Nanotech Bad

Nano Neg – Planet Debate
NanoTech FYI..................................................................................................................................................5
Inherency Neg...................................................................................................................................................6
General Solvency Answers...............................................................................................................................7
Nano Solar Solvency Answers..........................................................................................................................8
Commercial Nanosolar Isn’t Possible...............................................................................................................9
Competitiveness Advantage Answers.............................................................................................................10
Competitiveness Advantage Answers (Applies to ALL Competitiveness Advantages)..................................12
Competitiveness Advantage Answers (Applies to ALL Competitiveness Advantages)..................................14
Competitiveness Advantage Answers – Ext – Knowledge Spreads Abroad...................................................15
Competitiveness Advantage Answers – Ext: U.S. Leads Now........................................................................16
Competitiveness Advantage Answers – China or Russia Don’t Threaten the U.S. Nano Lead.......................17
Extensions – Patents Block Nano Development.............................................................................................18
Extensions – Patents Block.............................................................................................................................22
AT: We Solve Bad NanoTech........................................................................................................................23
AT: We Solve a Nano Arms Race.................................................................................................................24
AT: We Create Military Dominance in Nanotech...........................................................................................25
AT: We Create Regs.......................................................................................................................................28
Nanotech Causes Extinction...........................................................................................................................29
Nanotech Causes Extinction...........................................................................................................................30
NanoExtinction Outweighs Nuclear War........................................................................................................31
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Extensions – Grey Good Causes Extinction....................................................................................................32
Extensions – Nanotech Causes Extinction......................................................................................................33
Supporting NanoTech Leads to Self-Replication............................................................................................34
AT: Fat Fingers Stop Self-Replication............................................................................................................35
AT: Sticky Fingers Stops Self-Replication.....................................................................................................36
AT: Sticky Fingers Stops Self-Replication ....................................................................................................37
Nanotechnology Destroys the Economy.........................................................................................................38
Nanotechnology Destroys the Economy.........................................................................................................39
Nanotechnology Destroys the Economy ........................................................................................................40
Nanotech Causes Prolif...................................................................................................................................41
Extension – Nanotech Causes Prolif...............................................................................................................42
Nanotech Causes Arms Races.........................................................................................................................43
Nanotech Causes Arms Races.........................................................................................................................44
Nanotech Undermines Soft Power..................................................................................................................45
Nanotech Destroys Biodiversity.....................................................................................................................46
Nanotech Destroys Biodiversity ....................................................................................................................47
Nanotechnology Causes Space Wars..............................................................................................................48
Nanotechnology Causes Disease.....................................................................................................................49
Nanotech Destabilizes the Middle East...........................................................................................................50
Nanotech Threatens the Food Chain...............................................................................................................51
Nanotechnology Causes Terrorism.................................................................................................................52
Nano Threatens the Environment....................................................................................................................53
Nano Threatens Health...................................................................................................................................54
AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................55
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.......................................................................................................................................................................69
States Counterplan..........................................................................................................................................72
States Counterplan Solves R &D....................................................................................................................73
States Solve Military.......................................................................................................................................74
Politics -- Plan is Popular in Congress............................................................................................................76
Heidegger Links..............................................................................................................................................77
Heidegger Links..............................................................................................................................................78
Heidegger Links..............................................................................................................................................79
Heidegger Links..............................................................................................................................................82
Coal DA Links................................................................................................................................................84
Fiscal Discipline DA Links.............................................................................................................................85
Nano Not Inevitable........................................................................................................................................87
CP – International Regulation.........................................................................................................................89
International Regulation Counterplan.............................................................................................................90
International Regulation Counterplan.............................................................................................................91
Grey Good Answers........................................................................................................................................93
AT: NanoTech Inevitable................................................................................................................................94
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Asymmetric Warfare Answers........................................................................................................................95
Asymmetric Warfare Solvency Answers........................................................................................................95
Can’t Solve Asymmetric Threats through Military Means..............................................................................99
Can’t Solve Asymmetric Threats through Military Means............................................................................100
Can’t Solve Asymmetric Threats through Military Means............................................................................101
Extensions: Plan Causes Trade-Offs.............................................................................................................102
Extensions: Plan Causes Trade-Offs.............................................................................................................103
AT: Our Plan Solves the Problems With Fighting Asymmetric Wars...........................................................104
Improving Asymmetric Warfare Won’t Solve Terrorism.............................................................................105
Biopower K Links.........................................................................................................................................106
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NanoTech FYI
Nanotech defined
Dr. Raj Bawa, a biochemist and microbiologist, is a registered patent agent licensed to practice before the US
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 2007, Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology, “Nanotechnology
Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The U.S. Patent Office”, p. 703-4
One of the problems facing nanotechnology n9 is the confusion, hype, and disagreement among experts about
its definition. Nanotechnology is an umbrella term used to define the [properties,] products and processes at
the nano/micro scale that have resulted from the convergence of the physical, chemical and life sciences." n
One of the most quoted definitions is the one used by the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI):
"nanotechnology is the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers,
where unique phenomena enable novel applications." This definition "excludes numerous devices and
materials of micrometer dimensions, a scale that is [often] included within the definition of nanotechnology
by many nanoscientists." Therefore, some experts have cautioned against an overly rigid definition based on
a sub-100 nm size, "emphasizing instead the continuum of scale from the nanoscale to the microscale." n
5
Inherency Neg
Military using nano batteries now
E&E News, August 6, 2008
A Reno, Nev.-based nanotechnology company announced today that it would supply the Army with
advanced battery technology that the military says could pave the way for wider deployment in electric and
hybrid vehicles. Altair Nanotechnology, which manufactures nanomaterials for use in pharmaceuticals,
energy and a host of industrial applications, said it signed a $350,000 contract to develop prototype batteries
using lithium titanate technology for the Picatinny Arsenal in Denville, N.J. The new batteries will be
designed for use in the Army's M119 105mm lightweight towed howitzer, a gun capable of firing six rounds
a minute for two minutes at a maximum range of more than 11 miles, according to GlobalSecurity.org. The
new technology is a lithium ion system that uses "a nano-lithium titanate" as the material at its anode, or the
terminal through which a current travels to an electrolytic cell, Altairnano's Chief Executive Terry Copeland
explained in an interview. While he declined to say what part of the weapons system his batteries would
power, he described lithium titanate technology as ideally suited for battlefield conditions.
6
General Solvency Answers

4 things the plan doesn’t do that are necessary to solve
Matthew M. Nordan, Vice President Of Research, Lux Research, Inc, 2005, Hearing, June,
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy21950.000/hsy21950_0f.htm
What can the U.S. do to maintain and, moreover, extend leadership in nanotechnology? I see five key
actions. First, the U.S. must grow federal funding for nanotechnology research. Nanotech is a horizontal
enabler most similar to assembly line manufacturing or to electricity that will impact virtually every
manufactured good. It is as critical for us to lead in this field now as it was to lead in packet switched
networks decades ago, far before the Internet stimulated economic development. Second, we must eliminate
regulatory uncertainty surrounding environmental, health, and safety issues in nanotechnology. There
are no firm guidelines from the EPA or OSHA today about how those agencies plan to regulate
nanomaterials, and as a result, large corporations are beginning to hold back investment, for fear that the
ground will shift underneath them. Third, we must attract U.S. students to the physical sciences, but as
well, we must retain the foreign students that we import. Nobel laureate Richard Smalley has observed that
on current trends, by 2010, 90 percent of physical scientists worldwide will be Asian nationals, 60 percent
will be practicing in Asia. The U.S. should strengthen science education in K-12, reconsider the effect of visa
tightening on the inflow of foreign science and technology students, and develop economic incentives to
retain those researchers when they study here. Quite frankly, we risk becoming a drive-through educational
institution for other countries' students. Fourth, we must create financial incentives aligned with desirable
applications. Such programs can be coordinated through existing agencies. They require no incremental
bureaucracy. Consider NASA's $11 million project with Rice University to develop extremely low loss
power cables based on carbon nanotubes. And finally, we must be sensible about export controls in
nanotechnology, which could choke commercialization. Export controls in this field, per se, are a dead
end. The field is too broad to implement them. Such action would be like trying to impose controls on
assembly line manufacturing techniques and equipment. Instead, we believe the U.S. should identify
specific nanotech applications with military significance, like nanoparticulate explosives, and impose
sensible controls on them within existing frameworks
Research won’t produce new nanotech applications

John Sargent, senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy, May 15,
2008,Nanotechnology and U.S. Competitiveness, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/106153.pdf
Basic research in nanotechnology may not translate into viable commercial applications. Though no
formal assessment of the composition of the NNI budget has been made, there is general consensus that the
NNI investment since its inception has been focused on basic research. The National Science Foundation
defines the objective of basic research as seeking “to gain more comprehensive knowledge or understanding
of the subject under study without applications in mind.” Therefore, while basic research may underpin
applied research, development, and commercialization, that is not its primary focus or intent. In
general, basic research can take decades21 to result in commercial applications, and many advances
in scientific understanding may not present commercial opportunities
7
Nano Solar Solvency Answers

R&D won’t produce nanosolar advances
Cientifica, 2007, A reality check for solar nanotech,”http://cientifica.eu/blog/?p=369)]
In the short term, any solutions will come from making better use of existing resources, not from thin film
solar or the still mythical hydrogen economy. The companies using nanotechnology to produce thin film
solar systems have burned through a quarter of a billion dollars of venture capital money over six
years, and still haven’t cracked the manufacturing and reliability issues which will make the
technology economic. In the meantime, the easing of the current silicon shortage coupled with advances in
the efficiency of current generation solar cells gives the nanotech based solutions a narrowing window of
opportunity to aim at.
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Commercial Nanosolar Isn’t Possible

Transmission, distribution, and contracting prevent widespread nanosolar use
San Francisco Chronicle, July 11, 2007, As solar gets smaller, its future gets brighter,”
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi bin/article.cgi?
file=/chronicle/archive/2005/07/11/BUG7IDL1AF1.DTL&type=tech
It remains unclear, however, who would install nanotechnology-based solar components if they become
commercially available. "There's no channel to the market," said Nordan, who sees a fragmented
solar installation market made up of numerous contractors, which makes adoption of any technology
difficult. Nordan also sees obstacles in transmitting solar energy from rooftop collection sites back to
electrical grids and other buildings not wired with photovoltaics. Distribution an obstacle "The problem
is distribution. Nanomaterials could provide a way to transmit energy as well as capture it." Until the
distribution issue is solved, Nordan says, solar energy will not be able to meet its potential of supplying
vast amounts of power.
9
Competitiveness Advantage Answers

11 reasons nanotech won’t be commercialized
Jung Lowe, McNeil, Dean and Professor of Business Management, University of Illinois, September 2007,
Barriers To Nanotechnology Commercialization, http://www.ntis.gov/pdf/Report-
BarriersNanotechnologyCommercialization.pdf
1. Time between research and commercialization is estimated to be 3 to 10 years. Venture capitalists

and other sources of funding find this time factor to be a detriment. 2. The so-called “Valley of Death”
is the often fatal interlude between scientific results of the researcher and initial funding for proto-
typing and commercialization. The scientists ma y publish results and not be interested in commercialization. As often happens, where there is interest or not in
commercialization, the common comment is that for every dollar invested into basic research, which is critical to the U.S.’s competitive strength, almost one hundred dollars is required for a
The commercialization of nanotechnology scientific investment has little

competitive product to be produced.
relationship to the hi-tech dot.com, software commercialization paradigm. This is a serious gap
between research and commercialization that must be addressed by government agencies and the
venture capitalists. 3. Lack of proper infrastructure (labs, equipment, measuring devices, etc.)
hinders the growth of small business and researchers. The infrastructure needed is very expensive.
Furthermore, equipment becomes quickly outdated due to the major advances in technology. 4. Lack
of usage of federal and university laboratories and equipment hurts small businesses that can’t afford
this infrastructure. 5. Many of the employees or scientists are foreign nationals. They are not allowed
access to federal labs in most cases. 6. Small businesses do not have the capacity to produce products
at a large scale. 7. There is a lack of a coherent policy on tech transfer from universities to start-up
businesses. 8. Audit control from federal government is a hindrance to small companies. It is very
expensive to slow down work to comply with several federal agencies that conduct audits. There needs
to be a centralized system. 9. Patent office takes up to 36 months to respond to applications registered.
10. Potential barriers may include the lack of trained scientists, engineers, technicians and researchers
in this country. There is no federal policy addressing the deficit in scientific training at all levels of our
educational institutions and in improving the workforce with better and improved technical skills. 11.
The current tax policy does not assist research and development. There are not enough sufficient tax
credits for funding groups. 12. FDA and Patent offices do not have enough qualified staff to assess
nanotechnology products. 13. The development of nano tools must increase and be more available to
universities and startup businesses. 14. SBIR encourages research and not commercialization. It does
not support small companies. 15. Applied research needs to be encouraged more in universities and
federal labs. 16. The public perception that nanotechnology products are unsafe must be challenged to
insure the public fully understands its potential. 17. Lack of standards and measurements are
hindering advancements in nanotechnology. 18. The reduction of research and development funding
has been hindering advancement in research. 19. Current immigration policy is adversely affecting
research. U.S. - educated foreign nationals are going back to their home countries because of the
difficulty of going through the process to stay in the United States. 20. It is also difficult for an
individual to obtain a visa to enter the United States. 21. National assistance for nano technology
development in foreign countries is more effective than in the United States. It will be a problem for
competitiveness. 22. Some academics and researchers fight efforts for commercialization.
10

Turn – Companies will conduct research outside the U.S.
U.S.-based companies may conduct production and other work outside of the United States. In today’s
economy, supply chains are global and the work required to develop, design, produce, market, sell, and
service products is generally conducted where it can be done most efficiently. Even if U.S.-based companies
successfully develop and bring nanotechnology materials and products to market, work may be conducted,
and the economic value captured, outside of the United States.
Intellectual property rights litigation blocks widespread nano comercialization

Semiconductor.net, 2007, http://www.semiconductor.net/article/CA6503878.html
Nanotechnology is advancing at a dizzying rate, but profitable commercialization is being hindered by

looming legal issues, as uneven worldwide patent enforcement is forcing companies to resort to trade
secrets to protect their hard-won nanotechnology innovations.A panel of industry experts at the recent
NanoCon International conference in Santa Clara, Calif., considered several hurdles — ranging from legal
considerations to scalability and cost — facing nanomaterials manufacturing.“For nanotech to become a
true industry, it must consistently deliver application-tailored quality material in sufficiently large
qualities — whether kilogram or kiloton,” said Dave Arthur, CEO of SouthWest Nanotechnologies
(SWeNT, Norman, Okla.). “Many potential customers won’t begin product development unless they
know that we’ll be able to provide material at those kinds of scales.” Then there is cost. Although nanotech
materials deliver high value at small quantities, not many applications can support costs of thousands or even hundreds of dollars per
gram. The processes that produce these materials must become more scalable. Manufacturing scalability to a great extent is a matter
of achieving sufficiently uniform heat and mass transfer in processes, but there exists a chicken-and-egg situation regarding the
needed investment to attain this. “In an academic setting, nanomanufacturing means making one or two,” said Professor Joey Mead,
deputy director of the Center for High-Rate Nanomanufacturing of the Department of Plastics Engineering at the University of
Massachusetts Lowell, which is part of the National Science Foundation's Nanoscale Science and Engineering organization. “If you
toss 99 to get a good one and can publish results, that’s sufficient; not so for commercial manufacturing. For that you must really
understand the manufacturing fundamentals to enable industry to develop them for large-scale manufacturing.” Panel moderator
Kelly Kordzik, an intellectual property lawyer at Fish & Richardson P.C. (Austin, Texas), said some patents lie dormant like
monsters out of an old Japanese sci-fi thriller, waiting to be awakened to wreak havoc. “When the technology was getting started,” he
said, “broad and fundamental patents were filed by both universities and companies.”
Since presently there is not enough
profit to be had in nanotech patents, there has been no appreciable litigation to entangle development
or frighten away venture capitalists. However, there is an unholy race between nanotech’s progress
toward high-volume commercialization, and these older patents’ expiration dates. When valuable
applications start breaking en masse into the commercial world, making significant profits, many
expect that these patent holders will attempt to enforce them, possibly leading to complex and
paralyzing patent fights.
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Competitiveness Advantage Answers (Applies to ALL Competitiveness

Advantages)
Turn – R&D will inevitable be shared world-wide
Basic research is generally available to all competitors. Even when basic research presents the potential for
commercial exploitation, it may not deliver national advantage. Open publication and free exchange of
research results are guiding principles of federally funded fundamental research and research conducted by
U.S. colleges and universities. This approach may allow for the rapid expansion of global scientific and
technical knowledge as new work is built on the scaffolding of previous work. However, the information is
available to all competitors, U.S. and foreign alike, and thus may not confer competitive advantage to the
United States.
Nanotechnologies will just take developments and relocate abroad

The data typically used to assess technological competitiveness in mature industries — e.g., revenues,
market share, trade — is not available to assess the U.S. position in nanotechnology because it is a new
technology, commercial products are just beginning to enter the market in a significant manner, and it is incorporated in wide array of products across many industries. Accordingly, the
federal government currently does not collect this data on nanotechnology, nor do other nations. The number of nanotechnology products in the marketplace is increasing quickly though. Congress may
elect to ask federal agencies to assess what data (e.g. economic, labor force, students) would be useful in formulating federal policies and making resource allocation decisions and direct federal
statistical agencies to collect, analyze, and make public such data. The federal government may also seek to foster data collection efforts in other nations. In the absence of such data, assessments of
nanotechnology depend largely on alternative indicators, such as inputs (e.g., public and private investments) and noneconomic outputs (e.g., scientific papers, patents). By these measures, the United
States appears to lead all other nations in nanotechnology, though the U.S. lead in this field may not be as large as it has been in previous emerging technology areas. This is due to increased
investments and capabilities of many nations based on recognition that technological leadership and commercialization are primary paths to increased economic growth, improved standards of living,
. Nor does
and job creation. Nevertheless, these alternative indicators may not present an accurate view of technological leadership and economic competitiveness for many reasons
national technological leadership alone guarantee that the economic value produced by nanotechnology
innovations will be captured within a nation’s borders. In today’s global economy, companies have the
option of locating work — e.g. research, development, design, engineering, manufacturing, product
support — where it can be done most effectively. A variety of federal policy issues may affect the
development and commercialization of nanotechnology in the United States, including the magnitude
and focus of research and development efforts, the regulatory environment, and science and
engineering workforce development. Some support an active federal approach; others believe that a more
limited federal involvement is likely to be more successful and equitable. In addition to these factors, U.S.
competitiveness in nanotechnology will depend not just on the efforts of the United States, but also on the
speed and efficacy of foreign nanotechnology development efforts.
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U.S. leads in nanotech now
As with public R&D investments, on a PPP comparison basis, the United States led the world in 2006
in private sector R&D investments in nanotechnology with an estimated $1.9 billion investment, led by
companies such as Hewlett-Packard, Intel, DuPont, General Electric, and IBM. Japan’s $1.7 billion in
private investments in nanotechnology R&D — led by companies such as Mitsubishi, NEC, and
Hitachi — ranks a close second behind the United States. The private investments of companies
headquartered in these two nations account for nearly three-fourths of corporate investment in
nanotechnology R&D in 2006. In contrast to its high PPP ranking in public R&D investment, China ranks
fifth in corporate investment, accounting for only about 3% of global private R&D investments in
nanotechnology. Strength in an existing industry base may be a driver for private investment in
nanotechnology innovations. For example, multi-walled carbon nanotubes (MCWNTs) offer significant
improvements in lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery life. Japan’s strength in Li-ion batteries is seen as a driving
force in Japan’s leading position in the manufacture of MWCNTs and Japanese companies’ investments in
ton-scale production capabilities. Venture capital investment — early-stage equity investment, generally
characterized by high risk and high returns — provides another possible indicator of international
competitiveness. In 2007, venture capital for nanotechnology reached an estimated $702 million
worldwide of which U.S.-based companies received $632 million (approximately 90%)
13
Competitiveness Advantage Answers (Applies to ALL Competitiveness

Advantages)
Lack of scientists makes nano leadership impossible
The U.S. is not generating enough Science and Engineering Master's degree and Ph.D. holders to maintain
leadership in nanotechnology. Tighter controls on student visas since the September 11 attacks have reduced
the inflow of Ph.D. students to the United States in favor of Western Europe, and as economies in China,
India, and South Korea develop, foreign scientists are less likely to remain in the U.S. for their careers than
they were a decade ago. Nobel Laureate Richard Smalley from Rice University has noted that at current
rates, by 2010, 90 percent of all physical scientists will be Asian and 50 percent of them will be practicing in
Asia.
U.S. ahead on nanotech now
Mike Roco, senior advisor for nanotechnology at the National Science Foundation, 2007, The Future of
Nanotechnology, http://www.media.rice.edu/media/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&ID=9459
Nanotechnology in the United States is developing at a fast pace and has made significant advances in five
years that other technologies in 20th century took 15 or 20 years to achieve. NNI is investing about $1.4
billion annually in 2007, which is about one-quarter of the worldwide government investment in
nanotechnology. Industry has already exceeded the investment made by the federal government in the
United States. The United States has more than 50 percent of highly cited papers in the field, more
than 60 percent of patents related to nanotechnology at USPTO and about 70 percent of start-up
companies. That means we are a little bit more efficient, on average, for the investment. This is partly
because we organize nanotechnology using a horizontal, multidisciplinary approach that uses the same
methods, the same architecture, the same instrumentation and the same principles in different areas. This
promotes the exchange of ideas. We are also funding proportionally more fundamental, exploratory research.
We leave applications to be picked up by industry. Another reason the United States is doing relatively
well in outcomes is because of the better foundation in physics, chemistry and biology in our university
system and industrial labs. If you look toward the future, the field is moving very fast from studying simple
components – like nanotubes, nanoparticles, quantum dots – to studying active devices and nanosystems. We
are also beginning to see investigations into the close integration of these nanosystems for applications,
and eventually we'll be developing nanosystems that have very small components that are nanoscale
devices and even molecules or macromolecules. At that moment, we will arrive at so-called molecular
nanotechnology.
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Competitiveness Advantage Answers – Ext – Knowledge Spreads Abroad

Foreigners educated in the U.S. will spread the knowledge abroad
U.S.-educated foreign students may return home to conduct research and create new businesses. In
the era following World War II, many of the most gifted and talented students from around the world
were attracted to the science and engineering programs of U.S. colleges and universities. For many
years, many of those who graduated from these programs decided to stay in the United States and
contributed to U.S. global scientific, engineering, and economic leadership. Today, many foreign
students educated in the United States have economic opportunities in their home countries that did
not exist for previous generations. Some nations are making strong appeals and offering significant
incentives for their students to return home to conduct research and create enterprises. Thus, federal
support for universities, in general, and scientific and engineering research activities, in particular,
may contribute to the development of leading scientists and engineers who might return to their home
countries to exploit the knowledge, capabilities, and networks developed in the United States.
Reverse brain drain now

Newsweek, August 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/aug2007/sb20070821_920025.htm
For the first time in its history, the U.S. faces the prospect of a reverse brain drain. New research by
my team at the Pratt School of Engineering at Duke University shows that more than 1 million highly
skilled professionals such as engineers, scientists, doctors, researchers, and their families are in line for
a yearly allotment of only around 120,000 permanent-resident visas for employment-based principals
and their families in the three main employment visa categories (EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3). These
individuals entered the country legally to study or to work. They contributed to U.S. economic growth and
global competitiveness. Now we've set the stage for them to return to countries such as India and China,
where the economies are booming and their skills are in great demand. U.S. businesses large and small stand
to lose critical talent, and workers who have gained valuable experience and knowledge of American
industry may become potential competitors. The problem is simple. There aren't enough permanent-resident
visas available each year for skilled workers and their families. And there is a limit of fewer than 10,000
visas that can be issued to immigrants from any single country. So countries with the largest populations
such as India and China are allocated the same number of visas as Iceland and Mongolia.
15
Competitiveness Advantage Answers – Ext: U.S. Leads Now

U.S. leads in peer reviewed nanoresearch
The United States leads all other nations in peer-reviewed nanotechnology papers published in scientific
journals. A National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) analysis reported that the United States’ 24%
share of global publication output was more than double that of the next most prolific nation, China.
However, this share represents a decline from the early 1990s when the United States accounted for
approximately 40% of nanotechnology papers. The NBER working paper concludes, “Taken as a whole
these data confirm that the strength and depth of the American science base points to the United States being
the dominant player in nanotechnology for some time to come, while the United States also faces significant
and increasing international competition.”
U.S. leads in nanopatents
Patent counts — assessments of how many patents are issued to individuals or institutions of a particular
country — are another indicator used to assess a nation’s competitive position. According to the U.S. Patent
and Trade Office (USPTO), a patent grants ownership rights to a person who “invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.” By this definition, patents may be an indicator of future value and national strength in a technology,
product, or industry. By this measure the United States position appears to be very strong. United States
assignees dominate all other countries in patents issued by the USPTO. According to an analysis by the
USPTO of patents in the United States and in other nations, U.S. origin inventors and assignees/owners have:
the most nanotechnology-related U.S. patents by a wide margin; the most nanotechnology-related patent
publications globally, but by a narrower margin (followed closely by Japan); and the most nanotechnology-
related inventions that have patent publications in three or more countries, 31.7% — an indication of a more
aggressive pursuit of international intellectual property protection and, by inference, of its perceived
potential value. By this measurement, the United States is followed by Japan (26.9%), Germany (11.3%),
Korea (6.6%), and France (3.6%).43
16
Competitiveness Advantage Answers – China or Russia Don’t Threaten the U.S.

