that all these
different tests represent different forms of
memory. However, some distinctions pro-
posed to classify types of memory reflect
differences observed between tests, such as
differences between general knowledge tests
(semantic memory) and those for personal ex-
periences (episodic memory). The task, then,
is to find out which memory tests behave sim-
ilarly when certain independent variables are
manipulated and which tests respond differ-
ently. The next section presents this logic of
classifying tests based on whether they pro-
duce patterns of results that are similar to or
different from one another.
Dissociations among Memory Measures
Perhaps the primary method of distinguishing
between different types of memory is finding
interactions between independent or subject
variables and performance on different mem-
ory measures. For example, injury to certain
parts of the brain (especially the hippocampus
and surrounding areas in the medial tempo-
ral lobe) renders people amnesic for certain
types of information (Squire, 1992). When
Grounds for Distinguishing Types of Memory 3
amnesic patients are examined on tests of
memory and compared to control subjects
matched on age and education, they typi-
cally show impaired retention on certain types
of tests but not others (for a review, see
Moscovitch, Goshen-Gottstein, & Vriezen,
1994). For example, measures of short-term
memory (retention of digits or words over
brief periods without distraction) are often
comparable to those of healthy control sub-
jects, but certain measures of long-term mem-
ory (e.g., free recall of a list of words after a
delay of several minutes) are greatly impaired.
This outcome leads to the conclusion that, at
a minimum, these two different memory tasks
(short-term digit memory and long-term free
recall) tap different types of memory.
The same sort of outcome can also be
obtained between measures of memory in
normal, healthy adults by manipulating inde-
pendent variables. That is, some factor can be
varied and be shown to have a strong effect on
one measure of memory and either no effect or
even an opposite effect on a different measure
of memory (see, e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981;
Jacoby, 1983). Once again, at a minimum we
can conclude that the measures reflect differ-
ent types of memory capacity.
There are dozens of types of memory tests,
and many can be dissociated from one another
by manipulating subject, material, or indepen-
dent variables. Test differences can be useful
for attempting to “carve nature at its joints,”
but there are so many differences among tests
that it is hard to know how to classify them.
Although test dissociations are critical in the
enterprise of identifying types of memory,
most classification systems focus rather arbi-
trarily on a few test differences while ignoring
many others.
Neural Systems Underlying Memory
In the past 20 years, much research has been
directed towards understanding the neural
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
4 Kinds of Memory
systems underlying memory. Just as percep-
tual systems can be divided based on differ-
ences in function and neural circuitry (the
visual system, the auditory system, etc.), so
the hope is that memory can be fractionated
in similar ways (e.g., Schacter & Tulving,
1994). Most of the data brought to bear
on human memory have come either from
studies of brain-damaged patients or from ex-
periments that use neuroimaging techniques
(positron emission tomography [PET] or
functional magnetic resonance imaging
[fMRI]). These techniques have been useful
for finding differences among types of mem-
ory. As already noted, patients with damage to
the hippocampus and surrounding areas show
great losses on some types of memory tests
(such as free recall) but not on others (short-
term memory tests and priming on implicit
or indirect memory tests). Similarly, neu-
roimaging techniques often show differences
between tests of memory in the component
neural processes that underlie the test. These
facts may help specify neural differences
between tests of memory. Of course, when-
ever a dissociation occurs between two mem-
ory tests at the behavioral level as a func-
tion of independent variables, there must
be neural differences (Roediger, Buckner, &
McDermott, 1999). That is, assuming that the
brain is the cause of behavior, if there are
differences in behavior, there must be dif-
ferences in the neural mechanisms causing
the behavior. This statement is as true in un-
derstanding differences between measures of
memory as in understanding any other be-
havioral phenomena. Therefore, differences
in neural underpinnings of memory may help
solve the classification problem in some ways,
but dissociations among behavioral measures
of memory remain fundamental.
Although there is no acid test of any type
of memory, researchers look to converging
evidence from a variety of sources. The pri-
mary types of evidence are those just dis-
cussed: phenomenology, test differences, dis-
sociations among measures, and differences
in neural underpinnings.
BROAD DISTINCTIONS
AMONG TYPES OF MEMORY
In this section we cover important distinc-
tions that have been proposed to cut across
a variety of types of memory. Some of these
refer to types of memory tests, whereas
others are intended to refer to temporal prop-
erties of memory or different types of repre-
sentation.
Declarative/Procedural Memory
As noted above, Ryle (1949) proposed a fun-
damental distinction between declarative and
procedural memory, or “knowing that” and
“knowing how.” The modern champion of
this distinction has been Squire (e.g., Squire
1987; Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993),
who originally distinguished between declar-
ative and procedural memory but more re-
cently has preferred to cast the contrast
between declarative and nondeclarative cate-
gories. Declarative memory, in this typology,
is composed of episodic memory and seman-
tic memory. Episodic memory is defined as
memory for events (Tulving, 1972); one must
retrieve the time and place of occurrence in
order to retrieve the event, as in answering
the question, “Where did you go on vacation
last summer?” The retrieval query specifies
the time, but in order to recall the events, the
rememberer must retrieve the place where the
events occurred. Semantic memory refers to
relatively permanent knowledge of the world,
or generic knowledge. (Generic memory has
been suggested as a substitute for semantic
memory because the knowledge may not
always be meaningful; Hintzman, 1978). Our
knowledge that zebras have four legs, that
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
the chemical symbol for oxygen is O, and
that Joe Dimaggio was a baseball player, as
well as thousands of other facts, constitutes
our permanent knowledge or semantic mem-
ory. One idea about the relationship between
episodic and semantic memory is that repeat-
edly experienced events may become repre-
sented in a decontextualized form in seman-
tic memory. That is, the first time you heard
“Thomas Jefferson served as president of the
United States,” you might have encoded the
fact within episodic memory, but after hun-
dreds of exposures you can answer “Who was
third president of the United States?” without
having to retrieve any specific episode (a par-
ticular time or place) in which you heard this
fact.
The distinction between episodic and se-
mantic memory is clear at a descriptive level,
as proposed in the above paragraph, but re-
mains controversial among some researchers.
Even those accepting a clear division ar-
gue about the relationship between these two
systems and other systems, such as proce-
dural memory. Tulving (1985b; 1999) has
proposed that procedural memory is oldest
in terms of evolution and is shared by all
animals. Semantic memory is thought to be
a more recent adaptation during the evolu-
tion of the brain and neurocognitive systems,
and episodic memory is thought to be rela-
tively recent in terms of evolution and per-
haps unique to humans. Tulving (1999) has
argued that the development of episodic mem-
ory was necessary for humans to think about
the future as well as the past and was critical
for the development of civilizations. Unless
one has a concept of the future and can think
beyond the here and now, Tulving suggests,
there is no reason to farm, to build cities, and
so on.
According to Squire (1987), procedural (or
non-declarative, to use the later term) mem-
ory encompasses a very broad range of hu-
man skills and abilities: classical condition-
Broad Distinctions among Types of Memory 5
ing, motor skill learning, priming phenom-
ena on certain tasks, complex (skill-based)
problem solving, and more. All these and
others would represent subcategories of non-
declarative memory.
Distinguishing experimentally among
types of memory is a challenge. At one
point it was popular to distinguish between
tasks that were thought to reflect (rather
purely) episodic memory, semantic memory,
or procedural memory (Tulving, 1983). Thus,
for example, a standard recognition memory
experiment was thought to reflect episodic
memory, whereas asking general knowledge
questions (“What is the capital of Missouri?”)
was thought to reflect semantic memory.
Problems abound, however, and the simple
idea that tasks and memory systems map on
to one another in a simple fashion has been
abandoned. Performance on standard recog-
nition tests is now thought to reflect some
combination of episodic and semantic mem-
ory systems (Tulving, 1985b), and there may
even be a dash of procedural memory tossed
in (when one claims to recognize an event
because it is fluently processed; see Jacoby
& Dallas, 1981, for the idea that percep-
tual fluency helps drive recognition perfor-
mance).
In addition, others have argued that there
is a procedural component to all acts of re-
membering, even on supposed declarative or
episodic tests (Kolers & Roediger, 1984). The
mental procedures instantiated during a test
can alter the pattern of data obtained, even in
standard episodic tasks such as serial learning
(see Slamecka, 1977) or recognition memory.
Tulving (1983, pp. 303–308) showed that even
the seemingly trivial change in tasks between
subjects saying yes or no to putting checks
and crosses next to each item on a recognition
test can affect the outcome of the experiment.
However, if all tasks have a procedural (or
nondeclarative) component, then the strongest
form of the distinction between declarative
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
6 Kinds of Memory
and procedural memory becomes difficult to
defend. Still, in the pure cases (tying one’s
shoes versus remembering pictures on a free
recall test), the distinction is clearly sensible.
Explicit/Implicit Memory
Graf and Schacter (1985) first proposed the
distinction between explicit and implicit
memory (for a history of the idea, see
Schacter, 1987). The basic distinction is be-
tween tests that directly request memories
from the past (explicit tests) and those that
measure retention indirectly, without subjects
necessarily being aware that their responses
reflect memory at all. Explicit tests are those
such as free recall, cued recall, and recog-
nition in which subjects are required to re-
trieve events from the recent past. Implicit
tests are transfer tests: People are exposed to
some material and then later given an osten-
sibly unrelated task (such as naming picture
fragments or completing word fragments such
as e e h n ). Sometimes items in a prior study
phase may help, or prime, performance on the
test. For example, if subjects were to see either
a picture of an elephant or the word elephant
in the first phase of the experiment, those who
saw the picture would be better able to name
the fragmented picture of the elephant than
would those who saw only the word. Con-
versely, on the word fragment completion test,
studying the word but not the picture would
produce a benefit (Weldon & Roediger, 1987).
The measure on implicit memory tests is typ-
ically priming, or the benefit of recent expo-
sure to material on a later task that measures
transfer.
Explicit memory tests measure conscious
recollection, whereas implicit tests reflect
retention that has been variously described
as automatic, incidental, or even unconscious.
Debate swirls around how to characterize
performance on implicit memory tests. At
least two types of priming occur: perceptual
(data-driven) or conceptual (meaning-driven)
(Blaxton, 1989; Roediger, 1990). Tests such
as completing fragmented words or pictures
are perceptual in that basic perceptual manip-
ulations such as modality of study (auditory
or visual; symbolic form, i.e., words or pic-
tures) have great effects on perceptual implicit
