Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Thomas Gomart
May 2010
Russia/NIS Center
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Russie.Nei.Visions
Previous editions
1
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T. Gomart / Russia and Europe
Author
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T. Gomart / Russia and Europe
Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 5
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T. Gomart / Russia and Europe
Summary
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T. Gomart / Russia and Europe
Introduction
Translated from French by Nicola Farley.
This article takes up ideas first presented in the following two lectures: "Russia's
Foreign Policy towards Europe in 2009: What Has Been the Main Driver?" Boston,
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 13 November 2009;
DQG /¶(XURSH YXH GH 0RVFRX >Europe seen from Moscow], Paris, IHEDN,
15 February 2010.
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T. Gomart / Russia and Europe
and alliance with the EU, which is both its main trade partner and the
main framework for political integration on the continent. Putin and
Medvedev must carry out their foreign policy according to the
IROORZLQJFRQWUDGLFWLRQ5XVVLDDQWLFLSDWHV(XURSH¶VPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQLQ
global affairs, while knowing that its own degree of marginalization
depends in great part on the type of relationship it manages to forge
with Europe.
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T. Gomart / Russia and Europe
A desirable model
At the end of the Soviet period, "new thinking" (novoe myshlenie) was
encouraged by Mikhail Gorbachev to back up the following policy
changes: opening up to the world; arms reductions; withdrawal from
Afghanistan; retreat from satellite states; affirming democratic
principles; and respecting human rights. This "new thinking" provided
the conceptual framework for a move from a military superpower²in
which all resources were allocated to the military²to a more
reasonable power, that is one that renounces imperialism and
normalizes its internal functions, as well as its relations with others.
This historic mutation was carried out through convergence with the
West in general and Europe in particular.2 An important point that is
often avoided is that Gorbachev's project was never a renunciation of
socialism but a collective re-founding based on the respect of the
1
A. Makarychev, "Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and Power," CEPS Working
Document, No. 283, February 2008, p. 29-30.
2
R. English, Russia and the Idea of the West, New York, Columbia University Press,
2000, p. 5.
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3
A. ǖslund, Russia's Capitalist Revolution, Washington, Peterson Institute, 2007,
p. 6-7.
4
Interview with Egor Gaidar, December 2006.
5
V. Baranovsky, "The Kosovo Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy,"
International Spectator, Vol. 35, No. 2, April-June 2000, p. 113-130.
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An unavoidable partner
6
D. Averre, "From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the Legacy of Operation Allied Force in
Russia's Relations with the West," International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 3, 2009, p. 575.
7
D. Deudney and J. Ikenberry, "The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement,"
Survival, Vol. 51, No. 6, December 2009-January 2010, p. 48-49.
8
A. Panibratov and K. Kalotay, "Russian Outward FDI and its Policy Context,"
Columbia FDI Profiles, No. 1, October 2009.
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A political rival
9
K. Smith, "Russia-Europe Energy Relations, Implications for US Policy,"
Washington, CSIS, February 2010, p. 1.
10
M. 0DUJHORY ³$ 6WUDWHJLF 8QLRQ ZLWK (XURSH %DVHG RQ DQ (QHUJ\ 8QLRQ´
Russian Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3, 18 February 2010, p. 11.
10
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EU, which would then give it the right to define the contours of
European identity.11
11
R. Sakwa, "The Outsiders: Russia, Turkey, and Greater Europe,"
Russie.Nei.Visions, forthcoming, 2010.
12
T. Bordachev, Novyi strategicheskii soyuz. Rossiya i Evropa pered vyzovami XXI
veka YR]PR]KQRVWL µEROVKRL VGHONL¶ [A new Strategic Alliance. Russia and Europe
st
against the challenges of the XXI Century. 3RVVLELOLWLHV IRU D µ*UDQG %DUJDLQ¶@
Moscow, Evropa Editions, 2009, p. 76-93.
13
(GLWRU¶VQRWH: In September 2004, over one thousand people were taken hostage
in a school in Beslan, North Ossetia. After an assault by government forces, the
official outcome was 331 dead, including 172 children. Responsibility was claimed by
Shamil Basaev, leader of the radical Chechen separatist movement.
11
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14
A. Makarychev, op. cit. [1].
15
A. ǖslund and A. Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, Washington, Peterson
Institute/CSIS, 2009, p. 99-114. Figures and analysis in this paragraph come from
this source.
12
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16
M. Poe, The Russian Moment in World History, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 2003.
17
J. Garrard & C. Garrard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2008, p. 141.
18
T. Gomart, "NATO-Russia: Is the 'Russian Question' European?"
Politique étrangère (English edition), No. 4, 2009, p. 123-136.
19
T. Gomart, "Russian Civil-Military Relations: Is there something new with
Medvedev?" Carlisle PA, US Army War College, forthcoming.
