Trustees of Princeton University

Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict
Author(s): Andrew Mack
Source: World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan., 1975), pp. 175-200
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880 .
Accessed: 05/04/2011 11:50

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org
WHY BIG NATIONS LOSE SMALL WARS:
THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC
CONFLICT
By ANDREW MACK*

A cursory
examination
of thehistory
of imperialist in
expansion
thelatenineteenth and earlytwentiethcenturyrevealsone thing
veryclearly:Third-Worldresistance, where it existed,was crushed
withspeedyefficiency. In termsof conventionalmilitarythinkingsuch
successeswerenotunexpected. Indeed,together withtheAllied experi-
ence in thefirstand secondWorld Wars,theyservedto reinforce and
to rigidifythe pervasivenotionthatsuperiority in militarycapability
(conventionally defined)will mean victoryin war. However,the his-
toryof a numberof conflicts in the periodfollowingWorld War II
showedthatmilitaryand technologicalsuperiority may be a highly
unreliableguide to the outcomeof wars. In Indochina (1946-54),
Indonesia (0947-49), Algeria,Cyprus,Aden, Morocco,and Tunisia,
forcesgainedtheirobjectivesin armedconfrontations
local nationalist
withindustrialpowerswhichpossessedan overwhelming superiority
in conventional militarycapability.These wars werenot exclusivelya
colonial phenomenon,as was demonstrated by the failure of the
UnitedStatesto defeatits opponentsin Vietnam.
For some idea of the degreeto which the outcomeof thesewars
presentsa radicalbreakwiththe past,it is instructiveto examinethe
case of Indochina.The Frenchsuccessfully subjugatedthe peoplesof
Indochinaformorethan sixtyyearswith a locallybased armyonly
fifteenthousandstrong.The situationchanged dramaticallyafter
I946, when the Vietnamesetook up arms in guerrillastruggle.By
I954 the nationalistforcesof the Vietminhhad forcedthe French-
who by thistimehad deployedan expeditionary forceof nearlytwo
hundredthousandmen-to concededefeatand withdrawtheirforces
in ignominy.Withintwentyyears,a vastU.S. militarymachinewith
an expeditionary forcefivehundredthousandstronghad also been
forcedto withdraw.
The purposeof thispaperis to attemptto providea "pre-theoretical
* Researchfor this articlewas
supportedby the BritishSocial Science Research
Council.An ongoingprojectexamininga numberof case historiesof "asymmetric
conflicts"
is currently
beingsupportedby the RockefellerFoundation.
176 WORLD POLITICS
perspective"withinwhichthe outcomeof such "asymmetric con-
flicts"
maybe explained. In thefieldofconflictresearch,thestudyof
theoutcome andtheconduct ofwars,as againstthatoftheiretiology,
hasreceived remarkably littleattention.'
The outcome of"asymmetric
conflicts"
as described in thispaperhasbeenalmosttotally neglected.2
Arguably, it is easierto explainwhytheinsurgents werenotde-
featedthanitis toexplaintherelatedbutmoreinteresting question-
namely,how and whytheexternal powerwas forcedto withdraw.
Sincetheformer problem hasbeenthesubjectofintense investigation
bothby specialists in counter-insurgencyand strategistsof guerrilla
warfare,thegreater partofthispaperwilldealwiththelatter problem.
However, a fewfairly obvious pointsneedtobe madebefore goingon.
In analyzing thesuccesses of theBritishat Omdurman againstthe
Sudaneseand the Italiansin theirwar againstlocal insurgents in
Abyssinia,Mao Tse-tung has notedthatdefeatis theinvariable out-
comewherenativeforcesfightwithinferior weaponsagainstmod-
ernizedforces on thelatter'sterms. Katzenbach writesin thiscontext:
"Byandlarge,itwouldseemthatwhatmadethemachinery ofEuro-
pean troopsso successful was thatnativetroopssaw fitto die,with
glory,withhonor,en masse,andin vain."3Second,it shouldbe noted
that generalthistypeof war metwithlittledomestic
in opposition;
successonlyservedtoincrease publicsupport.4
Two interestingexcep-
tionswere the Boer War and the IrishRebellion(i9i6-22); it is sig-
thatin theseconflicts
nificant theresistance
to the British
was both
and bitterand,in themetropolis,
protracted generateddomesticop-
tothewar.5Thus,thefirst
position condition
foravoidingdefeatis to
toconfront
refuse theenemy onhisownterms. To avoidbeingcrushed,
1See BereniceA. Carroll,"War Terminationand ConflictTheory,"and William
T. R. Fox, "The Causes of Peace and the Conditionsof War," both in How Wars
End, Annals of the AmericanAcademyof Politicaland Social Science,Vol. 392
(November1970); and ElizabethConverse,"The War of All AgainstAll: A Review
of the Journalof ConflictResolution,1957-68,"journal of ConflictResolution,xii
(December i968).
2Exceptionsare foundin E. L. Katzenbach,"Time, Space and Will: The Politico-
MilitaryStrategyof Mao Tse-tung," in Lt. Col. T. N. Greene,ed., The Guerrillaand
How To FightHim (New York i962); RobertTaber, The War of the Flea (New
York i965); and JosephS. Kraemer,"Revolutionary GuerrillaWarfareand the
DecolonizationMovement," Polity,iv (Winter1971).
3 Katzenbach(fn.2), i5.
4 See, forexample,H. Wehler,"Industrial Growthand EarlyGermanImperialism"
in RobertOwen and RobertSutcliffe, eds., Theoriesof Imperialism(London i972).
5Two excellentrecentstudiesdealing directlywith domesticoppositionto these
wars are: StephenKoss, The Pro-Boers:The Anatomyof an Anti-WarMovement
(Chicago 1973), and D. G. Boyce,Englishmenand Irish Troubles:BritishPublic
Opinionand theMakingof IrishPolicyi9i8-22 (London 1972).
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 177
theinsurgent forcesmustretaina degreeof invulnerability, but the
defensive meanstothisendwilldependon theconditions ofthewar.
In guerrilla warfare in theclassicalsense,the "peoplesea" formsa
sanctuary ofpopularsupport forthe"guerrilla fish";in urbanguer-
rillawarfare theanonymity ofthecityprovides protection.Operating
in uninhabited areasand suppliedfromwithout(e.g.,thepost-i968
NorthVietnamese operations alongtheHo Chi MinhTrail in the
Vietnam War),theinsurgents maysimply relyon themountains and
foreststo concealand protect them.
Forstudents ofstrategy theimportance ofthesewarsliesin thefact
thatthesimplistic butonceprevalent assumption-that conventional
militarysuperiority necessarily prevailsin war-has beendestroyed.
Whatis alsointeresting is thatalthough themetropolitan powersdid
notwinmilitarily, neither weretheydefeated militarily.Indeedthe
military defeatof themetropolis itselfwas impossible sincethe in-
surgents lackedan invasioncapability. In everycase,successforthe
insurgents arosenotfroma military victory on theground-though
military successes may have been a contributory cause-butrather
fromtheprogressive attritionoftheiropponents' politicalcapabilityto
wagewar.In suchasymmetric conflicts, insurgentsmaygainpolitical
victory froma situation ofmilitary stalemate or evendefeat.
The mostrecentand obviousexampleofthistypeof conflict is the
American warin Vietnam, whichhasbrought homeseveral important
lessons.First,it has provided themostobviousdemonstration of the
falsityoftheassumptions thatunderlie the"capability" conception of
power.6Not onlydoes superiority in military force(conventionally
defined)notguarantee victory; it may,undercertaincircumstances,
be positively counter-productive.' Second,the Vietnamconflict has
demonstrated how,undercertainconditions, thetheatre of war ex-
tendswell beyondthebattlefield to encompass thepolityand social
institutionsof theexternal power.The Vietnamwar maybe seenas
havingbeenfoughton twofronts-one bloodyand indecisive in the
forestsandmountains ofIndochina, theotheressentially nonviolent-
butultimately moredecisive-within thepolityand socialinstitutions
oftheUnitedStates. The natureoftherelationship between thesetwo
6Problemswith different conceptionsof power in this contextare examinedin
AndrewMack, "The Conceptof Power and its Uses in ExplainingAsymmetric Con-
flict,"RichardsonInstitutefor Conflictand Peace Research(London i974).
7 The leastambiguousdemonstrations of thisapparently
paradoxicalassertionare to
be foundin the relatively rare cases of successful
nonviolentresistance
to armedag-
gression.See AndersBoserupand AndrewMack,War WithoutWeapons:Non-Violence
in NationalDefence (London i974).
178 WORLD POLITICS
conflicts-which are in factdifferent facetsof the sameconflict-is
criticaltoan understanding oftheoutcome ofthewar.However, the
American experience was in no senseunique,exceptto Americans.
