Professional Documents
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resulting from it. Today, most observers agree that there is no basis for
an over-optimistic assessment of the impact of globalization. Instead of
a steady increase and a fair distribution of wealth, we notice an ever-
widening gap between rich and poor people in industrialized and devel-
oping countries alike (UNDP 1999). Reducing, or even closing, this gap
by working toward a more equitable balance between shareholders and
stakeholders in the world economy (and the national economies) is one
of the formidable tasks of governance at the national, international, and
global levels.
The third challenge to international governance has been the end of
the cold war as a historical turning point that has enlarged the scope of
action of all actors in the triad mentioned above. For example, global in-
stitutions such as the UN system have no longer been blocked by the
vetoes of one or both of the two superpowers. International organiza-
tions of the UN system, such as the World Trade Organization, have
been given expanded jurisdiction and are tested in their capabilities by
their own success. In a similar vein, the remarkable growth of peace-
keeping operations in the 1990s has exacerbated the UN budgetary pre-
dicament. Finally, the emergence of ‘‘new wars’’ (Kaldor 1999) and the
spread of ‘‘old wars’’ make it more difficult for the United Nations to
fulfil its task of maintaining peace.
Although these three challenges (technological revolution, globaliza-
tion, and the end of the cold war) differ considerably in character, they
are all contributing to, first, the emergence of new problems or gover-
nance tasks, such as regulating the uses of the Internet and ensuring se-
curity of information; in addition, existing governance tasks, such as the
new quality of intrastate conflicts or the increasing disparities within and
among nations, have become more pressing. Second, new actors have
entered the world stage as a result of these three challenges. This hetero-
geneous set of new actors includes, inter alia, transnational corporations
(TNCs) and business associations, as well as transnational social move-
ment organizations (TSMOs) (Smith, Chattfield, and Pagnucco 1997),
transnational advocacy networks (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998), and other
coalitions of NGOs capable of running transnational political campaigns
(cf. Boli and Thomas 1999).
Existing international governance systems fail to respond to these new
problems and to deal adequately with the new actors’ aspirations. There-
fore, demands for more effective and responsive governance systems have
arisen. International governance is reacting to this need by transforming
itself (cf. Commission on Global Governance 1995; Messner and Nus-
cheler 1996, 1997). In order to design more effective and responsive gov-
ernance systems, it is an important task for both policy makers and
scholars to analyse the ongoing transformation of governance and, as far
4 BRÜHL AND RITTBERGER
ernance goals. In a narrow sense, there are three main goals of govern-
ance, mostly pursued by governments on the state level: these are (1) to
provide the population with physical security, (2) to guarantee the stable
reproduction of their natural environment, and (3) to ensure their live-
lihood, i.e. the production and distribution of needed goods and services.
In a broader and more differentiated sense, core governance goals en-
compass (1) security in its defence function (safeguarding the population
and the territory in question against the risk of war in general) and its
protective function (safeguarding individuals against the risk of crime
and the destruction of the environment). Furthermore, governance is
expected to provide (2) legal certainty (rule of law) and (3) channels of
participation and to produce a symbolic system of reference and the
communicative infrastructure within which a sense of collective civil
society can develop. Finally, a goal of governance is (4) to correct in-
equalities that result from markets (Zürn, chap. 2).
As long as national governments were able to attain these core govern-
ance goals independently (‘‘governance by governments’’), the need for
international governance was not pressing (Rittberger 2000: 192). Owing
to several factors, however, the ability as well as the willingness of the
separate states to pursue these governance goals on their own has con-
stantly decreased. The experience of the economic depression of the
1930s, of the Second World War and the cold war, as well as the decol-
onization of the third world, have enhanced the states’ readiness or
capability to cooperate and have thus strengthened the demand for in-
ternational governance. In addition, international interdependence has
intensified as a result of the extending exchanges and transactions among
individuals and collective actors. Therefore, individual states, more often
than not, cannot handle the problems arising from interdependence (or,
to be more precise, from the costly effects of these interactions and trans-
actions) independently (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). As a result of
interdependence (and of constraints on autonomous decision-making
resulting from interdependence sensitivity and vulnerability), the need
for political regulations ‘‘beyond the nation-state’’ has increased dramat-
ically (Mayer, Rittberger, and Zürn 1993: 393). This has prompted the
states to consider the option of pooling or delegating sovereignty more
frequently. Sovereignty is pooled when governmental decisions are made
by common voting procedures other than unanimity; sovereignty is dele-
gated when supranational organs are permitted to take certain decisions
autonomously, without an intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto
(Moravcsik 1998: 67). Delegating sovereignty rarely takes place in world
politics, because most states do not readily accept an authority above
themselves. Thus, delegating sovereignty may be observed more often in
regional integration schemes, such as the European Union (EU). Here,
FROM INTERNATIONAL TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 7
Globalization
of the Cold War’’ (see Higgott, chap. 4 as well as Devetak and Higgott
1999: 483).
