Political Dimensions of Agricultural Innovation and The Green Revolution in India: Paper

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION
&
THE GREEN REVOLUTION
IN INDIA
S.A.B.
ABSTRACT. This paper provides a rough outline of the genesis of the Green Revolution, with special emphasis placed on
its socio-political aspects. Most examples provided pertain to the Indian Punjab, as HYV diffusion was greatest there
compared to the rest of Southeast Asia. The first section deals with the major institutions and actors generally seen as
occupying a central role in the development of the high-yield seed variety (HYV), such as the CIMMYT and the IRRI. Briefly
discussed are also basic considerations about the growing circumstances in India and the proposed benefits of HYV seed
technology. In Part II, a detailed account is given about the precise political circumstances that surrounded agricultural
research after the Second World War. Discussed at length is also the influence of the Rockefeller Foundation and the U.S.
government in helping shape the Green Revolution‟s institutional predecessors in Mexico, such as the Office of Special
Studies. Part III runs through the social and political consequences of HYV seeds as an agricultural innovation devised
specifically to alleviate rural poverty. It entertains both the positive and negative aspects and also broadens the paper‟s general
scope by inviting the reader to think critically about the role of science in society. Part IV seeks to demonstrate how the
Green Revolution is largely the product of a socio-political system that encouraged its development and was largely
responsible for the minutia of its effects.
“CGIAR1 is the most meaningful affirming flame shining in our spaceship world today.”
- Monkombu Sambasivan Swaminathan
Director of the International Rice Research Institute
I. Introduction: An Agricultural Renaissance?
T
he Green Revolution is commonly recognized as a series of technological advancements in the field of agriculture
that enabled farmers to substantially increase their yields by modifying basic inputs such as seeds and fertilizers. The
“breakthroughs in plant breeding”2 that largely constitute the Green Revolution were initially developed outside
India by two large agricultural research organizations, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre, referred to typically by its Spanish acronym CIMMYT. The discoveries made by
these organizations subsequently spread throughout the world and carried the hope of raising crop yields in countries that
were in desperate need of increasing their food supply. Often, many such countries had experienced repeated famines and
generally had to rely on foreign food aid in order to prevent mass starvation, as evidenced by the Bihar and Bengal Famines in
India. By substituting existing plant breeds with new high yield varieties (HYV), it became possible to increase the production
of staple crops in order to meet, and in some cases even exceed demand. (Hazell & Ramasamy 1991, P. 1) While many
countries eventually adopted HYV type seeds and the corresponding techniques required to farm them, it was primarily India
(and to some extent Pakistan) where they were most extensively implemented.
In middle of the 20 century, India experienced two significant famines, both with disastrous consequences which
consequently had a major impact on policy and decision making regarding food and agriculture. Most notable in this regard is
the Great Bengal Famine which broke out in 1943. While an inquiry published in 1945 placed the blame for the famine
“squarely on the Governments of India and Bengal” 3 it is difficult to ascertain the precise reasons behind the disaster.
Overall, it is estimated to have killed between 1.5 and 3 million people in the province of British India then known as Bengal.
1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research based in Washington, DC.

2 KHAN, E. J.: The Stuff of Life IV – Everybody‟s Business, The New Yorker, March 4th, 1985. P. 53
3 PERKINS, John H.: Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes and the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 1997. P. 159
Whether caused by mismanagement of otherwise sufficient resources or the actual non-presence of essential staple crops (in
this case rice), the Famine was to have a decisive impact on the way food security would be perceived by the Indian
government and its people well into independence. (Perkins 1997, P. 159) The partitioning of the British India into the
Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan upon independence resulted in “a disaster for the Indian agricultural
economy.”4 Combined with a general decline in food production during the previous twenty five years of British rule, the
split of the British Empire pushed India into a situation where it was forced to import even greater quantities of food from
Pakistan. As of 1947 (the year of independence) India was not capable of feeding its population without food imports from
nearby Pakistan and other sources. Perkins further elaborates:
The food situation in India's first four years of independence, therefore, can be characterized as follows. A
pattern of increasing reliance on imports of food grains was standard behaviour in the sense that trade
channels in use since the 1920s expected to make the imports in order to satisfy consumer demand. At the
same time, India was acutely conscious of its vulnerability on the food issue. Failure to assure adequate
supplies at acceptable prices would have damaged the legitimacy of the new national government as surely
as the Bengal famine had tarnished the British. Imports of food could satisfy demand, but they were a drain
on foreign exchange, which was needed for other projects. In addition, Indian leaders surely did not like to
be dependent for supplies on Pakistan.5
The Great Bengal Famine and the first few years that followed India‟s independence served as the primer that would provide
the essential social and political atmosphere conducive to the implementation of the agricultural methods prescribed by the
Green Revolution.
Between 1966 and 1967 another famine occurred that would again cast doubt upon the Subcontinent‟s ability to feed its
population. Known as the Bihar famine, its proximate cause was “attributed to a „failure of crops of 1966 immediately
following partial failure of harvests also in the preceding year,‟ both of which were „due to deficient and unfavourably
distributed rainfall.”6 The subsequent inquiry into the incident known as the Bihar Famine Report published in 1973 did not
properly identify the actual causes of the incident. The Report concluded that “‟whenever a famine occurs in Bihar, it is always
due to failure of periodical rains, and as upon these depend the success or failure of the rice crop, it follows that famine in
Bihar is always caused by a failure of the rice crop.‟” 7 As Brass notes however, the actual production of foodstuffs in Bihar
was not substantially lower in the years 1965-1966 immediately before the famine – in fact production levels were at 96.2 per
cent that of normal. Further, the report also takes famine to be an inevitable consequence of drought, thereby disregarding
reasons such as economics, which may be equally if not more important. (Brass 1986, P. 247ff) In order to establish the
causes of resource shortfall in a particular region, one must also look at the relative availability of resources in the regions
from which emergency supplies might be procured should the need arise. Thus it emerges that famines occur by no means
solely due to natural processes:
“Drought-induced scarcity in Bihar requires the importation of grain from other parts of India or other
countries to make up the shortfall and to prevent famine, and therefore it is necessary to consider the food
situation in India as a whole at the time.”8
One of the most serious flaws of the Bihar Famine Report is that it paid relatively little attention to the idea that the famine in
Bihar might be the result of economic-development planning or agricultural policy-making. Brass goes on to suggest that the
Bihar Famine might have been better used to highlight the “three general features of the agricultural situation in India that
might have contributed to its occurrence:”9
“First, the drought and famine pointed to a persistent problem namely, the historically low and unstable
yields of the main food crop, rice, in the main cropping season in a vast area of the country (Brass 1983)
rather than merely to a sudden, unanticipated crisis. Second, the drought and famine indicated clearly that
6 BRASS, Paul R.: The Political Uses of Crisis: The Bihar Famine of 1966 – 1967, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Feb. 1986) P. 247
some areas of the country were in a better position than others to withstand the lack of rainfall, namely, the
canal and tubewell-irrigated areas. Third, the drought and famine suggested that what had been pointed out
in a Planning Commission report on the Easter Districts of U.P. (Government of India 1964) there were
severe environmental constraints and a dearth of capital resources, [which] made it difficult to envisage
major changes in the development of agriculture in the region from Eastern U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] to Bengal
unless considerable external resources were provided to alter agricultural practices.”10 (Emphasis Added)
According to Thakur, it was because of the drought that occurred in 1966-67 that “an agricultural policy was set in motion
that ultimately led to the so-called Green Revolution in the country.”11
Across the centuries, Indian farmers as well as their counterparts throughout the world were preoccupied primarily with being
able to produce enough food to feed their families, a practice generally referred to as „subsistence farming‟. In fact, this type
of farming is still one of the most common occupations amongst the world‟s peoples. In his article about the contemporary
role of rice as the world‟s predominant staple crop, E. J. Khan asserts that “there are over a billion men and women who do
very little throughout their lives except try to grow enough of it [rice] to keep on living.”12 This method of farming is
characterized by “primitive techniques and low yields” 13 and it generally results in the “cultivation of foodgrains being the
dominant pattern of land use.”14 In India, the typical food grain crops such as rice, wheat, millets, maize and barley constitute
about seventy to ninety per cent of the total caloric intake. However, despite the vast amount of land dedicated to the
production of these essential grains, food shortages remained a commonplace in most of the country. In any case, the
problem lies not simply with just raising the aggregate levels of production, but as the Bihar Famine made evident, it is a
matter of making all parts of India self-sufficient in terms of food. (Chakaravarti 1973, P. 320) In order to raise aggregate
production, one must raise either, or both, of its constituent factors: acreage and yield. The yield is characterized by “labour,
farming technique, fertilizers and irrigation” 15 whereas the acreage simply represents the total land area devoted to cultivation.
Because most of the agriculturally viable land in India is already cultivated, the only manner in which aggregate production
can be raised is by increasing (or modifying) the yield. In India, increasing yields was expected to not only provide ample
reserves of grain in case of eventual shortages, but also to allow for some form of “capital for investment.”16 Previous
attempts at increasing the yield of Indian farms had failed for a variety of reasons, primarily due to the unique growing
situation exhibited by many of the most fertile regions in India. Indian seeds had evolved over “several centuries in order to
withstand droughts, floods, low soil fertility, and crude tillage practices without variations in yields.”17 Many of the new seed
varieties were not sufficiently dynamic to endure these unique growing conditions and subsequently failed, whereas native
seeds did not properly respond to fertilizers and other changes in farming technique and hence could not be coaxed into
producing more simply by adding inputs.
Only through the introduction of the newly engineered HYV seeds would the Green Revolution in India truly begin to
flourish. These seeds had several characteristics which made them particularly suited to the unique growing conditions that
had prevented the widespread use of other imported varieties:
a) They are more responsive to fertilizers;

