A new kind of brigade has appeared in the Souiet force structure.

~
It provides additional capabilities that haue not been arailable
to the Soviets in thepast. This articleprouides a look at this new
element and considers its organ ization and role.

Major Roger E. Bert, US Army

Air Assault Brigades:

‘btd ‘,;:
New Ele knt in the
Soviet !ibesant
‘!ructure
Force i ‘$
.*.
MILITARY REVIEW
Introduction
S OVIET military doctrine, as is well-
known, has always placed heavy em-
phasis on the employment of desant or
landing forces.’ Within the desant force
spectrum, uozdushno-desan tnyye uoyska
( VDVI or the airborne force, in particular,
has been the eubject of special attention
and interest. The organization of the
Soviet airborne force began in 193o, and,
under the direction of then Red army chief
of staff, ,Marshal M. N. Tukhachevski, it
pioneered the development of airdrop and
air-landing tactics.
The historically la-ge size of the stand-
ing VD V force reflects its perceived value
to the Soviet military. Currently main-
tained at a level of 50,000 to 60,000 per-
sonnel, the VDV strength has been as
high as 100,000 during the postwar
period. As the world’s largest airborne
force, it has been constantly mo$lernized
and re-equipped to improve mobility and
firepower and has reached a point where
today it fights essentially as a motorized
rifle force once it is on the ground. As a
further confirmation of its perceived util-
ity to senior Soviet ground force com-
manders. virtually all major So}riet exer-
cises have included the use of troops from
the airborne force.
Given this background, it is not surpris-
ing that the S?vie@ have introduced a
new unit in the airborne desan t force
structure: tbe so-called “air assault
brigade.’” The appearance of this type of
brigade represents a significant increase
in the number of airborne-dedicated per-
sonnel in addition to the already sizable
W2 V force. As a newly organized and
deployed force,’ tbe air assau~t brigade
presumably provides a new capability for
..
22
performing certain missions that previ-
ously belonged to other forces or certain
new missions that resulted from a re-
evaluation of future combat require-
ments.
With this in mind, I will address the
subordination, organization and deploy-
ment of air assault brigades, as well as,
most importantly, their prospective mis-
sions. To properly evaluate potential mis-
sions, it will be necessary to speculate
about why these units were organized,
deployed and in response to what
strategy.
Air Assault Brigade:
Organization and Deployment
Air assault brigades are believed to
have been deployed with Soviet forces for
the past three to four years. So far, they
have been detected in the Soviet Union’s
western military districts (M Ds) and in
the forward-deployed Groups of Forces
(GOFS) in Eastern Europe: covering an
area that constitutes essentially the
Western tewtr uoyny (7TI or theater of
war.’ Based on the deployment pattern of
these forces, it is assumed that the
brigades are MD or front-level (in war-
time) assets. Tberd have been some tenta-
tive indications that these brigades may
be assigned as low as army level, but this
remains unconfirmed.
A comparison of the air assault bri-
gade’s organization and weapons distri-
bution (Figure 1) with those of a standard
Bi14D airborne amphibious infantry com-
bat vehicle (AA lCV)-equipped airborne
regiment (Figure 2)8indicates that the air-
borne regiment was probably the baeic..
model for the brigades. As is typical of
Soviet airborne units, the air assault bri-
gade has a very high density of crew-
October
 AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

I Au Assault 1

L_.._J

I Ant!a#rcraft
Battery
II
# I
Engineer
Company
I
t GElm”
B
D30 122mm towed how!tzer
M1943 120mm mortar
I
L
ir
Meiftcal
Platoon/ Company

18
6
I
I m
Principal Items of Equipment
supply
Company

S044 a5mm aux!hary-propelled field gun

RPGJ6D antitank grmade launcher
6
150
.
SA7 Grad surface-to-air mss!le 45 A(XJ 7 30mm automat!c grenade Iaunchel 24
ZU23 23mm antiaircraft gun E RPKS74 545nMn Ilght machmegun 111
BRDM AT3f5 antttaok gu!ded m]ssde launcher 9 BMD ambome amphibmus infantry combat vehtcle 64
Manpack AJ3/4 antitank gu!ded mmwle 14 BRDM and BRDM2 amph]blous scout cars 4
SPG9 73mm recodless antitank gun 36

Ih!s represents a Provisional assessment of the strength, orgamzawm and equtpment of the a!r assault brigade, based
on fragmental mformat)on from several sources

Figure 1

served and individual antitank weapons—
the ratio in terms of number of weapons
per 1,000 troops is nearly twice that found
in a standard motorized rifle division.’
However, there are noticeable differences.
The brigade has more combat battalions,
a mixture of two BMD-equipped and two
parachute assault battalions and an
organic artillery battalion.
The combination of two BAfD-equipped
battalions and two parachute battalions
is very intriguing. The BMD battalions
are totally in keeping with the recent
trend toward increased mobility within
the VD V where all divisional regiments
are being equipped with the BMD
AA ICV.8 However, the existence of
standard parachute battalions within the
air assault brigade in contract to the over-
all transition within the VD V toward

1983 23
MILITARY REVIEW
“heavier” airborne units might seem con-
tradictory, The explanation for this is
twofold.
First, air assault brigades and, in par-
ticular, their non-BJ4D-equipped bat-
talions would, in some cases, be employed
closer to the forward line of own troops
{F LO1l. As a front-level asset, these units
would support armies and di~,isions in the
front commander’s maneuver plan at
distances favorable for early linkup or fire
support. As a result, it is less critical for
these battalions to have ~he increased fire-
power and mobility that l?I?fDs provide
units operating farther in the enemy’s
rear area.
I
I
mE3El
mm
mm
M1943 120mrn mortar
\
Principal Items of Equipment
SA7 Grad surface-to.alr missile
123 23mm antimrcraft gun
BRDA4 AT 315 afmtank gu!ded mmsde launcher
RPGJ6D ant!tank grenade launcher
Tha represents d prowsonal assessment of the strength, organization
on fragmentary mformat,on from several sources
24
Second, it is assumed that the airlift for
these brigades would be provided primar-
ily by the front’s tactical air army (TAA).
Inasmuch as the lift capability at front
level is limited (a point that will be
discussed in more detail later), it simply is
not feasible to equip air assault brigades
with more equipment than can be moved
without excessive external support.
In the final analysis, it probably is no
accident (as the Soviets are fond of eay-
ing) that the air assault brigade sbructure
strongly resembles that of a reinforced
airborne regiment. In Soviet exercise play
subsequent to 197o, most airborne units
supporting frontal operations have been
Awbome
Regiment (BMtT)
1,455
— I
I I
6
mlz!$!zl
AGS17 30mm automattc grenade launcher 18
36 RPKS74 545mm bght machmegun 83
6 BMII awborne amphibious infantry combat vehicle 90
9 BROM and BRDM2 amphibious scout cars 4
111
and equipment of the aIr assault brigade, based”
Figure 2
October