In general, there are two major ways of defining the concept of glob-
alization.2 In a narrow sense, globalization denotes a continuous process
of increasing cross-border economic flows, both ‘‘financial and real,’’3
which are conducive to greater economic interdependence among for-
merly distinct national economies (Reinicke 1998: 6). It can thus be
defined more precisely as the ‘‘tendency towards international economic
integration, liberalization and financial deregulation beyond the sover-
eignty of the territorial state’’ (Higgott, chap. 4). In this context, global-
ization is interchangeable with economic interdependence. This implies
that globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon, for economic in-
terdependence among states has been observed as a characteristic of the
international system since the beginning of the 1970s (and may date even
further back, as some authors claim, e.g. Hirst and Thompson 1996).4 As
interstate and transnational interactions and exchange relationships have
accelerated since the 1970s and 1980s, interdependence has deepened.
In its broader sense, the term globalization is not restricted to the
mechanisms of cross-border economic transactions. Instead, it means
the extension of cross-border societal exchanges and transactions (Zürn
1995: 141)5 in a wide range of non-economic areas such as communi-
cation and culture (interaction of signs and symbols), mobility (trans-
boundary movement of persons), security (exchange of, or jointly pro-
duced, threats), and environment (exchange of pollutants and the joint
production of environmental risks) (Beisheim et al. 1999; Walter, Dreher,
and Beisheim 1997; Zürn 1998: 73–95) as well. Globalization thus de-
notes the ‘‘widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide intercon-
nectedness in all types of contemporary social life, from the cultural to
the criminal, the financial to the spiritual’’ (Held et al. 1999a: 2). It is not
restricted to the economic realm, but includes a general accumulation of
links across the world’s major regions and across many domains of social
activity (Held et al. 1999b: 483). In that broader sense, globalization has
a historical dimension (Keohane and Nye 2000a). Probably the oldest
form of globalization is environmental: ‘‘[C]limate change has affected
the ebb and flow of human populations for millions of years’’ (Keohane
and Nye 2000b: 3). Globalization in a military context dates from the
times of Alexander the Great’s expeditions of 2,300 years ago (ibid.: 4).
These different dimensions of globalization have appeared and disap-
peared again over the centuries. These historical manifestations of glob-
alization can be characterized as ‘‘thin’’ globalization. For example, the
Silk Road provided an economic and cultural link between ancient Eur-
ope and Asia, but the road was plied by a small group of traders and the
goods primarily had a direct impact on a small group of consumers along
14 BRÜHL AND RITTBERGER
. They all ‘‘feel directly damaged by the actual outcomes of the status
quo, albeit in different ways’’ (Wallach 2000: 47).
Protest activities of civil society groups at important international con-
ferences have attracted an unexpected amount of public attention. When
the ‘‘No New Round Turnaround’’ campaign organized the protests at the
WTO meeting in Seattle 1999, neither the city administration nor the po-
lice were in the least prepared for the number of participants. One year
later, in Prague 2000, the officials were already expecting mass demon-
strations to accompany the IMF and World Bank Annual Meeting, and
the UN Millennium Summit in New York City in fall 2000 brought about
protest activities of civil society groups as well. The so-called ‘‘S8 Mobili-
zation campaign’’ demanded a ‘‘truly democratic United Nations’’ and
queried the role of global business in world affairs, especially in the UN
system (Crosette 2000: 4). These joint activities of heterogeneous civil so-
ciety groups have been described as ‘‘globalization-from-below’’ (Falk
1999: 131; cf. Mittelman 2000: 26; Tussie and Riggirozzi, chap. 5).
