Exhibit To Hosemann's Rebuttal To Responses To Hosemann's Motion To Dismiss (NAACP V Barbour)

"
Case 3:11-cv-00159-TSL -MTP Document 59-1 Filed 04/13/11 Page 1 of 28

Case 3: 11-cv-00 119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 1 of 28
IN THE UNTED STATES DISTRCT COURT

. FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRCT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DMSION
MAISON COUNTY BOAR OF

SUPERVISORS and JOHN W. ROBINSON, III PLAINTIFFS
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:iicv119-WH-LRA
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,
.
LEE WESTBROOK, in her offcial
capacity as MAISON COUNTY CIRCUIT
CLERK and MAISON COUNTY REGISTRA
MAISON COUNTY REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE
COMMTTEE, AND MAISON COUN
DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMTTEE DEFENDANTS
MEMORAUM OF AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Jim Hood, Attorney General for the State of Mississippi ("Attorney General"), fies this
Memorandum Supportng the State of Mississippi's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 15).
I. Introduction.
Every fifth county election cycle - for offices with four year terms - occurs in the same year
that population data is released in the decennial federal census cycle. The unavoidable combination
of those two cycles every twenty years does not yield an automatic "one person, one vote" violation
for anyone. Neverteless, plaintiffs Madison County Board of Supervisors ("Madison Board") and
John W. Robinson, III ("Robinson") (collectively "plaintiffs") have filed this lawsuit makng that
faulty claim.
Plaintiffs, relying exclusively on that il-reasoned "one person, one vote" argument, have
EXHIBIT
l "A"
Case 3:11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 2 of 28
requested that this Cour issue a judgment: (1) declarig its curent supervsor distrct lines are
unconstitutional; (2) declarng that the Mississippi Legislatue's statutory qualifying deadline for
county candidates is unconstitutional, as applied to plaintiffs; and (3) enjoining the county candidate
qualifying deadline mandated by the Mississippi Legislatue. The Cour previously denied
plaintiffs' request for a temporar restrainng order encompassing their requested relief. Now, the
Cour should simlarly deny plaintiffs' request for a prelimiary and permanent injunction and
dismiss all their claims.
The Madison Board does not have stading to bring this lawsuit. Additionally, federal cour
in Mississippi, and elsewhere, have ruled that actionable "one person, one vote" violations are not
produced when census cycles and election cycles converge. See, e.g., Bryant v. Lawrence County,
Mississippi, 814 F.Supp. 1346 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Fairley v. Forrest County, Mississippi, 814
F.Supp. 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1993). The same pattern which taes place every twenty years is at the
hear of plaintiffs' claims here. It does not render the curent county election distrcts, or the
Legislature's established election deadlines, unconstitutional on account of "one person, one vote,"
or any other federal law. It does not warant the declaratory and injunctive relief that the plaintiffs
seek.
This Court should follow the opinions from previous federal cours that have faced the same
issue, and deny plaintiffs' relief, instead of interferig with Madison County's political process.
Plaintiffs' motion for declaratory and injunctive relief should be denied and their claims should be
dismissed with prejudice.
-2-
Case 3: 11-cv-00 119-WHB ~LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 3 of 28
ß. Facts.
A. Background and Procedural Facts.
1. The Madison Board's Redistricting Committee and Statements to the Public.
The Madison County election cycle began on Januar 1, 2011 when qualifying for county
offces opened. See Miss. CODE ANN. §23-15-299(2). The Madison Board planed to use the
curent supervisor distrct lines in its 2011 elections. (See Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistrcting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 2, 2011, Ex. "D"). On February 4, 2011, the 2010
United States Census data became available to the county. (Complaint at ~ 2, Docket No. i).
On Februar 22, 2011, the Madison Board held a public meeting to discuss redistrcting. (See
Steven G. Watson, County may redistrict before election, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, Februar
23,2011, Ex. "A").' The meeting was a follow-up to an anouncement that a commttee had been.
formed to consider redistrcting of the county's election distrcts. Members of the five-person
commttee formed by the Board included supervisor Tim Johnson, supervisor Karl Bank, county
admnistrator Brad Sellers, Board attorney Eric. Hamer, and Circuit Clerk Lee Westbrook. (See
Steven G. Watson, Residents 'don't trustsupervisors, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, Februar 23,
2011, Ex. "B"). The Madison Board openly acknowledged that putting more than two supervisors
on the commttee would make committee meetings open to the public. (Id.).
At the February 22 meeting, some members of the public questioned the make-up of the
commttee. The Board attorney responded to concerns by saying that the county could fie a lawsuit
to move the qualifying deadline for the curent election cycle. (See Steven G. Watson, County may
, Unless otherwise noted, references to exhibits contained herein refer to those exhibits attached to the
State's Response in Opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. _J fied at the same
time as this Memorandum.
-3-
redistrict before election, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, Februar 23, 2011, Ex. "A"). The Board
attorney explained that the Butler Snow fin had already filed a similar case in Hancock County and
could be associated so that Madison County would not have to "reinvent the wheeL." (Id.).
Following the public corients, the February 22 meeting culmated in a Madison Board vote to
fie this lawsuit. (Id.). The redistrcting process was expected to take several weeks. Meanwhile,
the Madison Board promised to hold multiple public hearngs and advise the public of any proposals .