of the regimental eize.g
With only minor differences in size and
, organization, the Soviet front com-
manders opposing NATO now have an in-
tegrrd, airborne-capable force available
for use in their operations. Nevertheless,
it is more probable that, unlike support-
ing sirborne regiments, sir assault bri-
gades would be deployed not as integral
units but as tailored subunits-that is,
one or two battaon task forces. This is
suggested first hy the number of bat-
talions and the differences in mobility
(BiMD-equipped versus parachute
assault) and, second, by the inadequate
frontal airlift available for a brigade-size
movement. A large-scale operation could
be mounted under current conditions only
with higher echelon support.
The questions that logicsfly arise are
Why were these brigades created, for
what roles and missions, and why were
they assigned to the fr’on t level? Before at-
tempting to address these questions, it is
necessary to note that the bulk of the
open-source information about new Soviet
um.ts is normally derived from exercise
play and from what the Soviets choose to
revesf about unit activities or from dis-
cussions in theoretical journals. As yet,
the Soviet military press has been very
circumspect about discussing the air
assault brigade as au organization. There-
fore. speculation about its missions and
employment must be based on:
. An anrdysis of capabilities implicit in
its organization.
. An inference of its uses as indicated
in general references to sir assault forces
in the Soviet military press.
. An identification of the shortcom-
ings in front capabilities it addresses.
e A determination of its role in the con-
text of overall Soviet operational-level
doctrine.’”
The last point is especially crucial to an
i 983
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
underst snding of the intended role of air
assault brigades. It is crucisf because of
significant changes that have occurred
and will continue in the Soviet opera-
tional-level approach to fighting and win-
ning a war in Europe. To fully appreciate
bow sir assault brigades might be used, it
is important to understand this fun-
damentrd alteration in Soviet military
thinking about how to defeat NATO.
The “Operational Maneuver Group”:
Tha Soviet Answer to the “Active Defense”
C. N. Donnelly, a frequent and respected
author on Soviet military affairs at the
Soviet Studies Centre, Royal Military
Academy, Sandhurst, in the United King-
dom, argues persuasively in a recent
article that the Soviets have introduced a
new operational-level concept specifically
designed to counter NATO’s active
defense strategy which is acknowledged
as a “very effective form of defense. ‘“ ]
According to Donnelly, Soviet military
doctrine holds that, if war breaks out in
Europe, it must be won very quickly “if it
is to be won at all.’’” If the war were to
continue too long, it could develop into a
catastrophic strategic nuclear exchange,
as well as engender internal centrifugal
pressures that could blow the Soviet bloc
apart.
(he primary task of the Soviets, there-
fore, is to reduce NATO’S prepsration
time since surprise is so crucial to
success. Ia If successful, NATO’S defenses
would not likely be heavily fortified, eche-
loned in depth or have a strong ope~a-
tionsf reserve.
Soviet planners well realize that the
early and effective use of NATO’s tacticaJ
nuclear weapons would severely disrupt if
not destroy their offensive. Thus, a strat-
25
 MILITARY REVIEW
egy and an operational plan would be
needed to forestafl the implementation of
NATO’s tactical nuclear option and to ac-
complish a rapid collapse of NATO’s
politico-military system. Such a strategy
would require:
o The achievement of surprise and
-’ assume NATO’s defense to be off-balance.
. A maximum amount of shock in the
first few hours of attack.
. Paralyzing NATO’s command and
control system.
● The achievement of rapid rates of ad
vance on severaf important axes deep into
NATO’s territory to shatter the defense.
● The reduction of risk repreeemted by
NATO’s tactical nuclear option.”
In studying N ATO’s defense planning,
}t’arsaw Pact military analysts see
several aspects of the active defense strat-
egy that could be exploited given the cor-
rect operationrd tactics. These are, for ex-
ample. NATO’S need tO identify the m~n
thrust early, its lack of a strong opera-
tional reserve and the consequent require-
ment to pull units from one part of tbe
defense line to strengthen another.”
Tbe Soviet operational-level answer to
successfully exploiting these factors and
thue achieving the strategic requirements
is the resurrection of a World War I I con-
cept —the “mobile group” —currently re-
ferred to as the “operational maneuver
group” or OMG. These organizations
were the “meet successful means of ex-
ploitation that the Soviets found to turn
tactical succe;s into operational success
and achieve a high rate of advance to
great depth’ ‘“ during the war.
.Juet what is an OMG, and what doee it
do? At army level, the basis for an OMG
would be a tank d]vision, while at front
level it would be major eiements of a tank
army. Tailored and possibly reinforced to
meet specific requirements, these groups
would likely be deployed by many of the
25
armies in an offensive on several axes
along a broad front on the first or second
day of hostilities. Supported by frontal
aviation, organic helicopter gunships and
artillery, OM Ge would seek the
rapid transfer of the attacking
fo;c;s”’ efforts into the enemy’s opera-
tional deferrsiue depth and the conduct of
the offensive with decisive goals, at the
high tempos and at a great depth. ”
Specific missions assigned to OMGS
along their axes of advance would include
to:
e Destroy nuclear weapons and de-
livery systems.
● Destroy or neutralize command
posts, electronic warfare units and
facilities, and air defense weapons.
e Prevent the withdrawal of enemy
troops.
e Delay the advance of reserves from
the enemy’s depth.
o Paralyze the enemy’s logistical sys-
tem.
e Capture major important areas and
objectives to be held until the main forces
arrive.”
Operating at a considerable distance in
front of an OMG would be its “forward
detachment.” This ehment, consisting of
a battalion task force for an army OMG or
a regimental task force for a front OMG,
would be separated from the OM G main
body by 20 to 40 kilometers.” Forward
detachments would generally conduct
reconnaissance for the OMG, identifying
weak points to be attacked by the OMG.
Forward detachments would try to deny
the enemy the opportunity to consolidate
on favorable lines of defense, conduct
raiding operations and seize tmgets if, by
doing so, they would significantly aid the
advance of the main body.’” Relying’ ‘to a
considerable degree” on the “able, bold,
and decisive operations of forward detach-
ments,” the Soviets hope to achieve ad-
flctober

vance rates of at least 40 to 50 kilometers
per day.”
The OMG concept is still evolving both
through discussion in Soviet military
journals and in actual practice during ex-
ercises. As Donnelly emphasizes, the
OM G is not a new formation; it is the use
of existing units in a different way and as
such represents “a concept of the very
greatest importance– a specific design to
defeat present NATO defensive plans.’ ‘2’
Air Assault Brigades:
An OMGConnection?
Soviet discussions concerning the
revival of the mobile group concept
reportedly started around 1976 and have
subsequently intensified, with particu-
larly broad coverage in the military press
in 1979.2! The time of these discussions,
quite apart from other factors, suggests
some correlation between air assault
brigades and the OMG ccmcept in that it
represents the approximate lead time re-
quired to decide unit formation, organir.a-
tion and then deployment ( 1976-79).
Apart from the time coincidence,
however, the key role of forward detach-
ments and raiding operations in the OM G
concept and the concomitant emphasis in
recent OM G literature on the importance
of tacticaf air assaults and desant opera-
tions seem to clearly indicate a major role
for air assault brigades in OIMG opera-
tions, if not an interrelationship. Several
statements from Soviet/Warsaw Pact
sources addressing OMGS and airborne/
air assault operations may further illus-
trate this:
. in contrast (o the past, [offensive]
capabilities have nou~ considerably ex-
panded, especially in the depth to which
blou~s can be deliuered by rocket forces,
1983
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
aviation, long range artillery, and the ex-
tensive use of air assault/airborne forces.
(Emphasis added.)”
. . pn”neipal tasks of the air force are.
to land tactical desants drawn from the
raiding and maneu uen”ng forces or from
the main forces of ground troops acting in
support of the operational maneuver
groups, This task involves transport
aircraft or helicopters landing ground
troops. . ..25
the essence of [the theory of a deep
offensiue operation] consisted of the
simultaneous suppression of the enemy ‘S
defense along its entire depth, penetration
of its tactical zone on a selected a;is with
a subsequent rapid extension of tactical
success. into the operational zone by intro-
duczng exploitation forces [tanks,
moton”zed n’fle troops, cavalry] and land-
ings of airbornelair assault forces for the
most rapid achievement of the ass?gned
missio n.”
. these [mobile] groups and [forward )
and special] detachments together u,ith
atrborne forces. prouided experience for
the Lmprouement on the theory of deep
combat opera tions. ”
Certainly, airborne and air assault
forces are considered to be important
elements of the OM G force structure. The
question that remains, however, is: I Iow
does, the role of the air assault brigades
differ from that of conventional airborne
or heliborne forces? The answer lies in ex-
amining the factors that influenced the
creation of the units.
Two factors influenced the decisions to
form and deploy these units. First was the
need to fill what could be termed the
front’s airborne/heliborne force employ-
ment “dead zone.’” Doctrinally, the
Soviets have maintained that heliborne
assaults and landings can be conducted as
far forwwd of the FLOT as 50 kilometers
—that is, tactical depth (see Figure 3). In
27
,
 .
MILITARY REVIEW
Strategic
Operational
F,gure 3 OMGS would be called upon to seize key
practice, however, these assaults rarely
extend beyond 15 to 20 kilometers for-
ward of the forward edge of the battle area
and are often much closer.” The apparent
reason for this substantial difference be-
tween theory and practice lies in tbe prin-
cipal weaknesses of heliborne forces—the
lack of mobility and firepower. To survive
at greater distairces, these forces need ar-
tillery and, aviation fire support and early
linkup with advancing units.
Airborne operations in support of frorr-
tal offensives have generally been of regi-
mental size in exerciees. Although
theoretically possible anywhere within 50
to 500 kilometers forward of the FLOT
when supporting a front, such operations
28
are usually conducted at depths much
greater th& 50 kilometers. Thus, a dead
zone appears-an area of somewhere be-
tween 20 and approximately 100 kilo-
meters deep in the enemy defensive zone.
This dead zone has existed ae a result of
the front commander’ inability to reach
vertically heyond 20 kilometers into the
enemy’s defensive zone. If the frorzt com-
mander wanted to assault deeper into the
enemy’s rear area, he was forced to re-
quest airborne assets from the Generrd
Staff or its wartime manifestation, the
Stauka (general headquarters staff):’ The
commander could not be assured that his
request would be approved or that an
operation would be launched quickly
enough to exploit a fleeting opportunity.
As the new OMG concept implies,
Soviet military planners envision a
number of rapid, deep penetrations aJong
several axes or “main directions, ” as the
Soviets term it, by army-level and possi-
bly even front-level OM Gs. To maintain
the high rates of advance considered
poseible under nonnuclear condition,
terrain-that is, river-croseing sites,’”
passes, crossroads, rail junctione, and so
forth to deflect reacting enemy reserves
end, in short, to perform the full range of
rear area missions.sl
In addition, these operations should be
carried out, according to Soviet strategic
considerations, in a relatively compressed
time frame if an offensiw against NATO
ie to be successful. This relatee to the sec-
ond factor responsible for air assault bri-
gade formation–the need to provide the
front commander and (possibly) subordi-
nate army commanders with organic air
assault forces that would be available
from the st=t of the operations.
With planning aimed at a relatively”
short, intense conflict with the commit-
ment of OMGS on D+l or D+2, it would

