Vijnan Parishad .. ......... Raja Rajkrishna Street " "".~ .......nc- ....

700 006, India '

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COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS A DISSENTER'S VOICE

DEBAPRASAD BANDYOPADHYAY

Bhakti P. Mallik, Ko1kata

Indian Statisttcai lnstitute, Kolkata

Swapan Kumar Banerjee .

Netaji SlJphas Open University Kolkata Krishna Bhattacharya Calcutta University 1. THE ADVENT OF COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS The recent trends in Indian Linguistics show a sudden thrust upon the area of Natural Language Processing (NLP) in conjunction with the introduction of computers in Linguistics. Here Computers are-used not only as a tool. for analyzing data with a predeterminedset of software packages (packages suitable for parsing Indian languages) supplied by foreign multinational companies or developed indigenously, they. are also used as .a multilirigual "speaking machine" ,which is supposed to create infin~te sets of sentences out of finite sets of .. ords and also translate v ~r~m one language to another. And in the realm of Information Technology It IS meant to bridge the gap between Indian languages. The methods of Chomskyan Linguistics and its derivatives, developed by divergent schools are also used as tools. for computational' parsing. These are all well-known facts now. The explosion of Computational Linguistics, thus, is a notable feature in different Linguistics Departments in India as there are different types of projects, courses, workshops, seminarsconducted by these departments with interdisciplinary help from other disciplines. Some scholars think it prestigious to be it part of Computer Science in the "age of computers". " One of the crucial questions,' which are related to philosophy of sciences', arises when we are talking about this newly invented paradigm called 'Computational Linguistics'. When there' were only pens, cards, and papers inexistence, no one talked about Card -or Pen-PaperLinguistics. Now those computers are around, we find a lot of talk about Computational Linguistics, Earlier, with the help of cards, papers and pens we were manipulating linguistic data, Which ·is now being done by the ComPllter that is nothing more than a glorified. tool for manipulating linguistic data. But the term 'Computational Linguistics' which includes the attem~t to use computer to process natur<¥ language means that the word 'computer' has some uses other than only a tool, as otherwise there

EDITORIAL BOARD ASSOCIATE EDITORS

,':AIt1estth~!llinICJom,UnN. of Annamalai, India

of OrientitJ Studies, Moscow ;It'~IB'atrioi:IDS.Q. University of fbadan, /badan \i':8rlaUl:C!hatterjiee~ Jadavpur University, Kolkata Jr; Furman Unlrtersify, S. Caro}intjjj U.S.A. '~'.J.lasauIPta,Central University, Hyderabad, India J~~'l1alllid~lv, of. Sydney Univ. of Bologna., Jtaly ftQtetjiids'Vilald. Univ. Pennsylvania ~IKall';:;£leCtoaf1 College. Pune, India of Illinois at Chicago Circle

of

~"-"i"''''.''I<J'l\yu

~'Pi(nde. University of IlIlonois at Urbana-ChampaIgn

Hyder8.bacf, India West Benga/ U'.OI;;\J-_,n_C" Ko/kate f:/,e(;!lbad. India
UnjivpJ:~itv_
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Univ. of Foreign Studies, Tokyo,

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would be a problem related to philosophy of Science, if the computer is proved to be only as useful as p~ns: p.apers and cards '. So wh~ exa.ctl~ d~ we need. to talk about such a discipline as Computational Linguistics . In fact there is no so much talk-s about Computational Geology or Computational Sociology, though both subjects among many other, use computers for manipulating their corpus. This special emphasis for this type of inter-discipline like Computational Linguistics is perhaps due to the fact that, apart from manipulating linguistic data, linguists along with Computer Engineers are trying to make computers a't'creative talking machine". This endeavour is generally referred to as Natural Language Processing (NLP). However, there areother two problems, apart from the 'Philosophy of Science Problem ", regarding Computational Linguistics in relation to the problems of both Natural and Social Sciences. The Nat~r~l Scien~ Problem questions the possibility of matching of human cogrntrve domain and computational algorithms. The Social Science problem deals with the problems of Language Planning in the context of plural society (I have already dealt with this problem, see Bandyopadhyay, 2000). These problems arise only when we are thinking about the goals and practical utility of Computational Linguistics. Unfortunately, we seldom think about the goal or utility of Computational Linguistics. In this paper I will try to understand the nature of Natural Science problem in reference to my earlier -generaJ pronouncement (1997). . 2. THE NATURAL, SCIENCE

