The Neapolitan Republicans and Nelson's Accusers

A. T. Mahan

The English Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 55. (Jul., 1899), pp. 471-501.

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 Thc Neajolita~zReju6Z'icnns nlzd

URING the past year the character of Nelson's conduct i11 the
I ) Bay of Xaples in the last week of June, 1700, has again beell
seriously called into question, and the grave imputations formerly
illade against his integrity have been revived with much parade of
additional evidence. It has become ilecessary for me, therefore, to
review the evidence and to restate the case. The latter I have
clone, briefly, ancl with avoidance of a n appearance of controversy,
in a revised edition of my Life of Nelson, which is expected to
appear alnlost sin~ultaileouslywith this article. I n that, I have
rncleavo~~red so to present the eviclence, that a careful reader may
tl15rein find the refutation of all the charges of treachery, false-
hood. and inadequate authority, which have beell made against the
admiral, either openly, or in language but slightly veiled. The
object of the present paper is more distinctly controversial ; the
aim being to show the distortion, suppression, and manufacture, of
evidence, by which it has been sought to fortify the old charges of
the early part of the century, which were tottering on their
unsound foundations. I hope to demonstrate that, whatever
opinion may be entertained as to the propriety of NeIson's
disallo~ving and suspending the execution of a capitulation,
formal1~-signed Itnt not formally esecnted, his conduct throughout
\\.as o11e11, above-board, and consistent; consistent vith itself, and
consistent also \\.it11 that sense of dnty v i t h which Selson's name is
conspicuously identified. Incidentally, I hope to prove that the
~videnceadduced in support of the charge of treachery has been
so mangled and perverted as hopelegsly to discredit the accusers,
convicting them either of inexcusable carelessness or of wilful mis-
represent a t'ion.
The charges against the admiral have been suinlnarised by his
accusers, with sufficient precision, under three heads, viz. : 1,that
he exceeded his powers, whence his action was illegal; 2, that
effective execution liad been given to a treaty of capitulation,
~ ~ h i cheh ilevertl~elessclisallo~~ecl,
thereby becoming guilty of a
breach of faith ; 3, that he secured the surreilder uf the castles of
Sal~les1 ) a~ clistinctly tieacherous assurance that this capitulation
472 THE lVE,IPOLITAN REPUBI,IC~A-AS July
woulcl be observed by him ; an end he is asserted to have attained
by ~vordsand acts of equivocation, ~vhicheffectually and naturally
deceived the other parties concerned. Of these three, only passing
mention vill be made of the first in the present paper. The writer
believes himself to have given adequate refutation of it in the
revision of his Life of the admirai. The Caracciolo incident will
not be mentioned, no cause having been seen to change the opinion
on the matter expressed in the original edition. The sting of the
three charges lies chiefly in the third, which has been enveloped in
a mass of misrepresentations, mingled ~vithhalf-truths ancl truths,
which, unless analysed and the errors exposed, yield an impression
most injurious to Nelson's fame. I hare also attempted a narra-
tive, fuller and more consecutive than I have elsewhere found, of
the incidents precedent and attendant upon the final transactions,
as conclucive to a better understanding of the whole matter. This
paper, therefore, is complenlentary and supple111entar~-to the
treatment followed in the Life.
After the flight of the Neapolitan Court to Palernlo, in
December, 1798, ancl the entry into Naples of the French army in
January, 1790, a republic was proclaimed under the title of the
Parthenopea11 Republic. Although the ilea form of government
found a number of supporters, not only in the city itself but in
the provinces, there was nevertheless a great deal of disaffection.
particularly in the rural districts and among the lowest classes of
the capital. The republic, in fact, rested upon force, and that the
force of a foreign army inadequate to the task of imposing order in
d l parts of an exceedingly difficult country, peopled by larrless
inhabitants. The influence of the priesthood over these being very
great, the Iiillg of the two Sicilies, in the early part of February,
had sent Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo from Sicily to Calabria, to stir up
tlie existing elements of the insurrection, and to give to then1
direction and organisation so far as possible. At about the same
time a diplomatic envoy, the Chevalier 3Iicherous, was sent to
Corfu, then in the possession of the French, but attacked by a
combined force of Turlis and Russians, to ask of these allies armed
assistance ; partly for the protection of Sicily, partly for an expedi-
tion to southern Italy, in support of Rufio. Before ;\Iicheroux's
diplomacy had time to bear fruit, Ruffo in his rnlclcrt~~l~ing was so
far successful that a condition of civil mar cnsuecl ; the niunbers of
Che rabble collected under him, to ~vllicllwas given the name of the
army of the Holy Faith, or, more briefly, the Christian army,
being more than sufficient to compensate for their lack of individual
efficiency and of organisation. T'ery considerable progress had
been made to the northward, t o ~ ~ a r dNaples,
s in April, 1799.
Similar conditions adverse to the republic existed also in the
northern provinces of the Abruzzi, as well as elsewhere.
 ?tIeanryliile, in bfarch, war hacl broken out betxeen France and
Austria; the latter in alliance with Russia. The campaign in
northern Italy v a s unfortunate to the French, ~ ~ 1 1were 0 compelled
to fall back rapidly to Piedmont. As this retreat voulcl permit
tlle allies, as they ailvanced, to interpose betxeen the army in the
~ i o r t hand the detachment a t Kaples, the latter was directed to
evacuate the liingdoni and to hasten to rejoin the main body. I n
accordance v i t h these orders the French abandoned the city on
% .?,April,leaving only a garrison in the Castle of St. Elmo, on the
liill overlooliing the place. 011 7 Nay they finally qnitted the
Seapolitan t e r r i t o r ~ .tlirowing garrisons into Capna in the interior,
and into &eta on tlic ~ ~ e s t e sea-coast-both
rn north of Saples.
ll7it1l these trivial exceptions, the Scapolitan republicans
were left to their orvn scanty resources. Tlie unfa~ourableout-
looli for tlicizz tended naturally, by the desertion of the timid, to
dilninish their numbers, and to srrell those of their opponents.
Tlzeir disadvantages were increased by the approach of a body of
sonle five or six htuldred Russians and Turks, 1~110,as n result of
3liclieron~'sm ission, landed in May, on the Adriatic seaboard, from
Corfu, ilad fallen on 1 ?Ifarch. Forming a junction with the
Christian army under Rufio, their commanders snbsequentl~took
part in the ~roceedings, and signed the capitulation, tlle dis-
~ ~ l l o ~ v a of
n cnhich
e l)y Nelson has gis-en rise to so much controversy.
As these ~ a r i o u shostile bodies approached the capital, they
came illto touch x ~ i t hthe Bay of Iiaples, and received support there
from a sinall squadroll of British and Scapolitan vessels of war,
tlie senior officer of which was Captain Edward J. Foote. Tht:
latter hacl succeeded to this command in consequence of the
\ r i t h d r a ~ ~of
a l Captain Thomas Tronbridge, called away l q Selson
allout 10 May, with a11 thc ships-of-the-linc, in consequence of a
Freiicli flect of t ~ ~ e n t y - f i vsail-of-the-line
e ha^-ing entered the
Xediterranean. To counteract the enemy's designs, Selson's
sluarlron of hear? ships vau liept concentratecl througllout the
remainder of Sfay, and until 90 June, either in the neighbourhood
of Palermo, or about tlze little islancl Ifaritimo, to the ~ ~ e s t w a rofd
Sicily. Tlle French, however, did not coine in that direction, as
llacl l~een expected, but v e n t to To11lo11, :tnd thence to T-ado
Ba1, near Genoa, nhere they communicated \\it11 their army in
northern Italv ; but, ;tlthough Sclsoil hacl occasional tidings of
their movements, tlzeir ultimate object continued unlino\~rnto him
on 20 June, and for some time later. On that day he confidently
believed them to be bound for Saples.' This belief, coupled with
favourable news from his superiors to the west~vard,was the
principal reason ~ h he y then left the neighbourhooil of Maritime.
On the Slst lie was a t Palermo, and the same cvening sailed again
I Sicolas, iii. ~ 0 1 .
47.4 T H E ATEdPOLIT,4N REP UBLICdSS July
for Kaples, expecting that, with the eighteen ships he had with him,
he was likely soon to meet twenty-five hostile vessels, individually
of force equal or superior to his own. Ruffo, Foote, and the
Neapolitan repnblicnns all shared this expectatioil of the French
fleet-the coming of the British was to them less probable.
Once before this, on 1 3 June, Nelson had started for Naples,
and it is with this date that his part in the transactions there, in
June, 1799, may be said really to have begun ; for on this first
abortive occasion, the admiral, besides embarking a large body of
Neapolitan troops, took with him, as representative of the king,
the hereditary prince, the second person in the kingdom. The
instructions issued at this time, dated 10 June, 1799, to the
commanders of the troops, and the letter of the same day from the
king to Nelson, which, in addition to its own significance, explicitly
mentions those instructions as enclosed, very strongly support, and,
in the judgment of the writer, demonstrably prove, the title of
Nelson on this first occasion to act as representative of the king,
with the full powere which were positively asserted for him both
by himself and by Sir William Hamilton.
Within twelve hours2 of quitting Palermo for Naples with the
Crown Prince on the 13th, information received by the admiral
concerning the French fleet made it espedient to return, which he
did, disembarking the prince and the troops on the morning of
the 14th; and proceeding again on the 16th for Naritimo.
There, on 20 J ~ n e he , ~ received the further intelligence which
set his mind at ease as regards the condition of affairs to the
westward of Sicily, and decided him to go again to Palermo, in
order to resume the expedition to Naples, whither he was now
convinced that the enemy was destined. He arrived off Palermo
on the 21st, went ashore, and had with the king and queen an
interview, which lasted only two hours." Precisely what trail-
spired is not recorded, but the result was that the fleet started
again and at once for Naples ; Sir William Hamilton, the British
ambassador, and Lady Hamilton, accompanying the admiral in the
flagship. Hanlilton gives the reason of his going, as follows : ' The
King of Naples entreated me also to accompany Lord Nelson, which
might be of great service to His Majesty, having been so many
years acquainted with Naples, and particularly as Lord Nelson was
not accustomed to the language of the country.' Hamilton acted
throughout, on the surface at least, as a simple intermediary
between Nelson and Ruffo. On this occasion the Crown Prince did
not embark, nor did any Neapolitan troops.
At this point arises the first controverted question, mhich
underlies all others : with what anthority was lord Selson vested
' ' Foudroyai~t's' Log, Sicolas. iii. 207-8.
Ibid. Sicolas. iii. 391. ., Ibid.
1899 d,YD X E L S O S ' S d CCUSERS 475
011 this second occasion? It is conceded that no formal
commission is extant, as issued on the 21st; nor are further
written instructions known to exist. Whatever formal authority
mas given is not a matter of record. But there do remain the
instructioils to the troops, and the letter to Nelson, issued ten
days before; and of them, equally, there does not exist any
revocation. It is, therefore, a perfectly reasonable inference that
the full powers conferred by them were considered still to exist, and
to be adequate to the present circumstances, although these were
regarded as even more urgent. The t v o departures were, in fact,
only successive incidents in one transaction, which mas continuous
in purpose throughout, thongh interrupted in execntion. The
original powers, therefore, held good. Nelson line~valso the views
of the sovereigns, as to the character of the action to be take11
under his powers. These views can be inferred from letters of the
king and queen to Ruffo of the same week. The exposition of these
powers and views is given, as has been said, in my revised
Life of Kelson.
011 the afternooil of '34 June the British fleet arrived off Kaples,
The inail1 body remained during the night some eight miles in the
offing ; but tllc flagship proceeded, anchoring just outside of the
hay a t 9 P.-11. lIeanr.rl~ile,affairs about the city had been progres-
sing rapidly. Of the course of events, the almost daily letters of
Captain l'oote to Kelson afford the best account." On 13 June the
Christit~nfumy wit11 its allies came near enough to the city to receive
sul~portfrom the British squadron, and Foote entered the bay of
Naplcs, having previously been off the island of Procicla. '011 the
evening of that day the royalists drove the enemy out of the forts
L'Esperon and Vigliena, and from Ponte della Ifaddalena. On the
evening of the 15th, the garrison at Castellamare, on the bay, oppo-
site Naples, surrendered to Foote, who ' pledged his word of honour
that they should be treated as prisoners of war, and promised, morc-
over, to intercede with his Sicilian Majesty in their behalf.' This
c,zpitulation mas carried into effect, the fortress ancl its coiltents
being surrendered under the conditions, and for that reason it mas
res~ected by Selson. The incident, otherwise unimportant, has
value, partly as illustrating the attitude of Foote, who permitted
the republicans to march out with military honours, ~vithoption to
go where they pleased, he receiving under the British flag such a s
thought proper to avail themselves of it ; and, partly, as throwing
light upon the ground for hopes, and the consequent tenacity, of
the garrisons in Naples itself, who still held out expecting similar
terms. 011 the 16th Foote reported to Nelson that the city, with
tilc exception of the three castles-St. Elmo, Uovo ancl Suovo-
$'It is to these i n a i n l ~ ,though not exclusi~ely,that, the 3larchese llaresca,
writing in 1?93 nnd 1$94, refers, : l.'oote's T*ii:iiicnlioic, pp. 1.55-158.
476 THE NL"4POLITAIN REPUBLICAXS' July
was in the hands of the royalists. St. Elmo was occupied by the
French, the other tn.0 principally by Neapolitan republicans. This
inforillatioii was taken to Palermo by the ' San Leon ' ship of war,
Captain Harrrard ; but Foote, who hacl been notified of ?;elson's
probable coming, l~opedthe fleet mould be met half way."
On the 17th Ruffo wrote to Foote that Snovo was treating,
negotiations in fact having begun the day before. He requested,
therefore, that hostilities against it should cease, but be continued
against Uovo, unless the latter hoisted a flag of truce.I0 Foote
complied, and here began a n informal partial armistice, which
must be distinguished from the final act of capitulation, and which
lasted, ~ ~ i brief
t h interruption, until Nelson's arrival on the 24th.
On the 17th it embraced only Nuovo, Uovo remaining obstinate,
and St. Elmo not attacked. That evening Foote, who till then
believed Selson still to be coming to Naples, in prosecution of his
first departure from Palermo on the 13th' received word from the
governor of Procida, and from Count Thurn, the senior Neapolitan
naval officer co-operating with him, that the admiral had been
compelled to return off Maritimo by the news received concerning
the great French fleet." Gnderstanding from this that the latter
might soon appear at Naples, he sent at once Captain Osnald,
of the ' Perseus,' to Ruffo, ' to represent the absolute necessity of
getting possession of the castles, even by granting favourable
terms.' l 2 To this Ruffo sent a written reply that things seemed
to be going well ; that he had offered as conditions that the French
should be carried back by sea to France, with their effects and
property, at his Sicilian majesty's expense ; the republicans to have
the liberty of following them, and to embark with their effects, but
at their 01~11espense. ' There is the whole of the matter.' "T'he
enemy, however, were reluctant to surrender to an ecclesiastic, and
he therefore wished Foote to summon them. Foote accordingly
sent Oswald to summon UOI-o,but he met with an uncivil refusal.
The insurgents also appear to have received intelligence that
tlle French fleet JYas approaching. Expecting relief by it, they
here broke off negotiations, making a sortie during the night, in
which they lrilled a number of the besiegers, and spiked several
cannon; and on the 18th Ruff0 ~vrotcto Foote that it was use-
less to thillli of capitul,ztions, ancl that he proposed to attack St.
Elmo seri~usly.'~Foote consequei~tlywent ashore that afternoon,
and hacl a personal interview, in which he admitted that the fall
of St. Elmo must cause the sularender of the other castles, but ex-
pressed doubt as to the sufficiency of the cardinal's means. He
sent 3t once, however, for mortars, as recluested.'j The news of
' Foote's T'iiidiccctwls, pp. 133-134. Ibid. p. 111. lo Ibid. pp. 176, 177.
Ibid. p. 136. Ibid. p. 136. Ibicl. p . 179.
l4 Ibici. p. 110. Ibid. p. 137.
1899 A
m SELSON'S ACCUSERS 471
these transactions, including part of 18 June, reached Palermo, in
substance a t lemt, on the 2Oth, ancl this v a s the extent of Nelson's
knowledge when he sailed thence on the 21st.lG The king then
understood that negotiatioils had been initiated, and terms offered ;
snd also that negotiations had been broken off by a sortie of the
republicans. Of their resumption nothing was certainly li110~11.
On the 19th) Foote, who had been shelling 1-ovo cluring the
night," received, to his ' great surprise,' l 8 a, letter from Rnffo,
requesting him to suspeild hostilities, and not to recoinrnence theill
while the flag of truce \17asflying, as a fresh negotiation had taken
place. As this suspension on the lgth, taken in connection rvitli
the previous one of the 17th, and interrupted o11ly by the night's
bombardment of Uovo, gave considerable respite to the garrisons,
Foote, while accecting to the request, espresseci plainly his cliscon-
tent ~r-it11' so long an armistice, which may prove very lsrejudicial
to the interest of his Sicilian Majest?.' ' H e also claimed his
right, as British representative, to be kept fully informed of all
that went on. Ruffo did not feel the same urgency, an(1 the nest
day, 20 June, at 4 P . X . , ~ O Foote sent again an urgent representation
of the inespecliency of delay. ' Thirty-six hours have now passed
since I was first made acquaintrd with the armistice, ~vithoutbeing
infornled of anything further.' " Ruffo could give no satisfaction,
but passed Foote's xiessenger on to the Chevalier 3Iicherous,*' 1~110,
with the cardinal's acquiescence, was conducting the negotiatiolls,
as ' JIinister Plenipotentiary of His l f a j e s t ~the Icing of the Tno
Sicilies near the Rnsso-Ottoman Fleet ; ' and who, lie xdded, n as
managing this affair with the Eussian commander, to nhom, (

