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Corporate governance 1

Corporate governance
Not to be confused with a corporate state, a corporative government rather than the government of a
corporation
Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a
corporation (or company) is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the
relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed. The
principal stakeholders are the shareholders, the board of directors, executives, employees, customers, creditors,
suppliers, and the community at large.
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject.[1] An important theme of corporate governance is to ensure the
accountability of certain individuals in an organization through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate the
principal-agent problem. A related but separate thread of discussions focuses on the impact of a corporate
governance system in economic efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders' welfare. There are yet other
aspects to the corporate governance subject, such as the stakeholder view and the corporate governance models
around the world (see section 9 below).
There has been renewed interest in the corporate governance practices of modern corporations since 2001,
particularly due to the high-profile collapses of a number of large U.S. firms such as Enron Corporation and MCI
Inc. (formerly WorldCom). In 2002, the U.S. federal government passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, intending to
restore public confidence in corporate governance.

Definition
It is common to suggest that corporate governance lacks definition. As a subject, corporate governance is the set of
processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation (or company) is directed,
administered or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many stakeholders
involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed.
Many of the "definitions" of corporate governance are merely descriptions of practices or preferred orientations.
For example, many authors describe corporate governance in terms of a system of structuring, operating and
controlling a company with a view to achieve long term strategic goals to satisfy shareholders, creditors, employees,
customers and suppliers, and complying with the legal and regulatory requirements, apart from meeting
environmental and local community needs. However, there is substantial interest in how external systems and
institutions, including markets, influence corporate governance.
Report of SEBI committee (India) on Corporate Governance defines corporate governance as the acceptance by
management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as the true owners of the corporation and of their own role as
trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about commitment to values, about ethical business conduct and about
making a distinction between personal & corporate funds in the management of a company.” The definition is drawn
from the Gandhian principle of trusteeship and the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution. Corporate
Governance is viewed as business ethics and a moral duty. See also Corporate Social Entrepreneurship regarding
employees who are driven by their sense of integrity (moral conscience) and duty to society. This notion stems from
traditional philosophical ideas of virtue (or self governance) [2] and represents a "bottom-up" approach to corporate
governance (agency) which supports the more obvious "top-down" (systems and processes, i.e. structural)
perspective.
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Legal environment
In the United States, corporations are governed under common law, the Model Business Corporation Act, and
Delaware law since Delaware, as of 2004, was the domicile for the majority of publicly-traded corporations.[3]
Individual rules for corporations are based upon the corporate charter and, less authoritatively, the corporate
bylaws.[3] In the United States, shareholders cannot initiate changes in the corporate charter although they can
initiate changes to the corporate bylaws.[3] In the UK, however, the analogous corporate constitutional documents
(the memorandum and articles of association) can be modified by a supermajority (75%) of shareholders.[3]
Shareholders can initiate 'precatory proposals' on various initiatives, but the results are nonbinding. Precatory
proposals which have received majority support from shareholders, even for several consecutive years, have
historically been rejected by the board of directors.[3]

History - United States


In the 19th century, state corporation laws enhanced the rights of corporate boards to govern without unanimous
consent of shareholders in exchange for statutory benefits like appraisal rights, to make corporate governance more
efficient. Since that time, and because most large publicly traded corporations in the US are incorporated under
corporate administration friendly Delaware law, and because the US's wealth has been increasingly securitized into
various corporate entities and institutions, the rights of individual owners and shareholders have become increasingly
derivative and dissipated.
In the 20th century in the immediate aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 legal scholars such as Adolf
Augustus Berle, Edwin Dodd, and Gardiner C. Means pondered on the changing role of the modern corporation in
society. Berle and Means' monograph "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" (1932, Macmillan) continues
to have a profound influence on the conception of corporate governance in scholarly debates today.
From the Chicago school of economics, Ronald Coase's "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) introduced the notion of
transaction costs into the understanding of why firms are founded and how they continue to behave. Fifty years later,
Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen's "The Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983, Journal of Law and
Economics) firmly established agency theory as a way of understanding corporate governance: the firm is seen as a
series of contracts. Agency theory's dominance was highlighted in a 1989 article by Kathleen Eisenhardt ("Agency
theory: an assessement and review", Academy of Management Review). US expansion after World War II through
the emergence of multinational corporations saw the establishment of the managerial class. Accordingly, the
following Harvard Business School management professors published influential monographs studying their
prominence: Myles Mace (entrepreneurship), Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (business history), Jay Lorsch (organizational
behavior) and Elizabeth MacIver (organizational behavior). According to Lorsch and MacIver "many large
corporations have dominant control over business affairs without sufficient accountability or monitoring by their
board of directors."
Since the late 1970’s, corporate governance has been the subject of significant debate in the U.S. and around the
globe. Bold, broad efforts to reform corporate governance have been driven, in part, by the needs and desires of
shareowners to exercise their rights of corporate ownership and to increase the value of their shares and, therefore,
wealth. Over the past three decades, corporate directors’ duties have expanded greatly beyond their traditional legal
responsibility of duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareowners.[4]
In the first half of the 1990s, the issue of corporate governance in the U.S. received considerable press attention due
to the wave of CEO dismissals (e.g.: IBM, Kodak, Honeywell) by their boards. The California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CalPERS) led a wave of institutional shareholder activism (something only very rarely seen
before), as a way of ensuring that corporate value would not be destroyed by the now traditionally cozy relationships
between the CEO and the board of directors (e.g., by the unrestrained issuance of stock options, not infrequently
back dated).
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In 1997, the East Asian Financial Crisis saw the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and The
Philippines severely affected by the exit of foreign capital after property assets collapsed. The lack of corporate
governance mechanisms in these countries highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in their economies.
In the early 2000s, the massive bankruptcies (and criminal malfeasance) of Enron and Worldcom, as well as lesser
corporate debacles, such as Adelphia Communications [5], AOL, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, Tyco, led to
increased shareholder and governmental interest in corporate governance. This is reflected in the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.[6]