Nano Lead
China is nowhere near the U.S. in nanotech.
NanoChina, 2007, Multinational Move on Nanotech, http://www.nanochina.cn/english/index.php?
option=content&task=view&id=771&Itemid=182]
In a story headlined, "China Second to U.S. in Nano," which citied a report this month from Lux Research,
UPI said that "several countries, including China, are beginning to gain on the top nations of the United
States and Japan." But a closer look at the Lux report shows that things are a little more nuanced and a lot
less sensational. The U.S. remains the big spender in nanotechnology. Even if VCs and the IPO market have
been cold, federal and state spending, as well as big companies like General Electric and DuPont, are more
than picking up the slack. China was ranked sixth in government funding (although it was even with Japan
when Lux factored in how much that spending could purchase in local markets) and fifth in corporate
spending. China's focus was also on low-cost areas like materials and chemicals that hold out less profit
potential than fields such as bioscience.
The Russian nanotech program sucks – corruption, inexperience, and lack of

transparency.
Nature, October 12, 2007, p. 4
In what could be the biggest windfall for science since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian parliament last
week gave the green light to a massive US$7-billion investment in nanotechnology over five years. The Russian
government hopes the programme will make the country a world leader in nanoscale technologies with a wide range of
military and civilian uses. However, the move has been criticized as poorly prepared and unlikely to yield results. Nano-
devices, designed from single atoms and molecules, are predicted to have applications in fields as diverse as consumer
electronics and biomedicine. All research and development activities will be coordinated by Rosnanotekh, a new tax
exempt body with far-reaching freedom to set up institutes, put work out to tender and commercialize results. But no
details have been announced about the precise structure, goals and content of the initiative. It is unclear, for example,
how projects will be selected for funding. Some Russian scientists, sceptical about fair allocation of funds, have given
the announcement a lukewarm response. The country has hardly any competence in nanotechnology, they say. And
given the widespread absence of efficient quality control in Russian science funding, many fear the scheme will be
poisoned by corruption. “Our government just doesn’t understand anything about science,” says one high level Russian
physicist who asked not to be named. “They think if they throw enough money at it they’ll get some nice exploitable
results in return. But we don’t even have the experts.” The programme is the brainchild of Russian President Vladimir
Putin, who is keen to reduce the country’s dependence on oil and gas. Putin recently compared the importance of
nanotechnology to that of nuclear science. He is said to have secretly recruited Mikhail Kovalchuk, the director the
Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, to head Rosnanotekh. Kovalchuk, who is not an expert in nanotechnology, is the
brother of Yuri Kovalchuk, a banker and businessman with close ties to Putin. The independent Russian media has
poured scorn on Russia’s foray into what some call the “banano” technology business. “Lack of transparency and
programme abuse for personal goals are the usual Russian dangers,” says former science minister Boris Saltykov, an
expert in science management.
17
Extensions – Patents Block Nano Development

Pattent bottlenecks block nanotech development
There is enormous excitement and expectation regarding nanotechnology's potential impact. However,
securing valid and defensible patent protection will be critical here. Although early forecasts for
nanotechnology commercialization are encouraging, there are bottlenecks as well. One of the major hurdles
is an emerging thicket of patent claims, resulting primarily from patent proliferation, but also because of
issuance of surprisingly broad patents by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Adding to this
confusion is the fact that the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative's widely-cited definition of
nanotechnology is inaccurate and irrelevant. This has also resulted in the PTO's flawed nanotechnology
patent classification system. All of this is creating a chaotic, tangled patent landscape in various sectors of
nanotechnology (e.g., nanoelectronics and nanomedicine) in which the competing players are unsure as to the
validity and enforceability of numerous issued patents. If this trend continues, it could stifle competition,
limit access to some inventions, and simply grind commercialization efforts to a halt. Therefore, reforms are
urgently needed at the PTO to address problems ranging from poor patent quality and questionable
examination practices to inadequate search capabilities, rising attrition, poor employee morale, and a
skyrocketing patent application backlog. Only a robust patent system will stimulate the development of
commercially viable nanotechnology products.
Patents critical to nanotech development
Dr. Raj Bawa, a biochemist and microbiologist, is a registered patent agent licensed to
practice before the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 2007, Albany Law Journal
of Science & Technology, “Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At
The U.S. Patent Office”, p. 719-20
Patents are critical to the nanotechnology "revolution." When investors or companies consider the merits of
their investment, patent issues are one of the most important items they review. For example, "there is ample
evidence that companies, start-ups, and research universities of all sizes are ascribing greater value and
importance to patents. [Increasingly], they are willing to risk a larger part of their budgets to acquire,
exercise, and defend patents." The process of converting basic research in nanoscience into commercially
viable products is likely to be long and difficult. Because development of nanotech-related technologies is
extremely research-intensive, without the market exclusivity offered by a patent, development of these
products and their commercial viability in the marketplace would be significantly hampered. Patents are
especially important for start-ups and smaller companies because they may help in negotiations over
infringement during competitive posturing with larger corporations. "In fact, patents may also protect the
clients of a patent owner because they may prevent a competitor from infringing or replicating the client's
products made under license from the patentee." n91 Furthermore, patents provide inventors "credibility ...
with [their] backers, shareholders, and venture capitalists - groups that may not fully understand the science
behind the technology."
18

Protections through trade secrets won’t attract ventura capital
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 2007, Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology,
“Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The U.S. Patent Office”, p. 720-1
Generally, patents precede funding from a venture capital firm. For a start-up company, patents are not only
a means of attracting investment, but also "validating the company's foundational technology ... ." Therefore,
"start-up companies are more aggressively seeking patents as a source of significant revenue. They cite the
potential for licensing patents and the power to control emerging sectors of nanotechnology as major
reasons for seeking patents on nanotech-related technologies." Additionally, "few venture capitalists are
likely to support a start-up that relies on trade secrets [alone]." In sum, investors are unlikely to invest in a
start-up that has failed to construct adequate defenses around its IP via valid, enforceable patents.
Onslaught of nano patent applications now

Federal agencies continue to grapple with nanotechnology. The U.S. Patent and trademark Office (PTO) is
no exception. In fact, "for more than a decade, all the major patent offices of the world have faced an
onslaught of [nanoscience and nanotech-related] patent applications." At the PTO, the situation is likely to
worsen as more applications are filed and pendency rates further skyrocket. As companies develop products
and processes and begin to seek commercial applications for their inventions, securing valid and defensible
patent protection will be vital to their long-term survival. In the decades to come, with certain areas of
nanotechnology further maturing and promised breakthroughs accruing, patents will generate licensing
revenue, provide leverage in deals and mergers, and reduce the likelihood of infringement. The development
of nanotech-related products, which is extremely research-intensive, will be significantly hampered in the
absence of the market exclusivity offered by a patent.
19

PTO has no plan to handle the explosion of patents
The overburdened and inefficient PTO "has yet to implement a [solid] plan to handle the soaring number of
nanotechnology patent applications being filed." This has resulted in additional time to review patent
applications (i.e., an increase in patent pendency) and concerns about the validity and enforceability of
numerous issued patents (which reflects a decrease in patent quality). nA recent report puts the average
nanotechnology patent pendency at four years [Figure 4], a period that is simply too long for certain
nanotechnologies that peak and then become obsolete in a few short years. Furthermore, surprisingly broad
nano-patents continue to be issued by the PTO. Obviously, this is partly the result of court decisions in the
past two decades that have made it easier to secure broad patents. Laws have also tilted the table in favor of
patent holders, no matter how broad or tenuous their claims." As a result, the PTO faces an uphill task as its
attempts to handle the enormous backlog in applications filed. It also faces a torrent of improperly granted
patents, many of which are likely to be "re-examined." The entire U.S. patent system is under enormous
scrutiny and strain. Various examination problems continue to haunt the PTO. nSome shortcomings specific
to nanotechnology patent examination beset the PTO: At present, the agency lacks a dedicated examining
group (called the "Technology Center" or TC) to handle applications on nanotechnology. Few examiners
have experience in this rapidly evolving field of nanotechnology. n123 Since "nanotechnology is
interdisciplinary in nature, patent applications that are searched, examined and prosecuted in one center
could and should be examined more effectively by a coordinated review in more than one [TC]." In reality,
applications are being dealt with differently within each center. n125 This approach results in non-uniform
examination of applications because examiners in different TCs review patent applications in light of the
case law and prior art unique to their own TC.
20

PTO can’t attract knowledgeable nanopatent reviewers
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 2007, Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology,
“Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The U.S. Patent Office”, p. 725-6
The PTO continues to be under-staffed in numerous TCs and it is plagued by high attrition. The agency's
inability to attract and retain a talented pool of patent examiners is creating havoc. Each year, at hearings on
Capitol Hill and in its annual report, the PTO brass proudly touts hiring over 1,200 new patent examiners to
alleviate the backlog that is clogging the patent system. However, it fails to focus on the critical issue of
"brain drain" resulting from an exodus of so many experienced patent examiners. It would be wise for PTO
Commissioners to focus on retaining some of its employees and not putting all its efforts on hiring new ones.
Some experts believe that these attrition rates are likely to be further exacerbated by decreasing morale and
work conditions, including poorly designed quality initiatives and inefficient electronic search software.
According to many experts, patent examiners are underpaid (relative to law firm salaries) and overworked
(as compared to their colleagues at the European Patent Office). They also have to review applications under
unreasonable time pressures and skyrocketing patent pendency. Arguably, the internal quality review process
that monitors quality of patents that have been allowed by patent examiners is fraught with a general lack of
legal and scientific expertise on the part of reviewer.
PTO has a nanotech information deficit

Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The U.S. Patent Office”, p. 727
The PTO has failed to effectively engage outside legal or technology experts. For example, "only a handful
of experts from industry or academia have lectured on nanotechnology at the PTO." This reluctance to use
outside expertise has further added to the information deficit. It is clear that the PTO lacks internal expertise
in nanotechnology and its isolationist policy only compounds the problem. Moreover, patent examiners are
not required to have advanced degrees in science or engineering. Even if they have such credentials (e.g.,
PhD, JD, PharmD, etc.), they are often "overruled" by those with much lesser legal and/or scientific
expertise. In other words, possessing advanced degrees or advanced training, by and large, go unrecognized
at the PTO. "[Few] training modules or examination guidelines have been developed to educate patent
examiners in the complexities and subtleties of nanotechnology." Similarly, no written guidelines specific to
nanotechnology are available for patent practitioners.
21
Extensions – Patents Block

Overlapping issues block patents
Michael A. Van Lente, B.S., Chemistry, Hope College (1980); Ph.D., Chemistry, University of
Minnesota/Minneapolis (1987); J.D. expected, Case Western Reserve University School of Law , Case
Western Law Review, 2006, p. 195-6
Apart from patents with claims that may be too broad from the standpoint of optimally encouraging the
development of nanotechnology and may lock up large application areas, observers and participants also see
a problem with patents that may not have met the required non-obviousness standard and may therefore be in
conflict. The patent statute provides: A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Commentators have opined that the maze of dominant and overlapping patents in
nanotechnology will be likely to lead to litigation as new companies attempt to stake out their beachheads on
previously claimed continents. Matthew Nordan calls the problem of overlapping issued patents with their
potential for extensive litigation "[t]he biggest threat to commercialization" of nanotechnology.
Many barriers to nanotech patents

Michael A. Van Lente, B.S., Chemistry, Hope College (1980); Ph.D., Chemistry, University of Minnesota/Minneapolis (1987); J.D.
expected, Case Western Reserve University School of Law , Case Western Law Review, 2006, p. 200-1
Mr. Miller and coauthors present a clear picture of what they perceive are the problems with the present
system, some of which are discussed above. The perception of a patent thicket has been incorporated into the
list of problems that they see at the PTO. The problems include rejection of valid claims, issuance of broad
and overlapping claims, a fragmented and chaotic IP landscape, insufficient expertise at the PTO, lack of
centralized review of nanotechnology applications, non-comprehensive searching of the prior art, a high
backlog of applications, issuance of patents that are too broad, and issuance of too many patents in a given
technology area. Other difficulties that they perceive are caused by patent holders acting with improper
motivations. These include the use of patents to strangle competitors, the use of patents by start-ups to block
other start-ups, and the use of patents by established corporations having market dominance to keep out new
technology with potential for displacing their own.
22
AT: We Solve Bad NanoTech

Military won’t adhere to nanotech limits in battle
John Robert Matthew, member of the Scientific Advisory Board @ NanoNow, 2004,, http://www.nanotech-
now.com/John-Marlow-Superswarm-interview-Feb04.htm
Lastly, there are the proposed prohibition on self-replication in open environments, the proposed restriction
on self-evolution, and the requirement that replicating nanites be dependent upon one of three things: a) an
artificial energy source; b) an artificial vitamin, or; c) a broadcast transmission. All of these seem quite
rational at first glance-though such restrictions would make superswarm implementation (as currently
envisioned) impossible. The problem is that wars do not take place in sealed laboratories, and no
military establishment is going to pay much attention to these guidelines because following them
renders nanoweapons useless. If nanites cannot replicate on the battlefield, they will be less effective
than those which can, and become vulnerable to destruction; if they rely upon an artificial vitamin or
energy source, their battlefield usefulness is compromised or destroyed, and they will be inferior to
those operating with no such hindrance; if they depend upon a broadcast signal, that signal can be
duplicated or jammed. Further, the development of such safeguards, even if desired, would slow
deployment-for which reason they're not likely to be implemented. So the military-ours as well those of
other nations-is basically going to throw this guidebook out the window. Which is not to say it doesn't
have its uses; it does. But the most likely source of a large-scale nanoevent is nanoweaponry-and the
institutions developing it are precisely those which are least likely to concern themselves with
cumbersome safeguards. They are also those most likely to be conducting research and development
activities under the all-concealing cloak of national security.
23
AT: We Solve a Nano Arms Race

It is not possible to solve a nano arms race
Mark Gubrud, Research Associate, Center for Superconductivity Research Physics, University of Maryland,
1997, Nanotechnology and International Security,
http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/
* The prospect of revolutionary advances in military capabilities will stimulate competition to develop and
apply the new technologies toward war preparations, as falling behind would imply an intolerable security
risk. Indeed, it is plausible that a nation which gained a sufficient lead in molecular nanotechnology
would at some point be in a position to simply disarm any potential competitors. * If two or more
technologically advanced nations or blocs exist in de facto confrontation, regardless of political differences
or other substantial conflicts of interest, then competition to apply the advanced technologies could segue
directly into an uncontrolled arms race — unless restraints have been put in place before the new
technologies can be applied. * A race to develop early military applications of molecular manufacturing
could yield sudden breakthroughs, leading to the abrupt emergence of new and unfamiliar threats,
and provoking political and military reactions which further reinforce a cycle of competition and
confrontation.
24
AT: We Create Military Dominance in Nanotech

Turn – Developing a military lead in nanotech causes first strikes
Mark Avram, Research Associate, Center for Superconductivity Research Physics, University of Maryland,
Nanotechnology and International Security, 2007,
First strike instability. Even if two sides are evenly matched, high levels of deployed armaments may be
militarily unstable, in that a surprise attack could perhaps decimate the opposing force before it could
respond. This is especially likely in co-occupied environments, i.e. space, the oceans, and along land lines of
confrontation. Forces based in protected areas may remain survivable, but serious competitors would not
cede vast stretches of "no man's land" to enemy control in advance of a fight, and whoever strikes first in the
co-occupied environments may gain an irreversible advantage. The greater the density of interpenetrating
forces, the shorter the strike time. Thus a crisis becomes progressively less stable as a buildup proceeds. A
perfect balance of technical and material resources is unrealistic in any case, which leads to a new type of
strategic instability: o Early advantage instability. If one has an early lead in a replicator-based crisis
arms buildup, the fact that a competitor may have somewhat faster replicators or superior weaponry,
or may have access to a larger primary resource base, provides another strong stimulus to an early
first strike. Moreover, it is unlikely that one actually knows the performance of an enemy's weapons or
production base, particularly after a long peace.
25

Can’t deter nanotech development
Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, 2004, Nanofactory Proliferation,”
http://crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/07/nanofactory_pro.html
This study will explore the challenge of preventing black markets, independent development, etc.
Subquestion A: How easy will it be to detect a development program? Preliminary answer: Probably
quite difficult. Development does not require exotic materials or massive industrial activity. It may
require mainly off-the-shelf technology. Researchers will be from diverse and common fields like software
engineering and computational chemistry, not concentrated in one exotic field. Depending on the
bootstrapping 'recipe', the design effort might be dispersed (networked/teleconferenced), and the entire
physical operation might be carried out in one moderate-sized laboratory. And most of the research would
not require world-class talent, though a successful program today might well require world-class
leadership. Subquestion B: How much easier will it be to develop a second nanofactory, compared with
developing the first one? Preliminary answer: Reverse engineering will give hints as to which path to take.
The definite knowledge that it can be done at all will reduce institutional friction. General technology
advances will give a second program more to work with. Any leaks of know-how or software will further
reduce the difficulty. It seems likely that the second nanofactory will be an order of magnitude less
costly. Subquestion C: How can nanoscale products be detected? Preliminary answer: Unknown.
Nanoporous filters can trap them. Non proximal sub-wavelength optics, if they work as claimed, may be able
to scan for them at a distance—but there are lots of natural nanoparticles, so recognition is also a problem.
MRI may be able to detect at a distance, though resolution is a problem and there may be a theoretical limit.
Subquestion D: How easy will it be to smuggle nanofactories? Preliminary answer: A fully functional
nanofactory, able (given a supply of feedstock, energy, and blueprint software) to make one twice as big
(and so on) and thus recreate a full manufacturing capacity, could be just a few microns on a side—small
enough to hide inside a human cell. Or any convenient size in between. We don't know of any way to
detect something like that without total intrusion of the volume being searched, which probably implies
destruction. Subquestion E: How easy will it be to detect proliferation-related activity? Preliminary answer:
Quite difficult. Especially once the 'recipe' is known, it will be very hard to spot a project—R&D for a
nanofactory project may require only a single small lab and a few computers. (For comparison, consider
Zyvex.) Subquestion F: How effective will deterrence be? Preliminary answer: To someone lacking a
comparable capability, a nanofactory would be incredibly valuable. This implies that deterrence will
not be successful. Provisional conclusion: It will be very difficult to limit proliferation of nanofactory
technology and possession of bootleg nanofactories.
26

It is not possible to create military dominance in nanotech
With the advent of nanotechnology, the qualitative advances in weapons technology will be enormous and compelling; no country will want to maintain armies that are effectively impotent against a
potential threat. Molecular manufacturing based on self-replicating systems, and superautomation by artificial intelligence, will also profoundly alter the issue of cost. A nation's military potential will
depend first on its position in the technology race. A second factor will be its natural resource base, but most nations have access to sufficient natural resources to support an arsenal many times larger
Earth. Currently the development of nanoelectronics and nanofabrication,

than any which has ever existed on
biotechnology, supramolecular chemistry, and other steps toward molecular nanotechnology is a

worldwide academic and industrial enterprise. No country can be said to have a lead in the race to develop assemblers, because there isn't any race and no
one is even close. But when and if it becomes clear that something like molecular manufacturing based on self-replicating assemblers lies within reach of, say, a five-year effort, it is likely that a race
The leading competitors will

will begin. Industry will be heavily involved, but national efforts will be stimulated and coordinated by government and military initiatives.
be those with the greatest concentration of advanced technology: the United States, Japan and Europe.
However, the race will also be joined by countries such as Russia, China, India, Israel, and others that
have a strong technology base, a lot of resources, or both. A race to be the first to develop and apply assemblers could be expensive. Such a
project could probably absorb the efforts of as many teams of designers, experimenters and theorists as could be mustered. Practical molecular manufacturing systems will be enormously complicated,
compared with the modest accomplishments of contemporary molecular engineering. Although there is good reason to believe that our capabilities are expanding rapidly enough to be able to meet this
task within a few decades, it would be foolish to think that the task is one that can be accomplished by a small team in the near term. A serious, focused effort to develop molecular nanotechnology
would be funded at the multi-billion dollar level, and would expand to a major industry in the race to develop applications. The cost of such an effort is probably a steep function of its earliness; thus it
would cost, say, the United States, quite a large amount to gain an advantage of a few years over its closest rivals. If the potential significance of molecular manufacturing were well understood, a very
large budget for its development would perhaps be warranted. But in the absence of a compelling threat, such as motivated the US atom-bomb project in its early stages, it is likely that skepticism will
rule the day, and so nanotechnology research will have to prove its worth by providing immediate payoffs. The size of the research effort will be tied to the size of the industry it generates. That
industry is likely to grow up simultaneously in several countries of the world. Another corollary of the steep cost function is that even countries that cannot afford a "Manhattan Project" may not be too
Thus if the United States, or another nation, decides to pull

far behind the leading powers in crossing the threshold of molecular manufacturing.
out all the stops and beat the rest of the world to advanced nanotechnology, and is successful in that
effort, it will have at most a few years to decide whether to use its advantage to impose a world order
that prevents the rise of a competitor, or to face the prospect of a nanotechnic confrontation. However,
it seems unlikely that any nation will ever gain such a decisive lead. Nuclear weapons will remain a
powerful deterrent until nanosystems have reached a very refined state of development, and even then
it is doubtful whether politicians would have the nerve to risk an attack on a large nuclear arsenal.
Even the thought of initiating a non-nuclear war with a nuclear-disarmed but large and resourceful
power, in the absence of any immediate provocation, would probably be anathema to decisionmakers
in a democratic state. In the mean time, the potential targets will be hurrying to catch up. It is most
reasonable to expect the more or less simultaneous emergence of advanced nanotechnology in a
number of industrial and potential military competitors, and its more or less simultaneous application
by several states to military systems and to their manufacture. Even if one nation gains an early lead, it
seems very likely that, under the assumption of peaceful armed coexistence, there would soon emerge a
world in which several sovereign states or blocs possessed a molecular manufacturing capability.
27
AT: We Create Regs

Military Won’t Follow the Regs
John Robert Marlow, member of the Scientific Advisory Board, Nanotechnow, 2004, Interview on the
Superswarm Option Nanotechnology Now, http://www.nanotech-now.com/John-Marlow-Superswarm-
interview-Feb04.htm
First, there's the issue of enforcement: who's in charge here-and who will watch the watchers? Who's
going to tell the United States: "Hey-you can't do that…?" Self-regulation may be a bit optimistic
when dealing with something which can destroy the planet if mishandled. Active shields might be one
approach; the superswarm option is another. A second potential problem is the prohibition on
independently-functioning subassemblies, which are crucial to superswarm implementation. Lastly,
there are the proposed prohibition on self-replication in open environments, the proposed restriction on self-
evolution, and the requirement that replicating nanites be dependent upon one of three things: a) an artificial
energy source; b) an artificial vitamin, or; c) a broadcast transmission. All of these seem quite rational at first
glance-though such restrictions would make superswarm implementation (as currently envisioned)
impossible. The problem is that wars do not take place in sealed laboratories, and no military
establishment is going to pay much attention to these guidelines because following them renders
nanoweapons useless. If nanites cannot replicate on the battlefield, they will be less effective than those
which can, and become vulnerable to destruction; if they rely upon an artificial vitamin or energy source,
their battlefield usefulness is compromised or destroyed, and they will be inferior to those operating with no
such hindrance; if they depend upon a broadcast signal, that signal can be duplicated or jammed. Further, the
development of such safeguards, even if desired, would slow deployment-for which reason they're not
likely to be implemented. So the military-ours as well those of other nations-is basically going to throw
this guidebook out the window. Which is not to say it doesn't have its uses; it does. But the most likely
source of a large-scale nanoevent is nanoweaponry-and the institutions developing it are precisely those
which are least likely to concern themselves with cumbersome safeguards. They are also those most likely to
be conducting research and development activities under the all-concealing cloak of national security.
28
Nanotech Causes Extinction