without proving myself a yery ungrateful man, I cannot ofier the

least displeasure.' " At 10 p.11. he wrote again, enclosiag the
capit~~lations,evidently a draft only, to which Foote's ~vritten
consent was vanted before forixal signature was given. Foote dicl
sign under a liind of protest, sayiiig he did not approve of this naJ-
of treating, but pnt his llsnle to it because Euflo hail signed, nnd
becauie he considered him the conficlential agent of his Sicilia11
majesty.?'
This was ~nidnight,20-21 June. The succeeciing day, tlie ",it,
the armistice was estended by Ruffo to include St. TIIP
terms had been drawn up by the comi~~anclant of Castel Suovo 011
the 19th,'' and approved by a council of war, assembled in Suovo
on the 20th. The last article provided that the treaty sllould not
l8 Xicolas, iii. 391, 393, note. " il~id~cnflmz, p. 137.
l* Ibid. p. 154. I J Ibid. p. 183. '"Ibzd. p. 139.
" Ib~d. p. 186. " Ibid, p. 187.
?9 Preamble to Treaty; Nicolas, ili. 487.

" Vindication, pp. 134, 187. 2s Ibid. p. 190. Ibitl. p. 101.

2- SO specified (&lessidor 1) by the commandant of St. Elmo, in afkiumg his
signature,
478 THE hrEAPOLITAS RlGP T7BLICL-ln;S July
be valid until ratified by the French commandant of St. Elmo,
who gave his approval on the 2 1 ~ t . Ruffo~ ~ then signed, as did
the commanding officers of the Russian and Turkish contingents.
The paper was next sent, this time by Micheroux, to Foote, reach-
ing him near midnight of the 22nd-231-d.~~Foote signed in the
course of the early morning of the 23rd, taking the precaution in
his letter to Micheroux, though not in the capitulation itself, ' to
protest against everything that can in any way be contrary to the
rights of His Britannic Majesty, or those of the English nation.'
This he explained, a t a much later time, was not meant to reserve
a right to reconsider the treaty, or to annul it, as Nelson did, but
' solely because I had signed my naiue under those of the Russian
and Turliish commanders, which might not be proper, as I was at
that time acting as the immediate representative of my King.' 30
By his signature, affixed thirty-six hours before Nelson arrived,
completeness was given to the doczcn~e~~t of the capitulation, a s
distinguished from its execzction, in whole or in part. The docu-
ment follows here. It will be observed that the time for receiving
execution is definitely fixed by the second article of the instrument.
The garrison mere to keep possession of the forts until the vessels
to take them to Toulon were ready to sail.
Article 1. The Forts Nuovo and Uovo shall be delivered to the Com-
manders of the Troops of H.M. the Xing of the Two Sicilies, and of those
of his Allies, the King of England, the Emperor of all the Russias, and
the Ottoman Porte, with all warlike stores, provisions, artillery, and
effects of every kind now in the magazines, of which an inventory shall
be made by Coi~lmissarieson both sides, after the present Capitulation is
signed.
Article 2. The troops composing the Garrisons shall keep possession
of their Forts, until the Vessels which shall be spoken of hereafter,
destined to convey such as are desirous of going to Toulon, are ready to
saiL3'
Article 3. The Garrisons shall march out with the honours of war.
with arms, and baggage, drums beating, colours flying, matches lighted,
and each with two pieces of artillery; they shall lay down their arms on
the beach.
Article 4. Persons and Property, both movable and immovable, of
every individual of the two Garrisons, shall be respected and guaranteed.
Article 5. All the said individuals shall have their choice of
enlbarking on board the cartels, which shall be furnished to carry them
% Nicolas, iii. 487-489. ?B Vindicatw?~,p. 194. " Ibid. p. 59.
The first draft here contained these additional words : ' The evacuation shall
not take place until the moment of embarkation' (Vindication, p. 195). These do
not appear in the final terms. This might have been important, because Article 2
fixes the time when, by evacuation, the treaty should receive practical execution, as
distinguished from completeness of form. As it was, Nelson arrived before the
transports were ready, and consequently found the republicans still in possession of
the forts. He therefore claimed, and undoubtedly believed, that the treaty could
rightfully be suspended, because not executed.
to Toulon, or of remaining at Naples without being molested, either in
their persons or families.
Article 6. The conditions contained in the present Capitulation are
common to every person of both sexes nom in the Forts.
Article 7. The same conditions shall hold with respect to all the
prisoners which the Troops of His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies,
and those of his Allies, may have made from the Republican troops, in
the different engagements which have taken place before the blockade of
the Forts.
Article 8. Ifessiel~rs,the Archbishop of Ealerno, Illicherou~,~~ Dillon,
and the Bishop of Avellino, detained in the Forts, shall be delivered to
the @onlinandantof Fort St. Elmo, where they shall remain as l~ostages,
until the arrival of the individuals, sent to Toulon, shall be ascertained.
Article 9. All the other hostages and State prisoners, confined in the
two Forts, shall be set at liberty, iinniediately after tlie present Capitnla-
tion is signed.
Article 10. None of the Articles of the said Capitulation can be put
into execution until after they shall have been fully approved by the
Commandant of Fort St. Elmo.
Concerning the propriety of this capitulation, considered as a
military measure, in the light of the existing circumstances, some
remarlis are admissible, in view of Nelson's anger and strong denun-
ciation when the terms became know11 to him. Foote states expressly
that at no time during the process of the negotiatioils was he con-
snltecl as to the terms ; 3J except of course in receiving the projet,
and being aslred to sign it. I n view of the fact that this admission
f o l l o ~ ~immecliately
s upon his opinion that the 'difficulties were
only got the better of by that terror which the British flag
inspires,' 3 L his tardy protests can scarcely be considered a due
assertion of the influence of the British Savy upon the agreement
reached by the belligerents. All parties seem to have been expect-
ing still the arrival of the French fleet; although some news,
alluded to as favourable in a letter from Ruffo to Foote, had been
received on the 21st, before either the commandant of St. Elmo or
Ruffo had signed the paper.3' The coming of that fleet would have
forced the retirement of Foote's squadron; and of the rojalist
forces also, if still in the open city. It was therefore important to
hasten a solntion which mould enable the position to be held, even
if the fleet arrived ; and a ~lr~cisiresolution of that character might
have justified the granting of such full concessions to the insur-
gents in Uovo ancl Suovo. But considering Foote's own statement to
Pluffo, that the fall of St. Elmo must insure that of the other
castles " "ecause it corninanded them), a treaty which only secured
the lower castles and left St. Elmo indefinitely in French hands, to
await the arrival of their fleet, can scarcely be deemed a decisive
'2 A cotisin of the 3iicheroux before mentioned, n 3i~zdicatio?r,p. 155
s* Ibid. " Ibid. p. 191. Ibid. pp. 93. 137.
 T H E SE.4 POLITLIY ERPTTRLICASS July