seem consistent that these operationaJ-
level commanders need integral air-de-
livered forces to help maintain the requi-
site speed of advance. Further, these
forces would provide a rapid responee
capability— a means by which to react to
any abrupt change in the combat situa-
tion. The vrdue of these forces in an over-
afl environment that demands the utmost
flexibility and adaptability of com-
manders is self-evident.
The need to extend the reach of the
front commander into NATO’s opera-
tional defense in support of OJNIGSis re-
flected in the BLfD battalion components
of air assault brigades. These battalions’
more substantial firepower end mobility
would permit them to survive at greater
distances from the FLOT for longer
periods of time than heliborne troops. As
a bonus, the availability of air assault bri-
gades could reduce somewhat the commit-
ments of airborne divisions. Although
clearly VD 1~ units would be used exten-
sively in support of fron ta/ operations,
there should be a greater availability of
them for strategic reserve (Reserves of
the Supreme High Command) missions or
to carry out missions at even greater
operational/strategic depths.
In short, the air assault brigade would
aPPem to be the solution to the problem of
providing the fi-on t-level commander an
organic force for vertical movements. The
emphasis on the OMG as a viable means
at the operational level by which to defeat
NATO, a level which previously did got
possess such forces, further reinforces the
perception of a direct relationship.
What kinds of missions could be ex-
pected for air assault brigadee? How
would they be employed with OMGS? As
a probable threedimensionsd or vertical
extension of an OM G, air assault bri-
gadea, in generaf, would have the same
kiuds of missions as the unit they sup-
1983
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
port. Of foremost importance would be
the destruction of nuclear weapons and
delivery systems, as well as commend
peats, radio-electronic means of combat
and air defense weapons.” In Exercise
NEMAN, held in the Baftic MD in 1979,
an airborne battaIion with B’MD.s was
dropped on an enemy division command
post on the second day of the exercise.”
Although it is not known whether this “
unit was from err air assault brigade or a
standard airborne division, it highlights a
possible mission for air assault brigade
elements.
Probably one of the single most impor-,
tant miseions to be asaigned to air%sauft
brigades in support of OMGS would be
the seizure end occupation of key terrain
—in particular, river-crossing sites. It is
virtually impossible to identify afiy signi-
ficant Soviet exercise in the western MDs
and GOFS that does not incorporate some
type of river-crossing operation. While
Soviet military writers extol the need for
successful fording of water obstacles from
the march by forward detachments, beli-
borne or airborne assaults, in most cases,
are used to seize and hold bridgeheads un-
til relieved by advancing forces.”
If OMGS are to sustain daily rates of ad-
vance of at least 40 to 50 kilometers, one
of the key factors in this achievement
would be the crossing of water barriers
without delay—that is, without being
forced to deploy and seize or find a cross-
ing point. Although timely river crossings
are obviously very important, other ter-
rain objectives, such as mountain passes,
crossroads, gap crossings, and so forth,
which could impede the advance of OMGS
would also be likely objectives for air
assaults.
Another mission for air assault bri-
gades would be the widespread conduct.of
raids in support of OMGa. Raids would be
conducted by company or even battalion-
,
29 ‘
MILITARY REVIEW
size elements on t ergets in front of or
parrdlel to the OMG’e main azis of ad-
vance. Raiding operations would disrupt
enemy forces reacting to the OM G‘s
passage, as well as simply increase the
amount of confusion in the rear area.
Lieutenant General V. G. Reznichenko,
assistant commandant of the Frunze
Military Academy, in an article citing the
current offensive application of lessons
imrmed from the Battle of Moscow, noted
approvingly the ad hoc formation of rtrid-
ing detachments to attack targets in the
enemy rear to “destroy personnel and
equipment, deny the enemy rest, to sow
panic.’ ‘3’ He went on to add that:
. . . these [mobile] groups and detach-
ments together with airborne troops used
for the first time in the Battle of Moscoro
have provided experience for the improve-
ment of the theory of deep combat opera-
tions.8s
Other raiding operation cited for their
effectiveness and current applicabilityy in-
clude the crossing of the Dnieper River in
1943 and the Manchuria Campaign of
1945. During the Dnieper ckossing,
groups of 600 to 800 airborne troops
operated independently behind German
tines for two months. During the two-
week Manchuria Campaign in 1945, 20
airborne parties of 50 to 500 personnel
were inserted in the Japanese rear areas’
In addition to raid operations in direct
support of OMG movements, air aesault
brigades could be useful for various
economy-of-force missions. As noted
previously, a perceived weakness of
NATO’e ,active defense strategy is the
need for main thrusts of an attack to be
identified early in the conflict. Landings
of air assault troops could easily be used
as feints or deceptions to confuse the
defender about the location of the main
objectives. In Exercise ZAPAD 81, for ex-
ample, a diversionary hetiborne assault
was Iauncbed in the enemy’s rear area to
draw away reserves, while a second air
assault was aimed at seizing a river-
crossing site for the 0MG.98
The greater depth in the enemy’s defen-
sive zone to which air assault forces can
be projected and the high mobility of the
BMD battalions make them ideal for re-
connaissance support of OMGS and their
forward detachments. The Soviets envi-
sion OM G forward detachments operat-
ing from 20 to 40 kilometers in front of the
main body. The importance Soviet mili-
tary writers attach to these detachments
cannot be overemphasized.sg
One of the lessone prominent in Soviet
literature about World War- H operations
of mobile groups (and forward detach-
ments) is that reconnaissance of tbe
enemy and bhe terrain along the group’s
main azis of advance must be improved.”
Certainly, the insertion of air assault
forces at various depthe along the pro.
jetted OMG “main direction” of advance
would be invaluable in providing timely
information on route conditions, as well
as enemy troop movements. Indeed, it is
not unreasonable to characterize such air
assault reconnaissance elements as the
“forward detachment’s forward detach-
merit, ” and, when operating as such, en
OMG might stretch from “head to toe” as
much as 100 kilometers.
Finafly, another poseible air assault
mission is uniquely associated with the
OMG concept. OMGS operating in
N ATO’s rear areas would
. . . require considerably more in the way
of support and protection than do forces
in the first echelon of the battle formation
of the main forces. This coupled with the
great uariety and the great importattce of
the tasks these groups perform makes
a widespread use of aviation necessary’
to snpport them effectively. (Emphasis
added. P’