13
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20
R. McDermott, "Russia's Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,"
Parameters, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, 2009, p. 67-68.
14
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It can scarcely be doubted that NATO remains the reference point for
Russia, which results in its pursuing a specific policy vis-à-vis
countries that do not belong to both the EU and NATO, such as
Sweden, Finland, Norway and Turkey. The desire to undermine
Western cohesion by playing on the link between the US and Europe
is a constant in Moscow's foreign policy, which favors bilateral
channels over institutional links. From this viewpoint, France's return
to NATO's integrated structures (April 2009) was interpreted by
Moscow as the swan song of European strategic autonomy, despite
the arguments of French authorities over the constitution of a
European pillar within the Alliance. From this perspective, the impact
of the "Orange revolution" must be highlighted. It was interpreted by
the Russian elite as the fruit of a Western desire to attract Ukraine
into its orbit, but also as a revolution instigated by the US, with the
intention of spreading it to Russia.21 This serves to highlight the highly
sensitive position of Ukraine in Russian policy vis-à-vis Europe and
the US. Its malleability and role in the transit of energy means that
Ukraine remains one of Moscow's priorities: the election of Viktor
Yanukovych should ease Moscow's apprehensions, even if major
issues such as the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet still need to
be settled.22 With regard to NATO, there are several movements
within the Russian elite.23 The first group believes that Russia and
NATO could reach an agreement over a balance that would preserve
their respective spheres of influence. The second movement²very
much in the minority²VWLOO HQYLVDJHV 5XVVLD¶V 1$72 PHPEHUVKLS
and adherence to Western values. The third movement, which is very
active in parliamentary circles, believes that, in spite of everything,
NATO is continuing to prepare an invasion of Russia.
Russia-NATO relations depend on the development of Russo-
American relations. Shaped by the cold war, these relations remain
21
D. Trenin, "Russia's Spheres of Interest, not Influence," Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 32, No. 4, 2009, p. 15.
22
On 21 April 2010, Presidents Medvedev and Yanukovych concluded an agreement
linking the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to the price of Russian gas
exports to Ukraine. The Russian presence in Sevastopol was prolonged for another
25 to 30 years. In exchange, Russia has promised Ukraine reduced gas export tariffs
for a period of ten years.
23
R. Allison, "Russian Security Engagement with NATO," in R. Allison, M. Light, and
S. White, Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe, London, Blackwell, Chatham
House Papers, 2006, p. 99-105.
15
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24
T. Graham, "US-Russia Relations, Facing Reality Pragmatically," in T. Gomart and
A. Kuchins, Europe, Russia, and the US, Finding a New Balance, Washington/Paris,
CSIS/Ifri, July 2008.
25
T. Gomart, "Obama and Russia: Facing the Heritage of the Bush Years,"
Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 39, April 2009.
26
T. Ambrosio, Challenging America's Global Preeminence, Russia's Quest for
Multipolarity, Burlington, Ashgate, 2005.
27
B. Lo, "Russia, China and the US: From Strategic Triangularism to the Postmodern
Triangle," Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 47, February 2010.
16
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Other Priorities
28
C. 5REHUWV³5XVVLD¶V%5,&'LSORPDF\5LVLQJ2XWVLGHUZLWK'UHDPVRIDQ,QVLGHU´
Polity, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2010, p. 38-73.
29
D. Wilson and R. Purushothaman, "Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050,"
Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper, No. 99, October 2003.
30
See for example: N. Roubini, "Quels sont les vrais pays émergents?" [Which are
the true emerging countries?], Les Echos, 16 November 2009 and in response:
K. Hirn and J-M. Laporte, "Eloge de la Russie" [Praise for Russia], Les Echos,
9 December 2009.
31
I. Bremmer, "State capitalism comes of age: the end of the free market?"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 3, May 2009.
32
Eurostat, September 2009.
17
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33
For an interpretation contesting the idea of a sustainable Sino-Russian alliance,
see: B. Lo, Axis of Convenience, Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics,
Washington, Brookings Institute, 2008. For an interpretation highlighting the Chinese
role in Russian policy, see: A. Tsygankov, "What Is China to Us? Westernizers and
Sinophiles in Russia's Foreign Policy," Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 45, December 2009.
34
A. 2UHVKHQNRY ³$UFWLF 'LSORPDF\´ Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4, 2009, p. 121-
132.
35
R. Danreuther, "Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment,"
International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1, p. 111-120.
36
S. Blank, "Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US's Neighborhood,"
Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 38, April 2009.
18
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37
T. Gomart, "Russia Alone Forever? The Kremlin's Strategic Solitude,"
Politique étrangère, Special issue, World Policy Conference, 2008, p. 23-33.
38
C. Wallander ³*OREDO &KDOOHQJHV DQG 5XVVLDQ )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\´ in R. Levgold,
Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past,
New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 444-445.
19
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