jS Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

ASME BPV Code Week in Las Vegas, NV May, 2011

What happened in the TEPCO

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
-The Great East Japan Earthquake and
the Status of the Nuclear Power Stations -

May 12,2011

Hiroyuki ITO
Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
External view of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
after the Accident
(Rcf,: TEPCO web site)

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

Presentation Contents

1. Summary of the Earthquake

2. Tsunami Observations
3. Status of the Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs)
hit by the quake and the tsunami
4. Accident Progression at Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1F)
5. Chronology of 1F Units 1 through 4 (1F1 - 4)
6. Radiation Dose around the NPS
7. Sea Water Monitoring around the NPS
8. Future Schedule
9. Summary
 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
n
1. Summary of the Earthquake

Main
14:46 M9.0 Shock

(Ref.: Earthquake
Research Institute,
the University of
Tokyo)

(Ref.: Japan Meteorological Agency}

•Date & Time: 14:46 March 11, 2011

•Magnitude: Mw = 9.0
Mw
(Ranked 4th largest in the world)

•Epicenter: ^130 Km offshore

•Source Depth: 24Km

Apr.9
P re-quake Post-quake

\f>^
j \n Nuclear Technology Institute
2. Tsunami Observations 1
lS-Apr-2011
t

Field Survey
° ) Xxv
44 44

42 42
0-""*^, HigashiDori NPS
/• W** Height > 4m
o>
-a

/
} *
f/
1 Onagawa NPS
Height: 13m
* ^^hA^MflkAJ. 4HK
• '

"MJKJ»- *
.jM^^TTK.t
hd^dd^^K^ 5t A * i A
40 |

3S f^ I Fukushima Daiichi NPS j 33

" TJ-F*" Height: 14-1 5m : 04— Fukushima
A^^K Daiichi NPS
f • Fukushima Daini NPS
"™5fc ; Inuridation Height:
36 - : ^C*\ Height: 6.5-7m-
J*AiiA:* 14 - 15m
36
7? f ^~\^ Locally >1 4m (Ref.: The 2011
1^? i • Inundation Height
^ Tokai Daini NPS Tohoku Earthquake
A Run-up Height Tsunami Joint
34 , j , Heiqht: 5.4m -, . Survey Group)
140 142 144 146 0 10 20 30 40
lonpilucle hci^hl [ni]
Note: The first and highest tsunami wave was observed at 1 5:51 (65 min. after the earthquake) at a point
50km north of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuctear Power Station (1 F). .,
 jV Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
3. Status of ttie Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs)
hit by the q uake and the tsunami
NFS Unit Type MWe Before After After Accelera- Tsunami
Quake Quake Tsunami tion'1' (gal) Height
HigashiDori 1 BWR-5 1,100 Outage Cold Shutdown Cold Shutdown — —
Onagawa 1 BWR-4 524 Operating Automatic Scram Cold Shutdown 587 [529] Design: 9.1m
BWR-5 Reactor Automatic Scram Ground level:
2 825 Cold Shutdown 607 [594] 13.8m
Start
(Observed: 13m)
3 BWR-5 825 Operating Automatic Scram Cotd Shutdown 573 [512]
Fukushima 1 BWR-3 460 Operating Automatic Scram Loss of cooling 447 [489] Design: 5.7m
Daiichi Operating Ground level:
2 BWR-4 784 Automatic Scram Loss of cooling 550 [438]
(1F) 10m(1F1-4)
3 BWR-4 784 Operating Automatic Scram Loss of cooling 507 [441] 13m(1F5&6)
(Observed:
4 BWR-4 784 Outage Cold Shutdown Loss of SFP<2> 319 [445] 14-1 5m)
cooling
5 BWR-4 784 Outage Cold Shutdown Cold Shutdown 548 [452]
6 BWR-5 1,100 Outage Cold Shutdown Cold Shutdown 444 [448]
Fukushima 1 BWR-5 1,100 Operating Automatic Scram Cold Shutdown 254 [434] Design: 5.2m
Daini (2F) Ground level:
2 BWR-5 1,100 Operating Automatic Scram Cold Shutdown 243 [428] 12m
3 BWR-5 1,100 Operating Automatic Scram Cold Shutdown 277 [428] (Observed:
6.5-7m,
4 BWR-5 1,100 Operating Automatic Scram Cold Shutdown 210 [415] Locally >14m)
Tokai Daini — BWR-5 1,100 Operating Automatic Scram Cold Shutdown 225 [400] Ground level: 8m
(Observed: 5.4m)
<') Observed maximum response acceleration (horizontal) on the basement of Reactor Building. The design response
acceleration (horizontal) is in square brackets. SFP<21: Spent Fuel Pool

