Professional Documents
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Corporate governance
Not to be confused with a corporate state, a corporative government rather than the government of a
corporation
Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a
corporation (or company) is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the
relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed. The
principal stakeholders are the shareholders, the board of directors, executives, employees, customers, creditors,
suppliers, and the community at large.
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject.[1] An important theme of corporate governance is to ensure the
accountability of certain individuals in an organization through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate the
principal-agent problem. A related but separate thread of discussions focuses on the impact of a corporate
governance system in economic efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders' welfare. There are yet other
aspects to the corporate governance subject, such as the stakeholder view and the corporate governance models
around the world (see section 9 below).
There has been renewed interest in the corporate governance practices of modern corporations since 2001,
particularly due to the high-profile collapses of a number of large U.S. firms such as Enron Corporation and MCI
Inc. (formerly WorldCom). In 2002, the U.S. federal government passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, intending to
restore public confidence in corporate governance.
Definition
It is common to suggest that corporate governance lacks definition. As a subject, corporate governance is the set of
processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation (or company) is directed,
administered or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many stakeholders
involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed.
Many of the "definitions" of corporate governance are merely descriptions of practices or preferred orientations.
For example, many authors describe corporate governance in terms of a system of structuring, operating and
controlling a company with a view to achieve long term strategic goals to satisfy shareholders, creditors, employees,
customers and suppliers, and complying with the legal and regulatory requirements, apart from meeting
environmental and local community needs. However, there is substantial interest in how external systems and
institutions, including markets, influence corporate governance.
Report of SEBI committee (India) on Corporate Governance defines corporate governance as the acceptance by
management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as the true owners of the corporation and of their own role as
trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about commitment to values, about ethical business conduct and about
making a distinction between personal & corporate funds in the management of a company.” The definition is drawn
from the Gandhian principle of trusteeship and the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution. Corporate
Governance is viewed as business ethics and a moral duty. See also Corporate Social Entrepreneurship regarding
employees who are driven by their sense of integrity (moral conscience) and duty to society. This notion stems from
traditional philosophical ideas of virtue (or self governance) [2] and represents a "bottom-up" approach to corporate
governance (agency) which supports the more obvious "top-down" (systems and processes, i.e. structural)
perspective.
Corporate governance 2
Legal environment
In the United States, corporations are governed under common law, the Model Business Corporation Act, and
Delaware law since Delaware, as of 2004, was the domicile for the majority of publicly-traded corporations.[3]
Individual rules for corporations are based upon the corporate charter and, less authoritatively, the corporate
bylaws.[3] In the United States, shareholders cannot initiate changes in the corporate charter although they can
initiate changes to the corporate bylaws.[3] In the UK, however, the analogous corporate constitutional documents
(the memorandum and articles of association) can be modified by a supermajority (75%) of shareholders.[3]
Shareholders can initiate 'precatory proposals' on various initiatives, but the results are nonbinding. Precatory
proposals which have received majority support from shareholders, even for several consecutive years, have
historically been rejected by the board of directors.[3]
In 1997, the East Asian Financial Crisis saw the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and The
Philippines severely affected by the exit of foreign capital after property assets collapsed. The lack of corporate
governance mechanisms in these countries highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in their economies.
In the early 2000s, the massive bankruptcies (and criminal malfeasance) of Enron and Worldcom, as well as lesser
corporate debacles, such as Adelphia Communications [5], AOL, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, Tyco, led to
increased shareholder and governmental interest in corporate governance. This is reflected in the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.[6]
The Company Secretary, known as a Corporate Secretary in the US and often referred to as a Chartered Secretary if
qualified by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), is a high ranking professional who is
trained to uphold the highest standards of corporate governance, effective operations, compliance and administration.
All parties to corporate governance have an interest, whether direct or indirect, in the effective performance of the
organization. Directors, workers and management receive salaries, benefits and reputation, while shareholders
receive capital return. Customers receive goods and services; suppliers receive compensation for their goods or
services. In return these individuals provide value in the form of natural, human, social and other forms of capital.