In I954 theVietminh destroyedtheFrenchforces whichweremustered
atDien BienPhuin a classicsetpiecebattle.The directmilitary costs
to theFrenchhavebeenmuchexaggerated; only3 per centof the
totalFrenchforcesin Indochinawereinvolved.The psychological
effects-like thoseof the Tet offensive somefourteen yearslater-
were shattering, however.The Vietminhdid not of coursedefeat
Francemilitarily. Theylackednot onlythecapability butalso any
interestin attempting sucha move.Dien BienPhu,however, had the
effect ofdestroying thepoliticalcapability("will"in thelanguageof
classicalstrategy)oftheFrenchGovernment tomobilize furthertroops
andtocontinue thestruggle-this despite
thefactthatthegreater part
of the financialcostsof the war werebeingborneby the United
States.Third,theVietnamwar,whichfortheVietnamese revolution-
arieshas nowlastedovera quarterof a century, has emphasized the
enormous importance which guerrilla strategists on
place "protracted
warfare." This is articulatedmostclearlyin Mao Tse-tung's works,
but it is also foundin the military writings of GeneralGiap and
TruongChinhand in the worksof the leadingAfricanguerrilla
strategists,Cabraland Mondlane.The certainty of eventualvictory
whichis theresultofintensive politicalmobilizationbytheguerrilla
leadership is thekeyto whatRosenseesas a criticalfactorin such
conflicts-namely, the willingness to absorbcosts.8Katzenbachhas
notedof Mao's strategic theory thatit is basedon thepremisethat
"ifthetotality ofthepopulation can be madeto resistsurrender, this
resistance can be turnedintoa warof attrition whichwill eventually
andinevitably be victorious."'
Or,as HenryKissinger moresuccinctly
observed in i969: "The guerrilla winsifhe doesnotlose."'0
Aboveall, Vietnamhas beena reminder thatin war theultimate
aim mustbe to affect thewill of theenemy.Moststrategic theorists
wouldofcourseconcurwiththisview.Butin practice, and at therisk
of oversimplification, it maybe notedthatit is a prevalent military
beliefthatif an opponent's military to wage war can be
capability
destroyed, his "will"to continue the struggleis irrelevantsincethe
meanstothatendareno longeravailable.It is notsurprising thatthis
8 StevenRosen,"War Power and the Willingnessto Suffer,"
in Bruce M. Russett,
ed., Peace, War,and Numbers(London I972).
9 Katzenbach(fn.2), i8.
'OHenry A. Kissinger,"The VietnamNegotiations," ForeignAffairs,XLVII (Jan-
uary i969), 2I4.
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 179
shouldbe a prevalent beliefin modernindustrial societies:strategic
doctrine tendsto mold itselfto availabletechnology, as criticsof
strategicweaponsdeployment haveforcefully pointedout.Neitheris
itsurprising thatguerrilla strategistsshouldseestrategy in verydiffer-
entterms. Lackingthetechnological capabilityor thebasicresources
todestroy theexternal enemy's military theymustofneces-
capability,
sityaimtodestroy hispoliticalcapability.Iftheexternal power's"will"
to continue thestruggle is destroyed, thenitsmilitary capability-no
matter howpowerful-is totally One aimofthispaperis to
irrelevant.
showhowandwhy,in certain typesofconflict,conventional military
superiority is notmerely useless, butmayactually be counter-produc-
tive.The implications forthosemilitary systemswhichrelyalmost
whollyon industrial powerand advancedtechnology needhardlybe
spelledout.
As I havenotedabove,in noneoftheasymmetric conflicts did the
localinsurgents havethecapability to invadetheirmetropolitan op-
ponents'homeland.It necessarily followsthatinsurgents can only
achievetheirendsiftheiropponents' politicalcapabilityto wagewar
is destroyed. This is truewhether the insurgents are revolutionaries
orright-wing nationalists,whether theyrelyon guerrilla warfare, ur-
ban terrorism, or evennonviolence. The destruction of the external
power'sforcesin the fieldplacesno materialobstaclein its path
whichwill prevent it fromsimplymobilizing moreforcesat home
and dispatching themto thebattlefront. The constraints on mobiliza-
tionarepolitical, notmaterial. In noneoftheconflicts notedwasmore
thana fraction of thetotalpotential militaryresources of themetro-
politanpowerin factmobilized. The U.S. warin Vietnamhasbyany
measurehad thegreatest impacton international and Americando-
mestic politics of anyconflict sinceWorldWar II, butthemaximum
number ofU.S. troopsin Vietnamat thepeakof thegroundwarin
i968 amounted to lessthanone quarter ofonepercentoftheAmer-
icanpopulation. The politicalconstraints operating againstfullmobi-
lizationof themetropolitan forcesariseas a consequence of thecon-
in themetropolis-both
flicts withinthepolitical eliteandin thewider
society-which the war,by its verynature,will inevitably tendto
generate. To paraphrase Clausewitz, politics
maybecomethecontinua-
tionof war by othermeans.Therefore themilitary struggle on the
groundmustbe evaluated notin termsofthenarrowcalculusofmili-
tarytactics, but in termsof its politicalimpactin the metropolis:
"Battlesand campaigns are amenableto analysisas ratherself-con-
tainedcontests ofmilitary power.... Bycontrast, thefinaloutcome of
180 WORLD POLITICS
warsdependson a muchwiderrangeoffactors, manyofthemhighly
elusive-suchas the war'simpacton domestic politics.. . ."' The
significanceofparticular battlesdoesnotlie in theiroutcomeas "self-
contained contests ofmilitary power."Thus,although theUnitedStates
couldcontend thatthei968 Tetoffensive markeda dramatic defeatfor
therevolutionary forcesin termsof themacabremilitary calculusof
"bodycounts," theoffensive was in facta majorstrategic defeatfor
theU.S.,marking theturning pointin thewar.The impactofTet on
Americandomestic politicsled directly to theincumbent President's
decision notto standforanother termofoffice. And,forthefirst time,
military requests formoreresources (a further 200,000 men) werere-
fuseddespitethefactthatthemilitary situationhad worsened.
Evenwheremilitary victory over the insurgents is unambiguous-
as in GeneralMassu'sdestruction of theFLN infrastructure in the
notorious BattleofAlgiers-this is stillno sureguideto theoutcome
oftheconflict. DespitethefactthattheFLN neverregained themili-
taryinitiative,theFrenchabandoned theirstruggle withinfouryears.
Indeed,thebarbarous methods usedbyMassuto achievethatvictory,
including thewidespread useoftorture, wereinstrumental in catalyz-
ing opposition to the war in metropolitan France.
The Algerianwaris an instructive exampleof ourthesis.Between
I954 and i962 there wasa radicalshift in thebalanceofpolitical forces
in metropolitan France.The colon(whitesettler) classofAlgeriawas
thechiefpolitical victim.A fewdaysafter fighting brokeout,theleftist
Minister oftheInterior, Francois Mitterand, responded toa suggestion
thatParisshouldnegotiate withtherebelsbystating flatly thatin the
Algeriandepartements "theonlynegotiation is war."Yet sevenand
a-halfyearslater,De Gaullehad notonlygranted therebelsall their
initialdemands(including sometheyhad notevenconsidered when
fighting brokeout), but receivedoverwhelming supportfromthe
majority oftheFrenchpopulation in doingso. Significantly, thelast
taskoftheFrenchArmy(whichhad itselfattempted a coupagainst
theGaullist government) wastohuntdowntheterrorists oftheOAS-
thediehardremnants ofthecolonclassin whoseinterests themilitary
had intervened in thefirstplace.
Frenchpolicythroughout thisconflict-asmetropolitan policyin
otherasymmetric conflicts-was besetby whatMao Tse-tungcalls
"contradictions." The initialmilitary repression directed againstthe
rebelsachieved forthemilitants whattheyhadbeenunableto achieve
1 Fred CharlesIkle,EveryWar MustEnd (London I97I), I-2.
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 181
forthemselves-namely, thepolitical mobilization ofthemassesagainst
theFrench.
