The Space Station: A Laboratory for Policy Sustainment

by
Jeff M. Bingham

Abstract

Since January 2001, when a nearly $4 billion cost “over-run” was identified by the Bush-
Cheney Transition Team, and subsequently verified by NASA, the International Space
Station has been a focus of criticism and complaint. In the past year, as attention has
been focused on the notion of leaving Earth orbit, within the framework of the new
Vision for Exploration articulated by President George W. Bush, the space station has
been viewed by some as perhaps the single greatest impediment to returning to the Moon
and going on to Mars. A review of the policy history of the space station, and especially
the manner in which that policy grew from concept to program and was sustained, despite
serious and consistent opposition, to the reality of hardware--and crews--on orbit suggests
that assessment to be inaccurate. This paper traces some of the highlights of that
historical path, and points out a number of lessons learned from that experience which
have relevance to the challenge of sustaining any long-term space exploration policy
initiative in the future.

Conceptual History

In 1869, south-central Maine became the fanciful launch site of a 200-foot diameter space
station, made of clay bricks, and occupied by thirty-seven individuals who had taken up
residence in the thirteen named “modules” within the structure to escape the New
England cold. The premature launch was the result of a sudden strong downpour, which
caused the “Brick Moon” to be dislodged from its supports and roll onto the huge
counter-rotating flywheels that had been spinning up for two years to build up the energy
needed to propel the sphere into orbit.

The entertaining tale told by Edward Everett Hale in the Atlantic Monthly magazine does
not appear to have influenced future contemplation of a space station as a serious
theoretical construct. It is doubtful that Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, then about twelve years
old living in Kaluga, Russia, had access to the magazine, though it is widely held that the
more widely-known and read Jules Verne had caused sparks in Tsiolkovksy’s fertile
mind. In 1898, Tsiolkovsky wrote an article entitled “Exploration of the Universe with
Reaction Machines,” which was published in 1903, and represents the first serious
discussion of the potential for a manned space station.

Other writers followed and expanded on Hale’s fantasy and Tsiolkovsky’s informed
speculation over the years: Herman Oberth, in 1923, Herman Noordung and Baron Guido
von Pirquet in 1928, H.E. Ross and R.A. Smith in 1948, H.H. Koelle in 1951 and, of
course, Wernher von Braun in 1952.

It was not until late 1959, however, that a space station found expression, at least in the
United States, in what may be seen as a preliminary policy document of a government
agency. Issued on December 15, 1959, when NASA was just a little over a year old, its
“Long-Range Plan” for space exploration envisioned, among other things, the launching
of satellites and proving of launch vehicles in 1960 and 1961, the “attainment of manned
space flight” with Project Mercury in 1961 or 1962, the launching of unmanned probes to
Venus and/or Mars in 1962, launching of an unmanned vehicle for a controlled landing
on the Moon in 1963 or 1964, followed by launching of an robotic circumlunar vehicle
and returning it to Earth in 1964, the establishment of a program in the 1965-1967 time
frame leading to circumlunar flight and to a permanent near-Earth space station, followed
by a piloted flight to the Moon “Beyond 1970.” In short, from the human spaceflight
point of view, develop man-rated space vehicles, get to orbit, establish a permanent space
station in orbit, and then go to the Moon.

Early Russian space successes and the geopolitical realities of the day led to the
juxtaposition of the last two stated goals, of course, and thus Apollo became the priority
from May 25, 1961 to 1969. Despite Apollo’s clear priority, however, a great deal of
work was done in NASA and within the aerospace contractor community on space station
concepts throughout the sixties. Over one hundred space station studies were conducted
by NASA and industry between 1961 and 1967. The eventual expression of much of that
work became the Skylab Program, which provided the United States with its first real
operational space station between its launch in May 1973 and the departure of its third
crew in February 1974.

Though it demonstrated the capability and viability of a space station, Skylab was never
articulated as the embodiment of a policy of maintaining a permanent presence in orbit,
as envisioned in the 1959 plan. Though some hope existed for several years that it might
be reconstituted with the advent of shuttle flights, delays in the shuttle development
schedule made it impossible to return to Skylab before it de-orbited in July 1979.

April 12, 1981 saw the launch of Space Shuttle Columbia on her maiden voyage, and the
shuttle era began, opening the door for discussion of the “next logical step” in the US
manned space program. At the same time, the new Administration of Ronald Reagan
was assuming the reins of power in the White House, and NASA’s new Administrator
and Deputy Administrator, James Beggs and Hans Mark, both identified a permanent
manned space station as that logical next step in their confirmation hearing in June 1981.

Within months of assuming their positions, they created a Space Station Task Force to
begin to focus on the kind of space station program that could be presented to the
President as a proposed major space policy initiative.

Finally, a Policy

NASA leadership was ready, by the end of 1983, to press for a favorable presidential
decision on space station development. Through a creative and effective process that has
been amply described by Dr. Howard McCurdy, that decision was obtained and
announced by the President in his State of the Union address on January 25, 1984. The
US government, especially NASA, finally had a space station development policy.

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The next three years saw the movement from design concepts to engineering drawings.
Moving from concept to hardware on orbit has been a complex path for the space station,
as illustrated in the following diagram.

Design and Development

Through the period of August 1981 to the end of 1985, competitive studies were
conducted by primary aerospace corporations leading to the selection of a reference
configuration for the space station. In 1986, a baseline configuration was adopted and
initial contracts were issued for hardware design and development.

Fits and Starts

As annual funding levels for NASA fluctuated, and as NASA’s congressional committees
levied additional design requirements and changes, both the design features and
development schedules were adjusted. In 1987, the Congress required a restructuring of
the space station which resulted in modifications in module size and internal
configurations. In 1988, the Congress mandated a rephrasing of the program
development schedule and elimination of some program elements, such as the free-flying
polar observation platform, and the Flight-Telerobotic Servicing system. Other planned

3
missions were dropped from the program, such as orbital servicing and the associated
orbital maneuvering vehicle. The following chart provides a visual representation of the
sort of congressional direction provide to the space station.