gain. No wonder that Nelsoil thought extravagant-called

' infamous '-the allowance of honours of war, with assnrecl safety,
to ' rebels and traitors,' as he regarded them, in so desperate a
plight and for so slight an advantage; the more so because, in
Foote's own opinion, St. Elmo could not, by the treaty, ' with
propriety be attacked until advice is received of the arrival of the
republicans at Toulon.' 3i
I t is true, a conflict with the castles would have produced much
injury to the city, and the anarchy existing in the ulldisciplinerl
Christian army furnished another reason for hastening matters to
a collclusion ; but, as against this urgency on the part of the
royalists, the republican garrisons in the lower castles felt their
situation to be so desperate, that ' ever since this morning,' the
19th,-four days before Foote signed the treaty,--' from the
moment they began to treat about a, capitulation, a great many
began to desert from the two castles, and among them forty
Frenchmen at least, besides a great inany Italians.' 38 This Foote
Itnew, before he signed even the pl'ojet for the capitulation ; and he
knew also, from the same letter, that in consequence of this panic
' The Castle is all open and the Cnlabrians have already penetrated
it.'
Under a cornparisoil of the relative military conditions, nothing
hut the simultaiieo~zssurrender of St. Elmo could be considered
a satisfactory equivalent for the very liberal terms granted.
Count Thurn, the senior Seapolitan naval officer, coilsidered at the
time that the capitulation ~ v a sunsatisfactory for this precise reason.
Foote, by hie own avowal, deferred much to Ruffo,3%nd not un-
justifiably, in view of the instructions turned over to him ; but after
all, as an ally, his rights were equal, and he was responsible to his
government. Knowing the above facts, he cannot be considered to
have shofvn proper firmness.
At 6 .i.ar., 24 June, twenty-four hours after signing, Foote re-
ceived a letter from Nelscn, dated the 18th, off Maritiino, asking
him either to bring the British vessels of his squadron to that
point, or a t least, if possible, to send to him the ' Perseus ' and the
' AI~~tine.' Not thinking it advisable to leave Naples himself, Footc
ordered the last named two ships to go, and they accordingly
started at once.40 At the moment, Nelson, unknown to Foote, Tas
nearing Naples with the fleet, and the ' RIutine ' met him before
No mention is made of the ' Perseus ' joining : and since it
was to her captain, being the senior, that Foote had intrusted oral
details of every circumstance that had passed,42and not improbably
also a letter written the previous day, enclosing a copy of the
57TF~tdication,p. 191. '* Ruffo to Foote, Tiudicatio,~,p. 185.
J9 pp. 164, 155, 190,
Vi?zdicatio~~, '"Ibid. pp. 135, 141.

u Foudrogant's ' Log, Sicolas, iii. 508. 42 T'indicntio~z,p. 111.

1899 A SD ATELSOS'S AC'C USERS 48 1

r a p i t ~ l n t i o n , 'Xelso11
~ dicl not learn the particulars of the latter
until Foote himself joined him a t 4 P . M . ~ ~Earlier on this same day,
Nelson had taken the first step in the line of action which 11c
pursued with steadiness throughout. H e drew up a paper, styled
' Observations on the Armistice concluded between the Cardinal
aiid the French and Rebels. 24th June, 1799.' The date applies
not to the ' Armistice,' but to his own paper, which mill be spoken
of throughout nnder the title of the Observations, to distinguish
it from certain other papers afterwarcis quoted. The Observations
contain, first, a statement of a report-afterwards found to be
erroneous-which hacl reached hinl on 23 June, a t sea, that a n
armistice hacl Lecn signed, providing that if the French ailcl
rebels were not relieved in t~venty-onedays they should snrrender
the three castles, and be removed to a place of safety ' a t the
expense of the Iiing of the Two Sicilies.' Upon this statement
follo~vsa course of reasoning, by which Kelson reached the conclu-
sion that the arrival of either fleet, British or French, ' destroyed
tlie compact."" This being settled, anci consiileriiig no ~ a l i d
compact to exist after the arrival of his fleet, he goes on in the same
paper to make to the cardinal three propositions for furtlier action;
each of which after~vards formed the substance of three distiilct
papers, aildressed in the following order of time to three different
parties : 1. The 'Declaration,' to ' the Seapolitan Jacobius ' in
Covo aiid Suovo. 2 . Tlle ' Summons,' sent to the Frellch in St.
Elmo. 3. The ' Opinioi~,' delivered to Rufio in person, after the
latter and Nelson hncl failed t o agree. I11 tlie Observations,
written before arrival, under the mistalien report, thls order is
exactly reversed. I t is there proposed to Huffo : 1, to send norci to
the enemy that the arrival of the fleet clesttoyed the compact ; 2 ,
that the I'rench be summoned to surrender ~vithiii t ~ v ohours ; 3,
that, ' as to Rehels and Traitors, no polver 011 earth has a right to
stand betveen their gracious Iiinq and them ; they must instailtly
thro~vthemselves on the clemency of their Surereign.'
I t vill be seen in the sequr.1 that from these propositions
Xelsou never wavered, although he has been accused of a colt,>-
.firre on the 2 6 t h ; '" and it is to be presuiiled that he equally
remained convinced of the accuracy of the reasonings by nlhich he
reached his decisions, embodied in the three propositions ; for,
nhen his action was called illto cluestion i11 Parliament, aearly a
year later, it was the Observations, althongh they Ivcre based u l ~ o n
a mistalren report, that he sent to his intimate friencl Davison, ' t o
explain his conduct; '-'"and Davison wit11 that vlem carried the
I' T7iltdication, 11. 110. " ' Seahorse's ' Log, Xicolnq, iii, 494. '3 Ibitl, p. 381.
"jobservations, &c., Kicolas, iii. 385.
47 E X G L I ~
HISTORICII.
E EF.~WIV,April 1898, p. 274.
'8 Nicolas, iii. 510.

VOL. SIT.---KO. LV, I I

 482 ?'Ill? NEAPOLITrlX l?EPU13LIC~1ATjS July
paper to Lord G r e n ~ i l l e then
, ~ ~ Foreign Secretary. I n virtue of
his conclusions, Nelson, the instant he came in sight of the flags of
truce flying from the ' Seahorse,' Foote's frigate, ,and from the forts,
made a, signal annulling the truce.50 This was before 4 P.M., the
hour when Foote came on board.51
After Foote had seen him, a letter, dated 24 June, 5 P.M., was
written to Ruffo, in Nelson's name and a t his request, by Sir
William Hamilton, who acted throughout in apparent subordina-
tion to Nelson. The attitude of the British ambassador towards
the admiral throughout these incidents is worthy of note. I n this
letter it was said that Nelson now knew from Foote the terms of
the capitulation ; that he disapprovecl them ; that he would not
remain neuter ; and ' that he has detached to meet your Emi-
nence the Captains Troubridge and Ball, who are fully inforined of
Lord Nelson's sentiments, and will have the honour to explain them
to your Eminence. My Lord hopes that the Cardinal Ruffo will
agree with him, and that to-mowow, at the bveal; qf day, he will be
able to act in concert with your Eminence.' " Whether the two
captains who, the wind being light, preceded the ship in a rowing
boat made more than one trip in performance of their mission
cannot be said ; from Nelson's expression to Keith, ' after much
communication his Eminence desired to comeaon board and speak
with me on his situation,' " it seems likely that they did. They
certainly carried to him the two papers," the Declaration to the
rebels and the Summons to the French, and most probably also
the Observations; for to the latter is appended, in Nelson's own
hand, ' Read and explained, and rejected by the Cardinal.' >'
During the night, 24-25 June, Nelson wrote to Dnckworth, i11
immediate command of the ships outside, giving directions for the
order of the fleet upon anchoring ; and in his letter he mentioned
that the cardinal and he had begun by d i ~ a g r e e i n g . ~ ~
At 9 P.M. the flagship anchored for the night, abreast Naples,
but outside. At daylight on the morning of the 25th, she shifted
her berth near to the city ;57 and the fleet, which had remained
outside during the night, anchored towards noon in a close line of
battle, two thirds of a cable between the ships. The cardinal
having refused, categorically, either to send in the admiral's
Declaration to the castles Uovo and Snovo, or to co-operate if
the armistice were broken, and being able to reach no conclusioll
'* Foote's Vindicatiolz, p. 46. " Oicolas, iii. 398.
" ' Seahorse's ' Log, Nicolas, iii. 494 ; Foote's Vi?zdicatw?a, p. 71, Signal was
made before it was possible for me to have any conversation with him.'
'? Diarq dc., of the Rt. Hmz. George Rose, i. 236. The italics are the author's.
Sacchinelli, Mem. szeZla vita deZ Card. R u f o (Rome, 1895), p. 230.
53 Nicolas, iii. 392. Sacchinelli speaks of much going and coming.
i4 Nicolas, iii. 392. " B i d . p. 386. Ibid. p. 387.
a - ' Foadroynnt's ' Log, Sicolas, iii. 508.
1899 2-1ATTjATELSO N'S ACCUSERS 183