b) The yields per unit of fertilizer are higher;
c) The heads do not topple when heavy with matured grains;
d) Excepting paddy seeds, they are drought resistant and adapted to a wide latitudinal range;
e) Their shorter growing period sometimes enables the cultivation of a second major crop; and
f) They can give two to four times the yields of the indigenous varieties. 18
11 THAKUR, Baleshwar et. al.: Urban and Regional Development in India, Volume 2, Concept Publishing Company, 2005. P. 585
12 KHAN, E. J.: The Stuff of Life IV – Everybody‟s Business, The New Yorker, March 4th, 1985. P. 53
13 CHAKRAVARTI, A.K.: Green Revolution in India. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 63, No. 3, Pages 319-330, Sep. 1973. P. 319
14 CHAKRAVARTI, A.K.: Green Revolution in India. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 63, No. 3, Pages 319-330, Sep. 1973. P. 320
15 CHAKRAVARTI, A.K.: Green Revolution in India. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 63, No. 3, Pages 319-330 (Sep. 1973) P. 320
Small scale introduction of these seeds began in the growing season 1966-67 and was initially very lucrative for the companies
involved. During this period, an estimated 4.66 million acres were used for growing HYV crops. By 1968-69, this had
increased to 22.97 million acres which represented 10.4 per cent of the total cultivated land area for the five major cereal
crops in India. At this point, the Indian government was already involved in the distribution of seeds and had established a
“National Seeds Corporation to provide financing and guidance.” 19 For the period 1973-74 the „Fourth Plan‟ set growing
targets at 60 million acres. (Chakravarti 1973, P. 320) These new seed varieties had an impact and India‟s gross agricultural
output almost immediately.
Figure 1: Aggregate Production Level of Selected Cereals20 (Millions of Tons, India)
Crop 1950-51 1966-67 1967-68 1969-70
Rice (milled) 20.58 30.44 37.61 40.43
Wheat 6.46 11.53 16.54 20.10
Jowar 5.50 8.95 10.05 9.72
Bajra 2.60 4.50 5.19 5.33
Maize 1.73 4.99 6.27 5.67
Total Food Grains 50.83 75.05 95.05 99.50
As the Green Revolution spread in India and through other parts of Asia, growth in the “global production of food grains
grew at rates outstripping those of the world population, thus defying Malthusian predictions.” 21 Thomas Malthus, an English
economist, published an influential paper in the late 18th century bearing the title An Essay on the Principle of Population. In it, he
“remarked that humans, like other species in the animal kingdom, have the ability to reproduce at a greater rate than
necessary to maintain a viable population.”22 If population growth were to carry on unchecked, it would eventually exceed a
region‟s carrying capacity resulting in famine. Malthus‟ theories gained renewed attention in the early 20th century with
happenings such as the „Dust Bowl‟ in the United States and the great Mexican famine that occurred in the 1940s. (Sherman
& Koontz 2008, P. 142) Even up until the early 1960s, food security in the context of Asia‟s rapid population growth rates
was generally regarded pessimistically by the scientific community. According to Sherman and Koontz, it was at this point
“becoming evident that producing the amount of food necessary to feed an ever increasing population would not be possible
with existing agricultural methods.”23 Incidentally, it is in Mexico that we begin to document the development of dwarf
variety wheat – one of the first types of HYV seeds.
II. Development of the High Yield Variety: A Glimpse into the Nexus of Politics and Science
H
istorically, the Green Revolution can be best understood by examining the actual concepts encompassed by the
term itself. To this extent, Parayil provides an explanation that is both illuminating and thorough:
“The term „Green Revolution‟ is generally taken to mean the increase in cereal productivity experienced in some
Third World countries as a result of the change in agricultural technology during the 1960s and 1970s. … It
is an instance of relatively successful technology transfer, notwithstanding some latent problems associated
with it. Generally, the Green Revolution involved the use of seeds of high-yielding varieties (HYVs), primarily of
wheat and rice, and the adoption of a package of improved agricultural practices involving fertilizers, pesticides,
controlled water, credits, mechanical threshers, pumps and so forth. These changes were instituted in place of
the „traditional‟ agricultural practice involving the use of seeds whose genetic makeup goes back thousands of years.”24
(Emphasis added)
21 DARITY, William A. Jr.: International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd Edition, Volume 3: Ethnic Conflict – Inequality, Gender. The Gale
Group, 2008. P. 164

22 SHERMAN, Wendy R. & KOONTZ, Trish Yourst: Science and Society in the Twentieth Century. Greenwood Press, London, 2008. P. 142
24 PARAYIL, Govindan: The Green Revolution in India: A Case Study of Technological Change. Technology and Culture, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct. 1992) P. 737
Parayil begins his definition ordinarily enough, considering the Green Revolution to have started in the 1960/70s with a
change in agricultural technology resulting in increased productivity of cereals. However, he proceeds to point out that this
change in technology was actually the result of „technology transfer‟, an idea which is rarely made explicit. It is significant
because it highlights the fact that HYV seeds were developed largely outside of the countries that would eventually come to
depend on them. Further, Parayil addresses another essential aspect, namely that HYV seeds require a set of corresponding
methods in order to facilitate optimal productivity. In fact, “without fertilizer or without controlled irrigation the new
varieties usually yield no more and sometimes less than traditional strains.” 25 (See also Chakravarti 1973, P. 323) These new
methods supplant the old ones, and indigenous seed varieties eventually go out of circulation in favour of their genetically
modified cousins. In a society where farming still “provides full or part-time employment to 55% of the workforce” 26 such
changes could not but have some kind of social consequences. (Saitō 1971, P. 22f) However this aspect of the Green
Revolution is commonly overshadowed by the claims of “knowledgeable observers that … agricultural innovations [saved]
millions of lives, especially in the developing world.”27
The „technology transfer‟ that eventually became the mainstay of the Green Revolution started in early 1940‟s with a team of
“four scientists funded by the Rockefeller Foundation … to assess the food shortage [in Mexico] and to work with the
Mexican government to help develop effective agricultural practices.” 28 By the early 1960s, this small research team had
blossomed into a fully-fledged organization dedicated to the agricultural sciences commonly known under the acronym
CIMMYT. It was at this institution that the first major breakthrough in HYV seeds was made, namely the “development of
short-statured, fertilizer-responsive, photo-insensitive rice and wheat varieties.” 29 Generally credited with their discovery is
plant pathologist Norman Borlaug, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 for his work in this field. Borlaug‟s insight was
won by concentrating his research on the short-stalked (dwarf) variety of food grains as opposed to their tall-stalked brethren
which typically dominated most agriculturally viable areas. His key discovery lay in allocating more energy to the inedible parts
of the plant such as the leaves and stems, which in turn allowed the plant‟s grain to grow larger. Overall, this dwarf variety
seed was about twice as energy effective as the tall-stalked type. A further benefit of the dwarf variety was that it allowed
more crop to be planted in a similar physical area because the plant itself remained more vertically stable. Vertical stability also
allowed the plants to draw more energy from fertilizer without falling over and thus becoming un-harvestable. This „miracle
wheat‟ purportedly allowed the tripling of crop yields within a relatively modest time frame. (Sherman & Koontz 2008, P.
142) It is this unparalleled yield potential which made the Green Revolution so remarkable in the eyes of many. Despite
having been applied to only relatively small percentage of the Subcontinent‟s arable land, HYV seeds had made her self-
sustainable by the 1980s and since 2000, even a net exporter of agricultural products. (Nagarajan 2004, P. 1f)
It remains to be addressed however, that the sole credit for „discovering‟ HYV wheat seeds cannot be given entirely to
Borlaug and the CIMMYT, at least not without some qualifying remarks. In fact, the first dwarf type seeds might not have
originated in the Western world at all. Parayil claims that HYV rice varieties were already in use by the Chinese as early as
1000 A.D. During the 1800s these seeds attracted the attention of Japanese farmers because it was noticed that their
productive potential could be expanded by supplying chemical fertilizers. The process of actually improving the plant through
synthetic modification “began with the selection in the 1800s and the hybridization process in the 1900s:” 30 During the rice
shortages that occurred between the first and second World Wars, the Japanese imperial government began to transfer this
new “seed-fertilizer-irrigation-based technology to its colonies in Korea and Taiwan.” 31 The HYV rice variety that was
implemented throughout Southeast Asia during the 1960s was actually a product of the IRRI in Manila, and was inspired by
the developments in Japan and Taiwan. The most successful and widely implemented type of rice pioneered by the IRRI was
a variety known as IR-8 which was based heavily on the Norin and Ponlai varieties developed by the Japanese. IR-8 and its
25 CLEAVER, Harry M.: Some Contradictions of Capitalism: The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 1/2
(Mar. 1972) P. 177
26 SANYAL, Sanjeev: The Indian Renaissance: India‟s Rise After a Thousand Years of Decline. World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 2008. P. 117
27 GILBERT, Geoffrey: World Population: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO, 2005. P. 107
29 PRAY, Carl E.: The Green Revolution as a Case Study in Transfer of Technology. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 458,
Technology Transfer: New Issues, New Analysis (Nov. 1981) P. 70