Last Chance/Redesign

By late 1992 it was obvious that the changes in the program and rescheduling--or
stretching out of development, along with management inefficiencies, was leading to a
projected cost increase of nearly $2 billion. November 1992 also marked a change in
Administration, with the election of former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton and Senator
Al Gore as President and Vice President. Senator Gore had been chairman of NASA’s
authorizing committee in the Senate and had demonstrated a continuing interest in space
projects, though the issue was never a matter of debate during the campaign.

With the emerging evidence of a serious cost increase in the space station, the first space-
related action of the Clinton Administration was to mandate a redesign of the space
station to reduce costs. The White House appointed a committee headed by Dr. Charles
Vest to examine redesign options provided by separate NASA teams. Between March
and June of 1993, NASA and its contractors prepared three separate options for review
by the Vest Committee. On June 7, 1993, the Commission made its recommendation to
the White House for further consideration of Options A and C. This position was clearly

4
at odds with the preference stated by several key members of Congress, who supported
the more “Freedom”-derived option B, which, they felt, protected the significant financial
investment in the program to that date. That position was clearly reflected in the
Committee Report accompanying H.R. 2200, the NASA Authorization Legislation for
FY 1994/1995, which was issued on June 10, 1993. (See pages 28-31) It was also clearly
stated on the House floor by several members during consideration of VA-HUD-IA 1974
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2491) on June 28, 1993. (See Congressional Record, Vol. 139,
No. 92, pages H4154-H4155.)

On June 17th, the President announced his support for a “Scaled-down version of
Freedom,” described as “Option A-2” and directed NASA to work with the Congress and
with international partners to refine the redesign configuration over a ninety-day period,
including consideration for adding Russia to the international space station partnership.

Expanded Partnership

On September 9, 1993, a modified configuration known as “Russian Alpha” was released

by NASA. Formal negotiations between and among NASA’s traditional station partners
and Russia continued, and in December the Russians were formally invited into the
international partnership dedicated to developing and using the space station.

The Russians, of course, brought enormous experience in space station operations, having
chosen to focus their space efforts in that arena at about the same time the US chose the
development of the space shuttle as the “next step” after the successful Apollo program.
They also brought existing hardware and systems that could be used to offset the
development of new capabilities by the previous partners and the US, most notably, f
course, the propulsion/reboost system via the Service Module, which had been the base
block for Mir 2, and the Soyuz crew vehicle and Progress resupply modules. At the time,
estimates were that these capabilities would save almost $2 billion in development costs
and fifteen months in deployment schedule for the space station. Those savings estimates
were probably fairly accurate, but, to the extent they were realized they were offset by
subsequent delays and requirements that have given some critics cause to suggest that
bringing Russia into the program was more a liability than an asset. That may be a
debatable issue, but recent events make it clear that without the Russian capabilities the
space station would, at this writing, be an abandoned and deteriorating vehicle anxiously
awaiting the return of the US space shuttle to prevent its premature and possibly
disastrous de-orbit and restore it to functionality.

There were other ramifications of the Russian participation that will be noted below,
relevant to the matter of the coalition of political support for the space station in the
debates that have occurred in the years since 1993.

Near-Death Experience?

While the redesign and subsequent partnership negotiations were under way, the
congressional schedule for consideration of NASA--and space station-- authorizations

5
and appropriations continued. The redesign teams had briefed key members and staff
members as the redesign progressed, but the NASA authorization bill came to the floor of
the House of Representatives not long after the Vest Committee recommendations, on
June 23, 1993. NASA and space station advocates were at a decided disadvantage in
arguing for support of a space station that had not yet been fully redefined. Key members
of the House authorization committee had made it clear during the redesign that whatever
the new configuration would be, it should rely heavily on making use of the design and
development already completed--and paid for--within the Freedom program. While it
appeared that objective, at least, had been met in the Vest Committee recommendations,
enough uncertainty continued to make the outcome of the debate unclear. In the end, the
vote against the Roemer amendment to kill the space station program was 224-225--a one
vote margin in favor of keeping the program alive.

Many cite this “near-death” experience as evidence of how close the space station came
to being terminated by the U.S. Congress. The fact is that, while a close vote, it was a
vote on an amendment to an authorization bill--the kind of legislation that has become
less and less necessary for program support. NASA has gone eight years at a stretch
without having an authorization bill passed by both houses of Congress. Programs live or
die more on the basis of funding than formal authorization. That is a peculiarity--and in
the author’s view, an aberration--of the federal budget process that suggests a separate
area of commentary and inquiry beyond the scope of this paper.

With respect to the FY 1994 appropriation the attempted amendment to deny funding for
the space station was defeated by a vote of 220 to 196 on June 28, 1993. A healthier
margin, of course. More telling, however, is the subsequent vote in the US Senate on a
similar effort to deny space station funding, which was defeated on September 21, 1993
by a vote of 59 to 40. That margin of support in the US Senate has been relatively
constant throughout the life of the space station program. The author is convinced that,
even had the station been defeated in the authorization bill--a bill that never came to a
vote in the Senate, it would still have been sustained in the appropriations legislation in
the House and in the Senate. And had the authorization bill passed the House without
including the space station, the station would likely have been reinstated by the Senate
and the issue resolved in favor of the space station in the final conference report of the
authorization bill.

It should be recalled that two years before, the House Appropriations Subcommittee with
responsibility for NASA funding had actually terminated the funding for the space station
in its report of the NASA appropriations bill. Most often, such an action by the cognizant
appropriations subcommittee has sufficient “authority” to be sustained by the full
legislative body. However, an amendment on the floor of the House restored the space
station funding by a vote of 240 to 173 on June 6, 1991. In 1992, the Chairman of the
House VA-HUD-IA Subcommittee attempted again to delete space station funding via an
amendment to the appropriations legislation. That amendment was rejected by the House
on July 29, 1992, by a vote of 181-237.

