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Journal of Baltic Studies

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The Baltic States As 'Small States': Negotiating The 'East' By Engaging The
'West'
Jeremy W. Lamoreaux; David J. Galbreath

Online publication date: 30 September 2010

To cite this Article Lamoreaux, Jeremy W. and Galbreath, David J.(2008) 'The Baltic States As 'Small States': Negotiating
The 'East' By Engaging The 'West'', Journal of Baltic Studies, 39: 1, 1 — 14
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01629770801908697
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 Journal of Baltic Studies
Vol. 39, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 1–14

THE BALTIC STATES AS ‘SMALL STATES’:

NEGOTIATING THE ‘EAST’ BY ENGAGING
THE ‘WEST’

Jeremy W. Lamoreaux and

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David J. Galbreath

Whether by population, territory or economic impact, Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania are small states. In 1940 and 1944, smallness meant forced
incorporation into the Soviet Union. From 1991, the Baltic states sat between
two geopolitical spaces: one Russian and one European. After years of
occupation, the Baltic states were keen to overcome their size and the dangers
that are inherent in being small. Thus, in 2004 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
returned to Europe and the ‘West’, a position they had held prior to the Second
World War. Membership in the EU and NATO provides both opportunities and
constraints, yet organizational membership also allows the Baltic states to pursue
geopolitical gamesmanship in the post-Soviet area vis-à-vis the Russian
Federation. Relying on Baldur Thorhallson’s concepts of action capacity and
vulnerability, we illustrate how the Baltic states have gone beyond what has been
expected of small states in international politics by engaging the ‘West’ to
negotiate with the ‘East’.
Keywords: Baltic states; small state theory; European organizations; European
integration; foreign policy; post-Soviet politics

A nalyzing size in international relations is difficult. Analyzing its impact on foreign

policy is even more so. Size, a concept associated with power, is frequently
considered when analyzing the potential international influence of a state. Large states
are often seen to wield considerable influence while small states are rarely seen as
influential. Are these assumptions accurate? Does size truly determine how influential

Correspondence to: David Galbreath, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen,
Aberdeen AB24 3QY, UK. Email: d.galbreath@abdn.ac.uk
ISSN 0162-9778 (print)/ISSN 1751-7877 (online) ß 2008 Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies
DOI: 10.1080/01629770801908697
 2 JOURNAL OF BALTIC STUDIES

a state can be in the international system? In the study of international relations there
are several theories that purport to accurately account for the influence of states
according to their size. Specifically, several theories attempt to account for the actions
of small states in international relations. Traditional small state theory offers an initial
insight as to how small states behave, stating that they will ally with larger, more
powerful states. Further, if we consider state size using regional security complex
theory as described by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003), states are limited not
only by their size, but by their geographic location in certain ‘regional security
complexes’.
In our view, neither of these theories provides an adequate means of measuring
smallness. In order to develop a fuller conceptual framework for small state analysis
this article revisits the issue using Baldur Thorhallsson’s recent article on ‘action
capacity’ and ‘vulnerability’ as measures of smallness (2006). Initial investigations
illustrate the contribution that Thorhallsson has made to the study of state size,
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although his analysis leaves out the importance of organizational burden sharing as a
key variable for size. We argue that by combining aspects of existing theories with
Thorhallsson’s approach to measurement, whilst also taking into account organiza-
tional influence, it is possible to provide a new framework that accounts more
accurately for the actions of small states.
To illustrate the validity of this new framework we consider the case of the Baltic
states and their interactions with both the East and the West. The Baltic case,
we argue, is particularly instructive for the study of state size on foreign and security
policies, due to the particular geopolitical location of these countries and the
challenges that inherently come therewith. The three Baltic states form a border
between the West and the ‘new outsiders’ (White et al. 2002) of Russia and the CIS.
They constitute the geographical point where Nordic, Baltic, Central European, and
Russian ‘cultures’ meet. The wider Baltic sub-region includes states of various size
(ranging from Denmark to Russia) and ideologies (from authoritarian Belarus to
democracy which is solidly embedded in the Nordic countries), and plays an
important role in the foreign and security policies of these states. More importantly,
it is the point where the current embodiments of the EU and NATO end, and meet
with a potential partner or competitor – Russia. As such, an analysis of the
Baltic states’ experiences can shed considerable light on the validity of this new
framework.
The article progresses through several phases. First, we address the concept of
‘smallness’ in international relations, providing outlines and assessments of both
traditional and current measurements of state size. Recently, the concept of small
states has come back into fashion and we ask whether there is anything new in the
latest approaches. Second, we consider how different theories say ‘small’ states ought
to behave. Specifically, we analyze traditional small state theory, alliance formation
and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Third, using literature, official
documents and interviews, we show that the Baltic states do not fit the traditional
mould of small states according to traditional theories, but are able to play the
geopolitical games of the post-Soviet sphere by engaging with regional organizations.
In other words, the Baltic states are negotiating the ‘East’ by engaging with
the ‘West’.
 THE BALTIC STATES AS ‘SMALL STATES’ 3