sister seed Taichung Native 1 were also the rice varieties that subsequently experienced widespread distribution in India. As
for the semi-dwarf wheat variety apparently first discovered at the CIMMYT, it was based heavily on the Japanese experience
with two strains known as Akakomugi and Daruma. By crossing certain American wheat varieties, the Japanese produced
Norin 10 which was introduced to the United States in 1946. The U.S. Department of Agriculture continued to develop this
strain of wheat, and eventually, scientists in Washington State produced a strain known as Norin-Brevor. It was this particular
cross that was taken to the CIMMYT in Mexico in 1954, and it became the base from which Norman Borlaug and his
colleagues produced the HYVs “that were transferred to India and other Third World countries in the mid-1960s.”32 (Parayil
1992, P. 743f)
The success of HYV seeds in India however is due not merely to just the threat of famine and the promise of abundance.
That is, HYV varieties were not implemented solely for practical purposes but also in response to government policy and
planning. The possibility of famine that large parts of the Indian subcontinent faced during the first half of the twentieth
century can be partially attributed to the reliance on subsistence farming by a majority of those in the agricultural sector.
Subsistence farming is “often characterized by an exclusion effect, which is a tendency on the part of peasant farmers to resist
change.”33 Preserving the status quo in this manner is what led to the “stasis in agricultural productivity that culminated in a
near famine situation in the 1960s.”34 However, there was relatively little additional land that could be cultivated, which
accentuated the reliance on technology as the sole method of improving productivity. In fact, the decline of productivity of
India‟s food system can actually be traced back to British colonial rule. Before the establishment of the British colony in the
mid18th century, “agricultural technology in India … was comparable or even superior to that in Europe.” 35 This assessment
coincides with a number of other opinions given by agricultural experts, such as that of Dr John Augustus Voelcker “who
was deputed by the Secretary of State to India to advice [!] the imperial government on the application of agricultural
chemistry to Indian agriculture.”36
“I explain that I do not share the opinions which have been expressed as to Indian Agriculture being, as a
whole, primitive and backward, but I believe that in many parts there is little or nothing that can be
improved. Whilst where agriculture is manifestly inferior, it is more generally the result of absence
of facilities which exist in the better districts than from inherent bad systems of cultivation…”37
(Emphasis in original)
During British rule, India‟s agricultural sector was neglected in favour of its industry and did progress in step with the rest of
the world. Between World War I and independence in 1947, the sector suffered continued setbacks “as a consequence of
complex factors including reduced exports due to worldwide recession, depression, and the near paralysis of shipping during
World War II.”38 The division of the British Raj into India and Pakistan and the emphasis on cash crops rather than staple
grains that followed compounded these problems further. (Shiva 1993, P. 27) Lastly, India was also burdened with the
unusual situation of having to feed one fourth of the world‟s mouths from only one sixteenth of its land base.
By the time of independence in 1947, India was an impoverished country with over “90 per cent of its population living in
nearly 600,000 villages dependent on agriculture.” 39 Although modern agricultural technology was introduced in India before
the Green Revolution, it had relatively little impact on the domestic food supply for a number of reasons. While the colonial
administration did introduce certain new methods intended to increase productivity, it generally applied them only to crops
destined for export. Attempts were also made in the early 20th century to perform research on rice and wheat; however these
did not lead to any significant increase in the availability of essential food grains. Parayil, following Pray, attributes the
shortcomings of these efforts to a lack of essential adaptive research. It turns out that such auxiliary research is necessary
32
PARAYIL, Govindan: The Green Revolution in India: A Case Study of Technological Change. Technology and Culture, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct. 1992) P. 744
36 SHIVA, Vandana: The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics. Zed Books, London, 1993. P. 25
when importing foreign technology into non-native “economic, social, and physical contexts.” 40 Several years after
independence, essential cereal production in India began to decline. Internally, India responded to this growing crisis by
advocating a set of responses designed largely to remain in harmony with natural processes and to respect “the diversity of
India‟s soils, crops and climates.”41 This program was championed largely by K. M. Munshi, India‟s first minister of
agriculture, and to a lesser extent, by Mahatma Ghandi, who wrote a series of articles about improving agriculture and
creating self-sufficiency between 1946 and 1947. (Shiva 1993, P. 27ff) The Five-Year Plan of 1951-56 can be regarded as one
of the first official policy initiatives regarding Indian agriculture. It led to a slight increase in food productivity primarily due
to favourable weather and an increase in irrigated cropland, which led policy planners to conclude that “the food problem had
been solved.”42 As a result, focus was shifted to industrial development under the assumption that the agricultural sector
would eventually reach a state of plenty under current policies and could therefore administer itself. (Parayil 1992, P. 741) The
brush with reality came in the 1960s with the occurrence of the Bihar Famine. This brought the poor state of domestic
agriculture into sharp focus and resulted in the governments renewed pursuit of regional self-sufficiency in matters of food
production.
The Bihar Famine also had another consequence in that the Indian government was only able of averting mass starvation by
requesting an emergency ration of wheat from the United States under a law known us the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954. Because of “technical changes, particularly the widespread use of fertilizers” 43 and economic
policies that encouraged production beyond market levels, the U.S. managed to achieve a “chronic surplus”44 of wheat by the
1950s. Upon coming to power, the Eisenhower administration had promised to reduce price support mechanisms and to also
lessen the cost of storing such large amounts of grain, which eventually led to the signing into law of P.L. (Public Law) 480.
According to Cleaver, the United States had actually been “stopgapping socially disruptive food shortages in the Third World
on an ad hoc basis” even before the signing of P.L. 480 made it official. What P.L. 480 effectively did was make it possible for
the U.S. government to “dispose of surplus American grain at little or no cost to the recipient government.” 45 While P.L. 480
was ostensibly introduced to maintain domestic prices at a level acceptable to U.S. farmers by reducing market surpluses, the
program would later become an instrument of foreign policy. (Perkins 1997, P. 175) Although the emergency wheat supplies
procured from the U.S. government certainly helped avert disaster, Perkins asserts correctly that the “[s]hipment of P.L. 480
wheat stocks to India [would have] far reaching consequences for India and Indian agriculture.” 46
The emergency wheat stocks given to India were paid for in Indian rupees, which the United States kept in India. By the
1970‟s “P.L. 480 payments gave the United States control of as much as one-third of the money supply in India. It was almost
as if the Americans had bought a big piece of India with grain.”47 The vast amount of grain dumped onto the Indian market
also had the effect of driving down prices far enough that domestic production effectively stalled. Indian farmers simply
could not compete with the artificially priced foreign alternatives. In 1965 a further shock came when President Johnson
announced a number of significant changes to the policy. No longer would U.S. aid be provided unconditionally, but instead
on a quid pro quo basis. The conditions which needed to be satisfied in order for a country to qualify as a recipient were
designed specifically to favour U.S. investors and capital. Most significant amongst these was a shift in “emphasis from
industrialization to agricultural development [and the] expansion of population control.” 48 (Cleaver 1972, P. 179) This „short-
tether‟ policy placed the Indian government in a considerable stranglehold when the 1965-66 famine subdued the country
into accepting foreign aid. Cleaver elaborates further:
“Successive droughts had brought about major food shortages and U.S. capital was knocking at the door
with plans for new fertilizer plants and demands for control over prices and distribution. Faced with
(Mar. 1972) P. 179