My intention is to briefly explore in this paper, the causes behind such mismatch between Chornskyan- creativity hypothesis and computational algorithms. Chomskyan creativity hypothesis asserts that every human being can create infinite sets of sentences out of finite sets of words with the help of their innate faculty or genetic endowment. Every human being has the competence to create such infinite sets. As this is an internal property of mind, in Chomsky's later work (1986), this competence is referred to as "Internalized Language" (lL). According to Chomsky, there is a Language Acquisition Device (LAD) within the cognitive domain of every human being. In this paper, we ~i11 see that the LAD does not always (that means, there is a provision for "sometimes") follow the procedural rules-or algorithms of contemporary Computers. Therefore, the systems of cognitive processing of language cannot be fully implemented in the. computational algorithmic models. The important thing here is that of Chomsky's own position regarding .this mismatch CIshe is. the propagator of such an intrinsic system of human linguistic competence which negates the possibility of.language learning via behavioural manipulation of stimulus-response technique. I ha~'e already discussed this' problem of Chomskyan Linguistics in connection with Computational Linguistics in Bandyopadhyay, 1997. The effort to implement complexities of human cognitive domain to Computers inaugurates the scope for returning to radical- behaviourism, which Chomsky himself refuted. Radical Behaviourism considers (wojman and machines are similar and both can be manipulated by the input stimulus. What escapes· here is the potentiality of human brain, which can discover or invent a new domain of thought that is impossible even for a future machine which cannot go beyond the computability. The extra-algorithmic functions of brain lie in the area of quantumclassical borderline, as Penrose (1990, 1994) 'asserts. The machine can only "produce" some rudimentary techno-sentences compatible to technothought of one -dimensional man. All the computational procedure face halting problems within its limit to the formal system of mechariizability. One cannot ignore these. formal 'problem. related to Hilbert. and Goedel who declared the incompleteness of formal system.

PROBLEM

The 'natural science' problem lies, as the Searle's Chinese room puzzle (see appendix} explores, highlights the' very nature of mismatch between computational algorithm and non-algorithmic (?)/extraalgorithmic mode of human mind/brain, One of the areas of NLP concentrates on the study of mathematical as well as computational models of the structure of language 'and its acquisition. But, if weare allowed to follow Searle-Penrose argument (in relation to Chomskyan creativity hypothesis), which states the extra-algorithmic principles of mind/brain and the impossibility of developing 'speaking/thinking machines' with a capacity parallel to human mind/brain, this is a rather impossible task to match the machine and the human brain. If Chomskyan linguistic theory is meant for the-exploration of human mind, it is not possible to implement human cognitive structure in computers, as computational mode of representation is almost different from human cognitive system as mentioned by Penrose (1990, 1994).

3. THE DOMAINS AND METHODS

Ever since the Logical: Positivists of Vienna Circle developed. the notion of logical syntax of languages taking cue from Russell- Whitehead's magnum opus Principia Mathematica (19L3), a new paradigm of Algebraic Linguistics as a part of broad area of Quantitative Linguistics begun. However; a major concentration was on developing a metalanguage to

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describe and understand the 'real world']. This concentration on real world had broken. only when Chomskyan syntax aimed to understand human cognitive domain with the help of syntax, t:]l.Ough Chomsky himself incorporated logical analysis of sentences in the algorithmic chain of Logical Form of S-Structure deploying logical positivist sentential calculus to understand the real world semantics (Though in Chomsky, 2001 the concept of LF is discarded). All these are part of, what Bar-Hillel (1970) called as Algebraic Linguistics, a part of Mathematical Linguistics. Computational Linguistics has also been enriched by this Quantitative Linguistics as computers also try to "understand" language considering its statistical structure and probability of selectional restrictions by deploying statistical methods. On the other hand, apart from this qualitative formalization or mechanization of, natural language.xitfferenr quantitative methods like probabilistic models are deployed to understand large linguistic corpus, Thus Information Theory. Artificial Intelligence and Cybernetics come under one umbrella of Mathematical Linguistics. However, this structuralist enterprise with a strict goal of formalization is attacked in Poststructuralist conditions. In fact, easy taxonomization of stable subject is largely questioned by Post-structuralism, which concentrates on the plurality of decent red subjects; In these connection, I want to raise some issues evolved out of this new paradigm as when we are, in India, rrying to quantify large linguistic corpus, should be' conscious about the' other side of the story, because scientific hypothesis always need such counter-hypothesis and counter examples. Chomsky himself asserted; "Linguistics would perhaps profit by taking to heart-a familiar lesson of the natural sciences. Apparent counter-examples and unexplained phenomena should be carefully-noted, but it is often rational to put them aside pending further study when principles of acertain degree of explanatory adequacy are at stake." (1980:2) Post-formal approaches are now concentrating on this pending counter-examples; which are not handled by existing formal paradigm. One such area .is fuzzy pragmato-semantics and other areas are non-derivational approach . to the so called levels of language. In the-following-I willtry to depict such counter issues or problem areas in brief. In thepost·fonnal approach, the. metamathematical algorithmic procedures are strongly criticized. Philosopher of sciences like Lakotos (1976) had developed a system of refuting the formal structures of metamathematics and introduced a non-formal system of proof. Not 'only Lakatos, other initiators of such non-formal mode of thinking are also to