These three aspects of globalization – the widening gap between poor
and rich and the growing relevance of both market forces and civil soci-
ety actors – profoundly alter the states’ performance in international
governance systems. Nation-states have lost their position as the para-
mount loci of governance, yet they continue to play a significant role in
the evolving global governance (see Zürn, chap. 2; Messner 1998; for a
detailed discussion see also the sections on the limits of international
governance systems and towards global governance, pp. 19–35).
The main problems of international politics in the cold war period with
regard to governance systems can be summarized as (1) unstable co-
operation between East and West at best and conflict brinkmanship at
worst, and (2) the dramatically reduced scope of action of most interna-
tional organizations, especially the UN system.
With the end of the cold war, the structure of the international system
began to change. This transformation challenged the international gov-
ernance systems in several ways. Most importantly, bipolarity no longer
limited the international organizations’ scope of action, as a consequence
of which they succeeded in gaining greater salience in world politics. After
the Security Council’s ability to act ceased to be blocked by the antago-
nism of the two superpowers, the way to peaceful conflict management
seemed to be open (cf. Betts 1994). Thus, in the early 1990s, an extra-
ordinary increase in the number of peace-keeping operations can be
observed: whereas the United Nations initiated no more than 15 peace-
keeping operations in the long period between 1945 and 1989, the Secu-
18 BRÜHL AND RITTBERGER
rity Council authorized 18 between 1989 and 1994 alone (Peou chap. 3).7
The intensified action of the Security Council is a result of the re-
definition of what is seen as a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression according to Article 39 of the UN Charter, and of a revised
notion of what is considered to be sovereign national activity (Doyle
1998: 4).
This remarkable new trend has caused two major difficulties, however:
first, the deployment of troops acceptable to all conflict parties has be-
come increasingly problematic (Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond 1996:
130); second, the apparently endless demand for peace-keeping has
compounded the United Nation’s financial problems. The expenditure
for peace-keeping operations rose from 31.04 per cent of the total budget
in 1990 to 49.92 per cent in 1997. At the same time, the budgetary short-
fall due to unpaid contributions by several member states, above all the
United States, amounted to about US$3 billion in 2000.
In addition to being confronted with these two difficulties, the United
Nations faces novel, grave obstacles to fulfilling its task of maintaining
international peace and security. This results from the fact that the fea-
tures of war have changed drastically in the last decades. Today, most
wars are intrastate instead of interstate (Hippler 1999: 422; cf. also Rohl-
off and Schindler 2000). In the 1980s and 1990s, this new kind of war
evolved especially in Africa, the Balkans, and in the south of the former
Soviet Union (Daase 1999; Kaldor 1999). ‘‘New wars’’ differ from ‘‘old
wars’’ with regard to their goals and the methods of warfare, and in the
way that they are financed. Whereas ‘‘old wars’’ served geopolitical or
ideological goals, most ‘‘new wars’’ are concerned with identity politics
(national, clan, religious, or linguistic identity). New warfare draws on
the experience of both guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency: the
military units combine different groups with a decentralized organization.
In old, conventional wars, battles were the decisive encounters: here, the
actors were typically vertically organized units. The war economies of
‘‘old wars’’ were centralized and autarchic; in ‘‘new wars,’’ they are de-
centralized and heavily dependent on external resources (Kaldor 1999:
6–8).
So far, the United Nations has failed to prevent (sometimes, even to
mitigate or speedily to terminate) these ‘‘new wars.’’ This is partly due to
the constraints of institutional mechanisms: they were created in order
to deal with ‘‘old wars’’ and are thus less capable of handling this new
kind of armed conflict effectively (cf. Ropers and Debiel 1995). Thus,
it might be helpful to include new actors in conflict-resolution mecha-
nisms. Since ‘‘unofficial actors,’’ such as NGO representatives or citizens’
groups (so-called Track Two diplomacy), nowadays perform a range of
supplemental or parallel functions to the official interstate relations
FROM INTERNATIONAL TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 19
tors: (1) new social forces with the power to revolt against the estab-
lished order are denied access to the political process; or (2) participation
is devalued for recognized actors who still have sufficient power to ham-
per a smooth functioning of the governance system (Rittberger 2000: 210).
In both cases, these actors feel deprived of their part in influencing
rule creation and rule management affecting their interests. Being kept
away from the political process, they tend to ignore the established order
whenever feasible.