upheaval at home and Johnson‟s intransigence, the Indian government opened her doors to some U.S.
capital and most of the Green Revolution.”49
P.L. 480 therefore, played a decisive role in ushering in the Green Revolution in India. It remains a matter of debate however
whether the provision of U.S. aid on a quid pro quo basis represents foreign „meddling‟ in domestic affairs, as even most
contemporary aid programs tend to impose certain prerequisites on recipient states. It is therefore difficult to determine
whether P.L. 480 assistance in India represents a purposeful foreign policy initiative on behalf of the United States. What is
clear however, is that government policy both in India and abroad largely helped pave the way for the change in attitude that
would make Indian policymakers all the more welcoming to the Green Revolution. India had “made it a matter of national
pride – after the bitter experience with Lyndon Johnson in 1965-1967 – not to resume food aid.”50 The dependence on
foreign assistance and its economic consequences is what ultimately placed agricultural self-sufficiency at the top of the
government agenda.
The development of the high-yield variety could never have happened without the assistance of organizations such as the
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. It was through such organizations that U.S. government involvement in agricultural
science had initially begun. These organizations provided the impetus and organized the talent that would eventually coalesce
into the institutions of the Green Revolution‟s technological forefront. The Rockefeller Foundation began its philanthropic
undertakings abroad in China starting in 1931, where it ran a program dedicated to “rural reform based on medical and
agricultural projects.”51 Somewhat ominously, the initiatives advanced by the Foundation in China promoted technical change
“in the midst of substantial social unrest, about which the foundation kept silent.”52 Many years later, critics (also drawing
largely on the social consequences of technological change) would similarly attribute social problems to the advent Green
Revolution in India, meaning that at the time such issues were by no means unprecedented. During 1939, the outbreak of
major hostilities in Europe and Asia necessitated the suspension of all Rockefeller Foundation activities outside of the
Americas. According to Perkins, it was through the “exigencies” 53 prompted by the War that the otherwise philanthropic
operations of the Rockefeller Foundation began to gain a strategic edge. It was the “Foundation[s] work in China and Mexico
that helped officers of both the foundation and the U.S. government understand agricultural development as part of
international politics and relations.”54 Perkins continues; “The foundation‟s Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP), especially,
was a critical event in the transformation of agricultural science from a tool merely for industrial modernization into a device
for power relationships between nations.” 55
The Rockefeller Foundation‟s involvement in Mexico was already in planning since as early as 1933. (Perkins 1997, P. 106)
However, Perkins argues and Shiva concurs56 that the Foundation‟s activities started in earnest when Henry Wallace, the Vice
President of the United States, visited the inauguration of President Ávila Camacho. (Shiva 1993, P. 36 & Perkins 1997, P.
106) On his return to the United States, Wallace is said to have remarked at a number of high profile meetings about the
“benefits that could come to Mexico if anyone could improve the productivity of corn (maize) and beans, the staples of the
Mexican diet.”57 Present at one of these meetings was Raymond B. Fosdick, the then President of the Rockefeller
Foundation. Perhaps in response to the Foundation‟s reduced presence in Europe and China, Wallace‟s statements made him
consider Mexico‟s agricultural situation as a possible philanthropic avenue. (Perkins 1997, P. 106) In response to these
meetings, a group of ranking scientists was assembled at Fosdick‟s behest to evaluate the Foundation‟s prospects in Mexico.
After some back and forth with the Mexican Secretary of Agriculture concerning precisely what type of research was to be
conducted, a unit named „the Office of Special Studies‟ was installed “as a semiautonomous research unit directly within the
(Mar. 1972) P. 179
50 KUX, Dennis: India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941 – 1991. National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1992. P. 311
56 Vandana Shiva, in her account of events, does not directly mention Wallace‟s visit to the inauguration. However, she does cite the collusion between U.S.
Ambassador to Mexico Joseph Daniels and Henry Wallace to establish “a scientific mission to assist in the development of agricultural technology in
Mexico.” (Shiva 1993, P. 36) The scientific mission she is referring to is the Office of Special Studies. Shiva‟s position will be elaborated upon further on in
this paper.
Mexican Department of Agriculture.”58 The Office‟s expenses would be shared between the Rockefeller Foundation and the
Mexican Department of Agriculture, however it would remain at the sole discretion of the Foundation “which Mexican
nationals [would] go on for advanced training in the United States and elsewhere.” 59 After the establishment of the Office in
1943, its director J. George Harrar formally invited Norman Borlaug to join the team. In 1944, Borlaug subsequently shifted
from his “classified wartime laboratory job in Dupont 60 to the plant breeding program in Mexico.”61 Eventually, the OSS
closed down and in 1966 the CIMMYT was opened in its stead – the institution that would ultimately facilitate the
development and propagation of the high-yield variety.
At its inception, the Mexican Agricultural Program started by the Rockefeller Foundation might have been intended as a
purely philanthropic endeavour designed to alleviate poverty and improve food security for Mexico‟s rural class. However
behind this outward appearance were greater economic considerations. Most of the MAPs Mexican supporters “wanted to
completely reshape the Mexican economy.”62 In order to turn Mexico into a modern industrial state, the majority of the
population would have to be weaned off of agricultural work and encouraged to take jobs in the industrial sector. Capital
flight from agriculture to industry would also have be facilitated and promoted in order to finance industrial development.
(Perkins 1997, P. 114) This idea of economic modernization through industrialization is very similar to what Nehru and his
government confronted in India shortly after independence, the consequences of which can be seen in the direction taken by
their Five Year Plans. In the 1960s it had already been remarked by two members of the Ford Foundation that Mexico‟s
agrarian economy was dualistic in nature. On the one hand were the largely mechanized and modernized farmers of the north
that depended on irrigated fields and operated their farms on a commercial, export-oriented basis. On the other hand were
the smaller farms referred to as ejidos. These depended largely on rainfall and were primarily engaged in the subsistence
production of beans and maize. (Perkins 1997, P. 114) Concerning this dichotomy, the Ford Foundation staffers remarked
that small subsistence farms “must „disappear if Mexican agriculture is to be fully modernized and rural misery is to be
eliminated.‟”63 Perkins goes on to surmise that while the factors that motivated the Rockefeller Foundation to assist in Mexico
were certainly complex and multivariate, their intention was primarily the betterment of life and not maintaining the status quo.
“The MAP was an agreement between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government. The
context in which it began was complex and included … (2) a highly dangerous world situation in which it is
reasonable to believe that the foundation wanted to foster the development of liberal democratic capitalism
rather than see either socialism or fascism make further inroads. … The MAP was an alliance between a
U.S. foundation that promoted liberal democratic capitalism and a Mexican government that was struggling
to establish a liberal democratic capitalist political economy. In the long run, probably both the
foundation and the Mexican government had no particular wish to improve the lives of peasant
farmers in their capacities as peasant farmers.” (Emphasis added and in original)
It is precisely this aspect of the aid program that would eventually make it problematic. Large scale economic reorientation
necessarily requires corresponding social change, particularly when reorientation requires a change as comprehensive as the
shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy. The MAP essentially had the effect of eliminating traditional farmers while
simultaneously contributing to the rise of new farming elite which profited enormously off of increased productivity allowed
by agricultural research. Most of the rural poor disappeared into the vastness of Mexico City, where they “may or may not
have found much improvement in their living standards.” 64 Of course the irony here is plain to see. The capital, which
provided the fuel for growth and transformation, came from those who actually benefitted least from the industrialization.
(Perkins 1997, P. 116) Many years later, a similar pattern of results would also unfold in India.
Overall, the MAP was considered a success, and by the 1950s a follow-up project was already underway in Colombia. What‟s
more, the program was also considered an important strategic success and prompted further involvement of the U.S.
60 Du Pont is a large U.S. conglomerate that currently ranks as the world‟s third largest chemical company.
government in similar assistance programs. (Perkins 1997, P. 117) During President Truman‟s inauguration speech in 1949,
specific mention was made of the necessity to lend “technical assistance in agriculture and other fields to the poorer nations
of the world.”65 In 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation again decided to move overseas and to simultaneously expand their
agricultural development work with the inauguration of the Indian Agricultural Program. (See also Parayil 1992, P. 745)
Understanding of the MAP is vital to deciphering the intricacies of political involvement in agricultural development schemes
because it was largely considered a template for future assistance. “[T]he American government saw the foundation‟s MAP as
a highly successful model for the development of new agricultural technology, and in various ways the MAP‟s collaborative
model of research involving both U.S. and foreign nationals was copied as the method for effectively transferring technology
from the developed world to the less developed world.” 66 Left out of the considerations however, were the social
ramifications that such technological accomplishments were bound to have on the societies on which they were imposed.
III. Social Consequences of Technological Change: Seeing Through the Prism of Science
A
lthough initially conceived of as a stepping stone for third world subsistence farmers to climb out of poverty, the
technological innovations that later became labelled as the „Green Revolution‟ caused a series of social aftershocks
in the regions that saw their most widespread application. While the debate still continues concerning the Green
Revolution, it seems to have taken the shape of an argument regarding the lesser of two evils. Proponents generally credit the
Green Revolution (and in most cases, explicitly Norman Borlaug) with being instrumental in averting famine on most of the
Asian continent and therefore helping save millions of lives. (Darity 2008, P. 164:3 & Gilbert 2005, P. 107 & Pray 1981, P. 68)
Its detractors generally see in the Green Revolution 1) a new mode of neo-imperialism, where technological innovations from
the West are used to „guide‟ the development of less-industrialized states, presumably along a path that would somehow
eventually benefit the patron countries; 2) a capital intensive form a farming that requires the purchase of massive amounts of
„inputs‟ from First World countries, creating a dependence on these countries and thereby facilitating capital flight; 3) a mode
of farming that primarily benefits large land owners as opposed to more modestly endowed subsistence farmers, thereby
enhancing regional income inequality; 4) an environmentally costly farming technique that encourages monocultures,
abnormally high pesticide and fertilizer use, dependence on artificial irrigation and completely disregards natural processes.
(Shiva 1993, P. 20ff, P. 171f & Cleaver 1972, P. 181 & Yapa 1993, P. 267 & Ehrlich & Daily 1996, P. 993f) As this paper
examines sources in a longitudinal manner, it is possible that understanding of the Green Revolution‟s effects has changed
over time. Such reasoning is particularly applicable to developments in the field of agricultural science where potential
problems generally have a long gestation period. As is generally the case, it is likely that both sides of the argument have
points which are both valid and relevant, so that it is impossible for either to claim overwhelming truth. While it may not be
possible to establish decisively which side of the argument is to be preferred in matters of veracity, a general outline of the
main features should provide a vantage point from which to glimpse the horizon of truth.
Parayil, in his conclusion, correctly asserts that “[m]ost literature critical of the Green Revolution does not question the
productive gain from the new technology.”67 The Green Revolution‟s most vehement critics tend to gloss over the dramatic
rise in production that has resulted since the HYV seeds became pervasive on the Subcontinent and elsewhere in Southeast
Asia. Production has increased to such an extent that India now ranks number two in the world in paddy rice and wheat
production according to a report released by the EU Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development.68 India has
also become a net exporter of agricultural food products, with a trade surplus of around $4 billion. 69 This increase in
production has presumably helped to not only to feed the population, but also to create jobs and increase wealth as a result of
trade, although this particular point is still bitterly contested amongst agricultural economists. Beyond the obvious benefits of
increased food production, many supporters of the Green Revolution also point out that it has helped all classes of people in
the regions where it has been implemented. Blyn, in a field study conducted on the personal wellbeing of small farmers in the
68 Monitoring Agri-trade Policy: India‟s Role in World Agriculture. The European Commission / Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural
Development. P. 4 [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/map/03_07.pdf] (20.04.2011)