Nanotech results in gray goo & extinction
Eric, Drexler, 1986, Chief Technical Advisor to Nanorex, Engines of Creation, http://www.e-
drexler.com/d/06/00/EOC/EOC_Chapter_11.html#section01of05
In Chapter 4, I described some of what replicating assemblers will do for us if we handle them properly.
Powered by fuels or sunlight, they will be able to make almost anything (including more of themselves) from
common materials. Living organisms are also powered by fuels or sunlight, and also make more of
themselves from ordinary materials. But unlike assembler-based systems, they cannot make "almost
anything". Genetic evolution has limited life to a system based on DNA, RNA, and ribosomes, but memetic
evolution will bring life-like machines based on nanocomputers and assemblers. I have already described
how assembler-built molecular machines will differ from the ribosome-built machinery of life. Assemblers
will be able to build all that ribosomes can, and more; assembler-based replicators will therefore be
able to do all that life can, and more. From an evolutionary point of view, this poses an obvious threat to
otters, people, cacti, and ferns - to the rich fabric of the biosphere and all that we prize. The early
transistorized computers soon beat the most advanced vacuum-tube computers because they were based on
superior devices. For the same reason, early assembler-based replicators could beat the most advanced
modern organisms. "Plants" with "leaves" no more efficient than today's solar cells could out-compete real
plants, crowding the biosphere with an inedible foliage. Tough, omnivorous "bacteria" could out-compete
real bacteria: they could spread like blowing pollen, replicate swiftly, and reduce the biosphere to dust in a
matter of days. Dangerous replicators could easily be too tough, small, and rapidly spreading to stop - at least
if we made no preparation. We have trouble enough controlling viruses and fruit flies. Among the
cognoscenti of nanotechnology, this threat has become known as the "gray goo problem." Though
masses of uncontrolled replicators need not be gray or gooey, the term "gray goo" emphasizes that
replicators able to obliterate life might be less inspiring than a single species of crabgrass. They might
be "superior" in an evolutionary sense, but this need not make them valuable. We have evolved to love
a world rich in living things, ideas, and diversity, so there is no reason to value gray goo merely
because it could spread. Indeed, if we prevent it we will thereby prove our evolutionary superiority.
The gray goo threat makes one thing perfectly clear: we cannot afford certain kinds of accidents with
replicating assemblers. In Chapter 5, I described some of what advanced AI systems will do for us, if we
handle them properly. Ultimately, they will embody the patterns of thought and make them flow at a pace no
mammal's brain can match. AI systems that work together as people do will be able to out-think not just
individuals, but whole societies. Again, the evolution of genes has left life stuck. Again, the evolution of
memes by human beings - and eventually by machines - will advance our hardware far beyond the limits of
life. And again, from an evolutionary point of view this poses an obvious threat. Knowledge can bring
power, and power can bring knowledge. Depending on their natures and their goals, advanced AI
systems might accumulate enough knowledge and power to displace us, if we don't prepare properly.
And as with replicators, mere evolutionary "superiority" need not make the victors better than the
vanquished by any standard but brute competitive ability.
29
Nanotech Causes Extinction

Grey goo destroys the universe
Howard Rheingold Stanford, Editor Emeritus of Whole Earth Review, 1992, At the beginning of the
twentieth century - computational biology –
Column,”www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1510/is_n76/ai_12635777
It looks as if something even more powerful than thermonuclear weaponry is emanating from that same,
strangely fated corner of New Mexico where nuclear physicists first knew sin. Those who follow the
progress of artificial-life research know that the effects of messing with the engines of evolution might lead
to forces even more regrettable than the demons unleashed at Alamogordo. At least nuclear weaponry and
biocidal technologies only threaten life on Earth, and don't threaten to contaminate the rest of the
universe. That's the larger ethical problem of a-life. The technology of self-replicating machines that
could emerge in future decades from today's a-life research might escape from human or even
terrestrial control, infest the solar system, and, given time, break out into the galaxy. If there are other
intelligent species out there, they might not react benevolently to evidence that humans have dispersed
interstellar strip-mining robots that breed, multiply, and evolve. If there are no other intelligent
species in existence, maybe we will end up creating God, or the Devil, depending on how our minds'
children evolve a billion years from now. The entire story of life on earth thus far might be just the
wetware prologue to a longer, larger, drier tale, etched in silicon rather than carbon, and blasted to
the stars -- purposive spores programmed to seek, grow, evolve, expand. That's what a few people think
they are on the verge of inventing. Scenarios like that make the potential for global thermonuclear war or
destruction of the biosphere look like a relatively local problem. Biocide of a few hundred thousand species
(including ourselves) is one kind of ethical problem; turning something like the Alien loose on the cosmos is
a whole new level of ethical lapse. The human species has precious little time to gain the wisdom necessary
to handle the knowledge scientists have discovered. Artificial life is too important to remain an esoteric
specialty. The time to think about what it might mean is now, while we still have a choice. Military
applications of autonomous, self-reproducing robots might lead to worse fates than mere annihilation.
There's some question about whether it is ever possible to put knowledge back in the bottle, but there is no
question that we still have time to make sure that the self-reproducing increasingly intelligent, interstellar
lifeforms that we are about to create are more closely modeled on E.T. than on the Alien.
30
NanoExtinction Outweighs Nuclear War

Nanobots are more likely to kill us all than nuclear war.
Bill Joy, cofounder and Chief Scientist of Sun Microsystems, August 2004,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html
What was different in the 20th century? Certainly, the technologies underlying the weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) - nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) - were powerful, and the weapons an
enormous threat. But building nuclear weapons required, at least for a time, access to both rare -
indeed, effectively unavailable - raw materials and highly protected information; biological and
chemical weapons programs also tended to require large-scale activities. The 21st-century
technologies - genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics (GNR) - are so powerful that they can spawn
whole new classes of accidents and abuses. Most dangerously, for the first time, these accidents and
abuses are widely within the reach of individuals or small groups. They will not require large facilities
or rare raw materials. Knowledge alone will enable the use of them. Thus we have the possibility not
just of weapons of mass destruction but of knowledge-enabled mass destruction (KMD), this
destructiveness hugely amplified by the power of self-replication. I think it is no exaggeration to say
we are on the cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil, an evil whose possibility spreads well
beyond that which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed to the nation-states, on to a surprising and
terrible empowerment of extreme individuals.
Replicators and AI have more destructive capability than nuclear war

Eric, Drexler, 1986, Chief Technical Advisor to Nanorex, Engines of Creation, http://www.e-
drexler.com/d/06/00/EOC/EOC_Chapter_11.html#section01of05
States could use advanced AI systems to similar ends. Automated engineering systems will facilitate
design-ahead and speed assembler development. Al systems able to build better AI systems will allow
an explosion of capability with effects hard to anticipate. Both AI systems and replicating assemblers
will enable states to expand their military capabilities by orders of magnitude in a brief time.
Replicators can be more potent than nuclear weapons: to devastate Earth with bombs would require
masses of exotic hardware and rare isotopes, but to destroy all life with replicators would require only
a single speck made of ordinary elements. Replicators give nuclear war some company as a potential
cause of extinction, giving a broader context to extinction as a moral concern. Despite their potential as
engines of destruction, nanotechnology and AI systems will lend themselves to more subtle uses than do
nuclear weapons. A bomb can only blast things, but nanomachines and AI systems could be used to infiltrate,
seize, change, and govern a territory or a world. Even the most ruthless police have no use for nuclear
weapons, but they do have use for bugs, drugs, assassins, and other flexible engines of power. With
advanced technology, states will be able to consolidate their power over people.
31
Extensions – Grey Good Causes Extinction

Gray goo results in extinction.
Bill Joy, cofounder and Chief Scientist of Sun Microsystems, August 2004, Why the Future Doesn’t need
Us,” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html
Though masses of uncontrolled replicators need not be gray or gooey, the term "gray goo" emphasizes that
replicators able to obliterate life might be less inspiring than a single species of crabgrass. They might be
superior in an evolutionary sense, but this need not make them valuable. The gray goo threat makes one thing
perfectly clear: We cannot afford certain kinds of accidents with replicating assemblers. Gray goo would
surely be a depressing ending to our human adventure on Earth, far worse than mere fire or ice, and one that
could stem from a simple laboratory accident.6 Oops. It is most of all the power of destructive self-
replication in genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics (GNR) that should give us pause. Self-replication is the
modus operandi of genetic engineering, which uses the machinery of the cell to replicate its designs, and the
prime danger underlying gray goo in nanotechnology. Stories of run-amok robots like the Borg, replicating
or mutating to escape from the ethical constraints imposed on them by their creators, are well established in
our science fiction books and movies. It is even possible that self-replication may be more fundamental than
we thought, and hence harder - or even impossible - to control. A recent article by Stuart Kauffman inNature
titled "Self-Replication: Even Peptides Do It" discusses the discovery that a 32-amino-acid peptide can
"autocatalyse its own synthesis." We don't know how widespread this ability is, but Kauffman notes that it
may hint at "a route to self-reproducing molecular systems on a basis far wider than Watson-Crick base-
pairing."7 In truth, we have had in hand for years clear warnings of the dangers inherent in widespread
knowledge of GNR technologies - of the possibility of knowledge alone enabling mass destruction. But these
warnings haven't been widely publicized; the public discussions have been clearly inadequate. There is no
profit in publicizing the dangers. The nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) technologies used in 20th-
century weapons of mass destruction were and are largely military, developed in government laboratories. In
sharp contrast, the 21st-century GNR technologies have clear commercial uses and are being developed
almost exclusively by corporate enterprises. In this age of triumphant commercialism, technology - with
science as its handmaiden - is delivering a series of almost magical inventions that are the most
phenomenally lucrative ever seen. We are aggressively pursuing the promises of these new technologies
within the now-unchallenged system of global capitalism and its manifold financial incentives and
competitive pressures. This is the first moment in the history of our planet when any species, by its own
voluntary actions, has become a danger to itself - as well as to vast numbers of others.
32
Extensions – Nanotech Causes Extinction

Nanotech innovation allows for accidental extinction.
Eric Drexler Chief Technical Advisor to Nanorex, 1991, Unbounding the Nanotechnology Revolution,”
http://www.foresight.org/UTF/Unbound_LBW/chapt_12.html
The previous section discussed ordinary accidents that would occur during the use of nanotechnology by
generally responsible, yet fallible, human beings. Nanotechnology also raises the specter, however, of what
have been termed "extraordinary accidents": accidents involving runaway self-replicating machines. One can
imagine building a device about the size of a bacterium but tougher and more nearly omnivorous. Such
runaways might blow like pollen and reproduce like bacteria, eating any of a wide range of organic
materials: an ecological disaster of unprecedented magnitude—indeed, one that could destroy the biosphere
as we know it. This may be worth worrying about, but can this happen by accident? How to Prepare a Big
Mistake The so-called "Star Trek scenario" (named after an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation that
featured runaway "nanites") is perhaps the most commonly imagined problem. In this scenario, someone first
invests considerable engineering effort in designing and building devices almost exactly like the one just
described: bacterial-sized, omnivorous, able to survive in a wide range of natural environments, able to build
copies of themselves, and made with just a few built-in safeguards—perhaps a clock that shuts them off after
a time, perhaps something else. Then, accidentally, the clock fails, or one of these dangerous replicators
builds a copy with a defective clock, and away we go with an unprecedented ecological disaster.
33
Supporting NanoTech Leads to Self-Replication

Nanotech will be developed using self-replication
Mike Roco, 2007, senior advisor for nanotechnology at the National Science Foundation, Nanotechnology:
Genesis of Semiconductor's Future,”http://www.semiconductor.net/article/CA476295.html
We're currently researching all four. The integration level will be incredible, and there will be more systems
of nanosystems than few separate devices for electronic circuits and transistors. We may have various
pathways to larger systems such as nanorobotics with emerging behavior, biomimetics, guided self-
assembly, and evolutionary approaches. We're beginning to build different types and new assemblies of
molecules.I can see a transistor being like amacromolecule, doing all the functions, or as a macrocrystal. The
key change will be the integration of these components. Today we speak of a single transistor integrated with
a microwire. Even on the nanoscale, you need a typical means of integration. I see a system where you
begin with nanotransistors and other nanosystems, building the final product in situ, without later
assembly. Self-assembly will be the core of most processes to build nanostructures. It allows you to
create molecules that create macromolecules that, in turn, allow the bottom-up creation of devices with
the desired properties and functions, in precise and economical ways.
34
AT: Fat Fingers Stop Self-Replication

Fat fingers won’t stop self-replication
Eric Drexler Chief Technical Advisor to Nanorex, 1991, Unbounding the Nanotechnology Revolution,”
http://www.foresight.org/UTF/Unbound_LBW/chapt_12.html
As noted elsewhere, if steric constraints near the tool tip make it unexpectedly difficult to manipulate
particular individual atoms or small molecules with sufficient reliability, a simple alternative is to rely upon
conventional solution or gas phase chemistry for the bulk synthesis of nanoparts consisting of 10-100 atoms.
These much larger nanoparts can then be bound to a positional device and assembled into larger (molecularly
precise) structures without further significant steric constraints. This is the approach taken by the ribosome in
the synthesis of proteins. Individual amino acids are sequentially assembled into an atomically precise
polypeptide without the need to manipulate individual atoms. “Atomically precise” is a description of the
precision of the final product, not a description of the manufacturing method. Complete control of every
aspect of a chemical reaction is not actually required to build a nanorobot. Effective control that delivers a
precise product is what is necessary. The “fat fingers” problem is not a fundamental barrier to the
development of molecular assemblers or the nanorobots they enable.
35
AT: Sticky Fingers Stops Self-Replication

Biological assemblers disprove Sticky Fingers
Eric Drexler, 2001, Chief Technical Advisor to Nanorex, On Physics, Fundamentals, and Nanorobots: A
Rebuttal to Smalley’s Assertion that Self-Replicating Mechanical Nanorobots Are Simply Not Possible,”
http://www.imm.org/publications/sciamdebate2/smalley/
Smalley also advances the “sticky fingers” problem, which is the claim that: “…the atoms of the manipulator
hands will adhere to the atom that is being moved. So it will often be impossible to release this minuscule
building block in precisely the right spot….these problems are fundamental….” The existence of some
reactions that don’t work still leaves plenty of room for reactions that do. To argue that the “sticky fingers”
problem is a fundamental barrier to building mechanical assemblers and nanorobots, Smalley must show that
no set of reactions exists which allows the synthesis of a useful range of precise molecular structures. To
consider but one approach, application of a voltage between a manipulator tool and the workpiece can cause
the target atom or moiety to move to the desired position. Again, Ho and Lee have provided an experimental
existence proof. For a biological example, consider the ribosome. This ubiquitous biological molecular
assembler suffers from neither the “fat finger” nor the “sticky finger” problem. If, as Smalley argues, both
problems are “fundamental,” then why would they prevent the development of mechanical assemblers and
not biological assemblers? If the class of molecular structures known as proteins can be synthesized using
positional techniques, then why would we expect there to be no other classes of molecular structures that can
be synthesized using positional techniques? Upon observing experimentally that polymers such as proteins
can be synthesized under programmatic control, what convincing evidence do we have that the programmatic
synthesis of stiffer polycyclic structures such as diamond is “fundamentally” impossible, and that mechanical
assemblers will never be built?
36
AT: Sticky Fingers Stops Self-Replication

Fingers irrelevant to grey good
Eric Drexler, 2001, Chief Technical Advisor to Nanorex, On Physics, Fundamentals, and Nanorobots: A
Rebuttal to Smalley’s Assertion that Self-Replicating Mechanical Nanorobots Are Simply Not Possible,”
http://www.imm.org/publications/sciamdebate2/smalley/
You have attempted to dismiss my work in this field by misrepresenting it. From what I hear of a press
conference at the recent NNI conference, you continue to do so. In particular, you have described molecular
assemblers as having multiple "fingers" that manipulate individual atoms and suffer from so-called "fat
finger" and "sticky finger" problems, and you have dismissed their feasibility on this basis. I find this
puzzling because, like enzymes and ribosomes, proposed assemblers neither have nor need these "Smalley
fingers.” The task of positioning reactive molecules simply doesn't require them. I have a twenty year
history of technical publications in this area and consistently describe systems quite unlike the straw man
you attack. My proposal is, and always has been, to guide the chemical synthesis of complex structures by
mechanically positioning reactive molecules, not by manipulating individual atoms. This proposal has been
defended successfully again and again, in journal articles, in my MIT doctoral thesis, and before scientific
audiences around the world. It rests on well-established physical principles. The impossibility of "Smalley
fingers" has raised no concern in the research community because these fingers solve no problems and thus
appear in no proposals. Your reliance on this straw-man attack might lead a thoughtful observer to suspect
that no one has identified a valid criticism of my work. For this I should, perhaps, thank you. You apparently
fear that my warnings of long-term dangers will hinder funding of current research, stating that "We should
not let this fuzzy-minded nightmare dream scare us away from nanotechnology....NNI should go forward.”
However, I have from the beginning argued that the potential for abuse of advanced nanotechnologies makes
vigorous research by the U.S and its allies imperative Many have found these arguments persuasive. In an
open discussion, I believe they will prevail. In contrast, your attempt to calm the public through false claims
of impossibility will inevitably fail, placing your colleagues at risk of a destructive backlash.
37
Nanotechnology Destroys the Economy
Nanosector breakthroughs will destroy the economy
John Robert, Marlow 04, John Robert: member of the Scientific Advisory Board, 2004, Nanosecurity and the
Future (if Any)” http://www.johnrobertmarlow.com/sa__art-nanosecurity%20and%20the%20future%20if
%20any.html
Even a purely commercial nanobreakthrough, however, could be enormously destabilizing. "With the advent
of automated self-contained local manufacturing," notes Phoenix, "shipping, warehousing, and
manufacturing jobs will all be lost." And that could be only the beginning: what happens when one company,
one industry—or one nation-is suddenly able to reduce production costs to near-zero? Competitors will find
themselves insolvent overnight. Millions of people may awaken to find their jobs being performed by
nanodevices. Cities, built as they are around conventional job concentrations, may become insupportable.
Non-nanoeconomies will collapse. Under such circumstances, the source of the breakthrough—or the
technology itself—may be blamed for the sudden woes of the world, resulting in a wave of global
nanoluddism. Fading nations may consider such a staggering economic advance to be an act of war—surely
the results could be as devastating—and lash out militarily before effective defenses can be put into place.
All of these issues and others are fully addressable with a comprehensive nanotechnology the benefits of
which are widely distributed-but for the moment, profit dominates, altruism seems in short supply, and the
societal and ethical implications of nanotechnology are taking a distant backseat. This is in itself a security
issue.
38

Nano will wipe-out many sectors of the economy
Mike Treder, Executive Director, Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, Bridges to Safety, and Bridges to
Progress,” http://www.crnano.org/Bridges.htm
Josh Wolfe of Lux Capital, editor of the Forbes/Wolfe Nanotech Report, says, "Quite simply, the world is
about to be rebuilt (and improved) from the atom up. That means tens of trillions of dollars to be spent on
everything: clothing, food, cars, housing, medicine, the devices we use to communicate and recreate, the
quality of the air we breathe, and the water we drink—all are about to undergo profound and fundamental
change. And as a result, so will the socio and economic structure of the world. Nanotechnology will shake up
just about every business on the planet." Low-cost local manufacturing and duplication of designs could lead
to economic upheaval, as major economic sectors contract or even collapse. To give one example, the global
steel industry is worth over $700 billion. What will happen to the millions of jobs associated with that
industry -- and to the capital supporting it -- when materials many times stronger than steel can be produced
quickly and cheaply wherever they are needed? Advanced nanotechnology could make solar power a
realistic and preferable alternative to traditional energy sources. Around the world, individual energy
consumers pay over $600 billion a year for utility bills and fuel supplies. Commercial and industrial use
drives the figures higher still. When much of this spending can be permanently replaced with off-grid solar
energy, many more jobs will be displaced. The worldwide semiconductor industry produces annual billings
of over $150 billion. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the industry employs a domestic
workforce of nearly 300,000 people. Additionally, U.S. retail distribution of electronics products amounts to
almost $300 billion annually. All of these areas will be significantly impacted if customized electronics
products can be produced at home for about dollar a pound, the likely cost of raw materials. If molecular
manufacturing allows any individual to make products containing computing power a million times greater
than today’s PCs, where will those jobs go? Other nations will be affected as well. For example, the Chinese
government may welcome the advent of exponential general-purpose molecular manufacturing for several
reasons, including its potential to radically reduce poverty and reduce catastrophic environmental problems.
But at the same time, China relies on foreign direct investment (FDI) of over $40 billion annually for much
of its current economic strength. When those dollars to purchase Chinese manufactured goods stop flowing
in, the required adjustments may not be easy and could result in violent struggles.
39

Nano will displace critical commodities, destroying the economy
AzoNano, April 29, 2008, The A-to-Z of Nanotechnology, Nanotechnology Led Changes To Manufacturing,
Defence, Farming, Human Development and the Possibility of Large Scale Social Disruption As Predicted
By The Friends of The Earth, http://www.azonano.com/Details.asp?ArticleID=1876
In the short-medium term, novel nanomaterials could replace markets for existing commodities, disrupt trade
and eliminate jobs in nearly every industry. Industry analysts Lux Research Inc. have warned that
nanotechnology will result in large-scale disruption to commodity markets and to all supply and value
chains: “Just as the British industrial revolution knocked hand spinners and hand weavers out of business,
nanotechnology will disrupt a slew of multi billion dollar companies and industries”. Technological change
and the social disruption it brings has been with us for millennia. What will be different this time is that we
are confronting the potentially near simultaneous demise of a number of key commodity markets where raw
resources (eg cotton, rubber, copper, platinum) may be replaced by nanomaterials, with subsequent structural
change to many industry sectors. The displacement of existing commodities by new nanomaterials would
have profound impacts for economies everywhere. However it would have the most devastating impact on
people in the Global South whose countries are dependent on trade in raw resources - 95 out of 141
developing countries depend on commodities for at least 50% of their export earnings.
40
Nanotech Causes Prolif

Nanotech development sparks proliferation and war.
Whereas the perfection of nuclear explosives established a strategic stalemate, advanced molecular
manufacturing based on self-replicating systems, or any military production system fully automated by
advanced artificial intelligence, would lead to instability in a confrontation between rough equals. Rivals
would feel pressured to preempt, if possible, in initiating a full-scale military buildup, and certainly not to be
caught behind. As the rearmament reached high levels, close contact between forces at sea and in space
would give an advantage to the first to strike. The greatest danger coincides with the emergence of these
powerful technologies: A quickening succession of "revolutions" may spark a new arms race involving a
number of potential competitors. Older systems, including nuclear weapons, would become vulnerable to
novel forms of attack or neutralization. Rapidly evolving, untested, secret, and even "virtual" arsenals would
undermine confidence in the ability to retaliate or resist aggression. Warning and decision times would
shrink. Covert infiltration of intelligence and sabotage devices would blur the distinction between
confrontation and war. Overt deployment of ultramodern weapons, perhaps on a massive scale, would alarm
technological laggards. Actual and perceived power balances would shift dramatically and abruptly.
Accompanied by economic upheaval, general uncertainty and disputes over the future of major resources and
of humanity itself, such a runaway crisis would likely erupt into large-scale rearmament and warfare well
before another technological plateau was reached.
Prolif causes extinction
Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, & Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis,
Survival, Summer 2002, p. 87-90
Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent
acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a
common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents
whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an
occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of
escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is
stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With
most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite
place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or
even whole nations.
41
Extension – Nanotech Causes Prolif

States will seek defenses against nanotech, triggering proliferation
An increase of nuclear arsenals, deployment in more secure, covert basing modes, and development of new
delivery systems designed to penetrate defenses, would prolong the reign of nuclear deterrence and postpone
the day of possible vulnerability to nanotechnic aggression. Thus a nuclear power or potential nuclear power,
especially one that was behind in the technology race, might want to retain its nuclear options or even
expand its nuclear arsenal. Advanced nanotechnology should also facilitate a possible nuclear rearmament to
levels manyfold higher than those of the Cold War. Thus it is possible that the result of a nanotechnic arms
race will be rampant nuclear proliferation and the expansion of major nuclear arsenals to warhead counts in
the hundred thousands or millions — A new "balance of terror," but note that a balance is not necessarily
stable.
Nanotech results in global arms races and instability.