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

4. Accident Progression at Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1F)
4.1 Accident Progression (1) -just after the earthquake
March 11 - Automatic scram caused by the earthquake (1F1, 2&3)
14:46 - Loss of offsite power due to the earthquake (1F1-6)
-All Emergency Diesel Generators (DGs) were started (1F1-6)
- 1C (1F1) and RCIC (1F2&3) were cooling the reactor core
- FPC was cooling the spent fuel pool (1F1-6)

Exhaust
Stack

1C: Isolation Condenser

RCIC: Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling System Sea water
[SCRAM] Reactors were
pump
FPC: Fuel Pool Cooling automatically shut down by
System the insertion of control rods
 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
4.2 Accident Progression (2)»Impact of the tsunami
March 11 - All seawater pumps failed due to the tsunami
15:41 - DCs and M/C flooded due to the tsunami (except 1F6)
-1 hr after _ AH AC power supply was lost (Station Blackout) (1F1-4)
the quake [ * ^y v - -
- 1F5&6 achieved cold shutdown by power supply from one DG
Ground Level : +10m {1F1 -4)
Tsunami Height : +13m (1F5&6)

Tsunami Height

3 f = te-y en U-te 5 a^d315'-' P. -12r

(Ref.: TEPCO web site}

M/C: Metal-Clad Switch Gear

fflef.: TEPCO web site}

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

4.3 Accident Progression (3) - just after the tsumami hit
March 11 - All motor driven pumps were inoperable due to the Station Blackout
(1F1-4)
- Core cooling by turbine driven pumps (1F2&3) or IC (1F1)

Exhaust Reactor Building

Stack
[Cooling] Core cooling by
turbine driven pump Spent Fuel
Pool (SFP)

Suppression Chamber (S/C)

All Motor Operated pumps were Inoperable due to tsunami

inoperable due to the Station flooding
Blackout 8
 N Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
4.4 Accident Progression (4) - Loss of core cooling
Loss of all core cooling function due to battery exhaustion (1F3) or other cause
(1F1&2)
Water level fell below the Top of Active Fuel (1F1-3)
Hydrogen Generation due to the Zirconium -Water reaction (1F1-3)
Fuel Rod damage (1F1-3)
Exhaust
Stack Loss of all core cooling
capability

Sea water
pump

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

4.5 Accident Progression (5) - SIC vent and Water injection
Seawater/Fresh water was Injected using fire-extinguish pump into the RPV (1F1-3)
Suppression Chamber (S/C) Venting to depressurize the PCV(1F1-S)
Hydrogen explosion occurred at Reactor Building (1F1 &3)
A sound of explosion was heard around S/C (1F2)
Reactor Building
Hydrogen gas transferred
to PCV and leaked into
Hydrogen Explosion R/B

Water injection by fire-extinguish pump via MUWC line to RPV 10

 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
5. Chronology of 1F Units 1 through 4 (1F1-4)
5.1 Trend data of 1F1 (March 11 -15) [mm]
900
Start S/C Venting
operation
I 000

turbine bldg.

Hydrogen
Increase in explosion
PCV pressure.