From the vantage point of a state-centric approach focusing on the
horizontal self-coordination of sovereign states, input legitimacy of inter-
national governance systems is not likely to be undermined as long as
states remain the dominant actors in world politics (Young 1994: 99–
100). The participation of states’ representatives in institutional bargain-
ing mechanisms is ensured by the fact that these bargaining processes
themselves are structured by a consensus rule. Owing to the principle
of state sovereignty, no state can be bound to certain norms and rules
against its consent; generally acceptable solutions for collective-action
problems thus have to be formulated. The consensus rule for interna-
tional negotiations therefore guarantees mutually acceptable results in
processes of horizontal self-coordination of states, i.e. international gov-
ernance systems (Rittberger 2000: 211).
However, international governance systems have increasingly come
under pressure on both theoretical and practical grounds. The difficulties
derive from at least two basic developments. First, owing to the ever-
expanding and ever-deepening transnational connections, national gov-
ernments are successively losing their monopoly of representing their
societies in international political processes. As suggested in the previous
sections, influential new actors with a growing ability to affect the author-
itative allocation of values have emerged in the global arena. These new
actors challenge the input legitimacy of purely intergovernmental policy-
making (Rittberger 2000: 212). Second, as a result of the growing need
for international or global solutions for formerly national problems, the
subjects of democratic states, having minimal influence on the processes
of collective decision-making on the international level, feel increasingly
alienated from the political process (cf. Scharpf 1993).
The United Nations may serve to underpin this argument. Like other
international institutions, the UN system is state-centric. Even if the gov-
ernments of the member states are elected democratically (and many
of them are not), the input legitimacy of public policy-making within
these institutions is rather low because of the distance between decision
makers and the people affected by these decisions (Bienen, Rittberger,
and Wagner 1998). ‘‘The Peoples of the United Nations,’’ to which the
opening paragraph of the UN Charter refers, have had few, if any prom-
24 BRÜHL AND RITTBERGER
Finding ways to close these governance gaps is one of the most promi-
nent tasks of politicians and political scientists. In this section, we first
present three different models of international or global governance. In
terms of desirability and feasibility, however, only one model remains.
We then outline and discuss some reform proposals and the ongoing
change in global governance, such as the opening of the UN system to-
wards non-state actors. To conclude this section, we ask whether these
changes are contributing to more effective and legitimate global gover-
nance.
With the end of the cold war as a historical turning point that had trig-
gered a moment of euphoria (Young 1997: 273), a discussion about the
future structure(s) of world politics has begun. In the first years after
the end of bipolarity, the discussion centred on the question of whether
the world would be structured in a uni-, tri-, or multipolar way. Since
then the main emphasis of the discussion has changed, and more general
questions are being asked, such as what effective global governance
looks like and, in particular, whether hierarchical or non-hierarchical
governance systems are more effective and legitimate.
At least three different models of global governance can be distin-
guished. Whereas protagonists of a hierarchical model argue that a world
state (or at least a hegemonic power) would be necessary to ensure the
effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance, advocates of a non-
hierarchical governance system suggest that horizontal self-coordination
would suffice to achieve effective and legitimate global governance just
as well as, or even better than, the hierarchical models (cf. Rittberger,
Mogler, and Zangl 1997; Rittberger 2000).
more or less the same as the model of international governance that was
predominant in the late twentieth century, in which states and inter-
governmental institutions attempt to regulate the behaviour of states and
other international actors. Others predict that states will disaggregate
over time into separate, functionally distinct parts, and that these parts
will network with their counterparts abroad, thus creating a dense web of
relations that constitute a transnational order (Slaughter 1997: 185). This
model is even more far-reaching than global governance as defined at the
beginning of this article, since it suggests that states remain important,
though not paramount, actors in evolving global governance.
Research shows that governance without governments is widespread
in industrially developed societies. The model proved to be quite helpful
in understanding the success and the failure of attempts at institution-
building in both military and political-economic relations (Axelrod and
Keohane 1985: 227; Young 1989: 375; Zürn 1992: 505–506). In addition,
governance without world government is entirely suitable to close the
governance gaps discussed in the previous section. As long as states (and
non-state actors) recognize that problems and conflicts can best be regu-
lated through cooperation, governance legitimacy in its output dimension
is likely to be secured. To be more precise, the jurisdictional gap is closed
as transsovereign problems are dealt with through international or trans-
national institutions. The incentive gap is narrowed because states are
interested in complying with international norms and rules (at least as
long as they consider that existing problems could best be dealt with at
the international level). The operational gap is narrowed inasmuch as
non-state actors play an important role in this governance model, there-
by bringing their knowledge and resources to bear on the international
and transnational policy-making processes. In addition, the participatory
gap is also narrowed since non-state actors, such as civil society groups,
have access to (or are even participants in) decision-making bodies. In
sum, this model is desirable as well as feasible.