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Elements of a Strategy for Sustainment

Despite the probability that the space station would have survived the 1993 congressional
deliberations, in the final analysis, the narrow margin in the vote on June 8 caused
sufficient alarm within NASA and the supporting contractor community to prompt the
initiation of an expanded, focused effort to prepare for future anticipated station
termination in the Congress. Efforts within the aerospace contractor community centered
heavily around two primary efforts: The National Keep It Sold effort and, in the
Washington, DC area, the Space Station Associates. These corporate-based coalitions had
their governmental counterparts within NASA.

At NASA Headquarters, in anticipation of the 1994 congressional debates on space

station, the NASA White House Liaison, Chris Dunn, and the Associate Administrator
for Legislative Affairs, Jeff Lawrence, established a loosely-organized structure which
they referred to as the “War Room” (more formally referred to as the Space Station
Information Center or, in its 1996 iteration, the NASA Information Center) to prepare
informational materials that could be made available to Members of Congress in response
to issues raised about the space station prior to and during the debate. Organized under
the combined authority of the Administrator’s Office, and the Office of Legislative
Affairs, the War Room included representation from other Headquarters offices, namely,
the Office of Space Flight, the Office of Public Affairs, the Office of External Affairs
(International), and the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences. Representation of these
offices was generally provided by a Deputy Associate Administrator from those
organizations or another senior staff designee. A common work area for the War Room
was established in a conference room provided by the Office of Spaceflight, with several
work-stations established there and used by designated staff support from the
participating organizations. Personnel from the space station program office in Houston
were sent on temporary duty assignments to support the War Room for several weeks
prior to anticipated floor consideration of space station-related legislation.

In early 1994, the Space Station Program manager, Randy Brinkley, began assessing the
means by which the Program Office, located at Johnson Space Center (JSC), could more
effectively provide support to NASA Headquarters efforts to keep the Congress more
adequately informed about the space station program. In midsummer a agreement was
reached with the NASA Chief of Staff, Michael Mott, and Jeff Lawrence, the Associate
Administrator for Legislative Affairs, to create a position of Legislative Affairs
Coordinator within the Program Office at JSC. The position was a Headquarters position,
formally within the Liaison Division of the Office of Legislative Affairs, but physically
located at JSC in the office of the Program Manager. This enabled the Office of
Legislative affairs to have a representative who was integrated into the technical and
developmental management activity of the space station program, and in a position to
identify and address emerging issues that would be of interest or concern to Members of
Congress and develop, in conjunction with the technical expertise at the program office
level, appropriate briefing materials and response materials to communicate those issues-
-and their resolution--to the Congress, as needed. This arrangement also enabled the
space station management team to be better informed about the interests and concerns of

7
the Congress vis-à-vis the space station, and to better understand the accountability
requirements and obligations of the Agency to the Congress.

Between 1994 and late 1996 a number of congressional staff and Member visits to JSC
and the space station program office were conducted which effectively addressed known
and emerging issues and kept the staff and Members well-informed about the progress of
the space station program. Potentially controversial problems were identified early and in
many cases mitigated or avoided altogether as a result of the close interaction and
communication. More will be said about the significance of this activity below.

During 1994 and 1995 the space station legislative coordinator was temporarily relocated
at NASA Headquarters to support the War Room effort at Headquarters for brief periods
of time leading up to, and including, active floor consideration of space station-related
legislation in the Congress. In 1996, that individual was tasked by the Office of
legislative Affairs to manage the War Room effort, beginning in April of that year. In
September 1996, the War Room/Space Station Information Center was made a permanent
entity at Headquarters, managed by the space station legislative coordinator, who was
then permanently relocated to NASA Headquarters.

During the same time period, the Office of Space Flight underwent some organizational
changes, and increased program management responsibility for the space station program
was delegated to the JSC Center Director. Within that framework, and with the departure
of the legislative affairs coordinator from the Program Office, that function was largely
maintained by the Space Station Program Chief of Staff, working in close cooperation
with the Space Station Information Center at Headquarters, and with JSC personnel
designated by the Center Director. In late 1997, that activity was augmented and
formalized in the Program Office with the establishment of an External Communications
Control Board (ECCB). The charter for this activity stated its purpose as:

“The ECCB is an executive level board which establishes a baseline for and
controls subsequent changes to delegated the ISSP Integrated External
Communications Plan. This control board provides a forum for identifying
common messages/themes in order to optimize participation by ECCB member
organizations. Not only will the ECCB serve as a decision making forum, it will
also play a significant role in the initial planning among the following disciplines:

• Congressional Liaison (House and Senate activities, ISSP themes, etc.)

• Education (Curriculum, On-orbit educational projects, etc.)
• General Public (Outreach, Informational Products, etc.)
• Research
• Media (Videos, Fact Sheets, Roundup Articles, Media Relations, etc.)
• Review Panels (ASAP, ACISS, SSUAS, IIAP, Stafford, IAR) -- Ad Hoc
basis”

Members of the Board included both NASA and contractor employees with primary
responsibility for the space station-related activities within the identified disciplines,

8
whether at JSC or at NASA Headquarters, including participation from the War
Room/NASA/Space Station Information Center. Thus, the ECCB was intended to assist
in coordinating and supplementing those activities, rather than duplicating them or
supplanting them.

From December of 1997 to late 1998, this organization met roughly weekly to consider
“themes and messages” for presenting the “space station story” to the media and external
interests. By early 1999, the ECCB activity was “absorbed” into the structured public
affairs operations at JSC.

The primary missions of both the ECCB and War Room were:

• Identify issues and emerging areas of concern regarding space station design,
development, cost and schedule.

• Develop coordinated and uniform responses to those issues, both within the
contractor and governmental participants respectively, and between the
government and contractors.

• Establish a systematic method of providing rapid responses to new issues that

may be raised in the course of debates on space station.

• Develop or review the development of materials that effectively communicated

the roles and missions of the space station.