be found in the Indian tradition, viz., in Nagesa's proposal on nonPaninian linguistic analysis, Bhantnhari's theory of apoddhara and in P~abhakar~'s anvitabhidhanavada, Bharttrihari as an anti-Iinguist . dlscard~ lUtel~ectual anal~ical procedures and introduced theory of abstraction, which has nothing to do with quantification but explains the abstract .nature of human understanding. New days, Aronoff (1916) and Rajendra Singh (1994) are proposing the same type of argumentation regarding morphophonemic analysis .i~ ~eir numerous publications in 80s and 90s. What I found that Rajendra Singh, Probal Dasgupta and Ramakant Agnihotri, all of them are inspired by the non-Paninian. tradition of non-analysis of Ianguage-object as developed by Nagesa, (otherwise known as Nagoji Bhatta) Prabhakara and Bharttrihari, Rajendra Singh (1994) emphasized one crucial fact of morphological analysis :, do we have, in pur cognitivedomain, network of related morphemes as stated or analyzed by linguist? For example, do we have a mental network of morphemes like require t--1 requisition, acquire ---7 ac~uisition, edit ---7 editor, eat -sedible etc, ? Different linguiststnterpreted this morphemic network differently. Aronoff relates lexemes 'nominate nominate, nominee' instead of interpreting them morhphemically, whereas according to Kipersky, morphemes '00' and 'ate' are added to the morpheme ,. 'nomin' Singh (1994) emphasized, following Aronoff, that lexical network precedes morphemic network. He cited remarks ofNagesa : "although there IS an expectancy of the anga when the suffix is added, it is absent when we have the knowledge of the suffix. There are, therefore, no grounds for accepting an implication of the angainthe grammar." Singh (ibid) interpreted it as : "If the suffix and the form to which it has been added al ways appear together, a reference to the suffix is sufficient to dire~t operations correctly" He gave priority to lexicon following the nonPaninian analysis of lexemes. Singh (1994) also interpreted Katyayana's varttika 7 in' the following way: "when the suffix is mentioned, we understand what we need to, redundantly, of course. t' • This perspective negates the morphological analysis in the traditional sense of the term that creates an ontological problem; instead he proposed the network of related Iexemes, which 'Works within the minds of a spe~er Of a given language, This priority of lexicon over morpheme is obviously, non-paninian and non-descriptive Linguistics. ~ From this perspective, it is far more important to understand commonsense and substantive interpretation of language rather than to undetstand language from the traditional formal linguistic point of view

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It will reveal the cognitive map and complex network of the speaker without considering it from the purview of modern science.

In fact either formal procedural or parametric principles do as Rajendra Singh (1997) emphasized, not govern the language, but there are constitutive principles, which was pointed out by Kant long ago. As people have the gestalt perception of language as a whole, they do not have the cognition of procedural and parametric rules as analyzed by the linguists. Singh and Dasgupta (1999) proposed the substantive analysis of Hindi and Bangla compounds instead of formal analysis as such taken from the Paninian tradition.
The endeavour to analyze linguistic data into different parts begun. in India, at the eve of second urbanization when rkpratisakhya was composed by Saunaka (600 BC) by involving the rules of analysis (padapatha) and' Synthesis isamhitapathd; followed by Panini's Grammar (400 BC). What is interesting to note here that these analytical procedures were discarded in the 7th C. AD, when Bhartrihari criticized these analytical procedures by calling them apoddhara ("analytical abstractions" made by the grammarians). Thus, the non-formal post-structuralist tradition of anti-linguistics had begun in India. Kumarila, in his abhihitanvayavada, said that in case of assigning meaning to words, it is the amalgamation of root and suffix that constitute the meaning ("prakrti pratyayau sahartham bruta"), However, he considered the separate and alienated status of words in the sentences. Later on, Prabhakara one follower of the mimamsa school like Kumarila . proposed the theory of anvitabhidhanavada where words only meaningful when they are used in the sentences. There is no alienated wordmeaning separated from syntactic constructions ..Bhattrhari took this queue and said the sentence-meaning is "atyantasamsrsta' (intimately attached) and discarded the "dividing" practice of grammarians who use to deploy the inductive method of agreement and difference (anvayi-vyatireka) by saying the analytical divisions as completely imaginary and by introducing the notion of "apoddhara", The language as a whole, in its non-imaginary indivisible vyavaharika (practical) existence, is called "anvakhyeya", The grammarians' way of imaginary divisions or apoddhara may lead to the 'truth' of language, but it is the trajectory from un-reason to reason, untruth to truth. 3
.