Nick Bostrom, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale, 2002, “Existential Risks,” Journal of
Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html
Even if effective defenses against a limited nanotech attack are developed before dangerous replicators are
designed and acquired by suicidal regimes or terrorists, there will still be the danger of an arms race between
states possessing nanotechnology. It has been argued that molecular manufacturing would lead to both arms
race instability and crisis instability, to a higher degree than was the case with nuclear weapons. Arms race
instability means that there would be dominant incentives for each competitor to escalate its armaments,
leading to a runaway arms race. Crisis instability means that there would be dominant incentives for striking
first. Two roughly balanced rivals acquiring nanotechnology would, on this view, begin a massive buildup of
armaments and weapons development programs that would continue until a crisis occurs and war breaks out,
potentially causing global terminal destruction. That the arms race could have been predicted is no guarantee
that an international security system will be created ahead of time to prevent this disaster from happening.
The nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR was predicted but occurred nevertheless.
42
Nanotech Causes Arms Races

Nanotech results in an arms race.
The possibility that assembler-based molecular nanotechnology (Drexler 1986, 1992) and advanced artificial
general intelligence may be developed within the first few decades of the 21st century presages a potential
for disruption and chaos in the world system. The key areas of concern are: The prospect of revolutionary
advances in military capabilities will stimulate competition to develop and apply the new technologies
toward war preparations, as falling behind would imply an intolerable security risk. Indeed, it is plausible
that a nation which gained a sufficient lead in molecular nanotechnology would at some point be in a
position to simply disarm any potential competitors. If two or more technologically advanced nations or
blocs exist in de facto confrontation, regardless of political differences or other substantial conflicts of
interest, then competition to apply the advanced technologies could segue directly into an uncontrolled arms
race — unless restraints have been put in place before the new technologies can be applied. A race to
develop early military applications of molecular manufacturing could yield sudden breakthroughs, leading to
the abrupt emergence of new and unfamiliar threats, and provoking political and military reactions which
further reinforce a cycle of competition and confrontation.
43
Nanotech Causes Arms Races

Nanotech will trigger an arms race
If nuclear weapons remain limited in number, advanced nanotechnology could facilitate extensive civil
defense construction, and provide active defense and counterforce weapons, undermining the nuclear
"balance of terror" and creating the appearance of a possibility of victory in a war between major powers.
From a purely military perspective, in the absence of a "balance of terror," a confrontation between more or
less equally advanced terrestrial nanotechnology powers could be unstable to preemption — in both of the
traditional senses: Arms race instability. A large imbalance in deployed hardware could allow one side to
strike with impunity, and even a few-to-one imbalance could be enough to provide assurance of victory. If
military production is based on a self-replicating capital base with a short generation time, the danger of
falling behind on an exponential curve, or the opportunity to trump, would create unprecedentedly strong
pressures to initiate or join and to maintain or gain the lead in a quantitative arms race. Unprecedentedly
large masses of military hardware could be produced in an unprecedentedly short time. First strike
instability. Even if two sides are evenly matched, high levels of deployed armaments may be militarily
unstable, in that a surprise attack could perhaps decimate the opposing force before it could respond. This is
especially likely in co-occupied environments, i.e. space, the oceans, and along land lines of confrontation.
Forces based in protected areas may remain survivable, but serious competitors would not cede vast stretches
of "no man's land" to enemy control in advance of a fight, and whoever strikes first in the co-occupied
environments may gain an irreversible advantage. The greater the density of interpenetrating forces, the
shorter the strike time. Thus a crisis becomes progressively less stable as a buildup proceeds. A perfect
balance of technical and material resources is unrealistic in any case, which leads to a new type of strategic
instability: Early advantage instability. If one has an early lead in a replicator-based crisis arms buildup, the
fact that a competitor may have somewhat faster replicators or superior weaponry, or may have access to a
larger primary resource base, provides another strong stimulus to an early first strike. Moreover, it is unlikely
that one actually knows the performance of an enemy's weapons or production base, particularly after a long
peace. Thus, a runaway nanotechnic arms race may be a race to nowhere; there may be no further island of
stable military balance out there, even if we could manage to avoid war along the way. A very rapid pace of
technological change destabilizes the political-military balance. Revolutionary new types of weaponry, fear
of what a competitor may be doing in secret, tense nerves and worst-case analyses, the complexity of
technical issues, the unfamiliarity of new circumstances and resistance to the demands they make, may
overwhelm the cumbersome processes of diplomacy and arms control, or even of intelligence gathering and
assessment, formulation of measured responses and establishment of political consensus behind them. A
runaway military technological revolution must at some point escape the grasp of even wise decisionmakers.
44
Nanotech Undermines Soft Power

Nanotech eliminates dependence relationships, collapsing soft power
John McCarthy, 2000, Molecular Technologies and the World Systems,

http://www.mccarthy.cx/WorldSystem/intro.htm
The advent of MNT will not only cause disruption in power relationships by adding power to some
states; it will also cause a loss of power for some. Not all power depends on military strength. Some is
based on dependency, and that power can be utilized by either withholding what the dependent state
needs, or by threatening to do so. This is usually referred to as "soft power," as opposed to the "hard
power" of military action (or threat of it) (4). As an example of soft power, consider the U.S.-Japan trade
relationship. Japan is dependent on the U.S. market, the largest single market in the world, as an outlet for its
goods. Without access to that market, the prices for many of its goods would be too high (since the per unit
cost would increase as the number of units produced decreased), and Japan would experience a lower
standard of living and massive unemployment, at least in the short term. Thus, the potential to withhold
something Japan wants gives the U.S. extra leverage in negotiations with that country. To be sure, the U.S.
needs Japanese goods, but Japan would be hurt more by the closing of the American market to its
goods than would the U.S., and it is this difference in relative dependency that gives the U.S. its
advantage. (5) But should molecular manufacturing make trade obsolete (the reasons this may be the
case will be presented later), then this advantage will vanish. Indeed, if MNT makes states more
independent of each other (this will also be explored in detail later), then many other relationships
based on dependency will change radically, making the soft power that is derived from manipulation
of dependency less effective. The elimination of this source of power will change the power structure in
many parts of the world in the same way that changes in absolute power will: by changing the relative
levels of state power in the international system.
45
Nanotech Destroys Biodiversity

Nanotech kills crucial river bacteria, which is the base of the food chain.
San Francisco Chronicle, 2005,, Nanotechnology may hold risks, scientists warn,”
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/10/20/MNGREFB1S71.DTL
The U.S. government should spend more money investigating potential health and environmental hazards of
nanotechnology, a leading environmental group says. New types of materials and chemicals that are invisibly
small -- i.e., with diameters measured in nanometers, or billionths of a meter -- have many possible valuable
uses in medicine, environmental cleanups, water treatment, energy production, technology and other areas,
representatives of the Washington-based group Environmental Defense acknowledged at a news conference
Wednesday. However, uncertainties linger over the possible harm of nanomaterials and nanoparticles on
human health and the environment, they cautioned. For example, nanoparticles used as anti-tumor agents are
so small that they might slip inside the human brain and perhaps damage it. Likewise, if leaked from a
factory, the particles might destroy river bacteria, which lie at the base of much of the food chain. Because
the toxic aspects of nanotechnology remain a frontier subject of research, "our traditional ways of thinking
about hazardous materials are going to have to broaden a bit," said Dr. John Balbus, the organization's health
program director. He and three colleagues wrote an article about the potential downsides of nanotechnology
for a recent issue of the journal Issues in Science and Technology, a joint publication of the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences and the University of Texas.
Nanoparticles kill crucial bacteria

AzoNano, The April 29, 2008, -to-Z of Nanotechnology, Too Much Good Nanotechnology May Be Bad for
the Environment With Silver Nanoparticles Killing Beneficial Bacteria,” http://www.azonano.com/news.asp?
newsID=6351
Too much of a good thing could be harmful to the environment. For years, scientists have known about
silver’s ability to kill harmful bacteria and, recently, have used this knowledge to create consumer products
containing silver nanoparticles. Now, a University of Missouri researcher has found that silver nanoparticles
also may destroy benign bacteria that are used to remove ammonia from wastewater treatment systems. The
study was funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation. Several products containing silver
nanoparticles already are on the market, including socks containing silver nanoparticles designed to inhibit
odor-causing bacteria and high-tech, energy-efficient washing machines that disinfect clothes by generating
the tiny particles. The positive effects of that technology may be overshadowed by the potential negative
environmental impact. “Because of the increasing use of silver nanoparticles in consumer products, the risk
that this material will be released into sewage lines, wastewater treatment facilities, and, eventually, to rivers,
streams and lakes is of concern,” said Zhiqiang Hu, assistant professor of civil and environmental
engineering in MU’s College of Engineering. “We found that silver nanoparticles are extremely toxic. The
nanoparticles destroy the benign species of bacteria that are used for wastewater treatment. It basically halts
the reproduction activity of the good bacteria.”
46
Nanotech Destroys Biodiversity

Nanotechnology destroys biodiversity, causing extinction.
Katrina Arabe, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, 2004, The Risks and Rewards of Nanotechnology,
http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/archives/2004/03/the_risks_rewar.html
Also disturbing is the possible health effects of engineered nanoparticles. "The smaller the particles, the more
toxic they become," says Vyvyan Howard, a University of Liverpool pathologist who analyzes
environmental aerosols. Already, the first two studies examining nanoparticles' impact on health have not
yielded reassuring results, reporting a different and more serious lung damage than that caused by
conventional toxic dusts. In the first study, which was sponsored by NASA, three kinds of carbon nanotubes
—microscopic carbon cylinders—were found to cause lung abnormalities in mice after these particles were
washed into the animals' lungs. And the lesions worsened over time, with some resulting in tissue death. In
the second study, rats were given similar exposures, and in a startling result, 15% of the animals receiving
the biggest amount died from lung blockages within 24 hours—something the researchers had never before
observed for any lung toxin. And the damage may not stop at the lungs. University of Rochester toxicologist
Gunter Oberdoerster has illustrated through experiments that inhaled nanoparticles can spread to a rat's brain.
Some are also concerned about nanoparticles accumulating in animal organs. Researchers at Rice
University's CBEN have demonstrated that particles at the nanoscale—like many other non-biodegradable
pollutants—build up in living things over time. They accumulate in microbes, in the worms that feed on
those microbes and in animals higher up the food chain. CBEN researchers stress that this doesn't mean that
nanoparticles pose a safety threat. Some scientists, however, believe that particles at the nanoscale could
burn up soil microbes, disturbing soil chemistry and its ability to sustain plant life. Others are even
convinced that nanotechnology could bring about the end of the world. They believe a well-known article
written in 2000 by Bill Joy, co-founder of the computer giant Sun Microsystems, who theorized that self-
replicating nanomachines could amass beyond our control and destroy the living world. Not all scientists
dismiss this scenario.
47
Nanotechnology Causes Space Wars

Nanotech development triggers wars in space
Large-scale development of space, beyond the near-Earth environment, would complicate the question of
military instability by possibly providing refuge for survivable forces. It is unclear, however, whether this
would fundamentally alter the picture drawn above. In the near-term, at least, and even after the development
of molecular manufacturing, it is likely that space development will occur under national auspices and under
claims of national sovereignty extended by otherwise earthbound nations. From this perspective, space
settlements and space-based weapons deployments would seem only to extend an Earth-centered
confrontation, and extend it into an arena of potentially lightspeed weapons and maximal military instability.
In the longer term, however, far-flung settlements would be outside the reach of any reasonable first-strike
order, so that the danger of such an attack would be somewhat defused. Long before that time, the issue of
territory in space is likely to be a powerful source of competition and conflict between the leading
technological nations of the Earth. Would-be sooners who hope to escape into outer space before terrestrial
stick-in-the-muds blow themselves up are engaging in unrealistic fantasy. Any attempt to seize control of an
extraterrestrial empire can only provoke a war that will not fail to pursue the pioneer settlers; indeed, it may
target them first.
48
Nanotechnology Causes Disease

Nanotechnology causes disease mutations
ETC group on Erosion, Technology, and Concentration Group, 2002, No Small Matter! Nanotech Particles
Penetrate Living Cells and Accumulate in Animal Organs, http://online.sfsu.edu/
%7Erone/Nanotech/nosmallmatter.html
Again, what’s the big deal? The big deal is uncertainty, but scientists see two potential problems specific to
these forms of carbon–one problem has to do with their shape and one, apparently, has to do with their size.
It turns out that Dr. Wiesner’s comparison of carbon nanotubes with asbestos is not merely rhetorical,
highlighting the need to assess the dangers of a material before it becomes ubiquitous. Carbon nanotubes
resemble asbestos fibers in shape: they are long and needle-like. According to Dr. Wiesner, carbon nanotubes
cannot pose much of a threat at present because, in our environment, they tend to clump together rather than
exist as single fibers (which have the potential to cause serious respiratory problems as asbestos fibers have).
However, an intensive area of research is to figure out a way to solubilize nanotubes–in effect, to de-clump
them–so that they can be more easily used as single, detached fibers.. Two patents on methods of solubilizing
nanotubes in organic solutions have issued in the last year to the University of Kentucky (USA).24. Very few
studies have been done to learn what might happen if nanotube fibers were breathed in or if they were used
in drug delivery or disease diagnoses or as biosensors. Immunologist Silvana Fiorito has discovered in
preliminary research that when a 1 micrometer-wide particle of pure carbon (in the form of graphite) is
introduced into a cell, the cell responds by producing nitric oxide, which indicates that the immune system is
working and the body is fighting back against an invading foreign substance.. When a nano-sized particle of
the same substance — pure carbon — is added to cells (in the form of either nanotubes or fullerenes), the
cells fail to produce an immune response–they welcome the alien carbon like a long lost relative. The ability
to slip past the immune system may be desirable for drug delivery, but what happens when uninvited
nanoparticles come calling? In other words, once nanotechnologists have figured out how to distract the
bouncer guarding the door, how can you be sure you’re still keeping out the riff-raff?
49
Nanotech Destabilizes the Middle East

Nanotech destabilizes the Middle East
Thomas McCarthy, 2000, Shaffer Distinguished Professor of the Humanities, Molecular Technologies and
the World Systems,” http://www.mccarthy.cx/WorldSystem/intro.htm
We can expect molecular nanotechnology to be opposed, whether openly or secretly, by any state that
expects to suffer a loss of relative power. Perhaps no loss of relative power among states will be greater than
that suffered by the oil-producing states of the Middle East. Molecular nanotechnology poses a challenge to
the primacy of fossil fuel as an energy source on several fronts. For one thing, manufacturing on a molecular
scale should be extremely efficient, without the wasteful processing associated with bulk manufacturing
techniques. This alone would lower the value of oil by lowering energy requirements for manufacturing a
given product. However, the efficiency of manufacturing has been increasing since oil started to become
widely used in industry, and the world's appetite for energy has only continued to grow, so greater energy
efficiency alone will not make oil obsolete. But what might do it is the fact that molecular nanotechnology
may lower the level of energy need in manufacturing to a point low enough that solar power, even if
collected by the inefficient cells we use today rather than a nanotechnological version, would be sufficient. If
molecular nanotechnology can do this, and it appears likely that it can, then oil would no longer be in
demand in any great quantity, and that would mean a great loss of power for the Middle East. Again, it is not
absolute power that is the only concern. Molecular nanotechnology, if adopted by Middle Eastern states,
could make everyone in the region far richer than today's richest sheik, with choices that are not available
today at any price, such as extremely long lifespans. Nonetheless, it may be actively opposed by many in the
Middle East because it will lead to a loss of relative power, in this case control of the world's supply of
energy. As OPEC demonstrated during the 1970s, this is an important lever to have one's hand on; by
decreasing the supply of crude in 1973, the OPEC nations were able to throw the economies of all the
industrialized world into deep recession, causing massive loss of jobs and lowered standards of living for
millions of people. The dependency of North America, Japan, Europe and most of the rest of the world on a
resource that is only found in abundance in one region of the planet and is controlled by a handful of
decision-makers is an incredible weakness, and one that was easily exploited. Although OPEC is no longer a
force, the dependency is real, and in some states (such as the U.S.) has even grown deeper. Dependency
means vulnerability, vulnerability to the decisions of others, and it demands that attention be paid to a region
of the world that otherwise would hold little significance. Were it not for oil, the Middle East would go
mostly unnoticed by much of the world. The oil-producing states are well aware of the source of their power,
having already flexed their muscle once. Molecular nanotechnology is not likely to receive a warm welcome
from these states, and many of them (notably Iran, Iraq and Libya) are practitioners of the lowest form of
violence: terrorism. The seriousness of an anti-nanotech terrorism, especially in a world where nuclear
materials are becoming easier to obtain, should not be lost on anyone.
50
Nanotech Threatens the Food Chain

Nanotech threatens the basis of the food chain, threatening ecosystems
Duke Law & Technology Review, 2008, p. 2
The same novel properties making nanomaterials commercially appealing also pose potentially serious risks
to human health and to the environment. Nanoparticles can enter the human body through skin absorption,
ingestion or inhalation. Once they enter the body, because of their size, nanoparticles can be carried past the
blood-brain barrier into brain cells and can pass through lung and liver tissue. Studies indicate that unique
attributes of insoluble nanoparticles--a small diameter and large surface area--significantly increase toxicity.
Some nanomaterials cause oxidative stress and localized immune lesions, and may lead to other tissue and
cellular damage. Nanoparticles are also linked to dangerous air, soil and water pollutants. A Rice University
study showed that certain individual insoluble nanoparticles become very water-soluble and bacteriocidal
when they aggregate. The study raised concerns that nanoparticle properties can endanger ecosystems by
killing bacteria constituting the base of the food chain. The existing methods of filtering and removing
nanoparticles from water and air are very cost intensive and generally unreliable.
51
Nanotechnology Causes Terrorism

Nanotech development triggers terrorism
Nanoethics, April 27, 2008, The Bad, http://www.nanoethics.org/bad.html
Privacy: As products shrink in size, eavesdropping devices too can become invisible to the naked eye and
more mobile, making it easier to invade our privacy. Small enough to plant into our bodies, mind-controlling
nanodevices may be able to affect our thoughts by manipulating brain-processes. Terrorism: Capabilities of
terrorists go hand in hand with military advances, so as weapons become more powerful and portable, these
devices can also be turned against us. Nanotech may create new, unimaginable forms of torture –
disassembling a person at the molecular level or worse. Radical groups could let loose nanodevices targeting
to kill anyone with a certain skin color or even a specific person.
52
Nano Threatens the Environment

Release of nanoparticles threatens the environment
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 2008, “Regulating the Impacts of Engineered Nanoparticles under
TSCA: Shifting Authority from Industry to Government,” p. 219-20
The manufacture, processing, and use of nanoparticles, or the degradation of nano-enabled products, may
disperse free nanoparticles throughout the environment. n23 The rapid adotption of nanoparticles' manufacture,
use, and disposal inevitably will lead [*220] to unintended consequences in ecosystems and organisms. n24
The potential use of nanoparticles for groundwater remediation and air and water filtration, n25 for example,
may expose humans and the environment to hazardous concentrations of metal nanoparticles (e.g., nanoiron
and titanium dioxide). n26 The release of nanoparticles into the environment also may disrupt abiotic
conditions, such as atmospheric, soil, or water chemistry. n27
53
Nano Threatens Health

Nanoparticles threaten human health
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 2008, “Regulating the Impacts of Engineered Nanoparticles
under TSCA: Shifting Authority from Industry to Government,” p. 220-1
In addition to causing adverse environmental impacts, nanoparticles may affect human health. Nanoparticles
move easily across cell membranes to the brain or other organs following inhalation. n28 The Royal Society of
Engineering has warned manufacturers that nanoparticles are hazardous to humans and should not be
released into the environment. n29 Clinical and experimental studies indicate that nanoparticles' small size,
large surface area, and ability to generate reactive oxygen species may cause the particles to induce lung
injury. Exposure to small, toxic, airborne particles may cause lung cancer, heart disease, asthma, increased
mortality, and cellular damage.
54
AT: We Establish Regulations

Nanotech regulations fail
Duke Law & Technology Review, 2008,
P21 Clarence Davies, a senior advisor to the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, recently suggested a new law as the appropriate regulatory response. n60
Davies argues that existing laws and agencies have significant flaws making them inapplicable to
nanotechnology. His most ardent criticisms of existing regulatory laws include: (1) inability to account for
the uniqueness of nanomaterial behavior, (2) shortcomings in legal authority to monitor nanotechnology
adequately, and (3) under-funding by the federal government of enforcement and measurement mechanisms.
No political support for aggressive nanotech regulations

Duke Law & Technology Review, 2008,
P22 The proposed law focuses on products rather than the environment, and shifts the burden from the
regulatory agencies to the manufacturers. The law requires manufacturers to prove that newly developed
nanomaterials are safe to consumers and manufacturers. Davies concedes that an effective, coordinated,
intra-agency program, similar to the framework established for biotechnology, may be viable. n63 He notes,
however, that given the current political climate, passing a new law or adjusting existing laws regulating
commercial products is highly unlikely. His proposal is not without substantive opposition, with many
arguing that it could harm small businesses and hinder innovation.
55

Regulations fail
James Hughes, 2001, Executive Director of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies,
Relinquishment or Regulation,” http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/RelReg.pdf
To regulate the new technologies at the depth required to prevent apocalyptic outcomes, we need to
create new global regulatory institutions. Enormous forces will be arrayed in opposition to their
creation. The first will be the alliance of corporate interests who stand to profit from less fettered
research and development. The second will the various citizen and consumer beneficiaries of the new
technologies, from patients receiving new treatments to those receiving cheaper dwellings, new clothes,
better food and better educations. Every step forward with biotechnology, molecular engineering, robotics
and information technology will create enormous popular as well as corporate constituencies. Any effort to
slow scientific progress will be vigorously fought. Occasionally Luddite forces, such the right-to-life
movement in the case of stem cell research, may erect road blocks. But in the end their efforts will prove
meaningless, as research continues in other countries, such as England which is publicly financing
embryonic stem cell and therapeutic cloning research. Even cloning, which has inspired paranoiac hysteria
far out of proportion to any actual threats it poses, may be impossible for international regulators to prevent
as offshore havens shelter experimenters. As we slowly create transnational regulatory institutions, a third
source of resistance will come from the less developed world, seeing that invasive safety regulation will
make it more difficult for them to benefit from the new technologies. One of the most contentious issues in
global climate talks has been the impact of environmental regulation on economic and industrial progress in
the less developed world. Even if we could coerce or convince developing nations to cooperate with bans on
technologies, it would only force the research underground, making it impossible to monitor and regulate. I
believe we will build strong global institutions in the next couple of decades capable of technology
regulation. But there will be no support for global governance that attempts to deny consumers,
patients, corporations and developing countries the right to benefit from the emerging technologies at
all.
UPI Doesn’t conclude affirmative

UPI, November 06, 2004, http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041104-010910-7296r.htm
Shipman thinks as soon as a federal agency such as the EPA or the Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration enacts a nanotech regulation, "it would probably have
a domino effect -- you would see other agencies start to pass similar regulations. In biotech, once some
regulations started coming out, other agencies (would follow)."
56