with the two captains, came on board the flagship on the afternoon
of the same day. A long and stormy interview between him and
Nelson followed." Neither party yielding his ground,Neison gave the
cardinal, in writing, the following written Opinion, which embodied
the first of the three suggestions contained in the Observations :-
' Foudroyant,' 26 June 1799.
Rear-Admiral Lord Nelson arrived with the British fleet the 24th
June in the Bay of Naples, and found a treaty entered into with the
Rebels, which, in his opinion, cannot be carried into execution, without
the approbation of his Sicilian Majesty.j9
The date of this Opinion is misleading to-day, because it uses
the now obsolete sea-time. The log of the flagship establishes that
Rnffo's visit was the afternoon of the 25th.6"t is probable, from
this, that the dates of the Declaration and the Summons, which both
read the 25th, were really the afternoon of the 24th ; that sea-time
was used in them, as it certainly mas in the Opinion, which must
therefore be dated on the afternoon of the 25th.'j1 I n that case the
Declaration and Summons could have been ready for Troubridge and
Ball, starting after 5 P.N. of the 24th to go ashore.
Another not wholly insignificant feature is to be remarked in
the Opinion, as here quoted. The forin is that occurring in the
Order Booli, and asserts that ' the treaty ca7znot be carried into exe-
cution ' without the Icing's approval. Writing to the commander-
in-chief two clays later, Selson qnoted it th~zs: ' The treaty ought
not to be carried into execution, ~vithoutthe approbation of his Sici-
lian Majesty, Earl St. Vincent-Lord Iieith.' b2
Here x a s a dead-locli, not only between the representatives of
two allies, but between two representatives of the liing of the two
Sicilies. The adnliral had with him over\.;helming force, and full
powers to act for the king. Before either or both of these advan-
tages the cardinal was po~verlessto carry out the capitulation. He
could only yield to superior force, but it nns in his power to refuse
co-operation in an act which he maintained to be in violation of
pledges given by him, and of good faith. Such a breach would
have been an open scandal, and a n injury to the common cause,
not to be henled by mere display of force on the admiral's part.
His arrival with his powers did indeccl supersede the, authority of
" ' Foudroyant's ' Log, Ficolas, i i i 382. i ~ i c o ~ siii.
s , 886.
b" Ibid.p, 508, note.
Hicolas gives both Opinion and Suinmons fro111 the Order Book. The
Declaration is from a copy in State Paper Office; but the copy of the Snmmons in
that office agrees with the one in the Order Book.
" Nicolas, iii. 393. The names of the British admirals do not occur in the
copy of the Opinion given to Ruffo. Nelson seems to have ail after-thought, that for
validity the signature of his commander-in-chief, ns well as of the king, was
necessary, whereas the failure of either to approve caused the whole to fall. He
seems to have learned, after penning the letter, that Keith had succeeded St. Vincent,
which accounts for both names appearing.
484 THE SESPOLIT.4N REPUBLICASS July
Ruffo as Vicar General; but it clid not necessarily follow that
Xelson would himself be able to wield the influence, and to exert the
control of the cardinal over the rabble which follo~vedhim, even
had he gone to the length of arresting him, which under his
present instructions the conditions scarcely varranted. Moreover,
the Russian and Turkish allies had agreed with the cardinal in the
capitulation. 'Nothing but my phlegm prevented an open
rupture,' said Sir TS7illiam Hamilton.
An open rupture, however, was avoided at the moment; and
the Opinion-' cannot be carried into execution, without the appro-
bation of his Sicilian Majesty '-having been rendered by Nelson,
the cardinal went on shore. He then made a proclamation by
trumpet throughout the city, and posted notifications as well, to
the effect that
the surrender of the castles of Uovo and Nuovo, concerted with the com-
mandant of St. Elmo, is announced, and the public is notified not to
molest, even by word, in person or in property, any one who should leave
the castles or their surroundings, under penalty of being shot.""
At the same time he wrote to General Massa," cornmanclant of
Nuovo, notifying him that,
although he himself, and the representatives of the allies, held as sacred
and inviolable the treaty of Capitulation of the Castles, 7ze.~.el.theless tl~e
rear-ndwziral of the E7zglisJ~s q ~ ~ a ~ l toas
r o n 7~ottoilli7zg to recogizise it,
and therefore the garrisons were at liberty to avail themselves of the 5th
article of the capitulation, as had been done by the patriots of St.
Martin's Hill, who had all departed by land. He therefore made this
comn~unicationin order that, co~zsideri~zg that the Englislz com~7zaizdedthe
sea, the garrisons might take such resolution as sliould best please them.
Although this notification n ~ u s tbe considered much less adequate
than the simple methocl of sending ill Nelson's own Declara-
tion and Opinion, it can scarcely be denied that the ~vords in
italics gave full knowledge to the garrisons that Nelson did not
recognise the treaty, and that therefore the retreat by sea, which it
stipulated, mas, to say the least, closed as far as English power
went. It justifies Nelson's assertion that the garrisons, when they
came out, did so 'with this knowledge,' " viz. ' t h a t the treaty
cannot be carriecl into execution ' without the approval of the king.
To this communicatioi~from Rnffo, Nassa replied :
We have given your letter the interpretation which it merited. Firm,
however, in our duties, we shall religiously observe the articles of the
treaty agreed upon, persuaded that similar obligation must be held by all
the contracting parties who have therein solemnly taken part. For the
rest, we cannot be either surprised or intimidated, and we shall resume
Z Cacaliere AIicheroux ; A x h i c i o Slorico per le povinee Xapoletane,
63 Maresca, I
xix. p. 531.
Ibid. The italics are mine. " Sicolas, iii. 40G.
our hostile attitude, whenever it may happen that you compel us thereto
by violeace.
H e then asked a11 escort for a messenger to St. Elmo, for
further conference with the commandant there ; after which a more
precise reply might be given.GG
The garrisons continued in the castles, except such as left, or
had already left, irregularly, despite the second article of the capitu-
lation, which specified that they should hold them until the ~ e s s e l s
were ready to convey to Toulon those who chose to go there.
The same evening, 25 June, Ruffo wrote to Nelson also, in words
r\hich will be given later, to tell him that ' the letter to the castles
will have been sent off by this time.' The character and contents
of this 'letter' are not specified, but as the cardinal anticipated
from it either a surrender at discretion, or an outburst of despair,
on the part of the rebels, it may fairly be inferred that Nelson,
who underetood the allusion, Ivas by it assured that his requirement
of unconditional surrender had gone to them. This was the
situation on the evening of the 25t11, and during the ensuing night.
l l e a n ~ ~ l ~ai lconimoiz
e standing ground had to be sought for
Ruffo and Nelson, as many things needed to be settled. The
disorder in the city approached anarchy, and it was essential that
St. Elmo should not remain in the hands of the French ; for both
circumstances threatened material injury, approaching destruction,
to the city. The safety of the latter, and the cessation of the
pillage and murder therein coiltinually occurring, vere the
dominating ideas in the cardinal's mind. These it mas that had
led him, originally disposecl to severity, to yield such extremely
liberal terms to the castles. As soon as they had surrendered, he
liopecl to devote the regular soldiery to the suppression of disorder.
The nest morning, 26 June, Hanlilton wrote to him, in Nelson's
nanle, as follows :
' Lord Selson begs rile to assure Four Eminence! that he is resolved to do
nothing which can break the Armistice which your Elllineilce has accorded to
the castles of Saples.' "'
I t must be observed, and that carefully, that Kelson here
promises to observe the armistice only-not the treaty of capitula-
tion. I t is not only interesting, but essential, to keep in mind his
attitude to~vardsthe latter. It ' cannot '-or ' ought not to '-be
carried into execution without the king's approval. It is simply
in a suspended condition, until approval or disapproval is given,
neither of rvhich is within his own power. Being thus inoperative,
it follorrs that any thing done, any step taken, in accordance rvith
its terms, has no sanction from the man who, from first to last, as
h6 d ~ c l i i ~S
i o~ O Y ~Q.c.,
C Oxix.
, 522.
" S~acchinelli,~ V e i i sulla
~, z'ita dcl Cnr,cli?~alcRz(J'o,p. 236.
486 THE SEAPOLITAN REPUBLICBATS July

R21$0 th~~oz~ghoz~tknew, denied its validity and refused to consent

to its execution. It might eventually become valid, if the king
approved ; till then it was logically a blank sheet of paper, a mere
organic structure into which the vital spark had not yet entered.
It must be remembered also, that Nelson's disapproval of the
stipyoscd armistice of twenty-one clays has nothing to do nith the
arnlistice he actually found. The first, as understood by him, was
in the nature of a treaty in itself, for it was stipulatecl that a t its
expiration the garrisons should go free ; everything, armistice
included, was embraced in one paper. The second was a n armis-
tice pure and simple ; a mere cessation of hostilities-not stipu-
lated, nor even mentioned, in the articles of the treaty-until the
momeilt arrived for putting the capitulation into execution; and
that moment, Nelson contende!, could not arrive until the appro-
bation of the Iring was given. The treaty itself postponed the
moment of execution to that when the vessels were ready to sail,
which they were not when Nelson arrived.
This Euffo thoroughly well knew. H e knew there was a n
armistice ar~cla treaty. H e knew also that Nelson had denied the
validity of the latter, until ratified by the king. Consequently,
when on the 26th he received a letter from Nelson, written im-
mediately upon the receipt of his own 011 the 25th-the connexion
between the two papers lies on the surface-he was in no w a j
liable to draw from the former any such mistaken conclusions as it
has since been sought to establish that he did. Nelson's letter is
not dated ; but the date, 26 June, is fixed by the refcrence to
Hamilton's letter, which was dated. It will shortly hereafter be
given in full, but is now postponed, because at this point it becomes
necessary to adopt a somewhat more controversinl method than has
so far been employed in the treatment of our subject. The neces-
sity arises from grave misrepresentations, recently illacle rrith
regard to the transactions immediately following the events of the
25th. I n order to be entirely just, both to the assertions thus
characterised and to the rebuttal of them, which I no^^ seek to
make, it is desirable to quote in f~111the passage in nhicll they
occur; for the misrepresentation, if such it be, consists not merely
in specific misstatements passing the bounds of l~srdonableerror-
which it is proposed to demonstrate-but in a general ingenious
perversion of evidence, by suppression and distortion, through
which an impression very contrary to truth, and most damaging to
Nelson's honour, is produced on a reader not familiar with the
facts.
The passage alluded to occurs in an article by Mr. F. P. Badham,
in the ENGLISHHISTORICAL REYIEWfor April 1898, pp. 274-276.
The foot-notes, except one embodied as a parenthesis, are umittecl.
Other\\ise the pttsbage is as follorrs :
 lb99 AXP S E L S O S ' S .I C'C'CI'SEIL'S -487
Such mas the situation on the evening of the 25t11, but on tlie morning
of the 26th Kelson esecuted a complete rolte-jncc. The fact of the
matter seenls to be that Hamiltoll had succeeded in impressing upon him
the extreme danger of an open rupture with the cardinal, such as now
bcenled imminent, especially after the arrival of the cardinal's U ~ ~ L I I L C Z ~ Z L I I L
(see above, 11. 908), in ~vhichh e threatelled to restore the stntzt, q i ~ o .
Haillilton had probably pointed out, too, that what could not well be done
by force might be ' decently ' done by a feint. At all events, whoever
cleserues the credit of originating it, that plan had been adopted ; and
accordingly, on the morning of 26 June, ' after much reflection,' Yclson
authoriscd Hilllilton to co~nll~ence new operations with the f o l l o ~ ~ i n g
note to Ruffo:
L o r d helson hcgb m e to assure \ o u r E u ~ i n e n c e tllat lie is rcsol\ed to do

notlling nliich cdli break tlie ar~iiistice(so Selsoil liad pcrsistcil 111 styliilg t h e