A key factor is an individual's decision to participate in an organization e.g. through providing financial capital and
trust that they will receive a fair share of the organizational returns. If some parties are receiving more than their fair
return then participants may choose to not continue participating leading to organizational collapse.
Principles
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and integrity, openness, performance
orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, and commitment to the organization.
Of importance is how directors and management develop a model of governance that aligns the values of the
corporate participants and then evaluate this model periodically for its effectiveness. In particular, senior executives
should conduct themselves honestly and ethically, especially concerning actual or apparent conflicts of interest, and
disclosure in financial reports.
Commonly accepted principles of corporate governance include:
• Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should respect the rights of shareholders and
help shareholders to exercise those rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by effectively
communicating information that is understandable and accessible and encouraging shareholders to participate in
general meetings.
• Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that they have legal and other obligations to all
legitimate stakeholders.
• Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs a range of skills and understanding to be able to deal
with various business issues and have the ability to review and challenge management performance. It needs to be
of sufficient size and have an appropriate level of commitment to fulfill its responsibilities and duties. There are
issues about the appropriate mix of executive and non-executive directors.
• Integrity and ethical behaviour: Ethical and responsible decision making is not only important for public
relations, but it is also a necessary element in risk management and avoiding lawsuits. Organizations should
develop a code of conduct for their directors and executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision
making. It is important to understand, though, that reliance by a company on the integrity and ethics of
individuals is bound to eventual failure. Because of this, many organizations establish Compliance and Ethics
Programs to minimize the risk that the firm steps outside of ethical and legal boundaries.
• Disclosure and transparency: Organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles and
responsibilities of board and management to provide shareholders with a level of accountability. They should also
implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company's financial reporting.
Disclosure of material matters concerning the organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that all
investors have access to clear, factual information.
Issues involving corporate governance principles include:
• internal controls and internal auditors
• the independence of the entity's external auditors and the quality of their audits
• oversight and management of risk
• oversight of the preparation of the entity's financial statements
Corporate governance 6
• review of the compensation arrangements for the chief executive officer and other senior executives
• the resources made available to directors in carrying out their duties
• the way in which individuals are nominated for positions on the board
• dividend policy
Nevertheless "corporate governance," despite some feeble attempts from various quarters, remains an ambiguous and
often misunderstood phrase. For quite some time it was confined only to corporate management. That is not so. It is
something much broader, for it must include a fair, efficient and transparent administration and strive to meet certain
well defined, written objectives. Corporate governance must go well beyond law. The quantity, quality and
frequency of financial and managerial disclosure, the degree and extent to which the board of Director (BOD)
exercise their trustee responsibilities (largely an ethical commitment), and the commitment to run a transparent
organization- these should be constantly evolving due to interplay of many factors and the roles played by the more
progressive/responsible elements within the corporate sector. John G. Smale, a former member of the General
Motors board of directors, wrote: "The Board is responsible for the successful perpetuation of the corporation. That
responsibility cannot be relegated to management."[25] However it should be noted that a corporation should cease to
exist if that is in the best interests of its stakeholders. Perpetuation for its own sake may be counterproductive.
superannuation or other benefits. Such incentive schemes, however, are reactive in the sense that they provide no
mechanism for preventing mistakes or opportunistic behaviour, and can elicit myopic behaviour.
However, good financial reporting is not a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of corporate governance if users
don't process it, or if the informed user is unable to exercise a monitoring role due to high costs (see Systemic
problems of corporate governance above).
Regulation
Enforcement
Enforcement can affect the overall credibility of a regulatory system. They both deter bad actors and level the
competitive playing field. Nevertheless, greater enforcement is not always better, for taken too far it can dampen
valuable risk-taking. In practice, however, this is largely a theoretical, as opposed to a real, risk. There are various
integrated governance, risk and compliance solutions available to capture information in order to evaluate risk and to
identify gaps in the organization’s principles and processes. This type of software is based on project management
style methodologies such as the ABACUS methodology which attempts to unify the management of these areas,
rather than treat them as separate entities.