Calcuttans are liars") in Logical Form (that follows the Logical Positivist path of propositional calculus, This LF is discarded by Chomsky, 2001) of S-Structure, the total formal as well as mechanical algorithmic system may collapse. The greatest problem, following this incompleteness of formal system, we would face, is the question posed by C. R. Rao (1987) "Is creativity mechanizable 7" We are deeply concerned with this question in connection with linguistic creativity, the notion of which was developed by Noam Chomsky. We, have doubts, in the present state of affairs, if it is at all possible to develop a Turing Machine, that can create infinite sets of sentences out of finite sets of words due to this non-formal nature of our Cognitive domain. In this situation, when we are in a transitional phase of paradigm shift, we have to be more cautious about the counterexamples given by the propagators of non-formal post-structuralist who are attacking the acute technical algocentrism of modem science. And they are' trying to get rid at algoeentric discourse of technical rationality (a discourse that is motivated by metamathematical formalism or computational algorithmic simulation ignoring the non-algorithmic constitutive rules). This new paradigm is more concerned about the human-subject than human-object as objectification made by science of enlightenment develops a mechanical view of human mind and consider everything is computable, quantifiable and algorithmic. Now, in this context, our task is not t~ leave fully the analytical tradition, but to get rid of monolithic and the mechanical concept of the human being. A system of logic can be developed where both the formal and non-formal system of reasoning can be incorporated. One such system Q.flogic introduced by P. C. Mahalanabis, when he found the Probability statistics in Jaina Philosophy of syadvada in relation to probabilistic theory. Syadvada includes dialectics of sevenfold predictions which are depicted in the" following Mahalanabis's translation : ' I. 2. 3. 4. 5.
.

syadasti syatnasti syadasti syatnasti Ca syadavaktyavyah syadasti avaktyavyasca syatnasti Ca avaktyavyasca syadasti nasti Ca avaktyavyasca

Goedel (1931) declared the incompleteness of formal algorithmic . 6. system. According to his theorem no formal system is complete enough to handle all the problems within a formal paradigm. If one puts any 7. Goedel's proposition or Russell's paradox ("One Calcuttan says that aU

May be, it is. = May be, it is not. = May be, it is and it is not. = May be, it is indeterminate. = May be, it is and it is indeterminate, = May be, it is not and it is indeterminate. = May be, it is and it is not and it is indeterminate.
=

8 What

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is noticeable here that Mahalanabis (1954) translated as "indeterminate" to make a provision for uncertainty principle as literary avakktyavyah means indescribable. Later on D.S. Kothari (1985) justified Mahalanabis's position as he noticed the similarity of Niels Borh's complementary principle. J. B. S. Haldane (1957). following Mahalanabis, also noticed in the syadvada in reference to the then physiology, the position of conclusion intermediate to certainty and uncertainty. Haldane mentioned one crucial thing in connection with syadvada that is known today as halting problem of Turing Machine. Haldane mentioned paradoxes of Principia Mathematica, when are given in a machine, the answer from the part of machine would be indeterminate or avakktyavyah, However, the translation of syad as "may be" by Mahalanobis should not be confused with "skeptic" "may be". The more appropriate to read it as "in some respect" or "somehow" (Ghosh, 1?91):

avaktyavyah

2. The following corpus from Bangia has a peculiar nature of noneompo nenti ality. On the other hand, they are rather prototypical. From the Semantico-pragmatic perspective, this prototypicality can not be handled in computational framework or even in the LF. So, is it preferable to shun off Fregeau principles of semantics or its derivatives like KatzFodorian Model, which is followed by Computational Linguists ? Keeping in mind. these questions, now we may look into the data. l. Sat-paMc bhebe kaj kOro. Seven-five think (inf.) work do-imperative "After thinking of the pros and conado your work."