As therebellion becamemorebroadly based,morenumerous forces
andevermoreextreme methods wereusedto attempt to quellit.The
Frenchalsotriedtobuyoffnationalist aspirations
byoffering togrant
someof thepoliticaldemandswhichhad initially beenmadeby the
insurgents-only to findthatthesehadbeenradically escalated.Offers
ofconcessions were-as is frequently thecasein suchconflicts-both
too smalland too late.The moreforcestheFrenchdeployed(ulti-
mately fourhundred thousand men),thegreater wastheimpact which
thewarhad in themetropolis. It was notso muchtheinhumanity of
thewar perse thatgenerated opposition in France;themajority of
Frenchmenandwomenwereno moresympathetic to theFLN than
werethemajority of Americans to theNLF in Vietnam.The major
causeof opposition laynotin theenormous costsof thewar to the
Algerians (thoughthiswasa factor), butin thecostsofthewartothe
Frenchthemselves. The progressively greaterhuman,economic, and
politicalcostsgaveriseto thephenomenon of"warweariness" which
manywriters havedescribed withoutanalyzing, and to the"lossof
politicalwill" of the government to whichthe military invariably
ascribed thedefeat. Thusitcanbe seenthattheshiftin thebalanceof
politicalforcesin metropolitan Francewas of criticalimportance in
determining theoutcome ofthewar.Politicalleadersin suchconflicts
do notgrantinsurgent demands becausetheyundergo a suddenchange
ofheart.Theyconcedebecausetheyhaveno choice.
Whyare asymmetries in structure important, and whatdo we in
factmeanby"asymmetry" in thiscontext? We mustfirst notethatthe
relationship between thebelligerents isasymmetric. The insurgents can
no
pose directthreat to thesurvival oftheexternal powerbecause,as
already noted,theylackan invasion capability. On theotherhand,the
metropolitan powerposesnotsimplythethreatof invasion, butthe
reality ofoccupation. Thisfactis so obviousthatitsimplications have
beenignored. It means,crudely speaking, thatfortheinsurgents the
waris "total,"whilefortheexternal powerit is necessarily "limited."
Full mobilization ofthetotalmilitary resourcesoftheexternal power
is simply notpolitically possible.(One mightconceive ofcaseswhere
thisisnotthecase-as in a popularly backed"holywar"forexample-
butsuchpossibilities are of no relevance to thepresentdiscussion.)
Notonlyis fullmobilization impossible itis notthought
politically, to
be intheleastnecessary. The asymmetry in conventional militarycapa-
bilityis so greatand theconfidence thatmilitary mightwill prevail
182 WORLD POLITICS
is so pervasive thatexpectation of victoryis one of thehallmarks of
theinitialendeavor.
The factthatone belligerent possessesan invasioncapability and
theotherdoesnotis a function ofthedifferences in levelofindustrial
and technological capabilityof thetwo sides.The asymmetric rela-
tionship is thusa functionoftheasymmetry in "resource power."
Somestrategic implications of symmetric and asymmetric conflict
relations maynowbespelledout.Theinsurgents, facedwithoccupation
by a hostileexternal power,are able to capitalizeon thosepowerful
forces to whichpoliticalscientistshavegiventhelabel"nationalism."
Whatthismeansessentially is thatdisparate andsometimes conflicting
nationalgroupsmay finda commonunity-a nationalinterest-in
opposing a common enemy.In thatcasethecohesion generated is only
indirectly a consequenceoftheasymmetry in resource power:itssocial
andpsychological bondsareto be foundin thecommonhostility felt
towardtheexternal enemy.
Clausewitznotedthatwar onlyapproximates to its "pureform"
whena "grandandpowerful purpose" is at stake.'2 Onlythenwillthe
fullmobilization of nationalresourcesbecomea possibility, and only
thenwillthediverseand sometimes conflicting goalsthatvariousna-
tionalgroups pursueintimeofpeacebedisplaced bya singleoverriding
strategic aim-"theoverthrow of theenemy."In a symmetric, "total
war"situation wherethesurvival ofbothsidesis at stake,bothhavea
"grandand powerful purpose"to defend.Thus,otherthingsbeing
equal,thepotential forinternaldivisions
arising ineither campis small
relative to thepotentialfordomestic conflict in thehomelandof the
metropolitan powerinvolved in an asymmetric conflict.In symmetric
conflicts,ceteris
paribus,theabsenceofconstraints on themobilization
andtheuseofconventional militaryforcemaximize thestrategic utility
of conventional warfare.Examplesofsymmetric "totalwars"arethe
firstandsecondWorldWarsandcivilwarsin whichthestruggle can
be seenin zero-sum terms-asoneofsurvival. However, although the
external-enemy/internal-cohesion thesis
ofsociologists likeSimmeland
Coserhasbeenwidelyaccepted, therelationship isnotas simpleas some
writers appearto think.Coserfollows Williamsin agreeing thatthere
hasto be a minimalconsensus thatthegroup(or nation)is a "going
concern," andthattheremustbe recognition ofan outside threatwhich
isthought tomenacethegroupas a whole,notjustsomepartofit.Coser
notesofthesecondWorldWarthat"attempts at centralizationbythe
12The finalchapterof Boserupand Mack (fn. 7) discussesClausewitzianstrategic
theoryand its applicationto "asymmetric
conflicts."
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 183
FrenchGovernment wereunavailing and couldnotmendthebasic
cleavages norremedy thelackof socialsolidarity."'3We mayadd to
thistwomoreconditions whichwill affect nationalunityin theface
ofexternal threat.First,resistancemustbe perceived as a viablealter-
nativetosurrender. It is noteworthythatafter thecollapseoftheNazi-
SovietPactin thesecondWorldWar,resistance to theNazis in occu-
piedEuropewas veryoftenled by Communists forwhomsurrender
meantextermination. A majority of thepopulation of theoccupied
countriesperceived surrender as a moreviablealternative thanresist-
ance-at leastuntilit appearedthatthetideof thewar had turned
against theNazis.Resistance movements whosemembers sharea revo-
lutionary ideology whichhas as one of itsbasictenetsthebeliefthat
"protracted war"willultimately be victorious,will,bydefinition, see
resistanceas an obviousalternative to surrender. Second,sinceoccupa-
tionis likelyto haveadverseconsequences forall groups, butmuch
worseforsomethanforothers, suchnationalunityas doesoccurwill
notbe unshakable. Butitwillbe enormously reinforced bywhatmay
be calledthe"bandwagon effect."'4
Dissentwillbe heavilyproscribed
and sanctioned sociallyas well as by theleadership.
Eventhough itisnotpossible tobeprecise abouttheconditions which
necessarilygenerate national solidarity
inthefaceofan external threat,
we maynotethefollowing twopointswithrespect toasymmetric con-
flicts:
(a) An external threatis a necessary ifnotsufficient condition for
theemergence ofa popularfront.
(b) Occupation and military repression bythemetropolitan power
hasin factproduced thenationalistunitypredicted bytheCoser-Sim-
melthesis.(One interesting exceptionis theconfrontation in Malaysia,
wheretherewasa deepcleavagedividing theChineseinsurgents from
theMalays.)Indeed,it is possibleto arguethatin somecasesthere-
pression did notso muchintensify a pre-existing basicconsensus as
createone.
(c) Moreimportantly, therewas no comparable unifying external
forcein thecaseofthemetropolitan power.On thecontrary, in every
case wherethe insurgents won,thewar was a profoundly divisive
issue.
Thosescholarswhoareexpounding the"paradox"thatexternal
con-
flictwillbothincreaseand decrease
domesticconflict
(see below) are
guiltyofcreating
a falsedichotomy.
Contrast intheUnited
thesituation
13LewisA. Coser, The Functionsof Social Conflict(New York I956), 87-IIO.
'4Boserupand Mack (fn.7), chap. i.
184 WORLD POLITICS
States,as thewar escalatedin Vietnam,withthatof Britainfacingthe
Nazis in thesecondWorldWar. In theformercase we see theprogres-
siveescalationofdomesticoppositionto thewar creatingdeep divisions
withinU.S. society.In the latter,"The Nazi attackappreciablyin-
creasedthe internalcohesionof the Britishsocial system,temporarily
narrowingthe variouspolitical,social and economicfissuresthatex-
istedin Britishsociety."'5In Britaintheelectoralprocesswas suspended
forthe durationof the conflictin orderto forma coalition"national
government." In the various"wars of nationalliberation"we see pre-
ciselythe same processin the formation of "popularfronts."Indeed,
thelabel "NationalLiberationFront"is foundin someguisein nearly
all theseconflicts,thoughrarelyin civilwars.16
It is mycontention thattheprocessofpoliticalattrition ofthemetro-
politanpower'scapabilityto continueto wage war is not the conse-
quenceoferrorsofgeneralship, thoughthesemaywell occur.Rather,it
is a functionof thestructure of the conflict,
of the natureof the con-
flictualrelationship betweenthe belligerents. Where the war is per-
ceivedas "limited"-becausethe opponentis "weak" and can pose no
directthreat-theprosecution of thewar does not take automaticpri-
macyoverothergoals pursuedby factionswithinthe government, or
bureaucracies or othergroupspursuinginterests whichcompeteforstate
resources.In a situationof totalwar, the prosecution of the war does
takeautomaticprimacyaboveall othergoals.Controversies over"guns
or butter"are not onlyconceivablein a Vietnam-type but in-
conflict,
evitable.In a total-warsituationtheywould be inconceivable:guns
would getautomaticpriority. In contrastto thetotal-war the
situation,
protagonists of a limitedwar have to competeforresources-human,
economic,and political-withprotagonists of otherinterests-govern-
mental,bureaucratic, "interest
groups,"and so forth.Clearly,ifthewar
is terminated quicklyand certainbenefitsare believedto be accruing
fromvictory(as in the case of the mini-warsof colonialexpansion)
thepotentialfordivisivedomesticconflict on thewar issuewill notbe
realized.Butthisis simplyanotherway of statingthatiftheinsurgents
areto win,theymustnotlose.