memory tests and little or no effect on concep-
tual implicit tests (McDermott & Roediger,
1996). On the other hand, conceptual implicit
tests (like explicit tests) are often affected by
manipulations of meaning, such as levels of
processing or the difference between gener-
ating material and reading it (Blaxton, 1989;
Srinivas & Roediger, 1990).
Conscious/Unconscious Forms of Memory
The term unconscious memory calls to mind
the concept of repression and the writings
of Sigmund Freud, who popularized the idea
in the early 1900s (e.g., Freud, 1917/1982).
Briefly, the notion is that painful childhood
memories are too threatening to the psyche
and so are banished to an unconscious state,
or repressed. The memories remain active,
creeping out in neurotic symptoms, in slips,
and in dreams. The evidence for this form
of unconscious memory is scanty (although
there is some evidence for it; see Erdelyi,
1996), but the general idea that memories can
be outside the realm of consciousness is un-
contested. Try to remember the name and face
of your sixth grade teacher and you may well
succeed. Until you were asked the question,
that knowledge was in an unconscious state.
By definition, most of our knowledge is un-
conscious (in this limited sense) at any one
point in time.
Conscious recollection in contemporary
studies of memory refers to deliberate, effort-
ful remembering in Tulving’s (1985a) sense of
traveling back in time and reliving an experi-
ence. Unconscious retention typically refers
to the automatic display of past experience
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
on some test such as an implicit memory
test. In the very first experiments on mem-
ory, Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) proposed a
relearning/savings technique for measuring
memory because it could potentially detect
unconscious knowledge (Slamecka, 1985).
Modern implicit memory tests can potentially
do the same. In addition, Jacoby (1991) pro-
posed a process dissociation procedure that
separates contributions of memory tests into
conscious and unconscious components by
employing an ingenious combination of
experimental conditions.
Voluntary/Involuntary Retention
The contrast between voluntary and invol-
untary retention covers much the same con-
ceptual territory as do the explicit/implicit
or conscious/unconscious contrasts. There is
a slightly different twist, however. Voluntary
retention refers to deliberate, willful recollec-
tion; the person actively tries to remember (as
on explicit tests). In its purest form, involun-
tary retention refers to recollection without
effort. However, voluntary remembering may
reflect automatic processes, and vice versa.
For example, if I am trying to remember
an event from my childhood and a similar
event recently occurred in my experience, I
may be primed to remember more easily the
childhood event (I might think that I am re-
membering the childhood event of my own
volition, not being aware of the unconscious
influence of the recent experience). Similarly,
in a case of involuntary or incidental retention,
one might try deliberately to use the recent
past as an aid. One complaint about implicit
memory tests such as completing fragmented
words is that subjects may use the cues de-
liberately to remember the past (e.g., Jacoby,
1991).
An interesting case occurs when conscious
recollection follows automatic retrieval—a
situation that has been called involuntary
Broad Distinctions among Types of Memory 7
conscious recollection (Richardson-Klavehn,
Gardiner, & Java, 1996). Briefly, a thought
or concept might come to mind unbidden,
with no apparent source for the memory.
Later, however, the source can be determined,
and the rememberer realizes, after some
reflection, “Oh, I must have thought of that
because of my recent experience.” The study
of conscious and unconscious experience is
one of the central issues in the contempo-
rary psychology of memory, which uses ex-
plicit and implicit memory tests, the remem-
ber/know procedure, and the process dissoci-
ation procedure.
Retrospective/Prospective Memory
Retrospective memory refers to memory for
the past—we reflect back and recollect what
has happened to us. Thus far we have de-
scribed only situations involving retrospective
memory: Remembering one’s childhood, rec-
ognizing a picture studied earlier in an experi-
ment, and completing a word fragment with a
recently seen word are all examples of mem-
ory for the past. Prospective memory refers
to a situation in which the focus is on the
future: how we remember to do things in the
future. Outside the lab, we face this task all
the time—remembering to pick up milk on
the way home, remembering to take one’s
antibiotic twice a day, and so on. The standard
laboratory paradigm for studying prospec-
tive memory requires subjects to remember to
perform a secondary task (e.g., press a key)
when they see a target cue embedded in
their primary task (e.g., whenever a specified
word occurs in a text; Einstein & McDaniel,
1990). Prospective memory researchers have
also used more naturalistic versions of this
paradigm such as having participants remem-
ber to call the lab on a particular day at a par-
ticular time (e.g., Maylor, 1990). Although
prospective and retrospective memory refer
to clear categories descriptively, it is not yet
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
8 Kinds of Memory
clear whether the two types of memory tests
involve different processes. That is, effects
of independent and subject variables may be
generally the same for prospective memory
tests and retrospective memory tests that are
equated on other features.
Code-Specific Memories
A central concept in the study of memory
is recoding: Stimuli in the outside world are
not copied into the brain, but rather recoded.
Psychologists refer to modalities of coding—
we can remember events as mental images or
verbal descriptions, or perhaps remember the
smell and the feel of past events. Psycholo-
gists have tended to focus on verbal recod-
ing, the conversion of experience into words
or schemas or scripts, with the assumption
that verbal coding is ascendant in adult hu-
mans (e.g., Glanzer & Clark, 1963). Although
language is important, spatial/imaginal repre-
sentations also underlie much of experience
(e.g., Paivio, 1986; Kosslyn, 1995). Memory
for odors seems to have special properties,
so olfactory coding is also important (Herz
& Engen, 1996). Motor coding may be crit-
ical at times; performing motor actions to a
command makes simple events more memo-
rable than does either hearing the command
or imagining performance of the command
(see Nilsson, 2000). Therefore, all these cod-
ing modalities are ways of representing expe-
rience, and each probably has distinct neural
substrates.
THE MODAL MEMORY TYPOLOGY:
SENSORY, WORKING, AND
LONG-TERM MEMORY
The distinctions discussed earlier represent
terms that refer to the varieties of memory
and memory experience. We now outline one
categorization scheme of memories that is
based, roughly speaking, on the degree of their
persistence. However, we must admit at the
outset that attempts to categorize memories
by their longevity are fraught with difficul-
ties, as sharp boundaries do not exist. One
type of memory usually blends into another.
Still, the three main categorizations presented
here represent a starting place.
Sensory Memories
Sensations are not coded instantaneously in
the brain; rather, the sensations from the re-
ceptors (the sense organs) linger in the ner-
vous system as information is being processed
by higher cortical centers. This sensory per-
sistence reflects a fleeting memory of the out-
side world in what is thought to be a relatively
faithful, unrecoded form. Although sensory
memories are thought to exist for all senses,
those most studied are for vision and audition.
Iconic Memories
The sensory memory for vision is referred
to as iconic memory. Sperling (1960) devel-
oped a standard technique for its study. He
presented subjects with arrays of letters for
very brief periods (20 ms) and asked them to
report parts of the array. The entire array was
too large to be reported from a single glimpse,
but he reasoned that if the letters were held in a
sensory store, people could rescue items when
directed to do so. He presented a tone vary-
ing in pitch (to direct attention to one line) ei-
ther just as the array was finished or at various
brief times afterward. He wanted to see if sub-
jects could report parts of the array and if this
ability would rapidly decrease (as the array
faded or was forgotten) from the iconic store.
Sperling’s experiments confirmed the exis-
tence of the iconic store and estimated its du-
ration at about a quarter of a second, under his
conditions. However, other techniques have
produced a quite different estimate, at around
100 ms compared with Sperling’s longer es-
timate (e.g., Haber & Standing, 1970). These
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
The Modal Memory Typology: Sensory, Working, and Long-Term Memory
different estimates can be reconciled by as-
suming that there are really two different brief
visual stores with different neural bases in the
early visual system (Crowder & Surprenant,
2000). One type of visual persistence seems
to correspond to the experience we all have
of visual afterimages, such as when a photo-
graphic flash persists before our eyes for a
brief period after the flash.
Echoic Memories
The sensory memory for hearing is called
echoic memory for the presumed brief echo
that perseveres in the nervous system after in-
formation is heard. The existence of echoic
memory is supported by an auditory paral-
lel of the Sperling partial-report technique
just described (Darwin, Turvey, & Crowder,
1972). Subjects heard briefly presented
sounds from three different locations; in the
whole-report condition they recalled as much
as possible, whereas in the partial-report con-
dition they were cued to recall from just one
of the three locations. The partial-report tech-
nique led to higher estimates of echoic mem-
ory capacity, although this advantage disap-
peared after the signal to respond was delayed
by about 4 s.
As with iconic memory, there seem to be
two different forms of brief auditory persis-
tence, one more short-lived than the other.
The shorter form lasts only hundreds of mil-
liseconds, but the longer one may last be-
tween 2 and 10 seconds (Cowan, 1984). These
echoic memories presumably help in compre-
hending speech and other auditory signals that
change rapidly over time (Crowder, 1981).
Working Memory
The term working memory is used to describe
a temporary memory system in which infor-
mation is maintained and manipulated for a
short period of time (Baddeley, 2000a). For
example, one draws upon working memory
9
when solving an addition problem such as
384 + 743 without a calculator or pencil and
paper. In order to accomplish this task, one
must temporarily store the addends, add the
last digits together, maintain this outcome
while adding the next two digits together, and
so forth, until the final solution is computed.
This notion of working memory is a fairly re-
cent one, and it differs from prior conceptual-
izations of short-term memory in that it places
an emphasis on the active manipulation and
use of information, rather than merely on its
maintenance or storage. However, both stor-
age and manipulation functions are important.
We consider the storage function first and then
turn to manipulation.
Within the information-processing tradi-
tion that postulated multiple memory stores,
the so-called modal model of memory (named
by Murdock, 1974) primarily emphasized the
storage functions of short-term memory. This
model (see Figure 1.1, adapted from Atkinson
& Shiffrin, 1971) postulated sensory storage
systems through which information flowed
to a short-term store that held information
briefly. The information could then be trans-
ferred more or less well to a long-term store
depending on how extensively it was pro-
cessed while being held in the short-term
system. Because only a limited amount of in-
formation could be maintained in the short-
term store at any given time, new incoming
information replaced older information in the
store. Depending on the amount of process-
ing already received, this “bumped” informa-
tion was either forgotten or transferred to the
second, long-term store (Atkinson & Shiffrin,
1968).
Several key findings supported the exis-
tence of separate short-term and long-term
stores. As already noted, some patients with
brain damage showed a loss of long-term
retention while short-term processes re-
mained intact. In addition, experimental evi-
dence showed different forgetting rates for
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43