69 Monitoring Agri-trade Policy: India‟s Role in World Agriculture. The European Commission / Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural
Development. P. 4 [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/map/03_07.pdf] (20.04.2011)

Indian Punjab and Harayana remarked that “only two families I had visited had not benefitted in the past decade.” 70
Otherwise “all other families showed gain, either in consumption or investment accumulation or both, a result of roughly a
doubling of real income in the past decade.” Blyn continues:
“All farmers, except those in Majari and Rori agreed that they were substantially better off than in the pre-
Green Revolution period. Of the farmers visited, seven had small (including the Rori farmer), five had
medium farms, and four had large farms. … My impression was that the gain in standard of living was
more apparent for the smaller cultivators. … But though the universality of gain was apparent to my eye, I
was amazed to find that urban, educated people generally took for granted that only rich , large landlords
had gained, that by corruption they had cornered the input markets, monopolized the credit, oppressed the
labourers – a kind of cant catechism. The most charitable view I can take of such talk is that it may
represent the lag of public knowledge behind actual circumstance and that it may accurately reflect the early
years of the Green Revolution.”71
To a large extent, the expectation that only „rich, large landlords‟ stood to gain from the advent of the Green Revolution is
also a dominant view in much of the critical Western literature. It ties in directly with the oft-cited problem of income
inequality, which Blyn suggests is far less of an issue than it is often made out to be. As mentioned previously, Blyn‟s report
also points out that the effects of the Green Revolution might have changed over time. It is very likely that the early adopters
of HYV technology were the wealthier land owners because it is far more likely they would have been financially predisposed
to the investment required to switch to this new method. (Blyn 1983, P. 707) In time however, the net benefits of Green
Revolution technology are assumed to have become equally distributed amongst all classes of farmers.
To a large extent, Parayil agrees with Blyn and goes on to directly address some of the main concerns frequently cited by the
Green Revolution‟s detractors. He asserts that in actual fact, the “inequalities in income distribution are decreasing in areas
where the Green Revolution has been successful.” 72 As he sees it, the “detractors of the Green Revolution are attacking the
wrong enemy.”73 The technology itself is inert and “does not dictate income distribution.”74 Instead, inequalities are far more
likely to result from “government subsidies, taxation, credit policies, and agricultural wage policies.” 75 Further, he mentions
that both agricultural workers and small land owners benefitted from increased productivity, either in increased wages or
more days of work. Parayil considers that poverty has actually “diminished” 76 in regions where the Green Revolution has
spread. He goes on to declare that “[i]f the Green Revolution had been uniformly spread to all the states in India, then the
grinding poverty that afflicts those who live in areas where agricultural modernization was least would have decreased
considerably.”77 What is most unique about Parayil‟s view is that he also ascribes a certain degree of empowerment to the
farmers who decided to use HYV technology, rather than regarding them merely as pawns in a game beyond their
comprehension. The core of this particular argument resides in the idea that the “failed development policies of the
government”78 actually created a demand for technological change amongst India‟s peasant farmers. These policies preferred
speedy industrialization to agricultural development and actively neglected addressing the many issues which plagued Indian
farming at the time. (Parayil 1992, P. 753) Most importantly, nowhere does Parayil assert that HYV technology was
implemented by farmers out of desperation – in fact, he stipulates that precisely the converse is true. “The technological
change that ensued from the introduction of the new package of agricultural practices was a direct result of the interaction of the
newly transferred technology and its recipients and their culture. The technology was welcomed by peasant farmers only when it became
compatible with the economic, social, and physical conditions in India.”79 (Emphasis added) Although difficult to substantiate, these
arguments stand in direct contradiction to the ideas of many critics, particularly the many who claim the Green Revolution is
a method of furthering the Western hegemony under the pretext of reducing rural poverty. What also stands out about this
70 BLYN, George: The Green Revolution Revisited. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jul. 1983) P. 706
71 BLYN, George: The Green Revolution Revisited. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jul. 1983) P. 707
conclusion is that it regards regional culture as an enabler of the technology, rather than proposing an antagonistic relationship
between the two, as is generally the case. Finally, it seems that Parayil‟s position can perhaps be best summarized with a quote
from his own paper: “[T]he Green Revolution resulted in the „transformation of peasants into farmers.‟”80
Juxtaposed against the previously illustrated accolades are numerous criticisms that take aim at the myriad socioeconomic and
environmental issues the Green Revolution is thought to have caused. For example, Vandana Shiva advances an account of
events that ranks the Green Revolution as one of two “major crises [to] have emerged on an unprecedented scale in Asian
societies during the 1980s.”81 Bearing the title The Violence of the Green Revolution, the crux of her argument is that the
technological innovations implemented under the banner of the Green Revolution represent a conspiratorial intermingling of
science and politics with little to restrain them and equally little to account for. Shiva sees a direct link between the political,
social and technical aspects of the Green Revolution, not only in the history of its development but also in its contemporary
aftereffects. She begins her criticisms with the proposed political goals of the Revolution as a scientific endeavour and goes
on to address how the social decay it caused eventually erupted into conflict. The “tragedy of Punjab”82 as she calls it, is not a
case of ethnic strife or a latent social conflict, but rather the result of a mechanistic process that is incapable of accounting for
its human components.
“The Green Revolution has been heralded as a political and technological achievement, unprecedented in
human history. It was designed as a techno-political strategy for peace, through the creation of abundance
by breaking out of nature‟s limits and variabilities. Paradoxically, two decades of the Green Revolution
have left Punjab ravaged by violence and ecological scarcity. Instead of abundance, Punjab has been left
with diseased soils, pest-infested crops, water-logged deserts, and indebted and discontented farmers.
Punjab has inherited conflict and violence. 3,000 people were killed in Punjab during 1988. In 1987 the
number was 1,544. In 1986, 598 people were killed.”83
What is unique about Shiva‟s position is not her attribution of violence to the effects of the Green Revolution. This aspect
was also mentioned by Parayil, who (somewhat surprisingly) proposes that the “militancy of agricultural workers”84 actually
be considered a “positive sign of social and political changes rather than [a] regressive trend[s].” 85 Rather, her insight lies in
understanding the Green Revolution as a complex amalgamate of science, politics and society rather than merely an isolated
case of technological change. She argues within a theoretical framework that specifically highlights the intricate and
occasionally antagonistic role played by science in guiding the direction of modern societies. For Shiva, even if the Green
Revolution had completely ameliorated poverty throughout the rural Subcontinent without the slightest negative effect,
questions would still have to be asked and lines drawn concerning precisely what role science should occupy in such social
transformations.
“In its very genesis, the science of the Green Revolution was put forward as a political project for creating
a social order based on peace and stability. … One the one hand, contemporary society perceives itself as a
science-based civilization, with science providing both the logic as well as propulsion for social
transformation. In this aspect science if self-consciously embedded in society. On the other hand, unlike all
other forms of social organisation and social production, science is placed above society. It cannot be
judged, it cannot be questioned, it cannot be evaluated in the public domain.” 86
It is therefore not just the Green Revolution in particular that is problematic, but rather it is science as a socio-political
construct that might be flawed. Certain consequences of the Green Revolution arose partly from people‟s attitudes toward it.
The very nickname given to HYV technology, „miracle seeds‟, already demonstrates the willingness to rely on scientific