Proposals
The book Money for Nothing suggests importing from England the concept of term limits to prevent independent
directors from becoming too close to management and demanding that directors invest a meaningful amount of their
own money (not grants of stock or options that they receive free) to ensure that the directors' interests align with
those of average investors.[29] Another proposal is for the government to allow poorly-managed businesses to go
bankrupt, since after a filing, directors have to cover more of their own legal bills and are frequently sued by
bankruptcy trustees as well as investors.[30]
Anglo-American Model
There are many different models of corporate governance around the world. These differ according to the variety of
capitalism in which they are embedded. The liberal model that is common in Anglo-American countries tends to
give priority to the interests of shareholders. The coordinated model that one finds in Continental Europe and Japan
also recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community. Each model has its own
distinct competitive advantage. The liberal model of corporate governance encourages radical innovation and cost
competition, whereas the coordinated model of corporate governance facilitates incremental innovation and quality
competition. However, there are important differences between the U.S. recent approach to governance issues and
what has happened in the UK. In the United States, a corporation is governed by a board of directors, which has the
power to choose an executive officer, usually known as the chief executive officer. The CEO has broad power to
manage the corporation on a daily basis, but needs to get board approval for certain major actions, such as hiring
his/her immediate subordinates, raising money, acquiring another company, major capital expansions, or other
expensive projects. Other duties of the board may include policy setting, decision making, monitoring management's
performance, or corporate control.
The board of directors is nominally selected by and responsible to the shareholders, but the bylaws of many
companies make it difficult for all but the largest shareholders to have any influence over the makeup of the board;
normally, individual shareholders are not offered a choice of board nominees among which to choose, but are merely
asked to rubberstamp the nominees of the sitting board. Perverse incentives have pervaded many corporate boards in
the developed world, with board members beholden to the chief executive whose actions they are intended to
oversee. Frequently, members of the boards of directors are CEOs of other corporations, which some[33] see as a
conflict of interest.
Corporate governance 10
Ownership structures
Ownership structures refers to the various patterns in which shareholders seem to set up with respect to a certain
group of firms. It is a tool frequently employed by policy-makers and researchers in their analyses of corporate
governance within a country or business group. And ownership can be changed by the stakeholders of the company.
Generally, ownership structures are identified by using some observable measures of ownership concentration (i.e.
concentration ratios) and then making a sketch showing its visual representation. The idea behind the concept of
ownership structures is to be able to understand the way in which shareholders interact with firms and, whenever
possible, to locate the ultimate owner of a particular group of firms. Some examples of ownership structures include
pyramids, cross-share holdings, rings, and webs.
Board composition
Some researchers have found support for the relationship between frequency of meetings and profitability. Others
have found a negative relationship between the proportion of external directors and profitability, while others found
no relationship between external board membership and profitability. In a recent paper Bhagat and Black found that
companies with more independent boards are not more profitable than other companies. It is unlikely that board
composition has a direct impact on profitability, one measure of firm performance.
Remuneration/Compensation
The results of previous research on the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation have
failed to find consistent and significant relationships between executives' remuneration and firm performance. Low
average levels of pay-performance alignment do not necessarily imply that this form of governance control is
inefficient. Not all firms experience the same levels of agency conflict, and external and internal monitoring devices
may be more effective for some than for others.
Some researchers have found that the largest CEO performance incentives came from ownership of the firm's shares,
while other researchers found that the relationship between share ownership and firm performance was dependent on
the level of ownership. The results suggest that increases in ownership above 20% cause management to become
more entrenched, and less interested in the welfare of their shareholders.
Some argue that firm performance is positively associated with share option plans and that these plans direct
managers' energies and extend their decision horizons toward the long-term, rather than the short-term, performance
of the company. However, that point of view came under substantial criticism circa in the wake of various security
Corporate governance 12
scandals including mutual fund timing episodes and, in particular, the backdating of option grants as documented by
University of Iowa academic Erik Lie and reported by James Blander and Charles Forelle of the Wall Street Journal.