Impact of Corporate Governance


The positive effect of corporate governance on different stakeholders ultimately is a strengthened economy, and
hence good corporate governance is a tool for socio-economic development.[7]
Marc Lane's [8] book on best corporate governance practices, "Representing Corporate Officers and Directors," was
first published in 1987.[9] [10] He revisited his treatise on corporate governance in 2005.[11] [12] The new version is
updated annually with the most recent supplement for the year 2010.[13] [14] With the goal of promoting positive
social change, Lane provides companies and their directors, officers, auditors and shareholders with insights for the
compliance of new legislation, rules and responsibilities in response to the avalanche of corporate accounting
scandals.[15] [16]
On the microlevel, corporate governance positively affects some key performance indicators. In a study [17] by
Standard & Poor's Governance Services [18] analysts back-tested the correlations of S&P’s with corporate
performance. The results of these tests reveal the statistically significant and practically meaningful predictive power
of the historical scores in terms of medium-term financial performance and growth in market cap. A one-notch
positive difference on S&P’s governance scoring scale corresponded, on average, to an additional 5.2% in annualised
sales growth and 7.0% in annualised market cap growth over a three-year horizon. The study also points out that
predictive power of corporate governance in terms of shareholder value exceeds its perception by financial markets.

Role of institutional investors


Many years ago, worldwide, buyers and sellers of corporation stocks were individual investors, such as wealthy
businessmen or families,who often had a vested, personal and emotional interest in the corporations whose shares
they owned. Over time, markets have become largely institutionalized: buyers and sellers are largely institutions
(e.g., pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, exchange-traded funds, other investor groups; insurance companies,
banks, brokers, and other financial institutions).
The rise of the institutional investor has brought with it some increase of professional diligence which has tended to
improve regulation of the stock market (but not necessarily in the interest of the small investor or even of the naïve
institutions, of which there are many). Note that this process occurred simultaneously with the direct growth of
individuals investing indirectly in the market (for example individuals have twice as much money in mutual funds as
they do in bank accounts). However this growth occurred primarily by way of individuals turning over their funds to
'professionals' to manage, such as in mutual funds. In this way, the majority of investment now is described as
"institutional investment" even though the vast majority of the funds are for the benefit of individual investors.
Program trading, the hallmark of institutional trading, averaged over 80% of NYSE trades in some months of 2007.
[19] (Moreover, these statistics do not reveal the full extent of the practice, because of so-called 'iceberg' orders. See
Quantity and display instructions under last reference.)
Unfortunately, there has been a concurrent lapse in the oversight of large corporations, which are now almost all
owned by large institutions. The Board of Directors of large corporations used to be chosen by the principal
shareholders, who usually had an emotional as well as monetary investment in the company (think Ford), and the
Board diligently kept an eye on the company and its principal executives (they usually hired and fired the President,
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or Chief Executive Officer— CEO).1


A recent study by Credit Suisse found that companies in which "founding families retain a stake of more than 10%
of the company's capital enjoyed a superior performance over their respective sectorial peers." Since 1996, this
superior performance amounts to 8% per year.[20] Forget the celebrity CEO. "Look beyond Six Sigma and the latest
technology fad. One of the biggest strategic advantages a company can have, [BusinessWeek has found], is blood
lines." [21] In that last study, "BW identified five key ingredients that contribute to superior performance. Not all are
qualities unique to enterprises with retained family interests. But they do go far to explain why it helps to have
someone at the helm— or active behind the scenes— who has more than a mere paycheck and the prospect of a cozy
retirement at stake." See also, "Revolt in the Boardroom," by Alan Murray.
Nowadays, if the owning institutions don't like what the President/CEO is doing and they feel that firing them will
likely be costly (think "golden handshake") and/or time consuming, they will simply sell out their interest. The
Board is now mostly chosen by the President/CEO, and may be made up primarily of their friends and associates,
such as officers of the corporation or business colleagues. Since the (institutional) shareholders rarely object, the
President/CEO generally takes the Chair of the Board position for his/herself (which makes it much more difficult
for the institutional owners to "fire" him/her). Occasionally, but rarely, institutional investors support shareholder
resolutions on such matters as executive pay and anti-takeover, aka, "poison pill" measures.
Finally, the largest pools of invested money (such as the mutual fund 'Vanguard 500', or the largest investment
management firm for corporations, State Street Corp.) are designed simply to invest in a very large number of
different companies with sufficient liquidity, based on the idea that this strategy will largely eliminate individual
company financial or other risk and, therefore, these investors have even less interest in a particular company's
governance.
Since the marked rise in the use of Internet transactions from the 1990s, both individual and professional stock
investors around the world have emerged as a potential new kind of major (short term) force in the direct or indirect
ownership of corporations and in the markets: the casual participant. Even as the purchase of individual shares in any
one corporation by individual investors diminishes, the sale of derivatives (e.g., exchange-traded funds (ETFs),
Stock market index options [22], etc.) has soared. So, the interests of most investors are now increasingly rarely tied
to the fortunes of individual corporations.
But, the ownership of stocks in markets around the world varies; for example, the majority of the shares in the
Japanese market are held by financial companies and industrial corporations (there is a large and deliberate amount
of cross-holding [23] among Japanese keiretsu corporations and within S. Korean chaebol 'groups') [24], whereas
stock in the USA or the UK and Europe are much more broadly owned, often still by large individual investors.