Determining State Size

Size, as a concept for measuring states, can prove problematic because different
authors take different characteristics into consideration. For example, the study of
small states by Colin Clarke and Anthony Payne (1987) measures size of population
(under 1 million) and geographical location (isolated from other small states), but also
characteristics such as economic development and the lack of ability to avoid/
overcome threats of violence to the territory of the state. Michael Handel, on the
other hand, considers criteria such as size of budget (especially in the field of security)
and territory, but not of population, because some states with populations of up to
50 million are still considered weak or small (Handel 1981, p. 31). Handel points
out, however, that these criteria can be misleading as geographically small states can
have large populations (e.g. Singapore), and large geographical states can have small
populations. Additionally, one cannot overlook states (such as Israel) that are consi-
dered ‘small’, ‘weak’ or ‘micro’ according to geographical, economic, or population
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criteria, but which have been able to exert considerable influence on larger states.
All of this makes problematic not only the issue of determining the ‘smallness’ or
‘largeness’ of a state, but also the ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’ of a state based solely on
objective criteria specific to that state.
Arguably, the most succinct and specific framework for measuring state size is
offered by Thorhallsson (2006). Thorhallsson argues that traditional methods of
measuring state size and influence, such as those highlighted above, are not accurate
in today’s world, simply because traditional measurements focus almost entirely
on material empirical data (territorial size, population size, gross domestic product
(GDP) and military capacity) and ignore non-material but no less influential
capabilities such as leadership, cultural unity, etc. (2006, pp. 8, 14). According to
traditional measurements states such as Belgium or the Netherlands would be
considered small states with very limited influence internationally. However, very few
people would dispute the fact that as members of the EU, these states, although
geographically small, are quite influential.
Thorhallsson addresses this inconsistency by proposing a new method of
determining size and influence. He provides six categories when determining state
size: first, the fixed size of the state, both territorially and in terms of population;
second, sovereignty size, or whether a state can actually maintain its own sovereignty at
the international level; third, a state’s political size, including military and
administrative capabilities, internal cohesion and external unity; fourth, economic
size, including not only GDP, but also market size and a state’s level of development;
fifth, perceptual size, or how the state is viewed by actors both domestic and foreign;
sixth, preference size, or the views of the governing elite regarding the possibilities
and priorities of the state internationally, and their ideas of the international system
as a whole (2006, pp. 8, 14).
However, Thorhallsson does not stop with these categories; he also provides two
‘measuring sticks’ for determining how influential states theoretically should be,
both domestically and internationally: these are action capacity and vulnerability
(2006, p. 14). Action capacity refers to a state’s ability to formulate and implement
policies internally/domestically as well as its ability to wield influence in the
 4 JOURNAL OF BALTIC STUDIES