T ~ e ' t t y ,cf. ' l)espatches,' lil. 390-31 xthich your Cmincnce h a s accorded to t h e

c l i i t e ~ ~ofuSaples.

E ~ i d e n t l yKuffo replied, taking exception to this assurance of Hamilton's

as inadequate, for Selson presently writes hinlself :

I a m just lioiloureti nit11 )our Eininence'z letter, xlid as Sir \I-. Hamilton
v rote this mornin!: t h a t I will not 011 ally collsideratio~lbreak t h e arnlistice
entcred into b j :on, 1 hope your 1:niinencc will be satisfied t h a t I a111 supporting
our icleka,. I \end once Inore Captain? T r o n b ~ i d g eand Ilnll.

These t n o captains, 1vho had previously been accleditcd by Haillilton

a s thoroughly inforlnecl of the sentiments of Lord Selson,' caine to
Ruffo, and completed the intpression whidi the letters above quotect
\\auld naturally conley. They \crball.\- assured him that Selson 'would
not interfere with the elecution of the capitulation.' The following
paper, founded on their verbal assurances, was then drawn up for them to
sign :
ancl n a l l lial e n u t h o r i t ~on tlie part of L o r d Kelson to
Cnptaini 'l'io~~liriilge
dpclare tllnt his lorcisllip will not oppose t h e eillbarkation of the rebels and of
t!lc peop!e ~ i h ocomposc thr ,n,uli5ons of the castles.
Troubridge nil Gall clemurred to signing 011 tlle gro11nd that sue11
10~111,tlsii.naturc wonid be an extension of their powers, ha\ ing probably
hetn forbitldeii to sign anything whatever. (Or n a s it with an inhllng of
nliat T I ~ S to happen thdt they shrdnlr fronl committing tliemsel~esmoli!
tli'~n tilt co111~1l1elp 2 ) E u t though Troubridge and Ball left tllc paper
ui~signe~l, the <\act accnrzcy of BuEo's ieport of their verbal assmancc,
' Lord Kelson all1 not oppose, LC.'i for it is on Ruffo's testimony, recorded
by his l~terarg esecntor, Sacchinelli, that the above facts rest), is
specifically confirined by a letter of Hamilton's, to be quoted presently.
It is convenieilt t o introduce h e r e t h i s extract from ' a letter of
Hamilton'&,' to n h i c h I shall hereafter recur, though in Mr.
B a d h a m ' s article i t is to be found t h r e e pages f u r t h e r o n (p. 2'78)'
outside of t h e liinits of t h r passage h e r e given. I introiluce it h e r e
because it i3 haid to colnfirln ' the c l a e t aec1xrac.y of H u k ' s yeport of
tllcir verl3al t~ssurai1c.e.' It is hoped that tlle ieacltr nil1 note thi5
488 THE IVEAPULIY'AIV BEPUBLICdlVS July
assertion carefully, for it will receive singular comment. Ms.
Badham i n introducing t h e extract writes a s follows (pp. 277,278):-
If any lingering doubt remain that this result was brought about, not
by a series of accidents, but by deliberate design, it is taken away by
13ainilton's reference, in his letter to Acton of 28 June:
Lord iielson kept the promise he had given to the Cardinal. I-Ie did not
oppose the embarkation of the garrisons, but the garrisons once embarlied, it
became patent what he had done wit11 them.""
Thus, following the Italian documents, we are irresistibly led back to
Footc's view, that the garrisons were enticed out of the castles 'under
pretence of putting the capituletion I had signed into execution.'
Resuming (after t h e above words, ' t o be quoted presently '),
Mr. Radhnln contiilues (p. 275) :-
After these letters of Nelson's ancl Hamilton's, and the supplen~entary
explanations of the two captains, Ruffo could not reasonably rltise
further objections. That declaration of Nelson's, ' ~villnot permit them
to embark,' even if it had been directly sent, was now distinctly rescinded.
That written opinion, 'ought not to be carried into execution,' was
rescinded too, for the two captains promised not only that Nelson ' would
not oppose' the esecution, but also that he ~vouldland f i ~ ehundred
marines to assist. Ruffo was completely deceived ; and, after deputing
Micherous to inform the garrisons that they must embark imn~ediately,
he wrote off to Hamilton thanking him for having used his moderating
influence, and saying what a relief to his mind it Ivas that affairs were
being so happily concluded.
Accordingly, Micheroux and the two captains visited the castles, anil
delivered Ruffo's message. TVhat grounds had the republicans for
suspicion ? I t is true that, the night before, Ruffo had written to
General llassa, tllo goverllor of Nuovo, inforniing him that Kelson ' has
shown himself untvilling to recognise the treaty,' and offering tho
garrisons a safe conduct over land : but this intinlation .was all too vague,
and whatever disqnietucle it left n u s t have been dissipated by the
assurances of the two captains. IIow unaware the republicans were of
Nelson's real intentions is conclusively shown by the fact of their
rejecting Ruffo's generous proposal, and complete inisuaderstanding of
its true motive :
We have given your letter the interpretation ~vhichit deserves. Standii~g
firm to our duties, we shall religiously observe the articles of tlle treaty that has
been concluded, persuaded that an equal obligation ought to bind all the con-
tracting parties who have solemnly intervened. Tor the reqt. we arc not to be
surpiised or intimidated, and shall resume the hostile attitude if 3 ou atteinpt to
constrain us by force.
What the king's mercy meant, the republicans knew right well; and
as sane men it cannot be doubted that, 011 the afternoon of the 26t11,
they would have preferred availing themselves of Buffo's offer, never
withdrawn, to coming out unoonditionally, ' to be hanged or otherwise as
their sovereign thought proper.'
Dumas, I 6'0t buiri d~ Ntzlloli, i ~ .34-b.
 I will now ask my readers to pause one moment, and to realise
the p n e r a l impression produced upon their mind by this passage
as regards the straightfor~vardnessand integrity of Xelson and of
'rroubridge, before I proceed to make upon it a, running commen-
tar., ~ ~ h i cshall
h shorn the specific errors it contains. the utterly
insecure founclatioiis upon which it therefore rests, and the
consequent falsity of the impression conveyed.
Tt will be observed, first, that ' the complete roltc;fact ' attributed
to Selsoii depends upon tlie assumption, wholly arbitrary and
unfounded, that the treaty and the armistice were one and the
same thing ; as the ~vriter more explicitly affirms by saying that
Nclson persisted in styling the treaty tlie armistice. The armistice
bcgan before the treaty, on the 17th ; v a s interrupted on the 18th ;
and resumed on the 19th. The ~ ~ r ' q j of c t the capitulation was not
signed until tlie 21st, 2nd the final terms not until the 33rd. The
armistice, continuo~zsfrom the 19th, had no need to be renewed after
tlic forinn1 completion of the capitulation, ancl the signatories of the
latter naturally observed it without further action, while anaiting the
evacuation. On tlle 24th Selson arrived, notified Ruffo that the
treaty was by hiin disapproved, and on the 25th gave him the
written Opinion that it caolrltl riot be executed, unless and until
approved by the king. Selson undoubtedly a t first intended also
to breali the ari~iistice,and to proceed at once to hostilities. The
cl~angeof purpose in this particular inay be called a rolte:jace, if the
term pleases; but there was no ~.olte~lircc as to the treatj. The
indcpeiiclent existence of the two is clear from the dates just cited.
That Selsoli so ~ulderstoodthen1 is also clear from his expression
to Keith, ' I used cvery argument in my power to convince the
C'iu.diiin1that the T r e a t j a~ltlArmistice wasb%t a n end by tlie arrival
of tho fleet.' '" The two syere, ant1 \Irere by him recognized to be, t ~ o
separate things ; as Foote, his great accuser, says : ' d treaty or
capitulation may be infamous : an armistice or cessation from
hostility cannot deser-vc this term.';' At the same time it is to
bc adizlitted that Selson at times spoke of the armistice as in-
famous, and of the treaty as infamous, both, in his opinion,
meriting that epithet; but the phrase, ' Treaty and ,Irmistice '
slio~vshis apprehension of their separate e~istence.'~
w "yere : \voi~ld have been nloie proper, but Selson's gramlnar was evcr UII-

certain. Thus he m i t e s just afterwards : ' The Hebels came out of the Castles,
which 7cas iiulnediately occupied by marines.'
:"Sicolas, iii. 393. :' I7iizc1icatio~l,p. 13.
-' I n one only instance that I l i ~ r cnoticed does there appear a semblance even of

