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The human person is the source and summit of all philosophical discourses. The purpose of

most philosophical inquiries can be arguably linked to the quest for the meaning of our lives. The

concern for human development thus can be viewed as an attempt to formulate an intelligible

discourse within which the human person can develop his full potentials and lead a meaningful

life. Pope Paul VI notes in Populorum Progressio that the aspiration of men is “to seek to do

more, know more and have more in order to be more” and the vision of development should be

“every man and of the whole man” (#6, #14). To achieve these, a good and sound anthropology is

necessary. Taylor thus, comes to the fore. In Sources of the Self, Taylor notes that “selfhood and

the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined

themes” (Taylor, Sources of the Self 3). He grapples with the meaning or fulfilment of our lives,

the spiritual (strong evaluation) as well as respect for life, integrity and well-being, even of

others. He is concerned about deep, powerful and universal moral intuitions. This paper thus

examines Charles Taylor’s topology of the self (as moral, political, spiritual, and creative subjects

of meaning) and its implications for human development.

Our morality involves claims about the nature and status of human beings and an assent to

or an affirmation of a given ontology of the human person. In Sources of the Self, Taylor notes

that the history of philosophy seems to reject this ontology of the human (4-5) – naturalism – the

view that nature, of which man is part, is to be understood according to the cannons, which

emerged in the 17th century revolution in natural science (Baker). Taylor’s critique of

foundational tendencies of modern epistemology lies in its three errors: (i) a free, rational but

disengaged self, (ii) the punctual self (instrumentalism reason), and (iii) atomism (Taylor,

Overcoming Epistemology 471-73). This focus on the self, flattens and narrows our lives, making

them poorer in meaning and less concerned with others or society. It leads to a disorientating

dislocation from those things that give meaning and sense to our lives (Baker). The implication is
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that we become like disassembled parts without bolts and nuts to fasten us together. This view

cannot grant social and emotive growths which are constitutively part of a holistic human

development. Just as “being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues”

(Taylor, SOS 112), so is human development inseparable from a sound morality that transcends a

disengaged self to a self-articulation in harmony with the spirit in things (461). A holistic growth

is only possible in community.

Human beings, for Taylor, are “subjects of significance” (Introduction 460) – beings for

whom things matter (personal agency) – implying that the self is connected to its purpose and

project. We are self-interpreting animals (459). This self-making is an art, it is primary and

spiritual (Taylor, OE 482-83). The human subjects must rely on an understanding of persons as

becoming individuals only through participation in an intersubjective reality (Calhoun). Thus,

agency is important in the contemporary conception of the self. As a neo-Aristotelian, Taylor is

of the view that the self is defined by its relation to the framework of goods that define the ‘good

life’ for that self. It is good to focus on what it is good to be and the content of obligation not

merely on what is good or right to do or the good life – a shift from Aristotelian ethics. The moral

frameworks are presided by hyper-goods (irreducible social goods) providing the standpoint, on

which they must be weighed, judged or decided about (Baker). The implication here is that the

individual self does not invent her moral outlook or private conception of the good. We can

conclude then that the self makes or interprets meaning for itself in view of higher values – an

allusion to an invitation to continuous growth.

The human being or the self can only flourish in society. One’s social world provides the

range of things worth doing, achieving or being. We cannot avoid social attachments. Taylor

argues that overcoming atomism shows the “priority of society as the locus of the individual’s

identity” (Taylor, OE 478). Taylor’s self-making agent then is synonymous to Ramose’s

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ngabantu, the imperative to become a human being, an embodiment of ubu-ntu, upon which the

fundamental ethical, social and legal human worth and conduct is based (Taylor, OE 482-83;

Ramose 52-53). For the African, the imperative is always ontologically to be in tune, “to dance

along with be-ing” and to be attuned. This metaphor of a dance epitomizes the harmony that

should exist in society for a holistic development of the self; the “interconnection of mutual

service which the things in this world of harmonious functions render to each other” (Ramose 59;

Taylor, SOS 275). The challenge atomists may pose though is that the individual is capable of

embodying the entire harmony in herself (multi-talentedness). Taylor’s possible response could

be that the language, talent and love for music or dance cannot be conceptualized outside of

society. It goes without saying then that a well ordered and harmonious society, where the

individuality of the other is recognized but in dialogue with other individuals, is the haven for

personal development.