Parties to corporate governance


Parties involved in corporate governance include the regulatory body (e.g. the Chief Executive Officer, the board of
directors, management, shareholders and Auditors). Other stakeholders who take part include suppliers, employees,
creditors, customers and the community at large.
The shareholder delegates decision rights to the manager to act in the principal's best interests. This separation of
ownership from control implies a loss of effective control by shareholders over managerial decisions. Partly as a
result of this separation between the two parties, a system of corporate governance controls is implemented to assist
in aligning the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. With the significant increase in equity holdings of
investors, there has been an opportunity for a reversal of the separation of ownership and control problems because
ownership is not so diffuse.
A board of directors often plays a key role in corporate governance. It is their responsibility to endorse the
organization's strategy, develop directional policy, appoint, supervise and remunerate senior executives and to ensure
accountability of the organization to its owners and authorities.
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The Company Secretary, known as a Corporate Secretary in the US and often referred to as a Chartered Secretary if
qualified by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), is a high ranking professional who is
trained to uphold the highest standards of corporate governance, effective operations, compliance and administration.
All parties to corporate governance have an interest, whether direct or indirect, in the effective performance of the
organization. Directors, workers and management receive salaries, benefits and reputation, while shareholders
receive capital return. Customers receive goods and services; suppliers receive compensation for their goods or
services. In return these individuals provide value in the form of natural, human, social and other forms of capital.
A key factor is an individual's decision to participate in an organization e.g. through providing financial capital and
trust that they will receive a fair share of the organizational returns. If some parties are receiving more than their fair
return then participants may choose to not continue participating leading to organizational collapse.

Principles
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and integrity, openness, performance
orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, and commitment to the organization.
Of importance is how directors and management develop a model of governance that aligns the values of the
corporate participants and then evaluate this model periodically for its effectiveness. In particular, senior executives
should conduct themselves honestly and ethically, especially concerning actual or apparent conflicts of interest, and
disclosure in financial reports.
Commonly accepted principles of corporate governance include:
• Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should respect the rights of shareholders and
help shareholders to exercise those rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by effectively
communicating information that is understandable and accessible and encouraging shareholders to participate in
general meetings.
• Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that they have legal and other obligations to all
legitimate stakeholders.
• Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs a range of skills and understanding to be able to deal
with various business issues and have the ability to review and challenge management performance. It needs to be
of sufficient size and have an appropriate level of commitment to fulfill its responsibilities and duties. There are
issues about the appropriate mix of executive and non-executive directors.
• Integrity and ethical behaviour: Ethical and responsible decision making is not only important for public
relations, but it is also a necessary element in risk management and avoiding lawsuits. Organizations should
develop a code of conduct for their directors and executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision
making. It is important to understand, though, that reliance by a company on the integrity and ethics of
individuals is bound to eventual failure. Because of this, many organizations establish Compliance and Ethics
Programs to minimize the risk that the firm steps outside of ethical and legal boundaries.
• Disclosure and transparency: Organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles and
responsibilities of board and management to provide shareholders with a level of accountability. They should also
implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company's financial reporting.
Disclosure of material matters concerning the organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that all
investors have access to clear, factual information.
Issues involving corporate governance principles include:
• internal controls and internal auditors
• the independence of the entity's external auditors and the quality of their audits
• oversight and management of risk
• oversight of the preparation of the entity's financial statements
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• review of the compensation arrangements for the chief executive officer and other senior executives
• the resources made available to directors in carrying out their duties
• the way in which individuals are nominated for positions on the board
• dividend policy
Nevertheless "corporate governance," despite some feeble attempts from various quarters, remains an ambiguous and
often misunderstood phrase. For quite some time it was confined only to corporate management. That is not so. It is
something much broader, for it must include a fair, efficient and transparent administration and strive to meet certain
well defined, written objectives. Corporate governance must go well beyond law. The quantity, quality and
frequency of financial and managerial disclosure, the degree and extent to which the board of Director (BOD)
exercise their trustee responsibilities (largely an ethical commitment), and the commitment to run a transparent
organization- these should be constantly evolving due to interplay of many factors and the roles played by the more
progressive/responsible elements within the corporate sector. John G. Smale, a former member of the General
Motors board of directors, wrote: "The Board is responsible for the successful perpetuation of the corporation. That
responsibility cannot be relegated to management."[25] However it should be noted that a corporation should cease to
exist if that is in the best interests of its stakeholders. Perpetuation for its own sake may be counterproductive.

Mechanisms and controls


Corporate governance mechanisms and controls are designed to reduce the inefficiencies that arise from moral
hazard and adverse selection. For example, to monitor managers' behaviour, an independent third party (the external
auditor) attests the accuracy of information provided by management to investors. An ideal control system should
regulate both motivation and ability.