international arena. Vulnerability measures a state’s domestic weakness and the

possible subjugation of the current government to discontents as well as its weakness
and risk of external subjugation at the international level. Consequently, each state can
be located on a linear spectrum with ‘fully competent’ at one end and ‘fully
vulnerable’ at the other end with regards to each of the six criteria, both domestically
and internationally (a potential of 12 separate rankings for each state).
In his article, Thorhallsson focuses on the size of states and their influence within
the EU. What he does not do, however (and admittedly, this is not his focus), is to
consider how membership of organizations reconfigures the action capacity and
vulnerability of states, a phenomenon that could be considered in relation to their
interactions with states lying both inside and outside the organization in question.
For example, according to Thorhallsson’s configuration, the Baltic states would be
considered vulnerable in terms of both their internal and their external capacities.
However, as members of the EU, their action capacity would have to be considered
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less vulnerable simply because they have the support of the EU in many of their third
party interactions and, potentially more importantly, they have an equal say in many of
the decisions of the EU. Thus, the Baltic states should be in a position to influence the
EU external relations agenda (see, for example, Kronsell 2002, pp. 30–1).

Determining Capacity and Vulnerability

Reflecting on the notion of state size, we consider how small states behave in the
international system. We engage with three frameworks that suggest small state
capabilities: David Vital’s small state theory, Stephen Walt’s analysis of alliances, and
RSCT relying on Buzan and Wæver. By engaging with these frameworks, we can then
consider the ability of small states to impact the agenda of international organizations.
Vital’s small state theory (1967, 1971) is heavily based on realist theory, which
holds that the international system is anarchic, states are the central actors within that
anarchy, and states are egoistic and rational. The primary goal of every state is to
retain their sovereignty and the means for doing that is by obtaining power, primarily
military power (Kolodziej 2005, p. 129). These characteristics hold true for large and
small states alike. Small states, however, regardless of how one interprets ‘smallness’,
have limited resources available to help secure their sovereignty, and thus have very
few options for remaining sovereign (Vital 1971, p. 120). The sole way for a small
state to remain entirely sovereign is to remain neutral and hope that no other, larger
state develops malicious designs toward it (1971, p. 12). If any challenge to
sovereignty arises (as is bound to happen in an anarchic system), small states are
forced either to contend with this alone and face the very real possibility of losing
their sovereignty entirely, or else ally with a larger state in some manner and by so
doing retain the majority of their sovereignty although losing a portion of it to that
larger state. Thus, according to Vital’s theory, the only real way for a small state to
retain some degree of sovereignty is to ally with a larger power (1971, pp. 123–4).
Developing this concept a step further, Walt argues that states have only two
options when forming an alliance: balancing or bandwagoning (Walt 1985). Balancing
refers to joining the weaker side of a conflict to prevent the other (stronger) side from
 THE BALTIC STATES AS ‘SMALL STATES’ 5

