Asia Program
Asia Program
April 7, 2011
Summary: Pakistan’s political
development since its indepen-
dence — fluctuating between
imperfect democracy and
uncertain autocracy — can be
attributed to several factors.
Democracy suffered as a result
of Pakistan’s colonial history, the
process of Partition with India,
and ethnic politics in the early
years of the country’s indepen-
dence. At the same time, truly
autocratic forces have been held
back by the resilience of Paki-
stan’s political parties, its civil
society, and its judiciary. Yet there
are reasons to be pessimistic
about Pakistan’s future, including
the poor record of its civilian
leaders, the growth of political
Islamism, the growing political
and economic influence of the
army and intelligence agencies,
and continuing ethnic sepa-
ratism.
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 745 3950
F 1 202 265 1662
1E info@gmfus.org
Why Pakistan is Neither a Democracy
Nor (Yet?) an Autocracy
by Christophe Jaffrelot
Democracies are always products of
historical trajectories. An enduring
puzzle is what went wrong with Paki-
stan’s democratic experiment. In spite
of the initial promises of the country’s
founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah, why
did Pakistan follow a political path so
different from India’s, turning towards
autocracy, while not fully embracing it?
Democracy Lost
Several reasons can be identified for
why democracy never took hold in
Pakistan in the first place. The first
relates to Pakistan’s colonial history.
History matters, and the end of the
British Raj offers a first explanation
for the divergence between India
and Pakistan. While many prov-
inces of India experienced forms of
democratization at the local level
as early as the 1890s, key provinces
of the territory that was to become
Pakistan — specifically, Punjab and
the North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP), today’s Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa — had a different story. First,
they were conquered or constituted
late, sometimes after long military
campaigns, and became laboratories
for an authoritarian bureaucracy. In
Punjab, this pattern of “paternalism,”
involved a strong British bureaucracy
levying taxes and administrating not
only the police but also the judiciary.
Second, Punjab and the NWFP did not
benefit from the same democratization
process as others because of security
imperatives, being on the frontline
of the Raj’s “Great Game” with the
Russian empire. Finally, Punjab and
the NWFP were major recruiting
grounds for the army and, conse-
quently, developed a military ethos.
In the immediate post-independence
era, a new set of security impera-
tives came to the fore. Immediately
after Partition, Pakistan felt insecure
vis-à-vis India for several reasons. It
was much smaller in terms of size and
much weaker in terms of resources.
The new state of Pakistan represented
a mere 23 percent of the area and 18
percent of the population of British
India, and it inherited no more than
10 percent of the Raj’s industrial
resources. Although Pakistan did not
lose its first war against India in 1947-
48, it was unable to achieve its stated
objectives with regards to the disputed
territory of Kashmir. And while India
largely inherited its state apparatus
from the British Raj, Pakistan had to
build its administrative capacity on
its own, creating new capitals from
scratch — first in Karachi and then
in Islamabad — that only reinforced
the notion of the country as an arti-
ficial nation-state. Democracy, as a
consequence, was a lower priority than
national security and state-building.
In the 1950s, the Pakistani army could
claim quite easily that national mobi-
lization and discipline were the order
Asia Program
of the day, while politicians seemed to waste their time
and energy unnecessarily bickering. It is important to note
that the 1958 military coup by General Ayub Khan was
largely supported by the country’s elites, mostly in Punjab,
including lawyers.
A final reason for the failure of democracy in Pakistan
was the arithmetic of demographics. In the 1950 census,
Bengalis in East Pakistan represented 55 percent of the
population of Pakistan and Punjabis about 25 percent,
followed by Sindhis, Pashtuns (Pathans), Mohajirs, and
Baluchis. Being in a majority, Bengalis demanded the
establishment of a democratic system. But power was in the
hands of the Mohajirs and of the Punjabis, who dominated
the army, and these minorities did not want to relinquish
their control of Pakistani politics by adopting a government
based on the “one man, one vote” principle. For Punjabis
in particular, retaining power was yet another reason not
to support democracy. This configuration changed in 1971
with the creation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan, and,
not coincidentally, Pakistan experienced its first period of
democracy in the 1970s. But the army, by that time well
entrenched, played on fears of the further breakup of the
country by India, and continued placing a premium on
security.
Forces against Autocracy
If democracy could never establish itself in Pakistan,
why did it not become an out-and-out autocracy? Again
there are several reasons. First, the political parties — and
political families — have proved themselves resilient. While
Jinnah, Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan,
and, of course, Ayub Khan never appreciated political
parties, which they accused of dividing the nation, Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto created the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in the
late 1960s. The PPP became the chief political opponent to
the military establishment from the 1970s onwards. In spite
of everything, the PPP, and the Bhuttos — who continue to
remain closely associated with the party — has remained a
counterweight to the army at the national level. Meanwhile,
other parties have played a significant role at the provincial
level, such as the Awami National Party (ANP) among the
Pashtuns, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)
in Punjab, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
among the Mohajirs.