10 Kinds of Memory

Response
Rehearsal

Sensory stores Short term store Transfer

• Visual Control processes
Environmental Retrieval Long term store
• Auditory (e.g., coding)
input
• Other modalities

Decay Forgetting Forgetting

Figure 1.1 The modal model of memory, adapted from Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971). The model
consists of sensory stores, a short-term store (STS), and a long-term store (LTS). Information flows from
the sensory stores to the STS, where it is processed and maintained via rehearsal. Transfer to the LTS is
dependent on the amount and quality of processing in the STS.

short- and long-term stores, as well as dif-
ferent characteristics of retained information,
with phonemic coding more probable for
short-term verbal memory and semantic cod-
ing more likely for long-term verbal memory
(Crowder, 1976). In addition, much evidence
concerning serial position functions in single-
trial free recall also was consistent with two-
process theory (e.g., Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966;
Glanzer, 1972).
Much of the research in the 1960s and
1970s was concerned with storage character-
istics of the short-term store; less emphasis
was given to other purposes of short-term
retention. That focus changed with the ad-
vent of Baddeley and Hitch’s working mem-
ory model, which broadened the concept and
led to modern notions of working memory.
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed the
original model of working memory, which
continues to be developed and modified (e.g.,
Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Baddeley, 2000b).
As depicted in Figure 1.2, the Baddeley model
of working memory consists of two modality-
specific “slave” systems controlled by a
higher-level executive system. The idea of
modality-specific slave systems grew out of
one of the findings not handled gracefully by
the Atkinson-Shiffrin model, namely, the find-
ing of relatively little impairment in short-
term recall following certain divided-attention
tasks (e.g., Brooks, 1968). This finding is eas-
ily explained by a model that allows for sep-
arate storage systems to handle information-
processing demands in different modalities,
but not by a model with a single modality-
free short-term store.
The Phonological Loop
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) hypothesized that
working memory is composed of three basic
components: the articulatory (phonological)
loop, the visuo-spatial sketchpad, and the
central executive. According to their model,
the phonological loop is responsible for
Central executive
• Controls slave systems
• No storage capacity
Visuospatial sketchpad
Phonological loop
• Subvocal rehearsal • Imagery and spatial
• Storage rehearsal
• Storage
Figure 1.2 Baddeley’s model of working mem-
ory. The model consists of two modality-specific
slave systems that process and maintain informa-
tion and are controlled by a central executive.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
The Modal Memory Typology: Sensory, Working, and Long-Term Memory
maintaining verbal and auditory information,
while the visuo-spatial sketchpad maintains
visual and spatial information. The central
executive coordinates these components and
allocates resources to them depending on the
demands of the environment. The basic model
has evolved over the years to include more
detailed descriptions of each component as
well as a series of subcomponents. Each of
the slave systems works not only to store in-
formation passively but also to maintain that
information actively.
The most widely studied component of
Baddeley’s model, the phonological loop, in-
volves both the passive storage and the active
rehearsal of verbal information. Four major
experimental findings are cited to support the
existence of this slave system; we describe
each of these in turn.
The errors people make when recalling
words suggest that working memory has a
phonological rehearsal component. Baddeley
(1966) found that immediate serial recall of
a list of items was impaired when the items
sounded similar to one another. This phono-
logical similarity effect is thought to occur be-
cause the similar phonological codes used for
the items are difficult to discriminate from one
another during storage or retrieval. Phonolog-
ical similarity would not matter if the working
memory system did not have a phonological
rehearsal component.
The finding that the length of words that
people are trying to remember affects imme-
diate recall also supports the concept of ac-
tive phonological rehearsal. A list of longer
words shows poorer recall than a list of shorter
words when the number of words presented is
equated (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan,
1975). Surprisingly, the crucial variable in
producing the word-length effect is not the
greater number of syllables in the longer
words, but rather the actual spoken duration of
the words. Baddeley et al. found that memory
span is approximately equal to the number of
11
words that can be read aloud in 2 s (see also
Schweickert & Boruff, 1986). This finding
suggests that we subvocally rehearse words,
and that the words can only be maintained for
about 2 s. This constraint on working mem-
ory explains why digit spans vary across lan-
guages; the memory span (the average num-
ber of words that can be accurately recalled
in correct order) is shorter in languages (e.g.,
Welsh) in which words are long (relative to
English) and take more time to rehearse (Ellis
& Hennelly, 1980). However, memory spans
are longer in languages (e.g., Chinese) that
have shorter words, thus allowing for the re-
hearsal of more words in the same time period
(Hoosain & Salili, 1988).
Another finding that supports the idea
of the phonological loop is the unattended
speech effect, which refers to the fact that
listening to irrelevant auditory speech impairs
recall. That is, if people are hearing words or
digits and trying to remember them, having
other speech in the background reduces the
amount that can be recalled. This effect sug-
gests that the unattended speech obligatorily
clogs working memory capacity by engaging
the phonological loop and thereby prevent-
ing rehearsal of the attended information that
people are trying to recall. Again, this effect
would not be expected unless there existed a
phonological rehearsal process with which the
unattended speech interferes (Colle & Welsh,
1976; Salame & Baddeley, 1987, 1989). Crit-
ically, the unattended speech effect remains
even when the unattended speech is in a for-
eign language or consists of nonsense sylla-
bles. However, the effect does not occur with
nonlinguistic materials, such as music.
A final bit of evidence for the impor-
tance of phonological rehearsal comes from
experiments using articulatory suppression.
In this kind of experiment, subjects articu-
late repeatedly some word or phrase such as
“the” or “hiya” while trying to remember in-
formation presented visually. Recall is quite
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
12 Kinds of Memory
poor under these conditions when compared
with conditions in which subjects are not
engaged in articulatory suppression (e.g.,
Richardson & Baddeley, 1975; Baddeley,
Lewis, & Vallar, 1984). This articulatory
suppression effect, as it is called, shows that
when conditions prevent access of studied
material to the phonological loop, recall of
that information suffers.
These four lines of evidence (among
others) support the concept of the phonolog-
ical loop as playing a central role in verbal
working memory. A comparable slave system
exists for nonverbal materials.
The Visuo-Spatial Sketchpad
The second slave system described by
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) is the visuo-
spatial sketchpad, which is hypothesized to
maintain visual and spatial information over
short durations and to permit manipulation
of this information. The visuo-spatial sketch-
pad has been further broken down into two
sub-components: The visual cache is respon-
sible for passive storage of pattern informa-
tion, while the inner scribe retains sequences
of movement. However, most of the research
described here is aimed more at supporting
the idea of a separate visual slave system than
at elucidating its specific characteristics. In
general, much less research has been directed
at nonverbal working memory than at verbal
working memory.
Brooks (1968) was one of the first to show
that maintenance of visuo-spatial informa-
tion can be independent of storage and ma-
nipulation of verbal information. He required
people to remember either sentences or vi-
sual patterns and then report on them either
by talking (verbal output) or pointing (spatial
output). His study demonstrated that holding
sentences in memory leads to verbal report
times that are slower than spatial report times.
However, when maintaining spatial patterns
in memory, subjects found it quicker and
easier to report on them verbally than by point-
ing. That is, the outcome is not that either
pointing or speaking is inherently more diffi-
cult, but that it depends on the type of in-
formation being held in memory. While peo-
ple can simultaneously do activities that draw
on both the phonological loop and the visuo-
spatial sketchpad, they are impaired when at-
tempting to do more than one activity that
draws on the same capacity (the phonolog-
ical loop or the visuo-spatial sketchpad) at
the same time. Analogous to the unattended
speech effect, unattended visual information
disrupts the visuo-spatial scratchpad. Logie
(1986) also showed that extraneous visual in-
formation selectively disrupted visual learn-
ing, again supporting the idea that people
can rehearse verbal and visual information in
separate systems.
Neurological evidence supports the inde-
pendence of visual and verbal slave sys-
tems, as they draw on different brain areas.
McCarthy and Warrington (1988, 1990) re-
ported a single patient who suffered from an
abnormality in his left temporal lobe. The
patient demonstrated normal ability to com-
prehend and maintain visual information
but could not comprehend auditory/verbal in-
formation. Using PET, Smith, Jonides, and
Koeppe (1996) provided converging evidence
that verbal and spatial working memory tasks
involve different areas of the brain. A letter-
name recall task (a verbal task) activated
regions almost entirely in the left hemisphere,
while remembering the positions of three
dots (a spatial task) activated only right-
hemisphere regions. In short, although the evi-
dence on operation of the visuo-spatial sketch-
pad is sparser than that on the phonological
loop, enough evidence exists to establish the
independence of the two slave systems.
The Central Executive
The central executive is the least specified
component of Baddeley’s working memory
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
The Modal Memory Typology: Sensory, Working, and Long-Term Memory
model and borders on the most fundamental
problems in all of cognition: consciousness
and control of behavior. The central executive
is hypothesized to have control over the allo-
cation of attention, the recruitment of slave
systems, and the preparation and use of strate-
gies, as well as other features, such as acti-
vating representations in long-term memory
(Baddeley, 1996). However, the central exec-
utive is thought to have no storage capabilities.
The central executive therefore holds most of
the power in working memory but is basically
relegated to the role of a homunculus. If the
central executive has control over the slave
systems, what controls the central executive?
The concept of the central executive is similar
to the Supervisory Attentional System, pro-
posed by Norman and Shallice (1980). This
system oversees and controls certain behav-
iors, overriding over-learned (automatic) be-
haviors when necessary.
Reading Comprehension
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) argued that
typical working memory tasks (e.g., digit
span and word span) do not accurately re-
flect the importance of working memory in
comprehension, and that a more appropriate
measure is reading span. In this task, sub-
jects read a series of sentences and then recall
the last word of each sentence. The num-
ber of words that can be reported accurately
is the measure of reading span. Although
the average number of words correctly re-
called was relatively small ( just 2 to 5 words
in the Daneman and Carpenter sample), this
span correlated very highly with performance
on questions measuring comprehension of
the prose passages. Daneman and Carpenter
argued that reading span measured working
memory ability, which influenced how well
material could be understood. Just and
Carpenter (1992) extended this argument and
proposed that the important link between
reading span and comprehension is working
13
memory capacity, for two main reasons. First,
individuals with larger working memory ca-
pacities can maintain more information about
syntactic constraints within a passage of text,
and can use this information to make judg-
ments about the text. Second, a larger work-
ing memory capacity facilitates maintenance
of more than one interpretation in cases of syn-
tactic ambiguity. This relieves high-capacity
individuals of backtracking in the text in order
to reinterpret ambiguous sections. The criti-
cal point is that a relatively simple measure of
working memory (reading span) predicts an
important cognitive ability (reading compre-
hension). Could measures of working mem-
ory be tapping some fundamental cognitive
capacity?
Intelligence
In recent years, some researchers have pro-
posed that working memory is closely re-
lated to intelligence as measured by stan-
dardized tests. One reason for this claim is
that performance on the verbal portion of the
SAT is correlated fairly highly with Daneman
and Carpenter’s (1980) reading span mea-
sure of working memory (r = .59). Simi-
larly, Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and Conway
(1999) showed that performance on working
memory tasks that measure the ability to hold
and manipulate information (such as reading
span) was highly related to measures of fluid
intelligence (the ability to solve novel prob-
lems and to adapt to new situations). The same
relationship does not show up on measures
that simply tap storage aspects of short-term
memory. Engle et al. argued that the rela-
tionship between working memory measures
and fluid intelligence exists because both con-
structs tap the ability to keep a representation
active and to manipulate it, despite distrac-
tions and interference.
Evidence from f MRI also shows a clear
relationship between performance on work-
ing memory tasks and measures of fluid
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
14 Kinds of Memory
intelligence. In one study (Prabhakaran,
Smith, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997)
participants solved three different kinds of
fluid reasoning tasks from Raven’s Progres-
sive Matrices while in the fMRI scanner.
Problems were classified as (a) visuo-spatial,
which could be solved primarily by figural
analysis; (b) analytical, which required ab-
stract reasoning in addition to figural analysis;
and (c) perceptual-motor, which did not re-
quire figural or analytic reasoning. The areas
activated by these tasks mapped onto those
activated by certain working memory tasks.
Visuo-spatial reasoning tasks activated the
same areas that spatial working memory tasks
often activate (e.g., right middle frontal
gyrus), and analytical tasks activated areas
often implicated in verbal working memory
and executive processes (e.g., left middle
frontal gyrus and left premotor cortex).
Summary
As with all parts of this chapter, no universally
accepted view of the working memory sys-
tem exists. Baddeley’s (1986) working mem-
ory model has provided a fruitful theoreti-
cal framework for empirical research in the
field; its parsimony and explanatory power
continue to motivate research. Of course,
several questions remain to be resolved in
the future (see, e.g., Miyake & Shah, 1999).
Baddeley (2000b) has recently proposed the
idea of a fourth component, the episodic
buffer. The episodic buffer is hypothesized
to integrate (bind) information from the slave
systems and long-term memory. New research
will address this idea. Another new direction
is in terms of neural instantiations of work-
ing memory theory, to specify the neural sub-
strates through research with animals and
humans. For example, recent neural theories
of the mechanisms underlying the central
executive have made some progress in avoid-
ing the problem of its resemblance to a
homunculus by proposing specific neural
mechanisms involved in the central executive
(e.g., a dopamine-gating theory of control;
Braver & Cohen, 2000). However, the mecha-
nisms of executive control remain largely un-
explored.
LONG-TERM MEMORY
The concept of long-term memory is some-
thing of a grab-bag because many different
types of retention qualify as “long-term
memory.” There are names and faces we have
known for years; text material studied for
exams; our general knowledge or semantic
memory for facts; all kinds of motor skills that
would include talking, walking, driving cars,
playing sports, and so on; and there are the
smells (e.g., popcorn) and touches (e.g., silk)
that we can instantly recognize. And these ex-
amples are but a sample. Everything we retain
that did not occur in the last few moments
can be considered long-term memory. Here
we sample some of the primary concepts that
have been used to analyze this huge category,
but there is certainly no agreed-upon taxon-
omy for the various capacities that comprise
long-term memory. We could have included
many more categories than the ones repre-
sented here.
Episodic Memory
As mentioned earlier, episodic memory refers
to memory for events (or episodes) and the
cognitive and neural mechanisms involved
in remembering those events. In order to re-
trieve such memories, the time and place
of occurrence of the events must be speci-
fied (explicitly or implicitly) in the retrieval
query (Tulving, 1972). Examples of episodic
memory tasks include recalling the events
experienced last week, recalling the words
from a list heard ten minutes ago, or re-
calling dinner companions from the day
before yesterday. Many of the laboratory
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
techniques developed by psychologists over
the years—recall of stories, pictures, or words
learned in the lab—test primarily episodic
memory. As noted earlier, Tulving (1985a)
has argued that episodic memory reflects a
special type of awareness—autonoetic (self-
knowing) awareness—and that this ability
may be unique to humans (Wheeler, 2000).
Episodic memory is reflected by performance
on explicit memory tests (although some
aspects of performance on these tests may
reflect contributions from other memory sys-
tems, as well). The concept of episodic mem-
ory has changed over the years since Tulving
(1972) first proposed it, but it remains a central
organizing concept in cognitive psychology
and cognitive neuroscience (for relatively re-
cent treatments, see Tulving, 1993; Wheeler,
2000).
One important sense in which episodic
memory is used is to describe tasks such as the
examples just given. The following nine tasks
can all be classified as episodic memory tasks
because they require subjects to think back to
the time that the events in question occurred
(Tulving, 1993). (The place is usually given
as “in the lab where you are,” but outside the
lab the place may need to be specified, too.)
1. Free recall. People are exposed to a set of
words or pictures and are asked to recall
them in any order after a brief delay.
2. Serial recall. People are given a series of
digits, words, or pictures and are asked
to recall them in the order of occurrence.
Variations might include giving one item
from the series and asking for the item that
appeared before or after it.
3. Paired-associate recall. People learn pairs
of items that might be related (giraffe-lion)
or unrelated (tightrope-pickpocket) and
are later given one item (e.g., tightrope)
and are asked to recall the other item. This