This saptabhangi nayajs an epistemologically amalgamated system of formal and non-formal approach. Moreover, what is known as poststructuralist plurality of interpretations is also covered by this sevenfold syadvada as a part of anekantavada, a theory of manifold perspectives. I think. this consideration of indeterminacy as a valid judgement apart from usual affirmative and negative statements and their compounds may open up a new avenue for understanding human cognitive domain as well as language domain either qualitatively or quantitatively or nonformally. .

2.a) Se TakaTa nOy-chOy koreche, money-classifier nine-six: do--imm.past "(He/She) has spent the money (carelessly)." 2.b) ghorTa nOy-chOy Hoye house-classifier nine-six be (inf.) "House is in topsy-tervy position." 3. ache. has (pres.)

ete kichu unis-bIS HObe na. for this some nineteen-twenty happen-fut. "Nothing will happen due to this trifle difference."

nolo

4. WE COUNT, TIlEY DON'T

The metanarrative of science.since enlightenment has been encouraging a division of the analyst and the analyzed. The analyst,a specialist, analyses human along with many other things and objectifies individual or group with the help of empirical method of quantification. However, what is missing here is that what lies in the actual subjective state of human cognitive domain. Taking cue from the earlier part of this paper, I will-try to depict some avaktyvyah or indeterministic and uncertain phenomena revealed in expression of numerals by Bangia speakers. My points of arguments are as follows : quantification is partly or fully different from analyst's rigorous quantification. Though this difference may tJe a usual matter to us, my question is, if there is difference, then by the way of only quantification and computation. may the analyst reveal the nature of cognitive domain. that supposed to have non-algorithmic constitutive rules?
1. Human

4. jaHa bahanno taHai tippanno, whatever fiftytwo that is fiftythree "A trifle difference does not count." (i.e. 52=53) All these 'idiomatic' expressions are related to numerals, but not with the mathematics that we know sufficiently well in the strict sense of the term as these expressions are not calculable or even computable:
The second problem, we have faced may be termed as "one is not

equal to one" problem, which is according to existing mathematical

system impassible. A rule of "one deletion" was proposed by Dasgupta (1987). For example, in the Determiner Phrases like

5. dokanduTo
shop-two-classifier 6. dokanTa shop-singular-classifier

Obviously "one" is deleted in 6. However. Dasgupta mentioned that 'one deletion' is not true in the cases like

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lilice

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7. j01Ta
6. telTa oil-classifier As according to the physical measurement, ·EkTa "One-classifier jOI water"

paMc "five thousand"

Hajar

say
9.

and in Bangla one cannot

paMcek five-one thousand "more or less five thousand." lakh lacs

15.a)
16W)

paNe

five

There are some pragmatic cases where such expressions like 9 is possible. That possibility may be ignored for the time being and instead, one may still maintain the rule of 'the one deletion'as the perception from the part of the speaker may still be "one" in those cases. It is 'one' as a unit which is perceived here by the speaker. Of course. this is not a deterministic physical 'one', but one as a whole unit. When any Bangia speaker says, 10. phrij theke jOITa ano. fridge [Tom water-classifier bring "Bring water from the fridge." his/her intention obviously refers to "one bottle of water". Therefore, 'one' is there in the D-structure, but it is a fuzzy one. The concept of this fuzzy "one" can be further illustrated in the following movement-transformations, where deterministic numeral expressions are changed to non-deterministic Determiner Phrases :

paMcek lakh five-one lacs "more or less five lacs." 11-l5 show those deterministic expressions in (a) and expressions in (b). Compared to (a), examples in (b) of classifiers with subsequent phonemic change and-an "one" to the specific numeral x, This one is not but this "one" has a range more or less than ±l.

Examples like non-deterministic. show the fronting addition of.. lekJ deterministic ±1,

5. A DIALOGUE ON NATURAL SCIENCE PROBLEM

Let us try to understand, in form of a dialogue between Prof. Neo Linguistic Practitioner (NLP) and Linguistically Justified Cybersystem (LJC, a robot similar to as imagined by Penrose. 1994 "Mathematically Justified Cybersystern or MJe), this problem on fuzzy numerals. It is written in a dialogue form instead authoritarian text following the ageold tradition of creating conversation to solve philosophical problems. especially hermeneutic problem. NLP : Now you are a capable Language interpreter. Do you face any problem regarding language systems as taught by me ? Do you understand my language now ? -LIC : (After finising simulated laughing) which was not simulated in my body. You expect something,

9. "'EkTa
11.a) ll.b) paMcTa five-classifier (definite)

goTa paMcek classifiertjndef) five-one "more or less five." paMcjon five-classifier (definite)

NLP : What is that ?