dominating the international system. This practice is often engaged in by large/

powerful states in an attempt to prevent a potential rival from becoming too powerful.
Bandwagoning refers to a state joining the stronger side of a potential conflict/rivalry
with the assumption that it has chosen the ‘winning side’. According to Walt, ‘the
weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon’ (2006, p. 96). This is so, he
argues, because small/weak states very rarely influence the outcome of a conflict, but
can still incur the wrath of larger states if they are on the losing side. Consequently, it
is in their best interest to choose the winning side in the first instance (2006, p. 100).
However, what explanatory power do these traditional realist arguments have in
explaining international politics within the EU? If Europe has moved past an anarchic
order, what is the value added in examining the Baltic states (as EU members) using
the realist paradigm? The value is realized when we consider the Baltic states’ own
perception of their security situation. While the three countries are indeed part of the
EU, NATO, and other organizations, they still perceive Russia as one of the greatest
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threats to their national security (military, economic, societal). Thus, Baltic perce-
ptions of Russia are still based on realist assumptions. Baltic foreign policies are still
based on a zero-sum, power politics view of regional geopolitics. At this point the
next theory becomes relevant.
According to Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), security in any
geographical location on the globe can be studied in any or all of four specific
contexts: at the local level; between states; between regions (or complexes); and on
the global level (Buzan & Waever 2003, p. 51). Buzan and Wæver focus on the
regional level primarily because ‘most threats travel more easily over short distances
than over long ones’, and thus ‘security interdependence is normally patterned into
regionally based clusters: security complexes’ (2003, p. 4). Regional security
complexes (RSCs) are ‘a set of units (generally states) whose major processes of
securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems
cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’ (2003, p. 44,
emphasis added). According to Buzan and Wæver there exist several regional
complexes across the globe, all of which share four characteristics. These chara-
cteristics are what render RSCs important to our study. The first three characteristics
are the socially constructed nature of RSCs, their mutual exclusion from one another,
and the internally anarchic nature of each (2003, p. 48). Social interaction between
states’ decision makers leads to the securitization and desecuritization of certain issues.
It also leads to anarchy within individual complexes. Geographical proximity leads to
these issues being centralized (primarily) in individual complexes and results in the
mutual exclusion of complexes. Despite the mutual exclusion of individual
complexes, Buzan and Wæver address the formation of alliances between entities
inside and outside of specific complexes. They outline two specific interaction
concepts relevant to such alliances: penetration and overlay. Penetration occurs when
states external to an RSC make alliances with states within (2003, p. 46). An example
would be the alliance between the USA and Japan. In this way, RSCs are linked
together, but still remain exclusive. Overlay, on the other hand, is a situation where
an RSC cannot form. It occurs when two great powers are so interested in an area that
a local pattern of security ceases to exist: the entire pattern of security is dominated
by two great powers (2003, p. 61). An example in this instance would be Europe
 6 JOURNAL OF BALTIC STUDIES

during the Cold War. The fourth and final characteristic, and one that is especially
central to our article specifically regarding entities such as subcomplexes, great
powers, superpowers and insulator states, is that RSCs and the remainder of the
security entities listed above can, and do exist simultaneously.
Considering these three theories, what should we expect in our observation of
small states? We should see small states attempting to form alliances as a means of
protection against perceptions of threat. Indeed, they should attempt to align with the
largest, ‘most likely to win’ entity. Additionally, their primary perceived threat ought
to come from an entity geographically close to them, but their allies need not be
limited to other entities within their RSC. Once small states have allied with a
stronger entity, however, we should see little activity from them, as they should be
there just for the ride.
How does all of this relate to the Baltic states? So far, the security situation of the
three countries matches these criteria exactly. They have allied with another entity as
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per Vital. They have bandwagoned with both the EU and NATO, as per Walt. In line
with Buzan and Waever, one of, if not the greatest perceived threat to all three Baltic
states comes from Russia, a geographically close entity, but their alliances are not all
geographically close. Additionally, Olav Knudsen argues that the Baltic Sea Region
forms a security subcomplex, which not only includes two mutually exclusive RSCs
(European and Post-Soviet), but is also influenced heavily by a super power in the
form of the US-led NATO (Knudsen 1999). However, we do not see the Baltic states
simply aligning with larger powers and then doing nothing according to these theories.
True, we do see them as insulator states between the European RSC and the post-
Soviet RSC (Buzan & Waever 2003, p. xxvi), but we also see them taking an active
role in determining the policy of the EU and NATO. Indeed, elsewhere we argue that
there exists a very real possibility that the Baltic states could play the role of a
‘bastion, beacon or bridge’ between the post-Soviet and European RSC (Galbreath &
Lamoreaux 2007, p. 109). What has transformed the Baltic states from parasitical
bandwagoners to policy determiners? We argue that membership in organizations,
rather than turning the Baltic states into parasites or pawns, is the factor that has
turned them to action. Indeed, membership within institutionalized regional
structures such as organizations means small states have the potential to impact
upon the organization’s agenda. This agenda-setting power alters the action capacity of
the small states. While it seems logical that small states on their own are limited as to
what actions they can take, it also seems logical that as a member of an organization,
their capacity to act increases.1 In the next section we illustrate that the action
capacity of the Baltic states has increased within the post-Soviet sphere because of their
membership of regional organizations.