Even before the negative influence on public opinion caused by the 2006 backdating scandal, use of options faced
various criticisms. A particularly forceful and long running argument concerned the interaction of executive options
with corporate stock repurchase programs. Numerous authorities (including U.S. Federal Reserve Board economist
Weisbenner) determined options may be employed in concert with stock buybacks in a manner contrary to
shareholder interests. These authors argued that, in part, corporate stock buybacks for U.S. Standard & Poors 500
companies surged to a $500 billion annual rate in late 2006 because of the impact of options. A compendium of
academic works on the option/buyback issue is included in the study Scandal [43] by author M. Gumport [44] issued
in 2006.
A combination of accounting changes and governance issues led options to become a less popular means of
remuneration as 2006 progressed, and various alternative implementations of buybacks surfaced to challenge the
dominance of "open market" cash buybacks as the preferred means of implementing a share repurchase plan.
References
[1] For a good overview of the different theoretical perspectives on corporate governance see Chapter 15 of Dignam, A and Lowry, J (2006)
Company Law, Oxford University Press ISBN 978-0-19-928936-3
[2] Foucault, M., Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984 Volume One P. Rabinow, ed., Penguin, London,
2000.
[3] Bebchuck LA. (2004). The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power (http:/ / papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers. cfm?abstract_id=387940).
Harvard Law Review.
[4] Crawford, Curtis J. (2007). The Reform of Corporate Governance: Major Trends in the U.S. Corporate Boardroom, 1977-1997. doctoral
dissertation, Capella University. (http:/ / www. xceo. net/ about_us/ crawford_dissertation. php)
[5] http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ articles/ A39143-2004Jul9. html
[6] http:/ / www. nhbar. org/ publications/ archives/ display-journal-issue. asp?id=13
[7] SSRN-Good Corporate Governance: An Instrument for Wealth Maximisation by Vrajlal Sapovadia (http:/ / papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers.
cfm?abstract_id=955289)
[8] http:/ / marcjlane. com/ index. php?submenu=About_Founder& src=gendocs& ref=AboutOurFounder& category=About
[9] Staff Writer (2009). Avvo.com/attorneys/60601-il-marc-lane-1132572.html "Marc Jay Lane" (http:/ / www. ). Avvo.
Avvo.com/attorneys/60601-il-marc-lane-1132572.html. Retrieved 28 May 2009.
[10] Staff Editors (Jan 1987). "Representing Corporate Officers and Directors (Business Practice Library) (Hardcover)" (http:/ / www. amazon.
com/ Representing-Corporate-Officers-Directors-Business/ dp/ 0471817880/ ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8& s=books& qid=1243963050& sr=1-1).
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[11] Penn, Michael (19 July 2006). "THE LAW OFFICES OF MARC J. LANE AND ITS FINANCIAL-SERVICES AFFILIATES JOIN
UNITED NATIONS' GLOBAL COMPACT" (http:/ / www. law. northwestern. edu/ news/ article_full. cfm?eventid=2761). Northwestern
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[12] Staff Editors (13 October 2004). "Representing Corporate Officers & Directors (Ring-bound)" (http:/ / www. amazon. com/
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[13] Staff Writer (2005). "Representing corporate officers and directors" (http:/ / openlibrary. org/ b/ OL3308939M/
Representing-corporate-officers-and-directors). . Retrieved 1 June 2009.
