Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AVIATION OUTLOOK
2009
Published by
Contributions by:
Peter Harbison, Derek Sadubin, Simon Elsegood,
Neha Mathur, Liz Thomson & Jennifer Tian
Disclaimer: Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation has made every effort to ensure
the accuracy of the information contained in this publication. The Centre
does not accept any legal responsibility for consequences that may arise
from errors, omissions or any opinions given. This publication is not a
substitute for specific professional advice on commercial or other matters.
Note: There are many definitions of what constitutes the ‘Middle East’,
reflecting geographical, economic, cultural, social and other considerations.
For the purposes of this aviation study, we have included the following
countries in our analysis: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Their
common features include their geography, but they are also defined by a
similar aviation-philosophical trend, by the internal links between them and
eg moves towards a common aviation market. More importantly, for the
purposes of this report, is their combined potential to effect change in global
aviation markets through applying new aviation norms.
100
Saudi Arabia
Even in a region that has been averse to change, Saudi Arabia’s national
aviation sector has long lagged the field. In the very recent past, however,
the Government has shown a strong, unprecedented commitment to the
process of reform. As the Government begins moving forward with the long-
delayed unbundling and privatisation of the flag carrier, the licensing of two
new domestic LCC competitors and possibly the corporatisation of the
airports, the Kingdom’s aviation sector has positioned itself to experience a
near-total renaissance.
The contracts are also part of the government’s broader plans to transform
the airport sector, opening it to investment and enhancing its attractiveness
to tourists, both domestic and international. Saudi Arabian traffic growth has
been sluggish in recent years, averaging just 3.4% over the last decade,
although domestic traffic rose 5% in 2007 and international increased 8.4%
thanks to the arrival of new entrants Sama and nas air.
Source: Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation & General Authority of Civil Aviation
15
12
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation & General Authority of Civil Aviation
Pakistan
3.2% Air India
2.0%
Egyptair
Saudi Arabian 2.0%
69.9%
Gulf Air
1.8%
Other
21.1%
The Dammam management contract marks the largest project CAI has ever
won, and its second success in the Middle East following its “master
planning” contract at Jordan’s Aqaba King Hussein International Airport.
CAI CEO, Wong Woon Liong, described the contract as a “land mark deal”,
strengthening the company’s strategic presence in the Middle East. He
stated, “we are indeed privileged to be given this opportunity to help
transform KFIA into a commercially and service oriented premier
international airport. This is the first time a foreign airport operator has been
tasked to manage KFIA, in line with the Saudi Arabian government’s decision
to give the state-owned civil aviation sector greater autonomy”.
Etihad
6.6% Gulf Air
5.9%
Air India
5.2%
Other
21.3%
The first phase is scheduled for completion in 2019 and aims to increase the
airport’s capacity to 12 million passengers p/a. This phase includes the
construction of a new 256,000 sqm passenger terminal, a second runway,
14 aerobridges, new 87 m air control tower, new airport road, security wall,
parking areas for 27 large, medium and small aircraft and a mosque, as well
as the preparation of a general expansion plan. The current runway will also
be expanded in this phase.
The second phase, to be carried out from 2019 to 2029, will increase
capacity to 18.4 million passengers p/a. This phase includes the construction
of an additional 172,000 sqm passenger terminal, new runways, 10
aerobridges, parking areas for another ten aircraft and an area for Pilgrims.
The third phase, to be carried out from 2029 to 2039, will increase capacity
to 30 million passengers p/a. This final phase includes the construction of
another 84,000 sqm passenger terminal, four aerobridges, parking area for
13 aircraft and new runways.
6.0%
3.0%
0.0%
-3.0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation & General Authority of Civil Aviation
Under the privatisation plans, SAA will act as a holding company, with
subsidiaries running its operational units, including catering, cargo, ground
services, technical and civil aviation services and an aviation academy.
Strategic partners will also be offered shareholdings in the new companies,
ahead of domestic IPOs for the units, planned within two to three years of
their sale. However the carrier and reportedly the Saudi Government have
been slow to act on the plans after an initial flurry of activity.
In Sep-07, SAA sold 49% of its profitable catering unit, (although it had
already approached the market for bids more than 12 months earlier).