task measures the formation of associa-
tions.
Long-Term Memory 15
4. Cued recall. People are given a series
of words, pictures, or sentences and are
then given a cue (often something not pre-
sented) and asked to recall a related event
from the series. If people study sentences
such as “The fish attacked the swimmer,”
the word “shark” might be given as a cue.
Paired-associate learning is one type of
cued recall task, but there are many varia-
tions.
5. Recognition. These tests, as the name
implies, require people to decide whether
or not they recognize an item as being
from the studied set. In a typical laboratory
paradigm, subjects might study a list of
100 words (under various conditions) and
then be given a test with 200 words, half
studied and half not studied. The task is to
select the studied words. If the subjects see
the words one at a time, they judge whether
each one was studied and respond yes or
no. This is called a free choice or yes/no
recognition test. If the subjects are tested
with pairs of words, one old and one new,
they have to pick the word that was stud-
ied. This is called a forced choice recogni-
tion test. Free and forced choice recogni-
tion tests resemble true/false and multiple
choice tests (respectively) used in educa-
tional assessment. Another variation is the
continuous recognition test, in which sub-
jects see a long stream of items and must
decide for each item whether or not they
have seen it earlier in the series.
6. Absolute frequency estimation tasks.
Subjects study items such as words or
pictures various numbers of times (say,
1–8 times) and then later are presented the
item and have to judge how many times
they studied it.
7. Relative recency judgments. Subjects
study items and then are given two and
asked which one occurred earlier (or later)
in the series.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
16 Kinds of Memory
8. Source judgments. Information is pre-
sented from a variety of sources (e.g.,
spoken or written words, or by a male and
a female voice if all items are spoken) and
during the later test subjects must iden-
tify the source of each (spoken or written?
Male or female?).
9. Metamemory judgments. Researchers can
ask subjects to give other kinds of rat-
ings that are thought to reflect features of
episodic memory. Confidence judgments
ask for ratings (on, e.g., a 7-point scale) of
how confident a person is about whether
an event occurred. People can also be
asked, for items they recall or recognize,
to judge whether they remember the mo-
ment of occurrence of the item or rather
just know it was presented but cannot re-
member the moment of actual occurrence
(Tulving, 1985a). These kinds of remem-
ber/know judgments have been extensively
studied (e.g., Gardiner & Richardson-
Klavehn, 2000) because remember judg-
ments are thought to reflect a pure mani-
festation of episodic memory. Subjects
can also be asked to evaluate more specifi-
cally the sensory, emotional, and contex-
tual characteristics of their retrieved mem-
ories (e.g., the Memory Characteristics
Questionnaire; Johnson, Foley, Suengas,
& Raye, 1988).
All these tests (and others) tap some aspect
of episodic memory by requiring subjects to
retrieve information from specific times in the
past. However, not all performances on the
episodic (or explicit) memory tests just listed
necessarily reflect “pure” manifestations of
episodic memory, as performance from rel-
atively automatic (Jacoby, 1991) or noetic
(knowing) states of awareness (Tulving,
1985a) might affect performance as well,
especially on tests with strong retrieval cues.
Many variables have been shown to affect
episodic memory performance across a range
of tests. We consider just a few such variables
here—variables manipulated during study or
encoding. In general, meaningful processing
of events produces better retention than does
processing that focuses on more superficial
features (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). In such
levels-of-processing experiments, as they are
called, subjects are exposed to words or other
material and are asked to make judgments
about them. For example, different groups
of subjects given the word “RABBIT” might
be asked: Is it in upper-case letters? Does it
rhyme with habit? Is it a type of animal? The
answer to all three questions would be yes,
but the first question requires only a super-
ficial visual examination for an affirmative
answer. The second question requires phone-
mic (or phonological processing) to sound out
the word. The third question requires sub-
jects to think about the meaning of the word.
Hundreds of experiments have shown that on
later tests of recall or recognition, meaning-
ful processing produces retention superior to
that afforded by phonemic processing, which
in turn provides better recollection than pro-
cessing of simple visual features such as type
font (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975). The exact
testing conditions for producing the effects
do matter, as discussed later, but the levels-
of-processing effect is ubiquitous in standard
tests of recall and recognition (see Figure 1.3
for an example). However, the interpretation
of the effect is still under debate (Roediger &
Gallo, in press).
Active involvement in learning, such as
generating information rather than reading it,
also promotes better retention (Jacoby, 1978;
Slamecka & Graf, 1978). This generation ef-
fect, as it is called, occurs even under condi-
tions in which the generation seems trivially
easy. Jacoby (1978) had students either read
word pairs (foot-shoe) or generate the sec-
ond word from a word fragment (foot-s e).
The fragments were easy (because the words
were related), so the target word could almost
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
1 is studied twice in succession, whereas spaced
Yes
No
.80
Proportion recognized
.60
.40
.20
0
Case Rhyme
Orienting task
Figure 1.3 The levels-of-processing (LOP) ef-
fect. Mean proportion of words recognized as a
function of orienting task and type of response to
the question (yes or no). Adapted from Craik and
Tulving (1975, Experiment 9B).
always be generated easily. In the test, sub-
jects were given the first word and asked to
respond with the paired word. When they had
generated the second word, they remembered
it much better than when they had read it,
even though the generation process did not
involve much effort. Slamecka and Graf pro-
duced similar results in a somewhat differ-
ent paradigm. Again, this generation effect
can disappear under certain conditions, but
it has fairly wide generality, especially when
the same subjects both read and generate in-
formation (i.e., when the variable is manipu-
lated within subjects; see Begg, Snider, Foley,
& Goddard, 1989; McDaniel, Waddill, &
Einstein, 1988; Slamecka & Katsaiti, 1987).
A third variable that reliably affects epi-
sodic memory tasks is repetition. In general,
and not surprisingly, repeated items are bet-
ter remembered than items presented only
once (the repetition effect; see Crowder, 1976,
Chapter 6). Less intuitively, however, the
spacing of repetitions does matter. Massed
repetition refers to the situation when an event
Long-Term Memory 17
repetition refers to the case in which time and
intervening items occur between repetitions.
For tests of long-term retention, spaced repe-
tition almost always leads to better retention
than does massed repetition; furthermore, up
to some limit, the greater the lag or spacing
between two presentations is, the better is re-
tention (e.g., Melton, 1970; Dempster, 1988).
This spacing or lag effect, as it is called,
occurs on practically all tests and under most
conditions. Interestingly, one exception oc-
Category curs when a test is given very quickly after
the second of two presentations; then massed
repetition leads to better retention than does
spaced repetition (e.g., Balota, Duchek &
Paullin, 1989).
Fourth, concrete materials generally pro-
duce better retention on episodic memory
tests than do abstract materials. For example,
pictures are better recalled than words (their
names); this is called the picture superiority
effect (Paivio & Csapo, 1973; Paivio, Rogers,
& Smythe, 1968). Words that refer to con-
crete objects (umbrella, fingernail) are better
retained than are abstract words matched on
such qualities as word length, part of speech,
and frequency of occurrence in the language
(Paivio, Yuille, & Rogers, 1969). The same
holds true for prose materials (Paivio & Begg,
1971). To generalize, speakers and professors
who can explain an abstract theory (e.g., the
kinetic theory of gases) by using a concrete
analogy or metaphor (molecules of gas behav-
ing like billiard balls on a pool table) often
can make their subject matter not only eas-
ier to understand but also more memorable.
Known since the days of the ancient Greeks
and Romans, mental imagery is one of the old-
est techniques for improving memory, and it
relies on the same principle: The mind gener-
ally grasps and remembers concrete concepts
better than abstract ones.
Finally, distinctive items are generally
better remembered on episodic memory tests
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
18 Kinds of Memory
(e.g., Hunt, 1995; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).
For example, a picture embedded in a list of
words should be better remembered than the
same picture embedded in a series of pictures.
Distinctiveness has been used to explain su-
perior memory for such items as bizarre sen-
tences (McDaniel, Dunay, Lyman, & Kerwin,
1988), unusual faces (Light, Kayra-Stuart, &
Hollander, 1979), atypical category members
(Schmidt, 1985), and words with unusual
orthographies (Hunt & Elliot, 1980). Distinc-
tiveness may increase attention to and pro-
cessing of an item at study. Distinctive items
also yield excellent retrieval cues, since no
other memories are associated with unique
events. Distinctiveness may underlie some of
the effects just discussed. For example, the
better memory associated with pictures and
concrete objects may be due to the distinctive-
ness of their encoding. Similarly, deeper, se-
mantic processing of words leads to more dis-
tinctive encoding and retrieval cues than does
more shallow, phonological, or orthographic
processing.
The various effects just discussed—the
levels-of-processing effect, the generation ef-
fect, the picture superiority effect, the spacing
(or lag) effect, and the distinctiveness effect—
represent just a sample of important variables
manipulated during encoding or study that
affect episodic memory performance. How-
ever, just because these variables are manipu-
lated during learning does not mean that they
only affect encoding of memories. Retrieval
processes are critically important in the study
of episodic memory.
A common experience is forgetting some
bit of information—the name of an acquain-
tance, where you left your keys—and then
suddenly retrieving the information later.
Sometimes the recovered memory seems to
occur spontaneously, but in other cases it is
prompted by cues. Such recovered memories
show that forgetting is not necessarily due
to loss of information from memory (e.g.,
degraded memory traces) but rather that the
information was available in memory, but not
accessible. Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) first
formally distinguished between information
that is available in memory (is stored) and
information that is accessible (is retrievable
under a particular set of conditions). Psy-
chologists may wish for a perfect measure
of what is stored in memory, but they will
never have one; all measures reveal the in-
formation accessible under a particular set
of conditions. The study of retrieval pro-
cesses is therefore a key to understanding
episodic memory (Roediger & Guynn, 1996;
Roediger, 2000; Tulving, 1974).
Even when we restrict our view to the
study of episodic memory measures, we find
that all tests do not reveal the same pattern
of results. For example, words that occur
in the language with high frequency are
typically better recalled on a free recall test
than are words that occur with less frequency
(e.g., Hall, 1954). So, we might conclude
that high-frequency words simply produce
stronger or more durable memory traces than
do low frequency words. However, this sim-
ple idea is ruled out by recognition experi-
ments. When high- and low-frequency words
are presented and then retention is measured
by recognition, low-frequency words are bet-
ter recognized than are high-frequency words
(Kinsbourne & George, 1974; Balota &
Neely, 1980). That different patterns of out-
come are often obtained when different mem-
ory tests are used is a fundamental fact that
must be understood.
Two general ideas that have been for-
warded to explain encoding/retrieval inter-
actions are the encoding specificity princi-
ple (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and the
principle of transfer appropriate processing
(Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977;
Roediger, 1990). Both principles maintain
that retention is best when the conditions
of retrieval match (complement, overlap,
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
recapitulate) the conditions of learning.
Within terms of the encoding specificity
framework, the idea is that features of expe-
rience are encoded and that retrieval cues are
effective to the extent that features extracted
from the cue match or complement those in the
memory trace (e.g., Flexser & Tulving, 1978).
The transfer appropriate processing principle
states that experiences during learning trans-
fer to a test to the extent that the test re-
quires appropriate cognitive operations to
permit expression of what was learned. Tests
may be more or less appropriate to tap what
was learned. These two principles are not
meant to be opposites; rather, they are some-
what different statements of what is funda-
mentally the same idea. Much evidence agrees
with these principles in episodic memory re-
search (see Roediger & Guynn, 1996, for a
review) and perhaps across all memory tests
(Roediger & McDermott, 1993). We shall re-
turn to these principles when we consider ev-
idence for implicit memory tests.
The study of episodic memory is a huge
topic, and we can barely scratch the surface
in this section. Tulving’s (1983) book, Ele-
ments of Episodic Memory, is a good starting
place for further study of this critical topic.
Much episodic memory research has been
laboratory-based. A somewhat different tra-
dition of research, but one that is also con-
cerned with personal experiences, goes un-
der the rubric of autobiographical memory, to
which we turn next.
Autobiographical Memory
Autobiographical memory refers to one’s per-
sonal history. Memories of the first week of
college, of learning to drive, and of a friend’s
phone number are all autobiographical to
some extent. As these examples demonstrate,
one’s autobiographical knowledge consists
of many different types of knowledge: epi-
sodes, procedures, and facts. Autobiograph-
Long-Term Memory 19
ical memory is an amalgam of varieties of
memories tied together by their importance
to one’s sense of self and one’s life history.
In some sense, then, it does not represent a
distinct category of memory (like episodic
and semantic memory are assumed to be), but
rather a distinct research tradition within the
field. Still, consideration of autobiographical
memory serves to bring out many of the core
concepts of memory as considered by most
people who are not psychologists.
The problem of defining autobiographi-
cal memory has been discussed elsewhere
in depth (e.g., Conway, 1990). Brewer (1986)
suggested distinguishing among personal
memories, autobiographical facts, and generic
personal memories. Personal memories, such
as memories of one’s wedding, are described
as memories for specific life events accom-
panied by imagery. These would be episodic
memories. Autobiographical facts, such as
memories for phone numbers, are memories
for self-relevant facts and are unaccompanied
by imagery or spatio-temporal context (like
semantic memories, as defined by Tulving,
1972). Other knowledge, such as knowledge
of how to drive, consists of abstractions of
events and is unaccompanied by specific
images. These could be considered procedu-
ral memories, but Brewer refers to them as
generic personal memories. In this section,
we focus on personal memories, with some
attention to generic personal memories.
Vivid Memories of Life Events
Clearly, people have access to many vivid per-
sonal memories. People can retrieve detailed,
emotional memories in response to a wide
variety of retrieval cues, from across the life-
span and following long delays. What, then,
leads to the unique, vivid personal memories
that characterize our sense of the past?
Historically, psychologists made surpris-
ingly few attempts to capture autobiographi-
cal memory. Galton (1879) conducted the
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
20 Kinds of Memory
first attempt to study personal memories; he
retrieved and dated personal memories in re-
sponse to each of a set of 20 cue words. Other
early research included Colegrave’s (1899)
collection of people’s memories of hearing
the news of Lincoln’s assassination as well as
Freud’s clinical investigations into childhood
memories (Freud, 1917/1982). However, ex-
perimental psychologists conducted little re-
search on autobiographical memory until the
1970s. At that time, the pendulum swung in
favor of more naturalistic research, partly in
response to Neisser’s famous charge that “If X
is an interesting or socially significant aspect
of memory, then psychologists have hardly
ever studied X” (Neisser, 1978, p. 4). In ad-
dition, the 1970s brought the publication of
three important methods and ideas: Linton’s
(1975) diary study of her own memories for
six years of her life, the idea that surprising
events imprint vivid “flashbulb memories” on
the brain (Brown & Kulik, 1977), and the
rediscovery of the Galton word-cueing tech-
nique (Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974). Urged on
by these results and the changing zeitgeist,
experimental psychologists turned to the
tricky problem of understanding how people
come to hold such vivid memories of their
own lives.
Results from Diary Studies
Beginning in 1972, Marigold Linton spent six
years recording descriptions, dates, and rat-
ings of 5,500 events from her own life. She
tested herself for recognition of a semirandom
sample of events each month. While Linton
was primarily interested in her ability to date
these personal events (e.g., Linton, 1975), she
did preliminary analyses of the characteris-
tics associated with remembered versus for-
gotten events. She argued that remembered
events were salient, emotional, and relatively
distinctive, and that there was some tendency
for positive events to be better remembered
(Linton, 1982).
Both White (1982) and Wagenaar (1986)
followed up Linton’s results, conducting diary
studies aimed more specifically at remember-
ing details of events rather than dates. Wage-
naar collected 2,400 events over a period of
6 years; he recorded the most salient event
each day, and coded it with four cues: who,
what, when, and where. He also rated the
salience (distinctiveness) of the event, as well
as its pleasantness and his emotional involve-
ment. White recorded one event per day for a
year; he haphazardly selected both salient and
nonsalient events. For each event, he recorded
a description and chose adjective descriptors.
He rated each event on a number of dimen-
sions, including the degree to which he par-
ticipated in the event, its importance to him, its
frequency, and its emotionality and physical
characteristics (e.g., sights, sounds, smells).
Overall, the results from the two studies corre-
sponded well with Linton’s observations:
Recalled events were unique, and, at least in
Wagenaar’s study, more emotional. Both stud-
ies presented some evidence for the better
recall of pleasant events.
Converging Results
While diary studies provide a rich source
of autobiographical memories, such richness
comes with methodological costs. Diary stud-
