“The nuclear danger posed by the potential for state failure in a North Korea or
a Pakistan is one of the most menacing facing the international environment.”
What If a Nuclear-Armed State Collapses?
MICHAEL O’HANLON
F
ew dangers in the twenty-first century can
compete with the altogether too plausible
scenario in which a nuclear-armed state
collapses, with the custody of its weapons imme-
diately becoming a national security threat of the
highest order to the United States and some of
its allies. In fact, there is a strong case that in the
post–cold war and post–9-11 world, this danger
represents the single greatest existential threat to
Western survival.
The chances of nuclear war between the United
States and Russia are now very small, those
between the United States and China nontrivial
but also limited. Also very small are the chances
that Al Qaeda or a related terrorist organization
could develop its own nuclear arms. But a terrorist
group that somehow got its hands on one or more
nuclear arms could pose an extraordinary risk to
the United States and other prominent Western
countries with controversial foreign policies, such
as the United Kingdom. It may well be that the
most plausible route to such an eventuality is the
collapse of a nuclear-armed country—most likely
Pakistan or North Korea, given their fragile poli-
tics—and the subsequent purchase or confiscation
of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group in the anar-
chical environment that ensued.
North Korea’s October 9 test of a nuclear device
adds to the urgency of the problem. If North
Korea, perhaps with its difficulties aggravated
by international sanctions, were to fall apart,
what would happen to its nuclear arms? Might a
desperate regime use rather than lose them? Or
might it sell them? Both Pyongyang and some
Pakistanis have shown a willingness to trade in
weapons materials.
MICHAEL O’HANLON is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies
at the Brookings Institution. His recent books include Defense
Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era (Brookings, 2005) and, co-
authored with Kurt Campbell, Hard Power: The New Politics
of National Security (Basic Books, 2006).
379
In postulating a collapse of a nuclear-armed
state, two key questions arise. First, what can be
done about the nuclear weapons and related mate-
rials and technologies themselves in such a situa-
tion? And second, assuming the answer to the first
question is not encouraging, what military options
exist for a brute-force operation to restore order
and stability countrywide in the hope that doing so
will ultimately allow dangerous nuclear capabili-
ties to be located and secured?
The recent experience in overthrowing Sad-
dam Hussein’s regime, for the purported purpose
of eliminating his weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) capabilities, is a good place to begin this
discussion because it shows the capabilities—and
the limitations—of US military power.
LESSONS FROM IRAQ
In the case of Iraq, no breakdown in order pre-
ceded the coalition’s invasion, and as it turned
out there were no WMD. But US intelligence was
incapable of determining an accurate verdict on
the WMD issue despite intensive focus on Iraq for
more than a decade and despite the presence of
inspectors for nearly a decade. This fact reflects a
broader and rather obvious, but still highly impor-
tant, reality: WMD technologies are sufficiently
compact that they cannot be easily identified by
remote reconnaissance.
Nuclear reactors can be seen, to be sure, as
can cooling ponds and reprocessing facilities. But
smaller centrifuge complexes to enrich uranium,
and certainly separated nuclear materials or weap-
ons themselves, are far too small and give off far
too weak a radioactive signature to be detectable
by long-range sensors. (In the case of Iran, much
of the information about its nuclear facilities has
come from internal dissident groups.)
This is not the only aspect of the Iraq War expe-
rience that offers lessons for the issue at hand. In
particular, the concept of “shock and awe” and
380 • CURRENT HISTORY • November 2006
the role played by special forces in the Iraq inva-
sion are relevant in assessing what capabilities the
United States and its allies would have for rapid
response elsewhere. And several other character-
istics of the war help illuminate issues involved in
brute-force stabilization missions.
Shock and awe. Striking hard at leadership and
military targets in a war’s early hours is a strat-
egy that air power proponents have counseled for
decades. Given the degree to which Iraqi forces
had become accustomed to coalition bombing in
the preceding decade, the actual extent of shock or
awe was probably limited. Things could be differ-
ent in a country that did not expect a US attack.