Although close air support by fixed-
wing aircraft is included, the primary
means of air support, as expressed by Ma-
jor Wojciech Mlchalak, would be heli-
copters. In his discussion of possible bas-
ing modes for helicopter units supporting
OMGS, these three sh,ernatives were pro-
posed:
8 The creation of EMorganic OMG “air
echelon” that penetrates u,ith OMGS into
the enemy’s rear areas and is based and
operates directly with OMGS.
. That helicopters support OMGS by
conventional methods—that is, from
bases sited with the main forces.
e That helicopters initially support
from bases with main forces, but “at deci-
sive moments in the operation the heli-
copters, after carrying out specific mis-
sions, land in the gi-oupings of the raiding
or maneuvering troops. There they are
serviced and replenished and they return
to battle operating jointly with the rsid-
ing and maneuvering forces. . .‘“’
Of the three proposals, the last is the
preferred choice. To successfully imple-
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
ment this basing option, as Ivfichslak
notes, it would be necessary for OMG
units to locate, secure sad defend suitable
helicopter Ianding zones. Certainly, the
reconnaissance of landing zones is a possi-
ble mission for forward-deployed air
assault tits, and, in fact, the securing and
temporary defense of Iaqding zones aud
rdrstrips are both very probable tasks.
For example, doring ZAPAD 81, a heti-
borne assault was conducted on an air-
field in the enemy’s rear area. After the
assault force had secured the landing
strip, transport aircraft followed with
“combat vehicles ‘ and additional forces.
These forces immediately departed to link
up with advancing naval infantry units
which had just carried out au amphibious
assault.” It is apparent that this type of
operation is ideafly suited for air assault
brigades. The parachute battalions can be
inserted either by airdrop or helicopter
landing, with the BMD batttilons landing
shortly thereafter.
Indeed, it is more and more Iikely that
sir landing, with its shortened time in the
MILITARY REVIEW
landing area, not airdrop operations may
be the preferable method of air aesault
force insertion. Lieutenant General N.
Pavlenko, VD V chief of staff, notes that
the primary goaf for sirborne forces is to
“shorten the time needed by units (regi-
ments) and subunits (battrrfions and com-
panies) to prepare for lending and combat
operations.’”4 And, lest one believe he is
only referring to airdropped forces,
Pavlenko emphasizes that “in the name of
our force Vozdushno-Desan tnyye Voyska
the word ‘parachute’ is missing. The
future of tirborne operations looks more
impressive than the present.’”5 BY this,
Pavlenko seems to imply an equally im-
portant role for both airlanded and air-
dropped forces. With the airlanding of air
assault forces either by helicopter or
transport aircraft, a significant reduction
in deployment time is achieved. As to
feasibility under combat versus interven.
tion conditions, Soviet airborne forces
cenied out 20 separate sirborne assault
operations during the 1945 Manchuriarr
CrnnpaiFY-afl were airlanded$c
There are, of course, other m&hods of
inserting air assault brigade elements
which would take advantage of the per-
sonnel’s airborne skills, and there are
situations where air-landing operations
are not possible. Any of a number of prac-
tical variations exist. For example, air-
borne elemente maybe dropped to estab-
tish a bridgehead at a river-crossing site
for the OM G‘s forward detachment with a
follow-on drop of BA4D units for support
if linkup ie expected to take some time. Or
the BA4D-equipped units could be
dropped at a greater depth to secure
snother crossing site rdong the OMG’s
axis of advance. The greater survivability
of these units would permit them to per-
form these missions more readily than
strictly parachute or heliborne assault
forcee.
32
Figure 4 shows an example of the use of
airborne forces to seize several crossing
cites on a breakthrough force’s axis of ad-
vance, as well as a deeper insertion to
delay enemy reserves. With the exception
that a heliborne assault would probably
be employed today for the first objective,
this is a very representative schematic of
how air assault brigadee might be used in
eupport of an OMG or any exploitation
force.”
;.
Unanswered Questions
The air aesault brigade, psrticulwly in
combination with OM Gs, and its pot en-
tiaI uses are impressive. But it is impor-
tant to emphasize that a number of ques-
tions need to be answered before a full
understanding of ite intended employ-
ment is attained. As Donnelly points out
about OMGS, while the concept has been
adopted by Soviet military plannere, the
implementation details have not been re-
solved.’a Much the same can be said of air
assault brigades.
Soviet military literature has extolled
the past and prospective value of air- ,
borne/air assault forces, both in generaf
and in relation to OMGS. However, it hae
not been specific about which kinds of
operations are the most important for air
assault brigades or the mechanics of their
execution. Indeed, without open acknowl-
edgement of their existence, and, in light
of the continuing evolution of the OMG
concept, it is probable that there are no
Soviet answers to these questions at the
present time.
Certainly, the missions and possible
tactics of air assault brigades outfined
previously are within unit capabilities and’
are based on either tbe resuk.s of exercises
or a careful reading of Soviet military
October
.,
Schematic of How Air Assault Brigades Might Be Used

-5.
Q

legend:
c1
AL
ID
Ikw3tmal

Cmnmrtmen!
Am,
I“f,”tq
Corm
dw,ston
mrborne Lmdmg

1,”, of breakthrough em,),. MRC

AR
Motmmd
wly
rtf!,
r,sww
mrw Afl
BEE
Army ,“$,l ,0”
Breakth, owh ,. P10,2,, <.” echelon
~
F]gure 4

literature. That listing of missions and meters end a troop capacity of 40.’g
schemes of maneuver, however, is an ag- Although the theoretical front lift capa-
gregate-air assault brigades would not city appears large, it is, in fact, much
be able to carry out every mission simul- smrdler. The front end army assault heli-
taneously or consecutively in a short con- copter regiments primarily provide fire
flict. This suggests that, as the Soviets ac support and are used for troop transport
quire more experience in the employment only when available. The fron t‘s main lift
of these brigades, certain priority mis. eupport comes from the transport heli-
sions and operationrd profiles should copter regiment. The regiment’s Mi-6
precipitate out of this aggregate-as will Hook heavy lift squadrons are, as a rule,
problems with their execution. used to move artillery, armored vehicles,
What are the problem areas and vulner- heavy equipment, and so forth which, in
abilities of air assault brigades with which practice, reduces the fronr’s lift capability
the Soviets could be expected to cope? to the Mi-8 Hip medium lift squadrons
First and foremost is the problem of lift. and the An-26 Curls. Currently, it is
Figure 5 illustrate the helicopter lift assessed that a front “s organic helicopter
capability normally available to a front or assets can move only a 500-man force in a
army. In addition, there are approxi- single lift.’”
mately 11 light transport aircraft in the As is evident from these figures, a front
front’s TAA–normally the An-26 Curl currently does not have the organic assets
which has a range of 900 to 2,250 kilo- to simultaneously move large elements of

L,
1983 33
MILITARY REVIEW

Soviet

Type MI-8 HIP MI-6 Hook” MP24 Hmd

Range lkdometets) 425 620 360
Troop Capacdy 28 65-70 8-12
Speed (kilometers per hour] 260 300 275

“The M, 26 Halo A armeared m 1978 as the M, 6 replacement The M,.6 can carrv 1 B!#O, The MI.26 can carry 2 BMDs
and 1 BMP

Helicopter Units—Front/Army

Army—Assault Helmopter Regtmentr L!ft CapacNy2

2 MI 24 Hr.d 0/[ squadrons (4o helicopters~ 320-480

2 MI 8 HID CIE squadrons (20 hehcoptersy” 560
Total 880.1.040

front – Independent Hehco@ Regment (Assault) bft Capacity

2 M, 24 squadrons (40 helmopters~ 320-480

2 Ah 8 squadrons (20 helmopters) 560
Total 880-1,040

Independent Helicopter Regiment (Transport)

2 M, 6 heavy Ilft squadrons (16 helicopters) 1,020
2 M, 8 med!um lift squadrons (26 helicopters) 728
Total 1,748

“Secondary role IS troop transport, primary rnlsslons are attack/fire support [Hind D) or antdank (H!nd-E)

““Normal{y, one squadron fs ttansport-oriented (HIP C), whale the other IS attack/f!re suppoti-ortented (HIP Q
Not,,
Assault h,l,coder re~,mmt, may be ,It,th,d to ,,.,,, ,, m,ded but ,,, n,! ,,ta”,, to tank m mmb,md arms ,,.,,% by Iabl,, .1 or~a”$zat,m md
W“wne”!