Internal corporate governance controls


Internal corporate governance controls monitor activities and then take corrective action to accomplish
organisational goals. Examples include:
• Monitoring by the board of directors: The board of directors, with its legal authority to hire, fire and
compensate top management, safeguards invested capital. Regular board meetings allow potential problems to be
identified, discussed and avoided. Whilst non-executive directors are thought to be more independent, they may
not always result in more effective corporate governance and may not increase performance.[26] Different board
structures are optimal for different firms. Moreover, the ability of the board to monitor the firm's executives is a
function of its access to information. Executive directors possess superior knowledge of the decision-making
process and therefore evaluate top management on the basis of the quality of its decisions that lead to financial
performance outcomes, ex ante. It could be argued, therefore, that executive directors look beyond the financial
criteria.
• Internal control procedures and internal auditors: Internal control procedures are policies implemented by an
entity's board of directors, audit committee, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance of
the entity achieving its objectives related to reliable financial reporting, operating efficiency, and compliance with
laws and regulations. Internal auditors are personnel within an organization who test the design and
implementation of the entity's internal control procedures and the reliability of its financial reporting
• Balance of power: The simplest balance of power is very common; require that the President be a different
person from the Treasurer. This application of separation of power is further developed in companies where
separate divisions check and balance each other's actions. One group may propose company-wide administrative
changes, another group review and can veto the changes, and a third group check that the interests of people
(customers, shareholders, employees) outside the three groups are being met.
• Remuneration: Performance-based remuneration is designed to relate some proportion of salary to individual
performance. It may be in the form of cash or non-cash payments such as shares and share options,
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superannuation or other benefits. Such incentive schemes, however, are reactive in the sense that they provide no
mechanism for preventing mistakes or opportunistic behaviour, and can elicit myopic behaviour.

External corporate governance controls


External corporate governance controls encompass the controls external stakeholders exercise over the organisation.
Examples include:
• competition
• debt covenants
• demand for and assessment of performance information (especially financial statements)
• government regulations
• managerial labour market
• media pressure
• takeovers

Systemic problems of corporate governance


• Demand for information: In order to influence the directors, the shareholders must combine with others to form a
voting group which can pose a real threat of carrying resolutions or appointing directors at a general meeting.
• Monitoring costs: A barrier to shareholders using good information is the cost of processing it, especially to a
small shareholder. The traditional answer to this problem is the efficient market hypothesis (in finance, the
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are efficient), which suggests that the small
shareholder will free ride on the judgements of larger professional investors.
• Supply of accounting information: Financial accounts form a crucial link in enabling providers of finance to
monitor directors. Imperfections in the financial reporting process will cause imperfections in the effectiveness of
corporate governance. This should, ideally, be corrected by the working of the external auditing process.

Role of the accountant


Financial reporting is a crucial element necessary for the corporate governance system to function effectively.[27]
Accountants and auditors are the primary providers of information to capital market participants. The directors of the
company should be entitled to expect that management prepare the financial information in compliance with
statutory and ethical obligations, and rely on auditors' competence.
Current accounting practice allows a degree of choice of method in determining the method of measurement, criteria
for recognition, and even the definition of the accounting entity. The exercise of this choice to improve apparent
performance (popularly known as creative accounting) imposes extra information costs on users. In the extreme, it
can involve non-disclosure of information.
One area of concern is whether the auditing firm acts as both the independent auditor and management consultant to
the firm they are auditing. This may result in a conflict of interest which places the integrity of financial reports in
doubt due to client pressure to appease management. The power of the corporate client to initiate and terminate
management consulting services and, more fundamentally, to select and dismiss accounting firms contradicts the
concept of an independent auditor. Changes enacted in the United States in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (in
response to the Enron situation as noted below) prohibit accounting firms from providing both auditing and
management consulting services. Similar provisions are in place under clause 49 of SEBI Act in India.
The Enron collapse is an example of misleading financial reporting. Enron concealed huge losses by creating
illusions that a third party was contractually obliged to pay the amount of any losses. However, the third party was
an entity in which Enron had a substantial economic stake. In discussions of accounting practices with Arthur
Andersen, the partner in charge of auditing, views inevitably led to the client prevailing.
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However, good financial reporting is not a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of corporate governance if users
don't process it, or if the informed user is unable to exercise a monitoring role due to high costs (see Systemic
problems of corporate governance above).

Regulation

Rules versus principles


Rules are typically thought to be simpler to follow than principles, demarcating a clear line between acceptable and
unacceptable behaviour. Rules also reduce discretion on the part of individual managers or auditors.
In practice rules can be more complex than principles. They may be ill-equipped to deal with new types of
transactions not covered by the code. Moreover, even if clear rules are followed, one can still find a way to
circumvent their underlying purpose - this is harder to achieve if one is bound by a broader principle.
Principles on the other hand is a form of self regulation. It allows the sector to determine what standards are
acceptable or unacceptable. It also pre-empts over zealous legislations that might not be practical.

Enforcement
Enforcement can affect the overall credibility of a regulatory system. They both deter bad actors and level the
competitive playing field. Nevertheless, greater enforcement is not always better, for taken too far it can dampen
valuable risk-taking. In practice, however, this is largely a theoretical, as opposed to a real, risk. There are various
integrated governance, risk and compliance solutions available to capture information in order to evaluate risk and to
identify gaps in the organization’s principles and processes. This type of software is based on project management
style methodologies such as the ABACUS methodology which attempts to unify the management of these areas,
rather than treat them as separate entities.