innovations as a saviour of mankind. Further, it was through science and technology transfer that the West hoped to
„modernize‟ the Third World, all the while regarding these inventions as socially neutral and unequivocally beneficial. The
83 SHIVA, Vandana: The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics. Zed Books, London, 1993. P. 11f
86 SHIVA, Vandana: The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics. Zed Books, London, 1993. P. 20f
reason behind this is that science is regarded to have certain omnipotence because to a large extent it does provide „logic and
propulsion for social transformation‟ as Shiva argues. It therefore tends to undergo little scrutiny, and should complications
actually arise, as in the case of the Green Revolution, then rarely if ever is the blame levelled at science itself:
“While science itself is a product of social forces, and has a social agenda determined by those who can
mobilise scientific production, in contemporary times scientific activity has been assigned a privileged
epistemological position of being socially and politically neutral. It offers technological fixes for social and
political problems, but delinks itself from the new social and political problems it creates. … Science stays
immune from social assessment, and insulated from its own impacts. Through this split identity is created
the „sacredness‟ of science.”
The „sacredness‟ that Shiva speaks of, as well as the proposed ambiguities in the relationship between science, politics and
society when complications do arise, are also reflected in the Green Revolution. In her view, the violent conflicts that arose in
the Punjab since the introduction of HYV seeds are inextricably linked with the technical innovations introduced to the
region years earlier. To her, the symbiosis of ecology, culture, politics and society is obvious and all the more significant in a
part of the world where farming is the way of life. Change any of these components, and you cannot help but alter the entire
system. (Shiva 1993, P. 15, 23f) These problems are compounded by the general view of science‟s „sacredness‟ and superiority
– it is simultaneously a system that must be better but cannot be criticized, so that its pre-eminence must always be assumed or
believed in and hence left unquestioned. Problems that arise are therefore externalised as either “unanticipated side effects” 87
or improper application of the method at hand. The above arguments are by far the best and most compelling for facilitating
an understanding of the Green Revolution that goes beyond the largely inadequate cause-effect model which generally
dominates the literature.
Moving beyond the rather broad implications associated with thinking about the position of science within society, there are a
number of more technical implications of the Green Revolution that still remain to be considered. First and foremost is the
question of the extent to which the Indian rural class actually benefitted from the increase in production allowed by new
HYV seeds. This brings up the much discussed question of income inequality and the claim of critics that it has significantly
worsened since Green Revolution technology was introduced. Cleaver observes that most of the studies which suggest that
income inequality and class contradictions remain unaffected by the new technology focus exclusively on the distribution of
the seeds themselves. He points out that this tells less than half the story, and that “the real question is that of the package.” 88
The additional inputs required by the newly bred plant varieties are as important if not more important than the actual seeds
themselves, and Cleaver suggests that there is “some indication that while more wealthy farmers may not use a higher
percentage of seeds they do use more of the complementary inputs.” 89
“How representative these studies are is hard to judge, but they do indicate that, while the new
combination of inputs is largely neutral with respect to technical economies of scale, there are other costs
like financing and education which are not. For those wealthier farmers who can adopt the new grains and
afford all the complementary inputs, the change can be a very profitable one. A study by AID shows
impressive differentials in average cash profits between traditional and new methods. Viewed together with
the higher adoption rate for the entire package by large farmers, the implied greater profit differential
suggests that the Green Revolution is resulting in a serious increase in income inequality between different
classes of farmers in those areas where it is being adopted.”90
The rapid introduction of such high profit potentials serves to skew the socio-economic order. It results in an increase in the
price of land (up to 500 per cent in parts of the Indian Punjab) which results in “effort by landlords to acquire more land and
(Mar. 1972) P. 181
(Mar. 1972) P. 181

(Mar. 1972) P. 182

to convert their tenants into hired labourers to reduce their costs.” 91 Daily and Ehrlich also take up the question of equity in
agricultural land use and explain clearly how technological methods which favour large land owners can lead to wage
reduction and labour displacement.
“Since the green revolution was launched, critics have argued that HYVs can only be exploited by
comparatively wealthy landowners who can afford the irrigation systems, fertilizers and pesticides required
by the HYVs. This advantage would be reinforced as large farmers bought out smaller ones until their
holdings were large enough to replace labour with machinery – which would further enhance their
advantage. This substitution, in concert with a growing class of landless labourers, would reduce
agricultural wages.”92
Walter Falcon also largely agrees that “[a]lthough in theory the new seeds and fertilizer are neutral to scale, in practice they are
not.”93 Analogous to Daily and Ehrlich, Falcon goes on to cite the labour-displacing quality of mechanization that inevitably
follows large-scale profit increases. Often, pressure towards mechanization may even be influenced by external factors such as
“domestic industrialists, politicians and even aid agencies [which] have vested interests in promoting various implements,
including tractors.”94 Falcon suggests it is not just labour displacement that becomes an issue in this context, but also the
growing intra-regional disparity that occurs as a result of snowballing production. This argument is closely related with the
one advanced by Shiva, who regards the violence which has engulfed parts of the Punjab to be a final damning indictment of
a deeply flawed scientific “experiment” and its economic aftereffects. (Shiva 1993, P. 12, 20 & 172) The strength of Falcon‟s
argument is that it illustrates in relatively simple terms how intraregional disparities may ultimately foment social unrest:
“Far more disturbing, however, are two other effects of the green revolution on employment, welfare and
stability. Both of these derive basically from the unequal growth that seems to be a concomitant of the new
technology. The process is as follows: The regions with irrigation, such as the Punjab, have the ability to
respond rapidly to the new technology. A combination of the resulting production plus an agricultural price
policy that reflects concerns for non-growing districts as well as vested agricultural interest will mean that
incomes in the irrigated regions grow at phenomenal rates. That is all to the good; the difficulty is that
welfare, between regions as among people, is more a relative concept than an absolute idea. The problem,
for example, is not that West Pakistan is absolutely well off by any international standard. The problem is
that the income (and imperialistic attitude) in West Pakistan relative to that in East Pakistan threatens to
tear the country apart.”95
This is precisely the “social breakdown” 96 articulated by Shiva as her greatest criticism against the Green Revolution. Falcon‟s
argument above further illustrates how scientific endeavour cannot be neutral when it seeks to modify people‟s livelihood,
even if the benefits generated are positive in aggregate terms. It is precisely such thinking that can lead to the common
misunderstandings that shape people‟s opinions of science and technology in a manner that does not accurately reflect the
situation borne out on the ground. The scale of these disparities can also become vast if left unchecked – in some cases a
third of the arable land in a country may experience double the yield, despite growth in the other areas remaining constant.
(Cleaver 1972, P. 182) Finally, it seems important to mention that problems related to income inequality do not affect just a
small portion of the rural class. Developments in the agricultural sector will eventually come to affect “the class structure of
cities as well.”97 For example, former agricultural labourers displaced by widespread mechanization will be forced to migrate
to cities in search of employment, creating a “permanently unemployable lumpen proletariat [which will] swamp even the new
91 CLEAVER, Harry M.: Some Contradictions of Capitalism: The Contradictions of the Green Revolution. The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 1/2
(Mar. 1972) P. 182
92 DAILY, Gretchen C. & EHRLICH, Paul R.: Socioeconomic Equity, Sustainability, and the Earth‟s Carrying Capacity. Ecological Applications, Vol. 6, No. 4
(Nov. 1996) P. 993