The Baltic States and International Organizations

The literature focusing on the relationship between the Baltic states and inter-
national organizations is characterized as transition, integration or conditionality. The
Baltic states have experienced what Silova has referred to as the ‘four-d’ transition:
de-militarization, de-Sovietization, de-Russification and de-socialization (Silova 2006).
 THE BALTIC STATES AS ‘SMALL STATES’ 7

In other words, there has been a political, economic and social transition in the
Baltic Sea region since independence in 1991. The focus on integration has been
primarily oriented towards rejoining ‘Europe’. First, there has been a plethora of
literature focusing on Baltic integration into the larger European security architecture
vis-à-vis the Russian Federation (Bajarnas et al. 1995; Trapans 1998; Knudsen 1999;
Lejins 2000; Miniotaite 2000). Second, many scholars have focused on the political
integration of the Baltic states into the European Union (Deksnis 2001; Levits 2001;
Rupp 2002; Van Elsuwege 2002). However, perhaps most frequent has been the
literature focusing on European conditionality and the Baltic states in relation to the
European Union (EU), Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe. Within this
subset, the majority has focused on the policies of the Estonian and Latvian
governments towards their largely Russian-speaking, stateless minorities (Steen 2000;
Evans & Lipsmeyer 2001; Gelazis 2003; Galbreath 2003, 2005; Budryte 2005).
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Overall, while much has been written about the external constraints on the Baltic
states, little has been written on what the Baltic states get from international
organizations.
One of the rare exceptions is Mark Jubulis, who at least offers an initial starting
point as to the value added of the international organizations in the Baltic context
(1996, p. 68). First, discussing Latvia in particular, Jubulis argues that Baltic
politicians and much of the titular national populace saw European integration as the
ultimate security guarantee. This security guarantee is particularly meaningful
considering the Baltic experience of forced inclusion into the Soviet Union. Second,
Russian accusations of human rights abuses have put Baltic politicians on the defensive.
This rhetoric illustrates the often virtual security dynamic in the Baltic Sea region.
Finally, Jubulis argues that the Baltic past meant that Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania had
the experience of dealing with human rights issues. In other words, international
organizations offered the Baltic states security, a bandwagon vis-à-vis Russia, and
methods of democracy that more closely resemble ‘choosing from the menu’ than
conditionality (see Jacoby 2004).
Today, the Baltic states are members of all four of the major European organizations
and there have been both continuities and changes in the international organization
value-added. Security remains a primary objective of the Baltic states as it does for
almost any nation-state. As discussed, the European organizations are fundamental parts
of the Baltic security strategy. A bandwagon vis-à-vis Russia is still required, although the
relationship between the three states and Moscow has ameliorated recently, despite the
occasional rhetorical ‘shots’ that are fired particularly at the OSCE and Council of
Europe. Nevertheless, the Baltic governments are no longer solely on the defensive and
European organizations have facilitated this foreign policy change. Since 2004, the Baltic
governments have each designed foreign policy strategies that include a focus on
promoting political transition in the EU’s eastern ‘neighborhood’ (Galbreath 2006;
Galbreath & Lamoreaux 2007). Finally, the Baltic states have experienced the transition
from importer to exporter. The EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe have confirmed
the democratic nature of the three states by membership as well as the closure of the
OSCE missions to Estonia and Latvia in 2001 and the cessation of the Council of Europe
post-monitoring dialogue with Latvia in 2006.
 8 JOURNAL OF BALTIC STUDIES

So, to what degree are the Baltic states able to transcend their demographic and
geographic size by plugging into the European organizations? Let us reflect back on
Thorhallson’s use of action capacity and vulnerability. As we stated before, action
capacity is a state’s ability to implement policies both at home and abroad.
Domestically, there are few power brokers outside of the main political system.
In Latvia and Lithuania, oligarchs have become important actors within the domestic
political systems. While politics in these states remains fractious, policymaking and
implementation is not restricted by alternative sources of domestic power. Estonia
remains relatively politically stable, but the Russian-speaking enclave in the north-east
posed a particular problem in terms of policy implementation, especially in the early
years of independence. However, while social integration remains limited, central
government sovereignty in the area is in full effect. Organizational membership has
provided the Baltic governments with greater resources for implementing policy
domestically. While party politics remains fractious in the Baltic states, especially in
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Lithuania, democratic institutions have been more effective since membership.