1l,l! wabll! b,, ,r, ,,;cu IXM ,, Ih,,, theoretlc?lly w,,,bl, 1“ ,,l”,! ,1? Ilft w!8bllIt+,$ ,r, much 10.,,. ,%”I!!w fro. wI,,., .,ss,0” (,1!,,1 “,,$”$
,ra,wor,, OW,,,Q,,I ,,,$1, W,,, ,,w,x,m,tel” 80 wce”ti md Other .,ss,0” ,wJ,rem,”t,

Figure5

an sir assault brigade. In addition, with capacity is essentially committed.

the exception of the Mi-6 Hook heli- Thus, it is clear that a major problem
copters, there ie not another fi-ont-level exists with organic front lift capabilities
airframe capable of transporting the and the employment of sir assault bri-
B&f,!) AA ICVS of the sir assault brigades. gades. The size of the problem varies
Further complicating the situation is the directly with the size of the intended
fact that if the front commander decides operation. If air assault units are
to conduct a conventional heliborne employed as company-size raiding par-,,
assault with a motorized rifle battalion ties, for example, then the front com-
basq–the standard Soviet force for such mander can shift his lift assets more com-
an operation—his entire helicopter lift fortably. If, on the other hand, he wants

34 October .

to deploy a battalion task force, hard
choices concerning mission priority would
have to be made or very careful opera-
tionef sequence planning conducted.
Looking at the OMG concept, in partic-
ular, with its implicit high operational
dynamics and compressed time frame, it
seems likely that the front commander
would eventually receive additions lift
assets to enable him tc mount additional
operations in support of his army OMGS.
This can be done in either of two ways.
The front tir assault brigades may be
directly supported with heavier lift eir-
craft for BMDs by Soviet military trans-
port aviation or uoyenno-transportnaya
auiatsiya (VTA) units, or front TAAs
might be augmented with additional heli-
copterhransport aircraft units.
The second option would seem more at-
tractive if only to reduce the coordination
problems created by the first option.
Further, if, in fact, sir assault brigades
were created to give tbe fi-on t commander
an organic force to influence action deeper
in bis operational zone, it would only be
logical that he afso receive organic means
for employing it. ~
A second, somewhat related factor, cer-
tain to affect air assault brigade opera-
tions in support of O.MGS, is air support—
in tbe sense of fire eupport and aerial
resupply. As noted previously, the exten-
sive use of helicopters is envisioned by
SOviet/tt’srsaw Pact military arrafysts as
a means for providing the fire support in
depth that ie vital to the eurvivaf of
OMGS and their attached air assault
elements, as well as the resupply of these
units. Proposed support schemes include
temporarily basing helicopter units in the
enemy’s rear area to better assist units
operating there. This is ambitious, if not
audacious, planning to say the least.
Even as the sir battle rages above 100
meters’ attitude for control of the sky in a
1983
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
Central European conflict, a eimilsr con-
flict would be waged for control of the 106
meters beneath it where helicopter forces
would normafly operate. It remains to be
seen whether the Sotiets would be able to
consistently project helicopter nir sup
port in operational depth for OMGS and
attached units which will be deployed
over substantial dietsnces in the enemy’s
rear.
Warsaw Pact OMG advocates have al-
ready acknowledged that the expected
“ sizeable loss rate among helicopters”
supporting OMGs “seems to hea funds- “
mental factor when deciding the cppacity
of the ~ound forces to operate in the
depth of the enemy formations. ““ This
factor may indeed be the fulcrum on
which rests the operational success of
failure of OMGS supported by sir assault
brigades.
A third question or factor srisingefrom
sir assault brigade operations in. support
of 0.!4 Gs is command and control. Air
assault brigade elements would probably
be assigned in support of armies’ rfivi-
sionef OMGS hy the front commander.
Further, the front would alao have to alln-
cate airlift support for each detached air
assault unit elthougb an army might he
able to provide its own fire support if an
assault helicopter regiment is attached.
The planning and coordination problems
spanning these echelons of command are
obvious, but these would be exacerha:ed
even further by the distances separating
them.
While initisf operational planning end
execution might be successful,~ aubee-
quent operations would unavoidably be
planned and conducted in a fluid end
rapidly changing combat environment.
Divisional OMGS, if successful in pene-
trating NATO’s operational defense zone,
would be attempting to coordinate and
direct the operations of their forward de-
35
 1
MILITARY REVIEW
tachments some 20 to 40 kilometers to the
front, the operations of supporting air
assault units either on the azes of advance
or conducting raids astride them, and the
operations of attached or supporting air
cover for the entire zone of operations.
Will commanders of OMGS, forward de-
tachments, air assault units, and so forth
be able to coordinate these operations suc-
cessfully? The Soviets recognize the prob-
lem but are unsure of its solution. Rezni-
chenko writes that:
. . . the success of offensive combat is
directly dependent on the level of training
of commanders and staffs: the lower that
Ieuef, the greater must be the degree of
centralized control. (Emphasis added.)’z
It is, at best, uncertain whether in-
creased external control, if feasible con-
sidering the locus of operations, would en-
sure successful coordination of these
units’ activities. In any case, this would
be a problem requiring resolution through
further refinement of these types of opera-
tions.
Conclusions
The air assault brigade, as a new ele-
ment of the Soviet force structure,
represents a significant increase in front-
level capabilities. Whereas previously the
front commander hadto rely on Ministry
of Defense/General Staff-controRed air-
borne forces for tmgets more than 20 kilo-
meters forward of the FLOT, he now has
an organic capability for vertical assaults
into this heretofore dead zone. These
brigades, with their combination of para-
chute and BMD assault battalions, com-
pensate for the mobility and firepower
shortcomings of heliborne assault forces
that limited the extent of their employ-
ment and created this dead zone.
36
While it is unconfirmed whether air
assault brigades were formed as a direct
result of the OMG concept’s resurrection,
they will definitely ease the implementa-
tion of its goals. Together with other
Soviet rear area forces, such as diver-
sionary brigades, regular airborne divi-
sions and even KGB (Committee of State I
Security) saboteure, these brigades exa-
cerbate even further N ATO’s behind-the-
Iines security planning problems. With
the addition of air assault brigades,
Soviet forces are now preparing to con-
duct vertical assaults throughout the full
depth of theater operations.
The air assault brigade is capable of per-
forming a myriad of missions, but, as
more operational experience is gained, it
will probably end up performing certain
specific types of missions more frequently
than others. Chief among these, particu-
larly in support of OMG operations,
would be the se;zure of key terrain critical
to a successful advance such as obstacle-
crossing sites and so forth.
Although air assault brigades are
potentially rich in employment possibil-
ities, ezisting problems demand atten-
tion. These include the source of initial
airlift, subsequent air-delivered fire sup-
port and resupply, and control by and
coordination with supported maneuver
forces. These are not insignificant prob-
lems by any means, and it is not at all cer-
tain that they can be solved satisfactorily.
Nevertheless, air assault brigades
represent a further manifestation of the
Soviet emphasie on desant operations and
their projected scale in a war with NATO.
Unlike many who argue that the use of
airborne/air aseault forces is pass6, Soviet
military planners continue to demon-
strate confidence in such forces. The ,.
organization and deployment of air
assault brigades are the most recent con-
firmation of thie.
 ,.
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