LIC : It is simply "understanding". I know only the algorithm and that does not entail I should "understand" anything. Though I know the meaning of "understand" as you have put it in my dictionary but I am devoid of that human quality. Therefore, T do no actually understand what understanding is. NLP: Ha Ha (nonnallaughing)! Do you know that you've pronounced a Russell's paradox in your last proposition.? You know, from this very paradox. The Goedel's theorem "was derived. According to this theorem no formal system is adequate enough to handle all the problems within

12.a) 12.b) 13.a) 13.b)

jona paMcek classifier (indef.) five-one paMckhana five-classifier khan paMcek classifier (indef.) five-one "more or less five."

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a formal paradigm. And Penrose said you could never understand any Goede] proposition. The whole NLP-programme depends only ~n simulation and algorithmic structuralization of language. And that will lead to what Searle described as ' Chinese room puzzle". Computer only "knows" the algorithm; s/he has no linguistic competence. For example, if you put any Goedel's proposition or Russell's paradox C:One Calcunan says that all Calcuttans are liars") in Logical Form (which follows the Logical positivist path of propositional calculus) of S-structure, the total formal as well as mechanical algorithmic system will collapse. LIC : You have totally destroyed our conversation. I am offended. The name of someone like Penrose should not be mentioned in the context of a highly developed cybersystem. His arguments are too trivial and metaphysical. In fact, he is not worth mentioning here at ali, the SearlePenrose arguments seem to me very unconvincing, for rea~ons that \~'e~c brieflv mentioned by Turing in his 1950 paper. As he pointed out, It IS meaningless to ask whether machine think. Similarly, it would be meaningless to ask whether brains think. People think. may be other living things; that the way the word is used. It is like askin? whether "airplanes" really fly. or submarines swim, etc. These are questions about choice of terminology, about adopting certain metaphor. There are no empirical questions. The Searle-type arguments show nothing. Suppo~ that in fact people do long division by an algorithm they learned ill school; their brains carry out the algorithm, but their brains don't do long division (for the trivial reasons noted by Turing), Furthermore, one can easily set up an "arithmetic room", analogous to Searle's Chinese Room. .. And use it to "prove" (i.e. to conclude falsely) that the brain does not use the algorithm. though it does. All of these beside the point are based on confusion, in my opinion, It is now better to listen to my problems, which I cannot match with my infallible mathematical ability. NLP : I give you all the' information about language. There should not be any problem as such. LIe : The fuzzy Bangla numerals, 'which you taught me, create many problems in my understanding. I do not find the m~ of "Se~e~-~ve", "nine-six", "nineteen-twenty" or "fifty-two-fifty-three' deterministically to understand the meaning of this expressions. NLP : This defeat of deterministic logic shows the fuzziness of these expressions, which represent a psychological non-deterministic rang~ of numbers in the mind ofBang1a speakers. The Bangia numeral expressions show the world-views of the community concerned with a special reference to their psychophysical way of looking at things (perception) and ways

of making order of things (understanding). Therefore, it is a he~eneutic problems that involves the relati~'e gap. between human perceptIon ru~d understanding ill relation to their habitat, However, this hermeneutic problem is beyond computer'~ procedural ~stem. However, these numeral expressions are common ill Bangla a~d the .Bangla speakers can understand the semantics of these expressions easily, However. the range of +-i is different in different persons belonging to different socioeconomic classes or even it may be different in a single person in different psychosocial context.
LJe: All these examples show failure to-detect the stimulus intensity from the part of Bangla speakers. Therefore, different threshold levels of responses of Bangla speakers may be detected statistically at the time of uttering such expressions. It we, following Weber-Fechner Law, can detect that we can easily define the exact nature different threshold levels. As Ute difference of thresholds tends to be a constant faction of stimulus intensity, it is possible to measure or quantify the exact natUf.c of those responses according to the particular stimuli in a particular setting, Then, by summing up just noticeable differences, one can develop. a sca~e that can measure logarithmic relationship to the intensity of physical stimulus under varying condition.