Internationally, the Baltic states have had a growing participatory role in the
region and on the international stage. Since 2004, the Baltic governments have
focused on supporting the political transitions in the post-Soviet region generally and
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine specifically. Estonia has promoted projects across the
western post-Soviet space, with Georgia being a particular recipient of development
aid and coordination. Latvia has developed close relations with Moldova and has
largely focused its development aid on Chisinau. Lithuania has worked closely with
Moldova and Georgia, but with a specific focus on supporting democratic institutions
in Ukraine. All three Baltic states have also supported projects in other states such as
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, Latvia and Lithuania have been important
actors in support of non-governmental organizations in Belarus. There is no doubt
that the Baltic influence in these states is limited by the agenda in Brussels (EU) or
Vienna (OSCE), which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have limited ability to
manipulate. Nevertheless, we argue that the action capacity of the Baltic states is
greater because they are members of these organizations than would be the case for
these small states if they remained outside.
Vulnerability refers to a government’s relationship with an alternative power
source, whether they are at home or abroad. We can make two fundamental
comments about the Baltic states and alternative sources of power. First, the three
countries have become less vulnerable to Moscow as the dissolution of the Soviet
Union falls further behind on the linear timeline. The OSCE missions to Estonia and
Latvia were the initial ways in which the two states could justify their minority policies
while highlighting the fact that thousands of Russian troops remained on Baltic soil.
Troop withdrawal in August 1994 was the next step after independence. The
withdrawal of Russian troops was important not only because it removed the potential
for a clash between the Baltic populace and Russian troops, but also because it broke
the link between the troop issue and the status of the Russian communities in Estonia
and Latvia following the citizenship laws in 1992 and 1994, respectively. Finally, the
spring 2004 entry into NATO completed a perceived insurance against future Russian
hostilities. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that if any one member state is
attacked, every other member state is required to come to that state’s defense.
 THE BALTIC STATES AS ‘SMALL STATES’ 9

Article V has only ever been invoked as a result of 11 September 2001. Should an
attack take place on Estonia, Latvia and/or Lithuania, there may be a lack of political
will to committing troops for the defense of small nations on the periphery. Clearly
Baltic governments are paying their dues to ensure future political will by sending
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO’s most recent summit was hosted in Riga in
October 2006, which also sent a signal of solidarity in the face of would-be attackers.
Nevertheless, the Baltic states’ biggest insecurities do not derive from the prospect of
an attack from Russia or another post-Soviet state, but rather from other issues such as
porous borders and illegal trafficking of arms and human beings (see Holtom 2003,
2005).
At the same time that the Baltic states have been moving away from Moscow, they
have been moving ever closer to Washington, DC and Brussels. Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania began their move to the West upon receiving membership of the OSCE and
the Council of Europe in the early 1990s. Following entry into the Council of Europe,
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the three Baltic states declared their intention to join the European Community
and NATO. These international organizations were perceived by successive Baltic
governments as being fundamental to their continued sovereignty. In other words, the
Baltic states perceived their vulnerability to be lower as members of an international
organization. In real terms, we can assume that membership of NATO, the EU, and
the OSCE has an impact on levels of vulnerabilities for small states. However,
some actors within the Baltic states may see little difference between West and East.
As many Euroskeptic politicians have claimed, the Baltic states have replaced one
union with another. Needless to say, all three states still have considerably more to do
in terms of fighting corruption and challenging the power of oligarchs. The road to
European integration has made challenging alternative sources of domestic power
easier and membership itself will continue to support clean government, especially as
long as the Baltic states remain net receivers of EU funding.
How do the Baltic states themselves use international organizations to ‘punch
above their weight’? Interviews in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Defense
in Latvia and Lithuania in spring 2006, and with Estonian officials in the spring of
2007 offer an indication. Baltic–EU relations, as described earlier, have had an impact
on the ‘smallness’ of the three states, particularly in terms of Thorhallson’s conceptual
framework. Various interviewees in the Latvian MFA have stated that EU membership
has led to a formal, institutionalized route of political communication with Latvia’s
‘strategic partners’ within the EU. One interviewee in Latvia stated that the Baltic
states benefit from an economy of scale. For instance, training border guards for
Latvia’s borders with Russia and Belarus is far less of a burden on the EU than training
Hungarian border guards for Hungary’s border with Ukraine. Economies of scale have
a direct impact on a small state’s level of action capacity at home. The Estonian foreign
minister, Urmas Paet, expressed this relationship in his speech to the Estonian
parliament (Riigikogu) in May 2005.2 The foreign minister expressed the benefit of
being a member of the EU when it comes to dealing with the Russian Federation
though showed caution as regards the vetoing of EU–Russian agreements. Minister
Paet argued that EU membership allows Estonia to gain from the same relationship
that, for example, France has with Russia. As a result, Paet argued, the Estonian
government must attempt to bend EU negotiations in its own favor without blocking
 10 JOURNAL OF BALTIC STUDIES