confusion, in Kelson'a words, bctwcen the treaty ancl the armistice. This occurs in
a prefatory bricf to the Observations, made upon thc supposed 21 days' armistice,
which n-as, i n form. a trentv, containing a n arnlistice as one of its essential conditions.
On thc copy in the Order Coolr, or in the Statc l ' a p ~ rOffice, or both (Sicolas does not
atate), hc prcfised in his own hand this note : ' Opinion ~lclirercdbcforc I saw the
trcaty of Brillistice, S-c., and only from reports ~ e att sea.' The caprcssion ' treaty
400 TEil3 NEAPOLI?'L4N REPl'BLICA-I.ArS July
On the same fouizdetioi~ rests the insinuation, ' Hamilto11
yl.oEaBl!/ pointed out that ~vlzat could not well be done by force
might be " decently " done by feint.' The words ' probably ' and
' feint ' are seemingly employed to soften the fact that Hamiltoil is
here accused of suggesting, and Nelsoii of aclopting, a discreditable
trick, in orcler to a truly infamo~zsdeception. The truth is, that
though Nelson had annulled the truce by signal, the signal applied
only to the naval vessels under his comi~zand: intimation to the
enemy of an intention to resume hostilities as necessary by the
laws of war, and that had not been given. After consideration,
Nelson decided not to break the armistice, and this change of
purpose he duly conveyed to the cardinal by letter from Hamilton.
The assumption, whether by Ruffo or by the writer under dis-
cussion, that by allowing the armistice he validated the treaty, 1~1zen
he had given a written opinion that the latter cotrlcl lzot be executed,
is purely gratuitous; and rests for foundation upon the initial
mistalre that the armistice and treaty were the same thing.
The inference, ' E ~ i d e n t l yRlrfo ~cylierl,taking erccption to this
assurance of Hamilton's as inadequate,' is, in default of the supposed
letter of Ruffo, equally gratuitous. It would be quite as possible-
quite as evident-that Ruffo expressed gratification that there ~vonld
a t least be no immediate attack upoil the castles. For Euffo's ' ideas,'
which Eelson hopes the cardinal is satisfied he is supporting, were
primarily to save the city from great injury by the continuance, on
the one hand, of fighting ancl firing from the castles, and on the
other from the anarchy and saeliing prevailing among the
Iazzaroni and his own semi-brigand forces. These, and not his
own predisposition to clemency, had led Ruffo to grant so easy a
capitulation ; and while it cannot he denied that he claimed the
treaty to be binding, it is certain that his leading idea was to
save the city, and this idea was snpported by Nelson when he
allo~ved the t~rnlistice. The latter sui~lmecl up the ilifference
between them thus to Dneli1~0l.tl1: ' The Cardinal thinks one house
in Naples to be l7rixccl more thnn his Sovereign's honour.'
Not only, Iiowever, is all this antecedently the niore probable
solution, but the understanding between Ruffo and Selsoil nas
rno1.e e ~ a c talicl more esplioit than has heretofore appeared. 1

of Ar~nistice' is vague. It must be remembered that the object of the note clearly is
to show the occasion of the paper's being written, in terms as brief as possible. I n
the Observations, Nelson, for Ruffo's information, had stated his views upon a treaty
which embodied an armistice a s one of its terms, as at Calvi. Transmitting them
afterwards for the inforiuation of his superiors, or of a successor, he briefly notes the
time and the occasion (reports at sea) of their being written. Whatever nleaniiig be
attached to the expression, it is not adequate, in my judgme~lt, to overcome the
accuracy with which the supposed armistice, the real armiaticc, and the capitula-
tion, are distinguished from each other in Selson's letter to Iieith of 27 Junc, and in
the coi~~m~uiications of Hamilton and oi hiwself to EutIo, oi 24, 2;. ant1 21i Juilc.
had advanced thus far, and beyond, in my discussion of t h e sub-
ject, when there most fortunately came into m y hands a letter,
written by Ruffo to Nelson during the evening succeeding their in-
tervielv of the 25th. This letter, from its contents, appears almost
certainly to be the one that drew forth Nelsoa's reply of the 36th,
nliich Mr. Badhain, in furtherance of his argument, mutilates, as
will he shown. From i t appears, first, tliat Euffo had, a s _Icton
wrote, ' yielded to the admiral's wise and steady declaratioi~s,'i3 and,
secondly, that though thus jielcling, he did, if Sacchiilelli rightly
reports, eiideavour indirectly to evade the collsequellces to the
garrisoas of Xelson's cletermination.
Tlie letter is as follows :
Your Excellency,-The letter to the castles will have been sent off
by this time, nlld if there is hope that they will surrender at discretion,
it may meet with success, as they see the increase of the force, and in
case they should JT-ishto attack, it will be well that we find ourselves in
force to destroy them.ii I therefore beg ;your excellency to disembark
1200 men, TI-hornit would be well to place in position to proceed after-
wards against St. Elmo, and therefore I offer for their quarters my house,
\vhich is vacant and very large. ... It is also difficult to be rei~chedby
.
hoiiil~s.. . I hope that your escellency will favour me, since there have
already t l ~ i sc > c c i l i ~ lbg een liostilities froin S. Elmo, and there is no time
to losc. TYith tlie grentcst respect and profound esteem, I am, Tour
Escellency's true and lnost devoted servant
P. dclla JIadalena, June 2Z, 1'799.
P. Carcl. RUFFO,T.G.i;J
His l.;scellcllcy I k n r Adn;ir,il Selson.

It seems quite evicleilt, therefore, that on tlie eveniiig of the 25th,

the day on nllicll Ruffo visited the flagship during thc afternoon,
he nrote to Sclson sayiug that ' t h e letter to the castlcs will have
been sent off II.T this time.' Talien in connesion wit11 the matter
lieretofore in dispute I~etneenthem, and with the fact that Ruffo,
as Xaresca shows, had himself written a letter to the garrisons,
convq-ing, ill his on11 nords, the decision of Selson, tliere beems
110 rooill left to do~zbtthat 'tlie letter ' Ras Selson's letter to the
castles, nhicll lluffo had l~eretoforerefused to hencl, and that
Nelsoil must so l i a ~ eunderstood. TVliethcr l?ulfo sl~olit!trutll
or not, ~vhetherby the letter h e ineaiit Selsoll's, or his owl1 in-
adequate renderiag of it, the absurailce is there, and justifies fully
Xelson's assertioil that the rebels received ' this Opinion,' and had
' this knowledge.'
We come nest to a n extraordinary mutilation of a quotation.
'3 Kicolas, vii. p. C ~ Y X S V ~ .
I L a k t t e r a ai castelli s a r i andata a questa ora, e se vi 6 d a sperare che ;i
a

diallo a disressione p o t r i buccedere, perell& vedono 1' aulnento della forda, e cjualora
volesscro attaccare sara belie cbe ci trovino in f o r m per Clistruggerli.'
' 5 British 3111sei11ll.Add. SISS. 34!111, fol. 235
49 2 THE' ,Vh'dPOLIir,i,l: REPUBLICAXS July
Selson's reply of the 26th, ' I am just honoured,' etc,, is deliberately
cut in twain ; as will be seen by comparing it, as given by Mr.
Badham (supra, p. 487), with that which Kelson actually wrote,
which was as follows :-
I am just lionoured wit11 you Eminence's letter ; and as His Excel-
iency Sir Ti'illiam Haillilton has wrote you this nzorni?zg, that I will not
on any consideration break the c~r~wisticc entered into by you, I hope
your Eminency mill be satisfied that I am supporting your ideas. I send
once lllorc Captains Troubridge and Ball [, to arrange with your Ewzinency
crcrythi7zg 7.elati.z;~to n?hattack on St. Elnzo : whenever your army and
cannon are reacly to proceed against it, I will land 1200 inen to go with
them, under the present armistice. I have only to rejoice that His
Britannic Majesty's fleet is here, to secure the city of Naples froin all
attacks by sea-I all1 etc.,
~ELSOS~.'"

I t ill bc observed that SIr. Badham's amputation of the pas-

sages here inclosed in brackets is not merely to give what is
necessary, and no more. That inay have been the intention ; it
is not the effect. By substituting a period for a comma after the
name of Ball, and by eliminating all that follows, the purport and
limitation of the captains' mission are concealed, and upon that
concenlme~~t is based the implication that the captains were fully
accredited at this time to express Nelson's views upon a subject not
mentioned in the letter they Lore ; eren to the extent of virtually
making a verbal engagement as to what Nelsoi~intended to do and
would do. And upon this promise, stated thns to have been
intimated, the argument proceeds that lluffo, being entirely
deceived, ordered the garrisons a t once to embark, and thus placed
lheill in the clntches of Kelson and the liing.
Now, it is perfectly clear, because distinctly stated by Nelson,
that the errand of the captains on the 26th was ' to arrange with
your Eminency everything relative to a n attack on St. Elmo ; ' and
there is no mention of any other purpose whatever. The letter of
the 24th had indeed accredited them as ' fully informed of Lord
Nelson's sentiments ; ' but upon what subject? Upon the treaty,
the terins of which he had just learned from Foote, upon his
resolve not to remain neuter, and upon his hopes that they might
ttct in concert against the enemy ; nothing more. To argue that
because an envoy has received to-day credentials to represent his
principal's views on one sul?ject, stated in writing, and two days
later is sent on an entirely different matter, equally clearly defined
in writing, he is on the second occasion empowered to say that his
principal has changed his mind on the first subject, but will not
:"icolas, iii. 391. T l ~ eitalics arc minc. ' T h i s morning ' was 26 June, the date
ot Haniilton'a Ictter.
1890 A A+lj SEIJ.YOSiS ACC T'SERS 493