Following that, the partial sale of the cargo unit, originally scheduled to be
completed before the end of 2007, was delayed until a winning bid was
selected in Jan-08, and then finally confirmed in Sep-08.
SAA plans to privatise the 30-40% of the remaining four units, with the
ground handling and the MRO unit next up for tender, followed by the Prince
Sultan Aviation Academy. The technical and civil aviation services business
will be the last to on the privatisation schedule, although no timeframe has
yet been given.
To quote the Director General, SAA has “many other plans in the pipeline” at
the moment. The point to be made is that perhaps it has too many to allow
it to successfully concentrate on the privatisation process. SAA’s turnaround
ambitions, necessary if the carrier is to ensure consistent, long-term
profitability and attract investment, may be a driving force delaying the
privatisation. SAA’s traffic performance has been lacklustre over the past
few years, and 2008 may be even worse.
The carrier slashed its domestic operations by 50% (where it was reportedly
losing approximately USD480 million per year), handing them over to new
domestic LCCs, nas air and Sama, after the government ended its domestic
monopoly.
India
Subcontinent
7.0%
Africa
4.0%
North America
0.3%
Asia Pacific
0.2%
It has placed several large aircraft orders in the past 18 months, for both
narrowbody and widebody aircraft, and now has orders and options for more
than 70 aircraft. Tellingly, the vast majority of orders are for A320 aircraft,
suitable for domestic and regional operations.
Despite the drop in demand witnessed in the region recently, nas air has
three new A320s scheduled for delivery between Feb-09 and May-09. The
new aircraft will increase the carrier’s seating capacity by approximately
40%, and allow it to reinforce its network with additional frequencies on high
demand international routes.
The carrier launched its second route to Lebanon with Riyadh-Beirut service
on 01-Nov-08. Twelve new destinations, including Abu Dhabi and cities in
Egypt, India, Jordan, Sudan, Syria and Pakistan, are expected to be
launched over the next two years.
Sama’s new CEO, Bruce Ashby, joined the LCC on 01-Dec-08, succeeding
Andrew Cowen, also co-founder of the airline, after nearly four years leading Sama: “With Sama having achieved
the start-up and initial growth phase of Sama. Mr Cowen’s contract expired profitability in August and September of this
in Dec-08. Mr Ashby was previously President and CEO of IndiGo Airlines for year, with 1.5 million guests carried to date
three years through its launch and initial growth phase. Mr Cowen’s and with an international route network
departure comes as Sama faces a challenging operating environment, spanning the Middle East, now I believe is
characterised by the following pressures: the right time to hand over the day to day
leadership of Sama. I extend my best
a) Government-mandated domestic fare cap: Ultimately prevents domestic wishes to Bruce who takes on a great
carriers from passing on increasing fuel costs to passengers, which the
Sama team without which, none of Sama’s
carrier purchases at market rates. The fare cap has not been raised
considerable accomplishments would have
since its implementation at the beginning of the decade, even as
inflation in the country’s booming oil economy has accelerated over the
been possible,” Andrew Cowen, former
past eight years, and is expected to peak above 6.5% in 2008. To CEO and co-founder. Source: Company
resolve the problem, the GACA implemented a review of the fare cap in Statement, 26-Nov-08.
2008, although has refused to accelerate the pace of the review;
b) Fuel supplier payment deadlines: Fuel suppliers have requested early
payment of their contracts, as a result of the notable reductions in oil
prices over the past four months, which has negatively impacted the
Saudi economy. As a result, in mid-Nov-08, Sama was reportedly
struggling to pay its employees on time;
c) Fuel costs: Sama felt the effect of the fuel spike in 1H08, which was
further exacerbated as its main competition, Saudi Arabian Airlines,
received a fuel subsidy. According to Sama, Saudi Arabian’s discount on
fuel “represents [a] five times cost difference”, something Sama is
unable to compete with;
d) Middle East traffic decline;
e) Intense competition in liberalised market: Sama has also been vocal in
complaining about the state of competition in the newly liberalised
Saudi aviation market. In Sep-08, it stated it was considering
withdrawing from Saudi domestic operations altogether unless “the
[domestic] situation improves and a reasonable return can be made”.