Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The aff has to withdraw forces throughout one or more of the topic countries –
they don’t because they only withdraw forces from Okinawa. Our caselist
includes COIN, non-combat forces from Iraq, PMCs from Iraq, Afghanistan, or
both, ground troops from South Korea, and any other withdrawal from the topic
countries that occurs throughout the countries. There’s a topical version of the
aff – all they have to do is withdraw from throughout Japan – solves their offense
Group the counter-interp – it’s worse for the negative because they justify any
tiny case like withdrawal from one base or certain weapons systems – there’s
literature for all of these cases but there’s no way to prepare for all of them – only
we solve limits because we ensure a predictable debate for both the affirmative
and the negative.
They say education – this is irrelevant if it’s not predictable education – that’s key
– they kill it through a limits explosion, that’s above – and our interpretation
solves because they can still withdraw the so-called “key” troops
They say fairness – but neg preparedness outweighs aff preparedness – we need
core generics like PICs and deterrence – aff innovation and infinite prep probably
mitigate abuse to some degree but the existence of affs like Futenma, aircraft
carriers affs, or any given aff on Gulliver’s wiki proves that affs can find literature
for everything
They say common sense – this is stupid – there’s no single way to read a
resolution ever, the fact that topicality exists proves this
They say generics check – they kill generics because their interpretation justifies
affs that can spike out of things like deterrence through only removing one base
1. Not a race to the bottom – the Aff can just argue that our standards are bad, or
that overlimiting is bad. It’s not about the smallest limits, it’s about the best
limits.
3. Most objective – only our paradigm can actually determine the winner of the
topicality debate with complete neutrality by evaluating it based on offense and
defense instead of whether the judge thinks the affirmative interpretation is
accurate.
Reasonability sucks –
They concede our Dworkin evidence – they are just as discriminatory as they
accuse us to be – they claim that the Okinawans have an inherent right to life that
is greater than that of anyone else – if it’s true that every life is valuable we
shouldn’t prioritize any one group over another
They concede Isaac – this is a turn to their ethics claims – arguing that the
affirmative should be implemented regardless of the consequences that come
with doing so is functionally the same as saying it is okay for the consequences to
happen – they are complicit with evil
This also answers their Donaldson evidence – deontology is preceded by util, not
the other way around
They concede our Cummisky evidence – this answers their next two pieces of
evidence – if it’s true that we should evaluate every life equally then our first
obligation should be to save as many lives as we can
They say we ignore systemic violence – this is not true – we are just weighing
consequences – if they win that systemic violence outweighs then they win under
our framework
They say genocide – but we access genocide better – the only warrant as to why
genocide is bad is because it kills a lot of people. Their evidence that says we
should act regardless of consequences doesn’t assume that those consequences
result in more people being killed.
-also cross-apply the Isaac analysis – immorality can still be necessary to prevent
more unethical options
They say embracing ethics key – but literally NOWHERE do they read any sort of
spillover evidence that says their morals will be embraced all over the world – no
reason other countries won’t fight
And here’s evidence to the contrary – Even if we changed the way we approached
international relations, other actors would still be realist
Guzzini 98 assistant prof. of polisci and IR at the Central European University (Stefano,
"Conclusion: the fragmentation of realism," Realism in International Relations and
International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold, Published by
Routledge, ISBN 0415144027, p. 235)
realist
Third, this last chapter has argued that although the evolution of realism has been mainly a disappointment as a general causal theory, we have to deal with it. On the one hand,
assumptions and insights are used and merged in nearly all frameworks of analysis offered in International Relations or
International Political Economy. One of the book's purposes was to show realism as a varied and variably rich theory, so heterogeneous that it would be better to refer to it only in
to dispose of realism because some of its versions have been proven empirically wrong,
plural terms. On the other hand,
does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and practitioners
ahistorical, or logically incoherent,
of international affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our
understanding of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision-
makers to another, help mobilizing certain understandings and dispositions to action. They also provide them with legitimacy. Despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can
It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners.
still powerfully enframe action.
Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is. Realism is not a causal theory that explains International
Relations, but, as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind-set, we need to understand realism to make sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still necessary
hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismissal of some valuable theoretical
insights that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also be futile. Indeed, it might be the best way to tacitly and uncritically reproduce it.
State Behavior Great powers fear each other . They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing.