At NASA Headquarters, an additional role for the War Room, acting through and under
the auspices of the Office of Legislative Affairs, was liaison with the Congress. The
primary activities of the War Room in the conduct of this role were:

• Development of Space Station Status summary and “Whip Card” for use by
Members of Congress in discussion and debate.

• Attendance at and interaction with “Whip” meetings organized by Members of

Congress in support of space station.

• Identification and scheduling of “Member Visits” by the NASA Administrator to

discuss space station status and issues.

• Preparation of Fact Sheets and Talking Points related to identified issues and
concerns.

• Development of responses to media articles or statements regarding space station

issues

• Compilation of briefing books and structured reference materials and visual aids
for use by requesting Members of Congress.

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 • Establishment of “real-time rapid response” capability to address emerging issues.

Some elaboration on several of the above-listed activities is in order to more completely

illustrate the implementation of key elements of what was, in effect, a strategy for
sustainment of the space station as a policy objective. For purposes of this summary, four
“action categories” are identified, within which the various activities fall--and which
serve as the primary elements of the generic sustainment strategy suggested by the space
station experience.

Information

Fundamental to any public policy, of course, is its articulation and justification. This must
be done both internally to the agency or organization responsible for implementing the
policy and externally, to the public, to the Congress, and to other interested and invested
individuals and organizations, using vehicles appropriate to the respective “audiences.”
With regard to internal information dissemination suffice it to say, for purposes of this
discussion, that they obviously should be consistent in general content with external
information instruments. Essential to information conveyed to external audiences is the
identification and consistent use of major themes and messages conveying the nature,
purpose and value of the policy and its instruments of implementation.

The space station experience illustrates both failures and successes in the dissemination
of information to external audiences. Where the effort has failed it has often been due to a
lack of consistency in the messages about the roles, missions and justifications of the
space station. This inconsistency was not always the fault of NASA or space station
management, since the space station was subjected to numerous modifications and
changes directed by the Congress, especially in the years from 1985 to 1992. Additional
changes were mandated within the various Administrations, most often by budgetary
considerations and evolving priorities. As budgets were reduced or limited, features were
removed, modified or development schedules were extended. Documentation,
explanation and impacts of these changes were often not effectively communicated to
external interests, resulting not only in uncertainty and confusion about goals, roles or
missions, but also occasionally leading to conflict and controversy between and among
institutions of interest. (An interesting case in point is the effort in 1987-1988 to develop
a free-flying orbital laboratory known first as the Industrial Space Facility, as proposed
by the Space Industries Corporation, and then referred to, generically, as a
Commercially-Developed Space Facility. Space does not permit an elaboration of that
example, but the reader is invited to explore it independently.)

As will be noted below, the competition for elements and facilities to survive the ebb and
flow of resources and priorities sometimes made it difficult to sustain consistent themes
and messages among the various constituencies interested and involved in space station
development. The establishment of the ECCB at JSC was an effort to address these kinds
of consensus-undermining pressures.

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In addition, at NASA Headquarters, a counterpart effort was maintained from roughly
1994 to the present, to interact with an organized activity of contractors involved in space
station development, known as the Space Station Associates. This coalition of corporate
representatives met generally on a weekly basis to discuss space station status and issues
and, when possible, coordinate responses and address developments being raised in the
media or within the Congress. Representatives of the NASA Office of Legislative
Affairs, the “War Room,” and the Office of Space Flight frequently participated in those
discussions, providing information on space station development status and issues being
addressed by NASA and the space station program.

Collaboration

The breadth and scope of any major public policy implementation results in a significant
number of separate entities becoming interested and involved, at varying levels of
activity. This is especially true of a large-scale and multi-faceted project such as the
International Space Station.

Internal to NASA, a number of distinct organizational entities are involved directly in the
space station program, including the Offices of Space Flight, the Office of Biological and
Physical Research, the Office of Mission Safety and Quality Assurance and, now the
Office of Exploration Technology. In addition, there are Center management offices,
program offices, and policy offices, and matrixed--assigned support--elements, such as
portions of engineering directorates, financial management staff, etc. These also, of
course, have changed and evolved over time as structural changes have been made
throughout the agency and its Centers. Maintaining institutional memory and effective
collaborative efforts in such a situation is a Herculean task. The details of how that has
been managed over time are not within the scope of this paper. The relevance here is that
the success or failure of those internal efforts have an impact on the ability to consistently
and accurately convey the status of the program to external interests.

In addition to the many elements of NASA involved with the space station program there
are a host of contractor personnel, ranging from the prime contractor to subcontractors
and vendors all across the country and in participating partner nations. To a large extent,
representatives of the major contractor organizations are integrated with the NASA/civil
servant work-force within the primary space station organizational elements at the
program level, though the degree of such integration has varied over the life of the
program. At a higher, or “policy level,” senior NASA managers and senior contractor
representatives have maintained collaborative efforts and communication and integration
on a regular basis, in a variety of forums over the life of the program, (SDOM-Space
Station Development and Operations Meetings 1995-1997; Program Manager Reviews,
etc.) most recently in the Space Station Control Board. The bulk of material and issues
considered in these forums were of a technical nature, affecting hardware and software
design and development, as well as managerial, including schedule and budget-related or
contract-related issues of performance and accountability.

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From its beginning as an announced policy of the US government, the space station has
been viewed as an international endeavor, combining the resources and expertise of now
sixteen nations. Beginning with the 1992 discussions between President Bush and
Russian President Yeltsin regarding shuttle and Mir flight exchange visits, leading
eventually to the Phase One Shuttle-Mir Program, and the 1993 formal invitation for
Russia to join the space station partnership, the interaction between the US and Russia in
the station program has become highly involved.

All members of any partnership bring both assets and burdens. The chief burden is the
expanded necessity for collaboration and effective integration of what may be very
different management, development and operational approaches and supporting
infrastructures. Other “collateral” issues may also impact the partnership, such as real or
perceived policy differences between and among various partners in areas not even
related to the program itself, as has been the case with US and Russian policy on missile
technology controls.