In hishighlyprophetic paperpublishedin i969, HenryKissingerob-
servedof America'swar in Vietnam:"We foughta militarywar; our
opponentsfoughta politicalone. We soughtphysicalattrition;our
opponentsaimed forour psychological exhaustion.In the process,we
15 Coser (fn. I3), 87-IIO; quotationfromp. 95.
16The obviouspointhere is that "nationalism"
is normallya meaninglessconcept
exceptin relationto an externalenvironment."Nationalism"may be significant
in
civilwarsthatare basedon an ethnicconflict
but not on class conflict.
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 185
lostsightof one of the cardinalmaximsof guerrillawarfare:the
guerrilla winsifhedoesnotlose.The conventional armylosesifitdoes
notwin.""7
In a similar vein,E. L. Katzenbach in i962 described Mao Tse-tung's
generalstrategic approachas follows:"Fundamental to all else,Mao
says,is thebeliefthatcountries withlegislative bodiessimplycannot
takea warofattrition, eitherfinancially or,in thelongrun,psycho-
logically. Indeed,theveryfactof a multi-party structuremakescom-
mitment toa longwarsopolitically suicidal as tobequiteimpossible....
Whenthefinancial burdenincreases frommonthtomonth, theoutcry
against thewarwillitself weakentheability ofthetroops tofight. The
warthatMao'stheory contemplates is thecheapest forhimtofight and
themostexpensive fortheenemy.""18
In orderto avoiddefeat, theinsurgents mustretaina minimum de-
greeofinvulnerability. In orderto win,theymustbe ableto impose
a steady accumulation of"costs"ontheiropponent. Theymustnotonly
be undefeated; theymustbe seento be undefeated. Strategically,the
insurgents' aimmustbe toprovoke theexternal powerintoescalating
itsforces ontheground. Thisinitselfwillincureconomic andpolitical
costsinthemetropolis. Sucha process ofescalation didinfactmarkthe
history oftheconflicts in Indochina, Algeria, PortugueseAfrica, Viet-
nam,andthecurrent conflictin Ulster.The directcoststheinsurgents
imposeon theexternal powerwillbe thenormalcostsofwar-troops
killedandmateriel destroyed. Buttheaimoftheinsurgents is notthe
destruction of themilitary capability of theiropponents as an endin
itself.To attempt sucha strategy wouldbe lunaticfora smallThird-
Worldpowerfacinga majorindustrial power.Directcostsbecome
ofstrategic importance when,andonlywhen,theyaretranslated into
indirect costs.These are psychological and political:theirobjective
is to amplify the"contradictions in theenemy's camp."
In themetropolis, a warwithno visiblepayoff againstan opponent
who posesno directthreatwill comeunderincreasing criticismas
battlecasualties riseand economic costsescalate.Obviously therewill
stillbe groupsin themetropolis whoseideological commitments will
leadthemto continue to support thegovernment's warpolicy;others
(munitions manufacturers, forexample)maysupport thewarbecause
theyhavemorematerialinterests at stake.But if thewar escalates
dramatically, as itdidin AlgeriaandVietnam, itmakesa definite im-
pacton theeconomicand politicalresources whichmightotherwise
havebeenallocated to,say,publicwelfare projects.Tax increases maybe
17 Kissinger(fn.x0), 2I4. 18 Katzenbach(fn.2), i8.
186 WORLD POLITICS
necessary to coverthe costsof thewar,a draftsystemmay have to be
introduced, and inflationwill be an almostcertainby-product. Such
costsare seenas partof the"necessary price"whenthe security of the
nationis directlythreatened. When thisis not the case, the basis for
consensusdisappears.In a limitedwar, it is not at all clear to those
groupswhose interests are adverselyaffectedwhy such sacrificesare
necessary."9
Butthatis onlypartof thestory.Justas important is thefactthatthe
necessity forthe sacrifices involvedin fightingand riskingdeathwill
appearlessobviousto the conscripts and even theprofessional soldiers
when the of
survival the nation is not directlyat stake.Americansol-
diersfoughtwell in thesecondWorldWar, but thelastyearsin Viet-
nam weremarkedby troopmutinies, widespreaddrugaddiction,high
levelsof desertion, and eventhemurdersof over-zealous officers
intent
on sendingtheirmen out on dangerouspatrols.This in factled to a
strongfeelingamongsomeseniorU.S. Armyofficers thatit was neces-
saryto get out of Vietnambeforemoralecollapsedcompletely.It is
impossibleto explainsuch a dramaticdeterioration of moralewithin
thearmyand the massiveoppositionto the draftwithoutreference to
thetypeof war beingfought.
Thereis also thequestionof themoralityof thewar. When thesur-
vival of the nationis not directlythreatened, and when the obvious
asymmetry in conventional military powerbestowsan underdogstatus
on theinsurgent side,themorality ofthewar is moreeasilyquestioned.
It is instructiveto notethatduringWorldWar II thedeliberateAllied
attemptto terrorizethe working-class populationsof Dresden and
otherGermancitiesgeneratedno moral outragein Britain.This de-
spitethefactthatthe thousand-bomber raidswere designedto create
so
firestorms devastating in effectthat more peopledied in one night
of bombingoverDresdenthanperishedin the Hiroshimaholocaust.
On the otherhand, the aerial bombardment of civilianlocalitiesin
Vietnam,the use of herbicidesand defoliants, napalm,and anti-per-
sonnelweapons have been all met with widespreadcontroversy and
protest.One shouldnot deducefromthisthatthe Britishpublicwas
morecallousto theeffects of humansuffering thanwas theAmerican.
19 Some interestingand recenttheoretical work in the "issue area" literatureis
relevantto thisdiscussion;see in particularTheodoreJ. Lowi, "MakingDemocracy
Safe for the World: NationalPolitics,"in JamesRosenau,ed., DomesticSourcesof
ForeignPolicy(New York i967); and WilliamZimmerman, "IssueArea and Foreign
Policy Process,"AmericanPolitical Science Review, LXVII (December I973). The
politics"and "linkagepolitics"is also relevant.
on "bureaucratic
literature
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 187
Moraloutrage is in largeparta function oftheinterests perceived to
be at stakein theconflict. Wheresurvival is theissue,thepropensity
to question and protest themorality of themeansusedto defeatthe
enemyis markedly attenuated.
As thewardragson andthecostssteadily escalate without the"light
attheendofthetunnel" becoming morevisible, thedivisions generated
withinthemetropolis becomein themselves one of thepoliticalcosts
of thewar.The government-or, moreprecisely, thatfactionof the
government whichis committed to thewar-will continue to argue
thatprosecuting thewaris in thenationalinterest, thatvitalsecurity
areatstake,
interests thattheinternational credibility andprestige ofthe
nationis at issue,and so forth. Whether or nottheseclaimsbearany
relationshiptoreality-whether theyarewhollytrueorwhollyfalse-
isquiteimmaterial. Whatcountsinthelongruniswhattheopponents
ofthewarbelieveto be at stakeand howmuchpoliticalcapitalthey
canmuster.
Finally,anotherwordabout"contradiction." Mao and Giap have
repeatedly emphasizedthatthe principalcontradiction whichthe
imperialistarmymustconfront on thegroundderivesfromthefact
thatforces dispersed to control territory becomespreadso thinlythat
theyarevulnerable to attack.If forcesare concentrated to overcome
thisweakness, otherareasareleftunguarded. For theexternal power
to overcome thiscontradiction requiresa massiveincreasein metro-
politanforces; butthisimmediately increases thedomestic costsofthe
war.On theotherhand,iftheimperialists wishtopacify theopposition
athomebywithdrawing someoftheirforces, thecontradiction on the
battlefrontsis sharpened. Anyattempt toresolve onecontradictionwill
magnify theother.The guerrilla strategistsunderstand perfectly that
thewartheyfighttakesplaceon twofronts and theconflict mustbe
perceived as an integrated whole.Fromthisperspective, thosewhoop-
posethewarin themetropolis actobjectively-regardless oftheirsub-
jectivepolitical a
philosophies-asstrategic resource forthe insurgents.