But in a situation of state collapse, attacking
military command and control would probably
have little utility. An effective strike would require
knowledge of where actual nuclear facilities and
materials were located. Thus, it would not be hard
to destroy known production infrastructure, but
it would be very difficult
to destroy weapons. Suc-
cess would likely depend Virtually nothing is known, or likely
on whether security forces
in the country in ques- to become known, about the location
tion shared the US view of North Korean nuclear weapons.
that destruction of these
weapons was a top priority.
Otherwise, Washington would probably not gain
information about the weapons’ whereabouts. And
even if it did, the weapons might be moved in the
few hours (at a minimum) that it would take US
forces to get in position to attack.
Special operations raids. These were impressive
in the Iraq War. Dozens of small special operations
teams disrupted Iraqi command and control, seized
oil infrastructure, prevented dams from being
demolished, and controlled airfields in regions
where Scud missiles might have been launched
at Israel. In some parts of the north and west of
Iraq, small teams of special forces helped hold off
much larger Iraqi main combat formations at key
moments. These operations were brave, creative,
and effective.
In Iraq, however, the special forces teams were
never far from reinforcement by heavy American
forces, and they had large amounts of US airpower
immediately available to back them up. In addi-
tion, since the United States chose the time to
initiate conflict, they could be comfortably pre-
positioned, first in the region and then within Iraq,
before acting. Otherwise, it could have taken sev-
eral days to move them from facilities in the United
States to where they needed to be. (In Afghanistan
in 2001, it generally took weeks to accomplish this
task.) Moreover, the special forces did not attack
the centers of national military power in the capi-
tal or large military bases.
On balance, it is difficult to assume that a surgi-
cal or limited operation could neutralize nuclear
weapons in the early hours or days of a state col-
lapse scenario. It may be useful, therefore, to con-
sider aspects of the Iraq experience that bear on
large-scale operations to impose stability through-
out a country.
Rapid invasion. US ground forces taking part in
the Iraq invasion largely bypassed southeastern
cities while rushing to Baghdad. In the war’s first
10 days, it was not clear that these forces could
sufficiently protect their flanks in areas that they
preferred not to seize. The ensuing debate was
somewhat overblown. In the worst case, coalition
forces could have waited a couple of weeks for
other units to arrive, with only modest harm in all
likelihood to the broader
strategy.
In a stabilization mis-
sion, rapid movement of
foreign forces is unlikely
to encounter strong, con-
certed resistance. Thus, as
in Iraq, it should be pos-
sible to move large forces fairly quickly. That said,
it should be recalled that a record-setting pace for
ground forces is 50 to 100 miles a day. It will take
time to consolidate control of a country even after
forces are deployed transcontinentally—a process
that typically takes weeks for substantial numbers
of light forces and months for heavy forces.
Urban warfare. The coalition did a good job
of establishing control over parts of Iraq’s major
cities in days. To try to seize the cities even more
quickly probably would have produced high casu-
alties on all sides. By contrast, to wait patiently for
the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division and other
reinforcements would have given Hussein’s forces
confidence as well as time to regroup and devise
new tactics. So the middle ground—using increas-
ingly assertive “reconnaissance in force” operations
to gain information, disrupt Hussein’s forces, and
engage selectively in firefights against elite Iraqi
units—was just right.
But the topography of Baghdad helped, with
wide boulevards. And the disorganized and inef-
fectual nature of Iraqi fighters helped even more.
Thus, as Anthony Cordesman has underscored,
one should not assume that future urban opera-
tions would be so straightforward. The postinva-

sion experience in Iraq itself has already taught
that lesson.
Resources and equipment. In addition to the coali-
tion forces’ high-technology weaponry, also impres-
sive was the global transportation capability used
to deploy the forces to the theater quickly. In par-
ticular, C-17 aircraft and fast sealift ships purchased
during the Clinton administration performed quite
effectively. One is also struck by the competence of
American and British troops and their commanders,
and the excellence of their doctrine and training.