The self is also a political entity. Taylor holds that the age of modernity and post-modernity

is pluralistic. He argues that it is essential to human identity that one’s community be recognised

politically and socially. Some forms of political liberalism endanger multiculturalism and

recognition by promoting homogeneity (Baker). In Taylor’s view, the self is not devoid of

communal attachments and hence the concerns of the individual should not be the sole concern of

politics. Thus, Taylor is against the view that the self is self-sufficient outside of society. A major

threat to the development of the self in the contemporary world can be likened to the proliferation

of nuclear weaponry, economic and political injustices leading to wars and terrorism, and global

warming. The lack of recognition of the other, the denial of the human person as subject of

significance, underscores the evil of these hindrances. Thus, the dignity of the human person will

be enhanced and the path to human development made easier should the ethics of authenticity

and the politics of recognition be encouraged, and bureaucracies (lack of freedoms) be eliminated
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(Stacer). Amartya Sen, from the economic point of view, argues in Development As Freedom, for

the removal of “unfreedoms” and the expansion of people’s capabilities as the fundamental way

of ensuring human development (3-4, 15-17; 292-97). However, Sen, like the modern

philosophers that Taylor criticises, is atomistic and leaves no room for the ontological view of the

self.

Part of the problem of atomism is due to secularisation and overcoming it has implications

for the progress of the human person. After the reformations and the revolutions that ensued, it

appeared religion had been dethroned. This idea was fuelled by scientific positivism. The main

thrust of the reformation was the shift from the external (hierarchy) to the inner personal

commitment of the believer (Taylor, SOS 215). This became identified with the empirical

paradigm of experience being the locus of religion (Lombo de Leon and Leeuwen 78). Taylor

likens its associated denial of special form of life (priesthood and monastic life) to “denying the

very distinction between sacred and profane” (Taylor, SOS 217) – an interpenetration which

affirms ordinary life. The vertical hierarchical structure of society became horizontal. “The

rejection of mediation implied the rejection of both social hierarchy and the role of the sacred in

society” (Lombo and Leeuwen 78). This, for Taylor, denies an ontological feature of selfhood;

human beings aspire to go beyond life to what is of intrinsic value beyond human flourishing. We

are thus able to draw Taylor’s affinity to Catholic Social Teachings and with human

development. It is for this reason that Pope Paul VI can say with Taylor that “by reason of his

own union with Christ, the source of life, man attains to new fulfillment of himself, to a

transcendent humanism which gives him his greatest possible perfection: this is the highest goal

of personal development” (Paul VI #15). Thus, by striving for the transcendental values, the self

paves the way for progress and fulfilment. This is the goal of human development.
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Taylor’s philosophy of the self thus combines both liberal and transcendental values

permitting the possibility of higher values. He has tried to awaken us to the ontology of the

human being and not merely the nature and status of the human person. The political implication

is that “there may be a need to sustain and promote the communal attachments crucial to our

sense of well-being” (Baker). This implies that social institutions and the provision of social

infrastructure should bear in mind not just the individual’s interests but gauge it through the

lenses of human dignity and the common good. This is equally applicable to what transpires at

the international and global level. The individual is both subject of his culture but also a citizen of

the world.

This does not imply that Taylor’s philosophy of the self is without problems. The empirical

epistemologist can react and claim that the metaphysical construct of the self eludes rational

evaluation and so cannot be the foundation for ordering our lives. Besides, Taylor’s analysis of

history and the implications he draws from it seem to portray that there is a single consequence of

history, what Taylor has named (the malaise of modernity). The question is: is it not possible for

other interpretations some of which could possibly contradict Taylor’s interpretation? It is taken

for granted that communion with society will normally produce desired results. But on an honest

note, Taylor’s philosophy challenges our thought frames and can obviously be the basis of

elevating the human person through positive progress.

This paper has shown how overcoming atomistic and foundational epistemic paradigms can

lead to human development by examining their implications for morality, the political, the

spiritual and the creative self. It has shown how development being for man and the whole man

cannot allow a disengaged conception of the self typical of modern philosophy. Recognizing the

connection of the self with society allows man to accept the other and thus organize society and

resources for the common good and not for individual self interest.
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LIST OF SOURCES

Baker, Dene. “Philosopher of the Month: May 2003 – Charles Taylor”.

http://www.philosophers.co.uk/cafe/phil_may2003.htm. Accessed: 15th October,
2009.

Calhoun, Craig. “Charles Taylor”. Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 1998.

“Introduction”. Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Lombo de Leon, Francisco and von Leeuwen Bart. “Charles Taylor on Secularisation”
Ethical Perspectives (2003).
http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=EP&ID=315
Accessed: 22nd October 2009.

McNeil, Russell. “On Charles Taylor’s Work”. http://www.malaspina.org/taylorc.htm.

Accessed: 17th October, 2009.

Paul VI. “Populorum Progressio”. Catholic Social Thought: The Document Heritage.
Ed. David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon. New York: Orbis Books, 1992.

Sen, Amartya. Development As Freedom. New York: Random House, 1999.

Stacer, John. Class Lecture. Metaphysics and Comparative Philosophy. Arrupe College,
Harare. 18 Sept. 2009.

Taylor, Charles. “Overcoming Epistemology”. Philosophy and the Human Sciences:

Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

……….Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989.