or considerations. (Id. V
MadisonBoard's vote to fie a lawsuit, drew skepticism from the public and candidates for
office. (See Editorial, We don't trust the supervisors either, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 2,
2011, Ex. "C"; Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL,
March 2, 2011, Ex. "D"). As of this writing, the Madison Board stil has not decided on a specific
plan for new lines. A public hearng is curently set for March 21, 2011 to discuss plans that might
be submitted to the Departent of Justice for pre-clearance. (See Lucy Weber, Madison supes eye
redistrict options, THE CLARION-LEDGER, March 15,2011, Ex. "E").
2. The Similar Hancock County Lawsuit.
Longbefore this laWsuit was fied, on December 14, 2010, the Hancock County Board of
Supervisors ("Hancock Board") filed a nearly identical challenge to the Mississippi Legislatue's
county election qualifying deadline. The case is pending before Chief Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. (See
Civil Action No. 1:1Ocv564-LG-RH at Complaint, Docket No.1). The Hancock Board is
represented in that lawsuit by the Butler Snow law firm, and at least one of the Butler Snow
2 Offcial actions of
the Madison Board at the February 22 mec;ting are also evidenced by the Board's
minutes. (See Minutes of the Board of Supervisors, February 22, 2011, Ex. "I," and online at -chttp://madison-
co.com/images/admin/pdfs/745 _86447 _Minutes_2-22- 1 1_(Final).pdf. J.
-4-
Case 3:11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 5 of28
attorneys in ths case has appeared in this case and the Hancock County case. On Februar 10,2011,
the Hancock Board filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment Permanent Injunction, and Preliminar
Injunction. (See Civil Action No. 1:1Ocv564-LG-RH at Motion for Injunction, Docket No.1 I).
On February ll, 2011, a hearng was set for February 25,201 L (See Civil Action No. 1:1Ocv564-
LG-RHW at Februar 11,2011 Text Order).
The Attorney General subsequently was allowed to intervene and filed a Motion to Dismiss.
(See Civil Action No. 1:lOcv564-LG-RH at Order, Docket No. 14; Motion to Dismiss, Docket
Nos; 19 & 20V The February 25 hearing was canceled and the case was stayed pending a ruling
on the Motion to Dismiss, which is curently in the briefing process. (See Civil Action No.
1: 1Ocv564-LG-RH at Februar 22,2011 Text Order & Februar 25, 2011 TextOrder).
In addition to the pending Motion to Dismiss, a Motion to Consolidate cases has been filed.
,
(See Civil Action NO.1: 1 Ocv564- LG- RH at Motion to Consolidate, Docket No. 27). The Motion
to Consolidate seeks to combine the Hancock County lawsuit, ths lawsuit, and several others that
have been fied by NAACP organizations in some Mississippi counties.4 As of this wrting, no
3 The Attorney General's Memorandum Supporting his Motion to Dismiss fied on February 23, 201 I in the
Hancock County action (Civil Action No. I: I Ocv564-LG-RHW, Docket No. 20J explains the numerous reasons that
Hancock County's Board has no valid claims in that case. Many of those arguments likewise explain why plaintiffs'
claims in this action have no merit. Indeed, the defend¡mt Madison County Republican Executive Committee has
seen fit to essentially duplicate that February 23, 201 I brief in support of its own arguments in opposition to the
plaintiffs' complaint in this action. (See MCREC Mem., Docket No. 13J.
4 Various local branches of
the NAACP and some individual voters have fied at least eight lawsuits in the
Southern District and eight lawsuits in the Northern District, as of this writing. The NAACP suits have been fied
against respective Mississippi county Boards of "Supervisors, and others, as defendants. The plaintiffs in the
NAACP cases have made virtally the same allegations and requests for relief as those advanced by the Madison
Board and the Hancock Board in their cases. The only substantive distinctions are the alignment of the parties, and
the statistical numbers before the courts with respect to each county involved. Notably, even though only a small
number of the county boards and other named defendants have responded to the NAACP complaints in those cases
so far, several counties reportedly intend to resist the relief requested (i.e., moving the qualifying deadline and
requiring the counties to re-draw their supervisor district lines in the middle of the current election cycle). (See, e.g.,
Civil Action No. 3:llcvI21-HTW -LRA, Answer and Defenses ofCopiah County Board of Supervisors, Docket No.
13; Civil Action No. 5:11cv30-DPJ-FKB, Answer and Defenses of Adams County Board of Supervisors, Docket No.
13). Meanwhile, other county boards have been weighing their options behind closed doors. (See, e.g., John Suratt,
-5-
decision on the Motion to Consolidate has been issued by Chief Judge Guiola.
3. This Lawsuit and the Plaintiffs' Motion for TRO.
. Meanwhile, the Madison Board filed this lawsuit on February 25, 2011. (Complaint, Docket
No. I). The named defendants are the State of Mississippi, the Circuit Clerk/County Registrar, the
county Republican Executive Commttee, and the county Democratic Executive Commttee. (I d.).
The only substantive difference between this lawsuit and the Hancock County lawsuit is that
the Board has been joined by an additional plaintiff, individual Madison County voter and attorney.
John W. Robinson, III. Plaintiffs fied a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Prelimiar
Injunction along with their Complaint. (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminar
Injunction, Docket No.2). On March 1, 2011, the Cour held a telephonic conference on the motion.
The Cour subsequently entered an order denying the plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraing
Order and setting a briefing schedule on plaintiffs' claim for a preliminar injunction. (Order,
Docket No.3). The paries are scheduled to appear for a hearng on April 1, 2011. (Id.).
The March I, 2011 qualifying deadline established by the Mississippi Legislatue has now
passed. Candidates have qualified under the existing distrct lines. The names of candidates for
office have been published under the curent election boundares. (See Qualifing deadline for
county elections passes, all