Old-fashioned equipment such as tanks performed
extremely well, the old-fashioned skills of infantry
soldiers were very important, and overall combat
operations were executed magnificently.
These observations suggest that Western main
combat forces are not badly suited to establishing
order in a chaotic country. But they also suggest
that, even in an era of modernized transport and
computerized logistics, a deployment time on the
order of many weeks or months would be required
to move large numbers of forces to a distant place
requiring stabilization efforts.
PROPER PREPARATION
Of course, stability was hardly established
throughout all of Iraq’s major cities quickly. Chaos
reigned in much of the country for many days after
Baghdad fell. The coalition simply was not prepared
to do the job of pacifying and controlling the coun-
try once organized resistance to its presence ended.
Optimistic assumptions that the conventional
military would not resist for long proved largely
right. But optimistic assumptions that the Iraqi
military and other elements of the Iraqi security
services would therefore quickly be available to
help stabilize the country proved badly wrong.
And so, therefore, did administration assumptions
that US force levels in Iraq could be sharply and
quickly reduced, with virtually all troops coming
home within a year.
It is not defensible to undertake regime change
without planning on a difficult postconflict envi-
ronment, as many had warned before the war. It is
hard to assess how much the mistakes made early
on in the post-Hussein period have contributed to
the difficult environment that persists today. But
they undoubtedly played a role, breeding cynicism
among the Iraqi people about the commitment of
US-led foreign forces to their well-being, and allow-
ing insurgents to regroup and recover.
This comment is not meant as invective against
the Bush administration Pentagon, but rather to
underscore an important point. It does not suffice
What If a Nuclear-Armed State Collapses? • 381
to have excellent forces—excellent plans for their
use are needed too. And in the scenario of a col-
lapsed nuclear-armed state, there will not be time
to create them once they are needed. The plans
must be developed in advance, despite the politi-
cal sensitivity of doing so.
A final point concerns force sizing. Before the
invasion, Army General Eric Shinseki said that
stabilizing Iraq could require “several hundred
thousand” outside troops. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz objected, and deployed roughly
half that, or about 150,000. That number appears
inadequate, and most analysts were critical of
them for lowballing requirements. Key missions,
such as safeguarding ammunition sites and pre-
venting postinvasion looting, were not conducted
for lack of troops.
In any event, whoever was right, Iraq helps pro-
vide a benchmark for scaling: somewhere between
150,000 and 300,000 foreign troops, and probably
200,000 to 300,000, are required to stabilize a coun-
try of 25 million. When considering operations in
a North Korea of about 25 million, a similar range
of forces would have to be assumed (though most
might be South Korean in that instance). When
considering Pakistan, with a population of about
150 million, these numbers would likely have to be
scaled up by a factor of five or more.
THE KOREA SCENARIO
Many at the Pentagon have long believed a sur-
prise North Korean attack on South Korea could
achieve important successes, quite possibly includ-
ing the capture of Seoul, before US reinforcements
arrived in sufficient numbers to work with surviv-
ing South Korean troops to stop and then reverse
the onslaught. But given continued improvements
in South Korean and US capabilities, together with
the gradual atrophy of the North Korean military,
allied prospects for successfully defending South
Korean territory appear good today—and are likely
to remain good in the future.
Still, the United States cannot neglect Korea in
its war planning and force structure analysis, espe-
cially in light of the recent nuclear weapon test. An
escalating crisis over nuclear weapons could lead to
war if the United States and its allies grew acutely
worried that North Korea might sell nuclear materi-
als abroad, or if they decided that Pyongyang must
be prevented from developing a large nuclear arse-
nal. It could also happen if North Korea miscalcu-
lated the new leverage its nuclear capabilities afford
it and pushed brinkmanship too far.