Governments arewellawareofthis,sinceit is theywhohaveto con-
frontthepoliticalconstraints. Yet government accusationsthatthose
opposedto thewar are "aidingtheenemy"are contemptuously re-
jected.Theyarenevertheless objectively correct. From thisperspective
we canalsoseewhytheslogan"imperialism is a papertiger"is byno
meansinaccurate. It is notthatthematerial resources of themetro-
politanpowerarein themselves underestimated bytherevolutionaries;
rather,thereis an acuteawareness thatthepolitical constraintson their
188 WORLD POLITICS
maximum deployment are as realas if thoseresources did notexist,
and thattheseconstraints becomemoreratherthanlesspowerful as
thewarescalates.
Few attempts havebeenmadetoanalyzetheoutcome ofasymmetric
conflictssystematically.Amongthosefew,evenfewerhaveseenthe
asymmetries whichcharacterize the conflict as beingcriticalto an
understanding of the outcome.However,some aspectshave been
touched on.Rosenconsiders theasymmetry in powerand"willingness
to suffer costs";Katzenbachexaminesthe asymmetry in "tangible"
and "intangible resources"; Galtungdistinguishes between"social"
and "territorialdefense"(asymmetry in goals); Kissinger,as already
noted, mentionsasymmetry in overallstrategy (physical versuspsycho-
logicalattrition);and Kraemerdistinguishes "colonial"versus"non-
colonial"guerrilla wars.20An examination oftheconflict in thelight
ofanyoftheseasymmetries provides certaininsightsintoparticularas-
pectsof thewar,butmissestheoverallpicture. The asymmetries de-
scribedin thispaper-in the interests perceived to be at stake,in
mobilization, in intervention in
capability, "resource power,"and so
forth-areabstracted fromtheircontextforthe sake of analytical
clarity.Butthewholeremains greater thanthesumof itsparts,and
it is theconflict
as a wholewhichmustbe studiedin orderto under-
standitsevolution and outcome.
Somewriters interestedin theetiology ofconflict havearguedthat
thenatureof thestatepolitymediates thelinkbetweeninternal and
external The samequestionis of relevance
conflict.2" withrespect to
therelatively neglected problem ofunderstanding theoutcomeofin-
ternational conflicts.
Is theprocess ofattritionofthepolitical capability
towagewar,whichwe observe so clearlyin theVietnam andAlgerian
conflicts,a function of thenatureof thepolityof themetropolitan
powersinvolved? Somewriters clearlybelievethatit is. Withrespect
toVietnam, EdmundIonsnotes:"Whilstthefreedom to demonstrate
-even fordefeatism in foreign policy-isclearly one ofthestrengths
of a freesociety,
it is also one of itsweaknessesso faras powerpolitics
isconcerned."22
Theargument ofIonsandother writers
isroughly
as
In contrast
follows. to "open"societies,
wheredissentis permitted,
dissent in "closed"or "totalitarian"
is repressed societies.
Therefore
20 Rosen (fn. 8); Katzenbach(fn. 2); Kissinger(fn. io); Kraemer(fn. 2); see also
JohanGaltung,"Mot et NyttForsvarsbegrep," Pax, No. i (Oslo i965).
21 E.g., Jonathan "Modelsforthe Analysisof ForeignConflict
Wilkenfeld, Behavior
of States,"in Russett(fn. 8).
22EdmundIons, "Dissentin America:The Constraints on ForeignPolicy,"Con-
flictStudies,No. i8 (London I971); emphasisin original.
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 189
societies
totalitarian will notbe troubled by thedomestic constraints
whichhavebedeviledU.S. policy-makers on Vietnam,forinstance.
In someofthebest-known examples ofasymmetric conflict in which
the insurgents gainedtheirobjectives-Indochina, Algeria,Cyprus,
Aden,Palestine, and Indonesia-themetropolitan powerwhichcon-
cededdefeatwas a "democracy." Asymmetric in whichthe
conflicts
externalpowersuccessfully crushedtheopposition (or has yetto be
beaten)includeHungary(i956), Czechoslovakia (i968), and Por-
tugal'songoingwarin Africa.In thesecases,themetropolitan regime
maybe described as "closed,""centrist,""totalitarian,"
or whatever;
in anycase,populardomestic oppositionis nottolerated. In addition
to thegovernment proscribing opposition,it maybe withholding in-
formation. The brutalities inflicted
on civiliansmaygo unreported,
thecostsof thewar to theeconomy concealed, and thenumberof
troopskilledminimized. Ions in thepaperquoted,and othersup-
portersoftheU.S. warin Indochina, havecomecloseto recommend-
ingcensorship forprecisely thesereasons.The Frenchmilitary strate-
gistTrinquier, withgreater concernforlogicthanforpolitical reality,
arguesthatin orderto prevent therotof"defeatism" or "lackofpo-
liticalwill" frombetraying thetroopsin thefield,theentirestruc-
tureof themetropolitan societymustbe altered.23The generalpoint
hassomevalidity. In Laos,a greater numberof civilianrefugees was
createdby U.S. bombingmissions thanin Vietnam,yetthe"secret
war"in Laos attracted farlessattention and controversy becausethe
presswas specifically excludedfromthebattlezones.Despitethese
obviouspoints, mymaincontention-that limitedwarsby theirvery
naturewill generatedomesticconstraints if the war continues-is
not disproved.In termsof the argumentput forwardhere,"politics"
underanypoliticalsystem involvesconflict overtheallocationof re-
In closedor centrist
sources. theseconflicts
polities, willbyand large
be confinedto therulingelite-butnotnecessarily so. The argument
maybe exemplified byexamining thecaseofPortugal.* Clearly,
popu-
laroppositionto thewarin Angola,Mozambique, andGuineaBissau
couldnotmanifest in Portugal
itself as did opposition
to theVietnam
warin theUnitedStates.But therewerenevertheless majorcontro-
versies
withintherulingPortuguese eliteconcerning thedesirability
-the costsand benefits-ofcontinuingwar in Africa:"[T]here seem
23 P. Trinquier,
Modern Warfare(New York i964).
* This articlewas beforethe
completed Spinolacoup in Portugalin the springof
1974.A briefdiscussion
of theimplications
of thecoup,and thoseof therecentdevelop-
mentsin the Ulstercrisis,has been added to the conclusion.
190 WORLD POLITICS
to be threemaincurrents whenit comesto themajordirection of
forPortugal:thecolonialist
orientation in variousversions
tradition
whichstillbelievein 'Portuguese
Africa,'theold 'Lucitaniantradi-
tion'thatwouldbasePortuguese futureon thePortugal/Brazil axis,
and the'Europeans' forwhomtheEuropeanCommunity mustap-
pearas a veryattractivehavenof escape."24The youngergeneration of
"modernizingtechnocrats" clearlysee Portugal'sfuture as allied with
theEuropeanCommunity and realizeequallyclearlythatthepriceof
a closerassociationwiththeEEC is thecessationof thewar in Africa.
Portugalis also an interesting case in the sense that,in additionto
domesticconstraints, thereare also powerfulinternational constraints,
Portugalbeing criticallydependenton the NATO countriesfor the
armsneededto fightthewar in Africa.This supportis,needlessto say,
highlyundependable, not onlybecauseit has alreadycome undersus-
tainedattackfromsome of the north-European NATO powers,but
more obviouslybecause Portugalhas a far greaterdependenceon
NATO thanNATO has on Portugal.Finally,populardomesticoppo-
sition has in the past manifesteditselfindirectly, as thousandsof
Portuguese"votedwiththefeet"by emigrating to theEuropeanCom-
munity.
It remainsto be explainedwhyPortugal,the oldestand weakestof
imperialpowers,shouldhaveclungto hercolonieslong afterhermore
powerfulrivalssurrendered by grantingindependence to theircolonial
dependencies. The usual explanationis thatit is a matterof an ideo-
logical-and essentially irrational-obsessionwith "manifestdestiny."
However,withoutdenyingthattheremay be a powerfulcontingent
of genuineideologueswithinthe Portuguesepolitywho supportthe
war forthesereasons,thisdoes not providethe whole answer.Those
mostloyal to the "Portugueseconnection"are the Portuguesesettlers
in the territoriesthemselves-loyalin the senseof totaloppositionto
blackrule.Butthisloyalty--like theloyaltyofUlsterProtestants, white
Rhodesiansor white colons in Algeria-is highlyunreliable.25 The
resistany attemptto hand overcontrolto the
settlerclasswill bitterly
24JohanGaltung,The EuropeanCommunity: A Superpowerin the Making (Lon-
don I973), i66.