They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a
From the perspective of anyone great power, all other great powers are potential
trivial level.
enemies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German
reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been
close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united
Germany. The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each
other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least
suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the "911" problem-the absence of a central
authority to which a threatened state can turn for help-and states have even greater
incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing an
aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war
with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great
powers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much
more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as
mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to
view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are
great. States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own sur- vival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no
higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as
vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis
on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances.11 But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might
be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union
against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China
States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the
so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as
well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.
613
Counterplan
Counterplan solves all of case and is competitive – 1NC Schenwar indicates that Congress is
the only person with the power to wage war – however, a failure to utilize the power of the
purse in the context of the military guarantees executive expansionism – Schlesinger
indicates that a militaristic executive guarantees endless interventionists genocides and
wars, turning case – also it goes against the foundation of the Constitution. The terminal
impact is global nuclear war – continued US adventurism risks breaking the taboo on nuclear
weapons and escalation to global nuclear war – that’s Hirsch
Ray Forrester, professor at Hastings College of the Law, August 89, “ESSAY: Presidential
Wars in the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem.”, The George Washington Law Review,
lexis, umn-rks
the "nuclear
where the Executive is subject to the rule of law. [*1640] Vietnam and other more recent engagements show that it can happen and has happened here. But
football"--the ominous "black bag" --remains in the sole possession of the President. And, most important, his
decision to launch a nuclear missile would be, in fact if not in law, a declaration of nuclear war, one
which the nation and, indeed, humanity in general, probably would be unable to survive.
Extending a majority rule analysis of optimal deterrence to constitutional torts requires some explanation, for we do
not usually think of violations of constitutional rights in terms of cost-benefit analysis and efficiency. Quite the
opposite, constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as deontological side-constraints
that trump even utility-maximizing government action. 69 Alternatively, constitutional rights
might be understood as serving rule-utilitarian purposes. If the disutility to victims of constitutional
violations often exceeds the social benefits derived from the rights-violating activity, or if rights violations create
long-term costs that outweigh short-term social benefits, then constitutional rights can be justified as tending to
maximize global utility, even though this requires local utility-decreasing steps. Both the deontological and
rule-utilitarian descriptions imply that the optimal level of constitutional violations is zero;
that is, society would be better off, by whatever measure, if constitutional rights were never
violated.
They say all three branches check – but 1NC Rosen and Schenwar indicate that
only unilateral action by Congress can solve because it demonstrates that
Congress will not stand for executive expansionism – incorporating the executive
still subordinates Congress – more evidence
Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers for the Library of Congress, Spring 97, “ARTICLE: Presidential
Independence and the Power of the Purse”, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, lexis, umn-rks
The shift of the war power from Congress to the President belies a core belief by the framers
that each branch would protect its own prerogatives. They believed that a powerful dynamic of institutional self-defense would
safeguard the system of separation of powers. n191 Instead, Congress repeatedly surrenders its powers to the President.
Congress contributes to presidential independence by conferring substantial spending
discretion by statute and by declining to challenge the growing customary spending
discretion that Presidents assume. n192 While custom changes power and relationships, at least in the area of the war power, it does not change
the Constitution. If Congress slept for decades and allowed President to singlehandedly commit the
nation to war, and one day Congress awoke from its slumbers to pass legislation telling the
President that he may not use funds for a pending military action, that is the end of it. The congressional
action, no matter how late in the day, would prevail. If we want to reestablish some of the fundamental
principles established by the framers, several steps are necessary. For reasons that have both constitutional and practical dimensions, U.S.