Action Beyond Obligation


Enlightened boards regard their mission as helping management lead the company. They are more likely to be
supportive of the senior management team. Because enlightened directors strongly believe that it is their duty to
involve themselves in an intellectual analysis of how the company should move forward into the future, most of the
time, the enlightened board is aligned on the critically important issues facing the company.
Unlike traditional boards, enlightened boards do not feel hampered by the rules and regulations of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Unlike standard boards that aim to comply with regulations, enlightened boards regard
compliance with regulations as merely a baseline for board performance. Enlightened directors go far beyond merely
meeting the requirements on a checklist. They do not need Sarbanes-Oxley to mandate that they protect values and
ethics or monitor CEO performance.
At the same time, enlightened directors recognize that it is not their role to be involved in the day-to-day operations
of the corporation. They lead by example. Overall, what most distinguishes enlightened directors from traditional
and standard directors is the passionate obligation they feel to engage in the day-to-day challenges and strategizing
of the company. Enlightened boards can be found in very large, complex companies, as well as smaller
companies.[28]
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Proposals
The book Money for Nothing suggests importing from England the concept of term limits to prevent independent
directors from becoming too close to management and demanding that directors invest a meaningful amount of their
own money (not grants of stock or options that they receive free) to ensure that the directors' interests align with
those of average investors.[29] Another proposal is for the government to allow poorly-managed businesses to go
bankrupt, since after a filing, directors have to cover more of their own legal bills and are frequently sued by
bankruptcy trustees as well as investors.[30]

Corporate governance models around the world


Although the US model of corporate governance is the most notorious, there is a considerable variation in corporate
governance models around the world. The intricated shareholding structures of keiretsus in Japan, the heavy
presence of banks in the equity of German firms [31], the chaebols in South Korea and many others are examples of
arrangements which try to respond to the same corporate governance challenges as in the US.
In the United States, the main problem is the conflict of interest between widely-dispersed shareholders and powerful
managers. In Europe, the main problem is that the voting ownership is tightly-held by families through pyramidal
ownership and dual shares (voting and nonvoting). This can lead to "self-dealing", where the controlling families
favor subsidiaries for which they have higher cash flow rights.[32]

Anglo-American Model
There are many different models of corporate governance around the world. These differ according to the variety of
capitalism in which they are embedded. The liberal model that is common in Anglo-American countries tends to
give priority to the interests of shareholders. The coordinated model that one finds in Continental Europe and Japan
also recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community. Each model has its own
distinct competitive advantage. The liberal model of corporate governance encourages radical innovation and cost
competition, whereas the coordinated model of corporate governance facilitates incremental innovation and quality
competition. However, there are important differences between the U.S. recent approach to governance issues and
what has happened in the UK. In the United States, a corporation is governed by a board of directors, which has the
power to choose an executive officer, usually known as the chief executive officer. The CEO has broad power to
manage the corporation on a daily basis, but needs to get board approval for certain major actions, such as hiring
his/her immediate subordinates, raising money, acquiring another company, major capital expansions, or other
expensive projects. Other duties of the board may include policy setting, decision making, monitoring management's
performance, or corporate control.
The board of directors is nominally selected by and responsible to the shareholders, but the bylaws of many
companies make it difficult for all but the largest shareholders to have any influence over the makeup of the board;
normally, individual shareholders are not offered a choice of board nominees among which to choose, but are merely
asked to rubberstamp the nominees of the sitting board. Perverse incentives have pervaded many corporate boards in
the developed world, with board members beholden to the chief executive whose actions they are intended to
oversee. Frequently, members of the boards of directors are CEOs of other corporations, which some[33] see as a
conflict of interest.
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Codes and guidelines


Corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in different countries and issued from stock
exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, or associations (institutes) of directors and managers with the
support of governments and international organizations. As a rule, compliance with these governance
recommendations is not mandated by law, although the codes linked to stock exchange listing requirements may
have a coercive effect.
For example, companies quoted on the London and Toronto Stock Exchanges formally need not follow the
recommendations of their respective national codes. However, they must disclose whether they follow the
recommendations in those documents and, where not, they should provide explanations concerning divergent
practices. Such disclosure requirements exert a significant pressure on listed companies for compliance.
In the United States, companies are primarily regulated by the state in which they incorporate though they are also
regulated by the federal government and, if they are public, by their stock exchange. The highest number of
companies are incorporated in Delaware, including more than half of the Fortune 500. This is due to Delaware's
generally management-friendly corporate legal environment and the existence of a state court dedicated solely to
business issues (Delaware Court of Chancery [34]).
Most states' corporate law generally follow the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act [35].
While Delaware does not follow the Act, it still considers its provisions and several prominent Delaware justices,
including former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey [36], participate on ABA committees.
One issue that has been raised since the Disney decision[37] in 2005 is the degree to which companies manage their
governance responsibilities; in other words, do they merely try to supersede the legal threshold, or should they create
governance guidelines that ascend to the level of best practice. For example, the guidelines issued by associations of
directors (see Section 3 above), corporate managers and individual companies tend to be wholly voluntary. For
example, The GM Board Guidelines reflect the company’s efforts to improve its own governance capacity. Such
documents, however, may have a wider multiplying effect prompting other companies to adopt similar documents
and standards of best practice.
One of the most influential guidelines has been the 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. This was
revised in 2004. The OECD remains a proponent of corporate governance principles throughout the world.
Building on the work of the OECD, other international organisations, private sector associations and more than 20
national corporate governance codes, the United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on
International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) has produced voluntary Guidance on Good Practices in
Corporate Governance Disclosure. [38] This internationally agreed[39] benchmark consists of more than fifty distinct
disclosure items across five broad categories:[40]
• Auditing
• Board and management structure and process
• Corporate responsibility and compliance
• Financial transparency and information disclosure
• Ownership structure and exercise of control rights
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development WBCSD has done work on corporate governance,
particularly on accountability and reporting [41], and in 2004 created an Issue Management Tool: Strategic
challenges for business in the use of corporate responsibility codes, standards, and frameworks [42].This document
aims to provide general information, a "snap-shot" of the landscape and a perspective from a think-tank/professional
association on a few key codes, standards and frameworks relevant to the sustainability agenda.
Corporate governance 11