25As Emmanuelnotesof the "settlerclass" in "colonial"situations:"They bene-
fittedfromcolonialismand therefore promotedit, withoutreserveor contradiction-
and forthatveryreasontheywerebasicallyanti-imperialist, howeverparadoxicalthat
may seem.From theverybeginningtheywere in conflict withtheirparentcountries
so at timesof crisis,goingso faras to take
so at all times,subjectively
. . . objectively
up arms againstit." ArgirihiEmmanuel,"WhiteSettlerColonialismand the Myth
of Investment Imperialism," New Left Review,No. 73 (May/JuneI972), 38-39.
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 191
indigenous population; it thereby provides a powerful brakeon any
movetowards independence.
For thesettlerclass,qua settler class,thegranting ofindependence
to theindigenous population posesa directthreatto localEuropean
hegemony inboththepolitical andeconomic spheres.Ifpressures inthe
metropolis aresuchthatwithdrawal fromthecoloniesappearslikely
-as seemshighlypossible following theSpinolacoupofthespringof
i974-theremaywellbemovesbythesettlers toattempt a typeofgo-it-
alone,UnilateralDeclaration of Independence strategy alongRhode-
sianlines.The colonsin Algeriatriedthisstrategy whenit became
obviousthatDe Gaullewas goingto givein to Moslemdemandsfor
independence. Theyfailed,but thewhiteRhodesians succeeded. In
thecurrent Ulstercrisisthereis littledoubtthatsucha strategy would
be attempted-and wouldmostlikelysucceedifitbecameclearto the
Protestantmajority thattheBritish weregoingtowithdraw-asseems
increasinglypossible.The "settlers" exhibit"ultra-loyalism" towards
the"mother country" up tothemoment at whichtheyappeartohave
beendeserted. If thebreakdoessucceed, thestructure of theconflict
changescompletely. If the metropolitan powerdoes not intervene
againstthe settlers' rebellion(Algeria) but insteadsimplymakes
nonmilitary protests (Britain againstRhodesia)thentheconflict be-
comessymmetric: a zero-sum struggleforascendancy, essentiallya civil
warin whichthesettler classhasa survival stakein theoutcome. The
willin manywaysprovetobe a moreformidable
settlers enemythan
was thevastlymorepowerful metropolitan power,becausethecon-
againsttheuse of forcewill be almostcompletely
straints absentin
theircase.Thusthetaskofnationalist movements tryingtobringdown
thesettlerregimes in Israel,Rhodesia, and SouthAfricais extremely
onerous.The questionfortheseregimes is notwhether to fightthe
insurgents buthow.In otherwords,despitesuperficial similarities in
and in descriptive
tactics language-"Palestinian guerrillas,""national
liberationstruggle,"-the "settler-regime" conflictsare fundamentally
differentfromasymmetric conflicts.
Thereis another, perhapsequallypowerful reasonwhythePortu-
gueseresistedindependence sobitterly.
It is extremely difficulttocalcu-
latetheeconomic costsandbenefits whichPortugal derivesfromher
overseas in partbecauseexchangecontrols
territories, are artificially
manipulated. However, evenifitcouldbe unequivocally demonstrated
thatthe costsofthe war exceed by a wide the
margin present economic
benefitswhichPortugalderivesfromhercolonies-most particularly
192 WORLD POLITICS
Angola-it would not invalidatethe hypothesis thata major Portu-
gueseinterest in maintainingthecolonialpossessionsis economic.Oil
in large quantitieshas alreadybeen discoveredin the overseasterri-
tories,and thereare also extensiveand as yetbarelyexploitedmineral
reserves.Portugaltherefore has a considerableeconomicinterestin
tryingto maintaincontrolin theseareas.26 When France and Britain
relinquished theirAfricancolonies,theyrelinquished also theeconomic
costsof administration while retainingwhateverbenefitstheyderived
fromtheirinvestments and fromspecialtraderelationships. Portugalis
in a verydifferentposition.SincePortugalis relativelyunderdeveloped
economically, thebenefitsshe derivesfromher overseasterritories are
basedon politicalratherthaneconomiccontrol.The keyeconomicen-
terprisesin the overseasterritories dominatedby non-
are increasingly
Portuguesecapital (in contrastto the situationin Frenchand British
Africancoloniesbeforeindependence).If Portugalwere to relinquish
politicalcontrolin Africa,shewouldlosenotonlythepresenteconomic
benefitsbutalso themoreimportant futurebenefits.
The so-calledneo-
colonialsolutionis nota possibility
forthePortuguese.
In discussingPortugalby way of exemplification of my argument,
I have raisedthreepossiblehypotheses, whichmightbe formulated as
follows:
(i) The politicalattrition ofthemetropolitan power'swar-making ca-
pabilityappearstobe positively correlatedwiththedegreeof"open-
ness" of the politicalsystemand negativelycorrelatedwith the
degree of "closeness"of the politicalsystem.Democraticpoly-
archiesare apparentlymost susceptibleto internaloppositionto
externalwars,whiletotalitarian "centrist" statesare lesssusceptible
to suchopposition. This argumentis subjectto severequalification
(see below).
(2) Where a metropolitan settlerclass existsin the insurgents' home-
land, it will have a survivalinterestin the conflictand will thus
actas a powerfulcountervailing "brake"to forcesin themetropolis
whichfavora pull-out.If the latterforcesprevail,therewill be a
strongpushfromthesettlerclassfora U.D.I.-typebreakwiththe
metropolis alongRhodesianlines.If thissucceeds,theconflict ceases
tobe asymmetric as definedhere.
(3) In a limitedwar,despitethe factthatthereis no directthreatto
physicalsurvivalofthemetropolis, theremaywell be otherpower-
26For a detailedargument
of thispointsee Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira,Portuguese
ColonialismfromSouth Africato Europe (Freiburgi972).
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 193
fulinterests
to be protected. thesalienceof thesein-
The greater
terests,
thegreaterthe resistance
to withdrawalwill be in the
metropolis.
The lastpointbringsus to thetwootherexamplesnotedabove-
the Russianinterventions in Hungary(i956) and Czechoslovakia
(i968). It is obvious
thatoneofthenecessary conditionsnotedearlier
fortheprocess ofpolitical
attritiontomanifest itselfwasabsent.In both
casesthelocalresistancewaseffectively andrapidly crushed.27
FromtheSovietpointof view,thesecurity whilenotone
interest,
ofa directthreat ofinvasion,was nevertheless highlysalient.For ex-
ample,Russianinterests in maintaining Czechoslovakia underSoviet
controlweretwo-fold. As Zemannotes,Czechoslovakia had a key
positionin theSovietsystem: "It is a workshop wherea lotofRussian
and East-European raw material is processed; thecountry'sterritory
formsa tunnelleadingfromwestern Europedirectly to theSoviet
Union."28 Second,fortheU.S.S.R.,twiceinvadedthiscentury from
theWestat a costofmillions oflives,a certain fixationon securityin-
terestswasunderstandable. Butthestrategic costsofrelinquishing con-
troloverCzechoslovakia werenotsimply thedirectcostsofcreating a
physical gap in thechainofsatellite bufferstates.The realriskfrom
theSovietpointofviewwas thatthesubversive ideologyof national
determination, of "socialismwith a human-i.e., non-Russian-face"
mightspreadfirstto the othersatellitestatesof EasternEurope and
ultimatelyto the SovietUnion itself.The Sovietintervention in Hun-
garyin i956 is a similarcase in point.
Theseexamplesshowthatitis virtually impossibletoproducea model
of asymmetric conflict
whichwould be sufficiently flexibleto account
fortheoutcomeof the casesof conflictthatmightbe includedunder
thatrubric.Neitheris it evidentthatthiswould be desirable.The prob-
lem with using models to explainconflicts is thatthereis a natural
tendencyto attemptto forcethe data to fitthe requirements of the
theory.The riskslie in ignoringotherfactorswhichmightfallwithin
thecategorysometimeslabeled"accidentsof history," but whichmay
neverthelessbe of criticalimportancein determining the outcomeof
a particularconflict.
Mostofthediscussion thusfarhas dealtwiththedomesticconstraints
whichwill be generatedin the metropolisas a consequenceof asym-
metriesin thestructure oftheconflict.We can quiteeasilypointto the
of thebreakdownof the resistance
27 For an analysis in the Czech case see Boserup
and Mack (fn. 7), chap. VI.
28Z. A. B. Zeman,PragueSpring(London i969).
194 WORLD POLITICS
mechanisms thatgenerate suchconstraints-though theformtheywill
takein practice willvaryaccording to theinterests perceivedto be at
stakeandaccording to thenatureofthepolityoftheexternal power.
Butlittleor nothing can be saidwithrespect to externalconstraints.