382 • CURRENT HISTORY • November 2006

Finally, it could happen if North Korea began to many in protected locations, that even a massive
fissure. Among the most difficult scenarios would attack could not prevent thousands of explosive
be one in which some fraction of the North Korean rounds launched by artillery tube or missile from
military held together and offered resistance landing in South Korea’s capital.
against allied entrance into their country, while Second, many North Korean military and politi-
other parts of the country (notably, those with the cal headquarters are deep underground, making it
nuclear weapons) began to fall apart, calling the hard to attack them even with a “shock and awe”
security of the nuclear arms into doubt. type of air campaign. Virtually nothing is known,
Pentagon planners have estimated US forces or likely to become known, about the location
needed for the defense and ultimate liberation of of North Korean nuclear weapons—especially if
South Korea at roughly six ground combat divi- they are not deployed on long-range missiles or
sions—including Marine and Army units, ten aircraft—except that they are likely to be kept in
wings of Air Force aircraft, and four to five Navy hardened sites. US special forces would also have
aircraft carrier battle groups—altogether totaling a harder time infiltrating into North Korea and
at least half a million Americans under arms. Are locating such sites for aerial attack than in Iraq,
these estimates still valid? And are they valid for a given the degree to which the country is cut off
case of North Korean regime collapse rather than from outsiders.
aggression? If they are, we can deduce immediately Third, there is no easy axis of approach to
that any war would require months to resolve, Pyongyang similar to the open desert used by coali-
since it would take that long to deploy such a large tion forces to race to Baghdad in March and April
American capa- of 2003. Korea’s
bility. difficult terrain
The interven- Were parts of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal ever to fall means that the
tion would be enemy harass-
exceedingly diffi-
into the wrong hands, Al Qaeda could conceivably ment of supply
cult. Although US gain access to a nuclear device with terrifying results. lines like that
defense reviews in which coalition
the 1990s lumped forces faced at a
Korea with Southwest Asia conceptually, the pen- few sites in Operation Iraqi Freedom could be a
insula is much more like a cross between the for- much more pervasive problem in any invasion of
mer intra-German border and Bosnia than like North Korea.
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or southern Iraq. This anal- Fourth, North Korea’s military is much larger
ogy applies to both the nature of the terrain—hilly than Iraq’s. Moreover, three-fourths of Iraq’s
and complex—and the nature of the fighting forces troops were believed unlikely to fight hard before
deployed in the vicinity. the war began; few make a similar assumption
The Korean peninsula remains the most densely about North Korea’s military. No one can predict
militarized region on earth, its armies more con- how this dynamic would play out in a collapse
centrated than Warsaw Pact and NATO units were in scenario. Perhaps only modest numbers of North
Central Europe during the cold war. North Korean Korean soldiers would fight hard against invading
forces of about 1 million (with a defense budget that forces; perhaps much larger numbers would. But
may exceed 25 percent of GDP and even approach even in a collapse scenario, many North Korean
40 percent) face off against combined allied forces soldiers would probably be more dependable, and
of about 600,000. Tens of thousands of pieces of fiercer in battle, than were most of Hussein’s elite
heavy equipment are deployed as well—some two- units. Finally, there is the matter of North Korea’s
thirds of the total within several tens of kilometers nuclear capability, which may be weaponized
of the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). before long. If diplomacy fails, this capability will
have to be factored into any scenarios involving
THE MILITARIZED ZONE conflict on the peninsula.
A preemptive use of force by South Korea and It is for these reasons that war simulations,
the United States, even in response to a disinte- even if inexact, predict hundreds of thousands of
grating North Korea, would encounter serious deaths in any future Korean war regardless of how
obstacles even above and beyond the challenge of it might start. The simulations probably exaggerate
deploying US forces to the peninsula quickly. First, likely casualties—but by a factor of two or three,
so many North Korean weapons are near Seoul, not ten or twenty.

Fortunately for the United States, in Korea any
invasion would be followed by an occupation that
the South Koreans could probably handle largely
on their own (unlike the situation in Iraq). But cre-
ating the conditions for that occupation to occur
could take a good deal of time and effort, with great
resulting uncertainty over what would happen to
North Korea’s nuclear weapons in the meantime.
Only if North Korean collapse effectively meant
disintegration of the country could South Korea’s
forces confidently control the situation promptly
and without substantial amounts of American help.