NOTES

, D,cfm”.ry “f B,,>. M,r,,.ry Term, CA Sow.{ V,,WL S.LW,” OPerat! O”, .0..5 ”.,,0 a, d,,,,,.” ,,”,, and lower The SW.!
WIIO.”1OI Documents, uSGOvernm,nl Prrnfr”g Otl,ce, Wa,h,nQ rm!wlq uses an ,Iltemlea!al estage, Iheoperat,ormt 1.,,1, govern.
10”, DC, 1965 067 l.the Sov,elm,l$tar, !ex,con, Oesan,.r,,l.”d t“g the act,.”. of },0.,s .“$ arm,., and, .! lb,, level, Places ,t. em
mg ,.,.,$, ,, Oer, ”ed ,, -troop, ,“lended ‘., ,Mnd,r,g, C,, Wh,ch ph.,,. for tile , . . . . ..!.$ a.hteveme”l of Strateg,c goal$
thaw ,!?.,0” ,ana’ea. 0. enemy.o.c.!ya temtory. m, me p“qm,e 31 C N Do.”elly, ,TheSo,,etO Pe,al,.n,lM anoe””,eG,ouP 6
(JI cons.ct,ng combat .0.,.,,.”s Accocd, ng to lhe tm.,tmr, New Challe”.e 10, NATO.’, !.,erne,,.na! Defense Re.,em. Vol.rne
me!hod”,ed, a,and!”g force ma” beamp.!b,ou, a,rt,oroe 0,.orn 15, Number i 1982, PP 1,177.86 (RePrm@d m M,i!ta,y R,”,,w,
b,ned a“daCC0rG2.0 10ZtSS’a$, ,”QO”rDOSe sue. alorcemavbe March ,983, DD4360 ) U“!es. otherw,,e “01,0, the ,ema,ntier .1 the
Watwy. ODwat>m:t
m lactwa , Omcussmn ,s essentr.lty . s.mmary 01 hey pojmslrom ttv sex.
2 The term a,r .S,,UH !m$gade ,s ,t,,mly of Wesler”.r< g,. .,1 lent am<!,
rel,ect!.rja we,,ern u”der,,and!.g el, ”.s,zeand q.,umed,ole ,! 12 Q",.k,y,, ,"these.set nattneS ov,et, mus,dest,oye"ouSh
IS “.? ,“”W. ho. ,., so”!.!.,,1,>tomes,.“!1s o, NATO, “.c,.3a, w?aPon,, del$”eW SySlem. a”d Pert,”e”t corn.
3 I“ Sov Ief mact,ce I., Meat<.” of brmad, .“G ..,.. s,,, mend ,“6 .0”[,0, “.,worx 10 make tile,, “s.. ,“1,?.s,5). before
..8$s .tth Ihal s!xctft nomenclature c% ritwwly mm such ““.1,,, ,.1..,. ,. .I,thor,zed .4. Donnelly go,”t. .“1, NATO
mga”!zalso.s .S”a!ly Wveellk?r . 9!3,, !11,Wogramcalm!s s!.” Iea.ae.s nave categoncai!y smwa mat m.y WII! c.m.w f,ght wtm
m area 01 r,sm..!ill!!y or can m., a SD.. !*IC COrmal rmsslo. .o.vermonai mea.ons foF.,f,ve.o r,,alew,,oaYs 11x$ mes.mablv
f.?, e.a”’.le .,1., ” W. Sowel $.,,. SNuc!.re .!, ,ewe!.1 .!, W,*W” m,$tmetramet hatIhesovret.wilt.rwtllnot ammlmh
mob,le .3s,..!, Lwqade. .h<’h We O@Olo”ed !“ “IOU”,., ”.., thetr goals See Donnelly ‘The S.,,.1 Opem.tmn.a! Manoe”vre
bord.r rewon, 01 the USSRSU!lgest, ng .Wograoh,. ally relatea Gro.v ANew C..!! engelor NATO,,l nrernat,..atD efenseRe.!ew,
m!, s!on OP c,, , DPl,177a”dl ,181,
4 Th,, Oe.lo,ment “alter” ,, ““I neces,.r,ly .“”s”,! as yet 13 BYdef,.$t,on, fflhe Sovtetleadecs bel!eve survr,;&.ann0lbe
The S.,,,, Gr.uDs .1 For.,. ,GOFS1, ,Parlx.u!.cw ,. East Germany, a.h,evea they wII not attack ..!,$ It ce. tm
We$tern ena Far Eastern M$l$tarb D,str,ct$ lMD.l. .orma11vrece,.e 14 00.”. i, Y.., Tbe SOvt.tOD.rattO. aIM8R0..vG,01DlD AN.w
l,mt pt,.r,?, . ..eweIDmentan dUd!t$t$ generally !.that”orm II. C!m!lenge for NATO: Intem.tm.al Defense Rewew .D .,1, P
h.$,ov, r a>r as.a.lt br,gade. are “01 subseck,enlly clePlow?d 1,179
t.roug”o.t lb, oI!w? MD, $“ the uSSR ?.$. would s.gge,, a 15 10$. .3,78<
s.ec,l,c ope!al!onal role v!sa.v,s NATO forces 16 ,O,d, P1,183
5 The We.,,,. ,healer of war or ,,.,, .0,”, ,lVl, O”.8,t, d 17 Ma,or Gem?rall Kr. oche”ko ,S.osobvR a.vtt!vaUsDekh.v
,P.erfl,
{7vD0
!t!eat.r, of nil, s,aryom-flt!onsor
P?e. umanly, tke Western TVhe.
,ea,r”o,e”n,hh
at lea9t tree
tie”s,v(”
TVDS the
@Pr.t,.~oy
Meklm(,,mva”ny,h
Gmme S;,.m Te.,ri.vkfi “AW.
Ko,Pu..,,
fa..ovYM I
Vowmokfoncheshw Zh.rnal
Western (NATO central reg,onl It!, N.,ttweste, n ,S.andtna,, an iMtl,tarv Hfsrorrc.l Jo.r..n, J.ly 1981, P20
Cou.tr, em ..0 me Sou$htiemler. (Turkey, Greece, 11.1? and me 18 Me,., wo,ctecn Mtctlalak, Av,at,o” ,“ 1., Ra,a Maneuvar
Medt,er,a.can) F“! f,,rt”er ,nlorm.a,o” on Sov,et TV, . . . TvD 00.,, !,.., of Ground %!.,s,’, P.i#.h A,< f.,., .“.s A,, &fe”Se
CO”, IW1. .ePDe”n,. M Rmg So,rel w.wfmIe Command anCI Con. ftev,ee, February ?982 P 1 c,,edby Do”nell), ,TheSo.,e!Ooe,a.
,,., [..!” ,0. ., ,,, ,,,,, Defense Conlm,,,ee ,/7, s,..,., 1$...1 Ma.oe..re Group A New challenge for NATO l.ter”a
7,..,??, s 0, w,, 8.(7 rhea, e,, .fM, ?l,.9ry 00,,,,,0., A,, ““,”,,. ,>ona, De fe”,e Re.,ew w c,, , D 1,182
,$1, Max. ell A,r ForcenBa,e Ala ?976 19 Colonel N K,reye” .nd 0310”.1 Don,yenko, ..fz OP”fa