ies typically involve only the experimenter as
subject; the events to be remembered are not
randomly selected; and the very act of record-
ing the events probably changes the way they
are encoded. Two different paradigms have
been developed to deal with these problems.
In one study, Thompson (1982) recruited 16
undergraduates to participate in a diary study;
the twist was that the participants recorded
events not only from their own lives but from
their roommates’ lives as well. All 32 parti-
cipants later attempted to retrieve the recorded
events and used a 7-point scale to rate how
well they remembered them. The critical find-
ing was that memory did not differ between
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
the recorders and their roommates, even
though the recorders had selected and re-
corded the events and had knowledge of the
upcoming memory test.
In another clever study, Brewer (1988a)
dealt with the event-selection issue by recruit-
ing subjects to carry pagers and record their
ongoing events whenever the alarm sounded.
Participants also rated their emotional state as
well as the frequency, significance, and goal of
the event. In the test, subjects were given one
of five different types of retrieval cues (time,
location, both time and location, thoughts, or
actions) and were asked to recall the event
in question. Correctly recalled events were
rated as being more associated with remem-
bered sensory details, emotions, and thoughts.
Consistent with the results of earlier diary
studies (Wagenaar, 1986; White, 1982), cor-
rect recall was associated with exciting, in-
frequent events occurring in atypical loca-
tions. Similar results were also obtained in
another beeper study in which the memory
test involved recognition rather than cued
recall (Brewer, 1988a, 1988b). As in labora-
tory studies of episodic memory, distinctive
events are well remembered.
We mention here only one of the many
other studies that support the idea that vivid
memories tend to be for life events that were
unique, important, and emotional. Rubin and
Kozin (1984) collected data on vivid mem-
ories using two paradigms. First, they asked
participants to describe their three most vivid
memories and then rate them on a number of
scales (e.g., national and personal importance,
surprisingness, consequentiality, etc.). Over-
whelmingly, participants provided memories
of events such as personal injuries or romantic
episodes that were rated high in personal but
not in national importance (see also Robinson,
1976). Second, participants retrieved autobio-
graphical memories in response to 20 national
(e.g., the night President Nixon resigned) and
personal (e.g., your 13th birthday) cues. These
Long-Term Memory 21
cues naturally varied in their ability to elicit
vivid memories; vivid memories tended to
be associated with consequentiality, surprise,
emotional change, and rehearsal (repeated
retrieval after the event).
Thus, vivid personal memories tend to be
associated with exciting, emotional, unique,
and even surprising life events. We turn now
to the question of what is forgotten.
Forgetting Life Events
Some researchers claim to find less forgetting
of life events than might be expected given the
high forgetting rates in many laboratory tasks,
but of course such comparisons are fraught
with difficulty. (No one really measures for-
getting of the thousands of trivial activities
that occur in our lives.) Both Linton (1978)
and Wagenaar (1986) reported forgetting less
than 1% of recorded events after a year delay,
but of course they had only recorded one event
per day, and the act of recording would make
events more memorable. Forgetting rates do
increase when events to be remembered are
not selected to be memorable; White (1982)
forgot about 40% of his events, and the parti-
cipants in Brewer’s beeper studies failed even
to recognize almost one third of events after
five months.
As in laboratory studies of words and pic-
tures, forgetting of autobiographical events in-
creases over time (Linton, 1978). It is critical
to note, however, that estimates of forgetting
are dependent on the type of retrieval cue used.
Emotion words are not good retrieval cues
(e.g., Robinson, 1976), and temporal cues are
not as strong as content cues such as “what,”
“who,” and “where” (Wagenaar, 1988; but see
Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter, & White, 1988).
We have already noted that unique events
are more likely to be remembered (e.g.,
Wagenaar, 1986). When evaluating forgotten
(non recognized) events, Linton (1982) clas-
sified many as the “failure to distinguish”
the target event from other similar events in
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
22 Kinds of Memory
memory. Once-salient events became less
memorable as Linton experienced more and
more similar life events, corresponding to how
the study of related material in laboratory ex-
periments increases interference effects (e.g.,
Underwood, 1957) and leads to an abstraction
of the gist of events or a schema for the events
(e.g., Bartlett, 1932). Although participants
may lose access to specific event memories,
they may retain more generic personal mem-
ories covering a class of related life events
(Brewer, 1986). Barsalou (1988) found that
students asked to recall the events from their
summer vacations most commonly responded
with summaries of events (e.g., “I watched
a lot of TV”). Only 21% of responses were
classified as corresponding to specific events
(e.g., “we had a little picnic”).
As already noted, forgetting of life events
increases with the passage of time. Crovitz
and Schiffman (1974) had college students
recall and date life events in response to a
series of cue words using Galton’s technique.
Briefly, subjects were asked to jot down a
few words describing the first memory that
came to mind for each of 20 cue words. They
were then asked to go back over the list of
memories and date each as accurately as pos-
sible. Crovitz and Schiffman counted up the
numbers of memories occurring in each of a
series of temporal categories. As expected,
subjects recalled the most things from their
recent pasts and the fewest from their dis-
tant pasts (see also Rubin, 1982). However,
a more complicated pattern emerges when
retention across the entire life span is exam-
ined. First, the decline is accelerated for mem-
ories from early childhood. Memories from
the first and second year of life are almost
nonexistent, and memories from the first
five years of life are infrequent (e.g., see
Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986). This phenomenon
is called childhood amnesia (Howe &
Courage, 1993). Second, a different function
occurs for older adults than for college stu-
dents. When older adults recall and date mem-
ories in response to word cues, they still re-
port fewer memories from more distant time
periods, and disproportionally few memories
from early childhood. However, they also
show what is called the reminiscence bump
(see Figure 1.4); given the rest of the distribu-
tion, a greater proportion of retrieved memo-
ries are dated to the periods of late adolescence
and early adulthood than would be expected
(e.g., Rubin & Schulkind, 1997). Numerous
reasons have been suggested to account for
the so-called reminiscence bump, including
a preponderance of “firsts” occurring during
the 20-something time period, the importance
of that time period for identity formation, and
Sum
400
Franklin & Holding
Number of memories per decade
Fitzgerald & Lawrence: Nouns
Fitzgerald & Lawrence: Affect
300 Zola-Morgan, Cohen, & Squire
200
100
0
1–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50
Age of memories in years
41–50 31–40 21–30 11–20 1–10
Approximate age of subjects at the
time of the event
Figure 1.4 Distribution of autobiographical
memories across the lifespan. In four studies, rep-
resented by the lower four curves in the figure,
50-year-old subjects remembered and dated life
events in response to cue words. The top curve col-
lapses over studies and sums over the lower four
curves. Subjects recalled a disproportionate num-
ber of events from adolescence and early adulthood
(reminiscence bump). SOURCE: Rubin et al., 1986.
Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge
University Press.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
greater rehearsal frequencies for the types of
events occurring during one’s 20s. The exact
reason for the bump remains uncertain.
Dating Autobiographical Memories
On what date did you hear about the attempted
assassination of Ronald Reagan? On what
date did you receive your acceptance letter
from the college that you eventually attended?
We suspect that our readers will be unlikely to
answer these questions quickly or accurately.
Numerous studies have shown that people
have difficulty in dating their autobiograph-
ical memories (for a review, see Friedman,
1993), and that this difficulty increases with
the passage of time from the target event
(Linton, 1975).
As introspection quickly reveals, however,
it is not that autobiographical memory lacks
all temporal information, which “would be
like a jumbled box of snapshots” (Friedman,
1993, p. 44). While the “snapshots” may
lack explicit time-date stamps, we are quite
capable of relating, ordering, and organizing
the “snapshots” into a coherent story. The
same subjects who cannot date a series of
events within a month of their occurrence
(3% correct; Brown, Rips, & Shevell, 1985)
can determine the temporal ordering of the
events (rank order correlation of .88; Brown
et al., 1985). There is an entire literature on
how people accomplish this; due to space con-
straints, we describe only a few of the strate-
gies people use to reconstruct when events oc-
curred. In general, people make use of what
little temporal information was encoded orig-
inally. At least two types of temporal in-
formation in memory appear relevant: the
temporal cycles that regularly occur in peo-
ple’s lives, and temporal landmarks. First,
natural temporal structures or cycles are en-
coded that later guide memory; examples in-
clude the academic calendar (Kurbat, Shevell,
& Rips, 1998; Pillemer, Rhinehart, & White,
1986) and the weekday-weekend cycle
Long-Term Memory 23
(Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prohaska, 1992).
Second, people have a better sense of the dates
of consequential landmark events, and thus
both public and private landmarks can be used
to guide date reconstruction (e.g., Brown,
Shevell, & Rips, 1986; Loftus & Marburger,
1983; for a review, see Shum, 1998). Such
information about temporal and event bound-
aries, combined with knowledge of some spe-
cific dates, can be used to place a date on a
target event. However, people’s reconstruc-
ted dates tend to be too recent (Loftus &
Marburger, 1983).
Other biases come into play when dating
autobiographical memories; we mention just
two here. Similar to the availability bias found
in decision making (see Chapter 10), memo-
ries for which people have more knowledge
are dated as more recent (the accessibility
principle; Brown et al., 1985). People also
may make rounding errors when they use in-
appropriately precise standard temporal units
(e.g., days, weeks, months; see Huttenlocher,
Hedges, & Bradburn, 1990).
Inaccuracies in Autobiographical Memories
Retrieval times for remembering autobio-
graphical events tend to be slow and vari-
able, suggesting that remembered events are
reconstructed. Although diary studies have
suggested that people are good at recogniz-
ing and remembering events that happened to
them, they do not show that people’s mem-
ories are accurate. A study by Barclay and
Wellman (1986) makes this point nicely. In
their study, students took a recognition test on
previously recorded life events that included
four types of items: duplicates of original di-
ary entries, foils that changed descriptive (sur-
face) details of the original events, foils that
changed reactions to original events, and foils
that did not correspond to recorded events.
Participants were good at recognizing origi-
nal diary entries (94% correct), but they also
accepted a large number of the foils. They
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
24 Kinds of Memory
incorrectly accepted 50% of modified descrip-
tions and 23% of novel events. These effects
increased over a delay such that after a year
subjects were accepting the majority of both
semantically related and unrelated foils.
More naturalistic data also support the
idea that participants’ autobiographical mem-
ories may not be accurate, even if they seem
vivid and are confidently held. Perhaps most
famous is the case of John Dean, a witness
in the Watergate hearings who appeared to
have an incredible memory for meetings with
Nixon—at least until the appearance of the
Presidential Transcripts, actual recordings
of Oval Office conversations. Neisser (1982)
provided a fascinating comparison of Dean’s
memory with the transcripts, revealing that
sometimes Dean’s memories reflected not
the truth but rather his fantasies and beliefs
about what should have been. For example, on
15 September 1972 John Dean assured Nixon
that “nothing is going to come crashing down
to our surprise” (p. 146). When recalling this
meeting nine months later, Dean remembered
that “I also told him there was a long way
to go before this matter would end and that I
certainly could make no assurances that the
day would not come when this matter would
start to unravel” (p. 147).
Numerous laboratory experiments have
since demonstrated that people remember
their personal histories as consistent with what
they believe should have happened, rather
than with what did happen. Ross (1989) has
argued that people use their current status
as benchmarks and then reconstruct the past
based on whether or not they think changes
should have occurred over time. For exam-
ple, people believe that attitudes and political
beliefs remain consistent over time, so they
often overestimate the consistency of the past
with the present. In one study, subjects’ at-
titudes towards toothbrushing were manipu-
lated; people exposed to a pro-brushing mes-
sage overestimated previous brushing reports,
whereas participants in an antibrushing con-
dition underestimated their previous reports
(Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981). Like-
wise, people may mistakenly remember a
nonexistent change if one was expected. Par-
ticipants who took a bogus study skills group
(leading to no improvement) misremembered
their prior skills as being worse than they
actually were (Conway & Ross, 1984).
Even the most emotional, unique memo-
ries are not immune from distortion. While
it was initially argued that unexpected events
(e.g., hearing of an assassination) triggered a
special mechanism leading to capture of all
event details in a very accurate memory trace
(Brown & Kulik, 1977), a spate of research
has appeared arguing to the contrary. The
so-called flashbulb memories may be particu-
larly vivid, rehearsed at high frequencies, and
confidently held, but they are prone to inac-
curacies just as are memories of less emo-
tional events. Early investigations of flashbulb
memories were retrospective only, meaning
that they did not assess the consistency of
participants’ stories over time (e.g., Yarmey
& Bull, 1978). A different picture emerged
from studies that involved the comparison of
initial reports to later memories. For exam-
ple, Neisser and Harsch (1993) compared ini-
tial reports of having learned about the space
shuttle Challenger’s explosion to those col-
lected 32 to 34 months later. Even though
their subjects reported high confidence in their
memories, only three subjects’ accounts con-
tained only minor discrepancies. Twenty-two
subjects were wrong on two out of three ma-
jor memory attributes (location, activity, and
who told them); the remaining eleven subjects
were wrong on all three. Other similar stud-
ies of disasters such as bombings and assas-
sinations have confirmed that what character-
izes flashbulb memories is the confidence with
which they are held (e.g., Weaver, 1993) rather
than their consistency and accuracy over time
(e.g., Christianson, 1989).
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
Not only may memories be distorted in de-
tail, but entire events may be misremembered
as well. Loftus (1993) created a procedure to
convince people that nonexistent events ac-
tually occurred: A trusted confederate (nor-
mally a relative) asked the subject to recall
repeatedly five childhood events for a class
experiment; unbeknownst to the subject, one
of the events had never occurred. Over a series
of sessions, subjects were willing to describe
detailed recollections of the false event, such
as being lost in a shopping mall (e.g., see
Loftus, 1993). Similar data have been reported
by Hyman and Pentland (1996), who found
that participants who imagined knocking over
a punch bowl at a wedding were more likely
to create false memories for having done so.
Consistent with the other memory errors de-
scribed thus far, however, a person is more
likely to accept a false memory when it is
plausible and consistent with the rest of his
or her history. For example, participants are
more likely to accept a false memory for a re-
ligious event when the ritual is of their own
faith (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997).
Autobiographical memories refer to peo-
ple’s retention of personal experience. But we
all know much more than that—knowledge
we share with many other people. We turn
now to that topic, our general knowledge.
Semantic Memory
As noted earlier, Tulving (1972) distinguished
between episodic and semantic memory, with
the latter term referring to general knowl-
edge of the world. Facts accessed from se-
mantic memory do not require one to retrieve
the original time or place of learning (e.g.,
Who was President during the U.S. Civil War?
Did Virginia or Nevada first become a U.S.
state? and so on through thousands of com-
mon facts). Semantic memory includes not
only memories of facts and concepts, but high-
level knowledge structures such as schemas
Long-Term Memory 25
and scripts as well. Tulving described seman-
tic memory as “a mental thesaurus, organized
knowledge a person possesses about words
and other verbal symbols, their meanings and
referents, about relations among them, and
about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the
manipulation of the symbols, concepts, and
relations” (p. 392).
Representations of new facts may initially
be episodic in that they are linked to their
original context of learning. For example,
in one study subjects who learned fictional
facts about famous people were later aware
that they had learned these facts during the
experimental session, although they were un-
sure about which of two experimental sources
had imparted particular facts (Schacter,
Harbluk, & McLachlan, 1984). With time,
however, such representations of new facts
may become “sourceless” and thus qualify as
semantic as opposed to episodic memories.
As shown in Figure 1.5, one way of con-
ceptualizing semantic memory for words and
concepts is as a large network in which re-
lated items (nodes) are linked, and the activa-
tion of one item spreads to other associated
items (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1969; Collins
& Loftus, 1975). Accordingly, subjects are
faster and more accurate when recognizing
a word if it was preceded by a related word;
for example, recognition of doctor would ben-
efit from the prior presentation of nurse or
hospital but not unrelated concepts such as
butter (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Still
under debate is how to best conceptualize the
nature of the nodes in the network; nodes
could represent features, prototypes, or ex-
emplars of concepts (see Chapters 5 and 10).
Similarly, the nodes in the network could rep-
resent specific facts. For example, the “George
Washington” node would then be linked to
what one knows about the man, such as
knowledge about his role in the American
Revolution and his first presidency. Accord-
ingly, Lewis and Anderson (1976) found that
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43