The size of its active ground forces—well over half
a million—is certainly adequate for stabilizing a
country of fewer than 25 million people, and most
of the troops are routinely well-positioned near the
DMZ. That said, the mobility of most of these units
is substantially less than is the case with Ameri-
can combat forces. And most of all, the strength
of any residual North Korean opposition cannot
be easily forecast even in a collapse scenario. For
this reason, the details of how the scenario would
unfold are crucial—and, unfortunately, unknow-
able in advance.
THE CASE OF PAKISTAN
Of all the military scenarios that would undoubt-
edly involve the vital interests of the United
States—short of a direct threat to its territory—a
collapsed Pakistan ranks very high on the list. The
combination of Islamic radicals and nuclear weap-
ons in that country is extremely worrisome. Were
parts of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal ever to fall into
the wrong hands, Al Qaeda could conceivably gain
access to a nuclear device with terrifying results.
(Another worrisome South Asia scenario could
involve an Indo-Pakistani crisis leading to war
between the two nuclear-armed states over Kash-
mir, perhaps with the potential to cause chaos or
destabilization within Pakistan as well.)
The Pakistani collapse scenario appears some-
what unlikely given that country’s relatively
pro-Western and secular officer corps. But the
intelligence services, which created the Taliban
in Afghanistan and have condoned if not abetted
Islamic extremists in Kashmir, are less depend-
able. And the country as a whole is sufficiently
infiltrated by fundamentalist groups—as assassi-
nation attempts against President Pervez Mush-
arraf as well as other evidence make clear—that
this alarming scenario of civil chaos cannot be
entirely dismissed.
Were it to occur, it is unclear what the United
States and like-minded states would or should do.
What If a Nuclear-Armed State Collapses? • 383
It is very unlikely that “surgical strikes” could be
conducted to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
before extremists could make a grab at them. It is
doubtful that the United States would know their
location; at a minimum, scores of sites controlled
by special forces or elite Army units would have
to be candidates for targeting. And it is at least as
doubtful that any Pakistani government would
countenance such a move, even under duress.
The chances of learning the locations would
probably be greater than in the North Korea case,
given the much greater openness of Pakistani soci-
ety and its far greater ties with the outside world.
But US-Pakistani military cooperation, cut off for a
decade in the 1990s, is still modest, and the pos-
sibility that Washington would be provided such
information or otherwise obtain it would have to
be considered small.
If a surgical strike, a series of surgical strikes,
or commando-style raids were not possible, the
only option might be to try to restore order before
extremists could seize the weapons and transfer
them to terrorists. The United States and other
outside powers might, for example, respond to
a request by the Pakistani government to help
restore order. But given the embarrassment asso-
ciated with a plea for outside help, it might not
be made until it was almost too late, complicating
the task of helping Pakistan restore order before
nuclear arsenals could be threatened.
The international community, if it could act fast
enough, might help defeat an insurrection. Or it
might help protect Pakistan’s borders, making it
difficult to sneak nuclear weapons out of the coun-
try, while providing technical support to the Paki-
stani armed forces as they tried to put down the
rebellion. All that is certain is that, given the enor-
mous stakes, the United States would literally have
to do anything it could to prevent nuclear weapons
from getting into the wrong hands.
India would of course have a strong incentive to
ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
And it would have the advantage of proximity; it
could undoubtedly mount a large response within a
week. But its role would clearly be complicated.
New Delhi would likely show little hesitation
intervening in the context of a dissolved Pakistani
state. However, for the more likely scenario in
which Pakistan was fraying, but not yet collapsed,
India’s intervention could increase the chances of
nuclear catastrophe. Intervention might unify Pak-
istan’s factions against the invader and quite possi-
bly lead to the deliberate use of Pakistani weapons
against India. This scenario, in which Pakistan’s
384 • CURRENT HISTORY • November 2006
territorial integrity and sovereignty might be on
the line—and its weapons put into a “use or lose”
state by the approach of the Indian army—is pre-
cisely the sort in which nuclear dangers have long
been considered to be very high.