five supervisor races are contested, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March
1, 2011, Ex. "G").
B. Facts Specific to the Merits of Plaintiffs' Claims.
The facts relevant to the merits are undisputed. Madison CountY maintains five supervisor
Amite hearings on new district lines set, ENTERPRISE-JOURNAL, March 8, 201 I, Ex. "F"J.
-6-
distrcts as required by state constitution and statute. See Miss. CONST., ar. 6 § 170; Miss. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-1. Those distrct boundaes are established by the county Board of Supervisors. See
Miss. CODE AN. §§ 23-15-281 & -283. The curent Madison County supervisor voting distrct.
boundaries were drawn by the Madison Board. The boundares were adopted and pre-cIeared by
the Deparent of Justice in March 2003, based upon 2000 census population data. (See Plaintiffs'
Motion for TRO and Injunction at Ex. "A," Docket No. 2). The distrcts have not since been
adjudged to violate constitutional, or state or federal law.
The Census Bureau released its 2010 population data on or about February 4, 2011.
(Complaint at~2; Docket No.1). The plaintiffs allege there has been an increase and shifts in
population and voting age population iIi Madison County evidenced by the 2010 data. (Id. at ~~ 17-
18). As such, plaintiffs claim use of the curent distrct boundaries in the curent election cycle
would violate the "one person, one vote" principle. (Id. at ~ 20).
Madison County's compliance with the "OIle":person, one-vote" principle - derived from the
Foureenth Amendment - depends, in part, upon the percentage deviation of the population among
the five supervisor distrcts. According to the plaintiffs, the 2010 census data shows an overall
maximum deviation among the five supervisor distrcts of thirt-eight point twenty-one percent
(38.21 %). (Id. at~ 18). More specifically, the plaintiffs' proffered numbers show there isa high
deviation of nineteen point thirt-seven percent (19.37%) in district three and a low deviation of
. eighteen point eighty-four percent (18.84%) in distrct five. (Id. at ~~ 16-21)
Certin regulations and deadlines pertaining to county elections, are prescribed by the
Mississippi Legislatue. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-1 et seq. The qualifying period for
supervisor candidates in each distrct is established by statute. County-wide distrct qualification
-7-
Case 3:11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed03/18/11 Page 8 of 28
began on Januar 1,2011 and the deadline is March 1,2011. See Miss. CODE AN. §23-15-299(2).
. Par primar elections wil be held in August 2011 and the general election wil take place in
November 201 1. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-191 & -193~
If new distrct . lines wil be used for 201 1 elections, the lines must be re-drawi and pre-
cleared by June 2, 2011. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-285 (mandating any change in lines must
be done at least two months prior to anyelection). Other time considerations are relevant. Absentee
ballots must be prepared and printed: Absentee ballots must be available fort-five (45) days in
advance of the August 2 primaries (i.e., June 18,2011). See Miss. CODE ANN.§ 23-15-649.
Departent of Justice regulations require any new lines to he pre:'cleared pursuant to Section
Five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Deparent of Justice can take up to sixty (60) days to
approve lines. 28 C.F.R. § 51.9(a). Departent ofJustice also may extend that time ifit requires
more information before pre-clearance, or if it objects to any part ofthe redistrcting plan. 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.9(c).
Based on these facts, plaintiffs now seek a judgment: (1) declaring that the curent supervisor
distrct lines are unconstitutional; (2) declarg that the Mississippi Legislature's statutory qualifying
deadline for county candidates is unconstitutional, as applied to plaintiffs; and (3) enjoining the
Mississippi Legislatue's county candidate qualifying deadline. (Complaint at pp. 9-10, Docket No.
1). Additionally, and implicit in plaintiffs' relief, the Cour would have to establish a new qualifying
deadline. The relief should be denied and their claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Legal Analysis.
A. The Madison Board Has Not Presented Any "Case or Controversy."
The Còurt should first decline to hear Madison Board's case. Federal courts may not
-8-
Case 3: 11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 9 of 28
consider a lawsuit that is not an "actual controversy," pursuant to Ar. il ofthe Constitution and the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 2201. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458
(1974). The Madison Board has the burden of establishing an "actual controversy," i. e., its stading.
See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). The stadig doctre's core inquir is
"whether the litigant is entitled to have.the cour decide the merits ofthe dispute or of paricular
issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To prove stading, "a plaintiff must show: (1)
it has suffered, or immnently wil suffer, a concrete and pariCularized injur~in-fact; (2) the injur
is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) a favorable judgment is likely to redress the
Ínjury." Houston Chronicle Publg Co. v: City of League City, Tex., 488 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir.
2007).. None of these elements are present here.
1. The Madison Board Does Not Have Standing to Represent Voters or Sue the
Defendants on Fourteenth Amendment Grounds.
As an intial matter, federal law says that the Madison Board - as a political subdivision of
the State - does not have standing here to challenge Miss. Code An. § 23-15-299(2) on behalf of
voters, or to sue the State and other political subdivisions. As explained by the Second Circuit,
"(p)olitical subdivisions of a state may not challenge the validity of a state statute under the
Foureenth Amendment." City of New Yorkv. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held the same. See Town of Ball v. Rapides
Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1051 & n. 1 (5th Cir. 1984) (political subdivison did not have
standing to sue the state or another political subdivision under the F ourteenth Amendment); Appling
v. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, 621 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1980) (political
subdivisions do not have same constitutional rights as individuals); City of Safety Harbor v.
Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (51h Cir. 1976) (municipal corporation could not assert
-9-
constitutional civil rights challenge as a plaintiff). For this reason, the Madison Board does not have
standing to bring this action, whether it be allegedly on behalf of voters, or simply againt the state
or other political subdivisions lie the defendants.
2. The Madison Board Has No Injury-in-fact..
Even if Madison Board is allowed to brig Foureenth Amendment challenges against the
state or other political subdivisions, the Madison Board's claims specifically do not meet the well-
established three-par test for stading, The Madison Board has no injur-in:-fact. It is only
concerned about a possible voter challenge to the 2011 elections if the legislatively mandated
qualifying deadline is not moved. The Madison Board. has not been sued. Rather, the Madison
Board claims there isa threat offuture constitutional challenges to its 2011 elections, and costs that
the Board might incur if future special elections are held. (Complait at'r 38, Docket No.1). That
is not an "injury-in-fact." It is a merely a conjectural har.
The Madison Board's injur claim is insufficient. Federal law does not require it to
implement 20 i 0 census data, in the middle of the 2011 election cycle, to avoid a "one person, one
vote" violation. The United States Distrct Cour for the Southern Distrct of Mississippi previously
. addressed an actual controversy that is virtally identical to the circumstances here. That court
determned that the use of existing boundary lines in county elections would not violate the "one-
person, one-vote" principle when receipt of the "new" census data left insuffcient time to redistrct.
Bryant v. Lawrence County, Mississippi, 814 F.Supp. 1346 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
In Bryant, citizens of Lawrence County challenged a supervisor distrcting plan formulated
in 1984. /d. at 1348. The plan was utilized for supervisor elections in 1991 just after the 1990
census data was available. Id. at 1352. The County had attempted to redistrct based on the 1990
-10-
Case 3: 11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 . Page 11 of 28
data, but was unable to gain pre-clearance from the Deparent of Justice prior to the 1991. elections
in the four year cycle. Id. Voters sued Lawrence County on "one person, one vote," and other
grounds, to require special. elections with distrcts devised using the fresh 1990 data. Id.
After reviewing other federal decisions where similar census-timing issues were involved,
and resolved in favor of the local governents, the court flatly rejected the plaintiffs ' contention that
special elections were required due to a "one person, one vote" violation. The court explaied
when a political body is operating under a constitutional plan (one pre-cleared by the
Justice Departent and not challenged in Court, or either agreed to by the paries to
.litigatioii and then pre-cleared by the Justice Deparent as is the situation in ths
case) that such body must have a reasonable time after each decennal census in
order to develop another plan and have it pre..cleared by the Justice Deparent.
Elections held under such a previously pre-cleared plan, in the year that new census
data becomes available, but before redistrcting can take place, should not be set
aside and new elections ordered.
/d. at 1354 (emphasis added). The Cour ultimately held there was no actionable "one person, one
vote" claim alleged by the plaintiffs in Bryant. Id.5
Here, the same reasoning applies to the facts facing the Madison Board. The curent
supervisor distrcts conform to a 2003 pre-cleared plan based on 2000 census data. If the Board
complies with the Mississippi Legislatue's directive, and proceeds on the statutory timetable for
the curent 2011 election cycle, then elections on lines drawn under the 2000 census wil not
produce a valid "one person, one vote" claim against the county. Using the curent lines would not
cause it any injur.
5 The plaintiffs may argue Bryant and the other cases regarding special elections are not relevant here, just
as they argued before the Court denied their Temporary Restraining Order. That argument is wrong and relies on a
distinction without a difference. The plaintiffs fied this suit in the middle of the current election cycle before any
elections have actually taken place. Special elections are thus not part of the relief at issue. However, the reason
why special elections were not ordered in Bryant, and the other cases directly on point, is the same reason why the
relief requested by plaintiffs here is not warranted. Elections on current lines, the same year as census data becomes
available, are not susceptible to a valid ~'one person, one vote" challenge.
-11-
3. The Madison Board Has No "Fairly Traceable" Injury.
The Madison Board claims its injur is a fear of expensive lawsuits and other costs
associated with election challenges. Even assuming that injur satisfies Arcle II, which it does
not, there is no proof that the injur has been (or would be) perpetrated by the defendants here. The
Madison Board is responsible for drawing the districtlines and compliance with "one person, one
vote," not the defendats. The Census Bureau collected the county census data and released it in
the middle of the curent election cycle. The Attorney General is not aware of any challenge, or
threat of any challenge, the defendants would make if the curent lines are not re-drawn
immediately. The Madison Board has not come forward with any proofthat such a challenge is
intended. The defendants are not the cause of the supposed injur the Madison Board complains
it is facing.
4. A Favorable Judgment Would Not Remedy the Madison Board's Alleged