the agreement altogether. Otherwise, in such areas as visa entries, other member
states will establish bilateral agreements which will simply leave out Estonia. Thus, the
point is to use the EU and its institutions, not hold them back.
EU membership has also allowed the Baltic states to increase action capacity
abroad, for example, through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the former
Soviet area. As suggested by another interviewee in Latvia, external action capacity
depends on the political will within the international organization. For example, it is
important for the Baltic states to keep Brussels (and the EU member states)
continually looking to the east in addition to the south and the Mediterranean. In this
case, the EU increases the Baltic states’ external action capacity, though this is limited
by the inability of the three countries to impact agenda-setting within the international
organization, a traditional aspect of ‘smallness’. Interviews in the Estonian foreign
ministry confirm this.3 For instance, one interviewee stated that Estonia is in a good
strategic geopolitical position to aid the ‘new outsiders’ such as Georgia, Ukraine and
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Belarus. The Baltic states are familiar with the processes – such as democratization and
de-Russification – that these countries are going through. At the same time, the Baltic
states have a strategic interest in stability in the region, an outcome that would
generally be beyond the capabilities of small states. Whether in a strategic or a moral-
political sense, the Baltic states have an interest in maximizing their own external
action capacity through the EU.
As interviews in Lithuania illustrate, the Baltic states have had to deal with the
cost of learning how to work within the confines of the EU. A lack of coherence in the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has a direct impact on the Baltic
states’ external action capacity. An interviewee in the Lithuanian MFA, echoing his
Latvian counterparts, stated that a lack of coherence as well as cohesion in the CFSP
makes life more difficult for small states. Large states in the EU are able to work
outside the confines of a common foreign policy through, for example, bilateral
policies rather than multinational initiatives, the latter being more favorable to small
states. The ‘bronze soldier’ incident in Estonia provides just such an example of this
difficulty. In response to Estonia’s decision to relocate the statue commemorating
Soviet soldiers who lost their lives taking Tallinn in 1944, a Russian-based cyber attack
was launched on Estonian-based banking and governmental internet sites, successfully
freezing access to them for several days. To show solidarity, the EU issued a statement
of support to Estonia. However, aside from this resolution, very little was done and
the cyber attacks were largely successful in blocking access to Estonian internet sites.
Whether or not the EU could have done anything practical is open to question.
However, the fact that nothing outside a resolution was accomplished by the EU
further highlights how the lack of cohesion in CFSP can be harmful to small states.
Overall, by considering the interviews, we were able to pinpoint three factors in
terms of determining the action capacity of small states: economies of scale;
identifying converging interests; and coherent, multinational policies within the
international organization.
The interviews also illustrate how international organizations have shaped Baltic
vulnerability. Baltic membership of NATO specifically has transformed defense and
security policy. An interviewee at the Latvian Ministry of Defense stated that before
membership, policy in this area was geared towards territorial defense. Following the
 THE BALTIC STATES AS ‘SMALL STATES’ 11