[14] Staff Writer (2005). "Representing corporate officers and directors" (http:/ / www. worldcat. org/ isbn/ 0735550964). WorldCat. . Retrieved
1 June 2009.
[15] Staff Writer (2009). "Marc J. Lane" (http:/ / www. harrywalker. com/ speaker/ Marc-Lane. cfm?Spea_ID=955). The Harry Walker Agency,
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[16] The Harry Walker Agency, Inc. (Monday, 22 May 2006). "Harry Walker Agency Adds Marc J. Lane to Its Roster of Renowned Business
Speakers; Impassioned..." (http:/ / www. allbusiness. com/ company-activities-management/ business-ethics/ 5478580-1. html). New York,
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[17] Oleg Shvyrkov & Elena Pastoukhova (2010). "The Governance Alpha: Back-Testing the Correlations of S&P’s Governance Scores with
Corporate Performance (Russia and Kazakhstan, 2000-2009)" (http:/ / www2. standardandpoors. com/ portal/ site/ sp/ en/ ap/ page. product/
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[19] http:/ / www. programtrading. com/ cgi/ ClientLogin. asp?
[20] http:/ / www. credit-suisse. com/ research/ en/
[21] http:/ / www. businessweek. com/ magazine/ content/ 03_45/ b3857002. htm
Corporate governance 13
Further reading
• Arcot, Sridhar, Bruno, Valentina and Antoine Faure-Grimaud, "Corporate Governance in the U.K.: is the
comply-or-explain working?" (December 2005). FMG CG Working Paper 001. (http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/
publications/searchdetail.php?pubid=1&wsid=1&wpdid=1308)
• Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton, Ailsa Röell, "Corporate Governance and Control" (October 2002; updated August
2004). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002. (http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461)
• Brickley, James A., William S. Klug and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Managerial Economics & Organizational
Architecture, ISBN
• Feltus, Christophe; Petit, Michael; Vernadat, François. (2009). Refining the Notion of Responsibility in Enterprise
Engineering to Support Corporate Governance of IT , Proceedings of the 13th IFAC Symposium on Information
Control Problems in Manufacturing (INCOM'09), Moscow, Russia
• Cadbury, Sir Adrian, "The Code of Best Practice", Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance, Gee and Co Ltd, 1992. Available online from (http://www.ecgi.org/codes)
• Cadbury, Sir Adrian, "Corporate Governance: Brussels", Instituut voor Bestuurders, Brussels, 1996.
• Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H.P. (2000) The Separation of Ownership and Control in East
Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 81-112
• Clarke, Thomas (ed.) (2004) "Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate
Governance," London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-32308-8
• Clarke, Thomas (ed.) (2004) "Critical Perspectives on Business and Management: 5 Volume Series on Corporate
Governance - Genesis, Anglo-American, European, Asian and Contemporary Corporate Governance" London
and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-32910-8
Corporate governance 14
• Clarke, Thomas (2007) "International Corporate Governance " London and New York: Routledge, ISBN
0-415-32309-6
• Clarke, Thomas & Chanlat, Jean-Francois (eds.) (2009) "European Corporate Governance " London and New
York: Routledge, ISBN 9780415405331
• Clarke, Thomas & dela Rama, Marie (eds.) (2006) "Corporate Governance and Globalization (3 Volume Series)"
London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, ISBN 978-1-4129-2899-1
• Clarke, Thomas & dela Rama, Marie (eds.) (2008) "Fundamentals of Corporate Governance (4 Volume Series)"
London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, ISBN 978-1-4129-3589-0
• Colley, J., Doyle, J., Logan, G., Stettinius, W., What is Corporate Governance ? (McGraw-Hill, December 2004)
ISBN
• Crawford, C. J. (2007). Compliance & conviction: the evolution of enlightened corporate governance. Santa
Clara, Calif: XCEO. ISBN 0-976-90190-9 9780976901914
• Denis, D.K. and J.J. McConnell (2003), International Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 38 (1): 1-36.
• Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, ISBN
• Erturk, Ismail, Froud, Julie, Johal, Sukhdev and Williams, Karel (2004) Corporate Governance and
Disappointment Review of International Political Economy, 11 (4): 677-713.
• Garrett, Allison, "Themes and Variations: The Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Major World
Markets," 32 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y).
• Holton, Glyn A (2006). Investor Suffrage Movement (http://www.contingencyanalysis.com/home/papers/
suffrage.pdf), Financial Analysits Journal, 62 (6), 15–20.