or

NLP : Quite contrary to this psychophysic~ measurement, 1 think, the attempt to quantify indeterminacy of fuzzy numerals would be trapped by' uncertainty This also reveals the uncertain non-computable slate of our consciousness.
J •

LIC : All these epiphenomenal and arbitrary externalized Linguistic expressions cannot be analyzed-via uncertainty principle. It is fallacious. NLP : But these epiphenomenal expressions reveal the nature of our unconscious knowledge of our Internalized language. Human consci~usness after all, as Penrose asserted lies in the Classical Quantum borderline. LJC : From the enlightened scientific perspective, any logical positivist (who follows the path of Classical Physics) would assert that, natural language is artificial and paradoxial, Though one can also. incorporate or simulate it in computers mechanically with suitable algorithm, still there will be a problem of understanding the semantic values of these fuzzy expressions. So it is better to create following logical positivist path, a .metalanguage, where everything is defined algorithmically

NLP : Then we could not also simulate human function in computers. The native speakers have the gestalt perception of language as a whole; they do not have the cognition of procedural and parametric rules as analyzed by the linguists. For example, it is not possible to say 12.b) is

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derived from 12.a) or vise verse (vide the Post-Formal described in the section-3 of this paper.

LIe : One possible answer for determining the priority of 12.a) and 12.b) may be found in Piaget's theory of child development. As Piaget asserted that towards the end of pre-operational stage, the use of number begins in the child and in concrete operational stage, the ne x l stage after pre-operational stage, child achieves logical thought, conservation concept, number, mass, weight etc., along with learning of classificatory matrix.
NLP : These two stages are much later stages after first stage of sensory-motor, where there is no knowledge of numerals. If a child. after learning quantification in concrete operational stage, how, then as an adult, does use such non-deterministic proposition. Why he or she is not so accurate like computers wit~ zero-defect, after lwning so much in concrete operational stage? . LIC: So, why do you teach me such things? 1 think you are wasting time make me simulate. If the route between human perception and human understanding is missing in case of computers, why do you teach me semantics ? NLP : The brand of Semantics which I've taught you is binary in its nature and it is borrowed from Fregean concept of compositional.function via Katz-Fodorian (1963) system of binary componential analysis ignoring the prototypical cognition of meaning of the human being. As cognition scientist observed that meaning as endorsed by human is not componentially analyzed, it is understood prototypically. Furthermore, doing componential analysis for the sake of computers leads us back to the future, as the theory of meaning today is more advanced than that of computational analysis. From the Logical positivist view point, on the other hand, this type of argumentation for justifying "unscientific" natural language is always discarded. A5 Russell showed that this leads to difficulty as human language consists of illogical terms. Speaking subject may preserve empty terms prototypically. For Russell, "Logic must do more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as Zoology, though 'with its more abstract and general features." (Russell, 1919 : 169) You ignore these entire scientific hypotheses for the sake of unscientific natural language. • NLP : "Pragmatics and Semantics, in the post-industrialized Infom1ation society has got, though in a negative way, a great feedback from Artificial Intelligence research. It is observed (Colomb, Turner,

1989) that the research on Artificial Intelligence (AI) helped to break down the illusory distinction between semantic and pragmatic knowledge and between knowledge and facts. Due to this feedback from AI research, a new field of semantico-pragmatics has developed, though by negating the mechanical concept of human cognition as propagated by AI research. As AI-enterprise reduces meaning into an algocentric grammar, it is rather impossible to have an idea of human linguistic cognition via fragmented computational framework. LJC : I do not understand your contention. Why do you do so ? NLP : Still yesterday I followed proceduralrules, Markovian process. description C"qoSoSlql "in which qo and ql are Internal states of the machine, So being the symbol on the tape which is rewritten as doing. this machine moves from state q, to state Mehulkar; 1974:9) for J>.1;J.,P-MT ith a view to develop multilingual speaking w machine. Yesterday I read one paper by Chomsky where he (1976, in Peck, 1987: 196-197) quoted this from Walter Sullivan,

and Turing's instantaneous

"The most extreme view, expressed by some members of the audience, was that human brains were 'uncoupled' from any genetic Influences whatsoever that, like computers built" to a standard design, their relative levels of performance were completely determined by programming."