Injury.
Again assuming the Madison Board could prove the other requirements for stading, which
they cannot, a declaratory judgment and injunction would not solve the problem the Madison Board
claims to face for at least three reasons. First, the Madison Board has not named any defendants that
might file suit against it. If-as it claims - the Madison Board's desire is to immunze itself against
a futue suit filed by anyone who is not a defendant, a judgment from the Court would not be
binding~ See, e.g., Fabela v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas, 2010 WL 4610143, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 15, 2010) (rejecting res judicata defense to voting rights claim based on prior litigation of issue
against different paries).
Second, and similar, to the extent that the Board is concerned that it might be sued for "one
-12-
person, one vote," no order of this Cour can prevent that contigency. An injunction or declaration
may provide a persuasive but not a legally binding defense to a futue action. It would not save the
Board from having to respond to a suit, if such an event ever occurs.6
Thrd, there is no proof-aside from speculation - that if the qualifyg date is moved by this
Court, the Madison Board wil be able to redraw its distrcts and get pre-clearance from the
Deparent of Justice in tie for the planed elections. The Cour should not simply assume that
modification of the Mississippi Legislatue's statutorily mandated deadlines wil produce a pre-
cleared plan in time to meet new deadlines prescribed by the Cour. See 28 C.F.R. § 5L.9(a) & (c)
(sixty (60) days for Deparent of Justice consideration of redistrcting plans, and additional time
if objections are lodged or fuher information is requested).
Additionally, public discord created by the Madison Board's assembly of its Redistrcting
Committee, and other public comment issues, may cause fuher delays in putting together a valid
redistricting plan. (See, e.g., Steven G. Watson, Residents 'don't trut' supervisors, MADISON
COUNTY JOURNAL, Februar 23, 2011, Ex. "B"; Editorial, We don't trust the supervisors either,
Madison County Journal, March 2, 2011, Ex. "C"; Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistricting, Madison County Journal, March 2,2011, Ex. "D"). There is no assurance the relief
sought by the Madison Board would remedy the problem it has invented for itself.
In sum, the Madison Board does not have any right to sue the defendants based on the
Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the elements required for Article III standing are not present. .
6 Additionally, and itonically, if the Madison Board obtains a declaration that its current district lines are
unconstitutional, that would be an open invitation for suits should it be unable to secure a pre-cleared plan from
Department of Justice before June 2. Its choice to essentially advocate against itself in that regard relies on a
haphazard gamble that Department of Justice wil approve any new lines in time to hold timely primary elections this
Summer.
-13-
The Cour lacks subject matter jursdiction as to the Madison Board's dispute. Accordingly, the
relief sought by the Madison Board should be denied and its claims should be dismissed by way of
surar judgment.
B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Should be Denied and Their
Case Dismissed With Prejudice.
As explained above, the Madison Board's claims should be dismissed altogether because it
has no standing to assert them. Additionally, and even assuming the Madison Board does have
standing, both of the plaintiffs' claims for relief should be denied, and their claims dismissed on the
merits.
1. Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Declaratory Relief.
As a staring point, under Count I oftheir Complaiiit, the plaintiffs have asked for a two-fold
declaration that holds: (1) the curent Madison County supervisor lines are unconstitutional ifused
in the 2011 elections; and (2) the Mississippi Legislatue's March 1 qualifying deadline is
unconstitutional as applied to Madison County. Under federal law , declaratory relief on either front
is inappropriate. Madison County's use of the current supervisor distrct lines in the 2011 election
cycle would not create an actionable "one person, one vote" problem. Therefore, the Cour should
not alter the Legislatue's election time table. The Cour should not legislate from the bench for
Madison County by declarng the curent lines, or the Mississippi Legislatue's qualifying deadline,
unconstitutionaL.
In Reynolds v. Sims, the United States Supreme Court's landmark case regarding "one
person, one vote" rights, the Cour pointed out that reapportionment of election distrcts is primarily
a concern for the legislative branches and explained judicial relief is only appropriate when a
governental unit fails to reapportion "in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity
-14-
to do so." 377 U.S. 533, 586(1964) (emphasis added). Nobody can validly argue that Madison
county has had an adequate opportty to draw new.lnes, or could be faulted if new lies are not
used in the August and November 2011 elections. Even so, plaintiffs have inappropriately asked
this Cour to stretch the "one person, one vote" principle to achieve a desired political result.
The crucial issue is whether, if this federal Cour does not legislate new election deadlines
for Madison County, would the county violate "one person, one vote" in holding elections under the
curent lines? Stated differently, given the facts which plaintiffs forecast wil play out if the curent
supervisor lines are used, would they produce a valid "one person, one vote" challenge? The prior
federal courts that have examined the same issue, on identical facts, have flatly said "no." See
French v. Boner, 963 F.2d 890,891 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 954; Ramos v. Illnois,
976F.2d335, 340-41 (7thCir. 1992); Republican Part of Oregon v. Keisling, 959 F.2d 144, 145-46
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 914; Kahn v.Grifn, 2004 WL 1635846, at *6 (D. Minn. July
20,2004), certifed question answered by 71 N.W. 2d 815 (Min. 2005); Fairley, 814 F.Supp. at
1343-46; Bryant, 814 F.Supp. at 1354.
The same reasoning of all these other federal cours applies to the plaintiffs' Complaint.
Madison County's curent supervisor distrct lines conform to a pre-cleared plan based on 2000
census data. If the Madison County supervisor elections proceed under the current lines, and the
county continues to comply with the Mississippi Legislatue's statutory timetable for the ongoing
2011 election cycle, then nobody has a valid claim for "one person, one vote." The entire basis for
plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief

(Count I) is misguided. Their motion should be denied and
its declaratory judgment count should be dismissed by way of summary judgment.
-15-
Case 3: 11 ~cv-00119-WHB ~LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 16 of 28
-16-
Case. 3: 11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 17 of 28
96JF.2d at 891 (no valid "one person, one vote" claim in year census data became available);
Ramos, 976 F.2d at 340-41 (no constitutional violation in four year delay of implementing new
Census data); Republican Party of Oregon, 959 F.2d at 145-46 (redistrcting causing temporary
dilution of voting power did not merit constitutional violation or require special elections); Kahn,
2004 WL 1635846, at *6 (alleged "one person, one vote" deviation did not require special elections);
Fairley, 814 F.Supp. at 1343-46 (no "one person, one vote" violation requiring special elections in
same year as new census data became available).
The same "one person, one vote" controversy arses every twenty years for elected offces
involving fpin year terms. Federal cours have recognzed that the issue is bound to occur every
fifth election cycle, yet unformly have held that the phenomenon does not create the automatic "one
person, one vote" violation as claimed by plaintiffs here. For example, in Ramos, the cour analyzed
that issue and held against the plaintiffs there:
(t)he four-year terms that Chicago aldermen serve merely indicate that every fifth
election (i.e.when the election year falls on the same year that the new census data
becomes available) likely wil result in a four-year delay in using the new census
data. But this simple consequence of the two different schedules (i.e. census every
ten years, elections every four) does not diminish the voting power of any protected
minority; there is merely a four-year time lag that occurs every other decade between
redistrcting and elections. Thus, accepting their allegations as tre, we hold .that the
plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would lead us to believe that the Ilinois
redistrcting scheme denies any class of citizens full paricipation in Chicago's
political process.
Ramos, 976 F.2d at 339-41. Similarly, as another example, the Kahn court observed the problem
was a consequence of the combination of the election and census cycles and maintained the court
should not interfere with state regulation of elections:
(o)f more concern to the Cour, however, is the probability, recognized by plaintiffs
at oral argument, that awarding plaintiffs the relief they seek in this instance would
effectively require a similar action at least every 20 years when the curent situation
-17-
Case 3: 11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16. Filed 03/18/11 Page 18 of 28
is répeated. It could require simlar action every 10 years in order to ensure that new
census data is incorporated and put into action as soon as possible, and could require
morè frequent action if Minesota decides to redistrct on a more frequent schedule.
As the Sixth Circuit noted, the only way to avoid such a problem would be to order
the City to limit term of office and the election cycle-a signficant intederence in
the State's right to regulate its elections that would be inappropriate absent
greater
provocation.
Kahn, 2004 WL 1635846, at *6;. 7 (citing French, 963 F.2d at 891-92). . Established federal
Jaw does
not allow anyone to ru to the courouse every twenty years to claim "one person, one vote"
violations. Precedent says the four year time lag between new census data and the next election
cycle does not diminsh anyone's constitutional voting rights.
Moreover, the size of the alleged deviation does not render elections under the curent
Madison lines per se invalid, as the plaintiffs erroneously believe. In French, where a total
deviation of over one hundred nineteen percent (119%) between two distrcts was at issue, the court
explained
in any system of representative governent, it is inevitable that some elections for