Regardless of the specific nature of collateral issues impacting international partnerships,

vehicles must be developed for managing the collaborative activities. In the case of the
space station, these vehicles have been established and maintained through the use of an
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) signed by all participants and through Memoranda
of Understanding (MOU’s) formally signed by senior representatives of the governments
and agencies involved. Those agreements have been implemented, in turn, through the
use of coordinating vehicles such as the Multilateral Coordinating Board (MCB), the
Space Station Control Board (SSCB) and, at the more technical level, bi-lateral and
multi-lateral Joint Program Reviews (JPRs) and Technical Information Meetings (TIMs),
as well as daily interactions among counterpart entities and individuals through
correspondence, email, or in direct meetings or via teleconference.

Yet another area of collaboration regarding the space station lies in the realm of non-
governmental interest groups and organizations interested in space station development
and utilization, and in space policy and space exploration in general. These organizations
have members and supporting constituencies from a wide range of backgrounds and
interests, and have their own short-term and long-term goals and missions that may be
different from, and sometimes in conflict with, the stated policy underlying and
supporting the space station.

An essential element of successful policy sustainment is to make every effort to ensure

that the wide array of active participants in the support and implementation of that policy
maintain the maximum level of collaboration in efforts at the lowest common
denominator of their interests--those matters upon which they are able to agree and which
are mutually beneficial to their interests. That much is obvious. The challenge is to find
the means to secure that collaboration. In the post-1993 space station experience, that
effort was largely coordinated through the “War Room” and conducted by its
participating organizations.

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A final comment about collaboration, which will be elaborated upon in portions of the
paper to follow, regards the matter of collaboration with--and within--the Congress.

All too frequently, in the author’s view, the relationship between legislative and
executive branches is conducted in an adversarial atmosphere. To a certain extent, it was
undoubtedly the view of America’s Founding Fathers that there should be a healthy
tension between those elected to Congress to enact the public will and those elected--and
especially those appointed--to carry out the mandates agreed upon by the Congress. To
the extent there is a healthy skepticism between elected officials and the bureaucratic
structures of an increasingly large and complex government that can work against the
potential abuses of centralized authority, that tension should be preserved.

There are times, however, when that tensions and skepticism leads to unnecessary and
counterproductive conflict, or at the very least to a reduction in the ability to take
concerted action when it is clearly in the best interests of the country to do so. The
exploration of space is not, and has never been, the subject of partisan political discord.
Major space policies have been articulated and supported by both major political parties
within the US political structure since the beginning of the Space Age, and while there
have been differences in view regarding the priority for space-related expenditures of
public funds versus expenditures for other public programs, space exploration has been
broadly accepted as an important national objective. Space policy is a realm of public
policy activity that therefore is an appropriate venue for greater collaboration between the
Executive and Legislative branches of government within the US political and policy-
making process.

The history of congressional interaction with NASA contains numerous examples of a

high degree of collaborative interaction versus antagonistic or adversarial conduct. The
author spent sixteen years as Chief of Staff to a U.S. Senator who was both personally
interested in space exploration activities and had formal legislative responsibilities vis-à-
vis the civil space programs between 1975 and 1992, first as a member of the Senate
Aeronautics and Space Committee, and then as a member, Ranking Member, and
Chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee responsible for NASA funding. That
Senator, Jake Garn, from the state of Utah, believed strongly in developing open and
cooperative relationships with the agencies with which he had a jurisdictional
relationship. Examples of the success and value of that collaborative relationship are too
numerous to begin to recount here. What is relevant is that it was demonstrably possible
to establish and maintain such a relationship without compromising the respective
legislative and executive roles as defined in the US Constitution and to achieve important
results in support of the nation’s interests in space exploration.

As will be seen below, a fundamental contributing feature to the success of such

legislative-executive collaboration is thorough, ongoing and honest two-way
communications. This seems almost too obvious to state, but in an adversarial
relationship, free and open communications are the first casualty, followed rapidly by the
loss of trust and mutual confidence which make it difficult if not impossible to build

13
effective policy consensus between the “separate but equal” branches of the US
government.
Anticipation

The most visible arena for policy debate in the US political system is the Congress.
Under the US Constitution, it is the Legislative Branch that creates the law, authorizes the
creation of Executive Departments and Agencies outside the White House, establishes the
budget authority for those departments, agencies and programs, and appropriates the
funding for all government activity. The bicameral nature of the Congress, and the
respective composition, authority and functions of the House and Senate, make for what
is often seen as a confusing and agonizingly slow-moving deliberative process. Coupled
with the competing political agendas of the 535 individual Members of the House and
Senate and the two major party organizations in each chamber, the entire process of
legislative consideration and enactment of legislation (i.e., policy) seems to defy analysis
and understanding, even for those who follow it closely or are even a part of the process.
(The author spent seventeen years as a senior staff member in the U.S. Senate and can
still find elements of the congressional process beyond comprehension.) Attempts to
provide abbreviated summary descriptions of the process abound, such as “The President
proposes; the Congress disposes,” or “No President spends a dime not appropriated by
the Congress,” and so on. Unfortunately, no catch-phrase can adequately capture the
totality of the process or the dynamics of the interaction of all the various elements.

The need to monitor and assess the actions of the Congress has spawned an ever-growing
industry of congressional “representational” organizations, loosely described as
“lobbyists” who attempt to track issues and legislation through the Congress, and engage
in efforts to affect the outcome of the process on behalf of their client corporations,
individuals, interest-groups or associations. In addition to these specialized
representational entities, corporations and government agencies typically maintain
“Governmental Affairs” or “Legislative Affairs” elements within their organizational
structure. Such units in federal governmental entities are somewhat restricted in the
degree of “lobbying” they can conduct, in the sense of trying to influence votes, and
primarily focus their activity in providing pertinent information to interested Members of
Congress. Executive Branch organizations are also limited in the messages they are able
to convey to the Congress by virtue of the incumbent Administration in the White House
and its policy objectives and priorities. Formal testimony of agency officials, for
example, must be reviewed and approved by White House personnel--usually the Office
of Management and Budget--before being presented in hearings. The same is true of
major policy-related correspondence to the Congress.