6 7..., erqa”,,atm”al ,..,1, nave DeP”ex!racleO trOm COOr t?,, ,.”0 Pr!menenwa Peredo””k h OtIVadov T.”” ovwh ,Mek lmmz,
a!natq malt Fwlo Ma.. al IFVI 10023 Sowel .41m, T,00Ps ro.annwh) %JW..SOV,, voye””o lslor,cheskw Zh.ma! (M:lrtary
llrganr,aton a“. fquvmm”, Department of the Arr”, W.,h, ng H)s,or?’al Jo.r”zO, Seotember 1982, P 2S
ton DC 1982 DD4180..O4I88 20 M.rm.lo LOW ,BoyevoveP r,mene.,YeB ro.elanNovYkhl
7 ,. ,,,”’ - d ,... ..1. ..,1,,, ,0,,. m,,,>,,, ,., .,,10 t, ,tde.tia”?z, ro.. ”n”kh VOysk., Vo,mm Istor<ches,,y Zhurn. t
ne.rr. 3 to 1 S,. Ma, or MIct’a.l Cr.tcher. The S0,,,1 A,rborne lM81#tam Hrsr.rtcal Jo.r.an November %982. .48
D,.,,,.. He.,e. 01’ the SovCeI GrO. ”0 Forces Defense 1“ 2? Kr.p.henko, Wwsiby RamWa Uspb.ha . ODeratwnoY
I. 11,LI, ”c, AQency ,DIA), *ash, ”gto”, DC, March <980, D 3 Gluome Smm, TankcWhhArmK Ta.kovykh, Mekh.n,2rrava..yk.
8 see Co.ra,nat, nc Draft FM 10023 SOWW
Arm, rroom voye.no lsmr!chestuy Zh.rn.l owmt.ry Hrslonc.i
Orqdn<,ata *.U Cwir”en,, 0. C!! p. 192 P.e.m. sly SO. (,S ::%”’:P c,, P 13 Both K, UC,Che”kO .“fl K,r,y,” and
.!rbOrn@d,v!$ O”. had””. 8MDw.!M,”l. ”OIW’J LMrschutererm Don venko [see foom.te 191 ,mdcate 40to 50 kdorneters !9., day as
men,, M,” .“,, .“. Bf,4D COmt,a-ny each W,,.!” ,“. D.., few standard .ava..e fates, but they m.. note. baseo on worm War II
year., all %“!.t .,rOOr”, 0,”’.,0., .8”, been t,.”, !t,O”, ”Q Io P.” emer,ence, mat rates .pto80t090 k$lom.ters Der aay may be
al! BMD. .,,,on., con,, gu, a,!on The BMDamDh!OrO”, a,rbOr”, !” feasible
Ia.lry COmb.i?eh,Cle W., f,r,t l“trOduced l”tO!he SOvlet ,,<bOr”, 22 Donnelly, ’TheSov,etO oerat,o.alM a.oeuvreGroup ANe*
Ior,esa, least ase,, !ya, 1970 wbenob3eme0, nExerC&3e DVlNA Challenge for NA1O,. lnrern. t!onal Defense Rewe.. 09 Cit., D
ProDer,, ,ons,.ered, ”ea, rborne forces ve,s!.nof t.e BMP!”fan ,,77
twcornbat.ehc,e ,t,se9.,ccea *$tha73mm m.,. 9 . . . ..tkta.k 23 1.9,0, D1,183
rms$, !e ,,.. ,,,, and ,“reemacn!”eq. ns !Kwe!gh, 75nletr!c!Qns, 24 Kr.c!chenkO, Sposoby R.?tmya UsPekha . Oper.twnoy
,s arr o,oPP.01. anG can s.rm US!ng the .ater,et system Olher Gr.bmes,lamti la.kovvkh Army. Ta.kovvhh !Mehhan,zrro.a.. yKh
BMDva, #ant, ”,, u.ec Omm.”da”OCO”7r01 ma#”E”a”ce,”!JDO. Korcmso, voyenno ls(ortcheskry zh.r.al Wf,l,t,ary H!s!orrcal
and a r.ce”r ,erslon ,0. IDD,O w!,. a 30mm .umma,, c ,,.”.” $“ Jo.r.z%oD o, D20 Theterm for.irborne oratrassa.l! forces
,,.. .+ ,“, 7hVn gun mat Krulmhenk. uses $. vozti.shno aes..lnwe Vo?sk.. which
9 Thela.t kro*ncomPletea .raropo faSo.feta $rBornea, v,s,o. ,I,eral,y ,ra”slated m Russ,,” m.,”, %wr].nd,ng fo,ces. Th!s
m exercme play occurred during Exercise DvINA ,. 1970 sm.. term has commonly been tra.st.teo t“ Western merat.re on SOvmt
men, ,. mamr Sov,et exe!c, ses such as SHrELD 76, BROFHER m,litar, o.eratro.s as,. a!rbornelor.es ,, Throughout th!sart,.le. in
HOOD iN4RMS80a.a2APAD87 .Lrborne reg, mentshavepart$c, vt’aw O; me deployment of .,, assault brrgades,-t!us term, when en.
Da,,. For a“ ,..,l ,’+”, summary.” Postwar Sov, et ,,rbomeexec co. n!ereo m S..,.! sources, has been transmteo to reflecl the
C!S.S see Rlc.ara Oden and Frank Ste!.ert TheSov!et A!rborne greater number of operational .ar,at,o”s rmpltc,t m atrlandt.g
T,00L,s, /7,,,,,+ .1 ,., s.,,,, 0, . . . . force, DIA Washs”gto” forces rather than lust slmmy a$rborne forces
DC Va!ch 1980 cm 517 For a .W.IO,W,I LIe”eh3PrlIe”t of alr 25 Mwha!eh, Avtat,on m the ReCa Mwm.vw Operations of
lands.. iorces m ,Oz..s.nouewnmvve VOVSN. IVDW from the Gro."a Force$,,P ol,shA,rF orcea.dA,rD eFenseRe.rew.o P CIt,
SOV-,et-PerSDeCt, Ve, See Ma, Or Ge”eral’~ KO,iyle”. Sfanovden8 ye! Ilp 54
eezv, t,ve voW. sh.o DesantnW Voysh,., Vorenno lstorlcheskw 26 CoIo.el N Rama.,chev. R.zvlt#veTe .rlvlPr aht!k#Bovevovo
Zh.rn.l lM$l,farv wrsfo,,cal Journal), SeDlember 1975, PP8085 Pr,me.e”, Ye vozti.shfio Desa.tnYkh Voysk Mezfi.ovennyy
10 1. SOV, P! mmtmy art there lsama!or lntermed,ate levelb+ Perma, Voyen.o.fsfor(chesksy Zhur.al tMIIIlarY Wstorlcar Jo.r
1*.en Wat. gy . . .. WX3SS..9 m,l,tary cmeratmns at the global,.. “Wl, October 1982, D72
t,on.1 .! meater 1...1 and fa.ucs enmmnpaswq those combat 27 LCe.@nant General V Rezntche. ho, ,Razvltlye lam?!
 MILITARY REVIEW