• Hovey, M. and T. Naughton (2007), A Survey of Enterprise Reforms in China: The Way Forward. Economic
Systems, 31 (2): 138-156.
• La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (1999), Corporate Ownership around the World. The Journal
of Finance, 54 (2): 471-517.
• Lekatis, George IT and Information Security after Sarbanes-Oxley (http://www.compliance-llc.com/
IT_and_Information_Security_after_Sarbanes_Oxley.pdf)
• Monks, Robert A.G. and Minow, Nell, Corporate Governance (Blackwell 2004) ISBN
• Monks, Robert A.G. and Minow, Nell, Power and Accountability (HarperBusiness 1991), full text available
online (http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/power/contents.html)
• Moebert, Jochen and Tydecks, Patrick (2007). Power and Ownership Structures among German Companies. A
Network Analysis of Financial Linkages (http://www.vwl.tu-darmstadt.de/vwl/forsch/veroeff/papers/
ddpie_179.pdf)
• Murray, Alan Revolt in the Boardroom (HarperBusiness 2007) (ISBN 0-06-088247-6) Remainder (http://www.
amazon.com/dp/B0013L4DZI)
• New York Society of Securities Analysts, 2003, Corporate Governance Handbook, (http://www.nyssa.org/
Template.cfm?Section=corp_gov_com&Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=3&
ContentID=499)
• OECD (1999, 2004) Principles of Corporate Governance Paris: OECD)
• Özekmekçi, Abdullah, Mert (2004) "The Correlation between Corporate Governance and Public Relations",
Istanbul Bilgi University.
• Sapovadia, Vrajlal K., "Critical Analysis of Accounting Standards Vis-À-Vis Corporate Governance Practice in
India" (January 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=712461
• Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 52 (2): 737-783.
• Skau, H.O (1992), A Study in Corporate Governance: Strategic and Tactic Regulation (200 p)
• World Business Council for Sustainable Development WBCSD (2004) Issue Management Tool: Strategic
challenges for business in the use of corporate responsibility codes, standards, and frameworks (http://www.
Corporate governance 15
wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=25&ObjectId=MTIwNjg)
• Low, Albert, 2008. " Conflict and Creativity at Work: Human Roots of Corporate Life (http://www.
conflictandcreativityatwork.ca), Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-84519-272-3
• Sun, William (2009), How to Govern Corporations So They Serve the Public Good: A Theory of Corporate
Governance Emergence, New York: Edwin Mellen, ISBN 9780773438637.
External links
• Standard & Poor's Governance Services (GAMMA Governance Scores) (http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
portal/site/sp/en/ap/page.product/equityresearch_gamma/2,5,13,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0.html)
• Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance at [[Stanford University (http://www.law.
stanford.edu/program/centers/rcfcg/)]]
• Corporations, Governance & Society Research Group at The [[Australian National University (http://corpgov.
fec.anu.edu.au/)]]
• Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) resources on corporate governance (http://www.cipd.
co.uk/subjects/corpstrtgy/corpgov/)
• European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) (http://www.ecgi.org)
• Global Corporate Governance Forum (http://www.gcgf.org/)
• The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance (http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olin_center/corporate_governance/)
• Institute of Directors (http://www.iod.com/corporategovernance)
• The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at the [[Yale School of Management (http://
millstein.som.yale.edu/)]]
• Kozminski Center for Corporate Governance (http://www.corpgov.edu.pl/) at Kozminski University, Poland
• The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance [[Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (http:/
/www.heyman-center.org)]]
• United States Proxy Exchange (http://proxyexchange.org/)
• UTS Centre for Corporate Governance (http://www.ccg.uts.edu.au) at the University of Technology Sydney,
Australia
• Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance [[University of Delaware (http://www.lerner.udel.edu/centers/
ccg)]]
• World Bank Corporate Governance Reports (http://rru.worldbank.org/GovernanceReports/)
]
Article Sources and Contributors 16
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