The early stages of public policy formulation in the US system generally move at a
relatively slow pace. The internal discussions are generally limited and closely-held, as
options are considered before the final adoption of a policy position. If the policy lies
within the scope of Executive Authority granted exclusively to the President, its
promulgation is usually carried out through public announcement and publication in the
Federal Register. If the policy requires additional authority to be granted by the
Congress, then it must be submitted as a proposed policy, either in the form of draft

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legislation, incorporated within the budget proposed by the President each year, or in
some other formal way, such as an Agency Operating Plan or notification to
congressional committees of jurisdiction. In all these cases, it then becomes subject to
some form of congressional--and therefore public--response.

Before turning to the relevant space station policy history vis-à-vis congressional
consideration, a brief synopsis of the elements of the legislative process may be useful.
Budget proposals and proposed legislation are referred to the appropriate committees of
jurisdiction within the House, the Senate, or both, whether originating from the White
House or from individual Members of Congress. Appropriations legislation must, by the
Constitution, originate in the House of Representatives. The committees of jurisdiction
will most often then prepare background materials for their members and conduct one or
more hearings regarding the issues addressed in the legislation. These can be at either or
both the subcommittee level or the full committee level, at the discretion of the
Committee Chair. The final committee action is generally referred to as a “mark-up” in
which amendments to the proposed legislation are considered and, if agreeable to a
majority of members, a final version is then reported back to the full House or Senate for
floor deliberation. All legislation intended to have the force of law, must eventually pass
both chambers in a form agreeable to both--most often after a “conference committee”
comprised of members of the relevant committees of jurisdiction of both chambers has
resolved any differences between House and Senate versions of the legislation. The result
of these conference committees, known as a “Conference Report” are placed before each
chamber for a vote and, if “adopted,” establish the language for drafting into the final
legislation to be sent forward for the action of the President, either signing it into law or
vetoing it and returning it to the Congress for further action.

A further element of the general legislative process is important to note. In addition to

the consideration of legislation described above, the committees within both chambers of
the Congress conduct what are referred to as “oversight” activities. These are essentially
measures taken by the committees--most actively by the authorizing committees--to
monitor and asses the manner in which previous authority and funding is implemented by
the recipients. These activities take the form of program reviews, in which agency
personnel provide status information on programs for which they are responsible to
committee staff and Members, committee investigations, which are more in-depth and
focused reviews of program details, hearings, in which program managers formally
testify regarding the status and their management of the programs, and special studies and
reports requested by the committees of such entities as the General Accounting Office,
the Office of Technology Assessment (No longer in existence, but relevant in the space
station policy history), the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress,
and sometimes independent reviewing entities established by the Congress or the
Administration or requested studies from organizations such as the National Academy of
Science or its subordinate Boards.

Eventually, the congressional process leads to its “bottom line”--the debate and
disposition of legislation on the floor of each chamber. A wide range of considerations
determine how the leadership of each chamber fix the schedule for floor debate. Very

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often that schedule is volatile and unpredictable. Consequently, the relatively slow,
ponderous process of investigations, reports and hearings can suddenly transform into a
rapid-fire, almost breathtakingly rapid process of floor consideration. The enormous
press of legislative business results in very limited time to actually engage in floor debate
on any given item of legislation. It is in the context of this final step in the process that
the element of anticipation manifests its essential necessity.

The post-1993 approach taken by NASA and external space station advocates focused a
great deal of effort in taking the steps necessary to be as prepared and equipped as
possible for the final floor debate on the space station, which included, every year from
1993 to 2000, a concerted effort by space station opponents to kill the space station.
Within NASA, responsibility for supporting this effort was focused in the War
Room/Space Station Information Center, described above, which supported the Office of
Legislative Affairs in its congressional liaison function.

Activities to fulfill the function of issues anticipation and preparation centered around
three primary areas of interest: Emerging Issues, Statements by space station opponents,
and major media articles.

Emerging issues were identified by close attention to the preparatory stages of legislation
noted previously: the results of studies or investigations conducted by or at the request of
congressional committees or Members and testimony and commentary in relevant
hearings. In addition, close attention was paid to internal developments within the space
station program, in areas of cost, schedule, and technical issues, with a view to
identifying areas of concern.

Statements by space station opponents were collected, analyzed, and responses prepared
and, where appropriate, provided to external interests or to staff or Members of Congress.
Those responses were also catalogued for potential use during floor consideration of
legislation, should the issues be raised again in that context.

Major media articles, such as those appearing in major national or international

magazines, journals, or other news publications, were examined and responses prepared
which addressed each salient point raised in the article, either by providing correct factual
information, countervailing information, or alternative interpretations or conclusions
derived from the information included in the article. These were also distributed in real-
time, as appropriate, to space station supporters and other interested staff and/or Members
of Congress, as well as catalogued and maintained for use during the consideration of
legislation on the floor of Congress.

The body of information collected and developed during the “anticipatory” process
became a significant component of the fourth category of category, which is described
below.

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 Communication

The fourth and perhaps most important category of activity is communication. This, as
the saying goes, is “where the rubber meets the road” in securing and sustaining a policy
commitment. The aggregation of information, the collaborative mechanisms and
participants, and the anticipated issues and responses all flow together into the activities
designed to communicate the content of and justifications for the stated policy.

Several key elements of successful communications can be identified. Among the most
important of these are Accuracy, Relevance, Responsiveness and Timing. The first two
are obvious on their face; the content of communications, in whatever form, must be
accurate and relevant to the interests of the recipient. Responsiveness and timing, as
contemplated in this paper, warrant some brief elaboration.