Loss of ECCS
function -1000
Sea water injection
via fire extinguish line

Reactor Shut Down

3/11 15:41 Reported High
Station Black out radiation level

3/11 0:00 3/12 0:00 3/13 0:00 3/14 0:00 3/15 0:00 3/1C 0:00

D/W Press ure [kPag] •Reactor Pressure —'.----S/C Prcssure[kPa£] Reactor Water Level (A)
[mm] 11
(Rcf,:NISA website) Fresh water injection via fire extinguish line

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

5.2 Trend data of 1F2 (March 11 -16)

Explosion sound
near S/C

Reactor Shut Down

3/11 15:41

(fief.: NISA website}

 J3 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
5.3 Trend data of 1F3 (March 11-16)
[kPa] -\O :

HPCI was lost

RCIC inoperable

Core cooling by f
RCIC & HPCI

3/11 14:46
Reactor Shut Down
| 3/11 15:41
o r--gj.gjJQp Black but

-100
3/11 0:00 3/12 0:00 3/14 0:00 3/150:00 3/1G 0:00
-Reactor Pressure(B) -S-Reactgr -S/C Prec "-Reactor Water l.evel[mm]
[KPupJ [KPag]

(Rcf.:NISA web site) 13

N Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

5.4 Chronology of 1F4
* All fuel in the core was transferred to the Spent
Fuel Pool (SFP).
March 14 - Water temperature in the SFP, 84°C
March 15 - Reactor building was damaged by
the hydrogen explosion
- Fire outbreak Reactor Building of 1F4 (March 16)
March 16 - Fire outbreak (Rcf.: TEPCO web site}

March 20 - Water spray to Spent Fuel Pool was started

* Severe damage in the SFP has not been observed.
The cause of the explosion is not clear.

Fresh Water Spray to SFP of 1F4

Fuel rack in SFP of 1F4 (April 28) (**f~- TEPCO web site} (April 17)
r (Ref.: TEPCO web site} 14
 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
5.5 Summary of Chronology of 1F ( SF Pool Reactor Power Supply I
Unitl Unit 2 UnitS Unit 4 Unit 5-6 Common SF Pool

i
March 11, 14:46 Earthquake
Cooling by injecting fresh water One D/G
survived
Start injecting
sea water bStart injecting
sea water

uStart injecting
sea water

uStart watering
20 Reactor cooling
(sea waler, sfiuldown
joStart injecting fresh water)
:c-n
Swtcned from D;G
lo sifsite power

:4 Received
elect'bity from
olis.te

Control Rccm light ng MSIan cooling by

existing system

Control Rocrn ligntinc

(Ref.: TEPCO web site} 15

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

6. Radiation Dose around the NFS

i 20

15

10

ODOCOOOOO cooooooo
c D -:-=sc 21; coo c -j 'j u^

(Ref. JANTI Web Site) Mar.14 date Apr. 19

- Quite a large amount of radioactive material has been released into the
atmosphere, but the radiation dose is decreasing.
- Tentative estimation: NISA 3.7E17Bq, NSC 6.3E17Bq (Ref. Chernobyl: 5.2E18Bq) 16
 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
7. Sea Water Mon itoring ar Olmd the NFS
Mar.•w 23 Apr + 27
Bq/L 5 :'^j

i 1; i MSI || h-m || c^ii? |

f 163
-
f ';:i£3l^
-~- Cs-134
|• M:rtli i
- r,. \- "-^-j| -yj-p ' ,[,],]«««. ||"•"•—— II-—-. i
n- <-,.*.«. ' 1 " -
5= 1 / //
M
*!*«— ^
•1^

j ^.-rr 30km
>'-,
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*-"• II "•* "~°— 1 j -»-;-i3i
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f ^/i,/ . t ico
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n / V. /»V X*
5
^.2v..^,
,,,-f, > / /
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S 40
0
y--" -^.XX "
-*
RM.MMM I