93 FALCON, Walter P.: The Green Revolution: Generations of Problems. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 52, No. 5, Proceedings Issue (Dec.
1970) P. 706
1970) P. 706
1970) P. 705
(Mar. 1972) P. 182

rush by multinational corporations to capitalize on cheap foreign labour.” 98 Changes in the circumstances of the agricultural
industry therefore, do not remain neatly contained within their particular sector but carry possible repercussions for the entire
economy.
Lastly, it is necessary to address the allegations that HYV seeds and their associated technologies represent an instrument of
Western foreign policy. That the actual development of these seeds proceeded in close step with political considerations has
already been thoroughly demonstrated in the previous section. Rather, the question is whether Green Revolution technology
is or has been used to actively promote Western interests abroad. Following Shiva, “[t]he Green Revolution was prescribed as
a techno-politic strategy that would create abundance in agricultural societies and reduce the threat of communist insurgency
and agrarian conflict.”99 She traces the origins of this Western attitude toward food availability back to the Colombo Plan
drawn up in 1950. This plan was forged in close cooperation between the nations of Southeast Asia, the United States,
England, Australia and several other Western nations. Excerpts from a preliminary memo demonstrate the precise nature of
the Plan and its developmental origins:
“What then was the solution to the „immense appeal‟ of communism, feeding as it did off the turmoil
induced by social and economic transition? The memo was, in fact, far more ambitious than earlier
proposals for regional collaboration and suggested the creation of a permanent consultative council, a
confederation with a „planned and integrated economy, which would increase food production through the
application of modern technology, embark on a program of industrial expansion… More than a proposal
for the simple correction of Asia‟s apparent economic stagnation, it called for cultural and social
conversion and the formulation of principles upon which the „New Society in South-East Asia should be
fashioned‟.”100
Immediately apparent from the above statement is that it could very easily also describe the Green Revolution and its
aftereffects. Indian ambassador K.M. Panikkar actually played a decisive role in creating the momentum required to push
through such a radical set of ideas by showcasing a paper advocating a closer relationship between Europe and Asia.
(Oakman 2010, P. 24) It seems that, at least in the past, the aversion of food crises on the Subcontinent at the very least
helped prompt certain policy considerations – however it still remains unclear whether HYV technology truly merits to be
considered as an instrument in the larger sense of the word. Similarly, it also remains uncertain whether HYV technology
should be considered in this context per se, or whether it is more appropriate to examine food supply considerations in
general. For other authors however, both the purpose and the intent behind the Green Revolution and HYV seeds were
apparent from the outset. Cleaver, boldly states in his analysis that the “development of this new technology is very much a
part of the efforts of the American elite to direct the course of social and economic development in the Third World.” 101 He
continues: “With a foreign policy devoted to facilitating the expansion of U.S. multinational business, the elite is always
concerned with creating new investment and sales markets. But it also tries to plan for the longer-run problem of economic
or political upheaval which might upset those markets.” 102 In this case Cleaver reverses the typical hierarchy found in the
literature regarding the Green Revolution as an extension of Western foreign policy. (Perkins 1997, P. 119 & Shiva 1993, P.
14) The net effect however, remains largely the same: socio-political control and simultaneous economic gain as consciously
planned elements of policies that view the Third World either antagonistically, exploitatively or both.
(Mar. 1972) P. 182
100 OAKMAN, Daniel: Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan. ANU E Press, 2010. P. 25
(Mar. 1972) P. 177

(Mar. 1972) P. 177

IV. Discussion and Analysis: The Political Unravelling of the Scientific Endeavour
L
akshman Yapa, in an influential article in Economic Geography, advances an argument which proposes that seed
technology is not simply a method of alleviating hunger, but also “an instrument designed to serve the economic
interests of particular classes of people.”103 His argument is distinct from others because he embeds it in a
framework of critical thinking about science and society in general. Citing Aronowitz and Foucault, he claims that the history
of improved seeds provide “an excellent example of the claim made by critical social theorists that science and technology are
in fact „social processes‟ directed by the power relations of the underlying society, serving to strengthen and reproduce those
power relations.”104 Yapa continues by explaining how the elements of scientific endeavour such as “ideas, assumptions,
models, methods, and language”105 can be moved to function toward a specific end („particular world view‟), quite possibly
and quite probably, without the consent or knowledge of those involved. Related to this idea is the concept of scientific
neutrality and the on-going debate that surrounds it. Science, it is said, may be used to either advance the „good‟ or promote
the „evil‟. The decision about which branch of this essential dichotomy should pursued lies with the „end user‟ however,
effectively absolving science itself from any particular responsibility. The veil of impartiality and neutrality that such thinking
provides, and behind which the technocrats long to take cover is flawed in numerous ways. This process of
“decontextualization”106 as Shiva calls it, forces the attribution of the negative effects of science to other „causes‟, which often
bear little relation to the problem at hand.
“Through the process of decontextualization, the negative and destructive impacts of science on nature
and society are externalized and rendered invisible. Being separated from their material roots in the science
system, new forms of scarcity and social conflict are then linked to other social systems e.g. religion. The
conventional model of science, technology and society locates sources of violence in politics and ethics, in
the application of science and technology, not in scientific knowledge itself.”107
To propose the social consequences of science be evaluated in absence of the processes which initially generated the actual
catalyst of change is an exercise in wilful ignorance. Science can only be understood in its entirety if one also takes into
account its social genesis. Robert Proctor provides an account of how the proposed science-society dichotomy is neither
appropriate nor sufficiently sophisticated to properly explain modern power schisms.
“The simplest and perhaps oldest version of the ideal of neutrality is that science may be used for good or
for evil. The problem with this view, though, is that it ignores the fact that science has both social origins
and social consequences. Who, can one ask, does science serve, and how? What has gained from the
„miracle wheat‟ and who has lost? … Whose economies have benefitted from the neoclassical theory of the
firm and whose have suffered? Science, in other words, does not always serve the collective we or the
generic man but particular men – often those who control the means of its production and application.
Science is not different from other aspects of culture in this sense.” 108
While the positive effects of the Green Revolution in terms of food production remain largely undisputed, it is equally certain
that some have benefitted from such technologies more than others. Presumably these are the same groups or individuals that
contributed to the rise of the Revolution in the first place, following Proctors argument above. While this in and of itself is
not wrong, it must first be qualified with a larger context. Among the people that have benefitted from HYV seeds and
associated technologies are the poor, the wealthy, politicians, farmers, non-governmental organizations and scientists – a
veritable cross-section of humanity. However the natural processes begun by this new technology are still in motion, and
future developments, particularly potential environmental impacts, remain uncertain. At the same time, it is also difficult to
establish an accurate picture of what the situation on the ground is actually like. For example, one independent report claims
103 YAPA, Lakshman: What are Improved Seeds? An Epistemology of the Green Revolution. Economic Geography, Vol. 69, No. 3, Environment and
Development, Part 1 (Jul. 1993) P. 267