26 Kinds of Memory

Hose

Firefighter Green Sprinkler

Grass Flowers

Picnic Children

Fire truck Siren

Handcuffs Police Ambulance

Male
Paramedic

Hospital Doctor Surgeon

Gun

Female Nurse Medicine

Sterile Needle Shot Weapon Bullet Trigger

Knife

Kitchen Steak Butter

Figure 1.5 A network representation of semantic memory, adapted from Collins and Loftus (1975).
Information is represented as nodes in the network, with connections to other associated information.
When a node is activated, some of that activation spreads to other associated nodes in the network.

learning new, unrelated information about
famous people slowed retrieval of already-
known information, presumably because an
increase in the number of an item’s associa-
tions reduces the amount of activation spread-
ing to any one associate. This outcome is
called the fan effect, because it is assumed
that the more facts that are attached to (or fan
off of ) a node, the slower will be retrieval of
any one fact.
Such a conceptualization of semantic
memory, however, leads to a “paradox of
the expert.” Experts know huge sets of facts
about their topics of expertise, and often have
speedy access to them. How can this be
explained? A network representation of an
expert’s semantic memory would be char-
acterized by a large number of information
nodes. For example, chess experts have stored
on the order of 50,000 chess patterns (Chase
& Ericsson, 1982). However, if these huge
amounts of information are stored in seman-
tic memory in network representations, this
fact should lead to the counterintuitive pre-
diction that expertise should slow information
retrieval due to reduced activation reaching
any one particular node. Yet expert knowl-
edge is characterized not only by its quantity
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
but also by its interrelatedness (e.g., Chi &
Koeske, 1983), and this fact may help account
for the speed with which experts access their
knowledge. Consistent with this idea, Smith,
Adams, and Schorr (1978) found that learn-
ing new, related information did not interfere
with retrieval of previously known facts. For
example, subjects who studied only two sen-
tences like “Marty did not delay the trip” and
“Marty broke the bottle” were faster at ac-
cessing information in these two sentences
than were subjects who studied those two sen-
tences plus the third sentence “Marty painted
the old barn.” This is the fan effect. However,
when the third sentence was related to one
of the first ones, such as “Marty christened
the ship,” the speed at which subjects could
retrieve information did not slow down.
People use the contents of semantic mem-
ory in ways other than directly retrieving a
fact to be remembered. Participants can rea-
son about the contents of semantic memory,
indicating what would be plausible given their
knowledge of the facts (e.g., Reder, 1982).
People can also sometimes retrieve partial in-
formation about the fact to be remembered.
For example, a person who cannot retrieve
the answer to a trivia question can predict
quite well whether or not she will recognize
it (Hart, 1967) and whether she will recall
the answer given its first letter (Gruneberg &
Monks, 1974). Similarly, subjects in a tip-of-
the-tongue state are able to describe charac-
teristics of the word to be remembered, such
as its first letter, its number of syllables, and
other words it sounds like (Brown & McNeill,
1966). Such results support the idea that
multiple features of facts are represented in
semantic memory.
How long do facts, concepts, and other
forms of knowledge stay in semantic mem-
ory? The question of the long-term reten-
tion of knowledge is important but difficult
to tackle given methodological issues. In one
ambitious study, Bahrick (1984) examined
Long-Term Memory 27
participants’ knowledge of Spanish words, id-
ioms, and grammar following retention inter-
vals of up to 50 years, for which participants
reported very little use of Spanish. Figure 1.6
shows the data on grammar recall, which are
representative of the results with the other
measures of retention. There are three dis-
tinct components to the retention function.
First, consistent with forgetting in traditional
episodic and autobiographical memory tasks,
participants experienced a drop in knowledge
of Spanish over the first 3 to 6 years of the
retention interval. Second, scores remained
stable over the next 20 to 30 years. Finally,
scores dropped off again as the retention in-
terval continued to increase, possibly reflect-
ing the declines often associated with aging.
The most interesting data involve the middle,
flat part of the retention function, in which
participants showed relatively stable knowl-
edge of Spanish years after learning occurred;
Bahrick labeled this component of the curve
as reflecting the permastore. Thus, semantic
memory appears to contain semipermanent
information, relatively immune to forgetting,
with the result that participants retain a large
14
Grammar recall
12
10
Mean score
8
6
4
2
0
1.2 3.2 5.8 9.5 14.6 25.1 34.6 49.7
Retention interval (years)
Figure 1.6 Ability to read Spanish over 50 years,
adapted from Bahrick (1984). The middle part of
the curve reflects the permastore, relatively stable
knowledge of Spanish over time. This finding of
a permastore holds across different measures of
Spanish knowledge, including grammar recall. The
data in this figure are smoothed.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
28 Kinds of Memory
amount of information without rehearsal. This
description of semantic memory holds across
different amounts of initial Spanish training,
and across different levels of original mastery
of the language.
The study of semantic memory per se has
not been pursued as vigorously over the years
as has the study of episodic memory. How-
ever, semantic memory borders on the issue of
how concepts and categories are represented
and accessed, and this topic has received great
attention (see Chapters 10 and 11). If it is de-
fined somewhat more broadly to encompass
these topics, semantic memory has occupied
cognitive psychologists to a great degree over
the past 30 years.
Implicit Memory
Implicit memory tests are indirect measures
of the retention of past experience (Schacter,
1987; see also Roediger, 1990). In terms of
the procedures used to study implicit mem-
ory, the encoding phase is like that of a stan-
dard episodic (or explicit) memory experi-
ment, whereas the test phase is like that of a
standard semantic memory test. That is, dur-
ing a first (encoding) phase subjects are usu-
ally exposed to a series of words or pictures
(either with or without instructions to learn
the material). However, during the test phase
subjects are asked to complete a task based
on their past knowledge to the best of their
abilities, as in a semantic memory test, but
no specific mention is made of using recently
presented information from the earlier phase
of the experiment. The implicit test is there-
fore thought to measure incidental retrieval
of past experiences (Jacoby & Witherspoon,
1982; Roediger & McDermott, 1993).
Several standard tests of implicit mem-
ory involve accessing lexical knowledge, or
knowledge of the forms of words. If subjects
have studied the word elephant in a long list of
words, they might later be given a number of
fragmented forms of words and asked to name
the first word that pops to mind that fits the
clue. For example, ele or e e h n might
be given; these tests are called word stem
completion and word fragment completion,
respectively. If subjects have recently stud-
ied the word elephant, they are more likely
to complete the stem (which could be com-
pleted several ways—element, electric, elec-
tive, etc.) or the fragment (which can only be
completed one way) with elephant. The mea-
sure of interest in implicit memory tests is
priming, or the difference in probability (or
speed) of completing the stem or fragment
with a target when it has been recently studied
relative to when it has not. Therefore, some
items are not studied but are tested to get the
base rate against which to measure priming
from past experience. It is possible to con-
duct the same experiment with pictures that
are studied and picture fragments that are used
as test items, as well as with other types of ma-
terial and procedures.
Implicit memory tests have revealed a
number of startling outcomes about human
memory, in that standard variables that seem
well understood in other arenas either have
no effect or opposite effects on standard im-
plicit memory tests such as word fragment or
word stem completion. As noted earlier, the
study of implicit memory began with the ob-
servation that even densely amnesic patients,
who showed dismal performance relative to
control subjects on explicit tests such as free
recall, showed intact priming on implicit tests
(Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968; see also
Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984). This outcome
shows that “amnesic patients” are amnesic
only for certain types of memory; in addition,
standard explicit tests do not measure the only
type of memory. Implicit memory tests re-
quire different processes and rely on differ-
ent memory systems than do explicit tests
(Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Roediger,
Buckner, & McDermott, 1999).
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
The difference between standard explicit
and implicit memory tests extends far be-
yond work with brain-damaged patients. In
the section on episodic memory we reviewed
four different powerful effects of manipulat-
ing variables during study—(the levels-of-
processing effect, the generation effect, the
picture superiority effect, and the repetition
effect). Those outcomes generalize reason-
ably well across episodic memory tests (free
recall, cued recall, standard recognition tests);
but on the kind of verbal implicit memory
tests described earlier (word stem and word
fragment completion), all four of these ef-
fects either disappear (there is no effect of the
variable) or actually reverse. For example, Ja-
coby and Dallas (1981) first showed that the
levels-of-processing effect that is so power-
ful in recognition and recall did not occur on
a verbal implicit memory test akin to those
discussed here. This outcome has been repli-
cated, but some have reported small effects of
levels of processing. Even when they occur,
they are tiny compared to effects on explicit
tests. Similarly, Jacoby (1983) and Blaxton
(1989) found that words that are read produce
more priming in naming visually degraded
or fragmented words than do words that are
generated during study. Therefore, the gener-
ation effect on standard explicit tests reverses
on these kinds of implicit tests. Some have
reported no differences between generating
and reading on certain types of implicit tests
(e.g., Masson & MacLeod, 1992), but that is
still quite different from the standard posi-
tive effect obtained on explicit tests. The pic-
ture superiority effect also reverses on verbal
implicit memory tests (Weldon & Roediger,
1987), and sometimes no priming whatso-
ever from pictures occurs on verbal tests
(Srinivas, 1993). The repetition effect also
does not occur on implicit memory tests;
Challis and Sidhu (1993) showed that 16
massed repetitions of a word produced prim-
ing equivalent to one presentation!
Long-Term Memory 29
In short, the “laws of memory” seem quite
different on these verbal tests involving frag-
mentary visual clues that challenge the per-
ceptual system. The types of implicit memory
tests discussed thus far are called perceptual
or data-driven tests; they present fragmentary
data to the perceptual system and require sub-
jects to produce a response. The fact that stan-
dard effects on explicit tests (e.g., levels of
processing) vanish or reverse on these implicit
tests can be understood through the principle
of transfer appropriate processing. These tests
challenge the perceptual system but do not re-
quire much analysis of meaning. Therefore,
as long as subjects have read the word forms
during study, they will show a benefit on a
later test. Deeper processing adds other pro-
cesses (meaningful ones) to the reading, but
this will not help a subject complete a word
fragment or word stem. Similarly, it is bet-
ter for subjects to have read the word than to
have generated it, because in the former con-
dition they have practiced the skill they will
need at the test (i.e., reading the word from
a brief or fragmentary clue). In the case of
studying pictures, the word form is not pre-
sented at all, and hence there is little or no
priming on a word fragment completion test.
The skills and systems needed for priming
on implicit memory tests are different from
those required by standard explicit tests
(which are usually meaning-based), so pat-
terns of outcome are quite different (Roediger
& McDermott, 1993).
As noted toward the beginning of this chap-
ter, there are two types of implicit memory
tests: perceptual and conceptual. Conceptual
tests also reveal intact priming in amnesic
patients (Shimamura, 1986), but in other ways
they are similar to standard (meaning-based)
explicit tests, probably because conceptual
tests are themselves meaning-based. Exam-
ples of conceptual implicit memory tests in-
clude free associating to words for 30 seconds
(tusk: ???), generating members of categories
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
30 Kinds of Memory
for 30 seconds (animals: ???), or answering
general knowledge questions (What animal
did Hannibal use to help scale the mountains
in his attack on Rome?). In each of these cases,
having previously studied the word elephant
would lead to priming on these tests, relative
to the case in which the word had not been
studied. However, for these types of tests
there is a positive effect of levels of process-
ing on priming, as well as of generating (e.g.,
Srinivas & Roediger, 1990). Again, this pat-
tern is interpretable in terms of transfer ap-
propriate processing ideas, because both these
manipulations are conceptual in nature. How-
ever, data from some experiments fail to con-
form to the transfer appropriate processing
ideas. McDermott and Roediger (1996) and
Weldon and Coyote (1996) both found that
presentation of pictures during an encoding
phase produces equivalent levels of priming
as words, despite the greater conceptual elab-
oration thought to be involved in processing
pictures. This puzzle and others await future
resolution.
Procedural Memory
Procedural memory involves memory for cog-
nitive and motor skills. Skiing, reading, driv-
ing, and typing are all examples of proce-
dural memory. Such knowledge is generally
acquired slowly via practice. As described
earlier, procedural or nondeclarative knowl-
edge often cannot be verbalized; in fact, peo-
ple may not even be aware that learning has
occurred. Their behavior is characterized by
“knowing how” to do something rather than
“knowing that” they know it. Consistent with
this, amnesic patients show intact procedural
memory on a variety of tasks, including ro-
tary pursuit (Brooks & Baddeley, 1976) and
solving the tower of Hanoi problem (Wilson
& Baddeley, 1988). If the skill is acquired af-
ter the brain injury that rendered the patient
amnesic, the patient will often learn the skill
and yet deny knowledge of the task.
Acquisition of Procedures
Singley and Anderson (1989) did an in-depth
analysis of the acquisition of text-editing
skills by secretarial students trained in typ-
ing but not word processing. Over 6 days,
students practiced making corrections to a
word-processing document. As shown in Fig-
ure 1.7, time per page decreased from a mean
of 8 min on the first day to 2 min by the last
day. Singley and Anderson classified subjects’
time as either thinking time or keystroking
time. As all subjects were experienced typ-
ists, keystroking time remained fairly con-
stant across the 6 days. However, thinking
time decreased dramatically across the 6 days
as subjects became more experienced with
word processing. Even the slight decrease in
keystroking time was due to the elimination
of keystrokes rather than to increases in the
speed of key pressing. These results are ex-
plainable within Anderson’s (1982) frame-
work for skill acquisition, in which people’s
8.0
Total time
Thinking time
Keystroking time
6.0
Minutes per page
4.0
2.0
0.0
1 2 3 4 5 6
Days
Figure 1.7 Acquisition of word-processing
skills. Thinking time decreased dramatically over
time as typists’ knowledge moved from a declar-
ative to a procedural state. Anderson (1995),
reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
initial knowledge is declarative and is trans-
lated into automatic procedures via practice.
On day one, subjects’ knowledge of word pro-
cessing was in a declarative state, meaning
that they looked up and used specific produc-
tion rules for different editing situations (e.g.,
“to make this change, first I need to highlight
this passage with the mouse, press the delete
key, and then type the new words”). Time per
page decreased as subjects automatized pro-
cedures, made fewer errors, and eliminated
unnecessary rules.
“Knowing That” versus “Knowing How”
As noted already, people can demonstrate pro-
cedural learning even when they are unaware
of it themselves. Curran and Keele (1993) ex-
amined subjects’ awareness of their learning
of a visuo-spatial sequence. They were in-
structed to press keys corresponding to par-
ticular spatial locations of visual signals on
a computer screen; sometimes the sequence
of signals followed a repeating spatial pattern
that subjects could learn. Over the course of
the experiment, their behavior showed learn-
ing as they responded more quickly in blocks
of trials that followed the sequence than in
blocks of trials that were randomly arranged.
Subjects who had been informed about the
nature of the repeating sequences showed the
most learning (M = 210 ms), but uninformed
subjects also showed learning. Based on re-
sults of a postexperiment questionnaire, un-
informed subjects were divided into those
who were more or less aware of the re-
peating sequences. All uninformed subjects
showed learning, although more learning oc-
curred in more-aware (M = 189 ms) than in
less-aware subjects (M = 118 ms) (Curran &
Keele, 1993, Experiment 1).
Such unawareness of procedural learning
can occur even when the skill is of a cogni-
tive nature. In a classic study by Berry and
Broadbent (1984), the subject’s task was to
learn how to control the output of a hypothet-
Long-Term Memory 31
ical sugar factory so that production amounted
to 9,000 tons of sugar. The factory produced
6,000 tons of sugar at the beginning of the
experiment; to change that output, subjects
were able to manipulate the size of the work
force. The relationship between work force
and sugar output was not a direct one, so
they could not reach the desired output sim-
ply by multiplying the work force by 1.5.
Rather, sugar output (P) was computed by
the formula P = 2 × W − P1, where W was
the work force in hundreds and P1 was the
previous output in tons. Subjects manipulated
sugar production for 60 trials, and by the end
of the experiment they were very good at con-
trolling output (M = 8675 in Experiment 1).
However, on a postexperiment questionnaire
they showed little explicit knowledge of the
relationship between sugar production and
work force. Procedurally, the subjects knew
how to get the sugar production in the right
range, but they were unable to state what
the rule was relating work force and sugar
output.
Specificity of Skill Learning: Applying
Transfer Appropriate Processing Ideas
As described earlier, subjects’ episodic mem-
ories may be tied to the context of their origi-
nal learning. People retrieve more information