put it in \vritii~g,is clearlv untenable ; especially nhen tlie princi-

pal is but a mile distant. Ruffo had in his hands two written
papers by Nelson-one the letter of the 2-lth1 brought to him by
the captains, the other the Opinion, given him personally by Nelson
-in both which it was distinctly stated that the capitulation nonld
not be allowed. A child, in the face of such papers, would not
have accepted the assurance of a second party, unaccompanied by
a written retractation by the principal. The only probability g i ~ e n
to this argument, which rests upon the statenlent of Sacchinelli,
Ruffo's biographer, is obtained by cutting out that part of Nelson's
letter of the 26th \vhich defined, and limited, as Troubridge, even
according to Sacchinelli, saicl, the pon.ers he ancl Ball possessed.
They had absolutely no po\vers ~vhaterer,except to arrange for tlle
attacli on St. Elmo.
That ' Troubridge and Ball demurred to signing, on the ground
that sncli formal signature would be an extension of tlieir po~vers,'
is a statenlent which perverts, by suppression and insinuation, thc
account 197 Sacchinelli, upon which alone it rests. Sacchinelli';
~ ~ o r are
ds :
Troubridge wrote with his own hand this declaration, but would not
sign it, saying that they had been charged and accredited ~ i t hthe letter
of June 24 to treat by voice concerning military operations, and not at
all, in writing, affairs pertaining to diplomacy.
Tt perverts by suppression, in not mentionillg their limit a t'lon
to military affairs ; by insinuation, in the expression ' formal
signature being a n extension of their powers,' for it was not tllc
formal signature, but the treating 01; diplomatic matters at all,
that mas then beyoild their scope. That Sacchinelli was in error in
saying Troubridge wrote mith his own hand, Mr. Badham aclmits.i7
He mlght with little pains have seen that Sacchinelli as equally
mistalien in saying ' t h e letter of June 24.' The captains' mission
proceeded on the letter of 26 June, and was of a purely nlilitary
character ; and Troubridge, ' vhose lionour,' to use St. T-incent's
words, ' was as bright as his s~vord,'spolie only truth when he said
that he n-as then linlited to military operations. Sacchinelli clocs
not mention Selson's letter of the 26t11, ~vhichindicates either tllat
he dicl not know of it, or that he carelessly suppressed it ; either
supposition being very damaging to llis authority. H e nttribotes
their present mission to bringing Hamilton's letter of 2(i June,
which does not illention tlzenl, instead of to Selson's of tlle same
date, which does.
The same unfortunate tendency to insinuate subterfuge is see11
in the succeeding words of the writer-'having probably been for-
" In a note on p. 275.
$94 . 3 E P t:RT,IC. I Xj5'
TfIE cY13dPOLIY'Ail
V July
bidden to sign anything whatever. (Or was it with a n inkling of
what was to happen that they shrank from committing themselves
more than they could help ?).' The innuendo is of the same nature
as in the case of Hamilton, before noticed. I n doubtful matters, a
suggested solution is doubtless often permissible ; but not sugges-
tion of evil, where men's repute is at stake, especially when there
is contrary evidence so strong as in the closing words of Nelson's
letter, omitted by Rfr. Badham. Nor does the word ' probably,' used
i n both instances, soften the implication. It must be left to the
candicl reader to determine whether touches like this do not impart.
by insinuation, to the whole passage a colour not justified by the
facts. That the alleged paper mas drawn 1111 for the captains to sign
is very possible. The particular statement of Sacchinelli, that
Troubridge himself xrote it, being untrue, and his ignoring
Nelson's letter of the 26t11, go far to invalidate his testimony,
which is all we here have on Ruffo's side of the case. For we have
now to touch ~zponthe nest most extraordinary misstatement, by
the side of which even the mutilation of Nelson's letter grows
small.
Ruffo's testimony, according to Sacchinelli, which, as erroneous
in two particulars, sorely needs corroboration, receives it, so our
writer says, from a letter of Hamilton's which he mill quote shortly.
This quotation we have already given (szi;u~-a,p. 488). Will the
reader believe that Hamilton dicl not write those words, thus
gravely adduced ? They are merely the comment of that prince of
romancers, 11.Alesandre Dumas, upon what Hamilton had written ;
-the inference of 31. Dumas, whatever value may be attributecl to
that. The error occurs thus : 39. Dumas in his work, I B o ~ h o n itli
Sapoli, gives, with some elimination, Hamilton's letter to Acton
(the Sicilian Prime Minister a t Palermo) of 28 June. I n the midst of
it he iaterrupts Hamilton's narrative to interject his own comment,
which has been gravely quoted in this passage as the words of
Hamilton. The justice of Dumas' inference each persoil may
estimate for himself-to me it seems wholly unfounded ; but, be it
good or bad, it is Dumas, not Hamilton, who speaks. Here follows,
translated, so much of the text fsom Dumas' b001i as is necessary
to show the character of the mistake. Hamilton writes :
Lord Nelson thought himself sufficiently authorised 7 8 to take pos-
session of the polaccas, and to anchor them in the midst of the British
squadron, where they remain at the disposition of His Majesty. . ..
This is followed by the comment of Dumas himself, printed by
Mr. Badham a s if it were Hamilton's own :-
Lord Nelson, therefore, had kept the proinise he had given to the
By a letter received 28 June from the Iring. See Rose'$ Diaries, i. 238.
Cardinal. He had not opposed the embarkation of the garrison, but the
garrison once embarked, it appears what he had done with it.i9
Then follow sentences which Mr. Badham omits :-
That is n thing which surpasses by far the Pnnic faith so much
reproached to Carthage.
After this Sir William Hamilton continues : ' Affairs cannot
go worse for their Sicilian IIajesties,' e t ~ . ~ O
Jve are all liable to error-to oversight ; but error is not
1jardoilable when evidently careless, and when directed to the
destruction ot a dead man's reputation. M. I h m a s v a s perfectly
fair and accurate in his dealing with the matter. Not only are
Hamilton's words curefully guarded by quotation marks, but, ns
seen, when they are resumed, st 1:hrase is introduced which malres
the fact that they are so perfectly clear : Sir Killiam Hamiltol~
contiilues.'
Sext follows another attempt to confound things which differ,
as armistice and capitulation differ. Permission to embark is
brought into close connesion with a n alleged promise of the
captains for Nelson, that he ' " J\-oulcl not oppose " the execution,'
and the impression is produced that, if not the same thing, they
i i l l p l ~the same sanction ; whereat;, in fact, embarliation (which,
as they (lid embark, it is reasonable to suppose \\-as allowed) is
qnite as consistent with Nelsoli's demand for ~ulconditionnl sur-
rencler, as it is wit11 the terms Iinfio granted. Selson had
permitted tlle armistice, while rejecting the first capitulation. I n
accepting snrrender on his on-11 terms-unconditional-he allo~vett
enlbarliatioii, a~vaiting tlie Iring's decision. JIr. Badham has
follorved the method of Sacchinelli, tr.110 gives tlle facsimile of the
alleged declaration of the captains, ' Lorcl Selson will not oppose
the embarliation ; ' while in the test (p. 236) he quotes them as
declaring, ' Nelson will not prevent the esecution of tlie capitula-
tion.' That any promise, espressecl or implied, was given not to
oppose the execution ot the terms grxiited by Ruffo, depends holly
upon Sacchinelli, s1io1~i.nto be w o n g in two points, viz. that
Tronbridge wrote the paper with his own hand, and that their
authority s a s derivecl from the letter of the 24th ; not to speak of
the discrepancy between the facsimile and the test. The sole
support to Sacchinelli's assertion of the promise is an alleged es-
pression of Sir William Hamilton's, proved to have proceeded not
from him, but from Dumas.
The statement that the captains further promisecl tlint Xelson
I.c. ' v i t h his prolnise.' Mr. Badham translates : ' t h e garrisons once embarked,
it became patent \\-hat he had done with tllem.' In t h e original it stands: ' s i vede
che cosa ne aveva fatto.'
'O Dumaq, I Rorb3?1i di X q o l i . iv. 51.5. !I(;.
496 THE hrEAPOLITL‘1.\' REPI;BIJC-IYS July
' mould land marines to assist in the execution ' of the capituln-
tion is again a n error, based on a letter of Hamilton's, given in
full by Dumas, but here mangled and garbled. The reader is
referred to the original,$l ~ ~ h i is c hdated 27 June. I n it will be
found two statements : one, that Nelson had promised to give all
the assistance that the fleet could give for the service of the king ;
the other, some lines further, separated by a period, that, the
embarkation of the rebels having been arranged, five hundred
marines will be latlcled to garrison the castles.82 The two, relating
to differeilt times and conditions, are brought together, to con-
stitute a promise of which there is no other proof; and it is quietly
assumed throughout that it was impossible any other arrangement
could have been made than for the execution of the original treaty.
The disentanglement of errors like these, from the company of
partial truths in which they are inserted, is proverbially difficult.
Mr. Badham's nest misstatement, like two or three of the pre-
ceding, is easily exposed. Ruffo,' he says, ' was conlpletely cleceizcd.'
Sacchinelli is our only authority as to Ruffo's inlpressions in this
transaction, and these are his words :-
The Cardinal, abtlzo~~gl~ke suspectecl that t l ~ e ~n~igl~t
e Be bad faith iz
t l ~ i snot
, ~ ~wishing to dispute with those two captains, concerned hiinself
no further than to charge Minister Micheroux to accompany them to the
castles, to arrange with the republican commanders the esecutioil of the
articles ~tipulated.~'
Ruffo evidently was not deceived any further than he chose to
be. Sacchinelli7sversion of Uicheronx' mission-' to arrange the
esecution of the articles stipulated,' i.e. of the treaty-must be
taken with the large allowance due to his errors before indicated,
and, in my judgillent, to s general looseness of statement and
tendency to assumptions. H e also asserts afterwards that ' t h e
English themselves esecuted the treaty which they at first refused
to recognise.' Against this assumption-for, lacking other proof,
such it is--is to be set Kelson's written Opinion, still on record,
that the treaty could not be esecuted without the Iring's approval.
There is no proof that the adnliral ever receded from this
position. Ruffo had no ground to believe h e had, except the
alleged promise of the captains, of which adequate proof is
I Bol.boni di Napoli, iv. 87, 86.
d' AS there has come to m y notice some perplexity nt the seenling discrepancp
betweenxelson's letter of 26 June, promising to land 1,200 men, thenumber Ruffoasked,
and the fact that 500 only mere landed the same day, I explain that Selson's letter was
written before the garrisons accepted the terms, and referred only to the enterprise
against St. Elmo. Upon the surrender 500 marines were landed to occupy Suoro
and Uovo. When ready to act against St. Elmo, Nelson asked that these be relieved
by Neapolitan troops, in order to make up the promised British reinforcement of
1,200.
81 The alleged verbal promise, yet refusal to qign. Sacchinelli, p. 237,
n-anting ; nor could any verbal promise of an envoy supersede tlie
written statenlent of his principal, near a t hand. To this is to be
addecl Selson's written statement to his commander-in-
chief, and to E a r l Spencer," the First Lord of the Admiralty, both
within three weelis of the transaction, that the rebels came out of
the castles with the kiionledge that the treaty n a s by him dis-
a l l ~ w e d , ~and
' that they inuit submit themselves to tlle Iiing's
determination " upon it.
I11 fact, aillit1 mncli conflict of te~timoiiy anlong Italian
witnesses, this h:is alnayi been by far the most probable account.
I t is also tlie iolntion accepted 1)y tlie recent Italian writer, tlie
;\Iarchese ;\[nl.eica, n h o s~uininp his narrative by saying: It iq
nllorable to suppose tliat 3Iicherou.i, together ~ v i t hthe t n o English-
illell (Troubriclgc :xiid Ball), arranged ~ i t htlle conimanders of the
forts that the capitulation slio~ulclbe elecuted upon lines snbordi-
nated to tlie declarations of Selson. There n a s no lonaer rooin to
speal; of a n unmodified execution, after tlie declarations of the
English (admiral) and after the enforced adhesion of X u f f ~ . ~Only ~
an unconditional surrender conld at that moment be discussed;
and if conditions were offered, they could only be most briefly
these, that the patriots should surrender the castles, purely and
sinlply, that those who wishecl to go to Toulon should enlbarl; and
remain in the road., the remainder in tlie forts, until the deter-
il~inntionof the kin:: in botl1 cases was l r n o ~ ~ n . ' Bnffo'i letter of
the 25th to Selson, published for the first time in this article,
clinches IIaresca's argument.
I t will be notecl that Mr. Badhain nlis~.epresentsRuffo's mission
of 3Iicherons to the forts, as given by his authority, Saccliinelli.
Iccordiiig to the latter, l\Iicherous' instructions \\-ere not that tlle
garrisons ' must embarlr inimediately ; ' they mere that he should,
in coi~,junctionnit11 the captains, arrange n i t h the reynblican
commanders for tlie e\ecutioii of the articles stipulated." Slight-
ing allusioil only is made by Mr. Baclhanl to the letter sent by Ru&
to tlie garrisons on tlie iiight of tlie "tli, narning the111 that
Selson n nuld iiot recognise the treaty : ' The intinlation n FLS a11
too \ague, and hat ever disquietndc it left must have been dissi-
pated hy tlie nssiurances of the captains.' That sucli assurances
mere given is not only not proved ; the authority tllnt alleges the111
l ~ a sbeen discredited. Ruffo's intimation, also-pre~iousl~given
in full in this article-~vas not vague, though less peremptory than
Selson's onn. Finally, Nelson himself not only niade the statc-
" Sicolas, iii. 393. 'ti Ibid. 11. 401;.