2
Secondly, in spite of the severe repression of unions, Paki-
stan’s civil society continues to express alternate views and
articulates the interests of minority players in the public
sphere. The media remain free enough — and journal-
ists courageous enough — to analyze Pakistan’s domestic
problems with remarkable lucidity. NGOs are still in a posi-
tion to mobilize liberals in favor of human rights (like the
Lahore-based Human Rights Commission) and the rights of
women.
Finally, Pakistan still benefits from institutions supporting
the rule of law. Like India, Pakistan inherited from the
British a judiciary that still largely follows Western proce-
dures. Occasionally, judges stand by the requirements
of their profession and resist pressures from above. For
example, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry resisted General
Pervez Musharraf ’s policies (including the elimination of
Baloch nationalists) and, as a rallying point for Pakistan’s
lawyers, became largely responsible for the president’s
resignation in 2008. Generally speaking, lawyers have also
retained some power and prestige, as evident from their
demonstrations against Chaudhry’s suspension by Mush-
arraf throughout the country in 2007.
Reasons for Pessimism
Nevertheless, despite the resilience of the political parties,
of civil society, and of the judiciary, there are good reasons
to be concerned about Pakistan’s political future. For one
thing, the civilian rulers have largely discredited themselves.
Since assuming power in the aftermath of Musharraf ’s
resignation, the political parties have lost most of their
credibility, not only because of the old patron-client ties
they continue to rely upon to consolidate their power (such
as the role of the hereditary Pirs in the stronghold of the
PPP in Sind), but also because of their autocratic tenden-
cies (former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had indulged
in truly authoritarian behavior during his second term in
1997-99) and, even more importantly perhaps, because of
incompetence and corruption. President Zardari’s image
is particularly tarnished on these two grounds today. His
image — much like Musharraf ’s before he left office — is
also marked by his perceived proximity to the West, in
particular the United States.
Asia Program
A further cause for worry is that the Islamists are exerting
a growing influence over society. This development finds
expression in cultural policing, in the widespread support
(even among lawyers) for the assassination of opponents
of the recently proposed anti-blasphemy law, and in the
rise of sectarianism — in particular, violence between
Sunnis and Shias. The relative popularity of the Islamists
is partly related to the growing unpopularity of a political
class that benefits materially — sometimes illegally — from
its position. They also appear tainted by their close ties to
the United States. Many Islamists, by contrast, are hostile
to the West, engaged in social work and deliver justice in
some form, such as the parallel judicial system established
in the tribal regions by the Pakistani Taliban. The rise of
certain militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba is
also due to the protection they enjoy from the army, which,
despite fighting against the Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaeda, and
sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, cultivates its
relations with anti-Indian jihadists active in Kashmir and
elsewhere.
Furthermore, the army for its part has effectively become a
state within the state. Although civilians have returned to
power every decade or so, they have lost ground each time.
In the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could confront the army in
many realms. But by the 1980s and 1990s, prime ministers
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had lost all influence in
at least three major domains — nuclear policy, Afghanistan
policy, and India policy — where the army and intelligence
agencies enjoyed a monopoly. Today, the army has also
acquired important positions in the economic realm. It has
its own companies that partake in industry and commerce
and owns land throughout the country. The army would
have much more to lose than before the Musharraf years if
the civilians insisted on regaining their past prerogatives.
Lastly, the country’s security orientation is reinforced by
the fact that its national unity is still in question. In addi-
tion to sectarian conflicts and the fight between the army
and some Islamists groups, ethnic tensions prevail in
Karachi, where the Mohajirs resent the growing influence of
Pashtun migrants, and in Baluchistan, where separatists are
involved in a full-scale guerilla war. Against this backdrop,
perhaps the only solution for the United States and other
members of the international community is to pursue a
long-term strategy that strengthens what is left of Pakistan’s
civil society while investing in the existing political parties
despite their serious limitations.
About the Author
Christophe Jaffrelot is a senior research fellow at the Centre d’Etudes
et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Sciences Po, Paris.
About GMF’s Asia Program
The German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program addresses the implica-
tions of Asia’s rise for the West — in particular, how Asia’s resurgence
will impact the foreign policy, economic, and domestic challenges
and choices facing the transatlantic allies — through a combina-
tion of convening, research, study tours, fellowships, partnerships
with other GMF programs, and partnerships with other institutions.
The program’s initiatives include the Stockholm China Forum and
India Forum, seminars on Japan and Pakistan, a Japanese fellowship
program, Asia-related panels at GMF’s annual Brussels Forum, and
paper series on Pakistan, on transatlantic approaches to Asia, and on
deepening cooperation between democratic Asia and the West. For
more information, see www.gmfus.org/asia.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-
partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedi-
cated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between
North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF
does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the
transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy
and business communities, by contributing research and analysis
on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to
foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In ad-
dition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democra-
cies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent
memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong
presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters
in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris,
Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. GMF also has smaller
representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.