For example,therewerefewexternal constraintsbearingdownon
BritishpolicyintheMau Maurebellion inKenya,yetinthecaseofthe
nationaliststrugglein IndonesiaagainsttheDutchthesituation was
verydifferent.The criticalfactorherewas theU.S. threatto cutoff
MarshallPlan aid to theDutchif theyfailedto makea settlement
withtheIndonesian nationalists.A completely differentsetofpotential
external pressurescouldbe brought to bearagainstPortugalvis-a'-vis
thePortuguese warsin Africa, and so on.
In an asymmetric conflict,
thepotential forthegeneration ofinternal
divisionsin themetropolitan powerexistsregardless of thehistorical
epoch,thenatureofthepolityoftheexternal power,theinterests per-
ceivedto be at stake,and theinternational context in whichthecon-
flicttakesplace.Thoughthesefactors mayinfluence theformand
intensity takenby theseinternal divisions in anyparticular conflict,
thecauseofthesedivisions is independent fromall ofthem.It arises
fromthenatureof theasymmetric relationshipswhichexistbetween
thebelligerents.On theotherhand,nothing canbe saidin theabstract
aboutanyexternal constraints whichmaybe brought to bearon the
external power.Thesearedependent on theconditions ofa particular
historicalepoch.
SUMMARY

The initialproblem was oneofexplaining howthemilitarily pow-

erfulcould be defeatedin armed confrontation with the militarily
weak.Thiswasnotjustidlespeculation; in a number ofcritically
im-
portantconflictsin thepost-World War II epoch,industrial powers
havefailedtogaintheirobjectivesinwarsfought onforeign soilagainst
In all ofthesecasesthesuperiority
forces.
localnationalist in conven-
tionalmilitarycapabilityof the externalpowerwas overwhelming.
In a sense,thesewarsmaybe seenas a replayof themini-wars of
colonialconquestwhichtookplacein thelatenineteenth and early
twentieth butwitha critical
centuries, difference.In theearlier
era,the
powersusedminimal
industrial forcetoachieverapidsuccess, whereas
in thepost-World War II conflicts,
thesameindustrial powerscon-
frontedthe same Third-World countries
with massive forces
and lost.
In explainingthesuccessesofthe"weaker"party, I pointedoutthat
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 195
an obviousminimalrequirement forvictorywas thattheinsurgents
shouldnotlose.Theyachieved thisbyrefusing to confront theindus-
trialpowerson theirowntermsand byresorting insteadto "uncon-
ventional" formsof warfare-guerrilla war,urbanterrorism, or even
nonviolent action.However, I didnotexaminethisaspectoftheprob-
lemin anydetail.I tookthefactthattheinsurgents did notloseas a
"given"whenI inquiredintothemoreinteresting problem-namely,
howdidtheywin?I notedthatoneofthekeyasymmetries whichchar-
acterizedtherelationships ofthebelligerents wasthat,as a consequence
oftheasymmetry in wealthand economic and technological develop-
ment, theinsurgents lackedthephysical capabilitytoattackthemetro-
politanpower.It thusfollowed logically
thatthemetropolitan power
couldnotbe defeated militarily.In turn,victory fortheinsurgents
couldonlycomeaboutas a consequence of thedestruction of theex-
ternalpower'spolitical capability towagewar.The historical evidence
of theoutcome of thepost-World War II conflicts confirms thelogic
oftheargument.
As a nextstep,I examined thedynamics of theprocessofpolitical
attrition,
arguing thattheasymmetries whichcharacterized theconflict
provided thebasis,notonlyfortheinitialrestraints on mobilization of
militaryforces, butalsofortheemergence ofinternal divisionsas the
wardraggedon andcostsaccumulated. The factthatthewarwasby
definition "limited"also providedthe basisfor a sustainedmoral
critiqueof themilitary meansemployed-from torture to napalm-
whilereducing thewillingness oftroopsto risktheirlivesin combat
andofthedomestic population tomakeeconomic sacrifices.
However,
theprocess ofattrition wasnotseenas arising primarily froma steady
across-the-board increment of "warweariness," as somewriters have
suggested; stilllesswas it seenas a processof conversion at thetop
whereby thepoliticalleadership was gradually persuaded of theim-
morality or undesirability ofitspolicies.The controversies themselves
becameoneofthecostsofthewar.Timeis a resource in politics,and
thebitterhostilitiessuchwarsgenerate maycometodominate political
debatetothedetriment ofthepursuit ofotherobjectives. Provided the
insurgentscanmaintain a steadyimposition of"costs"on theirmetro-
politanopponent, thebalanceofpolitical forces in theexternal power
willinevitably shiftin favoroftheanti-war factions.
Althoughthemaindiscussion dealtessentiallywithdomestic con-
I alsorecognized
straints, thatinternationalconstraints wereoftenof
greatimportance in asymmetric conflicts.
However, whereas themech-
196 WORLD POLITICS
anismsgivingrise to internalconstraints could be identified, it was
impossibleto say anythingin the abstractabout externalconstraints.
Having outlinedin fairlygeneraltermstheconditionsunderwhich
theprocessofpoliticalattrition mightbe expectedto manifestitselfin
practice,I thenbriefly
examinedthecountervailing forces.I notedthat
thenatureof thepolityof the externalpowermighteitherinhibitor
facilitate
thegenerationof domesticconflict. But I also arguedthatin-
ternaldivisionswere primarilya functionof the conflictrelationship
and not of differencesin the politicalstructure
of the metropolis. Fi-
nally,I notedthatthesalienceof theinterest whichtheexternalpower
-or ratherfactionswithinit-had in pursuingthe war would also
affectthe processof politicalattrition.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Examplesof the typesof hypotheses whichthisanalysismightsug-

gestweregivenearlierin thepaper.It wouldbe easyto thinkofothers,
forinstance:
The greatertheinteresta particular factionhas in the
metropolitan
prosecution
ofthewarand thewiderthebasisofitsdomesticsupport,
thegreaterwill be thesupportforcontinuingthewar.
Anotherexamplewould be:
The weakerand moredependenttheexternalpoweris on external
supportin orderto prosecutethe war,the moreimportant
external
will be in determining
constraints theoutcome.
The objectionsto thesealternativeapproaches-otherthan for the
purposeof illustrating pointsin the argument-areseveral.First,they
would slice the conflictup intoparts(eithertemporally or spatially)
whichare thenexaminedin relativeisolation.I have arguedthata full
understanding can onlycomefroman analysisoftheconflict as a whole.
Second,thereis the technicalproblemof operationalizing such vague
conceptsas "interest"or "faction."Third, even if operationalization
werepossible,thehypotheses wouldremainuntestable bythetraditional
statistical
significance tests.That is a problemwhichhas been largely
ignoredin mostof the quantitative studiesin conflictresearchwhere
conflicts
tendto get lumpedtogether-symmetric and asymmetric and
acrossperiodsof up to a hundredyearsor more-in orderto obtaina
sufficientlylargesampleforstatistical manipulation.Thus the quanti-
tativestudiesundertakenby Rummeland Tanterwith the objectof
testingthe relationship betweenexternaland internalconflicts arrive
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 197
at theconclusion thatno suchrelationship exists.29
However, therela-
tionships may wellexistbutbe hidden the
byprecisely methodological
methods intended to revealthem.Contrary to writers likeStohland
Wilkenfeld, thereis no "paradox"in theapparently contradictory as-
sertions that,on theonehand,external conflicts causeinternal conflict
and,on theother, thattheycreateinternal solidarity.30
Whether ornot
thisis thecaseis a function ofthenatureoftheconflict. Butsincethe
typeofconflict isnotidentified,therelationships arelostintheaggrega-
tionofdata.It is notpossibleto consider asymmetric conflicts (as de-
finedhere)on theirown,sincethesizeofthesampleis fartoosmall.
Theonlywayoutofthisdilemma istoattempt a "timeseries" analysis.3'
Here,insteadofmanyconflicts beingexamined once,thedatamatrix
is filledbyexamining oneconflict (or a few)overmanytimeintervals.
The methodological and epistemological problems withthistypeof
analysis areenormous, however, andtheresults produced thusfarare
extremely modest.