" :bid, 1). 38s. " Ibid. 11. 386.

" 9Iaresca accepts the \\.0l'd3 of Acton to S e l s o n (Sicolns. ~ i i17.. c l s s x ~i. notel.
' Thp Cardinal yirldetl t u your wise and steady declaration.'
" "drcltivio S t o ~ i c o ' I'~.ori~~
~ W I Ze X cr ~
e ~ o l r t n i txis.
r . 5'23-2(;.
*' Sncchinelli, p. 23i.
 498 TFfE SIf~.lPOLTT,4S Ill? PUBI,TC=1NS July

nlents quoted to Keith and to Spencer, but less than a year after-
ward also asserted : ' On Ruffo's refusal to send in a joiut declara-
tion to the French and Rebels, I sent ~ I nzyL ~ ~ o tand
e , on which the
Rebels came out of the castles.' 92 If the present writer has demon-
strated, as clearly as he hopes he has, the utter untrustworthiness
of Sacchinelli's story about the verbal assurances by Troubridge
and Ball, what difficulty remains to accepting that the republican
commanders were notified of the real state of the case by the
captains, and that Acton spoke truly in saying that Ruffo yielded
to Nelson's declaration ; under protest possibly, but yielded ?
Nelson's words, ' I sent in my note,' correspond precisely toRuffo's
the evening after their interview, ' the letter to the castles will have
been sent off by this time.' It went from Nelson, without Rnffo's
adhesion.
So much of this article had been ~vrittea vhen the writer
received from the Director of the Riz~istcr.JInrittis~~~--to whom he
takes this opportunity of expressing his thanks for much courtesy
and assistance received-two Italian pamphlets on the snine
subject, published during 1898, subsequent to the article in the
ENGLISH HISTORICAL BEVIEV, which seems to have occasioned
them, a t least in part. These are entitled ' Nelson e Caracciolo,'
by Francesco Lemmi," and ' Nelson, Caracciolo, e la Republica
Napoletana,' by Pasqnale Villari ;" the latter being a review in the
Suoca ,.i,ttoloyin-by a writer whose high reputation has been
deservedly gained in other fields of history-of the former, which
appears to be the work of a still youthful student. I t is extremely
singular to find in these, and especially in the former, the same line
of argument, the same ignoring or perversion of evidence, in the
matter of the third charge, that characterise their English prede-
cessor. Sacchinelli's account, loose and erroneous as it is, is followed
~vhereit discredits the British admiral and his officers ; is perverted
in other places where it does not.g5 Signor T'illari, following herein
Signor Lemmi and Mr. Badham, states, as a starting-point in his
argument, that Nelson ' having entered the Gulf of Naples, and
understood more precisely the capitulation already signed, notified
Ruffo that he did not consider valid an nr)nisticc which had not been
approved by the king, to whom the rebels should surrender uncon-
ditionally. And he called it armistice, although he linew it was
capitulation, as if to signify that the latter for him did not exist,
and that he recognised nothing further than the fact of hostilities
suspended.' 9G The fact is that Hamilton's letter of 24 June, ill
Nelson's name, given by Sacchinelli (p. 230) and by Rose (vol. i.
9?Nicolas, iv. p. 232. The italics are mine.

Florence, 1898. U' Rome, 1899.

'.
93
The treatment of the third charge by Lemlni will be found sumnlsrised in his

pamphlet, IIIa Do71za?tda,pp. 47-50.

' i l l r i , p 1 0 Villari himself italicises armistice.
p. 236), speaks throughout of the capitulation and never once uses
the word armistice ; while Nelson's own Opinion to Ruffo, 25 June,
says ' treaty ' and never once armistice. The trend of this argument
of course is, that when Nelson on the 26th said he would observe the
armistice, he meant that he would observe the capitulation. Most
singular of all, Signor Lemmi walks straight into the same hole as
Mr. Badham, in confounding Dumas' comment with Hamilton's
words, and gravely adducing it as corroborative evidence ;g7 nor
does Signor Villari correct him. What can be said when men
deal thus with evidence ? Surely, since first the blind led the
blind, never clid both fall into a ditch more clearly yawning before
the dullest vision. One has but to pursue the quotation, fully
given above in this article, to its end, to realise the comical result
to which it leads ; for, with equal truth, Sir William Hamilton
can be made gravely to conipliinent himself, to Acton, upon the
similarity of his recent action, ancl that of Nelson, to the in-
famies which had given to Punic faith the notoriety of a proverb.
It would be vain to deal seriously with such arguments ; and,
besides, to do so would be but to lead a reader over the line of dis-
proof already traversed. Signor Lemmi, however, with the logical
consistency of the Latin intellect, fearlessly formulates against
Nelson the final charge, which his English coadjutor either fails to
realise or fails to frame : ' I t may therefore with reason be asserted
that Selson lied, knovingly, when he wrote to Lord Keith (27
June, 1799), to Lord Spencer (19 March, 180099, and to Lord
Davison ( 9 May, 1800)) that the Eebels embarked, knowing that
the maintenance of the capitulation depended upon the decision
of the Iiing. And, however repugnant to his character of a proud
and valiant warrior, we are forced to remember that he drew the
rebels into the net by a fraud, and delivered them, without mercy,
to the executioner.' 99
I f Selson so lied a i d so acted, let the truth indeed be demon-
strated, and let us mourn in the bitterness of our hearts the fall of
a noble spirit. But, if proof fall far short of demonstration, the
man's life, before and after, is proof of the weightiest kind that the
accusittioii is false ; else character and reputation have lost the
vorth we are accustomecl to attribute to them. More, that value
which they justly bear, in the eyes of thinking men, calls for the
sternest condemnation upon the traducer, where carelessness in
nzaliing the charge is shown, much rioxe if carelessness be so gross,
yet so elusive to ordinary search, as the present writer thinks
he has shown it to be.
" Lemmi, p. 4!1. Both Italians seem to have followed l l r . Badham blindly i n
these instances.
gR SO Lemmi gives the date. It is to be presumed he refers to the letter of 1 3
July 1799, where the statement occurs. Xicolas gives n o letter to Spencer of 19 M ~ r c h
1800; nor tlo I know of any such. 9a Lemmi, p. 50.

K h 2
500 THE ,VEBPOT,IT.4S BEPUBLICANS Jnlg
As I have mentioned a t the beginning of this article, I have
passed over the question of the powers under which Xelson acted
on this occasion, though I am convinced that he llad received such
powers from the king of the Two Sicilies, and with a full knowledge
of the king's general intentions a s regards the insurgents, which
had long before been communicated to Ruffo, who had disobeyed
his orders and exceeded his authority in granting the terms he
clid. To show this with satisfactory fulness would unduly prolong
this paper,'OO which is therefore concluded with the following s~ulm-
nlary of the decisive points, believed to have been established :-
1. JJThen Nelson arrived in Naples, 24 June, 1799, he fonncl a n
armistice existing with the forts Nuovo and Uovo, and also a
capitulation signed, the moment for executing which, as prescribeci
by its own terms, had not yet arrived.
2. H e instantly notified Ruffo thnt he ~voulclnot allow the
capitulation, and sent him at the same time a message to the
enemy to that effect, which Ruffo refused to cleliver.
3. Sext day, 26 June, he gave Ruffo a ~ r i t t e nOpinion thnt the
capitulation could not take effect until approved by the Iring.
There is no evidence that he ever receded from that position,
which was given in vriting.
4. On the evening of the 26t11, execution not yet having
taken place, Ruffo clid notify the garrison, in his o~vnwords, if not in
those of Nelson, that the latter was unwilling to recognise the
treaty ; of ~vhichaction he also informed Nelson, by a letter dated
the same evening. To this the commander of Nuovo, senior
officer among the republicans, made a reply; which proyes that
then, if not before, he lrnem the stand taken by Nelson.
5. Nelson's promise, given 26 June, to observe the armistice
in no way involved his attitude tolvards the capitnlation ; ancl
was given for reasons independent of the latter.
6. The account of the assurances said to have been giren
by Tronbridge and Ball is attended \vith so illuch error as to be
extremely suspicious; the more so as the assurances are antece-
dently iu~probnble,and the captains clemonstrably had no authority
to give them.
7. the interview bet~veeil the commandants of the forts

lbU Ny argument on this head is briefly given i n the r e ~ i s e dedition of my Life of

3-eZsot~. The autho~itiesale h e ~ egive11 for reference, ~ i z:. 1. Sicolas, iii. pp. 491-3,
.;22-3 (note), Letter of the king of the Two Sicilies to Lold Nelson, 10 June, 1799.
2. Diaries, efc., of Rt. fIo?t. Gcorge Rose, i. pp. 231-6, Instructions of king to
Seapolitau generals, especially Articles 2, 4, 7, 10. 3. The letter of Sir W. Hamilton
to the Foreign Office, 14 July, 1799, Recoril Ofice. 4. Letter of same to Charle3
Greville, 14 July, 1799, Alfred illorrison Collection, KO. 405. 5. Dumas, I Borboni di
~\~apoli,letters of Iiing to Ruffo, 1 May, 1799 (v. p. 239), and of 17 June (p. 253); and
of the queen to Ruffo, 21 June, Duma? (iv. p. 77) ; or in Arch. Sto?. per le ploz. Sap.,
1880. 11. 576.
on the one hand, and Troubridge and Ball on the other, on
the afternoon of 26 June, it is-at the very least-quite as probable
that the insurgents yielded to Kelson's terms as that Nelson
yielded to theirs. Lemnli, in laying stress upon the words, ' a
tenore clella capitolazione,' in Bfinichini's report of the surrender
of Uovo, assumes, on the sole authority of Sacchinelli, contrary to
Nelson's statement and to the opinion of Naresca, as ~vellas of
the present nriter, that the terms of final capitulation under the
stern esigence of Xelson, and the guns of the British fleet, n-ere
the same as those signed by Ruffo and Foote.
8. No case has been made out against Nelson's own con-
temporary statement that the rebels came out with full knowledge
that thc capitulation Tvns disallowed. O n the contrary, Ruffo's
letter to him, on the evening of 25 June, clearly implies that his
ultimatum was then being conveyed to them. Sacchinelli's
account, with all that is alleged in support of it, has been shown to
be so tainted with errors as to have no weight against Kelson's
~ o r d supported
, by his general reputation for integritj.
I t remains only to add that the garrisons quitted the castles,
and embarlied in the vessels, on the evening of 26 June, nearly twenty-
four hours after Ruffo's intimation to them, and forty-eight after
Xelson sent to Ruffo his o m determination not to observe the
capitnlation, together with a message for the enemy to that effect.
A. T. ~IAHAN.