Should the immediate crisis somehow be
resolved and stabilization efforts then be required,
the scale of the undertaking could be breathtaking.
Pakistan is a very large country with a population
six times Iraq’s. Stabilizing a country of this size
could easily require several times as many troops
as the Iraq mission—with a figure of up to a mil-
lion being plausible. India has that number of
ground troops in its military, but they are deployed
widely throughout the country, with limited capac-
ity for quick movement (even within India)—and
as noted, the politics of Indian intervention even in
a collapse scenario could be quite complicated.
Of course, any international force would have
help. Presumably some fraction of Pakistan’s secu-
rity forces would remain intact, able, and willing to
help defend their country. Pakistan’s military num-
bers 550,000 Army troops, 70,000 uniformed per-
sonnel in the Air Force and Navy, another 510,000
reservists, and almost 300,000 gendarmes and
Interior Ministry troops.
But if some substantial fraction of the military
broke off from the main body, say a quarter to a
third, and were assisted by extremist militias, it is
quite possible that the international community
would need to deploy 100,000 to 200,000 troops
to ensure a quick restoration of order. Unless much
of India’s million-man army were available, the pri-
mary burden would then fall in all likelihood on
the United States. Given the presumed need for
rapid response, the US share of this total would
probably be a majority fraction, or quite possibly
50,000 to 100,000 ground forces.
FACING THE MENACE
The nuclear danger posed by the potential for
state failure in a North Korea or a Pakistan is one
of the most menacing facing the international envi-
ronment. Military options in addressing such a sce-
nario would require considerable good fortune to
achieve the critical goal of preventing a loss of cus-
todial control over the country’s nuclear weapons.
A surgical strike might, with excellent intelligence,
destroy the weapons. But such intelligence is usu-
ally lacking, and the strike would probably have to
be conducted very quickly.
Unless a country’s larger immediate neighbor
could effectively step into the fray without wors-
ening the situation, a larger mission to secure an
entire country would take weeks or months to
mount under most circumstances, by which time
many could have had opportunities to obtain the
dangerous arms.
What if a stabilization force cannot locate
nuclear weapons or materials? One possibility, of
course, is the removal of the weapons from the
country before ground forces could arrive. But
just as likely is that the weapons would reside in
the hands of a rogue element of the military, or a
nongovernmental militia, or even a terrorist group
within the country. They might be in the process
of exploring means of moving a weapon outside
the country, or of selling it to a criminal or terror-
ist organization.
Under such circumstances, stabilization forces
would presumably need to develop intelligence
sources on the possible locations of nuclear mate-
rials, while also safeguarding the nation’s borders
and frequently checking internal transportation
systems. This approach would require exquisite
homeland security tools with a sweep and a reli-
ability not yet attained in the United States. At a
minimum, radiation detectors would have to be
deployed at all points of embarkation—including
airports, ports, and land crossings.
Were the nuclear material plutonium or highly
enriched uranium rather than an assembled
nuclear bomb, the danger of its being shipped
abroad might be slightly less, but the possibility
that it would escape notice would be much greater.
Indeed, it could be carried over a border by some-
one on foot—especially in Pakistan, with its long
land borders and proximity to jihadist groups.
Obviously, any operational plan for stabilizing a
nuclear state would need many thousands of indi-
viduals trained in border and customs monitoring
practices, equipped with suitable technology, and
quickly deployable to remote sites.
This analysis does not rule out the desirability
of improving military tools that could be useful
in a collapsing nuclear-state scenario, including
a restructured, more flexible US Army; a careful
expansion of special operations; and new units ded-
icated to stabilization operations, border monitor-
ing, and nuclear-materials detection. Nor does this
analysis rule out efforts to seek help in such opera-
tions from a collapsed state’s neighbors, Western
allies, and international institutions. Overwhelm-
ingly, however, it points to the critical importance
of doing whatever is possible to prevent a nuclear-
armed state’s collapse in the first place. N