Ownership structures
Ownership structures refers to the various patterns in which shareholders seem to set up with respect to a certain
group of firms. It is a tool frequently employed by policy-makers and researchers in their analyses of corporate
governance within a country or business group. And ownership can be changed by the stakeholders of the company.
Generally, ownership structures are identified by using some observable measures of ownership concentration (i.e.
concentration ratios) and then making a sketch showing its visual representation. The idea behind the concept of
ownership structures is to be able to understand the way in which shareholders interact with firms and, whenever
possible, to locate the ultimate owner of a particular group of firms. Some examples of ownership structures include
pyramids, cross-share holdings, rings, and webs.

Corporate governance and firm performance


In its 'Global Investor Opinion Survey' of over 200 institutional investors first undertaken in 2000 and updated in
2002, McKinsey found that 80% of the respondents would pay a premium for well-governed companies. They
defined a well-governed company as one that had mostly out-side directors, who had no management ties, undertook
formal evaluation of its directors, and was responsive to investors' requests for information on governance issues.
The size of the premium varied by market, from 11% for Canadian companies to around 40% for companies where
the regulatory backdrop was least certain (those in Morocco, Egypt and Russia).
Other studies have linked broad perceptions of the quality of companies to superior share price performance. In a
study of five year cumulative returns of Fortune Magazine's survey of 'most admired firms', Antunovich et al. found
that those "most admired" had an average return of 125%, whilst the 'least admired' firms returned 80%. In a separate
study Business Week enlisted institutional investors and 'experts' to assist in differentiating between boards with
good and bad governance and found that companies with the highest rankings had the highest financial returns.
On the other hand, research into the relationship between specific corporate governance controls and some
definitions of firm performance has been mixed and often weak. The following examples are illustrative.

Board composition
Some researchers have found support for the relationship between frequency of meetings and profitability. Others
have found a negative relationship between the proportion of external directors and profitability, while others found
no relationship between external board membership and profitability. In a recent paper Bhagat and Black found that
companies with more independent boards are not more profitable than other companies. It is unlikely that board
composition has a direct impact on profitability, one measure of firm performance.

Remuneration/Compensation
The results of previous research on the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation have
failed to find consistent and significant relationships between executives' remuneration and firm performance. Low
average levels of pay-performance alignment do not necessarily imply that this form of governance control is
inefficient. Not all firms experience the same levels of agency conflict, and external and internal monitoring devices
may be more effective for some than for others.
Some researchers have found that the largest CEO performance incentives came from ownership of the firm's shares,
while other researchers found that the relationship between share ownership and firm performance was dependent on
the level of ownership. The results suggest that increases in ownership above 20% cause management to become
more entrenched, and less interested in the welfare of their shareholders.
Some argue that firm performance is positively associated with share option plans and that these plans direct
managers' energies and extend their decision horizons toward the long-term, rather than the short-term, performance
of the company. However, that point of view came under substantial criticism circa in the wake of various security
Corporate governance 12

scandals including mutual fund timing episodes and, in particular, the backdating of option grants as documented by
University of Iowa academic Erik Lie and reported by James Blander and Charles Forelle of the Wall Street Journal.
Even before the negative influence on public opinion caused by the 2006 backdating scandal, use of options faced
various criticisms. A particularly forceful and long running argument concerned the interaction of executive options
with corporate stock repurchase programs. Numerous authorities (including U.S. Federal Reserve Board economist
Weisbenner) determined options may be employed in concert with stock buybacks in a manner contrary to
shareholder interests. These authors argued that, in part, corporate stock buybacks for U.S. Standard & Poors 500
companies surged to a $500 billion annual rate in late 2006 because of the impact of options. A compendium of
academic works on the option/buyback issue is included in the study Scandal [43] by author M. Gumport [44] issued
in 2006.
A combination of accounting changes and governance issues led options to become a less popular means of
remuneration as 2006 progressed, and various alternative implementations of buybacks surfaced to challenge the
dominance of "open market" cash buybacks as the preferred means of implementing a share repurchase plan.