Empirically, nanotech regulations do not follow with incentives
Albert C. Lin, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, The Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2007, p.
362
Despite the concerns discussed in the preceding Part, the manufacture and use of nanotechnology products
are not specifically regulated. The 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003, n86
the only federal statute specifically focused on nanotechnology, aims only to develop and promote
nanotechnology. There is no federal law specifically regulating the health and environmental effects of
nanotechnology, nor are there any specific state laws in the area. n87 In the eyes of some manufacturers, this is
as it should be. Their view is that nanomaterials should be regulated no differently from the conventional
substances from which they are manufactured.
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) will fail to regulate nanotech
Albert C. Lin, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, The Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2007, p. 362-
3
Given its breadth and purpose, TSCA is the most likely source of authority for addressing possible
risks associated with nanomaterials. In contrast to many other environmental laws, which govern only the
release of pollutants into the environment, TSCA gives the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") the
broad authority to regulate the entire life cycle of a chemical substance. Moreover, TSCA's purpose--
addressing the concern that humans and the environment are exposed to thousands of chemical substances
and mixtures that may pose unknown or unreasonable risks --seems well-suited to the nanotechnology
challenge. Nevertheless, among the major environmental statutes, TSCA has been relatively neglected, and
the difficulties encountered in its implementation stem from fundamental deficiencies in the substance of the
statute itself. TSCA provides EPA with regulatory authority in three key areas: regulating chemicals that
present health or environmental risks; screening new chemicals and significant new uses of existing
chemicals; and testing chemicals where risks are unknown. First, under section 6 of TSCA, EPA has the
authority to regulate the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of any chemical substance if
it finds that there is a "reasonable basis to conclude" that such an activity "presents or will present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." This standard requires both a factual finding of risk
and a normative finding that such risk is unreasonable. In determining whether a demonstrated risk is
unreasonable, EPA must balance the health and environmental effects with the benefits arising from use of
the substance. Furthermore, under a leading judicial interpretation of section 6, EPA must evaluate the
availability of substitutes for the chemical in question, it must apply only the least burdensome regulatory
measure that provides adequate protection, and its decision to regulate must be supported by substantial
evidence. Second, for new chemicals, section 5 of TSCA requires manufacturers to provide a
premanufacture notice ("PMN") and to submit any available health and safety data to EPA. n98 EPA may take
action to control unreasonable risks, but if EPA takes no action on the PMN within ninety days, manufacture
of the chemical can proceed. n99 Section 5 of TSCA also gives EPA the authority to evaluate significant new
uses of existing chemicals. n100 In order to determine that there is a significant new use, however, EPA must
promulgate a rule pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. n101 A company subject to such a rule must
57
provide a significant new use notice ("SNUN"), which is similar to a PMN. Third, although TSCA itself
does not require manufacturers to conduct testing that would generate any health and safety data, section 4 of
TSCA authorizes EPA to require such testing to be done. n103 EPA must make certain statutory findings--that
a chemical "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment," or that a chemical
"will be produced in substantial quantities," resulting in substantial human exposure or entry of substantial
quantities into the environment --and EPA must promulgate a rule to require such testing. Notwithstanding
TSCA's potential applicability, little attention has been paid to the statute as nanotechnology applications
have come to market. Hundreds of nanomaterial-containing products have become available in recent years,
but not until October 2005 did EPA review its first application under TSCA to make a product composed of
nanomaterials. Several factors explain not only why TSCA has been ignored, but also why the statute is
inadequate to address the potential hazards of nanotechnology. First, although TSCA is broad in scope, it
leaves important regulatory gaps. Some products containing nanomaterials, such as cosmetics and
sunscreens, lie beyond EPA's regulatory authority under TSCA. Whether agencies other than EPA have
adequate authority over these items is doubtful in many instances, as will be explained below. Second,
TSCA has turned out to be a very weak source of authority because of the burdens it places on EPA before
EPA can limit the manufacture, processing, or distribution of a chemical substance. As noted above, EPA
must demonstrate the existence of unreasonable risk, it must choose the least burdensome regulatory measure
that provides adequate protection, and its decision to regulate must be supported by substantial evidence. n114
This unreasonable risk standard has been deemed "a failure" by one commentator because "[i]t has imposed
huge information demands, invited contention and judicial intervention, and thwarted regulatory action."
Given the uncertainty that tends to surround the effects of chemical exposure, the burden of proof is often
too difficult to meet. Furthermore, as another critic has noted, the requirement that regulatory action be
supported by "substantial evidence ... is very difficult to meet, and . . . contrasts with the much easier
'arbitrary and capricious' standard" applied under most other environmental statutes. Similarly, even before
EPA can require testing of a substance, it must demonstrate the existence of potential risk--yet such
information may not be available if no testing has been done. Third, the implicit assumption behind TSCA
is that no information on the risk of a chemical means that there is no risk. Substances whose effects are
uncertain are treated the same as substances that demonstrably pose no unreasonable risks. This presents a
particularly difficult challenge to the regulation of nanotechnology because of the vast uncertainty regarding
its impact on health and safety. The difficulty of that challenge is compounded by the rapid pace of
developments in the field. Given the variety of engineered nanoparticles likely to be produced, and their
differing properties, it will be virtually impossible for the government to determine under TSCA whether or
not each type of particle presents an unreasonable risk before products containing those particles are put on
the market. Fourth, TSCA's PMN regulations contain an exemption for new chemicals or significant new
uses of chemicals produced in volumes of ten thousand kilograms or less per year. This threshold would
exclude most nanomaterials. The exemption does not apply if EPA determines that a chemical may cause
serious acute, chronic, or significant environmental effects, but the regulation places the burden on EPA to
make such a showing.
58

Biotech proves adequate regulatory regimes will not develop
7
Many commentators have suggested parallels between the development of biotechnology--the use of
recombinant DNA techniques to transfer genetic material from one species to another n-and the challenge
presented by nanotechnology today. Although the full ramifications of the spread of biotechnology are not
yet known, commentators identify the failure to anticipate the controversy surrounding genetically modified
organisms ("GMOs") as a mistake for the nanotechnology industry to avoid. A comparison of the two fields
reveals a striking similarity in the government's approach to each: minimal oversight and a stubborn
insistence on the adequacy of regulatory schemes that do not account for the unique problems posed by new
technologies. Both biotechnology and nanotechnology offer the prospect of revolutionary benefits, with
advances cutting across a wide range of products and industries. Both fields, however, involve new and
unpredictable technologies that have the potential for catastrophic consequences should thing go awry. The
uncertainty accompanying each technology is substantial, with potentially vast and irreparable impacts on
human health and the environment. Furthermore, existing health and environmental statutes are an imperfect
fit for addressing the unique challenges posed by biotechnology and nanotechnology because these statutes
were not drafted with the potential risks of these new technologies in mind. Just as the rapid development of
biotechnology has tested the regulatory system, nanotechnology threatens to overwhelm the government's
ability to identify and address risks. And although the tort system is available as a backstop to deal with the
shortcomings of regulatory statutes, it at best offers an incomplete solution because the negative effects of
these new technologies may be latent, irreversible, and difficult to trace. The federal government's approach
to biotechnology has been largely hands-off. A 1974 report issued by a National Academy of Sciences
committee called for general oversight of genetic engineering by the National Institutes of Health ("NIH").
In response, the NIH established an advisory committee composed primarily of scientists to review all
research proposals for compliance with applicable guidelines. This approach established some oversight to
account for health and environmental concerns, but left the regulation of the field to the scientific
community. Controversy grew over the inadequacy of this approach, and in 1986, the federal government
adopted the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology. The Coordinated Framework
essentially declared that EPA, the FDA, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") already
possessed adequate legal authority to regulate biotechnology. Rather than calling for new regulatory
authority, the Coordinated Framework established mechanisms designed to facilitate interagency
coordination. Under-girding the Coordinated Framework--and the determination that biotechnology could
be addressed under existing statutes and regulations--were two critical assumptions: first, that the techniques
of biotechnology are not riskier than traditional breeding techniques; and second, that GMOs are not
fundamentally different from other organisms. Supported by a scientific community that was increasingly
confident about the safety of genetic engineering, the Coordinated Framework enabled the government to
promote the growth of the biotechnology industry while maintaining the appearance of regulatory control. n206
The Coordinated Framework also seemed to be the easiest way to deal with what critics perceived to be a
complex and rapidly developing problem. As the government admitted, "there did not appear to be an
alternative, unitary, statutory approach since the very broad spectrum of products obtained with genetic
59
engineering cut[s] across many product uses regulated by different agencies." Today, the government
continues to follow a general approach of promoting genetically modified ("GM") foods. Although a few
commentators assess the government's approach to biotechnology in a positive light, criticism has persisted.
Scientists continue to worry about negative impacts on genetic and biological diversity, food chains, and
ecological communities. The unintended out-crossing of GM crops, for example, could transfer herbicide
and insect resistance to weedy relatives. n211 Furthermore, many commentators have faulted the exclusion of
public input from biotechnology policymaking. Professor Sheila Jasanoff contends, for instance, that
"biotechnology ceased to be a matter for broad participatory politics and became instead an object of
bureaucratic decision making under the guidance of technical experts." The lack of public input laid the
foundation for a public backlash triggered by incidents that suggested that government oversight of GM
foods had been inadequate. In 2000, for example, GM StarLink corn, which had been approved for
commercial use only as animal feed, was discovered in corn products sold to consumers. This discovery led
to cancellation of the StarLink registration, product recalls, rejection of U.S. corn shipments, and class-action
lawsuits. It also helped to fuel a growing grassroots movement to ban or restrict GMOs.
60

Attempts to regulate nano fail
80
The biotechnology experience also offers further parallels and lessons for nanotechnology that are worth
noting. The Coordinated Framework rested on the questionable assumption that biotechnology's techniques
and products posed risks no different in nature or degree from conventional breeding techniques. The lack
of regulation of nanotechnology reflects a similar assumption that nanotechnology's potential risks are no
different than those posed by ordinary materials. The little that we do know about nano-materials suggests
that they are likely to pose hazards that are substantially different from those posed by conventional
materials. Unlike biotechnology, the potential hazards of which are primarily ecological, nanotechnology's
potential hazards directly threaten both human health and the environment. In addition, nanotechnology
will likely enable the production of entire classes of materials whose risks could not have been anticipated
when existing statutes were drafted. The attempt to regulate biotechnology under the Coordinated
Framework also illustrates the difficulties involved in relying on general statutes to address the unique risks
posed by emerging technologies. Various commentators have identified gaps and inconsistencies in the
regulation of GM products resulting from the attempt to apply legislation enacted long before such products
were conceivable. Government agencies have had difficulty responding to technological advances, and the
division of authority among agencies has unnecessarily exposed the public and the environment to adverse
risks. Attempting to regulate nanotechnology through existing statutes likely would result in similar
problems. Indeed, the range of potential nanotechnology applications suggests that the difficulties will be
even greater. Already, the commercial proliferation of cosmetics and other products containing
nanomaterials--with little or no regulatory oversight--points to the existence of regulatory gaps and the need
for an approach specific to nanomaterials.
61

Regulatory category schemes do not apply to nano
University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, Fall, 2006, “Nanoscale Materials: Can (and
Should) We Regulate the Next Industrial Revolution?”, p. 314-5
Furthermore, the ability of existing regulatory schemes to deal with the unique physical and chemical
hazards posed by these new commercially valuable nanomaterials has been challenged. n11 The current
relevant regulatory regimes classify materials either by physical particle size or chemical composition. n12
Unfortunately, because the inherent reactivity of many chemical compositions dramatically increases as the
physical size of the nanoparticles decreases, neither categorization scheme alone is likely to be very useful in
accurately assessing the health and environmental impacts of these new materials.
Past federal incentives did not include regulations

Mme Sass, jsass@nrdc.org, est une scientifique senior a Natural Resources Defense Council (NDRC),
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Summer, 2007, p. 4-5
Despite these early warnings, government response thus far to the potential risks has been woefully
inadequate. In spring 2005, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology issued its five
year review of the interagency National Nanotechnology Initiative, established in 1991 to direct federal
research activities on nanotechnology. Although the text of the report is 46 pages long, the section
addressing "Environmental, Health and Safety" does not appear until page 35 and is less than one page long.
According to the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, only four percent of the fiscal year ("FY") 2006 federal nanotechnology funding was earmarked for
research on health and environmental effects, and another four percent on social implications and education.
Meanwhile, federal funding for nanotechnology research and development has soared from $ 464 million in
2001 to $ 1.2 billion in FY 2007. n18 Of this investment, the National Science Foundation will get $ 373
million. More than $ 600 million is earmarked for the U.S. Departments of Defense ($ 345 million) and
Energy ($ 258 million). By comparison, only $ 142 million is slated for the human health and environment
protection branches of the federal government, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") ($ 9
million), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ($ 133 million), which includes the
National Institutes of Health. With this disparity in funding priorities, it is hard to imagine how safety testing
could ever catch up with research and development.
62

Development won’t lead to industry regulations
Mme Sass, jsass@nrdc.org, est une scientifique senior a Natural Resources Defense Council (NDRC),
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Summer, 2007, p. 5
The private sector response to potential health and environment threats has been mixed. Some corporations
seem concerned only about public perception and hope to disavow actual risk by avoiding safety testing,
keeping safety data confidential, and providing empty reassurances to the public. Fearing actual or perceived
risks, insurance companies such as Swiss Re, and financial investment advisers such as Innovest and
Allianz, have called for safety testing and regulatory oversight of nanomaterials. Other large corporations
and many small startup companies also would welcome safety testing and regulations if they were not overly
costly or burdensome, because they would contribute to market stability by reducing future risks of liabilities
and consumer rejection.
63

We control the uniqueness of this question-no existing regulations
Nell Greenfieldboyce 2006 (1/11, "Report Finds Regulation of Nanotech Inadequate", NPR,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5148949)
Davies says officials should develop regulations now to identify any potential problems. “The existing
system is not well tailored to deal with nanotechnology,” he says. His analysis of existing laws was done
for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a nonpartisan research institute for advanced
study that was established by Congress. There's been relatively little money spent on studying the safety
of nanomaterials, Davies says, or on research into environmental effects. “We know so little about the
hazards, to the extent that there are any, from nanotechnology,” Davies says. “What that means is that you
need to have a regulatory system that provides incentives to generate the information.” So far, no federal
agency has put in place any nano-specific regulations.
Regulation of nano will fail-8 reasons

David Forrest 1989 (23 March, Foresight Nanotech Institute, "Regulating Nanotechnology Development",
http://www.foresight.org/nano/Forrest1989.html)
But regulatory control has its share of problems as well: 1. in the appointments process, the people
best-qualified to handle regulatory responsibilities are not always chosen [23], 2. regulatory
commissions often have an imbalanced representation of members with various backgrounds, talents,
and outlook [23], 3. the current mechanisms for public participation in the regulatory process result in
low participation rates; this in turn results in a reduced range of ideas and information, and heavy
domination of rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings by the regulated industries [24], 4. commissions
of co-equal members have difficulty making general policy rules, manage bureaucracies inefficiently,
and don't effectively coordinate their efforts with other regulatory agencies [25], 5. administrative
procedures are slow and cumbersome [25, 26, 27], 6. there is often redundancy of effort and lack of
coordination between agencies with overlapping areas of jurisdiction [28, 29], 7. because (a) regulators
tend to be specialists in particular areas and (b) their time is often consumed with rulemaking,
adjudications, and administrative tasks, regulators generally do not consider broad policy issues or the
effects of new technology on future regulation [30, 31], 8. mechanistic application of regulations by
inspectors tends to alienate those who are fundamentally law-abiding and discourages cooperation;
flexible enforcement (for example, disregarding trivial violations, or getting a firm to remedy an obvious
hazard not covered in the regulations) ". . . vests an extraordinary degree of discretion in public officials,
generates opportunities for bribery or favoritism, and provides agency critics with examples of overlooked
violations."
64

Only one dissident kills the entire regulatory net
K. Drexler, nanotechnologist, 1986 ("Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology")
The unilateral suppression of nanotechnology and AI, in contrast, would amount to unilateral
disarmament in a situation where resistance cannot work. An aggressive state could use these
technologies to seize and rule (or exterminate) even a nation of Gandhis, or of armed and dedicated
freedom fighters. This deserves emphasis. Without some novel way to reform the world's oppressive states,
simple research-suppression movements cannot have total success. Without a total success, a major
success would mean disaster for the democracies. Even if they got nowhere, efforts of this sort would
absorb the work and passion of activists, wasting scarce human resources on a futile strategy. Further,
efforts at suppression would alienate concerned researchers, stirring fights between potential allies
and wasting further human resources. Its futility and divisiveness make this a strategy to be shunned.
65

Regulation empirically fails and is impossible to define, verify, or enforce
K. Drexler, nanotechnologist, 1986 ("Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology")
In a more promising approach, we could apply local pressure for the negotiation of a verifiable, worldwide ban. A similar strategy might have a
stopping nanotechnology and artificial intelligence would pose
chance in the control of nuclear weapons. But
problems of a different order, for at least two reasons. First, these technologies are less well-defined than
nuclear weapons: because current nuclear technology demands certain isotopes of rare metals, it is distinct from other activities. It can be defined and
(in principle) banned. Butmodern biochemistry leads in small steps to nanotechnology, and modern computer
technology leads in small steps to AI. No line defines a natural stopping point. And since each small
advance will bring medical, military, and economic benefits, how could we negotiate a worldwide
agreement on where to stop? Second, these technologies are more potent than nuclear weapons:
because reactors and weapons systems are fairly large, inspection could limit the size of a secret force
and thus limit its strength. But dangerous replicators will be microscopic, and AI software will be
intangible. How could anyone be sure that some laboratory somewhere isn't on the verge of a strategic breakthrough? In the long run, how could
anyone even be sure that some hacker in a basement isn't on the verge of a strategic breakthrough? Ordinary verification measures
won't work, and this makes negotiation and enforcement of a worldwide ban almost impossible.
Pressure for the right kinds of international agreements will make our path safer, but agreements simply to
suppress dangerous advances apparently won't work. Again, local pressure must be part of a workable strategy. Global
Suppression by Force If peaceful agreements won't work, one might consider using military force to suppress dangerous advances. But because
of verification problems, military pressure alone would not be enough. To suppress advances by force
would instead require that one power conquer and occupy hostile powers armed with nuclear
weapons-hardly a safe policy. Further, the conquering power would itself be a major technological
force with massive military power and a demonstrated willingness to use it. Could this power then be
trusted to suppress its own advances? And even if so, could it be trusted to maintain unending,
omnipresent vigilance over the whole world? If not, then threats will eventually emerge in secret, and
in a world where open work on active shields has been prevented. The likely result would be disaster.
Military strength in the democracies has great benefits, but military strength alone cannot solve our
problem. We cannot win safety through a strategy of conquest and research suppression.
66

And, industry won’t regulate itself-any attempt is self-serving and distracts from the
lack of federal action
Michelle Chen 2007 (April 16, "Nanotech Critics Warn Against Industry Self-Regulation", The New
Standard, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/4677)
As the science of tiny particles seeps into commercial markets, controversy is swelling over whether the
nanotechnology industry can be trusted to regulate itself. Nanotechnology, which involves using extremely small particles
to make electronics, cosmetics and other products, is considered as a potential watershed for various industries ? and a potential ecological hazard. But
one recent attempt to forge a partnership between environmental advocates and nanotech-business interests has bred fears that the
appearance
of industry self-regulation could trump government oversight. In an open letter issued last Thursday, several
environmental groups, unions and other organizations blasted a safety-research plan called the "Nano Risk Framework" proposed by Environmental
Defense, a conservation group, in partnership with DuPont, one of the firms leading nanotechnology development. The critics, which include the
International Center for Technology Assessment (CTA), Greenpeace, the AFL-CIO, Friends of the Earth and the United Steelworkers of America,
the Framework reflects corporate interests and is "at best, a public-relations campaign that
said
detracts from urgent worldwide oversight priorities." The problem, they say, is that the Framework
prioritizes voluntary standards dictated by private interests, rather than government regulatory
systems. The Food and Drug Administration?s current regulations do not target nanotechnology
specifically, aside from conventional review and surveillance of drugs and other products.
67

Regulations fail to keep up with the technology
Food Chemical News, March 17, 2008, p. 5
Despite a spate of publicity about nanotechnology, a regulatory regime is not yet in place, Mark Mansour, a
partner in the Washington law firm Foley & Lardner, told a March 4 forum on new technologies sponsored
by the American Society of International Law. "The pace of change far exceeds the ability to keep up,"
Mansour said. "There's no impartial arbiter out there except for government. Consumer organizations don't
have the mantle of officialdom. How do you imbue government agencies with the ability to manage
change?" Mansour noted that, unlike biotech, regulators could see nanotech coming. "There's no excuse [for
inaction]," he said, citing potentialsqueamishness on the part of consumers, little understanding of output
traits and "controversy swirling around it." Regulators are "trying to get their arms around" nanotechnology,
Mansour continued, praising the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for doing
the best job, especially regarding aircraft production. "FDA and EPA are woefully under-resourced; FDA
can't deal with the problems it already has. I don't think nano is a major issue for food production, except for
packaging," he added. Industry understood the need for self-regulation, Mansour said, noting that DuPont has
worked with Environmental Defense on the issue. The European Union has also been proactive, engaging
with the WoodrowWilson Center for Scholars and others "to avoid what happened with biotech." Stressing
that the most important use of nanotechnology is military, Mansour said worker safety regimes are needed.
"Still, there are lots of imponderables," he said. "You can't complete a safety regime because it's a bunch of
industries. These are retail regulatory regimes, and principles are needed to guide the flow of products.
"Industry would like to give government the tools to do the job," he concluded. "They don't want to go the
way of biotech and see consumer confidence go down the drain."
68

Regulation won’t follow nano development; regulation fails
Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2008, p. 1065-6
The availability of funding and the potential financial rewards combine to create a significant incentive to
undertake nanotechnology research and development. In the rush to capitalize, the government has not given
adequate consideration to the risks that nanotechnology-related products and inventions may pose to public
health and safety. Nanotechnology is special in that it is applicable across many fields, but it is this very trait
that makes nanotechnology so difficult to regulate. Although the government is largely funding research
efforts in the United States, it has not done enough to ensure that these efforts will ultimately benefit, and
not harm, its citizens. As one critic stated, the government "has acted as a cheerleader, not a regulator, in
addressing the nanotech revolution." In fact, of all the money the federal government has invested in
nanotechnology, only about 5% is expressly allocated for environmental, health, and safety research in
2009.
69

FDA regulatory approach inadequate
The FDA's mission, by its very nature, is to engage in a balancing test whereby strict regulatory controls are
pitted against the need to get useful and often life-saving products on the market in a timely fashion. The
FDA's regulatory scheme is therefore designed for adaptability, and it is built on the recognition that
different products require different levels of regulation to ensure the public safety. General adaptability,
however, can be stretched only so far before it breaks down, and despite the demonstrably unique properties
of nanotechnology-containing products, the FDA states that "existing requirements may be adequate for most
nanotechnology products that [the FDA] will regulate." The FDA expresses this view because it believes that
a new nanotechnology material would be the same size "as the cells and molecules with which FDA
reviewers and scientists associate every day. In particular, every degradable medical device or injectable
pharmaceutical generates particulates that pass through this size range during the processes of their
absorption and elimination by the body." While this may be true, the FDA's conclusion that its current
regulatory scheme is adequate does not logically follow. First, as illustrated above, the size of a product does
not dictate the product's behavior or safety. Size does not necessarily give rise to a particular property;
instead, a certain size (on the order of nanometers) provides a strong indication that novel properties may
also exist. Second, the nanoscale products with which the FDA claims familiarity are medical devices and
pharmaceuticals - products that are often designed to specifically pass through the nanoscale. Some new
drugs, for example, are constructed to fit into a protein's "active site" and thereby to either increase or
decrease the protein's activity. These active sites can be even smaller than the nanoscale, on the order of
angstroms (or one-tenth as small as a nanometer). But the pharmaceutical particulates and degradable
devices that are approved by the FDA and go on to be successful products are those that survived the FDA's
regulatory process - had safety issues arisen due to properties resulting from the product's nanoscale size,
that product theoretically would not have received FDA approval. The fact that some products successfully
withstood FDA review does not mean that all nanotechnology-related products will likewise be able to
withstand such review. Finally, the FDA's regulatory measures for drugs and medical devices are much more
rigorous than for other types of products, such as cosmetics and food supplements, that are just as likely to
contain nanomaterials. Any doubts expressed about the adequacy of the FDA's regulatory scheme become
even more pressing once one considers that the FDA has little to no regulatory power over these types of
products - products that, if they contain nanomaterials, present the same hazards that exist for pharmaceutical
or medical device products. n6 For example, some of the most prominent nanotechnology products on the U.S.
market are cosmetics, n67 which make up more than 15% of the nanotechnology-product market. n68 These
include, for example anti-wrinkle creams such as L'Oreal RevitaLift Double Lifting treatment, which
contains "nanosomes" of Pro-Retinol A; Lancome's Hydra Zen cream, which contains "nano-encapsulated
Triceramides;" and Zelens's name-brand face cream, which contains C<60> molecules. n71 Although
cosmetics ostensibly fall under the FDA's regulatory umbrella, they are primarily regulated by the
manufacturers themselves. Indeed, with the exception of color additives, the FDA has no statutory authority
to subject cosmetic products to pre-market oversight. n73 The FDA states that "manufacturers are not required
to register their cosmetic establishments, file data on ingredients, or report cosmetic-related injuries to [the]
FDA." n74 The FDA cannot authorize a cosmetic product recall, and must depend in large part on the
manufacturer to voluntarily remove a dangerous product from the marketplace. n75 Instead, the FDA attempts
70
to use its misbranding authority to encourage proper substantiation of product safety. If the FDA concludes,
through its own examination, that a particular cosmetic product is not safe, the best it can do is use its
labeling authority to inform the consumer: "Warning - The safety of this product has not been determined." n76
Products that combine cosmetics and drugs (sometimes called "cosmeceuticals") may slip through the
regulatory cracks, because although the FDA claims that "such products must comply with the requirements
for both cosmetics and drugs," the fact of the matter is that cosmetics that claim to contain nanoparticles
"intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease [or] articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals" n78 have not
been subjected to pre-market review.
71
States Counterplan
Text: The 50 United States and relevant U.S. territories should (insert plan mandates)
The states can solve