LIC : SO, n?W you are skeptic about, my very existence ? NLP ; I have become more skeptic when I faced the question raised C. R Rao "Is creativity mechanizable T' In fact, the mecbanizability of creativity was questioned by C. R. Rao (1987) in 18.I.'s twenty-first convocation addressin the context of uncertaintv and randomness. Rao by quonng Hofstadter, negated this possibility by saying.' 'IWe have no answer at present as all attempts 10 do so have not yet succeeded even in a small measure. It is believed that creativity results.from random thinking by allowing the human mind to from random thinking by . allowing the human mind to wander unfettered by the rigidities of accepted knowledge or conventional rules." This remark is also true for linguistic creati~~ . . NOTES 1.

trc ;

T. Madhava Menon pointed out (personal correspondence, 200 I) that CL is a "small bush" and it does not achieve the status of a phenomenon in the Philosophy of Science. I agree with such ~ronouncement, however, keeping in mind the present state of affairs III the field of Linguistics, I, am bound to mention such a big tree to totally uproot that small bush. Reader, please pardon me for such

II
16 Pract-Bhasa-Vijnan Indian Journal of Linguistics Computational Linguistics." A Dissenter S lotce 17 deployment of an anti-green metaphor to e"'1::ing~sh an anti-green subject. (please see Bandyopadhyay, 2000 for ann-green effects of Computer-manufacturing industry), 2. 'For my part, I believe that, partly by means of the study of syntax, Finally, when all the manipulations are complete, the resulting sequence is fed out again through the slot Since 3.11 these manipulat40fls are simply carrying out the algorithm of Schanks programme, it must tum out that this final resulting sequence is simply the Chinese for "yes" or "no", as the case may be, giving 11,(, correct answer to the original question in Chinese about a story in Cluncse. Now Searle makes it quite clear that he does not understand a word of Chinese, so he would nothave the faintest idea what the stories are about. Thus, the mere carrying out of a successful algorithm does not in itself imply that any understanding has taken place. The (imagined) Searle locked in his Chinese room would not understand a single word of two stories! Now, Searle replaced the single inhabitant of his Chinese room by a whole team of human non-Chinese-speaking symbol manipulators. To get the numbers large enough, he even Imagines replacing his room by the whole of India, its entire populations (excluding the Indians who know Chinese) being now engaged in symbol manipulations. The symbol manipulators do not understand the story, despite the strong-Al claim that the mere carrying out of the appropriate algorithm would elicit the mental quality of 'understanding'. REFERENCES
Arnoff M. 1976. Word Formation in Generative Grammar, MA : MIT Press. Bandyopahdyay~ D. 1997. "A Dialogue on Computational and Chomskyan Linguistics" Indian Journal of Applied Linguistics. 'klJ. XXllI, No.2. 29-

we can arrive at the considerable knowledge concerning the structure

of the world." (Russell, 1940:347). 3. The cohabitation of Indian and Western non-formalism is not intended to say something like "Everything is in Vedas" (this type ofutt~ran~e is largely criticized. by the eminent physicist Meghnad Saha m his numerous Bangia writings).

APPENDIX
Now I will cite "Searle's Chinese Room puzzle" almost in toto from Penrose (1989:23-:26) for those. who are not acquainted with the puzzle. I think, this puzzle can tackle the problems depicted in the paper. "The aim of one computer programme is to provide a simulation of the understanding of simple stories like" A man went into a restaurant and ordered a hamburger. When the hamburger arrived. it was overbaked and burnt and the man stormed out of the restaurant angrily, without paying th~ bill. or leaving 2 tip." For a second example: "A man went into a restaurant and ordered a hamburger. When the hamburger came he was very pleased 'with it and as he left the restaurant he gave the waitress a large tip before paying his bill." As a test for an "understanding" of the stories, the computer is asked whether the man ate the hamburger in each case (a fact, which had not been explicity mentioned in either story). To this kind of simple story and simple question, the computer cangive answers which are essentially distinguishable' from the an~wers an English-speaking human being would give, namely. for these particular examples, "no" in the first case and ''yes'' in the second. So in this/'very" limited sense, a machine has already passed a Turing Test! Searle's argument that it does not is to invoke hisconcept of a "Chinese room". He envisages first of all, that the stories are to be told in Chi~ese rather than English-surely an inessential change-and that all the O~tiO~ of the computers algorithm for this particular exercise are supplied (in English) asset of instructions for manjpulating counters with Chinese symbols on them. Searle imagines "himself" doing all the manipulations inside a locked room. The sequences of symbols representing the stories and then questions are fed into the room through some small slot No other Information whatsoever is allowed in from the outside.

42. DeIhl.

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