when in the same mood, place, or state as that
of original learning. A similar thing occurs for
procedural memory; subjects show better re-
tention on tests of procedural memory when
they can use the same procedures in the test as
at learning (Kolers & Roediger, 1984). Kolers
demonstrated procedure-specific memory in
a series of studies in which participants prac-
ticed reading geometrically inverted (i.e., up-
side down) text. The task became less cogni-
tively demanding with practice, leading to a
decrease in reading time and also a decrease
in retention for the inverted sentences
(Kolers, 1975). After a delay of more than
a year, subjects showed savings in relearning
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
32 Kinds of Memory
the skill by showing reduced reading times
relative to their initial reading speeds in the
first phase of the experiment (Kolers, 1976).
Critically, however, savings were greater for
text that had been read the previous year than
for new text. Presumably subjects were able
to use the same procedures to reread the pre-
viously seen text, whereas slightly modified
procedures had to be used for the novel texts.
Similarly, recognition memory benefits from
a match in procedures at study and in the test.
Kolers and Ostry (1974) had students read
normal and inverted sentences at study, and
then tested recognition memory with normal
and inverted sentences. Both types of sen-
tences were best recognized when the test al-
lowed students to use the same procedures to
parse the sentences as at study; recognition
was best for sentences both studied and tested
in the same format (normal or inverted).
Expertise Revisited
We discussed earlier how experts have more
interconnected knowledge in addition to more
domain-specific knowledge. Our discussion
of procedural memory adds to the picture of
experts by endowing them with highly prac-
ticed, domain-specific skills. The chess ex-
pert moves quickly early in the game because
he or she often has a memorized rule for the
best possible move, and thus thinking time is
greatly reduced. The secretary has automa-
tized typing; the student is highly practiced
at reading. Thus, expert knowledge is best
characterized as consisting of domain-specific
procedures in addition to a large amount of
domain-specific declarative knowledge.
CONCLUSION
The theme of this chapter is that the single
term memory does not do justice to the under-
lying concepts it represents. Memories come
in multifarious forms, and within each form
the diverse kinds of memory are multifaceted.
Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscien-
tists have all made important contributions to
the understanding of these varieties of mem-
ory. This chapter represents a progress report
on our understanding at the turn of a new
century.
At the same time, however, this chap-
ter comments on the usefulness of apply-
ing classification schemes to memory. Notice-
ably absent from our chapter is the memory
researcher’s analog to the biologist’s
taxonomic tree or the chemist’s periodic
table—namely, a figure depicting the best way
to subdivide memory into types. While it may
be tempting to present a figure for the clas-
sification system of memory, there is no such
easy solution for memory researchers. Rather,
as we have argued throughout the chapter,
there are multiple dimensions one could use
to sub-divide memory into types, including
(but not limited to) how long the memory
trace lasts, phenomenological differences in
accessing different kinds of memory, perfor-
mance on different memory tests, and the neu-
rological systems underlying performance on
these tests. We organized our discussion of
memory around how long the memory trace
lasts; if we had chosen a different criterion, we
would have ended up with a different overall
framework. While this admission may be dis-
couraging to the student of memory who is
looking for the correct answer to how vari-
ous types of memory should be classified, we
believe our chapter is an appropriate charac-
terization of the current state of the study of
human memory.
We wish to make one other caveat regard-
ing classification systems. The urge to tie
all research to a classification scheme some-
times leads to under-appreciation of some
memory research. Although this chapter is
probably too long, we omitted many topics
that could be considered varieties of memory
and included in this chapter. Unfortunately,
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
research that does not fit nicely with one of
the classifications may be ignored or relegated
to an “other topics” category. For example,
our chapter has been relatively silent on the
important issue of social and collective as-
pects of memory. While we are very inter-
ested in research on topics such as collabora-
tive remembering (for an excellent summary,
see Weldon, 2001), such topics do not fit eas-
ily within the classification scheme we have
described. Consider, for example, the broad
topic of collective memory (e.g., Wertsch, in
press), which may be loosely defined as the
common memories of a group of people about
their society, culture, and history. For exam-
ple, people in the United States have the com-
mon experience of learning American history
and, for recent history, of living through the
events. For people who are in their 50s (or
older) in the year 2001, the Vietnam War is a
living memory. Even if people did not partic-
ipate in it, they still lived through those turbu-
lent times, so new foreign excursions might be
shaped by the thought that “we might be en-
tering a new Vietnam.” For American college
students of 2001, the war resides in memory
only from second-hand sources (history, nov-
els, movies, recollections of family members,
etc.), and the impact is probably different. The
Vietnam war (and World War II or the Civil
War) and other major national events shape
our historical identity, and our personal iden-
tity as Americans. The same process is true in
every country and every society, with impor-
tant commonalities and important differences
(e.g., consider how Black and White college
students in the southern United States might
remember and be shaped by the Civil War).
These questions of collective memory are fas-
cinating and clearly a type of memory (a part
of semantic memory?), but they are just begin-
ning to be explored empirically. We have not
included this category and several others that
could plausibly have been considered under
the title of “varieties of memory.”
References 33
REFERENCES
Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive
skill. Psychological Review, 89, 369–406.
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human
memory: A proposed system and its control pro-
cesses. In K. W. Spence (Ed.), The psychology of
learning and motivation: Advances in research
and theory (pp. 89–195). New York: Academic
Press.
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1971). The con-
trol of short-term memory. Scientific American,
225, 82–90.
Baddeley, A. D. (1966). Short-term memory for
word sequences as a function of acoustic, seman-
tic, and formal similarity. Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 18, 362–365.
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Baddeley, A. D. (1996). Exploring the central ex-
ecutive. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 49A, 5–28.
Baddeley, A. D. (2000a). Short-term and working
memory. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.),
The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 77–92).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Baddeley, A. D. (2000b). The episodic buffer: A
new component of working memory? Paper pre-
sented at the annual meeting of the Psychonomic
Society. Los Angeles, CA.
Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working
memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychol-
ogy of learning and motivation: Advances in re-
search and theory (Vol. 8, pp. 47–89). New York:
Academic Press.
Baddeley, A. D., Lewis, V., & Vallar, G. (1984).
Exploring the articulatory loop. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: Human Exper-
imental Psychology, 36, 233–252.
Baddeley, A. D., & Logie, R. H. (1999). Work-
ing memory: The multiple-component model.
In A. Miyake & P. Shah (Eds.), Models of work-
ing memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance
and executive control (pp. 28–61). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Baddeley, A. D., Thomson, N., & Buchanan,
M. (1975). Word length and the structure of
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
34 Kinds of Memory
short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning
and Verbal Behavior, 14, 575–589.
Bahrick, H. P. (1984). Semantic memory content
in permastore: Fifty years of memory for Span-
ish learned in school. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 113, 1–29.
Balota, D. A., Duchek, J. M., & Paullin, R. (1989).
Age-related differences in the impact of spac-
ing, lag, and retention interval. Psychology and
Aging, 4, 3–9.
Balota, D. A., & Neely, J. H. (1980). Test-
expectancy and word-frequency effects in re-
call and recognition. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6,
576–587.
Barclay, C. R., & Wellman, H. M. (1986). Accura-
cies and inaccuracies in autobiographical mem-
ories. Journal of Memory and Language, 25,
93–103.
Barsalou, L. W. (1988). The content and organiza-
tion of autobiographical memories. In U. Neisser
& E. Winograd (Eds.), Remembering reconsid-
ered: Ecological and traditional approaches to
the study of memory (pp. 193–243). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in ex-
perimental and social psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Begg, I., Snider, A., Foley, F., & Goddard, R.
(1989). The generation effect is no artifact:
Generation makes words distinctive. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 15, 977–989.
Berry, D. C., & Broadbent, D. E. (1984). On
the relationship between task performance
and associated verbal knowledge. The Quar-
terly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 36A,
209–231.
Blaxton, T. A. (1989). Investigating dissociations
among memory measures: Support for a trans-
fer appropriate processing framework. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Mem-
ory, & Cognition, 15, 657–668.
Braver, T. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2000). On the con-
trol of control: The role of dopamine in regu-
lating prefrontal function and working memory.
In S. Monsell & J. Driver (Eds.), Attention and
performance XVIII (pp. 713–737). Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Brewer, W. F. (1986). What is autobiographi-
cal memory? In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobi-
ographical memory (pp. 25–49). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Brewer, W. F. (1988a). Qualitative analysis of the
recalls of randomly sampled autobiographical
events. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, &
R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of mem-
ory: Current research and issues (pp. 263–268).
New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Brewer, W. F. (1988b). Memory for randomly
sampled autobiographical events. In U. Neisser
& E. Winograd (Eds.), Remembering reconsid-
ered: Ecological and traditional approaches to
the study of memory (pp. 21–90). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Brooks, D. N., & Baddeley, A. D. (1976). What
can amnesic patients learn? Neuropsychologia,
14, 111–122.
Brooks, L. R. (1968). Spatial and verbal compo-
nents of the act of recall. Canadian Journal of
Psychology, 22, 349–368.
Brown, N. R., Rips, L. J., & Shevell, S. K. (1985).
The subjective dates of natural events in very-
long-term memory. Cognitive Psychology, 17,
139–177.
Brown, N. R., Shevell, S. K., & Rips, L. J. (1986).
Public memories and their personal context. In
D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical Memory
(pp. 137–158). Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Brown, R., & Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulb memo-
ries. Cognition, 5, 73–99.
Brown, R., & McNeill, D. (1966). The “tip of the
tongue” phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learn-
ing and Verbal Behavior, 5, 325–337.
Challis, B. H., & Sidhu, R. (1993). Dissociative ef-
fect of massed repetition on implicit and explicit
measures of memory. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
19, 115–127.
Chase, W. G., & Ericsson, K. A. (1982). Skill and
working memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The
psychology of learning and motivation (vol. 16,
pp. 1–58). New York: Academic Press.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
Chi, M. T. H., & Koeske, R. D. (1983). Network
representation of a child’s dinosaur knowledge.
Developmental Psychology, 19, 29–39.
Christianson, S. A. (1989). Flashbulb memories:
Special, but not so special. Memory & Cogni-
tion, 17, 435–443.
Colegrave, F. W. (1899). Individual memories.
American Journal of Psychology, 10, 228–255.
Colle, H. A., & Welsh, A. (1976). Acoustic mask-
ing in primary memory. Journal of Verbal Learn-
ing and Verbal Behavior, 15, 17–31.
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-
activation theory of semantic processing. Psy-
chological Review, 82, 407–428.
Collins, A. M., & Quillian, M. R. (1969). Retrieval
time from semantic memory. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 8, 240–248.
Conway, M. A. (1990). Autobiographical memory:
An introduction. Philadelphia: Milton Keynes.
Conway, M. A., & Ross, M. (1984). Getting what
you want by revising what you had. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 738–748.
Cowan, N. (1984). On short and long auditory
stores. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 341–370.
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of
processing: A framework for memory research.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,
11, 671– 684.
Craik, F. I. M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of
processing and the retention of words in episodic
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 104, 268–294.
Crovitz, H. F., & Schiffman, H. (1974). Frequency
of episodic memories as a function of their
age. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 4,
517–518.
Crowder, R. G. (1976). Principles of learning and
memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Crowder, R. G. (1981). The role of auditory mem-
ory in speech perception and discrimination. In
T. Meyers, J. Laver, & J. Anderson (Eds.), The
cognitive representation of speech. Amsterdam,
The Netherlands: North-Holland.
Crowder, R. G., & Surprenant, A. M. (2000). Sen-
sory stores. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia
of psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
References 35
Curran, T., & Keele, S. W. (1993). Attentional
and nonattentional forms of sequence learning.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, & Cognition, 19, 189–202.
Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individ-
ual differences in working memory and reading.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,
19, 450– 466.
Darwin, C. J., Turvey, M. T., & Crowder, R. G.
(1972). An auditory analogue of the Sperling
partial report procedure: Evidence for brief audi-
tory storage. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 255–267.
Dempster, F. N. (1988). The spacing effect: A case
study in the failure to apply the results of psy-
chological research. American Psychologist, 43,
627–634.
Ebbinghaus, H. (1885/1964). Memory: A contri-
bution to experimental psychology. New York:
Dover.
Einstein, G. O., & McDaniel, M. A. (1990). Nor-
mal aging and prospective memory. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
& Cognition, 16, 717–726.
Ellis, N. C., & Hennelly, R. A. (1980). A bilingual
word-effect: Implications for intelligence test-
ing and the relative ease of mental calculation in
Welsh and English. British Journal of Psychol-
ogy, 71, 43–52.
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., &
Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working memory,
short-term memory, and general fluid intelli-
gence: A latent-variable approach. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 309–
331.
Erdelyi, M. H. (1996). The recovery of uncon-
scious memories: Hyperamnesia and reminis-
cence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Flexser, A. J., & Tulving, E. (1978). Retrieval inde-
pendence in recognition and recall. Psychologi-
cal Review, 85, 153–171.
Freud, S. (1917/1982). An early memory from
Goethe’s autobiography. In U. Neisser (Ed.),
Memory observed: Remembering in natural
contexts. New York: Freeman.
Friedman, W. J. (1993). Memory for the time
of past events. Psychological Bulletin, 113,
44–66.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
36 Kinds of Memory
Galton, F. (1879). Psychometric experiments.
Brain, 2, 149–162.
Gardiner, J. M., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2000).
Remembering and knowing. In E. Tulving &
F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of
memory (pp. 229–244). New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Glanzer, M. (1972). Storage mechanisms in recall.
In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The Psychology of Learn-
ing & Motivation (Vol. 5, pp. 129–193). New
York: Academic Press.
Glanzer, M., & Clark, W. H. (1963). Accuracy of
perceptual recall: An analysis of organization.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,
1, 289–299.
Glanzer, M., & Cunitz, A. R. (1966). Two stor-
age mechanisms in free recall. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5, 351–360.
Graf, P. & Schacter, D. L. (1985). Implicit and ex-
plicit memory for new associations in normal
and amnesic subjects. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition,
11, 501–518.
Graf, P., Squire, L. R., & Mandler, G. (1984). The
information that amnesic patients do not forget.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 10, 164–178.
Gruneberg, M. M., & Monks, J. (1974). “Feeling
of knowing” and cued recall. Acta Psychologica,
38, 257–265.
Haber, R. N., & Standing, L. G. (1970). Direct esti-
mates of the apparent duration of a flash. Cana-
dian Journal of Psychology, 24, 216–229.
Hall, J. F. (1954). Learning as a function of word
frequency. American Journal of Psychology, 67,
138–140.
Hart, J. T. (1967). Memory and the memory-
monitoring process. Journal of Verbal Learning
and Verbal Behavior, 6, 685–691.
Herz, R. S., & Engen, T. (1996). Odor memory:
Review and analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review, 3, 300–313.
Hintzman, D. L. (1978). The psychology of learn-
ing and memory. Freeman: San Francisco.
Hoosain, R., & Salili, F. (1988). Language dif-
ferences, working memory, and mathematical
ability. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, &
R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of mem-
ory: Current research and issues, Vol. 2: Clini-
cal and educational implications (pp. 512–517).
Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Howe, M. L., & Courage, M. L. (1993). On resolv-
ing the enigma of infantile amnesia. Psycholog-
ical Bulletin, 113, 305–326.
Hunt, R. R. (1995). The subtlety of distinctiveness:
What von Restorff really did. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 2, 105–112.
Hunt, R. R., & Elliot, J. M. (1980). The role of non-
semantic information in memory: Orthographic
distinctiveness effects on retention. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 109, 49–74.
Hunt, R. R., & McDaniel, M. A. (1993). The
enigma of organization and distinctiveness.
Journal of Memory & Language, 32, 421–445.