There is an unfortunate tendency within many large organizations, and especially, it

seems, within large government organizations, to develop “boilerplate” or “template”
responses to requests for information or answers to frequently asked questions, especially
when there are large numbers of requests for similar information. Short, highly “filtered”
minimal responses are developed and used to respond to key words or broad topical areas
found in incoming correspondence or requests for information. These products of what
can be described as a “mail-room mentality” can be seriously counterproductive in the
attempts to build support for a policy and to build a level of confidence in the Agency--in
this case, NASA--and its willingness and ability to impart useful and meaningful
information. Often, this approach is adopted in order to meet an objective for rapid and
timely responses. Obviously, the less time required to generate a response to an inquiry,
the more quickly that response can be communicated. However, while a rapid response
by an agency to an inquiry is highly valued by a congressional staff member or Member
of Congress, for example, few things are less appreciated by them than an agency
response that leaves them wondering not only what is truly meant by the response, but
why it appears that whoever generated the response could not have read or understood the
initial inquiry.

Maintaining effective communications with the Congress requires that considerable effort
be made to acknowledge the right--even the duty--of members of congress and their staff
to obtain clear, complete and accurate program and policy-related information from a
federal agency spending taxpayer dollars authorized and appropriated by the Congress
and to prepare responses accordingly. If an incoming request appears vague or is
otherwise unclearly stated, it should be incumbent on the agency to seek immediate
clarification of what is being requested and what expectations are held for the agency
response. Telephones, emails, and even face-to-face meetings, if necessary, are quite
useful in securing the necessary clarification. If an agency finds that difficult to do, it has
failed badly in fulfilling its part of the “collaborative” activities mentioned above. It
should also be noted that effective anticipatory activities, as described above, are
intended to ensure that the information and materials needed for both responsive and
timely communications are already available.

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Among the effective “tools” for carrying out effective communications activities are
agency briefing materials, talking points, fact sheets or white papers, speeches and/or
statements, either as delivered by senior agency officials or as drafted for use by external
supporters and advocates, individual conversations, correspondence and meetings, and
material design for broader, mass audiences, such as audio-visual or multimedia
presentations. During the post-1993 space station experience, all of these kinds of tools
were utilized in an effective, highly-coordinated manner.

Results

Without interviewing each Member of Congress who voted on space station amendments
over the years, it is impossible to measure with certainty the impact of the steps and
efforts described above. What is measurable is the record of votes cast over the period of
time discussed within the scope of this paper. The following charts provide a visual
representation of the shift in vote patterns over time in congressional deliberations on
space station:

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Numerous analyses exist which identify the major voting blocs and visible trends within
the larger total numbers illustrated by these charts. As with almost any vote in the
Congress, a wide range of considerations determine how and why any given Member will
vote on a specific amendment or piece of legislation. Explanations abound as to why
there were dramatic swings in station-related vote outcomes in the House of
Representatives, while the outcomes in the Senate remained relatively constant. Some
appear fairly obvious, such as the higher degree of member continuity in the Senate over
time, where there are six-year terms and only a third of the body is up for reelection every
two years, versus the greater fluctuation in membership composition in the House, which
is up for re-election, in its entirety, every two years. Generally, when voting postures are
established in the Senate it requires something fairly significant to prompt a change in
that posture over time.

What is important to note, for purposes of this paper, is that the vast majority of the
previously-described efforts invested by NASA and its partners in the post-1993 period
was directed at staff and Members of the House of Representatives rather than the Senate.
The same basic information and material was made available to the Senate, but there was
simply less demand for its use in the context of the sort of stable vote outcomes reflected
in the above chart.

An additional point to remember is that the progress of the space station program did not
suddenly become trouble-free after 1994. Indeed, it could be argued that it faced even
more difficult and complex issues than it had before the time, as contractors moved into
production, testing and integration of actual flight hardware and software, both within the
US and its partner nations, which included Russia as a key and, some would argue,
difficult new partner in a significant and often controversial role in the redesigned space

19
station. There was certainly no reduction in the number or aggressiveness of space
station opponents during that period, both within the Congress and in the private,
academic and scientific communities. Yet there was a clear, measurable and steady
increase in the margins of support for the space station throughout the post-1993 period.

It is the author’s belief and contention that the elements of a “strategy of sustainment”
briefly outlined in this paper played an important role in securing that increased margin
of support, at least through the end of 1998.

Hardware on Orbit

November 20, 1998 marked the initiation of on-orbit space station assembly with the first
element launch. As would never have been imagined in 1984, that launch occurred from
the steppes of Kazakhstan, with the launch of the Russian-built, U.S.-owned “Zarya”
module--formerly known as the FGB, or “Functional Cargo Block.” Thirteen days later,
on December 3rd, the space shuttle Endeavour launched, carrying the Unity Node on
what was the first true “assembly” flight, during which a new module was mated to
hardware already on orbit. Zarya and Unity were mated on December 6, 1998, an event
that marked the birth of what would become a “New Star” in the heavens.

With these two events, after almost 16 years, the policy statement uttered by President
Reagan on January 25, 1984 had its visible manifestation in orbit. Subsequent to the
commencement of space station assembly, three more half-hearted attempts were made in
the House of Representatives by Representative Tim Roemer and others, to terminate the
space station. But, as has been illustrated, the wind was fairly well out of the sails of
those attempts even before the first element launch. With hardware on orbit and much
more completed hardware awaiting launch, there was little likelihood that the program
would be terminated, and the vote outcomes in 1999 and 2000 demonstrated the vast
majority’s acceptance of that fact. In July 2001, Representative Roemer offered and then
withdrew without debate or vote an amendment to terminate the space station during
floor consideration of NASA appropriations legislation. He then offered an amendment
which would have required NASA not to defer funding for several station elements while
forcing it to abide by a total funding cap--which would have created an impossible
situation for the space station. That amendment was defeated by a voice vote.
Representative Roemer retired from Congress at the end of 2002 without making any
further attempt to terminate the space station, and none have been made by other
Members since that time. In the Senate, since the retirement of Senator Dale Bumpers at
the end of 1998, no further attempts have been made to terminate the station. Criticism
and concerns about the space station, however, have not disappeared along with the
formal attempts to kill it.