four-year or longer term wil occur on the cusp of the decennial census.
The terms inevitably wil last well into the next decade; and, depending on shifts in
population in the preceding decade, the representation may be unequal in the sense
that the distrcts no longer meet a one-person, one-vote test under the new census.
...Theprinciples of mathematical equality and majority rule are important, but we

should not allow them to outweigh all other factors in reviewing the time of
elections.
...We do not believe that considerations of mathematical equality in representation

or the presumption in favor of redistrcting every ten years outweigh the
considerations outlined above concernng the validity offour-yearterms, the settled
expectations of voters and elected officials, the costs of the elections, and the need
for stability and continuity of office....
French, 963 F.2d at 891-92. The one hundred and nineteen percent (119%) in French simply did
not create a valid "one person, one vote" claim given the release of the census data was durng the
-18-
election cycle.
Here, the facts are the same ths time around. The curent Madison County supervsor
distrct lines were approved by the Madison Board and pre-cleared by Deparent of Justice in
2003. Those lines have never been determined to violate anyone's "one person, one vote" right, or
any other constitutional rights. Just like in all the other federal cases involving similar facts, it
would not violate anyone's rights to use the curent lines in the 2011 Madison County supervisor
election cycle that is well underway.
More specifically, plaintiffs allege the population distrbution of Madison CoUnty has
changed since the 2000 Census. The 2010 figures came out little more than a month ago, and after
the 2011 election cycle commenced. Based on their numbers submitted to the Cour, the plaintiffs
claim Madison County currently has a deviation ~fthirt-eight point twenty-one (38.21 %) given the
current supervisor lines. An alleged high deviation of nineteen pointthirt-seven percent (19.3 7%)
exists in distrct thee and a low deviation of eighteen point eighty-four percent (18.84%) in distrct
five.7 These deviations are far smaller than French and akn to the deviations in Bryant and Fairley.
In any event, the timing of the release of the 2010 census data is actually dispositive here. The Cour
should follow the guidance provided by all the prior opinions on the subject and hold that plaintiffs
do not have a legally valid claim.
There is no credible arguent that using the curent supervisor lines would create an
actionable "one person, one vote" violation. The plaintiffs consequently cannot succeed on the
merits of their claims that the current lines are unconstitutional, or that deadlines must be moved to
7 In Fairley, Judge Pickering offered a statistical analysis explaining why deviations similar to the
percentages offered by the plaintiffs here actually reveal only a minimal variation in voter influence. 814 F.Supp. at
1336-38. The math used in Fairley is equally applicable here and shows why the deviation claimed by plàintiffs is
not as drastic as they complain.
-19-
Case 3:11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 20 of28
accommodate them. Therefore, plaintiffs' injunctive relief should be denied.
b. There is no Threat of Irreparable Injury.
Even assuming plaintiffs might succeed on the merits, which is not tre, the plaintiffs also
have not shown they would suffer irreparable harm from the use of the curent supervsor distrct
lines in the curent election cycle, or if the Cour does not change the deadlines applicable to the
2011 elections. The reasoning of the cases cited above explain why plaintiffs have no likeliood
of success on the merits and equally demonstrates why plaitiffs do not face any threat of irreparable
injur here. See French, 963 F.2d at 891; Ramos, 976 F.2d at 340-41; Republican Party of Oregon,
959 F.2d at 145-46; Kahn v.Grin, 2004 WL 1635846, at *6; Fairley, 814 F.Supp. at 1343-46;
Bryant, 814 F.Supp. at 1354. . Additionally, in Reynolds, cited above and repeatedly by plaintiffs,
the CoUr explained the reasons why plaintiffs have no ireparable injur here:
(r)eallocation of legislative seats every 10 years coincides with the prescribed

practice in 41of the States, often honored more in the breach than the observance,
however.... Limitations on the frequency of reapportonment are justified by the
need for stability and continuity in the organization of the legislative system,
although undoubtedly reapportoning no more frequently than every 10 years leads.
to some imbalance in the population of distrcts toward the end of the decennial
period and also to the development of resistance to change on the part of some
incumbent legislators. In substance, we do not regard the Equal Protection Clause
as requiring daily, monthly, annual or biennal reapportionment, so long as a State
has a reasonably conceived plan for periodic readjustment of legislative
representation. While we do not intend to indicate that decennal reapportionment
is a constitutional requisite, compliance with such an approach would clearly meet
the minimal requirements for maintainig a reasonably curent scheme oflegislative
representation.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84. Even the analysis of plaintiffs' best case explains they do not have
a valid "one person, one vote" concern just where new census data was released durng this year's
ongoing election cycle. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any irreparable injury. The factor merits
denial of their claims for injunctive relief.
-20-
c. Plaintiffs' Alleged Threat of Injury is Outweighed by Harm to Other

Interested Partes.
The balance of harms first weighs against injUnctive reliefbecause there is no threat of injur
to plaintiffs, as explained above. Beyond that fact, the defendants and other interested paries would
suffer more than plaintiffs if any injunction is imposed.
Candidates have already qualified under the existing lines. The names of candidates for
office have been published and classified according to the curent election boundares. (See
. .
Qualifing deadline for county elections passes, all five supervisor races are contested, MADISON
COUNTY JOURNAL, March 1,2011, Ex. "G"). Moving the qualifying deadline or mandating that new
lines be used in 2011 would create confusion for the defendants, and all resideIÌts of Madison
County. Meanwhile, there is no certainty that any qualifying delay, or other modification of
deadlines and a mandatory injunction, would produce a new pre-cleared plan in time. If new lines
are hastily put in place, all of the voters the plaintiffs claim to protect would suddenly not know who
is qualified, what distrct they wil be votlng in, and may not be able to have their input regarding
. redistrcting considered.
The Departent ofJustice regulations and Mississippi statutes. applicable to the redistrcting
and 2011 election processes evidence this point. Primares are due to be held on August 2.
Therefore, the lines must be re-drawn and pre-cleared by June 2, 2011. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-
15-285 (explaining any change in lines must be done at least two months prior to any election).8 The
DepartentofJustice can take up to sixty (60) days to approve any plan. 28 C.F.R. § 51.9(a). The
8 Other time considerations are also at issue and demonstrate why accelerating the Madison County
redistricting process would be problematic. Absentee voter ballots must be prepared and printed. Those ballots
must be identical in form to the ballots used in the election and available forty-five (45) days in advance of the
August 2 primary election (i.e:, June 18,201 I). Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-649.
-21-
. Departent of Justice also may extend that time if it requires more inormation, or if it obj ects to
any par ofthe plan. 28 C.F.R. § S1.9(c). Whle that process is in motion, the candidates (and the
voting public that the plaintiffs claim to be protecting), would not know their district lines or the
. candidates. Moreover, before Deparent of Justice even gets involved, if the Cour usurs the
Mississippi Legislatue and endorses a mad rush to reapportionment, public input would be
diminished.
In other words, shriing Madison County's redistrcting time frame - essentially self-
inficted by its Board - is more likely to create confsion and harm everyone, rather than fix any
problems. There is no proof, aside from speculation, that if the supervisor qualifying
date is moved
by an order from this Cour or immediate redistrcting occurs, the Board wil be able to re-draw its
districts, keep the public informed, hold suffcient heargs, and get pre-clearance from the
Deparent of Justice in time for the elections. The Cour should not simply assume that ordering
more time for qualifying, or mandating a new time frame in which the process must be complete,
wil equate to approval of a new plan from Deparment of Justice. Defendants and everyone else
(including the plaintiffs) will be better served if the Madison Board takes its time to get Madison
County's redistrcting correct.9 Reasoned analysis ofthe balance of