(-Ref. MEXT Web Site) L,:^;

iM
- A large amount of radioactive material 1 lj3
-•-1-131

has been released into the sea. la110 -A-Ci-137

•3
i
.f
A

- Radioactivity concentrations in sea water at the

point of 30km offshore are decreasing.
V*b.*-r^
\\]
17

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

8. Future Schedule - Roadmap towards Restoration
(Released by TEPCO on April 1 7)
Current Status STEP1 (around 3 months) STEP2(+3 to 6 months Mid-term Issues
0
Stable cooling

-« | Nitrogen gas injection ^ 0

—
esh water

[J shutdown |
njecting

(1Fl,3)Flooding up to top of active fueC

E camination and implementation %f
heat exchange function /

(1F2) Sea ing the damaged location )

\g up to *.
8 Prevention of breakage
of structural materials , etc.

( top of active fuel ,'

r

o fc o
Stable cooling

3
fresh water
Spent Fuel

B' Enhance reliability of water injection^ Remote control of water \n /

Injecting

H
CO
Pools

3
tr Removal oft fuels
Restore coolant circulation system/ Examination and \n of
(D \t exchange
Cl
o
o
(1F4) Install supporting structure "> 51
function /

to
Accumu

Transferring \r with high J

contaminated

Expansion of storage ' \g facilities /

Installation of storage /
Decrease

}
Wate

radiation level / processing facilities Installation of full-fledged

(Q S
o 2 Decontamination 1 \t processingwater
(reuse)
treatment facilities
Mitigation

Is
~" OJ
Installs! on
Storing water with \w radiation of storage
level / facilities / \n processing /~
tS . etc/
a

Dispersion of inhibitor / Removal Debris / Installation of reactor

E! 1 Installing reactor building cover > ™»°™9 cover (coniamer
|

Monitoring ~~^>
... — 1 « •
(Rcf.: TEPCO website)
18
 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
8. Future Schedule - Overview of Major Countermeasures
Reactor building cover Injection of fresh water with pumps

Cooling of spent fuel pool by external water injection Storage of low

radiation-level water
Circulation cooling of spent fuel pool
Reactor
Bujldin.g [ SJ8 Processing high
Nitrogen gas injectjon radiation-level water
Waler processing facility
(Decontamination and Megafloats
desalt processing] Barges, Reservoir

Flooding up to top of Reuse of Storage of high

water radiation-level water
active fuel

{1 F2) Sealing (he

damaged location Dispersion of inhibitor / Removal of debris

•piping (1NI) Installation of supporting structure under

pumps the bottom of spent tuel pool
heat exchangers, water (Ref.: TEPCO web site)
processing facilities

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

9. Summary
(1) On March 11, there was a huge magnitude 9.0 earthquake that occurred off the
Pacific Coast of Japan. All Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) on the east coast were
shut down safely.
(2) About one hour later, a huge tsunami hit Japan. However, all NPPs continued
cooling down operations, except for Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1F).
(3) Because 1F NPS was attacked by a tsunami that was much higher than the plant
was designed for, the Sea Water Pumps and Power Supply Systems were flooded
and the plant then lost the cooling systems due to a Station Blackout, etc.
- Operating units (1F1,2&3) lost the Core and Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling
systems
- Outage unit (1F4) lost the SFP cooling systems
- Outage units (1 F5&6) successfully achieved cold shutdown through recovery
measures.
(4) Hydrogen explosions occurred at the units in which cooling function was lost, which
may have been caused by a Zirconium-water reaction. In addition, the Reactor
Building was damaged (1F1,3&4).
(5) For the units that lost the cooling system, water is continuously being injected from
outside (1F1-4).
(6) Quite a large amount of radioactive material has been released into the
atmosphere and sea, and continuous efforts are being made to bring the situation
under control.
(7) Extensive recovery efforts are being continued. Stable cooling is scheduled to take
three (3) months and cold shutdown is scheduled to take another 3 to 6 months.
20