As the NNAP report notes, the states are playing an increasing role in nanotechnology. In 2004, State
funding for nanotechnology-related projects was $400 million, or approximately 40 percent of the total
federal investment. To date, State funding for nanotechnology has been focused on infrastructure—
particularly the construction of new facilities—with some research support being provided in the form of
matching funds to public universities that receive federal research dollars. In addition to receiving State
support, universities and national laboratories also leverage federal investments through industry
contributions of funds or in-kind donations of equipment and expertise. The NNAP report lists 15 examples
of nanotechnology infrastructure investments at the State and local levels, and further details on non-federal
initiatives can be found in the recent report on a 2003 NNI workshop on regional, State, and local
nanotechnology activities.
State action encourages nanotech development—current policies prove
FDI, 2005, Foreign Direct Investment, premier Financial Times Group publication for the business of
globalization, “The Next Big Thing?”
http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1364/The_next_big_thing_.html
The US is by far the world’s largest supporter of nanotechnology. Besides federal initiatives, today many
states are incorporating nanotechnology into their economic development efforts. In 2004, about $400m was
poured into research, facilities and business incubation programmes. York State is a big player in the
industry. Four years ago, New York governor George E. Pataki included nanotechnology in the ‘Centers of
Excellence’ effort to create a powerhouse of activity. Today, corporations match these funds by two to three
times. Small Times magazine recently cited the University at Albany’s Center of Excellence in
Nanoelectronics as first in the nation in nanotechnology facilities, as well as first in microtechnology and
nanotechnology industry outreach. “Companies like IBM, Micron, Hewlett-Packard and Motorola are anchor
partners at the centre,” says Michael Fancher, director of economic outreach at Albany NanoTech and
associate professor of nanoeconomics at the College of Nanoscale Science and Engineering. Other states that
play a strong role in the sector include California, Massachusetts, Colorado, Virginia, New Mexico, New
Jersey, Michigan, Texas, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina and Ohio. Much of the activity in Virginia is
government and defence related.
72
States Counterplan Solves R &D

State governments can do nanotech research
Michael A. Van Lente, B.S., Chemistry, Hope College (1980); Ph.D., Chemistry, University of
Minnesota/Minneapolis (1987); J.D. expected, Case Western Reserve University School of Law , Case
Western Law Review, 2006, p. 181
States and numerous companies are also investing in nanotechnologies. The fifty state governments
combined invested more than $ 400 million in nanotechnology research and development in 2004. n49
Statistics rate Massachusetts as the number one nanotechnology state "in terms of the per capita number of
nanotech companies, patents, research activity, commercial applications and other factors." n50 In California,
a major nanotech research facility known as the California Nanosystems Institute is being built on the UCLA
campus. n51 The State of New York will contribute $ 150 million to support a new semiconductor plant that
IBM is building along the Hudson River and related nanotechnology research. n52 Other examples are
numerous. n53
73
States Solve Military

States solve: the private sector R&D that they spur will shape the future of the
military.
James Carafano, Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security for International
Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 2005, Rethinking the Principles of War CH13: “Preponderance in
Power,” p228-229, ttp://books.google.com/books?id=zvUAXd18pJkC&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=%22
Preponderance+in+Power
%22&source=web&ots=Nx1CUKuZDs&sig=79DADCBfm7MuEbgcXBbpJODWQ64&hl=en&sa=X&oi=b
ook_result&resnum=1&ct=result]
Technology has always been a factor in shaping the future of war, but its impact is En from deterministic.
Much contemporary discussion on military history and the impact of technology on military transformation
misses the mark. Technology does not define future ways of war. As Williamson Murray and MacCregor
Knox concluded in an anthology of the dynamics of military revolution, scientific development and new
weapons systems may stimulate change, but the conduct of warfare is shaped by larger economic, political,
and geostrategic factors. IS The impact of future technologies will likely be the same. They might unleash or
accelerate social and cultural changes that reshape the nature of war, but it is unlikely they will simplify or
define how combat is conducted. Technology will always be a "wild card" in war's future. Future
technological change, however, will diverge in character from the experiences of the last century. Since
World War II, militaries have largely pioneered the technologies that were the most critical to military
competition. In the United States, for example, from jet aircraft and nuclear weapons to stealth technologies
and precision-guided weapons, the Pentagon largely set the course of investments in science and technology,
shaped research and development programs, and determined how disruptive new technologies would be
applied to battle. The impact of the public sector defense research effort was pervasive and dramatic. The
twenty first century will be different. In the future, the private sector, not the government, will likely make
the largest investments in the basic science research and product development that create the technologies
with the greatest capacity to change the nature of combat. In turn, how the private sector chooses to develop
these technologies, apart from the guidance or prohibitions established by governments, may determine how
future conflicts are fought. Trends in information technology development offer a clear example. During the
Cold War, the government financed much of the cutting-edge research on computers and related electronics
that resulted in new combat capabilities. Today, the government is virtually dependent on the private sector
for advances in information technology. One of the emerging operational concepts of twenty-first-century
warfare is often called "network-centric operations. Network centric operations generate increased
operational effectiveness by networking sensors, decision makers, and forces to achieve shared awareness,
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater efficiency, and a degree of self-
synchronization. Network-centric capabilities, [end page 228] however, are being assembled with systems
integration technologies, many of which are already widely commercially available, including technologies
that facilitate passing high volumes of secure digital data, create ad hoc networks, integrate disparate
databases, and link various communication systems over cable, fiber-optic wireless, and satellite networks.
In effect, many of the concepts for network-centric warfare and how it is being implemented are significantly
influenced by how the private sector has evolved in a twenty-first-century knowledge economy. The growing
dependence of modern militaries on commercial information technologies illustrates one way in which war
74
in the twenty-first century will be different. Emerging technologies with the greatest potential to change the
nature of military competition are being spearheaded not by defense departments and ministries, but by
individual entrepreneurs, multinational conglomerates, start-up companies, investors, stockholders, and Wal-
Mart shoppers. Militaries are already grappling with understanding and harnessing information technologies
and the prospects for cyber-warfare, but these challenges may represent merely the dawn of an age in which
military competition is defined by commercial research and development and consumer choice. Several
candidate technologies have already emerged that may shape the character of war beyond the capacity of the
public sphere to control or even influence, understanding how they might impact military competition could
provide tar more insight into fighting in the future than mastering the principles of war.
75
Politics -- Plan is Popular in Congress

The National Nanotech Initiative was overwhelmingly bipartisan.
Industry Week, June 9, 2008, http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=16491
NanoBusiness Alliance Executive Chairman Sean Murdock on June 5 commended the House of
Representatives for passing the National Nanotechnology Initiative Amendments Act of 2008 (H.R. 5940).
The bill, which reauthorizes and updates the successful federal interagency nanotechnology research and
development program, passed by an overwhelming, bipartisan margin. "We are pleased that Congress
continues to recognize the importance of nanotechnology," said Murdock. "It is imperative that the United
States maintain its lead in the global nanotechnology race, and this bill will help make that happen."
Nanotech is overwhelmingly bipartisan.
Nanotechnology is the concept of molecular manufacturing.The federal government has played a central role
in catalyzing U.S. R&D efforts. In 2000, President Clinton launched the U.S. National Nanotechnology
Initiative (NNI), the world’s first integrated national effort focused on nanotechnology. The NNI has enjoyed
strong, bipartisan support from the executive branch, the House of Representatives, and the Senate. Each
year, the President has proposed increased funding for federal nanotechnology R&D, and each year Congress
has provided additional funding. Since the inception of the NNI, Congress has appropriated a total of $8.4
billion for nanotechnology R&D intended to foster continued U.S. technological leadership and to support
the technology’s development, with the long-term goals of: creating high-wage jobs, economic growth, and
wealth creation; addressing critical national needs; renewing U.S. manufacturing leadership; and improving
health, the environment, and the overall quality of life.
76
Heidegger Links
Nanotech transforms atoms into a standing reserve
Gyorgy Scrinis, 2007, research associate at RMIT University's Globalism Institute; Kristen Lyons: rural
sociologist at Griffith, THE EMERGING NANO-CORPORATE PARADIGM: NANOTECHNOLOGY
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE, FOOD AND AGRI-FOOD SYSTEMS,”
http://www.csafe.org.nz/ijsaf/archive/vol15(2)-07/articles/2%20-%20Scrinis-Lyons.pdf
These techno-scientific characteristics will in turn constitute or enable the extension and continued
transformation of the ecological relations of the contemporary food system. Nanotechnology greatly extends
the ability to engage with, transform and reconstitute nature at the atomic and molecular levels, including
the engineering of thoroughly novel organisms, materials and final food products. While this level of
engagement with nature is not in itself new, its reach and the ability to apply it in a wider range of situations
is being radically enhanced. This mode of engagement involves encountering nature — ie. plants, animals,
microorganisms, wholefoods — as being constructed from a set of standardised and increasingly
interchangeable nano-molecular components (Scrinis, 2006a). There is little respect here for the integrity of
the objects of nature in their received form, for all are encountered as plastic and malleable, a standing-
reserve of raw material (Heidegger, 1977) ready to provide useful components, to be re-engineered from the
atom up, or whose self- assembling properties at the molecular level are to be harnessed, in order to meet the
requirements of — and to be smoothly integrated into — the dominant agri-food system (Dupuy, 2007).
This more abstract mode of encountering nature will increasingly define the character of food production
practices and products as it works its way through the system, including plant and animal breeding and
production practices, food processing techniques and products, and consumption practices.
77
Heidegger Links
Nanotechnology transforms our natural understanding, constructing life as part of the
infrastructure of industry to be exploited.
Gyorgy Scrinis, 2007, research associate at RMIT University's Globalism Institute; Kristen Lyons: rural
sociologist at Griffith, THE EMERGING NANO-CORPORATE PARADIGM: NANOTECHNOLOGY
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE, FOOD AND AGRI-FOOD SYSTEMS,”
http://www.csafe.org.nz/ijsaf/archive/vol15(2)-07/articles/2%20-%20Scrinis-Lyons.pdf
Nano-biotechnology refers to the use of nanotechnology to manipulate living organisms, as well as to enable
the merging of biological and non-biological materials. This includes the use of nanotechnology to facilitate
genetic engineering breeding programs, the incorporation of synthetic materials into biological organisms,
and ultimately the creation new life forms. The ETC Group refer to the creation of new life forms through
the development of ‘synthetic biology’ as one of the ultimate goals of nano-biotechnology research (ETC
Group, 2007). Synthetic biology entails going beyond merely cutting and pasting existing gene sequences
between organisms — and the current imprecision, randomness and other limitations of these techniques —
and instead involves constructing DNA itself out of atomic building blocks, with the aim of creating novel
organisms that are able to be ‘programmed’ to more precise specifications. Rodney Brooks from the
Massachussetts Institute of Technology puts forward this vision of a nano-biotech future: “Much of what we
manufacture now will be grown in the future, through the use of genetically engineered organisms that carry
out molecular manipulation under our digital control. Our bodies and the material in our factories will be the
same...we will begin to see ourselves as simply a part of the infrastructure of industry” (ETC Group, 2005b:
13). In these ways, atomic elements and molecular structures become the Lego-style building blocks for
producing a wide range of materials and products across all industrial sectors. Nanotechnology extends the
reconstitutive rationality that has characterised the contemporary techno-sciences, and which can be defined
as where the objects of nature are not merely used and exploited in their received form, but increasingly
encountered as malleable and available for reconstruction from the ground up — or in this case, from the
atom up.1 Nanotechnology can also be understood as constituting a materially more abstract level, or mode,
of engagement with nature — a way of taking hold of and transforming nature that is further abstracted from
the objects of everyday sensible and practical experience (Sharp, 1992).
78
Heidegger Links
Nanotechnology allows for unprecedented exploitation of nature by changing what
nature is at the atomic turning nature into a standing reserve
Keekok Lee, 1999 Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public
Policy at Lancaster University The Natural and the Artefactual: The Implications of Deep Science and Deep
Technology for Environmental Philosophy, p. 30-33
Like all positivists, Hobbes was fundamentally interested in understanding and generating order in the world,
not by means of the theological or metaphysical mode of thought, but by the application of scientific method
to the study of both natural and social phenomena as well as moral and legal ones. The theological mode did
secure order in the world, or at least Europe, for a long time, by relying on supernatural entities, superstitious
beliefs and practices. The metaphysical mode, usually in conjunction with the former, was but another
attempt to use unreason to procure order in human thought and behavior. The superiority of the positive
mode over the other two lies precisely in its use of reason and science to achieve order. In other words,
positivism, while disagreeing with the earlier modes about the means to achieve order, nevertheless, is in
agreement with them on the end they all aim at attaining. That is why it may be distinguished from them by
calling it the scientific philosophy of order. The order which both the physical and social worlds exhibit is
not God-decreed; rather, it is the outcome of an attempt by the human intellect to grapple with the
complexities of physical and social life using the methodology of positivism, that is, of science. Order in the
study of natural phenomena takes the form of systematically structuring sense experience into a coherent
interconnected body of knowledge so that knowledge about one phenomenon could ultimately be understood
by being derived from knowledge about others within it.54 Not only does such an axiomatic structure allow
explanation, prediction and theory testing to take place, as we have seen, but it also enables us in the end to
control nature (in the strong sense earlier identified). And this bears out the Baconian dictum that
"knowledge is power." In the light of the above, it would be fair to conclude that built into the new scientific
method and its accompanying philosophy from the seventeenth century onward is the aspiration to control
and manipulate (and in that way to dominate) nature. Bacon, Descartes and Hobbes all unhesitatingly
declared it to be so. It does not look as if the ideal of knowledge for its own sake, what Einstein called "the
holy curiosity of inquiry," ever existed in its neat purity at the inception of modernity (or at any time, later,
for that matter). The philosophical as well as the ideological requirements of the new philosophy ensure that
science as technology and science as theoretical knowledge go hand in hand. While humans had used and
controlled nature in the past, modem science makes it possible for them, more systematically than ever
before, to control (to exploit) nature. This new opportunity for manipulating nature has prompted several
radically different responses. The majority holds that the exploitation of nature redounds to the good of all
humans. Some argue that the possibility of exploiting nature would displace the exploitation of men by
fellow men only when capitalism has been superseded, and envisage, thereafter, a cornucopia for all humans.
Others hold that the exploitation of nature is yet another means to sustain the exploitation by some humans of
others (whether capitalism is dislodged or not) and that the exploitation of nature and of humans must
together be overcome. Yet others recognize even the possibility of exploiting certain humans while
emancipating nature from exploitation. Those who subscribe to Adam Smith's "invisible hand" argument
represent the first (which is the dominant) attitude. Marx stands for the second, utopian socialists for the
third, and the so-called eco-fascists for the fourth. The crucially built-in goal of controlling nature in modern
science has taken on another dimension in the last thirty years or so with the establishment of molecular
79
genetics as a theoretical discipline and its accompanying technology called biotechnology, a form of genetic
engineering. Apart from this significant actual development, promises of more spectacular ones are already
on offer, such as (molecular) nanotechnology. The next chapter will argue that this involves a deeper kind of
control of nature than the earlier types of scientific theories and their associatcd technologies were capable
of. This, surprisingly, in turn permits the dramatic reimposition of teleology upon the world, the restoration
of formal and final causes, two of the four Aristotelian causes which modernity from the seventeenth century
onward has cast into the outer darkness. But before the next chapter can go on to demonstrate this, one needs
first to clarify the notion of teleology, to distinguish between its different forms and, in turn, to relate these to
the four causes. Furthermore, one needs to draw the distinction between what may be called old teleology on
the one hand and new teleology on the other; the former embodies pre-modernity and a more passive form of
anthropocentrism while the latter, modernity and a correspondingly more aggressive form of
anthropocentrism. Teleology, Its Forms, and Their Fortunes The relegation of the formal and final causes to
the realm of the superstitious or the 'metaphysical' is often regarded as constituting the definitive break from
the medieval worldview or the hallmark of modernity. As already commented upon, the theological and
metaphysical modes of explanation are considered to be redundant. But to say that the rejection of the formal
and final causes is synonymous with the rejection of the teleological worldview may be too simplistic and,
hence, misleading. 55 To begin with, the rejection of the former was accompanied at the same time with the
establishment of strong anthropocentrism, the claims that only humans have intrinsic value, and nonhuman
naturally-occurring beings, therefore, have only instrumental value for humans. But this view is held to be
remarkably similar to that of Aristotle (and Aristotelians). It is indeed true that for Aristotle, in his hierarchy
of beings, humans are higher than animals because they possess reason to a greater degree. Furthermore, he
also believed that the purpose of beings further down the hierarchy of rationality is to serve those higher up:
[W]e may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for
the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not at all, at least the greater part of them, for food,
and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and
nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man.56 Kant said
something quite similar, that "so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals are not self-
conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man. We can ask, 'Why do animals exist?'
but to ask, 'Why does man exist?' is a meaningless question." So it is held that Aristotle as well as the
moderns share the view that other nonhuman naturally-occurring beings are for the benefit and use of man.
This, however, amounts to a form of teleology. There might or might not be a God who created the world
especially for humans, but it appears that an unbroken dominant tradition runs through the history of Western
thought from Aristotle via the Aristotelians to modernity, that the nonhuman natural world exists for the sake
of humans. And yet it is also commonly claimed that modernity broke with the medieval worldview
precisely by its rejection of teleology. Perhaps what has led to the confusion is the ambiguity within the
notion of teleology itself. In the first instance, one may have to distinguish between two possible theses,
external teleology on the one hand and intrinsic/immanent teleology on the other. The latter is what may be
involved with formal and final causes (which will be examined later). The former is about perceived
hierarchy in the world ordered in terms of certain criteria or attributes, with the superior beings at the top,
and the related belief that those further down exist to sustain and maintain those above them. Aristotle chose
rationality as the appropriate attribute to order his hierarchy, Kant, self-consciousness, and Descartes,
linguistic capacity or soul. This set of related characteristics unsurprisingly, according to their critics-like
Routley and Routley61-enthrones humans at the summit of the pyramid. From this perspective, external
teleology and anthropocentrism go hand in hand. This conjunct holds true in modernity no less than it did in
the medieval cosmology. But while modernity requires the rejection of intrinsic/immanent teleology,
80
medieval cosmology did not. The difference may be traced to the goal of controlling nature built into the
methodology and ideology of modem science. Its ontology of materialism and mechanism, pioneered by
Galileo and philosophically systematized by Hobbes, Descartes and others, which renders matter inert and
dead, entails the rejection of intrinsic/immanent teleology, at the same time extolling anthropocentrism. If
matter were truly inert, then clearly, humans need not be constrained by its telos and may, therefore, do what
they please with it entirely to suit human ends and purposes, including re-fashioning and re-modeling it.
While the predecessors of modernity simply held nature, as they found it, by and large, to be ordained for the
use of man, their successors in the modem era go one beyond, and consciously aspire through their scientific
method to control (dead) nature by molding it in accordance with their own ends. For instance, as already
observed, the scientific developments of the last twenty years, in particular, molecular genetics and its
accompanying genetic engineering,62 as well as nanotechnology on the horizon, embody the ultimate
truiumph of this aspiration. One may conclude that the conception of nature as dead matter is what
constitutes the definitive break between modernity and its medieval past in European thought.
81
Heidegger Links
Nanotechnology reduces nature to a standing reserve and destroys our relationship to
Being – we have a moral obligation to stop dominating the natural world.
Keekok Lee , 1999 Visiting Chair in Philosophy at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public
Policy at Lancaster University The Natural and the Artefactual: The Implications of Deep Science and Deep
Technology for Environmental Philosophy, p. 30-33
In other words, nanotechnology may be seen as an instance of the long awaited fulfillment of the ultimate
promise given by modern science at its inception in the seventeenth century, but, which it has taken four
centuries to make good. As we have seen, according to the metaphysics of Scientific Naturalism, matter is
uniformly dead or inert, consisting of mere extension, and is itself devoid of form or telos. Such metaphysics
is in keeping with the view that there is a general process of production which consists ultimately of the
rearrangement of the elements of such matter to serve solely human ends. Hence modern science and its
technology become the study of the manipulation of nature. Nanotechnology cannot, and does not, dispense
with elementary matter as atoms of the various elements which exist in nature, the analogue of what Aristotle
called first or prime matter. Instead, its implied claim amounts to being able only to dispense with second
matter, that is to say, natural kinds, be these biotic like species of plants and animals, or abiotic like diamond
or granite. These are forms of low entropic structures which are scarce because humans may render extinct or
use biotic kinds far faster than they can replace themselves. In the case of certain abiotic kinds, they are
simply nonrenewable, at least in the time-span which could be relevant to the sustainability of our industrial
civilization. But in a nanotechnological world, such scarcity would not be worrying. Nanotechnology appears
to be able to bypass most, if not all, abiotic natural kinds, by rendering them irrelevant to the process of
production. In their place, it will be able to construct new forms of second matter, new synthetic kinds. By
this maneuver, not only is the scarcity of natural kinds rendered irrelevant to the industrial processes of
production but the artefactual kinds may be said to supersede them. Such supersession, in turn, as we shall
see, would lead to both the ontological and the physical elimination of natural kinds. Natural kinds are
entities which come into existence and continue to exist independent of human volition and agency;
artefactual kinds, in contrast, are entities whose existence and maintenance are the intended outcome of
human volition and agency. They come into, or go out of, existence entirely at human bidding. Technological
products are artefacts, and artefacts are the material embodiment of human intentional structures.
Nanotechnology, by allowing humans to assemble objects (or to disassemble them), atom by atom, with
absolute precision, embodies the perfect technique for the manipulation of nature. Such manipulation
amounts to near perfect, if not perfect, control and, therefore, near perfect or perfect mastery of nature.
Whether such control and mastery are considered as domination is immaterial. If the notion of domination
conjures up physical conquest, such as disemboweling the earth as in current mining, tearing out part of the
earth as in quarrying, disfiguring the earth's landscape as in surface waste disposal, cutting down trees and
destroying habitats and whole ecosystems as in massive deforestation, then such images of laying waste the
land through the equivalent of scorch-earth policies are clearly irrelevant in the context of nanotechnology.
But if domination is to be understood in terms of a relationship between two parties where one party (the
dominator) totally and successfully imposes its will on the second party (the dominated), then the notion
could be said to be appropriate. Humans in possession of nanotechnology are in a position systematically to
replace natural abiotic by artefactual kinds if and when it suits their purposes to do so-humans are in total
82
charge, the master of their own destinies, whereas natural kinds are, powerless, at their mercies. Such a
situation justifies the political image of domination with which modem science has been associated. This
image is reinforced by another matter, that of the ultimate humanization of nature.23 Under extant
technologies, the process of humanization is, relatively speaking, not as profound as it could be when
compared with nanotechnology. Up to now, natural kinds may have been transformed by extant
technologies, to some extent, into artefacts but their degree of artefacticity is, relatively speaking, still not
very deep, although biotechnology, in respect of biotic nature, is capable of" increasing such depth by
crossing the species boundaries, Nanotechnology claims to be able to construct de novo synthetic, abiotic
kinds, from the design board, using the right arrangement of atoms. In conjunction with biotechnology, it
could also redesign existing biotic kinds, turning them into near total artefacts. The serpent which haunts the
new Garden of Eden is not so much the serpent of pollution. On the contrary, the more perfect the control
and mastery over nature, the less likely is the technology to produce polluting effects. After all, pollution has
been referred to as the "naturally mediated unintended and unforeseen consequences of specific practices of
activity upon nature."24 On this criterion of perfect mastery, the more perfect the technology, the less
polluting it is-perfect precision and control mean that only whatever is intended comes to be and all that is
unintended, as far as possible, is eliminated.25 If the most fundamental environmental value is not to
undermine the functioning and integrity of the biosphere via polluting processes and pace of production, then
nanotechnology must be considered to be environmentally benign and, therefore, the ultimate green
technology. It is possible, as we have just seen, for such a technology in combination with another like
biotechnology, to ensure that the biosphere carries out its public service functions, namely, to act as a sink to
absorb waste, to continue the great carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen cycles. But if the most fundamental
environmental value is not merely that, but the preservation of natural kinds together with the processes at
work in nature which ensure that natural kinds continue to exist, to change and to evolve, to maintain
themselves autonomously, then nanotechnology (in conjunction with biotechnology) seems to pose a severe
threat to the preservation of the natural, as it possesses the potential to humanize the whole of nature. It is to
be resisted then on grounds that the natural (meaning natural kinds and the processes which generate and
sustain them) could be made redundant and replaced entirely by the artefactual (synthetic kinds, whether
biotic or abiotic and the processes manufacturing them). As we have seen, the natural and the artefactual
belong to two very different ontological categories, The natural constitutes 'the Otherness' for what is human.
By rendering the natural redundant in principle, nanotechnology is in danger of destroying 'the Other.' To put
it minimally, it is compatible with ontological impoverishment even if it does not entail either a permission
or a duty to eliminate the natural, both empirically and as an ontological category. Ontological
impoverishment is to be deplored not merely because in the end it amounts to human impoverishment. It is
that of course, but more importantly, it is to be deplored as yet another expression of strong anthropocentrism
and of a purely instrumental attitude to nature on the part of humans. It amounts to the denial, in yet another
context, of the claim that nature can be a locus, if not also a source, of intrinsic value." I t is morally wrong
of us humans to eliminate nature (by rendering it redundant, making it over to our image to serve our
purposes), not simply because it diminishes ourselves as moral beings, but because the diminishment lies
precisely in our moral blindness to something other than ourselves which deserve moral consideration, or
could be said to be the bearer of intrinsic value. In other words, although moral blindness is clearly a human
failing, it is not merely to be deplored because it constitutes a human failing, but because ontological
elimination, loss or supersession is constitutive of that failing.
83
Coal DA Links
Solar nanotech will replace coal.
Celsias, 2007, http://www.celsias.com/article/nanosolars-breakthrough-technology-solar-now-cheap/
Their mission: to deliver cost-efficient solar electricity. The Nanosolar company was founded in 2002 and is
working to build the world's largest solar cell factory in California and the world's largest panel-assembly
factory in Germany. They have successfully created a solar coating that is the most cost-efficient solar
energy source ever. Their PowerSheet cells contrast the current solar technology systems by reducing the
cost of production from $3 a watt to a mere 30 cents per watt. This makes, for the first time in history, solar
power cheaper than burning coal.
Solar nanotech will replace coal

