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2. Describe in some detail the composition and style of the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina and
the strategies it employed in its ultimately unsuccessful bid to defeat the Vietminh. What were its
strengths? Its weaknesses? What would it have taken to produce a French victory?
 2

France underwent major restructuring following the recapturing of France at the end of

1944 and the new regime sought to regain influence over its colonial assets. First the current

French army was reorganized and in reference to Indochina the 2




 



 


F or in nglish the French Far ast peditionary
orps was

formed.1 Seeking an opportunity late in the war the Japanese launched a military coup in early

1945 in Indochina against a French government in transition and kicked the French out through

use of etreme brutality and overwhelming force. The Vietminh under Ho
hi Minh fought a

guerilla war with the help of the
hinese in the North while the newly formed
F along

with the British retook control of Southern Indochina. French collaborators and traitors were

removed and the communists under Ho
hi Minh were kicked out of politics as they were

communists. The initial mission of the
F was to accept the surrender of the Japanese and

reassert control over the area through supporting Saigon and dismantling the operational centers

the Vietminh had fortified and garrisoned during their guerilla war against the Japanese. This

angered the Vietminh and violence erupted which eventually become what is now known as the

First Indochina War.2 From this point on the
F would face many challenges fighting an

enemy it did not understand nor respect.

To first understand how the
F fought in Indochina it is important to first

comprehend how it was organized and deployed. The central unit to the
F was the Far ast

Infantry Battalions. These battalions consisted of 300-400 soldiers throughout the war although

on paper they were supposed to have much more. In a typical uropean battalion there should be

around 1000 soldiers.3 French units in Indochina were largely under strength as the previous

1
Leulliot Nowfel and Danny Hara. ‘
 May 25 2007.
2
Marsot Alain-Gerard. "The
rucial Year: Indochina 1946."  
 2 


 

 19 no. 2 April 1984: 337-354.
3
Leulliot Nowfel and Danny Hara. ‘
 May 25 2007.
 3

figure shows manpower was one of the main disadvantages the French faced in trying to

conduct military operations. These infantry battalions were broken down into one

headquarters/service company HQS and four rifle companies. The rifle companies each

consisted of around 90 soldiers once again very undermanned. ach company would have a

support platoon that would be armed with machine guns/mortars and three rifle platoons that

were comprised of three squads.4 Towards the end of the war these rifle companies would be

integrated with mobile armored units in an attempt to use combined arms to better fight off

ambushes that were taking a serious toll on the French troops.

These battalions were often accompanied by native auiliaries who were trained by

French cadres to a uropean model of war. The
F was made of enlisted and volunteer

French Union soldiers who were largely not of French descent. Soldiers from Madagascar

entral Africa and North Africa made up a large percentage of the
F. Most uropean

soldiers served with the French Foreign Legion or the Paratroopers which had a different and

smaller level of organization. The same is true of the armored units which usually operated in

units of four whether it be armored cars or tanks they on average operated in fours guarding

conveys since the roads were the only place they could successfully operate.

The strategies the French used changed throughout the war as they used techniques

mainly through trial and error. During the initial phases of the war the French used their

overwhelming superiority in firepower to force the Vietminh to fight a guerilla war unless they

wanted to suffer heavy causalities. The Vietminh then used Maoist principles and waged a

successful and frustrating war of attrition on the French. The French suffered due to

overconfidence in their technology and a lack of information and political propaganda. The

4
Leulliot Nowfel and Danny Hara. ‘
 May 25 2007.
 4

French forces spent on majority of their resources on search and destroy missions where they had

no idea where the enemy was or what kind of strength the Vietminh possessed in a certain area.

The French also tried to use the mobility of paratroops to drop in behind enemy forces when the

army would attempt a thrust in the region. This is known as the hammer and anvil maneuver and

it was successful once during the initial stages of the war where the French came close to

capturing key Vietminh leaders. They would never enjoy the same success again. Most of the

fighting took place in the northern region of Tonkin while other areas were plagued by small

scale ambushes that tied down a large majority of French troops. The French government was

never fully ready to commit the amount of troops necessary to win the war and therefore the

F was left to fight a war it was not capable of winning by itself. The
F also suffered

from a lack of any system for collecting intelligence. n a small unit scale certain commanders

were able to work with peasants to obtain information but these groups were the eception. The

Vietminh intelligence system was so good that Vietminh agents could list French commanders

and what their personality flaws were which they often used to great effectiveness. The French

did not lose the war from a military standpoint but from a political one. With the absence of any

political system they had no chance of winning the hearts and minds of the Indochinese people

especially after 1950 when
hina began supplying the Vietminh with heavy equipment and

communist political support.5

With this being said there were some strong points about the
F in Indochina. First

was the supply base behind their army. The French units were under strength in respects to

manpower but were able to be regularly supplied with ammunition state of the art artillery

rifles food and all the necessities able to fight a war. The French had the ability to air drop

5
Tønnesson, Stein. "The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945-75." Journal of Peace Research 22, no. 1 (March 1985): 9-
29.
 5

supplies in use primitive helicopters to VA
casualties and bring in lots of firepower to an

area on short notice using artillery/air strikes. However in terms of offensive operations the

French lacked the ability to mount large scale airborne operations being able to only drop in 2

battalions at one time which seriously damaged their ability to operate effectively on a large

scale.6 After the initial reinsertion phase and success in early set-piece battles the French became

locked in a stalemate with the Vietminh. This stalemate was broken with the
hinese providing

communist support after their victory over the Nationalists.7 The French having no political

scheme in place to win over the Vietminh population found themselves fighting an unwinnable

war after 1949.

6
Leulliot Nowfel and Danny Hara. ‘
 May 25 2007.
7
Fall Bernard. Street Without Joy. New York: Schocken Books 1961.
 6

 
 

Fall Bernard. á




  New York: Schocken Books 1961.

Leulliot Nowfel and Danny Hara. ‘
 May 25 2007.

http://members.multimania.co.uk/Indochine/inde.html#top accessed November 29 2010.

Marsot Alain-Gerard. "The
rucial Year: Indochina 1946."  
 2 



 


19 no. 2 April 1984: 337-354.

Tønnesson Stein. "The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945-75."  
 ! " #  
" 22 no. 1
March 1985: 9-29.