2004 membership in NATO, Baltic defense and security policy has been reformulated
to work within the niche capabilities required by NATO. Another interviewee in
Latvia argued that the Baltic states have a role to play in NATO by keeping the
organization interested in the immediate region at a time when NATO has increasing
out-of-area operations ongoing. Again, agenda-setting is key. Interviewees in Lithuania
concentrated on NATO’s contribution to the restructuring and financial support of its
armed forces. On one hand, small states do not have the capacity to field large
militaries and thus economies of scale benefit organizational investment in small state
militaries. On the other hand, NATO’s focus on niche capabilities means that the
Baltic states need only concentrate on their particular areas of expertise, such as
diving, bomb disposal, and military police. Overall, Baltic vulnerability has been
shaped by NATO membership in terms of threat reduction, reform, financial and
technical support, and niche orientations.
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Conclusion
In this article we show that small states are able to impact the region regardless of size
and the ascribed action capacity because of their membership in powerful international
organizations. In considering traditional as well as more recent theories of small states,
the consensus was that small states are rather limited in what actions they can take and
that in nearly all cases they will bandwagon with a larger state/entity. Most of the
existing literature indicates that once states have allied with a larger entity, they have
very limited purpose and are essentially ‘along for the ride’ or simply serve as pawns
between larger entities such as RSCs. We argue, however, that by joining international
organizations, small states increase their capacity to be influential both within the
organizations and without. In short, though they are small by all accounts on their
own, the Baltic states’ membership in international organizations allows them to
punch above their weight. We show this gradual transition by comparing the foreign,
domestic and security policies of the Baltic states from the 1990s with their current
policies. The consensus among interviewees was that the Baltic states, individually and
as a group, are much more influential internationally because of their membership
within the EU and NATO. Consequently, the position of the three countries has
changed drastically from being an importer of democracy and security to being an
exporter and champion of these traits, largely due to their membership in powerful
international organizations.

Notes
1 According to several interviewees in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense
of Lithuania and Latvia, interviewed in March and April 2006, some of the pre-
2004 members of the EU, as well as some of the newest member states, are happy
being a part of and benefiting from the EU, but not really eager to play
a significant role in setting the agenda of the Union. The Baltic states, however,
are eager to be agenda-setters in the EU and NATO, especially with regard to the
new ‘neighborhood’.
 12 JOURNAL OF BALTIC STUDIES

2 Main Guidelines of Estonia’s Foreign Policy, address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Estonia Urmas Paet to the Riigikogu on behalf of the
Government of Estonia, 13 December 2005.
3 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9–11 April 2007. Tiiu Viljasaar, Counsellor
(International Organizations & Regional Cooperation Division); Aivo Orav,
Director General of Department (Department of Political Director); Margus
Kolga, Director General of 1st Political Department (International Organizations
and Security Policy); Mart Laanemäe, Undersecretary for Political Affairs; Urmas
Paet, Foreign Minister; Katrin Kanarik, Director of 3rd Division (Political
Department of Western Europe and North America); Simmu Tiik, Director
General of 3rd Political Department (Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America,
Australia and Oceania); Kai Kaarelson, Director of EU Coordination Division
(European Union Department).
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David J. Galbreath is a Lecturer of Politics and International Relations at the

University of Aberdeen. His research focuses primarily on the international politics of
the Baltic Sea region. He has published in journals such as Governance, Geopolitics,
 14 JOURNAL OF BALTIC STUDIES

Nationalities Papers, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, and previously in Journal

of Baltic Studies. He has a forthcoming book with Ainius Lasas and Jeremy W.
Lamoreaux entitled Continuity and Change in the Baltic Sea Region (Rodopi, Amsterdam).
(d.galbreath@abdn.ac.uk)

Jeremy W. Lamoreaux is a doctoral student at the University of Aberdeen

researching hard security between the Baltic states and Russia. He has published
in Geopolitics and is the author with Luca Ratti of a forthcoming book chapter
entitled ‘Post-Cold War Security and Defence in ‘‘Old’’ and ‘‘New’’ Europe’, in Defence
Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge, London).
(j.lamoreaux@abdn.ac.uk)
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