harms injunction factor weighs
heavily against granting plaintiffs' requested relief.
4. The Public Would be Harmed by an Injunction.
In addition to all the other factors that weigh against plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief,
9 Additionally, plaintiffs have failed tò recognize or address the fact that the Department of Justice likely
requires pre-clearance of any injunction issued by this Court that would disrupt the election cycle. 28 C.F.R. § 51. i 8
(explaining changes affecting voting ordered by a federal court and/or subsequent changes by governmental body
necessitated by court order subject to pre-clearance requirements). Obviously, this lawsuit, and the plaintiffs'
motion for an injunction, have come way too late to derail the current election cycle.
-22-
and contrar to the plaintiffs' allegations regarding their claimed interests, all of the citizens of
Madison County, and Mississippi, would be better served if the Cour does not interfere in the
county's 2011 election cycle. In a situation where the timing of the election cycle was at issue, a
three-judge redistrcting. panel of the United States Distrct Cour for the Southern Distrct of
Mississippi explained why the public interest would be hared if it enjoined a qualifying deadline
to enable the Legislatue to get pre-clearance from Deparent of Justice. See Smith v. Clark, 189
F.Supp.2d 529 (S.D. Miss. 2002)~
In Smith, the Cour was faced with a request to enjoin the qualifying deadline for
congressional elections in 2002, but the public interest factors identified there are equally relevant
now in the scenario involving Madison County:
...we are convinced that a postponement of (the qualifying) deadline would likely
create confusion, misapprehension and burdens for the voters, for the political
paries, and for the candidates. As we said in our (previous) order, many voters may
want to partcipate in the election process to a greater extent than mere voting. They
want to know the candidates personally, to select their choice, to give money to their
selection, and to organize the people in their precincts or counties in the campaign
for their choice. Given that all previous distrcts are being cross-mixed by the loSs
of one congressional representative, resolving these new problems wil take all the
pre-primary.time that the present statute allows. If we delay the establishment of
election distrcts and advance qualifyng dates, such voters who want to become
fully involved in the process wil not timely know in which distrct they are going
to be placed, and thus will not timely know where and with whom to become
involved. The same situation wil exist for the candidates. Postponing the election
schedule means that the candidates and political paries would encounter campaign
and election burdens - that is, significant time constraints on gettng acquainted with
new voters, establishing organzations in new election districts and the multiple new
precincts and counties therein, raising campaign fuds within the new distrcts,
developing strategies for particular geographic areas, etc.
189 F.Supp.2d at 535-36. Just like in Smith, extending the qualifying deadline in Madison County
would be problematic and risks confusing voters and candidates. A candidate who qualifies after
the curent deadline (which has already passed) would be at risk of coming off the ballot. Voters
-23-
who plan to vote for her, or give money to the campaign, would be hared by such a measure.
The same tye of reasoning applies to any proposal to have new supervsor distrcts in place
by a specific date in the middle of Madison County's curent election cycle. Shrnkg the time
frame in which voters and candidates can be certn of who is ruing, where they are rung, and
who candidates wil represent, would inappropriately cause much more har than it would good.
Specifically, uncertinty already exists because of the Madison Board's actions and would
only be exacerbated by giving plaintiffs an injunction. Originally, "(s)upervsors had planed to
delay the redistrcting and use existing distrct lines in the 2011 election because the 2010 census
numbers did not become available until (Februar)." (See Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 2, 2011, Ex. "D"). On March 1, 2011, the public
was told that the qualifying deadline passed and candidates were set to ru under the curent distrct
lines. (See Qualifing deadline for county elections passes, all five supervisor races are contested,
MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 1,2011, Ex. "G"). Meanwhile, the Madison Board changed
its mind and now wants to rush to re-draw new lines. (See Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 2, 2011, Ex. "D").
Some view the Madison Board's flp-flop decision and this lawsuit as "erratic behavior (that)
is nothing more than a desperate ploy to help Karl Bans maintain his reign while sticking it to D.L.
Smith ~ and there's no easy way to do that." (See Editorial, We don't trst the supervisors either,
MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 2,20 II, Ex. "C"). Others are concerned because re-drawing
the lines wil impact the distrcts where candidates may ru, and where they must campaign. (See
Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 2, 2011,
Ex. "D"). Candidates have even said publicly that lines should not be re-drawn before the upcoming
-24-
election because of the confsion new lines would create. (See Steven G. Watson, Smith could face
Redd in remap, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 16,2011, Ex. "H").IO If the Cour grants
injunctive relief, there are more potential problems than there would be in maintaining the status
quo. The Cour should head off the problems by denying plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief,
rather than causing more problems by granting it.
Additionally, the public interest of Mississippi as a whole cuts against granting plaintiffs'
requested injunctive relief. As discussed and noted above, a similar case filed by Madison County's
.lawyers is pending in Hancock County. There are also currently at least sixteen other cases fied in
the Nortern and Southern Distrcts by branches of the NAACP that involve the exact same
arguments and seek the same legal relief. Allowing Madison County - or any other counties - an
unwaranted exception to the Legislatue's qualifying deadline, or laying down an il-founded
precedent that Mississippi counties' election boundaries are unconstitutional (and must be redrawn
and pre-cleared immediately) in the middle of the curent election cycle, would throw elections
across the state into disaray. Moreover, given that this issue recurs every score of years due to the
intersection of four year terms of office and the release of decennal census data, uncertinty wil
envelop Mississippi's local elections every twenty years if the plaintiffs are permitted to succeed.
In sum, the public - in Madison County and state-w~de - wil be better served here if the
Madison Board follows the law established by the Mississippi Legislatue, the county's voters have
10 The March 16 news

