The Cognitional Structure Amended

By

Anthony J. Faber, B.A., J.D., Phd.

(C)Copyright (2011) by Neothomism, P.C. (PA)

In his Essay, “The Cognitional Structure,” Bernard Lonergan asserted that we know reality

best through the threefold cognitional structure of experience, understanding, and judgment.

Lonergan states that on the level of experience we experience sense experience, as well as

internal experience. On the level of understanding, we conceptualize, categorize, and compare

and contrast ideas. On the level of judgment, Lonergan states that judgment is a matter of

asserting there is a conditioned judgment, which and when the criterion for judgment have been

met, becomes a conditioned judgment whose conditions have been fulfilled, such that the

judgment now becomes a probable judgment of fact. The problem with the foregoing account of

judgment is that the cognitive activity involved only seem to be taking place on the level of ideas,

and thus, does not really differ in a significant way from level 2 thinking. This, unfortunately for

Lonergan, lends his account of the cognitive structure to be susceptible to the hermeneutic

critique of Gadamer, that is, the problem of the Hermeneutic Circle. And, Lonergan does not

seem to have any account of “Forestructures of Knowing” as discussed by Gadamer.

Fortunately, however, an alternate approach to the cognitional structure is possible. Here,

we once again have the cognitional structure of experience, understanding, and judgment. And,

while the first and second levels function the same, the third level, that of judgment differs.

Judgement is defined as a cognitive faculty which employs analogical reasoning. Thus, please

consider the following:

 1. I experience the lamp with sense experience.

2. Based on the accepted definition of “lamp” as a fixture which throws light forward

(c.f. Peter Gabel’s article on reification), I can say that I understand my sense

experience of a “fixture which throws light forward” to be a lamp. This can be

done with a logical syllogism involving an assumed definition of a lamp such as

the definition stated above.

3. Based on my experience and understanding of the “lamp,” I judge my experience

of the lamp to be analogous to my understanding of the lamp, and therefore

make a probable judgment of fact, that the “lamp” is in fact a lamp.

Given the foregoing, Lonergan’s account of the cognitional structure is flawed and should

be replaced by the account given here. For empirical verification of analogical thinking, see, The

Miller’s Analogy Test, and the GRE which are used use as a college and graduate school

entrance tests by many universities rather than the ACT or SAT.