foreign policy must be conducted only with funds appropriated by Congress. Allowing the President to carry
out foreign policy with private or foreign contributions would create a political system the framers feared most: the union of purse and sword. The framers
deliberately separated those powers to protect individual liberties. Fusing the powers in
today's world creates dangers far greater than in 1787. At the Iran-Contra hearings, Secretary of State George Shultz repudiated the idea of
using nonappropriated funds for foreign policy: "You cannot spend funds that the Congress doesn't either authorize
you to obtain or appropriate. That is what the Constitution says, and we have to stick with it." n193 The President may not spend funds "in the name of
the United States [*139] except as appropriated by Congress." n194 Members of Congress continue to use the power of the purse to direct the President in
foreign affairs and war, but increasingly they exhibit a lack of institutional self-confidence. They do not
function like a coequal branch. A greater number of legislators believe that the Constitution, whatever its original purpose, now gives the lion's share
(if not the exclusive share) of foreign policy and the war power to the President. The result is statutory language and legislative histories that are conspicuously vague and
contradictory. It is not unusual to see legislative principles expressed in non-binding form, merely announcing the "sense" of Congress on a matter of national urgency. Non-
if
binding resolutions are not totally without effect. They at least can be cited as evidence that Congress has not completely acquiesced to presidential actions. n195 But
members of Congress want to participate in questions of war and peace on a coequal basis and with maximum
effectiveness, they must do so through explicit statutory commands , not sense-of-Congress resolutions. The framers did not
create Congress -- the first branch of government -- to debate and release general, non-binding declarations. Nor is it consistent with the Constitution for executive officials to
merely "consult" legislators before they act. The purpose of Congress is to authorize national policy, especially in military affairs. Some legislators in recent years have claimed
that Congress can limit funds for past actions but never for future actions. There is no constitutional support for that theory. The decision to use military
force against other nations is reserved to Congress, and through that prerogative and the power of the
purse, members may confine a President's actions prospectively as well as retrospectively.
They say Baudrillard – but Baudrillard is just talking about deterrence breaking
down – make him prove a causal internal link between rejecting interventionist
wars and deterrence breaking down
Yudkowsky 8 (Eliezer, Full-time Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial
Intelligence and Cofounder, January 22, 2008, “Circular Altruism”)
Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential
risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one
of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry
about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation
until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition
will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly
people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and
narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally,
underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of
90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g.,
incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product)
while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only
44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or
the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The
scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this
book - or some other cause which none of us fore saw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.
Bostrum 3 (Nick, Professor of philosophy at Oxford, Winner of the Eugene R. Gannon Award
for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity
Cost of Delayed Technological Development”
http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html)
The effect on total value, then, seems greater for actions that accelerate technological development than for practically any other possible action.
colonization of the
Advancing technology (or its enabling factors, such as economic productivity) even by such a tiny amount that it leads to
local supercluster just one second earlier than would otherwise have happened amounts to bringing about
more than 10^31 human lives (or 10^14 human lives if we use the most conservative lower bound) that would not otherwise have
existed. Few other philanthropic causes could hope to mach that level of utilitarian payoff. Utilitarians are not the only ones who should strongly oppose
astronomical waste. There are many views about what has value that would concur with the assessment that the current rate of wastage constitutes an
enormous loss of potential value. For example, we can take a thicker conception of human welfare than commonly supposed by utilitarians (whether of a
hedonistic, experientialist, or desire-satisfactionist bent), such as a conception that locates value also in human flourishing, meaningful relationships,
noble character, individual expression, aesthetic appreciation, and so forth. So long as the evaluation function is aggregative (does not count one person’s
welfare for less just because there are many other persons in existence who also enjoy happy lives) and is not relativized to a particular point in time (no
time-discounting), the conclusion will hold. These conditions can be relaxed further. Even if the welfare function is not perfectly aggregative (perhaps
because one component of the good is diversity, the marginal rate of production of which might decline with increasing population size), it can still yield a
similar bottom line provided only that at least some significant component of the good is sufficiently aggregative. Similarly, some degree of time-
discounting future goods could be accommodated without changing the conclusion.[7] III. THE CHIEF GOAL FOR UTILITARIANS SHOULD BE TO REDUCE
it may seem as if a utilitarian ought to focus her efforts on
EXISTENTIAL RISK In light of the above discussion,
accelerating technological development. The payoff from even a very slight success in this endeavor is so enormous that it
dwarfs that of almost any other activity. We appear to have a utilitarian argument for the greatest possible urgency of technological development.
However, the true lesson is a different one. If what we are concerned with is (something like)
maximizing the expected number of worthwhile lives that we will create, then in addition to the opportunity cost of
delayed colonization, we have to take into account the risk of failure to colonize at all. We might fall
victim to an existential risk, one where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and
drastically curtail its potential.[8] Because the lifespan of galaxies is measured in billions of years,
whereas the time-scale of any delays that we could realistically affect would rather be measured in years or
decades, the consideration of risk trumps the consideration of opportunity cost. For example, a
single percentage point of reduction of existential risks would be worth (from a utilitarian expected utility
point-of-view) a delay of over 10 million years. Therefore, if our actions have even the slightest effect on the probability of eventual
colonization, this will outweigh their effect on when colonization takes place. For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and
four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. The utilitarian imperative “Maximize expected aggregate utility!” can be
simplified to the maxim “Minimize existential risk!”.