Natural News, June 7, 2008, http://www.naturalnews.com/023389.html
A new combination of nano and solar technology has made it possible for solar electric generation to be
cheaper than burning coal. Nanosolar, Inc. has developed a way to produce a type of ink that absorbs solar
radiation and converts into electric current. Photovoltaic (PV) sheets are produced by a machine similar to a
printing press, which rolls out the PV ink onto sheets approximately the width of aluminum foil. These PV
sheets can be produced at a rate of hundreds of feet per minute. "It's 100 times thinner than existing solar
panels, and we can deposit the semiconductors 100 times faster," said Nanosolar's cofounder and chief
executive officer, R. Martin Roscheisen. "It's a combination that drives down costs dramatically." Because of
their light weight and flexibility, the PV sheets (dubbed PowerSheets) are much more versatile than current
PV panels, which must be mounted on sturdy surfaces like roofs or the ground. In addition, because there is
no silicon used in the production of the sheets, they cost only 30 cents per watt of power
produced.Traditional PV cells cost approximately $3 per watt, while burning coal costs about $1 per watt.
"This is the first time that we can actually drop the cost of solar electricity down to a level that would be
competitive with grid electricity in most industrialized nations," said Nanosolar co-founder Brian Sager.
84
Fiscal Discipline DA Links

Funding for nanotech is perceived as unnecessary and useless.
Wayne Crews, director of technology policy at the CATO Institute, 2003, Nanotech funding seen as useless,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3110]
But now Republican advocacy of science pork is back. Exhibit A for 2003 is nanotechnology, the cutting-
edge science of direct manipulation of matter at the molecular level. Government wants to get involved in a
big way, despite companies such as IBM, Hewlett Packard and Intel -- and numerous venture capitalists --
already taking the lead. Promised applications include smaller and cheaper computer chips, nano-scale
"punch cards" to boost computer storage, stronger-than-steel carbon "nanotubes" with myriad applications,
and new materials and coatings including responsive clothing. The field sports its share of hype: Surely,
promised "nanobots" to attack cancers and other human ailments-or even repair cellular damage and revive
cryogenically frozen human beings-remain in the far-distant future. Similarly, the proposed "Starlight
Express" carbon-nanotube elevator to outer space-from a NASA-funded outfit called Highlift Systems-
belongs to the realm of science fiction. Perhaps more representative are today's uses in cosmetics and
sunscreens, and "NanoTitanium" fishing rods that incorporate nano-particle titanium and carbon fiber.
Regardless, the little technology has clearly reached the big time. Michael Crichton's best-selling novel
"Prey," the story of destructive, out-of-control nanobots is surely only the latest in pop culture's speculations
on the dark side of micro-engineering. Meanwhile, the ETC Group, while alarmed about the potential
hazards of unrestrained nanotechnology, points out that yearly scientific citations to "nano" have grown
nearly 40-fold, the number of nano-related patents is surging, and nine nanotechnology-related Nobel prizes
have been awarded since 1990. To many in Congress, what's needed is not a free hand for technology
entrepreneurs to explore this blossoming field, but government money. President' Bush's proposed 2004
fiscal year budget for the National Nanotechnology Initiative is $847 million, a 9.5 percent increase over
2003. The NNI was created by the Bush administration in 2001. In addition, the House Science Committee
authorized a $2.4 billion funding program for nanotechnology, and the full House approved it last week.
That's not huge by Washington standards, but such programs only grow. Politicians have no innate ability to
pick among competing technologies, whether nano, macro or otherwise. If they did, they'd be entrepreneurs
themselves. And they're particularly bad at the job when using taxpayer money. Politicians can merely transfer wealth,
which automatically invites wasteful pork-barreling to propel funds to one's home state. Scientific merit need not carry
the day. But even if it did, taxpayers should get to decide for themselves which technologies to invest in.
Nanotechnology is plainly viable on its own, moving forward on fronts too numerous to catalog, all seeking to make
breakthroughs before others. Nanotech venture capitalist Josh Wolfe told Wired that most business proposals he sees
now have "nano" in the title. Venture capitalists have plowed in hundreds of millions of dollars over the past five years.
And according to the National Science Foundation, the market in nanotech products could be $1 trillion a year by 2015.
That's nearly 10 percent the size of today's gross domestic product. The vigorous calls for government research seem in
part a reaction to the technology market downturn. But we ought not look for a technology savior in emergent biotech or
nanotech spawned in government labs. Forthcoming technologies should be products of capitalism and
entrepreneurship, not central planning, government R&D, and pork barrel. Tomorrow's nanotechnology markets have
too much potential and are too important be creatures of government.
85
Trillions in nanotech development by 2014

Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 2008, “Regulating the Impacts of Engineered
Nanoparticles under TSCA: Shifting Authority from Industry to Government,” p. 218-9
The commercial manufacture of nanoparticles is part of a "nanotechnology value chain." n8 Engineered

nanoparticles provide manufacturing raw materials, ingredients, or additives n9 for intermediate products with
nanoscale features (e.g., coatings) that eventually are processed with other materials or intermediate products
to yield finished, "nano-enabled" goods. n10 Manufacturers also combine engineered nanoparticles with larger,
bulk-type materials or other nanoparticles to improve the properties and commercial uses of traditional
materials n11 and to stimulate improvements in productivity during the composition, synthesis, or purification
of products. n12 Nanoparticles have been added to products ranging from auto parts to packaging materials in
order "to enhance mechanical, thermal, barrier, and flame-retardant properties." n13 Commercial applications
of currently available or forthcoming nanoparticles include titania nanoparticles for sunscreens and paints;
carbon nanotube composites in tires, tennis rackets, and video screens; fullerene cages in cosmetics; and,
silica nanoparticles as solid lubricants. n14 Nanoparticles also show promising "green" applications in the
context of marketable alternatives for the remediation of environmental hazards, water [*219] quality and
filtering improvements, renewable energy systems, and processes for reducing and replacing the use of raw
materials. n15 Lux Research, a nanotechnology research and advocacy firm, projects that industry will
produce $ 2.6 trillion of manufactured goods incorporating nanomaterials by 2014. n16
86
Nano Not Inevitable

Lack of public confidence will collapse nanotech absent regulation
As discussed above, nano-based products are already on the market and the numbers have increased
considerably over the last [*309] two years. n113 Workers in nanotech manufacturing facilities and
laboratories are potentially being exposed to nanomaterials, and consumers are already using products that
rely on various types of engineered nanoparticles. Even though nano-based industries are at an early stage of
growth, it is likely that nanomaterials are already being emitted into the air, discharged into the water,
disposed of, and shipped through the domestic and global economy with minimal, if any, federal or state
review and little available research about the possible effects on human health and the environment. n114
Unless significantly more resources are devoted to this effort in the near term, nanotechnologies could fail
to realize their potential and unnecessary harm to the public and environment could result. Such a scenario
would be particularly unfortunate, because nanotechnology presents the opportunity to apply lessons learned
from experiences in analogous situations, such as the regulation of biotechnology, where in some countries
public trust in the technology was undercut. n115 It also would be regrettable because some new nano-based
products and manufacturing processes promise enormous health and environmental improvements over
existing medical, energy, and industrial applications. Finally, an effective governance structure for
nanotechnology also could be useful in the future when new scientific advancements and greater
technological convergence, discussed above, present similar challenges.
States can regulate nanotech

Lux Research estimates that state and local governments invested [*323] more than $ 400 million in
nanotechnology research, facilities, and business incubation programs in 2004. n154 Although several states
have enacted legislation encouraging or promoting nanotechnologies, n155 no states have enacted regulatory
authorities. [*324] Under most of the major environmental statutes, the states also have a potential role in
regulating nanotechnologies through delegated federal programs. In addition, states may have existing
statutes that could be used to regulate nanotechnologies, such as the Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction
Act. n156 Issues to consider include: the appropriate role of state governments in regulating nanotechnologies;
whether states are likely to step forward to regulate nanotechnologies in the absence of pervasive and
specific federal regulation and, if so, the advantages and disadvantages of such a proactive state role; and
whether a federal-state dialogue would be helpful in securing the benefits of state-level thinking and
minimizing later potential conflicts.
Nanotech threatens the foundation of the food web

Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, 2007, p. 3
87
Putting the amazing properties of these products aside, however, the unpredictability and novelty of
manufactured nanoparticles has also seen commentators, such as Balbus et al., suggest that:
these novel properties may pose new risks to workers, consumers, the public, and the
environment. The few data now available give cause for concern: Some nanomaterials appear
to have the potential to damage skin, brain, and lung tissue, to be mobile or persistent in the
environment, or to kill micro-organisms (potentially including ones that constitute the base of
the food web). n16
Voluntary nanotechnology regulations won’t solve
Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, 2007p. 19-20
While it appears that the United States is intent on treating nano-based products as the substantial equivalent
of conventional products, the government is not, however, unaware of the increasing concern over
nanoparticles. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for instance is currently considering the
implementation of a voluntary nanotechnology stewardship program in order to get a better understanding
of existing chemicals being manufactured at the nanoscale, which fail to trigger the notification of the TSCA.
n74
While such a voluntary approach is interesting, it is unlikely that the [*20] program by itself will prevent
increasingly large regulatory gaps from occurring within the United States in the near future.
88
CP – International Regulation
Nanotech regulations should be developed internationally
It is important to recognise that for a regulatory framework to evolve at the international or national level some degree
of "technical standardisation" must first occur. Without consensus on definitions, common nomenclature and standards
for classification and testing of nanotechnology and nanomaterials, it is extremely difficult to define or classify the
objects or processes to be regulated. In recognition of the need for a common language for nanotechnology, the
International Standards Organisation (ISO), a voluntary standards development body, established the ISO/TC 229
Nanotechnologies technical committee in 2005. n103 The aim of the technical committee, which comprises three
working groups convened by Canada, Japan and the United States, is to develop "[i]nternational [s]tandards for
nanotechnologies." n104 The ISO believes that "by giving [*27] nanotechnologists a common language and processes,
standardisation will facilitate safer and faster product development and will enable interoperable end-products." n105 It is
likely that the work of several national and international standards development bodies, including the British Standards
Institute (BSI), American Nationals Standards Institute (ANSI), ASTM International and the Taiwan Accreditation
Foundation (TAF), each of which has already initiated voluntary standards development for nanotechnology, will assist
the ISO in establishing "norms" for nanotechnology and thus start to meet the standardisation challenges posed by
nanotechnology. n106 This work on standards represents an important first stage in both national and international
regulatory development processes. Intergovernmental dialogue on the challenges and risks posed by manufactured
nanoparticles has, to date, primarily occurred within the confines of the OECD. This transnational forum comprises
thirty countries that "work together to address the economic, social and governance challenges of globalisation." n107
Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States are all OECD member countries, and this forum provides
an opportunity for each of these players to exert their influence on international nanotechnology research and
regulatory programs. The history of OECD initiatives has been generally to disseminate information freely to non-
OECD countries, n108 and their focus on harmonization is likely to see the OECD emerge as a key player in the
development of any international regulatory framework for nanotechnology. The locus of activity regarding
nanotechnology within the OECD has been driven by the network of multidisciplinary experts within the Chemicals
Committee who hosted the first OECD Workshop on the Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials in December of 2005.
n110
The workshop provided "one of the first opportunities for governments to discuss [the] topic at the international
level, together with other stakeholders." n111 A key initiative to come out of the Workshop was the establishment of the
Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (WPMN), whose role will be to "promote international co-operation in
health and environmental safety related aspects of manufactured nanomaterials (MN), in order to assist in the safe
development of manufactured nanomaterials, while avoiding non-tariff barriers to trade." n11 The first meeting of the
WPNM in October 2006 resulted in the development of a Draft Program of Work 2006-2008. In prioritising the
OECD's role in addressing policy, risks and challenges posed by nanotechnology, the program has been designed to
focus on three key work areas, specifically: 1) "Identification, Characterisation, Definitions, Terminology and
Standards;" 2) "Testing Methods and Risk Assessment;" and 3) "Information Sharing, Co-operation and
Dissemination." n113 Importantly, the subsequent development of guidelines and principles by the Working Group, or
more generally the Chemical Committee, will not be binding on member countries. They would nonetheless represent
prima facie a member country's commitment to implement the guidelines or recommendations within their national
regulatory framework. Arguably, the non-binding, soft law "norms" established by the OECD, including an
internationally agreed instrument, may become a foundation for any emerging consensus on global regulatory
frameworks.
89
International Regulation Counterplan

International regulation solves
At the supranational level, the European Union and its member states have turned their attention to the issue
of nanotechnology and the need for safeguards against potential risks posed by nanotechnology. While the
European Union is yet to enact any regulations specifically addressing the production and use of
nanotechnology, the European Commission is funding a range of research projects examining
epidemiological studies looking at nanoparticle toxicity and risk. In conjunction with these activities, "the
European Commission [has sought] international debate on nanotechnology-related issues such as public
health, safety, environment, consumer protection, risk assessment, metrology, [and] norms." nMoreover, the
European Union has recently articulated the need for governments and industry to develop an international
"code of good conduct" for the responsible development of nanotechnology. While it appears unlikely that
the European Union will be able to negotiate an enforceable "code of good conduct" in the short to medium
term, societal pressures, primarily from within the European Union itself, may result in the development of a
set of guiding principles for the responsible development of nanotechnology. As with the development of
international environmental regulation, this form of soft law initially could be broad in its scope, with the
potential to evolve as the technology develops. Similar to the OECD process, Bowman and Gilligan note that
a "code of good conduct" developed primarily by the European Union could establish norms for the
international conduct and regulatory behaviour for nanotechnology, while offering an alternative to the
extension of formal international and national regulatory frameworks.
90
International Regulation Counterplan

International regulatory regimes superior to national regulatory regimes
While this paper has noted several current frameworks that will be employed in regulating nanotechnology
within the international sphere, it is apparent that a number of institutions, instruments and actors will be
involved in regulating nanotechnology. It is also clear that much regulation will also occur in an ad hoc,
decentralised manner. As well, it is likely that in the short to medium term regulatory oversight will occur by
default -- if we learn from the case of biotechnology. In other words, the evolving regulatory regime will in
large part simply be the result of nano-products falling within the existing scope of these existing institutions
and instruments. A central question here is the degree to which any gaps or "regulatory fissures" might exist
in national and international regimes. On this matter, there is again much work to be done including the
mapping of existing regulations within the nation state, reviewing their interpretation and assessing the
adequacy of any softer guidelines, codes and practices presently in existence. To illustrate this point, take the
case of the rapid commercialisation of pure carbon molecules, most notably CNTs. Simply put, CNTs are
naturally-occurring hollow tubes of rolled carbon sheets (graphene sheets), which have potential applications
across the fields of nano-electronics, fuel cells, biosensors and drug delivery mechanisms. As CNTs consist
only of carbon molecules, n144 under existing national regulatory frameworks such as those found in the
United States or Australia, they are not automatically defined as "new" chemicals. This is because the
chemical composition of the CNT is equivalent to that of macro or micro carbon particles, and existing
regulations do not take into account the novel properties exhibited by CNTs, including their potential
toxicity. Moreover, given the potential applications of CNTs across fields such as industrial chemicals,
therapeutic goods and devices, and veterinary chemicals, it appears likely that CNTs will fall within the
regulatory scope of multiple national agencies, thereby increasing the likelihood of products falling into a
regulatory fissure. The patchwork approach within the international sphere presents additional obstacles,
magnified by a lack of comprehensive standards, oversight, specialised bodies, risk assessment frameworks
and universally accepted regulatory frameworks. Likewise, within the international sphere, issues of
implementation, enforcement and politics become problematic. Without a doubt, the rapid growth forecasted
for nanotechnology will result in an increasingly diverse and complex application of nanotechnology across
numerous sectors and jurisdictions. Powered by its likely economic importance, the regulatory fissures
observed with CNTs at the national level, including issues of occupational health and safety, product safety
and human and environmental health and safety, appear destined to be magnified within the international
sphere in the absence of a rigorous and collective approach to addressing the potential risks posed. This
paper investigated the current domestic and international regulatory frameworks into which nanotechnology
is now being thrust. It observed that the regulation of nanotechnology manufacturing processes and products
presents a myriad of complex policy and regulatory challenges for public and private sector actors.
Conceptually, we conclude that regulatory discussion, debate and development will grow on six frontiers --
product safety, privacy and civil liberties, occupational health and safety, intellectual property, international
law and environmental law. And within each of these areas, mechanisms ranging from soft law to hard law
will have a role to play in the future. Looking briefly at the regulatory terrain into which nanotechnologies
will be thrust for three of these frontiers across four jurisdictions, we observe that existing regulatory
frameworks will form the immediate basis for regulating nanotechnologies. Looking further afield, we also
91
observe that there have been no nanotechnology-specific regulatory responses thus far. As a result, a range
of serious regulatory fissures are now emerging. In countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan
and the United States, regulation of nanotechnologies continues to rely primarily on the trigger of "new
chemicals" being identified. Critically though, existing chemicals now being produced at the nanoscale are
not considered to be "new" for purposes of these regulatory frameworks, despite the unpredictability and
novelty of manufactured nanoparticles. The failure to address this gap is of increasing concern. Both
escalating commercialisation of products containing manufactured nano-particles as well as our embryonic
understanding of technological impacts, such as human and environmental toxicology, suggest that the
emerging regulatory debate on nanotechnology has now become urgent. While national responses to the
question of new arrangements for regulating nanotechnologies have generally been slow, two further points
can be made at present. It is likely that we will face a choice of regulatory path if we learn from the various
regulatory responses to GMOs, where a continuum has been observed from the product-based response of
the United States through to the process-based response of the European Union. As well, it appears that of
the four jurisdictions reviewed in this paper, the United Kingdom is presently the most advanced in leading
the development and implementation of a nano-specific regulatory regime. We can also conclude that it will
be a careful and targeted approach in the short to medium term rather than anything more comprehensive or
grandiose. Notwithstanding this, it is recognised that this could, of course, change in an instant given a single
industrial accident involving nano-particles and the knee-jerk regulatory reaction that would probably follow.
Within the international context, a patchwork of existing institutions and instruments will play a role in
regulating future nanotechnologies. Likewise, it is evident from this review that traditional nano-products
are likely to fall within the pre-existing international regulatory frameworks. Importantly, the next step
forward in this arena appears to be the work of the international standards-setting bodies -- for both national
and international regulation. Additionally, the OECD's effort to establish guidelines (i.e., forms of "soft law")
is likely to become a foundation for any emerging consensus on global frameworks and codes of conduct.
Importantly, though, the potential scope of nanotechnology will result in this framework being incomplete
and inconsistent in effectively regulating the technology. It is therefore likely that the regulatory fissures that
are beginning to appear at the national level are destined to be magnified at the international level. The
consequence of this is that nanotechnology is likely to fall between the regulatory cracks of ad hoc,
incomplete and decentralised regulatory regimes. It is also likely that transnational NGOs will play an
increasingly important and visible role in future policy and regulatory debates, and their involvement will
challenge the social, democratic and jurisdictional legitimacy of the coming nano-age.
92
Grey Good Answers

No real risk of grey goo
Albert C. Lin, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, The Harvard Environmental Law Review,
2007, p. 355-6
Finally, replicators, the most advanced form of nanotechnology--and the furthest from being realized--are
devices that would contain a set of processing and fabrication mechanisms sufficient to replicate themselves.
Simply put, these nanomachines could reproduce themselves, and the instructions for their own construction,
from relatively simple parts in a process akin to cell division. One hypothesized danger of self-replication is
that nanomachines might proliferate in an uncontrollable manner and ultimately consume the earth. The
term "gray goo" refers to the material resulting from such a scenario of self-replication run amok. Like any
significant new technology, nanotechnology offers the potential for tremendous benefits as well as risks.
Some of these risks--the "gray goo" scenario, for instance--are remote and unlikely. Others--in particular,
the unknown effects of exposure to free manufactured nanoparticles--raise more significant concerns that
confront us today. It is these more immediate risks that are the focus of this article.
93
AT: NanoTech Inevitable

Nanotech at an early state of development now
Mario Salerno , MIT, October 2008, p. online “Designing foresight studies for Nanoscience and
Nanotechnology (NST) future developments”
During the last few decades, there has been increasing interest in science and technology at the nanometre
scale. Significant resources are being invested in this direction by governmental institutions, public research
centres, universities and firms throughout the world. At the same time, nanotechnology is still at an early
stage of development and future scientific and technological results are difficult to foresee and pursue,
given the broad extent of the disciplines involved and the possible technological advancements. In this
context, foresight methodologies can play a pivotal role by individuating, inside this wide spectrum of nano-
research, the most promising fields of enquiry and exploitation for nations, firms, research centres etc.
Regulatory failure will collapse support for nanotech, killing its development
Another concern is that if the FDA does not act quickly to regulate nanotechnology products, the public will lose
confidence in the products' safety. Ensuring that the public gets accurate information about nanotechnology is not only
important for consumers, but key for manufacturers as well, because public perception can dictate whether a market will
exist for the products of nanotechnology. The FDA's mission is more than simply regulating new products and
protecting the public health. The FDA is also responsible for "helping the public get the accurate, science-based
information they need to use medicines and foods to improve their health." Public confidence in the FDA as an
administrative agency has fallen over the last few years. The FDA must counter this perception with regard to
nanotechnology products in particular, because "perceived risks may very well constitute the tipping point that will
decide whether nanotechnology succeeds." One has only to think back to genetically modified corn to realize the
impact that public perception has on product success. In that case, the EPA approved a strain of corn that was resistant
to a particularly threatening insect, but was not harmful to other insects, humans, or animals. Four years later, a paper in
the journal Nature claimed that the genetically modified corn pollen harmed monarch butterfly larvae. Immediate public
outcry followed, and the European Union banned the corn entirely. Later studies contradicted the earlier results, but
neither publication of those studies nor the EPA's statement of confidence in the safety of the corn could save it. n181 In
the regulatory vacuum that exists at the FDA, there is the risk that a single negative incident like that seen with
genetically modified corn could completely undermine public confidence in nanotechnology and derail future efforts at
new product development. The now-infamous incident with "Magic Nano" underscores the point. Magic Nano was an
aerosol glass and ceramic tile sealant marketed in Germany. It was recalled just three days after being released on the
market, after approximately 100 consumers reported symptoms such as difficulty with breathing and chest pains. A few
weeks later, German regulatory authorities released tests showing that Magic Nano contained no nanoparticles
whatsoever. By that point, however, nanotechnology's reputation had taken a hit. As yet, no American product has
created a similar scare. One could easily occur, and regardless of whether that scare is justified or not, it will impact the
public's willingness to use nanotechnology products. Even though there may be no "inherent risks or toxicities
associated with nanomaterials, the public's perception of that is not going to be realized until ... studies are promoted in
concert transparently with the development of novel materials." If the FDA creates a strong regulatory network and can
assure the public that nanotechnology products are being carefully monitored, nanotechnology will be able to survive
and thrive where genetically modified foods could not.
94
Asymmetric Warfare Answers

Urban warfare investments now
National Defense,. July 1, 2008, p. online
See that spider crawling along the sidewalk? In five years, you might want to take a closer look to see if it
has a nanocomposite exoskeleton or cameras and infrared sensors for its eyes. No, you haven't stumbled
upon a Hollywood set filming the sequel to "Minority Report," the Tom Cruise sci-fi flick in which tarantula-
like police 'bots scuttle through buildings to identify, people by scanning their irises. But you will have
happened upon a technology thatwas inspired in part by the movie. The Army Research Laboratory in April
awarded a $37 million contract to BAE Systems to develop biologically based surveillance and
reconnaissance robots to help soldiers conduct urban warfare. The terrestrial and aerial unmanned systems
are part of a recent spate of Defense Department initiatives to spur miniature robotics innovations for troops
on the ground. Officials believe these insect-and bird-sized robots will help close the gap on surveillance
needs not being met by the larger drones flying in the skies over Iraq and Afghanistan. "You can't always get
a Predator over there fast enough or with the right sensors on it to provide the surveillance, particularly if
troops want to know what is inside a building," says Aaron Penkacik, chief technology officer for electronics
and integrated solutions at BAE Systems. The company will lead an alliance of scientists and researchers
from government, academic and industry laboratories to design and build collaborative robots that will
provide troops intelligence whenever and wherever they require it, he says. Imagine a Marine or soldier
patrolling a city block when he suspects there might be insurgents in one of the buildings ahead. He
stops,pulls several small robots out of his backpack and deploys them intothe air and on the ground. They fly
and scramble ahead, sending backimages and audio to a handheld device monitored from the safety of his
vehicle or under protection of his comrades.
Future Combat Systems developments transform warfighting
Asymmetric Warfare Solvency Answers