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Further reading
• Arcot, Sridhar, Bruno, Valentina and Antoine Faure-Grimaud, "Corporate Governance in the U.K.: is the
comply-or-explain working?" (December 2005). FMG CG Working Paper 001. (http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/
publications/searchdetail.php?pubid=1&wsid=1&wpdid=1308)
• Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton, Ailsa Röell, "Corporate Governance and Control" (October 2002; updated August
2004). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002. (http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461)
• Brickley, James A., William S. Klug and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Managerial Economics & Organizational
Architecture, ISBN
• Feltus, Christophe; Petit, Michael; Vernadat, François. (2009). Refining the Notion of Responsibility in Enterprise
Engineering to Support Corporate Governance of IT , Proceedings of the 13th IFAC Symposium on Information
Control Problems in Manufacturing (INCOM'09), Moscow, Russia
• Cadbury, Sir Adrian, "The Code of Best Practice", Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance, Gee and Co Ltd, 1992. Available online from (http://www.ecgi.org/codes)
• Cadbury, Sir Adrian, "Corporate Governance: Brussels", Instituut voor Bestuurders, Brussels, 1996.
• Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H.P. (2000) The Separation of Ownership and Control in East
Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 81-112
• Clarke, Thomas (ed.) (2004) "Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate
Governance," London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-32308-8
• Clarke, Thomas (ed.) (2004) "Critical Perspectives on Business and Management: 5 Volume Series on Corporate
Governance - Genesis, Anglo-American, European, Asian and Contemporary Corporate Governance" London
and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-32910-8
Corporate governance 14

• Clarke, Thomas (2007) "International Corporate Governance " London and New York: Routledge, ISBN
0-415-32309-6
• Clarke, Thomas & Chanlat, Jean-Francois (eds.) (2009) "European Corporate Governance " London and New
York: Routledge, ISBN 9780415405331
• Clarke, Thomas & dela Rama, Marie (eds.) (2006) "Corporate Governance and Globalization (3 Volume Series)"
London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, ISBN 978-1-4129-2899-1
• Clarke, Thomas & dela Rama, Marie (eds.) (2008) "Fundamentals of Corporate Governance (4 Volume Series)"
London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, ISBN 978-1-4129-3589-0
• Colley, J., Doyle, J., Logan, G., Stettinius, W., What is Corporate Governance ? (McGraw-Hill, December 2004)
ISBN
• Crawford, C. J. (2007). Compliance & conviction: the evolution of enlightened corporate governance. Santa
Clara, Calif: XCEO. ISBN 0-976-90190-9 9780976901914
• Denis, D.K. and J.J. McConnell (2003), International Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 38 (1): 1-36.
• Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, ISBN
• Erturk, Ismail, Froud, Julie, Johal, Sukhdev and Williams, Karel (2004) Corporate Governance and
Disappointment Review of International Political Economy, 11 (4): 677-713.
• Garrett, Allison, "Themes and Variations: The Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Major World
Markets," 32 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y).
• Holton, Glyn A (2006). Investor Suffrage Movement (http://www.contingencyanalysis.com/home/papers/
suffrage.pdf), Financial Analysits Journal, 62 (6), 15–20.
• Hovey, M. and T. Naughton (2007), A Survey of Enterprise Reforms in China: The Way Forward. Economic
Systems, 31 (2): 138-156.
• La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (1999), Corporate Ownership around the World. The Journal
of Finance, 54 (2): 471-517.
• Lekatis, George IT and Information Security after Sarbanes-Oxley (http://www.compliance-llc.com/
IT_and_Information_Security_after_Sarbanes_Oxley.pdf)
• Monks, Robert A.G. and Minow, Nell, Corporate Governance (Blackwell 2004) ISBN
• Monks, Robert A.G. and Minow, Nell, Power and Accountability (HarperBusiness 1991), full text available
online (http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/power/contents.html)
• Moebert, Jochen and Tydecks, Patrick (2007). Power and Ownership Structures among German Companies. A
Network Analysis of Financial Linkages (http://www.vwl.tu-darmstadt.de/vwl/forsch/veroeff/papers/
ddpie_179.pdf)
• Murray, Alan Revolt in the Boardroom (HarperBusiness 2007) (ISBN 0-06-088247-6) Remainder (http://www.
amazon.com/dp/B0013L4DZI)
• New York Society of Securities Analysts, 2003, Corporate Governance Handbook, (http://www.nyssa.org/
Template.cfm?Section=corp_gov_com&Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=3&
ContentID=499)
• OECD (1999, 2004) Principles of Corporate Governance Paris: OECD)
• Özekmekçi, Abdullah, Mert (2004) "The Correlation between Corporate Governance and Public Relations",
Istanbul Bilgi University.
• Sapovadia, Vrajlal K., "Critical Analysis of Accounting Standards Vis-À-Vis Corporate Governance Practice in
India" (January 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=712461
• Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 52 (2): 737-783.
• Skau, H.O (1992), A Study in Corporate Governance: Strategic and Tactic Regulation (200 p)
• World Business Council for Sustainable Development WBCSD (2004) Issue Management Tool: Strategic
challenges for business in the use of corporate responsibility codes, standards, and frameworks (http://www.
Corporate governance 15

wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=25&ObjectId=MTIwNjg)
• Low, Albert, 2008. " Conflict and Creativity at Work: Human Roots of Corporate Life (http://www.
conflictandcreativityatwork.ca), Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-84519-272-3
• Sun, William (2009), How to Govern Corporations So They Serve the Public Good: A Theory of Corporate
Governance Emergence, New York: Edwin Mellen, ISBN 9780773438637.