If we moveawayfromthequantitative literatureto examineother
attempts at explaining theoutcomeof asymmetric conflicts,different
problems arise.The literature
oncounter-insurgency, forexample, con-
centrates almostexclusively on thedevelopment of thewar on the
groundand ignoresitsimpacton themetropolis. Ikle notes:"When
it comesto actualfighting, thescoresthatcountare,forinstance, the
number ofenemy unitsdestroyed, squaremilesofterritory gained,and
othersuccesses or failures
in battle.Wheresuchan attitude prevails,
professional military menwouldconsider it unusual,ifnotsomewhat
improper, to askwhether these'mid-game' successeswill improve the
ending."32 Counter-insurgency theorists can thusprovidea partialex-
planation ofwhyinsurgents maylose,buttheycannot, almost bydefini-
tion,grasphowitis thattheymaywin.Awareness thatinsurgent suc-
cessesarea consequence of "lackofpoliticalwill"or "defeatism" on
thepartofthemetropolitan governments is ofcoursethere, butthisis
seenas a contingent phenomenon almostwhollyunrelated to thecon-
29 R. J. Rummel,"Dimensionsof Conflict BehaviorWithinand BetweenNations,"
GeneralSystemsYearbook,viii (i963), I-50; and RaymondTanter,"Dimensionsof
ConflictBehaviorWithinand BetweenNations,I958-60," Journalof ConflictResolu-
tion,x (March i966), 4i-64.
Michael Stohl,"LinkagesbetweenWar and DomesticPoliticalViolence in the
UnitedStates,i89o-i923" in J. Caporasoand L. Roos, eds., Quasi-Experimental
Ap-
proaches(EvanstonI973); and JonathanWilkenfeld,"Introduction" to Wilkenfeld,
ed., ConflictBehaviorand LinkagePolitics(New York I973).
31 See RobertBurrowesand BertramSpector,"The Strengthand Directionof
Relationships BetweenDomesticand ExternalConflictand Cooperation:Syria,i96i-
67" in Wilkenfeld, ibid.; also Stohl (fn. 30).
32Ikle(fn. ii).
198 WORLD POLITICS
ductofthewar.Moresophisticated worksin thecounter-insurgency
fielddo consider political
factors in theinsurgents' homeland-namely,
thepayoffs ofsocialandeconomic reform as a meansofreducing popu-
larsupport fortheinsurgents. ButonlyTrinquier provides a sustained
analysis ofthepolitical andsocialchangesnecessary in themetropolis
ifsuchwarsareto succeed-andin thiscasethedemandsoflogicare
followed withno regardforpolitical reality.
Although muchoftheresearch literatureonconflict dealswithevents
leadingup to theoutbreak ofwar,therehasbeena recent renewalof
interestin "war-termination studies."33However, theseconcentrate on
thefinalphasesofthewar,in particular thoseleadingtonegotiations
oroffering possibilities
forthird-party mediation. The evolution ofthe
waranditswidersociopolitical dimensions arelargely ignored.
A numberof excellent historical case studiesof thevariousasym-
metric conflictshavebeenmentioned in thispaper.Manyofthemhave
a virtuemanifestly lackingin otherworks, namelythatoftreating the
conflictas a wholeratherthanexamining particular "technical" di-
mensions or temporal slices.However, individual casestudies canpro-
videno conceptual basisfordistinguishing betweenwhatmightin
thiscontext be called"structural necessity" fromhistorically unique
factors.Sincenarrative history is unableto discriminate betweenthe
universal andtheparticular whenanalyzing conflicts,it is a mostun-
reliableguideto thefuture. Military history is repletewith"Maginot
lines,"illustratingthedangersofrelying on historical precedents.
Specific
problems raisedbythesedifferent methodological approaches
to asymmetric conflictsand thedifferent fociof interest whichhave
beenemployed willbe dealtwithin depthin a forthcoming study.34
In particular, thatstudywillexaminethewritings oftheleadingrev-
olutionary strategists.
In the presentpaper,I have dealtessentially
withtheprocessof attrition as a function of theasymmetries which
characterize theconflict.An asymmetric strategy wouldbe onewhich
soughttoamplify thisprocess ofattrition indirectly.An outlineofthe
basicrequirements of suchan "asymmetric strategy" (derivedfrom
thestrategic writings of Clausewitz, Glucksman, and Mao Tse-tung)
is provided in thefinalchapter of War Without Weapons.35
Finally,itshouldbe obviousthatmyaimin thispaperhas notbeen
to providea "model"whichmaythenbe "tested"by applyingit
33Carroll (fn. i); Fox (fn. i); Ikle (fn. ii); and R. F. Randle,The Originsof
Peace (New York I973).
34AndrewMack, "WorkingPaperson Asymmetric Conflict,"
Nos. i-vi,Richardson
Institute(London I974).
35BoserupandMack (fn.7).
 THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 199
mechanicallyand ahistorically
to a widerangeof conflicts.
Rather,it
has beento constructa conceptual frameworkwhichwill providea
focusforempirical studies.Like the"paradigm" of thephysicalsci-
enceswhichThomasKuhnhas described, thisconceptualframework
functionsessentially
to directthe researcher's
attentiontowardpar-
ticularaspectsof the real world-to distinctions
and relationships
which"common sense"oftendoesnottakeintoaccount. The frame-
workdefines thenecessary questionswhichmustbe asked;it does
notseekto provideautomatic answers.

CONCLUSION

Recentdevelopments in two ongoingasymmetric conflicts have

tendedtobearoutthemainthrust ofmyargument. The mostdramatic
development hasbeentheSpinolacoupin Portugal whichclearly has
far-reaching
implications forthewarsofnational liberationin Angola,
Mozambique, andGuineaBissau.*The secondis theconflict inUlster.
The springof i974 sawtheemergence, in England,ofsignificant do-
mesticopposition to thewar,withseveralcampaigns fortroopwith-
drawalattracting growingsupport fromverydifferent politicalcon-
stituencies.
SincetheBritish Government hasexhausted all theobvious
"initiatives"
(jugglingthe local Ulsterleadership, directrule,the
Northern IrelandAssembly, and theCouncilof Ireland)to no avail,
andsincetheI.R.A.remains notonlyundefeated butcapableof esca-
latingits offensivewherenecessary, it seemscertainthatthe cam-
paignforwithdrawal willgatherstrength. One ofthemostsignificant
aspectsofcurrent I.R.A.activityis itsrolein maintaining andsolidify-
ingProtestant "extremism." The bombing functions essentiallyto pre-
ventthe "moderate" politicalsolution, favoredby the Westminster
government and the Catholicand Protestant centergroupswhich
dominate theAssembly, fromcomingtofruition. The Spinolagovern-
mentinPortugal facesa similarproblem. Havingexplicitly abandoned
thebeliefthatthewaris winnable, theregime's currentstrategy is to
seeka "political"
solution.GeneralSpinolaadvocates greatly increased
autonomy, but"theoverseas territoriesmustbe an integral partofthe
Portuguese nation."It is alreadyobviousthatsucha solutionis ac-
* Since this
conclusionwas written,thenew PortugueseGovernment has abandoned
the earlierinsistencethat the "overseasterritories
must be an integralpart of the
Portuguesenation."The threatof a possiblesettlerbid fora unilateraldeclaration
of
independence was brieflyraisedin Mozambique,but evaporatedwiththe considerable
exodusof whitesto Portugaland SouthAfrica.In Angola,witha largersettlerpopu-
lation,fargreatermineralresources, and deep divisionsbetweencompetingliberation
movements, the situationremainsunclear.
200 WORLD POLITICS
ceptableneither to theEuropeansettlers norto theliberation move-
ments.Withdrawal is now clearlya seriouspoliticaloptionforboth
metropolitan powers.In admitting thatthe colonialwars are un-
winnable, GeneralSpinolahas in factadmitted defeat:"theconven-
tionalarmylosesifit doesnotwin."In bothcountries thekeyques-
tionis no longerwhether to withdraw butratherwhenand how.
To conclude,it hardlyneedspointingout that-if correct-the
implications of the foregoing analysisforindustrial powerswhich
becomeembroiled in longdrawn-out warsin theThirdWorldarefar-
reaching.Governments whichbecomecommitted to suchwarsfor
whatever reasonshouldrealizethat,overtime,thecostsof thewar
will inevitablygenerate widespread opposition at home.The causes
ofdissent lie beyondthecontrolof thepoliticalelite;theylie in the
oftheconflict
structure itself-inthetypeofwarbeingpursued andin
theasymmetries whichformitsdistinctive character.Anti-war move-
ments, on theotherhand,havetendedto underestimate theirpolitical
Theyhavefailedtorealizethatin everyasymmetric
effectiveness. con-
flictwheretheexternal powerhas beenforcedto withdraw, it has
beenas a consequence of internal Thus,anyanalysisof the
dissent.
outcome ofasymmetric conflicts
mustofnecessity takeintoaccount and
explainnotonlythetenacity and endurance ofthenationalist forces,
butalsothegeneration ofinternal in thehomelandoftheir
divisions
metropolitan enemy.In thistypeof conflict, anti-war movements-
andthisincludes all thesocialforcesthatopposethewar-have,despite
theirshort-term failuresand frustrations, provento be remarkably
successfulin thelongrun.