Turn -- Focusing on asymmetric warfare traps the U.S. in wars we cannot win and
collapses U.S. readiness
Michael Mazaar, professor of National Security, U.S. National War College, former debater, Washington
Quarterly, Summer 2008, http://twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer_mazarr.pdf
The rapidly emerging conventional wisdom in U.S. defense policy suggests that the dominant threats
we face today and will face over the coming decades are nontraditional, asymmetrical, and insurgent-
terrorist in character, rather than the large-scale, interstate wars about which U.S. defense planners obsessed
from the 1930s until about 1989. According to this line of thinking, U.S. force structure, doctrine, planning,
and procurement programs ought to shift to meet this new series of threats, toward combating terrorism,
insurgencies, “fourth generation wars,” and the like. This conventional wisdom builds on thoughtful
concepts of the future of warfare and has the best interests of the United States very much at heart but,
if taken seriously, would distort U.S. defense priorities for years to come and trap the U.S. armed
forces in endless conflicts that military power cannot win.
95
Turn – focusing on asymmetric warfare undermines deterrence, ignores the defense

revolution, and forfeits a major role for U.S. military power in deterring conflict
Redirecting U.S. military forces substantially to an asymmetric threat is misguided for three reasons. First, it
allows U.S. national security officials and military planners to ignore the real degree of the revolution
in conflict that is underway. Second, it promises to get and keep the United States involved in conflicts
in which it is often counterproductive to become militarily embroiled. Finally, it risks forfeiting the
much more important global role for U.S. military power: deterring and responding to major
conventional aggression.
Asymetric threats should be dealt with through diplomatic tools, military responses
won’t solve
The argument here is not that the United States should ignore asymmetric conflicts around the globe or that
they pose no threat to U.S. interests. Rather, such conflicts represent less of a threat to the United States
than has become fashionable to assume, and the military instrument of statecraft is the wrong tool to
deal with them. The United States should powerfully enhance its efforts to reduce instability, conflict, and
radicalism in key areas of the world and to shore up institutionalization and governance in critical states. It
should do so, however, by relying on an expanded and deepened set of nonmilitary tools and do so largely in
an anticipatory and collaborative manner rather than an ex post facto and interventionist one.
96

Turn – attempting to solve instability through asymmetric warfare increases it
Meanwhile, attached to the background of the current war on terrorism is a very different sort of challenge:
countering the rise of radical Islamism writ large. This radicalism is a product of popular reactions to
incomplete and partially successful modernization and Westernization, the inability of local
governments to provide social goods, the perceived humiliation of Muslim peoples and interests
globally, the socioeconomic decline of parts of the Muslim world relative to the West, and much else.
Such environments produce mind-sets filled with real and invented grievances, overwhelmed with the
existential demands of modernity, and anxious to revalidate a humiliated national or ethnic group by
resuscitating ancient value By conceiving of this broad range of complex phenomena in military terms
amenable even in part to kinetic violence, however, a defense policy obsessed with asymmetric war
risks distracting attention from the true degree of change required in how the United States conceives
of national security.
Turn – intervening in asymmetric conflicts just suppresses the conflict in the short-
term, doesn’t solve, and increase long-term risks
Luttwak agrees that “an unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a
great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents
become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that fighting must continue until a
resolution is reached.” The problem in recent decades has been that “wars among lesser powers have
rarely been allowed to run their course” but instead have often been interrupted “before they could
burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for lasting settlement. The implication of both
arguments is clear enough. If an asymmetric war is brewing in a developing nation, intervention to stop
it could well demand an excruciating commitment on the part of outside powers, forcibly ending the
possibly centuries-old aggressive ambitions of one or all sides, keeping those ambitions submerged for
years or perhaps decades, and then sponsoring alternative social, economic, and psychological trends
to ensure that the aspirations, hatreds, stereotypes, and power dynamics that gave rise to the conflict
do not reappear. “Peace takes hold,” Luttwak concludes, “only when war is truly over,” and
interventions suspend that process indefinitely. “Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse
to intervene in other peoples’ wars—not because they are indifferent to human suffering but precisely
because they care about it and want to facilitate the advent of peace.”23 To some, the resulting policy will
appear morally noxious; to allow civil wars to “burn themselves out” is to conspire in immense violence. The
urge to act is very real and can sometimes be indulged with little cost. In some cases, wars are ready to end
with just a bit of help, and simple UN observer missions with modest peacekeeping muscle can do
yeoman’s work. In 2007–2008, some 104,000 personnel from 119 countries were serving in 20 UN
peacekeeping operations at a cost of $7 billion.24 The United States can support this ongoing, globally
shared effort without nearly the sorts of risks embodied by an across-the-board asymmetric-warfare doctrine.
97
No obligation to intervene in conflicts when allowing them to burn out is a better alternative
Yet, if Betts and Luttwak are correct—if wars that run to a logical conclusion pave the way for a truer peace,
whereas conflicts that are interrupted tend to break out in continuing violence—then the moral
calculus of intervention is not as straightforward as it might seem. An excellent example may be the
Balkans, where the intervention, justified as it was at the time, seems only to have pushed a lid down
onto a simmering conflict, rather than ending it.25 The ultimate questions are where the moral obligation
for ending a conflict lies and just how high a price the United States and the leading world powers are
expected to pay, and for how long, to discharge the obligations some claim for them. The last six years have
suggested that between the idealistic goals of the intervention-minded and the hard realities of nation
building and stability operations lies a far greater gulf than many had assumed.
Asymmetric wars do not threaten U.S. military security
Finally, U.S. national security policy must be tied to U.S. national interests as well as to a calculation of
serving global values and norms. When reconsidered with a cold eye, the claim that vital U.S. interests
are at stake in numerous asymmetric wars does not hold up. By their very nature, being usually
distant from the United States, involving small-scale adversaries and limited conflict, asymmetric wars
generally do not hold essential stakes for the United States. Over and over again, when the United
States has withdrawn from the scene of such conflicts, as in Lebanon, Somalia, and Vietnam, it has
suffered injured prestige but no grave insults to national security. Where it has chosen not to intervene at
all, no substantial national interests have compelled U.S. involvement. From a pre–September 11
perspective, asymmetric war resides at the margins of U.S. interests.
98
Can’t Solve Asymmetric Threats through Military Means

Asymetric threats cannot be solved through military means
Although it is always dangerous to generalize, much of the instability described by theories of

asymmetric and nontraditional warfare stems first and foremost from causes other than military
aggression. Many rebellions, insurgencies, and civil wars are the symptoms of political, economic, and
psychosocial factors that undermine social stability and popular commitment to public order. Once
order has collapsed, leaders and groups arise determined to seize power, and the contest can become a
clash of power-seekers. Yet, the essential problem in many so-called failed states and other contexts
that give rise to civil wars, insurgencies, and the radicalism at large in the Muslim world is a society or
a large group of individuals beset with some combination of economic stagnation, ethnic division,
cultural resentment, historical grievance, political or national repression, and other factors. These
afflictions—injustices, in the eyes of the aggrieved—are not amenable to military solutions.
Using military force to counter insurgency fails

Such conflicts require the use of social, economic, political, informational, and psychological tools of
statecraft. Fighting radical Islamism in Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco, or Pakistan does not invite
military force; making war on one’s enemy will not be effective in the way that it is in interstate war.
Political scientist Richard Rubenstein argued that “retaliation based on the principle of collective
responsibility for terrorist actions follows precisely the adversary’s script.” Hechmi Dhaoui, writing
from a psychiatrist’s perspective, pointed out that “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a godsend for the
Wahhabists” because it furnished them with the world-embracing struggle that they needed to validate their
doctrine. Mark Juergensmeyer, a leading authority on extremist thought, explained that a “war-
against-terrorism strategy can be dangerous, in that it can play into a scenario that religious terrorists
themselves have fostered: the image of a world at war between secular and religious forces. A
belligerent secular enemy has often been just what religious activists have hoped for.”
99

Turn – Using military sources against counterinsurgency strengthens the insurgency
Counterinsurgency and nation building are different situations from the task of countering Islamic
radicalism, but the utility of military force is often only marginally greater. Modern counterinsurgency
doctrine rests on the truism that achieving lasting stability even in the face of an armed insurgent
enemy depends primarily on nonmilitary actions and tools: building viable political institutions,
resuscitating the national infrastructure, spurring the local economy, creating effective police forces,
and much more. The security provided by large military forces may be an ongoing, sustaining
precondition for such results, but it cannot guarantee them. Meanwhile, the actions of those military
forces, especially when they are foreign, run the risk of empowering the rebels, terrorists, or
insurgents by alienating the local population. Following his return from Iraq, Major General Peter
Chiarelli listed as one of his primary lessons that “those who viewed the attainment of security solely
as a function of military action alone were mistaken.” He concluded: Erosion of enemy influence
through direct action and training of Iraqi security forces only led to one confirmable conclusion—you
ultimately pushed those on the fence into the insurgent category rather than the supporter category....
Kinetic operations would provide the definable short-term wins we are comfortable with as an Army but,
ultimately, would be our undoing. In the best case, we would cause the insurgency to grow. In the worst case,
although we would never lose a tactical or operational engagement, the migration of fence-sitters to the
insurgent cause would be so pronounced the coalition loss in soldiers and support would reach unacceptable
levels.1
100

No way fighting asymmetric wars will work
The problem with asymmetric wars around the world as well as the most essential reason why the
United States has trouble prosecuting them effectively is that such conflicts will inevitably be strictly
limited for the United States, whereas for its enemies, they will often approach absolute warfare. This
mismatch is inherent to the character of asymmetric war, in which fanatically devoted terrorists,
insurgents, or rebels are attempting to win a conflict they may see in absolute, even apocalyptic terms,
whereas the United States is trying to manage a war far from home that engages secondary national
interests. Control of power in places such as Baghdad, Kabul, Mogadishu, and, from a more distant
vantage point, Saigon is far more important to the revolutionaries, insurgents, gangs, and militia
leaders on the scene than it would ever be to the United States, at least over the long term. This crucial
asymmetry of commitment cannot be bridged unless the United States confronted an asymmetric
challenge that engaged truly vital national interests, and it makes asymmetric warfare a poor
candidate for long-term U.S. military focus. As it has done a number of times already, it threatens
repeatedly to embroil the United States in losing endeavors. The problem is exacerbated in a globalized
information age in which the psychological impact of violence in distant conflicts on U.S. and global
populaces is far greater than in earlier eras. Some years ago, two insightful military analysts, Richard
Betts and Edward Luttwak, offered a second powerful reason to avoid asymmetric wars, making the case that
attempting to “cure” many such conflicts by imposing external military force was exhausting for the
intervening power and in fact counterproductive. Although the external powers have the best intentions
and the temporary result of their actions might indeed be to quell violence and save lives, such
interventions can often merely translate civil strife into slow-motion conflicts that simmer for decades,
surging up whenever external controls are loosened. Both writers began from the basic assumption
that a certain subset of civil conflicts do not arise because of accident or misunderstanding, but as a
result of clashing political goals on the part of warring parties. As a result, as Betts argued, limited
intervention in such situations “may end a war if the intervenor takes sides, tilts the local balance of
power,” and helps one side to win. Intervention can also end a war “if the outsiders take complete
command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and impose a peace settlement.” The first
sort of intervention is not impartial, however, and the second is not limited; and it is precisely an
impartial, limited intervention that the United States and the world community has been trying to
accomplish in recent years. “Trying to have it both ways usually blocks peace,” Betts concludes, “by
doing enough to keep either belligerent from defeating the other, but not enough to make them stop
trying.”
101
Extensions: Plan Causes Trade-Offs

Plan trades-off with training, focus, and contingency planning
Can well-trained military forces make a difference in such contexts? Can they contribute toward a successful
outcome? Of course they can, and they are arguably doing so in parts of Iraq today. Yet, the U.S. defense
establishment cannot afford to master every mission, and the question for U.S. defense planners is one of
priority and opportunity costs. The United States can only afford to do so much. It only has so many
military forces to devote to various potential contingencies, and those troops only have a finite number
of training hours to be allocated. If counterinsurgency and nation building are mostly political, social,
economic, and psychological tasks and are only military in character to a small degree, it does not
make much sense to spend billions developing skills, units, doctrines, and equipment that ultimately
will not be decisive in most asymmetric challenges, all the while continuing largely to ignore, in relative
budgetary and bureaucratic terms, the nonmilitary tools (economic aid, foreign service efforts, public
diplomacy, and cultural outreach) that will be decisive in such conflicts. Meanwhile, there are
opportunity costs to be borne. Gradually but inevitably, a focus on and continual engagement in
asymmetric wars will force the United States to devalue systems and force structures appropriate for
interstate war
Focusing on asymmetric warfare creates long-term resource trade-offs

That amount does not begin to count the accumulating health, pension, operations, maintenance, and other
related costs built into the defense budget itself. Repeated deployments into stability operations create
enormous ongoing costs in these areas as well as in lost equipment that must be replaced, bonuses to
boost recruitment for unpopular wars, and other associated obligations. Over the long term, these
costs tend to drive out new investments, and an asymmetric war strategy that has U.S. forces hopping
from one stability operation to another will substantially magnify this problem. Beyond that, there are
skills and training trade-offs; every month an Army captain spends in Arabic language training is a
month not spent mastering large-scale warfare tactics.
102
Extensions: Plan Causes Trade-Offs

The plan trades-off with real threats to U.S. readiness
The strategic opportunity costs may be even more profound. While the U.S. national security apparatus
obsesses about asymmetric conflict, the nonmilitary tools necessary to deal successfully with such challenges
languish. Meanwhile, other potentially more important security threats, such as the challenge of rising
powers, such as Russia and China, receive less attention than they should. In an era in which the potential
for war between major powers, although unlikely, remains alive, this kind of a trade-off seems
strategically unwise, especially because of the undeniable fact that such large-scale wars, were they to
occur, would engage U.S. interests that dwarfed anything at stake in contingencies such as Somalia or
even Afghanistan. Russia is headed increasingly for a sort of autocratic, anti-Western nationalism, and
China’s determination to transform its economic strength into geopolitical and military might has long
been obvious. Although neither of these states will inevitably become a threat to peace, either one
could. Along with continuing risks such as North Korea and Iran, these realities render naive the
assumption that the world has been rendered immune from the requirement for deterrence of major
conventional war. Unlike in the case of asymmetric challenges, where a broad range of national and
international states and organizations can play important roles in dealing with the economic, social,
and political challenges involved, only the Defense Department offers the sorts of tools—long-range
strike, global logistics, space-based capabilities, missile defense, and the like—required to engage in
major conventional operations. If the United States allows these capabilities and skills to depreciate, no
one else is capable of picking up the slack.
103
AT: Our Plan Solves the Problems With Fighting Asymmetric Wars
Changing military methods doesn’t make counterinsurgency effective
Undoubtedly, U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan have done heroic work adapting to the
demands of these sorts of conflicts. Yet, there is a strong case to be made, informed by the experiences of
those same troops over the last six years, that U.S. efforts represented a fundamental mismatch from the start.
Deploying aggressive military units trained to kill, destroy, and seize territory into environments in
which their primary goals quickly become performing missions such as convening local governments,
building schools, or functioning as the local police force creates a natural tension. This tension can be
eased, but it is inevitable and will continue to manifest itself as long as military units are employed in
roles for which they were neither created nor trained and are not suitable, to some irreducible and
crucial degree Fired on by secretive enemies, armies tend to fire back overwhelmingly and
destructively. Patrolling streets in search of hidden insurgents, armies tend to “demonstrate resolve,”
to show strength, and to maintain a constant search for elusive enemies. This often involves kicking in
doors, rifling through homes, and conducting hurried and angry interrogations—humiliations visited
on a populace by a roving counterinsurgent army, no matter how respectful and restrained it attempts
to be. Success in counterinsurgency operations emerges almost in spite of their military components.
Improving the military won’t solve asymmetric conflicts

It is thus dangerous to view the military as the lead agency to deal with very diffuse, broad-based asymmetric
challenges such as radical Islamism, nation building, stability operations, and even counterinsurgency. Talk
of redirecting U.S. military emphasis to asymmetric threats amounts to a form of avoidance, allowing
U.S. national security planners to ignore the truly dramatic change underway in the character of
conflict. As smart, adaptable, and courageous as U.S. military officers and men and women clearly are
and will be, asymmetric challenges demand asymmetric responses—political, economic, cultural,
informational, and psychological tools, tactics, and techniques allowed to work organically over time,
not retrained military forces whose true purpose is to fight and win wars, which are different
enterprises. The strategic trap is obvious: Furnished with a vast, expensive, skillful military tool,
policymakers will use it again and again, as they have been doing, without confronting the tougher
challenge of shifting resources into nonmilitary tools of statecraft
104
Improving Asymmetric Warfare Won’t Solve Terrorism

Effective counters to asymmetric warfare won’t solve terrorism
In the post-9/11 world, some argue that key U.S. interests are at stake because of international terrorism. Yet,
the view that we will “inevitably” be drawn into such wars in an era of failed states, primarily to forestall the
emergence of safe havens for terrorism, is one of the most egregious unchallenged assumptions of post–Cold
War defense planning. Terrorists do not need full-blown failed states in which to operate. The frontier
areas of Pakistan are al Qaeda’s best refuge today, and some of its most aggressive recruiting is taking
place in places such as Algeria, Morocco, and western Europe. Wiping the world political map clean of
failed states would not end these threats, nor, on the opposite end of the ledger, is every failed state a
terrorist haven. Haiti, Somalia, and a number of other countries today can be described as failed or
failing, and yet none has become host to large-scale terrorist training camps. Even if there were a
generalized connection between state failure and terrorism, such a correlation would still not solve the
asymmetry of commitment problem. Although instability in general may be a vital concern around the
globe, no one country’s civil strife will ever be crucial enough to the United States to place U.S.
interests on an even par with those of the local belligerents. There are other problems. Deploying large
military forces in at-risk countries is hardly the right answer for state failure; many tools exist to deal
with terrorist power centers short of invasion, occupation, and nation building. Even from a narrowly
military standpoint, a better approach is available: find out where the terrorists are and strike them
without trying to repair every unstable context that offers a temporary safe haven. Meanwhile, use
nonmilitary tools to improve governance, institutionalization, and economic performance in states of
concern. The answer is not a new isolationism but a clear-eyed recognition of the tasks the U.S.
military is best suited to perform and of the parallel, politically challenging effort to substantially
increase the nonmilitary tools in the U.S. arsenal that will, in the medium and long term, accomplish
much more in avoiding the failed-states problem. Taken at the level of strategy, the focus on asymmetric
war in defense policy assumes a foreign policy that would have the United States leaping into one stability
operation after another in service of a guiding ideology that assumes that Washington and its allies can and
must create order in failed states. Such an ideology is highly questionable on empirical grounds, and as a
foreign pol icy, it almost certainly will not sustain public support. The American people, especially in the
wake of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, have no appetite for endless nation-building schemes.26 Yet, a defense
strategy committed to preparing for asymmetric war presumes that the United States will commit
itself to precisely such a campaign. The case for an asymmetric-war focus in U.S. defense policy seems
to suggest that the United States will not be able to help itself. In a world of nonstate threats, it will
plunge from one civil conflict or insurgency to another, trying to quash the world’s instability to keep
itself safe. If objective tests are applied, however, vital U.S. national interests are simply not at stake in
such wars. It turns out that U.S. defense policy already has been playing a global role that serves U.S.
and global interests, interests that are in fact more important than placing the United States in service
of asymmetric and nontraditional missions.
Defense Department Documents and Publications, October 8, 2008
Emerging global trends --including rapid population growth, the rise of extremism, and advances in
information technologies -- are all conspiring, Chiarelli said, to create an era of persistent conflict. This era
of persistent conflict will require that soldiers engage in "full-spectrum operations." The general cited
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who in a speech last week at National Defense University said: "The
105
categories of warfare are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes." Full-spectrum operations, Chiarelli
said, involve the entire spectrum of tactical challenges, both kinetic and non-kinetic activity. There are
"elements of both, all the time, shifting constantly, sometimes without warning." But current-force Army
vehicles were designed for the Cold War and heavy conventional conflict; they were not designed for full-
spectrum operations and asymmetric warfare. More recent Army tank variants, such as the M-1A2 Abrams
have more modern systems enhancements, which make them better suited to 21st Century asymmetric
conflicts. That's why Chiarelli said, when he was commanding Multi-National Corps-Iraq, he specifically
asked for the M-1A2 variant. The Army, however, wanted to give him the old M1A1 Abrams. "Pete, a tank
is just a tank," he was told. But "if you know anything about fighting a tank in urban terrain and the
capability the independent sites give you," the General said, "you realize the error of 'a tank is a tank.' A tank
is not a tank."
Biopower K Links
Military UAVs will significantly enhance police surveillance powers
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May 2008, p. online
The U.S. military's development of the UAV would significantly affect law enforcement. Using existing
nanotechnology, police UAVs would be the size of a small bird and stay aloft quietly for hours. Using facial
and voice recognition software, the devices would scan hundreds of yards omnidirectionally, day or night,
for felons or wanted persons. One UAV could perform many of the same tasks as several plainclothes
officers in unmarked vehicles.12
106

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Nano Neg – Planet Debate

General Solvency Answers...............................................................................................................................7

Nano Solar Solvency Answers..........................................................................................................................8

Commercial Nanosolar Isn’t Possible...............................................................................................................9

Competitiveness Advantage Answers.............................................................................................................10

Competitiveness Advantage Answers.............................................................................................................11

Competitiveness Advantage Answers (Applies to ALL Competitiveness Advantages)..................................12

Competitiveness Advantage Answers.............................................................................................................13

Competitiveness Advantage Answers (Applies to ALL Competitiveness Advantages)..................................14

Competitiveness Advantage Answers – Ext – Knowledge Spreads Abroad...................................................15

Competitiveness Advantage Answers – Ext: U.S. Leads Now........................................................................16

Extensions – Patents Block Nano Development.............................................................................................18

Extensions – Patents Block Nano Development.............................................................................................19

Extensions – Patents Block Nano Development.............................................................................................20

Extensions – Patents Block Nano Development.............................................................................................21

Extensions – Patents Block.............................................................................................................................22

AT: We Solve Bad NanoTech........................................................................................................................23

AT: We Solve a Nano Arms Race.................................................................................................................24

AT: We Create Military Dominance in Nanotech...........................................................................................25

AT: We Create Military Dominance in Nanotech...........................................................................................26

AT: We Create Military Dominance in Nanotech...........................................................................................27

AT: We Create Regs.......................................................................................................................................28

Nanotech Causes Extinction...........................................................................................................................29

Nanotech Causes Extinction...........................................................................................................................30

NanoExtinction Outweighs Nuclear War........................................................................................................31

Extensions – Nanotech Causes Extinction......................................................................................................33

Supporting NanoTech Leads to Self-Replication............................................................................................34

AT: Fat Fingers Stop Self-Replication............................................................................................................35

AT: Sticky Fingers Stops Self-Replication.....................................................................................................36

AT: Sticky Fingers Stops Self-Replication ....................................................................................................37

Nanotechnology Destroys the Economy.........................................................................................................38

Nanotechnology Destroys the Economy.........................................................................................................39

Nanotechnology Destroys the Economy ........................................................................................................40

Nanotech Causes Prolif...................................................................................................................................41

Extension – Nanotech Causes Prolif...............................................................................................................42

Nanotech Causes Arms Races.........................................................................................................................43

Nanotech Causes Arms Races.........................................................................................................................44

Nanotech Undermines Soft Power..................................................................................................................45

Nanotech Destroys Biodiversity.....................................................................................................................46

Nanotech Destroys Biodiversity ....................................................................................................................47

Nanotechnology Causes Space Wars..............................................................................................................48

Nanotechnology Causes Disease.....................................................................................................................49

Nanotech Destabilizes the Middle East...........................................................................................................50

Nanotech Threatens the Food Chain...............................................................................................................51

Nanotechnology Causes Terrorism.................................................................................................................52

Nano Threatens the Environment....................................................................................................................53

Nano Threatens Health...................................................................................................................................54

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................55

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................56

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................57

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................59

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................62

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................63

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................64

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................65

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................66

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................67

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................68

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................69

AT: We Establish Regulations........................................................................................................................70

States Counterplan Solves R &D....................................................................................................................73

States Solve Military.......................................................................................................................................74

Politics -- Plan is Popular in Congress............................................................................................................76

Fiscal Discipline DA Links.............................................................................................................................85