The three models depicted in the previous section are not currently im-
plemented, nor can any one of them serve as an outline for the future.
Current international governance and evolving global governance have
to be regarded, rather, as a patchwork of heterogeneous elements deriv-
ing from governance under the hegemomic umbrella (e.g. in security
communities, cf. Peou, chap. 3) as well as governance without world gov-
ernment (e.g. international regimes). As governance without world gov-
ernment appears to be the most desirable and feasible of possible gov-
ernance models, it is discussed in this section in more detail.
FROM INTERNATIONAL TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 29
hensibility of the norms and rules themselves (ibid. 22). ‘‘Active man-
agement,’’ i.e. capacity building, dispute settlement, and the adaptation
and modification of norms set forth in treaties, may thus be a useful tool
for improving compliance (ibid. 197). The actors’ efforts towards com-
plete fulfilment of their obligations can be effectively supported and or-
ganized by institutions (ibid. 227).
The ozone regime, for instance, has implemented this managerial strat-
egy for enhancing compliance. If a member state fails to comply with the
Montreal Protocol’s rules, the Implementation Committee submits re-
commendations to the Meeting of the Parties to agree on suitable
measures. Hitherto, the Implementation Committee has mostly recom-
mended offers of assistance to non-complying states. The Russian Feder-
ation, for example, received additional funding through the Global
Environmental Facility in order to speed up the conversion of chloro-
fluorocarbon (CFC)-production facilities (Brühl 1999).
If the managerial model of compliance does not positively influence
the actors’ behaviour, a second measure of closing the incentive gap is
required – namely, authoritative dispute settlement. Compliance with the
agreed norms and rules can be enhanced by hauling deviant actors be-
fore a court of law or a body akin to it. In fact, more and more interna-
tional institutions tend to establish specific compliance mechanisms based
on judicial or quasi-judicial dispute-settlement procedures, thus taking an
important (though not universal) step towards the legalization of world
politics. Legalization is defined as ‘‘the degree to which rules are obliga-
tory, the precision of those rules, and the delegation of some functions
and interpretation, monitoring, and implementation to third parties’’
(Goldstein et al. 2000: 387). ‘‘Legalized institutions’’ adopt precise rules
and delegate authority to a neutral entity for implementation of the
agreed rules (ibid.). Typically, compliance in these legalized institutions
is higher than that in non-legalized institutions.
The WTO is an example of such a legalized institution. WTO members
have agreed that, if they believe that a state is violating the WTO’s rules,
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will deal with these violations on
the basis of clearly defined rules with definite timetables for reaching a
decision. Once a decision has been handed down, the DSB also has the
power to authorize retaliation against a state that does not comply with
a ruling. Since 1995, the DSB has authorized five suspensions of trade
concessions.
The majority of international and transnational institutions have not
yet implemented an adequate compliance follow-up. In institutions with-
out any compliance follow-up, such as the climate-change regime, agree-
ments on at least one or another compliance mechanism will be neces-
sary to ensure an effective follow-up.
34 BRÜHL AND RITTBERGER
Notes
1. However, it is important to note that, to a certain extent, additional information at a
certain time or in a certain context may be harmful, and at another time and place this
same increment of information may have a neutral or even beneficial effect (Hurley and
Mayer-Schönberger 2000).
2. Since the main purpose of this section is to discuss the challenges posed by globalization
to international governance, and not the analysis of globalization itself, we refer only to
the two extreme views on globalization. For a more differentiated view see Held et al.
(1999a: 2–16).
3. For data and analysis cf. Albert et al. (1999).
4. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr (2000a: 105) distinguish globalization and
interdependence. According to these authors, globalization, first, refers to networks of
connections rather than single linkages and, second, includes multicontinental distances,
not simply regional networks. (For their concept and analysis on interdependence see
Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987.)