Posner 5 (Richard, The Probability of Catastrophe. Richard A. Posner. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern
edition). New York, N.Y.: Jan 4, 2005. pg. A.12. Proquest)
The fact that a catastrophe is very unlikely to occur is not a rational justification for ignoring
the risk of its occurrence. Suppose that a tsunami as destructive as the one in the Indian Ocean occurs on
average once a century and kills 150,000 people. That is an average of 1,500 deaths per year. Without having to
attempt a sophisticated estimate of the value of life to the people exposed to the risk, one can say with some confidence that if an annual
death toll of 1,500 could be substantially reduced at moderate cost, the investment would be worthwhile. A combination of educating the
residents of low-lying coastal areas about the warning signs of a tsunami (tremors and a sudden recession in the ocean), establishing a warning system
involving emergency broadcasts, telephoned warnings, and air-raid-type sirens, and improving emergency response systems, would have saved many of
the people killed by the Indian Ocean tsunami, probably at a total cost below any reasonable estimate of the average losses that can be expected from
tsunamis. Relocating people away from coasts would be even more efficacious, but except in the most vulnerable areas or in areas in which residential or
commercial uses have only marginal value, the costs would probably exceed the benefits. For annual costs of protection must be matched with annual,
not total, expected costs of tsunamis. Why weren't any cost-justified precautionary measures taken in anticipation of a tsunami on the scale that
occurred? Tsunamis are a common consequence of earthquakes, which themselves are common; and tsunamis can have other causes besides
earthquakes -- a major asteroid strike in an ocean would create a tsunami that would dwarf the Indian Ocean one. There are a number of reasons for such
neglect. First, although a once-in-a-century event is as likely to occur at the beginning of the century as at any other time, it is much less likely to occur in
the first decade of the century than later. Politicians with limited terms of office and thus foreshortened political horizons are likely to discount low-risk
disaster possibilities, since the risk of damage to their careers from failing to take precautionary measures is truncated. Second, to the extent that
effective precautions require governmental action, the fact that government is a centralized system of control makes it difficult for officials to respond to
the full spectrum of possible risks against which cost-justified measures might be taken. The officials, given the variety of matters to which they must
attend, are likely to have a high threshold of attention below which risks are simply ignored. Third, where risks are regional or global rather than local,
many national governments, especially in the poorer and smaller countries, may drag their heels in the hope of taking a free ride on the larger and richer
countries. Knowing this, the latter countries may be reluctant to take precautionary measures and by doing so reward and thus encourage free riding.
Fourth, countries are poor often because of weak, inefficient, or corrupt government, characteristics that may disable poor nations from taking cost-
people have difficulty thinking in terms of probabilities, especially very low
justified precautions. Fifth,
probabilities, which they tend therefore to write off. This weakens political support for incurring
the costs of taking precautionary measures against low-probability disasters. The operation of some of these
factors is illustrated by the refusal of the Pacific nations, which do have a tsunami warning system, to extend their system to the Indian Ocean prior to the
recent catastrophe. Tsunamis are more common in the Pacific, and most of the Pacific nations do not abut on the Indian Ocean. An even more dramatic
example concerns the asteroid menace, which is analytically similar to the menace of tsunamis. NASA, with an annual budget of more than $10 billion,
spends only $4 million a year on mapping dangerously close large asteroids, and at that rate may not complete the task for another decade, even though
such mapping is the key to an asteroid defense because it may give us years of warning. Deflecting an asteroid from its orbit when it is still millions of
miles from the earth is a feasible undertaking. In both cases, slight risks of terrible disasters are largely ignored essentially for political reasons. In part
because tsunamis are one of the risks of an asteroid collision, the Indian Ocean disaster has stimulated new interest in asteroid defense. This is welcome.
The
The fact that a disaster of a particular type has not occurred recently or even within human memory (or even ever) is a bad reason to ignore it.
risk may be slight, but if the consequences, should it materialize, are great enough, the expected cost
of disaster may be sufficient to warrant defensive measures.