External links
• Standard & Poor's Governance Services (GAMMA Governance Scores) (http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
portal/site/sp/en/ap/page.product/equityresearch_gamma/2,5,13,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0.html)
• Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance at [[Stanford University (http://www.law.
stanford.edu/program/centers/rcfcg/)]]
• Corporations, Governance & Society Research Group at The [[Australian National University (http://corpgov.
fec.anu.edu.au/)]]
• Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) resources on corporate governance (http://www.cipd.
co.uk/subjects/corpstrtgy/corpgov/)
• European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) (http://www.ecgi.org)
• Global Corporate Governance Forum (http://www.gcgf.org/)
• The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance (http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olin_center/corporate_governance/)
• Institute of Directors (http://www.iod.com/corporategovernance)
• The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at the [[Yale School of Management (http://
millstein.som.yale.edu/)]]
• Kozminski Center for Corporate Governance (http://www.corpgov.edu.pl/) at Kozminski University, Poland
• The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance [[Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (http:/
/www.heyman-center.org)]]
• United States Proxy Exchange (http://proxyexchange.org/)
• UTS Centre for Corporate Governance (http://www.ccg.uts.edu.au) at the University of Technology Sydney,
Australia
• Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance [[University of Delaware (http://www.lerner.udel.edu/centers/
ccg)]]
• World Bank Corporate Governance Reports (http://rru.worldbank.org/GovernanceReports/)
]
Article Sources and Contributors 16

Article Sources and Contributors


Corporate governance  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=417830254  Contributors: Aaronhill, Abdullah Mert, AbsolutDan, Adam.J.W.C., Adanielch, Adrian J. Hunter,
Aesopos, Alexihlo, Alexlinsker@gmail.com, Alfredxz, Allisoga, Altenmann, AntiVan, Apoc2400, ArielGold, Arsalan Khan Pathan, Arthena, Ask123, Axlq, BD2412, Bangdrum, Bar mangan,
Beagel, Beetstra, Belovedfreak, BenTremblay, Benfremer, Bfigura's puppy, Biruitorul, Blu Aardvark, Bmcdaniel, Bmi232, Bmicomp, Bobo192, Bryan Derksen, Buchanan-Hermit, Businessrep,
CBowers, CalSGWorker, Cannaya, Charles Matthews, Chemingway, Choosey, ChrisRBennett, Cmdrjameson, Coemgenus, Corp Vision, Corpgov, Crazytales, Cwaesche, Cyalxndr, D6,
Dabomb87, Dachannien, Damieng, David fac51, DavidHOzAu, DavidTurner100, Dboselli, Dcarafel, Dcarpenter, DeadEyeArrow, Dekisugi, Dkc1971, Do DueDiligence, DocendoDiscimus,
Domaley, Dominic Sayers, Drakonian Imperium, Drilnoth, Dwilliams0428, EECavazos, EFocus, Edward, El C, EmmelineK, Enzo Aquarius, Ericbonetti, Essjay519, Examtester, FaerieInGrey,
Farcaster, Farmanesh, Fifo, Finance C, FinanceQ, Financeeditor, Flawiki, Forich, Fruits, Fusionmix, GLeachim, Gaius Cornelius, Gamble456, Gaslan, Gaslan2, Gavin Moodie, Giler, Gilliam,
Gobbleswoggler, Grafen, Greekcats, GreenReaper, Gregbard, Gregoryloyse, HG, Hello32020, Hmains, Hogayoga, Hu12, ICGN, ImperfectlyInformed, IrishHR, IvanLanin, J Crow, J.delanoy,
JDMBAHopeful, Jeffpc2, Jem147, Jfire, Jhegland, JoanneB, JohRth, John, John Quiggin, JonHarder, Jpopovac, Jyoshimura, Kalivd, Karavan-LP, Kevinkor2, Khalid hassani, Klausness, Kmccoy,
Kmklim, Kurieeto, Kuru, Kza, Landroni, LaserBeam, Leetnoob, Legis, Leolaursen, Lilyhover, Lisalima, Loren36, Luk, Lumos3, LunaTech, MBisanz, MER-C, Mark ok7, Martg76, Martin
Kozák, Maurreen, Max Tulip, MaxHund, McGeddon, McSly, Mchap, Mdahpiercey, Mdd, Michael Hardy, Michael Snow, Mini123.u, Mole31, Mr.Z-man, MrOllie, Muppet317, Musical Linguist,
Mydogategodshat, NadiaLala, Nagelfar, Neale Monks, Neilc, Neutrality, Niniey, Nminow, Normxxx, Noufal cp, NuclearWinner, Nyresearcher, Ohnoitsjamie, Olivier, Ommm, Ondra2, Pb30,
Personalbest, Phgao, Pirc ltd, Postdlf, Prari, Psdanalyst, Pstessel, Qxz, RJN, RainbowOfLight, Redgolpe, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwilmsi, Rkitko, Rodrigoleite, Roopchand pokhriyal, Roryridleyduff,
RoyBoy, Rrburke, Rvelamuri, RyanCross, SDC, Sagax, Sagink, Sapovadia, Sciurinæ, Seanachas, Sesu Prime, Sherifhany, SimonP, Singhalawap, SiobhanHansa, Snowmanradio, Sole Soul, Sox
First, Sox617, Spegali, Squash Racket, Ssilvers, Ssweeting, Stemcat, Steverapaport, Stifle, Stuartwilks, SueHay, Suidafrikaan, T g7, Thatguyflint, The Anome, The Heyman, ThePedanticPrick,
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Xactandy, Xp001ping, Xp001xp, YellowMonkey, Yeu Ninje, Yurik, Zrinski hr, ‫רה יראב‬-‫בוט‬, ‫ينام‬, 649 anonymous edits

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