5. These scholars prefer the term ‘‘denationalization’’ to ‘‘globalization,’’ as the latter is
mostly understood as a process resulting in a status of globality. Because most trans-
boundary interactions take place within the OECD world, and not on a global level,
‘‘globalization’’ appears to be a misnomer. ‘‘Denationalization,’’ in contrast, refers only
to the extension of societal transactions beyond the national level, no matter what the
actual scope of the transactions (see Zürn, chap. 4; Zürn 1998; Beisheim et al. 1999).
6. A value of 0 signifies perfect equality; a value of 1, perfect inequality. The world Gini
coefficient deteriorated slightly from 0.63 in 1988 to 0.66 in 1993. In the Russian Feder-
ation, the Gini coefficient rose markedly from 0.24 to 0.48 between 1987–1988 and
1993–1995 (UNDP 1999: 6).
7. However, in the second half of the 1990s the UN started to wane in global influence.
The number of Blue Helmets decreased to 27,000 in 2000 after it had peaked in 1993,
when 80,000 peace-keepers were deployed (Peou, chap. 3).
8. Kalevi J. Holsti (1996: 119) defines ‘‘failed states’’ as follows: ‘‘Leaders become in-
creasingly isolated and inhabit make-believe worlds concocted by their cronies and
dwindling sycophants. Government institutions no longer function except perhaps in the
capital city. The tasks of governance, to the extent that they are performed at all, de-
volve to warlords, clan chiefs, who are well armed. The state retains the fig leaf of sov-
FROM INTERNATIONAL TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39
ereignty for external purposes, but domestic life is organized around local politics. The
national army . . . disintegrates into local racketeering, or hires itself out to local rulers.’’
9. Input legitimacy is more difficult to achieve in international governance than in gover-
nance by national governments, because neither an international public nor a transna-
tional collective identity has yet come into existence (cf. Brock 1998; Wolf 2000: 213–
242; Zürn 2000: 192).
10. In his Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, Robert Keo-
hane (2001: 3), for instance, has proposed that each political institution in global gover-
nance needs to meet the three criteria of accountability, participation, and persuasion.
We discuss these criteria under the headings of closing the jurisdictional gap (account-
ability), the participation gap (participation and accountability), and the incentive gap
(persuasion).
11. At first glance, this idea looks very promising but its further analysis shows that it re-
mains unclear who is to decide on the appropriate level of public policy-making in dis-
tinct areas (cf. Brand et al. 2000, also Mürle 1998). For a different point of view see
Höffe (1997).
12. In addition, UN member states apparently do not favour implementing far-reaching re-
forms in general. This reluctant attitude is indicated by their recurrent inability to agree
on less important reform proposals. Thus, the closure of all governance gaps will be
difficult to achieve. For different UN reform proposals cf. Alger 1998; Hüfner and
Martens 2000. Whereas most of the far-reaching reform proposals have not been im-
plemented, Kofi Annan has implemented a ‘‘Quiet Revolution’’ (Annan 1998a) by re-
forming the UN Secretariat.
13. Global public policy (GPP) networks are one set of arrangements of public–private
partnerships. GPP networks are institutional innovations as not only do they combine
the ‘‘voluntary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the financial muscle
and interest of business and the enforcement and rule-making power and coordination
and capacity-building skills of states and international organization,’’ but also they
create new knowledge as consensus emerges over often contentious issues. They thus
ensure constant learning of all participants (Reinicke and Deng 2000: 29–30).
14. The Secretary-General asked the business community to support and respect the fol-
lowing:
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Principle 1 (protection of inter-
national human rights within their sphere of influence) and Principle 2 (make sure
their own corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses).
2. The Declaration of the International Labour Organization on fundamental principles
and rights at work Principle 3 (guarantee freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining), Principle 4 (support the elimination
of all forms of forced and compulsory labour), Principle 5 (assist the effective aboli-
tion of child labour), and Principle 6 (support the elimination of discrimination in re-
spect of employment and occupation).
3. The Rio Declaration of the UN Conference in Environment and Development
(1992) Principle 7 (support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges),
Principle 8 (undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility),
and Principle 9 (encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally
friendly technologies).
15. Cf. the modalities of the guidelines ‘‘Cooperation between the United Nations and
Business Community’’ issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 17 July
2000.
16. ‘‘Think-tank NGOs’’ such as the Transnational Resource and Action Center have pub-
lished various short articles on this topic, cf. Paul (2001). Other NGOs have written a
40 BRÜHL AND RITTBERGER
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