story also goes on to explain cite comments from the Board attorney that the
Madison Board may not agree on a proposed plan at the upcoming March 21 hearing, but that the Madison Board's
chances in this Court wil improve if an approved plan can be sent to Department of Justice before the Court's April
1 hearing. Obviously, the Madison Board's recent rush to re-draw lines and push them through the process
unfortunately runs the risk of skewing the process and short-cutting around public review and input.
-25-
the certinty of elections under the curent pre-cleared lines, and the Madison Board taes adequate
time to get its redistrctig correct. The public interest weighs against an injunction in this case and
that is another reason the count for injunctive relief should be denied.
IV . Conclusion.
In sum, Madison County cannot be faulted under "one person, one vote" for being caught
in the convergence of the curent election cycle and release of offcial census data. But, by the same
token, its Board and one of its residents cannot abuse that phenomenon that occurs every twenty
years to undo an act of the Mississippi Legislatue or manufacture a private election time table.
The Cour should deny the Madison Board's motion, and dismiss its claims, because it has
no standig. Similarly, and even assumng the Madison Board has stading, both of the plaintiffs'
counts for declaratory and injunctive relief have no merit. The motion for prelimiar injunction
should be denied, and for the same reasons, the Court should dismiss the plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice by way of the Attorney General's separately fied motion for sumary judgment.
THIS the 18th day of March, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
JIM HOOD, ATTORNY GENERA OF

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ON BEHALF
OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
By: S/Justin L. Matheny

Harold E. Pizzetta, III (Bar No. 99867)
hpizz~ago.state.ms. us
Justin L. Matheny (Bar No. 100754)
jmath~ago.state.ms. us
Special Assistant Attorneys General
Offce of the Attorney General
-26-
P.O. Box 220

Jackson, MS 39205
Telephone: (601) 359-3680
Facsimile: (601) 359-2003
-27-
?:' . Case 3:11-cv-00159-TSL -MTP Document 59-1 Filed 04/13/11 Page 28 of 28
CERTIICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been filed electronically with the Clerk of
Cour and thereby served on the followig persons:
Mark W. Garrga
Tomme S. Cardin
Malissa Winfield
Butler Snow ü'mara Stevens & Canada, PLLC
P.O. Box 6010
Ridgeland, MS 39158-6010
Eric Hamer
Hamer & Associates
P.O. Box 2185
Ridgeland, MS 39158
John W. Robinson, III

Law Offices of John W. Robinson, III
618 Cresent Blvd., Ste. 200
Ridgeland, MS 29157
Cory T. Wilson
Wiloghby Law Group
P.O. Box 2305
Madison, MS 39130
James H. Herrng
Herrng, Long & Crews PC
P.O. Box 344
Canton, MS 39046
THIS the 18th day of March, 2011.
S/Justin L. Matheny
Justin L. Matheny
-28-

Exhibit To Hosemann's Rebuttal To Responses To Hosemann's Motion To Dismiss (NAACP V Barbour)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Exhibit To Hosemann's Rebuttal To Responses To Hosemann's Motion To Dismiss (NAACP V Barbour)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

"

Case 3:11-cv-00159-TSL -MTP Document 59-1 Filed 04/13/11 Page 1 of 28

IN THE UNTED STATES DISTRCT COURT

MAISON COUNTY BOAR OF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:iicv119-WH-LRA

MEMORAUM OF AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING

Memorandum Supportng the State of Mississippi's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion

for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 15).

dismiss all their claims.

dismissed with prejudice.

A. Background and Procedural Facts.

1. The Madison Board's Redistricting Committee and Statements to the Public.

redistrict options, THE CLARION-LEDGER, March 15,2011, Ex. "E").

2. The Similar Hancock County Lawsuit.

LG-RHW at Februar 11,2011 Text Order).

3. This Lawsuit and the Plaintiffs' Motion for TRO.

county elections passes, all

1, 2011, Ex. "G").

B. Facts Specific to the Merits of Plaintiffs' Claims.

adjudged to violate constitutional, or state or federal law.

. eighteen point eighty-four percent (18.84%) in distrct five. (Id. at ~~ 16-21)

supervisor candidates in each distrct is established by statute. County-wide distrct qualification

November 201 1. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-191 & -193~

III. Legal Analysis.

A. The Madison Board Has Not Presented Any "Case or Controversy."

2007).. None of these elements are present here.

or other political subdivisions lie the defendants.

2. The Madison Board Has No Injury-in-fact..

is not an "injury-in-fact." It is a merely a conjectural har.

In Bryant, citizens of Lawrence County challenged a supervisor distrcting plan formulated

vote" claim alleged by the plaintiffs in Bryant. Id.5

cause it any injur.

3. The Madison Board Has No "Fairly Traceable" Injury.

4. A Favorable Judgment Would Not Remedy the Madison Board's Alleged

against different paries).

Board from having to respond to a suit, if such an event ever occurs.6

if objections are lodged or fuher information is requested).

1. Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Declaratory Relief.

1343-46; Bryant, 814 F.Supp. at 1354.

plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief

same year as new census data became available).

that issue and held against the plaintiffs there:

should not interfere with state regulation of elections:

cycle does not diminsh anyone's constitutional voting rights.

in any system of representative governent, it is inevitable that some elections for

...Theprinciples of mathematical equality and majority rule are important, but we

...We do not believe that considerations of mathematical equality in representation

election cycle that is well underway.

do not have a legally valid claim.

accommodate them. Therefore, plaintiffs' injunctive relief should be denied.

b. There is no Threat of Irreparable Injury.

(r)eallocation of legislative seats every 10 years coincides with the prescribed

denial of their claims for injunctive relief.

c. Plaintiffs' Alleged Threat of Injury is Outweighed by Harm to Other

suffer more than plaintiffs if any injunction is imposed.

County's redistrcting correct.9 Reasoned analysis ofthe balance of

heavily against granting plaintiffs' requested relief.

4. The Public Would be Harmed by an Injunction.

F.Supp.2d 529 (S.D. Miss. 2002)~

now in the scenario involving Madison County:

only be exacerbated by giving plaintiffs an injunction. Originally, "(s)upervsors had planed to

redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL, March 2, 2011, Ex. "D").