Nasf.mtelno.o Bova,. !Joyen.o I$torrche$rn,y Zn.m.! IMrwa!v II 36

H,smr,cal Jo.rnaO, December 1981, D 37 41 M#chalak, A.,.,,.. m !,. Ilatd Mane.,., 0De,at02nS 01
28 t. Exercise NEMAN, .ona.cted m 1979. a helrtmrne assault Ground Forces. Polish Au Fo,ce anti A,r Defense Revle.. 0.0 .,t.
m se(ze a mm crossI.Q We was Iauncma dwssonal alter
tn. for Llz
ward detachment w,?. ““able to force the r!”er from the march 1“ 42 lb(ti cm 24
mmucb as tanks were .01. to s. PDort the crossing by d,fect f!re, 43 For a full account, see v Atahu s Verlo!etov. Kras.aYa
th,s .sw3.11 was carr,eo 0.1 very close m aa.a.c,. g Ir,e.alv forces z.ez.a lRea star), 11 seotember 1983. D 2 W!we .ncertaln. ‘t IS mv
2S! There we. number of ..,13 mat both m Wa.et,me and war Qel,ef mat th!s .ss..11 was carried ..! w alr assault brog.de
l,me belong exclusively to tn. Sov,et General Sta!f or Stavk. elements The hoops co.d.cl!ng me OPeratm” were newr referred
resoectlvely These ..(M mcl.de all vuv lorces, SDec, a SQ.. I,., to ., ,nOtortz,d rifle troom as ,s often done when de, C,<tl”9 “.It.
l,$lery anti even corrmnea arms rownat!cms Th, s pool of forces w PartlclDetm9 m he!, tmrne assaults Further, me .sqe of the Iwm
cal, ed ,IIe R“GK {Reserves o, the SuPrwne Wgh Conmnand) They combat veh!c! es, Pre$urnebly relwr!”g to infantry combal
.,, “CJIII.IIY COmmtlt,o O“IY ,“ dve,t ,uDDO,t 0? S,a.k. P1anneO “eh,cle, 9S Iwrc’o,ely vague, SUWW,WW some type ot ccmIDat vehr
.........=
. . . . . . ...= cl. othe! than rmght w expect..- for exern me,. eMO r.mer than
30 Tne Seuure.1 we, cms.mg Stes m esDec#aw cr,vcal m the . BMP BMD means ,comDat veh,cle, a,morne,. while BMP IS
E.ro,e8n theater of 0,,,,:,0”s Accor d,.. to a 1965 Sov,et Stud,, combat “axle. ,nfa”!r”
m.ces ,. thts theater vm.lo encounter waief otmtacles *DO meters 44 L,e”te”a”t G.”; ,., P Pavle”ko, %2”,1 <”, r.kt,t!?
woe every 35 m 60 kilometers 700 m 300 meters w,ae every 100 to Vo2ti. NmO DeSa”,”,kh V.,,,., ‘/.,,””. ls,or(chesB(” Zh”r”.1
150 k,, ometers .“0 g,..,., ,.,”300 me, er, w,de every 250 to 300 (Mr$(t.,y H,stormal Jo.mzI), Ja”u.w 1980 D 32 KOStylev, aSS,St..t
,I[orne, e,, !0 the commander ‘/DV !., rml,tar” Ceao, ”ess alla ea.c.tm. also
31 For an e..ellent art$cle 0. Sovret rear W,, rn$ssmns am IX’ has rlsc”ssed the O“W”Q ,efmement of ,Q”, ”me.t anti land, ng
ltc. see C N Do.. + Owrat,ons m me Enemy Rem,, Mt., t.dl”, q”., .Nh .“ Wlli?ha,,$ 0“ ~.w q“,ck,, .,rbor”e ““#t, c.”
“a,ro..l Defense Revrew VOl. me 13. Number 1 1980 .. 3541 clear I..’OQ.Q areas and move I.1O combat See .. POYSA .8
32 M!chala. Av,at, on ,“ the Raca Maneuver OP&on, of UChen,”: Kr.s”.”a Z“eZUa (R,. Sfar), 5 Au$3”3t 1981, P 2
Gro.no Forces P.I,s. Art f.,.. e.o Arr Defense Rev!ew, 00 c$t 45 C(teO 1“ 0.,” and Ste,”ert ‘The SOV, W A,rbor.e TIOOPS
~, %,(,. .1 tn. So”ret Ground Forces OP crI P i2
33 S.e Krasnaya Zero. (Re. star) 2429 July >979 For . full 46 Kosty!ev, S,.”. ”!,”(”, , %zv,tfye Vosdus.no Desa”l”ykh
anawt!cal account of NCMAN, see R!ctmrd ode., ,, Exerc!se Voysh voyen. o )stomcoeskw Zmmnaf IMll, taw Mlstorjcal
NEMAN, RLW,ew .! me So., et G,mmu Forces, DiA b%?tungton, Jo.m.11 OP .,1, P 84 .,corn bat vs ,nterve”lmn COndttro.$ refers
DC ,,. ”.,.” ?980 ““ 5,. tome e.wcled scale.1 oppos,t,on POSSLW t“ me area of emPloY
36 FO, .xamDIe, during Exerc,5eS NEMAN 79 BROTHE8H000 ment 4 re,, ew of ,,,,.1 ,“!.,,,.110”, 0, armed tomes reveals that
,N 4RMS 80 and 2APA0 87, hel,borne .ss,”,!s were .sed to secure ,.,, look 01,.. m an omrat!ond e“”[r.”me”t mn, !derabl, m.r.
,,.., .,Ossl ... 1., ,0,”,,”, .,.[0!,,,,0” 10.,,s !?,.,.. than the one Vih!ch vmuld .,,,.,1 under omen, ! was All
o;he; la,tors Del”g ,0.,1, 0“, would “.arrnally be m;,, .onf!de”t ,“
a PI.. mr an mnmng t,.oDs ,. an Imwrvent, On sce”arm ma. m a
9,..,.1 *.,
37 K~s!”le”. Sla”ovlen,, ? ! Ra,vrt(ye VO$OU,””O Desa”!n,kh 47 RWnan!che, ,R.z.,,!,e 1.0((! r .?.kwf B.,e”.a.o Pmllale
v..,. vove””o ls,o,, cr,es,,, Zh. ma, (M>),,.,. tl,.sfor, cal “!.. “Ozdushno Des. n,”. #h Uo. sh Mezhvovennw” Per, od.
,o;r”aO, w ‘of $@ 83-84 k+,”.. Is W!C.,,”T 2..,;.3 (Md,tart JCa;JO.kSO
HWm 00 .,1,
38 A Shem ..0 R ode., Exerc,se ZAPAD 81. Rem. of fhe D 76 A,lhwgh Ihls art,cle Drwnar,ly .3WC USS.S the cIeveloLwIe”l of
Sowet Gro””O Force3 L71A, W.s.l”bto”, D C Alml 1982, P 4 awOOrn# 10!.!3s and t.. !!,, !“ the USSR bet.,. Wo,,d W,? 1, a, w!!h
39 For example, Rezn>che. uo Ra. v,l!ye T.8!!R, many such arttcles lesson, learned from these Per,o(ls are used a,
Nast.oaiel .0.. 8.,., VOW... !st.r,cheshv Zh.mal IMslmary an ex.m Ple for current aPD1, cal#On Ih,s a#awam t. wobaDly very
H<8!or>c.1 20”r”all 0. 0,[ P 38 .,$te, that the !ncreaseO ,01, 01 reF,re.e”lat!”e 0} a scheme 01 rna”e””er of a,, a,.a”,t force, !“
ows,o”al Iorwaro Celachment. t. me Cons.ct of maneuver .Dera ,“PDort Of . breakthrough
,,0”s 1, 0“, of the mla”rtan! fa, !O,S m the .Ch,e”eme”l .1 h,Qh D, 48 Do”.. IIY, The Sows Owat,..al tv!moe.we Gro.o A New
Ie.sve tempos Lmm Boyev.ye Pr,menenwe Bronelamo.veh ( Cnal!enge for NATO l.tem.t,onai Deten.e Re.,e* 00 c,t P
Mekh. ”,,rm. a””, ti. V..,* V..,.”. Is,ortcfies k,, Zhum. J 1,177
lwd.r, H’slor,cal Jo.r.. ft, .0 it Chief 0, me him. ovskv 49 Coomc”atmg D,,,, FM ,0023, so”,., Arm” Troops Oqa.c,e
A.aLIwny 01 the Tam Forces, note, that the large role PlaYeO by ,!0” .“0 @.>m77e”f OD C(, PO d 173 .“6 4 774
forward deiachme”, s I“ wcmd war 1+has .01 lost [!1s1 swn, f,ca.ce 50 Coord#”atma Draft FM 10022, Sow,, Army S,w.ra,m?d War
u.uer contemporary CO. akt,ons. See .1s. K$reYe; an-a D-on yen%. t.,. 6’. 0$7,,, Area S.L’.or, D,oartment of the Ann, Wasn, rqtcm
,, 0..,, 60,.0.0 Pr?menenf”a PSredo”vhb Otre”.o” rs”ho.”kfi D C Au..,t 1982 03.5
(Mehham2,r0”aflWM/ KO%WSO”. vow... !s v Z..ia ( mrrksh 51 M>;halak Av>at,on I. the R.,. !4..,.,,, ODW.,,0., of
wJ,I,!arv H,. Iorc.: Journal .O .,1 D 27 ..5 General d 1.. Army Gm..a Force,, Polo. Afr t arm .“0 Arr Defense Re.,e* on .,:,
M KOZ!OV Paz.,lsw Srr.teg,, 10perarm”ov. Isk.$. tva,, Voyenrm L13
,s,.,,c.,sMvo Z?7UC”.1 (Mrl, !a,y tft, for(ca! 30”,”,0, November 52 !?e, nk.hen. o Raz”,!(”e 7,8 I,*, Na, !”oa?elno.o Boy,
19B2, D 14 Vo”emm lSIOrrche$.r, Z/win. ( (Mcl,tery Firstor(cd Journal), o. cc,
4D Re, ”Whe”kO R,av(l,ye Takf,ks Nast.oateI’nou. 80”. D 38
‘/.”,””0 Is?.nche,hr, Zn.r”aJ (M,M.W H,$forrcal JOur”aI1 0P cft

Major Roger E. Bert is currently

Germany. He receuxd

sity and an MA. from Georgetown

He has held various command
trons L. Korea
states,
and
u student at
the US Army Russ inn Znstztuce, Garmwch,
a B.A J?om Syrrzcum Uni.
uersity, an M L.A from Johns Hopkins

the C’ontnzental
West

Uniuep
Unwersity.
and staff posi-
United
1,-
38 October .