Wiener 5 (Jonathan, Professor of Law, Environmental Policy and Public Policy at Duke
University, University Fellow of Resources for the Future, “Book Review: Catastrophe: Risk
and Response; Collase: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed”, Journal of Public Analysis
and Management, Autumn, Vol. 24, Issue 4, pp. 885-9)
Moreover, there are at least two major questions about the remedies for risks of catastrophe and collapse. The first is how to prioritize among the wide
array of potential end-of-the-world scenarios. The number and diversity of such doomsday forecasts in the literature is bracing, as evidenced by Posner’s
own extensive survey, Martin Rees’s Our Final Hour (2003), John Leslie’s The End of the World (1996), and Corey Powell’s article “20 Ways the World
Could End” in Discover magazine (October 2000), as well as prior retrospective studies cited by Diamond such as Joseph Tainter’s The Collapse of
The lower the probability of catastrophe that one is willing to consider, the
Complex Societies (1988).
greater the number of conceivable catastrophes. Indeed, as the probability asymptotically approaches
zero, the number of imaginable scenarios approaches infinity. And if the end of all life on Earth
is valued at infinity, rather than at $600 trillion, then the expected value of the catastrophic risk is an
infinitesimal probability multiplied by an infinite impact. These conundrums make priority-setting nearly impossible.
Attempting to sort out which are “real” or “plausible” risks (remember the Y2K computer disaster?) can recapitulate the error that Posner seeks to avoid,
of neglecting low-probability risks. At the same time, Posner worries that crying wolf—false positives—lull the public into inattention. Diamond argues that
we must tolerate some false alarms in order to have warning systems sensitive enough to
issue true alarms; zero false alarms would imply the failure to issue some true alarms. His calculus of optimal alarm accuracy is very similar to
Posner’s BCA. Ex ante, the real question is not whether the risk is “real” or “true,” but whether the
expected value of the low (but non-zero) probability multiplied by the catastrophic impact
(with a premium for risk aversion) justifies some cost of prevention.
519
Kritik
The affirmative insists on drilling the images of pain associated with our soldiers
in Okinawa into our heads, ensuring that we will remember it for as long as we
live and forever be scared by it. However, this insistence on remembering and
guilt turns the case – as long as we focus on pain and paying off our infinite debt
to those who have suffered we can never actually solve oppression – we are
paralyzed by our guilt, unable to take any meaningful action. Saurette indicates
that our insistence on creating an ideal world where this pain does not exist
makes us hate the world we live in and refuse to change it for the better – this
leads to a world where death becomes desirable. The alternative is to forget
about the suffering associated with the bases in Okinawa. Our Zupancic evidence
says that this refusal to acknowledge suffering is a way to resist the paralyzing
function of suffering; to allow everybody to decide their own will to power. Use
the ballot to move past the harms that they discuss and find new ways to act –
this solves the case because it opens up ways to actually act politically.
3. Perm doesn’t necessarily allow for their impacts – Zupancic indicates that a
willingness to divorce pain from suffering is key to create new political action that
moves away from the paralysis they cause, allowing us to solve their impacts –
means there’s no risk of a net benefit
Zarathustra affirms being. Immediately before describing his restoration to divinity of "Lord Chance," he
announces:
I have become one who blesses and one who affirms: this is why I wrestled long and was a
wrestler, so that once my hand would be freed for blessing. And this is my blessing: to stand over every thing
whatsoever as its own sky or heaven, as its rounded roof, its azure bell and eternal security: and blessed is he who
thus blesses! For all things are baptized in the well of eternity and beyond good and evil. (III:4; 209.3-10)
Nietzsche, too, affirms being. His "experimental philosophy" presses on to "the
reverse" of "a will to the No," on to "a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is,
without subtraction, exception, or selection" (16[32] / WP:1041). His amor fati requires
"that one want nothing otherwise, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.
Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it [...] but rather to love
it" (EHII:10).
Nietzsche's affirmation is, certainly, an acceptance. But an agreement? A
categorical agreement? No, Zarathustra would insist, three times no!
Zarathustra may "say yes as the open sky says yes," but he also says "no as the
storm says no"; he says no, we have seen, to despotism, to dogmatism, and to
mediocrity. And he knows that there is much shit in the world.
-61
The most provocative teachings I find in Nietzsche are not political, but rather ethical;
Nietzsche does not attempt to tell us how to save the world, but rather how to save
ourselves – how to save ourselves from living lives that we will come to view with regret
rather than with pride. And he teaches that we can do that without becoming
supermen who blithely crush their supposed inferiors beneath their feet.
2. Cross-apply White from above – the role of the ballot should be choosing
between competing ontologies, not political solutions – if we win that the
ontological stance of the 1AC creates a hatred of the world we live in you vote
negative to reject it – the political effects of the alternative don’t matter
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