Huttenlocher, J., Hedges, L. V., & Bradburn, N. M.
(1990). Reports of elapsed time: Bounding and
rounding processes in estimation. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
& Cognition, 16, 196–213.
Huttenlocher, J., Hedges, L. V., & Prohaska, V.
(1992). Memory for the day of the week: A 5 + 2
day cycle. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 121, 313–325.
Hyman, I. E., Jr., & Pentland, J. (1996). The role of
mental imagery in the creation of false childhood
memories. Journal of Memory and Language,
35, 101–117.
Jacoby, L. L. (1978). On interpreting the effects of
repetition: Solving a problem versus remember-
ing a solution. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 17, 649–667.
Jacoby, L. L. (1983). Remembering the data:
Analyzing interactive processes in reading.
Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior,
22, 485–508.
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation frame-
work: Separating automatic from intentional
uses of memory. Journal of Memory & Lan-
guage, 30, 513–541.
Jacoby, L. L., & Dallas, M. (1981). On the rela-
tionship between autobiographical memory and
perceptual learning. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 110, 306–340.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
Jacoby, L. L., & Witherspoon, D. (1982). Remem-
bering without awareness. Canadian Journal of
Psychology, 36, 300–324.
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A., Suengas, A. G., &
Raye, C. L. (1988). Phenomenal characteristics
of memories for perceived and imagined autobi-
ographical events. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: General, 117, 371–376.
Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (1992). A capacity
theory of comprehension: Individual differences
in working memory. Psychological Review, 99,
122–149.
Kinsbourne, M., & George, J. (1974). The mech-
anism of the word-frequency effect on recogni-
tion memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 13, 63–69.
Kolers, P. A. (1975). Memorial consequences of
automatized encoding. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 1,
689–701.
Kolers, P. A. (1976). Reading a year later. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning
and Memory, 2, 554–565.
Kolers, P. A., & Ostry, D. J. (1974). Time course
of loss of information regarding pattern analyz-
ing operations. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 13, 599–612.
Kolers, P. A., & Roediger, H. L. (1984). Procedures
of mind. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior, 23, 425–449.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1995). Mental imagery. In S.
M. Kosslyn & D. N. Osherson (Eds.), Visual
cognition: An invitation to cognitive science,
Vol. 2 (2nd ed., pp. 267–296). Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Kurbat, M. A., Shevell, S. K., & Rips, L. J. (1998).
A year’s memories: The calendar effect in au-
tobiographical recall. Memory & Cognition, 26,
532–552.
Lewis, C. H., & Anderson, J. R. (1976). Interfer-
ence with real world knowledge. Cognitive Psy-
chology, 8, 311–335.
Light, L. L., Kayra-Stuart, F., & Hollander, S.
(1979). Recognition memory for typical and un-
usual faces. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Human Learning & Memory, 5, 212–228.
References 37
Linton, M. (1975). Memory for real-world events.
In D. A. Norman & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.),
Explorations in Cognition (376–404). San
Francisco: Freeman.
Linton, M. (1978). Real world memory after six
years: An in vivo study of very long term mem-
ory. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, &
R. N. Skyes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory
(pp. 69–76). London: Academic Press.
Linton, M. (1982). Transformations of memory in
everyday life. In U. Neisser (Ed.), Memory ob-
served: Remembering in natural contexts. New
York: Freeman.
Loftus, E. F. (1993). The reality of repressed mem-
ories. American Psychologist, 48, 518–537.
Loftus, E. F., & Marburger, W. (1983). Since the
eruption of Mt. St. Helens, has anyone beaten
you up? Improving the accuracy of retrospec-
tive reports with landmark events. Memory &
Cognition, 11, 114–120.
Logie, R. H. (1986). Visuo-spatial processes in
working memory. Quarterly Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Human Experimental Psy-
chology, 38A, 229–247.
Masson, M. E., & MacLeod, C. M. (1992). Reen-
acting the route to interpretation: Enhanced per-
ceptual identification without prior perception.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
121, 145–176.
Maylor, E. A. (1990). Age and prospective
memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology,
42, 471–493.
McCarthy, R., & Warrington, E. K. (1988). Evi-
dence for modality-specific meaning systems in
the brain. Nature, 334, 428–430.
McCarthy, R., & Warrington, E. K. (1990). The
dissolution of semantics. Nature, 343, 599.
McDaniel, M. A., Dunay, P. K., Lyman, B. J., &
Kerwin, M. L. (1988). Effects of elaboration and
relational distinctiveness of sentence memory.
American Journal of Psychology, 101, 357–369.
McDaniel, M. A., Waddill, P. J., & Einstein, G. O.
(1988). A contextual account of the generation
effect: A three-factor theory. Journal of Memory
and Language, 27, 521–536.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
38 Kinds of Memory
McDermott, K. B., & Roediger, H. L., III (1996).
Exact and conceptual repetition dissociate con-
ceptual memory tests: Problems for transfer ap-
propriate processing theory. Canadian Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 50, 57–71.
Melton, A. W. (1970). The situation with respect
to the spacing of repetitions and memory. Jour-
nal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 9,
596–606.
Meyer, D. E., & Schvaneveldt, R. W. (1971).
Facilitation in recognizing pairs of words:
Evidence of a dependence between retrieval op-
erations. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
90, 227–234.
Miyake, A., & Shah, P. (1999). Models of work-
ing memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance
and executive control. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Morris, C. D., Bransford, J. D., & Franks, J. J.
(1977). Levels of processing versus transfer ap-
propriate processing. Journal of Verbal Learning
and Verbal Behavior, 16, 519–533.
Moscovitch, M., Goshen-Gottstein, Y., & Vriezen,
E. (1994). Memory without conscious recollec-
tion: A tutorial review from a neuropsycholog-
ical perspective. In C. Umilta & M. Moscov-
itch (Eds.), Attention and performance: Vol. 15.
Conscious and nonconscious information pro-
cessing. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Murdock, B. B. (1974). Human memory: Theory
and data. Potomac, MD: Erlbaum.
Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the im-
portant questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E.
Morris, & R. N. Skyes (Eds.), Practical aspects
of memory (pp. 3–24). London: Academic Press.
Neisser, U. (1982). John Dean’s memory: A case
study. In U. Neisser (Ed.), Memory observed:
Remembering in natural contexts. New York:
Freeman.
Neisser, U., & Harsch, N. (1993). Phantom flash-
bulbs: False recollections of hearing the news
about Challenger. In E. Winograd & U. Neisser
(Eds.), Affect and accuracy in recall: Studies of
“flashbulb” memories (pp. 9–31). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Nilsson, L. G. (2000). Remembering actions and
words. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.),
The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 137–148).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Norman, D. A. (1970). Models of human memory.
New York: Academic Press.
Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1980). Attention to
action: Willed and automatic control of behavior.
In R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwarts, & D. Shapiro
(Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation: Ad-
vances in research and theory (Vol. 4, pp. 1–18).
New York: Plenum Press.
Paivio, A. (1986). Mental representations: A dual
coding approach. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Paivio, A., & Begg, I. (1971). Imagery and com-
prehension latencies as a function of sentence
concreteness and structure. Perception and Psy-
chophysics, 10, 408–412.
Paivio, A., & Csapo, K. (1973). Picture superiority
in free recall: Imagery or dual coding? Cognitive
Psychology, 5, 176–206.
Paivio, A., Rogers, T. B., & Smythe, P. C. (1968).
Why are pictures easier to recall than words?
Psychonomic Science, 11, 137–138.
Paivio, A., Yuille, J. C., & Rogers, T. B. (1969).
Noun imagery and meaningfulness in free and
serial recall. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 79, 509–514.
Pezdek, K., Finger, K., & Hodge, D. (1997). Plant-
ing false childhood memories: The role of event
plausibility. Psychological Science, 8, 437–441.
Pillemer, D. B., Goldsmith, L. R., Panter, A. T., &
White, S. H. (1988). Very long-term memories of
the first year in college. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition,
14, 709–715.
Pillemer, D. B., Rhinehart, E. D., & White, S. H.
(1986). Memories of life transitions: The first
year in college. Human Learning: Journal of
practical research & applications. 5, 109–123.
Prabhakaran, V., Smith, J. A. L., Desmond, J. E.,
Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1997). Neu-
ral substrates of fluid reasoning: An fMRI study
of neocortical activation during performance of
the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test. Cogni-
tive Psychology, 33, 43–63.
Reder, L. M. (1982). Plausibility judgments ver-
sus fact retrieval: Alternative strategies for
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
sentence verification. Psychological Review, 89,
250–280.
Richardson, J. T., & Baddeley, A. D. (1975). The
effect of articulatory suppression in free recall.
Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior,
14, 623–629.
Richardson-Klavehn, A., Gardiner, J. M., & Java,
R. I. (1996). Memory: Task dissociation, process
dissociations and dissociations of conscious-
ness. In G. D. M. Underwood (Ed.), Implicit
cognition (p. 85–158). Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Robinson, J. A. (1976). Sampling autobiographical
memory. Cognitive Psychology, 8, 578–595.
Roediger, H. L., III (1990). Implicit memory:
Retention without remembering. American
Psychologist, 45, 1043–1056.
Roediger, H. L., III (2000). Why retrieval is the
key process in understanding human memory.
In E. Tulving (Ed.), Memory, consciousness, and
the brain: The Tallinn conference (pp. 52–75).
Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis.
Roediger, H. L., III, Buckner, R., & McDermott,
K. B. (1999). Components of processing. In
J. K. Foster & M. Jelicic (Eds.), Memory: Sys-
tems, process, or function? (pp. 31–65). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Roediger, H. L., III., & Crowder, R. G. (1976). A
serial position effect in the recall of United States
presidents. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society,
8, 275–278.
Roediger, H. L., III., & Gallo, D. A. (in press).
Levels of processing: Some unanswered ques-
tions. In M. Naveh-Benjamin, M. Moscovitch, &
H. L. Roediger III (Eds.), Perspectives on human
memory and cognitive aging: Essays in honour
of Fergus Craik. New York, NY: Psychology
Press.
Roediger, H. L., III, & Guynn, M. J. (1996). Re-
trieval processes. In E. L. Bjork & R. A. Bjork
(Eds.), Memory (pp. 197–236). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (1993).
Implicit memory in normal human subjects. In
F. Boller & J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook
of neuropsychology (pp. 63–131). Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
References 39
Ross, M. (1989). Relation of implicit theories to
the construction of personal histories. Psycho-
logical Review, 96, 341–357.
Ross, M., McFarland, C., & Fletcher, G. J. (1981).
The effect of attitude on the recall of personal
histories. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 40, 627–634.
Rubin, D. C. (1982). On the retention function
for autobiographical memory. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 21–38.
Rubin, D. C., & Kozin, M. (1984). Vivid memories.
Cognition, 16, 81–95.
Rubin, D. C., & Schulkind, M. D. (1997). The dis-
tribution of autobiographical memories across
the life span. Memory & Cognition, 25, 859–
866.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York:
Barnes and Noble.
Salame, P., & Baddeley, A. D. (1987). Noise,
unattended speech and short-term memory.
Ergonomics, 30, 1185–1194.
Salame, P., & Baddeley, A. D. (1989). Effects
of background music on phonological short-
term memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Human Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 41, 107–122.
Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: History
and current status. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13,
501–518.
Schacter, D. L., Harbluk, J. L., & McLachlan,
D. R. (1984). Retrieval without recollection: An
experimental analysis of source amnesia. Jour-
nal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 23,
593–611.
Schacter, D. L., & Tulving, E. (1994). What are the
memory systems of 1994? In D. L. Schacter &
E. Tulving (Eds.), Memory systems (pp. 1–38).
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Schmidt, S. R. (1985). Encoding and retrieval
processes in the memory for conceptually dis-
tinct events. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 11, 565–
578.
Schweickert, R., & Boruff, B. (1986). Short-term
memory capacity: Magic number or magic spell?
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
40 Kinds of Memory
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 12, 419–425.
Shimamura, A. P. (1986). Priming effects in amne-
sia: Evidence for a dissociable memory function.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Experimental Psychology, 38, 619–644.
Shum, M. S. (1998). The role of temporal land-
marks in autobiographical memory processes.
Psychological Bulletin, 124, 423–442.
Singley, M. K., & Anderson, J. R. (1989). The
transfer of cognitive skill. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Slamecka, N. J. (1977). A case for response pro-
duced cues in serial learning. Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology, 3, 222–232.
Slamecka, N. J. (1985). Ebbinghaus: Some asso-
ciations. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11, 414–435.
Slamecka, N. J., & Graf, P. (1978). The generation
effect: Delineation of a phenomenon. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 4, 592–604.
Slamecka, N. J., & Katsaiti, L. T. (1987). The gen-
eration effect as an artifact of selective displaced
rehearsal. Journal of Memory and Language, 26,
589–607.
Smith, E. E., Adams, N. E., & Schorr, D. (1978).
Fact retrieval and the paradox of interference.
Cognitive Psychology, 10, 438–464.
Smith, E. E., Jonides, J., & Koeppe, R. A. (1996).
Dissociating verbal and spatial working memory
using PET. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 11–20.
Sperling, G. (1960). The information available in
brief visual presentation. Psychological Mono-
graphs, 74 (Whole No. 498), 29.
Squire (1987). Memory and brain. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Squire, L. R. (1992). Declarative and non-
declarative memory: Multiple brain systems
supporting learning and memory. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 4, 232–243.
Squire, L. R., Knowlton, B., & Musen, G. (1993).
The structure and organization of memory.
Annual Review of Psychology, 44, 453–495.
Squire, L. R., & Slater, P. C. (1975). Forgetting
in very long-term memory as assessed by an
improved questionnaire technique. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and
Memory, 1, 50–54.
Srinivas, K. (1993). Perceptual specificity in non-
verbal priming. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19,
582–602.
Srinivas, K., & Roediger, H. L., III. (1990). Clas-
sifying implicit memory tests: Category associ-
ation and anagram solution. Journal of Memory
& Language, 29, 389–412.
Thompson, C. P. (1982). Memory for unique per-
sonal events: The roommate study. Memory &
Cognition, 10, 324–332.
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic mem-
ory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Or-
ganization of memory (pp. 381–403). New York:
Academic Press.
Tulving, E. (1974). Cue-dependent forgetting.
American Scientist, 62, 74–82.
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Tulving, E. (1985a). Memory and consciousness.
Canadian Journal of Psychology, 26, 1–12.
Tulving, E. (1985b). How many memory systems
are there? American Psychologist, 40, 385–398.
Tulving, E. (1993). What is episodic memory?
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2,
67–70.
Tulving, E. (1999). On the uniqueness of episodic
memory. In L. G. Nilsson & H. J. Marksow-
itsch (Eds.), Cognitive neuroscience of memory
(pp. 11–42). Seattle: Hogrefe & Huber.
Tulving, E., & Pearlstone. Z. (1966). Availability
versus accessibility of information in memory
for words. Journal of Verbal Learning and Ver-
bal Behavior, 5, 381–391.
Tulving, E., & Schacter, D. L. (1990). Priming
and human memory systems. Science, 247, 301–
306.
Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encod-
ing specificity and retrieval processes in epi-
sodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 359–
380.
Underwood, B. J. (1957). Interference and forget-
ting. Psychological Review, 64, 49–60.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43
Wagenaar, W. A. (1986). My memory: A study of
autobiographical memory over six years. Cog-
nitive Psychology, 18, 225–252.
Wagenaar, W. A. (1988). People and places in
my memory: A study on cue specificity and re-
trieval from autobiographical memory. In M. M.
Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.),
Practical aspects of memory: Current research
and issues. New York: Wiley.
Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1968). A
study of learning and retention in amnesic pa-
tients. Neuropsychologia, 6, 283–291.
Waugh, N. C., & Norman, D. A. (1965). Primary
memory. Psychological Review, 72, 89–104.
Weaver, C. A., III. (1993). Do you need a “flash”
to form a flashbulb memory? Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology: General, 122, 39–46.
Weldon, M.S. (2001). Remembering as a social
process. In D. L. Medin (Ed.), The Psychology of
Learning and Motivation (Vol. 40, pp. 67–100).
New York: Academic Press.
Weldon, M. S., & Coyote, K. C. (1996). Failure to
find the picture superiority effect in implicit con-
ceptual memory tests. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition,
22, 670–686.
References 41
Weldon, M. S., & Roediger, H. L., III. (1987).
Altering retrieval demands reverses the picture
superiority effect. Memory & Cognition, 15,
269–280.
Wertsch, J. V. (in press). Voices of collective re-
membering. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Wetzler, S. E., & Sweeney, J. A. (1986). Child-
hood amnesia: An empirical demonstration.
In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory
(pp. 191–201). Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Wheeler, M. A. (2000). Episodic memory and auto-
noetic awareness. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory (pp.
597–608). New York: Oxford University Press.
White, R. T. (1982). Memory for personal events.
Human Learning, 1, 171–183.
Wilson, B., & Baddeley, A. (1988). Frontal amne-
sia and the dysexecutive syndrome. Brain and
Cognition, 7, 212–230.
Yarmey, A. D., & Bull, M. P., III (1978). Where
were you when President Kennedy was assassi-
nated? Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 11,
133–135.
pashler-44076 book November 27, 2001 9:43

42