New Challenges, Tragedy and a New Policy Environment

The first week of November 2000 brought two major developments for space
exploration; one that was obvious; another that wouldn’t become so until more than three
years later. The first came on November 2, 2000, when the Soyuz-TM module, launched

20
on October 31, docked at the aft docking port of the Zvezda Service Module and the
Expedition One crew entered the nascent space station to begin permanent habitation of
the growing on-orbit facility.

The second development was the presidential election of 2000 which brought about a
change in the US Administration with the election of George W. Bush as President of the
United States. A little over three years later, on January 14, 2004, President Bush would
go to NASA Headquarters and announce the initiation of a new “Vision for Exploration”
which would redirect the US human space exploration effort on a path that would be
intended to lead, eventually, far beyond the space station; back to the Moon, on to Mars,
and beyond. It is, as has been noted earlier, the challenge of sustaining that vision which
has prompted this review of the lessons learned from the space station experience.

It has not been a direct path of course, from the election of 2000 to the new Vision for
Exploration. More lessons--some extraordinarily painful--had yet to be learned. The first
steps began with the transition from the Clinton Administration to the Bush
Administration. The Bush-Cheney Transition Team asked former Bush (41)
Administration official and commercial space entrepreneur Courtney Stadd to lead a
NASA Transition Team to conduct a review of NASA, its programs, budget and
management, and prepare a review of its findings and recommendations for the new
Administration, to be sworn in the following January. This paper will not attempt to
address the breadth and scope of the Transition effort. Suffice it so say that, during the
course of that effort it became clear that the space station program was facing a
disturbingly higher-than-expected estimate of the funding levels needed to complete its
assembly. As the numbers were checked--and double-checked by NASA--in the early
weeks of 2001, it was announced that the “shortfall” for future funding requirements was
$4 billion.

Needless to say, this created shock-waves of concern throughout the space station
“constituency,” the Congress and the new Bush White House--especially the Office of
Management and Budget. The initial response of the Administration to the space station
news was reflected in the Budget Blueprint document, which was released on February
28, 2001. For the space station, it meant a redefinition of “assembly complete” with the
introduction of the term “US core complete,” defined as that point at which the space
station would be ready to accept major international hardware elements. More
specifically--and of greater concern to space station supporters and potential researchers--
was the elimination of funding for the Habitation Module, Crew Return Vehicle, and
Propulsion Module, and the realignment of funding for U.S. research equipment and
associated support with assembly build-up. The net effect of those changes was a
limitation of crew size to three, rather than the previously planned seven, posing the
threat of severe limitations on crew time for research. A “carrot” was offered that was
intended to force NASA to address cost and management issues that had led to the large
down-stream cost growth: future funding decisions to develop and deploy any U.S.
elements or enhancements beyond completion of the U.S. core would depend on the
quality of cost estimates, resolution of technical issues, and the availability of funding
through budget efficiencies. The Blueprint also spelled out specific reforms that NASA

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was expected to undertake in financial and program management, required an
independent review to validate cost estimates and other reform options, and transferred
space station program management reporting from JSC to Headquarters pending
development of a new program management plan.

The independent review called for began on July 30, 2001 with the appointment of the
International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force, which
was tasked to report its findings and recommendations by November 1, 2001.

By the time the IMCE began its work, NASA had secured agreement with the White
House that efforts could be undertaken to explore opportunities to increase space station
crew size, depending on success in financial reform efforts.

The combination of IMCE recommendations and FY 2003 Budget request led to creation
of an effort to review space station research options and priorities in the context of
anticipated assembly schedules and on-orbit capabilities. The creation of a Research
Maximization and Prioritization Task Force (ReMAP) was announced on March 28, 2002
and directed to complete its review and report by September 2002, with a preliminary
report due in July to enable consideration of revised research objectives for the FY 2004
budget submission.

NASA began 2003 with perhaps the best understanding of the true challenges and
realistic potential for space station development that it had had in many years--possibly
for the life of the program. It did not yet have all the answers, but at least knew most of
the questions. February 1, 2003 brought a terrible tragedy with the loss of the space
shuttle Columbia and her crew, the grounding of the space shuttle fleet and, with it, the
interruption of space station assembly for what will eventually have been more than two
years.

The accident was followed by an intense and comprehensive examination of the factors
causing and relating to the loss of the orbiter and crew, conducted by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), which released its findings on August 26, 2004. In
response to the Board’s findings, and in consequence of its own internal investigations,
NASA has initiated Return to Flight activities, including an additional independent
Return to Flight Task Group (RTFTG) to evaluate NASA’s efforts to implement the
recommendations of the CAIB. With respect to the space station, NASA initiated a
Continuing Flight Team (CFT) to review the CAIB report and its applicability to the
space station and to ensure continuation of space station operations and development in a
manner consistent with both the CAIB and IMCE recommendations. The CFT issues
periodically-updated status reports on those activities, as Volume 2 of NASA’s formal
response to the CAIB.

All of these activities are crucial to the successful re-establishment and continuation of
US space flight capability under any circumstances following the Columbia accident.
With the announcement of the new Vision for Exploration in January of this year,

22
however, they now serve as a sort of back-drop for that new Vision, which is now taking
center stage in the US space policy arena.

That new Vision statement was accompanied by the creation of the President’s
Commission on Implementation of United States Exploration Policy, created, as its title
states, to make recommendations for implementation of the new Vision. The
Commission, commonly referred to as the Aldridge Commission, after its Chairman, Pete
Aldridge, Jr., issued its report on June 4, 2004. That report offers a wide array of
suggestions and recommendations regarding the next steps to be taken on what it
describes as “a journey to inspire, innovate and discover.”

First among the Commission’s “Imperatives for Success” in implementing the Vision is
“Sustainability” of the initiative over several decades, requiring the support of “multiple
Presidents, multiple Congresses, and a couple of generations of American taxpayers.”
The exact nature of a broad strategy to ensure that sustainment is, as yet, unknown. This
paper has attempted to demonstrate that the space station policy sustainment experience
can be a source of valuable input into the evolution and implementation of that strategy.

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