that per capita calorie consumption on the Subcontinent has actually decreased in rural areas and stayed largely level in urban
ones between 1983 and 2005. (Deaton and Drèze 2009, P. 42) This report, which does not make a single mention of either
the Green Revolution or HYV seeds, is a serious thorn in the side of those who would like to stake out some significant role
for said technology in alleviating hunger and combatting malnutrition. The report states that “[u]ndernutrition levels in India
remain higher than for most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, even though those countries are currently much poorer than
India…”109 Although the authors take great pains to describe the inapplicability of their data toward establishing any definite
picture about the state of nutrition in India as a whole, the paper is nonetheless surprising, and relativizes the oft-cited term
„miracle seeds‟. The above, taken in context with India‟s contemporary 4 billion dollar trade surplus in wheat and paddy rice
can make it easily appear as if the rise in productivity over the last two decades has helped primarily to serve the ends of
agribusiness, commercial farmers and well-endowed land owners instead of the rural poor. To proclaim the Green Revolution
a success and to cite the situation India and Southeast Asia as precedence for establishing a similar program in Africa 110 seems
in many ways a rather premature conclusion.
Food is inherently political. Its availability or lack thereof provides fuel for social unrest, instability and even revolt. “‟Hungry
people are dangerous people‟”111 remarked one correspondent for the Eastern World journal. These considerations are not
simply relics of a bygone era, where fear of communism and the expansion of the Soviet Union ranked supreme on the
political agenda. However it was in the period immediately following World War II that concerns about global food security
entered into the political consciousness, and it was the United States which stood at the forefront. Under the label
“population-national security theory (PNST)”112 was advanced a line of thinking that posited a causal relationship between
“overpopulation, resource exhaustion, hunger, political instability, communist insurrection and danger vital to American
interests.”113 Hunger, especially Third World hunger, thus became linked to combating communism and therefore an issue
worthy of political consideration at the highest levels. This political impetus provided the essential motivation for the
furtherance of agricultural sciences, in particular those related to plant-breeding. (Perkins 1997, P. 120) In some ways PNST
represents a milestone in the science-politics nexus and an affirmation of the critical social theorists that no scientific
innovation can remain neutral, because science is both motivated by and used in, social processes. It must be mentioned
however, that an immediate and direct link between PNST and the Green Revolution is difficult to determine. Much of the
evidence is circumstantial, and the few direct links are related primarily to scientific research that spawned HYV technology
rather than to its subsequent diffusion on the Subcontinent and the rest of Southeast Asia. What the PSNT illustrates
however, is the establishment of a strategy that specifically suggests using food as a stabilizer and bulwark against social unrest
that might otherwise be detrimental to U.S. interests.
With its roots in industrial agriculture, it is doubtful whether the Green Revolution could ever represent a wholly impartial
method of increasing food productivity, even in the absence of political utilization. The social processes that marked the
beginnings of Green Revolution in Mexico marginalized research already underway there which proposed to improve the
food situation without relying on high-input industrial agriculture. Regardless of how many people the Green Revolution
might have helped, it was ultimately a conscious choice to promote productivity in tandem with the use of capital intensive
inputs, rather than being merely just another method of increasing crop yields.
“‟Historically, the Green Revolution represented a choice to breed seed varieties that produce high yields
under optimum conditions. It was a choice not to start by developing seeds better able to stand drought or
pests. It was a choice not to concentrate first on improving traditional methods of increasing yields, such
as mixed cropping.” (Emphasis in original)
Because of this, HYV seeds created scarcity where it sought to generate abundance. Regions are not always poor because they
lack resources. In fact, a “reasonable case can be made that, in many instances, modern technologies have contributed to
109 DEATON, Angus & DRÈZE, Jean: Food and Nutrition in India: Facts and Interpretations. Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 7 (Feb. 2009) P.
42
110 HAZELL, Peter: Think Again: The Green Revolution. Foreign Policy Magazine.
[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/22/think_again_green_revolution] (25.04.2011)
111 OAKMAN, Daniel: Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan. ANU E Press, 2010. P. 73
scarcity by destroying existing sources of supply and creating demands for new ones.” 114 Of the many proposed disadvantages
of the Green Revolution, this ranks chief amongst them. It demonstrates the callousness and disregard of modern scientific
endeavour when motivated by social and political ends. In a rush to „develop‟ a region, or to alleviate hunger, the human
element fades into the background and is replaced instead by rationally motivated objectives that lack the lateral flexibility
necessary to accommodate what has not been foreseen. The commodification of seeds is a perfect example of this. Through
the process of hybridization that helped scientists create the HYV, seeds would effectively lose their growth and yield
potential after the first planting due to inbreeding. The practice of improving seeds by selection that had been carried out by
farmers for thousands of years was thus effectively rendered pointless. If they wanted to partake in the Green Revolution,
they had no choice but the renewed purchase of seeds every year from the major agribusinesses that supplied them. (Yapa
1993, P. 262) Further environmental effects, such as the predominance of monocultures and the increased reliance on
fertilizer and pesticides however, were no longer opt-out issues. Farmers became affected by water conflicts, land use issues
and ecological deterioration regardless of whether they employed HYV technology or not.
Yet despite this apparent abundance of problems, the Green Revolution still cannot be regarded as wholly negative. Most
importantly, it remains essential not to abdicate science from the realm of agriculture, as we may eventually come to rely on it.
With global population increasing, and the amount of arable land actively decreasing (or at best, remaining constant) we may
eventually have to rely on science to meet global food requirements. At the moment, the Green Revolution can best serve
mankind as a lesson in the social genesis of the scientific process. Ideally it should provide future and current agricultural
scientists with a point of comparison for their own work and encourage them to question the purpose and intent of their
research.
V. Literature
 BLYN, George: The Green Revolution Revisited. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jul. 1983)
 BRASS, Paul R.: The Political Uses of Crisis: The Bihar Famine of 1966 – 1967, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 45,
No. 2 (Feb. 1986)
 CHAKRAVARTI, A.K.: Green Revolution in India. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 63, No. 3,
Pages 319-330, Sep. 1973
 CLEAVER, Harry M.: Some Contradictions of Capitalism: The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, The
American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 1/2 (Mar. 1972)
 DAILY, Gretchen C. & EHRLICH, Paul R.: Socioeconomic Equity, Sustainability, and the Earth‟s Carrying
Capacity. Ecological Applications, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov. 1996)
 DARITY, William A. Jr.: International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd Edition, Volume 3: Ethnic Conflict
– Inequality, Gender. The Gale Group, 2008
 DEATON, Angus & DRÈZE, Jean: Food and Nutrition in India: Facts and Interpretations. Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 7 (Feb. 2009)
 FALCON, Walter P.: The Green Revolution: Generations of Problems. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 52, No. 5, Proceedings Issue (Dec. 1970)
 GILBERT, Geoffrey: World Population: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO, 2005
 HAZELL, Peter: Think Again: The Green Revolution. Foreign Policy Magazine.
[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/22/think_again_green_revolution]
 KHAN, E. J.: The Stuff of Life IV – Everybody‟s Business, The New Yorker, March 4th, 1985
 KUX, Dennis: India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941 – 1991. National Defense University
Press, Washington D.C., 1992.
 OAKMAN, Daniel: Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan. ANU E Press, 2010
 PARAYIL, Govindan: The Green Revolution in India: A Case Study of Technological Change. Technology and
Culture, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct. 1992)
 PERKINS, John H.: Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes and the Cold War, Oxford University
Press, 1997
 PRAY, Carl E.: The Green Revolution as a Case Study in Transfer of Technology. Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 458, Technology Transfer: New Issues, New Analysis (Nov. 1981)
YAPA, Lakshman: What are Improved Seeds? An Epistemology of the Green Revolution. Economic Geography, Vol. 69, No. 3, Environment and
114

 SANYAL, Sanjeev: The Indian Renaissance: India‟s Rise After a Thousand Years of Decline. World Scientific
Publishing Co., Singapore, 2008
 SHERMAN, Wendy R. & KOONTZ, Trish Yourst: Science and Society in the Twentieth Century. Greenwood
Press, London, 2008
 SHIVA, Vandana: The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics. Zed
Books, London, 1993
 THAKUR, Baleshwar et. al.: Urban and Regional Development in India, Volume 2, Concept Publishing Company,
2005.
 YAPA, Lakshman: What are Improved Seeds? An Epistemology of the Green Revolution. Economic Geography, Vol.
69, No. 3, Environment and Development, Part 1 (Jul. 1993)

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POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF AGRICULTURAL

I. Introduction: An Agricultural Renaissance?

1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research based in Washington, DC.

a) They are more responsive to fertilizers;

Crop 1950-51 1966-67 1967-68 1969-70

Rice (milled) 20.58 30.44 37.61 40.43

Wheat 6.46 11.53 16.54 20.10

Jowar 5.50 8.95 10.05 9.72

Bajra 2.60 4.50 5.19 5.33

Maize 1.73 4.99 6.27 5.67

Total Food Grains 50.83 75.05 95.05 99.50

Group, 2008. P. 164

Technology Transfer: New Issues, New Analysis (Nov. 1981) P. 70

(Mar. 1972) P. 179

Development. P. 4 [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/map/03_07.pdf] (20.04.2011)

Development. P. 4 [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/map/03_07.pdf] (20.04.2011)

(Mar. 1972) P. 181

(Mar. 1972) P. 182

(Nov. 1996) P. 993

(Mar. 1972) P. 182

(Mar. 1972) P. 177

(Mar. 1972) P. 177

Development, Part 1 (Jul. 1993) P. 267

Development, Part 1 (Jul. 1993) P. 268

Development, Part 1 (Jul. 1993) P. 268

Development, Part 1 (Jul. 1993) P. 262

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