Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Harvard University
Archon Fung is an associate professor The multifaceted challenges of contemporary governance In this article, I develop a framework for understand-
of public policy at the John F. Kennedy demand a complex account of the ways in which those ing a range of institutional possibilities. Such a frame-
School of Government, Harvard University.
E-mail: archon_fung@harvard.edu.
who are subject to laws and policies should participate work is a necessary—if incomplete—part of the answer
in making them. This article develops a framework for to a larger question regarding the amounts and kinds
understanding the range of institutional possibilities for of appropriate participation in governance. Though I
public participation. Mechanisms of participation vary do not develop this framework into a general “theory
along three important dimensions: who participates, how of the public” (Frederickson 1991), this approach
participants communicate with one another and make suggests that such a general theory may remain elu-
decisions together, and how discussions are linked with sive. Whether public institutions and decision-making
policy or public action. These three dimensions constitute processes should treat members of the public as
a space in which any particular mechanism of consumers, clients, or citizens depends partly on the
participation can be located. Different regions of this context and problem in question.1
institutional design space are more and less suited to
addressing important problems of democratic governance There are three important dimensions along which
such as legitimacy, justice, and effective administration. forms of direct participation vary. The first concerns
who participates. Some participatory processes are
H
ow much and what kind of direct public open to all who wish to engage, whereas others invite
participation should there be in contempo- only elite stakeholders such as interest group represen-
rary democracy? The multiplex conditions of tatives. The second dimension specifies how partici-
modern governance demand a theory and institutions pants exchange information and make decisions. In
of public participation that are appropriately complex many public meetings, participants simply receive
in at least three ways. First, unlike the small New information from officials who announce and explain
England town or even the Athenian city-state, there is policies. A much smaller set of venues are deliberative
no canonical form of direct participation in modern in the sense that citizens take positions, exchange
democratic governance; modes of contemporary par- reasons, and sometimes change their minds in the
ticipation are, and should be, legion. Second, public course of discussions. The third dimension describes
participation advances multiple purposes and values the link between discussions and policy or public
in contemporary governance. Master principles such action. These three dimensions—scope of participa-
as equal influence over collective decisions and respect tion, mode of communication and decision, and
for individual autonomy are too abstract to offer extent of authority—constitute a space in which any
useful guidance regarding the aims and character of particular mechanism of public decision can be lo-
citizen participation. It is more fruitful to examine the cated. Here, I will show how regions of this institu-
range of proximate values that mechanisms of partici- tional design space are suited to addressing three
pation might advance and the problems that they seek important problems of democratic governance: legiti-
to address. I will consider the illegitimacy, injustice, macy, justice, and effective governance.
and ineffectiveness of particular clusters of governance
arrangements here. Third, mechanisms of direct par- Participatory Designs: The Democracy Cube
ticipation are not (as commonly imagined) a strict If there is no canonical form or institution of direct
alternative to political representation or expertise but public participation in contemporary democratic
instead complement them. As we shall see, public contexts, then one important task is to understand the
participation at its best operates in synergy with repre- feasible and useful varieties of participation. In what
sentation and administration to yield more desirable remains perhaps the most cited work in the literature
practices and outcomes of collective decision making on participatory democracy, Sherry Arnstein develops
and action. an influential typology in her essay “A Ladder of
66 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue
Citizen Participation” (1969).2 She argues that partici- appropriate that the tool include the alternative—
pation is valuable to the extent that it “is the redistri- often the norm—of no citizen participation to enable
bution of power that enables the have-not citizens . . . comparisons and juxtapositions.
to be deliberately included in the future.” She posits a
“ladder” of empowerment with eight rungs: manipula- Participant Selection
tion, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, part- In what follows, I suppose that the principal reason
nership, delegated power, and finally, citizen control. for enhancing citizen participation in any area of
contemporary governance is that the authorized set of
Arnstein’s classification still provides a useful correc- decision makers—typically elected representatives or
tive to naive and untempered enthusiasm for public administrative officials—is somehow deficient.3 They
participation. As an analytic tool, however, it is obso- may lack the knowledge, competence, public purpose,
lete and defective in two main ways. First, it improp- resources, or respect necessary to command compli-
erly fuses an empirical scale that describes the level of ance and cooperation. Whether the direct participa-
influence individuals have over some collective deci- tion of citizens in governance can remedy one or other
sion with normative approval. There may indeed be of these deficiencies depends in large measure on who
contexts in which public empowerment is highly participates: Are they appropriately representative of
desirable, but there are certainly others in which a the relevant population or the general public? Are
consultative role is more appropriate for members of important interests or perspectives excluded? Do they
the public than full “citizen control.” Second, there possess the information and competence to make
have been many advances in the theory and practice good judgments and decisions? Are participants re-
of participation since Arnstein’s essay was published. sponsive and accountable to those who do not partici-
A large body of work in political theory has distin- pate? Therefore, one primary feature of any public
guished between aggregative and deliberative decision decision-making device is the character of its
making (Cohen 1989; Gutmann and Thompson franchise: Who is eligible to participate, and how
1996). Practitioners have developed many techniques do individuals become participants? In the universe of
to recruit participants such as random selection direct participation, there are five common selection
(Fishkin 1995), to facilitate meetings, and to design mechanisms.
entire participation processes suited to civil disputes,
regulatory challenges, and even law making (Connor The vast majority of public participation mechanisms
1988; Creighton 2005). use the least restrictive method of selecting partici-
pants: They are open to all who wish to attend. Actual
Out of these many ways in which people come participants are a self-selected subset of the general
together to discuss public matters, three questions population. Though complete openness has an obvi-
of institutional design are particularly important for ous appeal, those who choose to participate are fre-
understanding the potential and limits of participa- quently quite unrepresentative of any larger public.
tory forms: Who participates? How do they commu- Individuals who are wealthier and better educated
nicate and make decisions? What is the connection tend to participate more than those who lack these
between their conclusions and opinions on one hand advantages, as do those who have special interests or
and public policy and action on the other? stronger views (Fiorina 1999).
This section describes an institutional design space Two alternative participant selection methods address
that maps arenas of decision making along these three this difficulty. Some mechanisms that are open to all
dimensions. In considering this space, it should be selectively recruit participants from subgroups that are
noted that actual decision-making processes are fre- less likely to engage. For example, some community
quently composed of multiple points. Administrative policing and urban planning initiatives employ
rulemaking, for example, often comprises moments in community organizers to publicize meetings in
which interested individuals and stakeholders com- low-income and minority communities. Selective
ment on proposals in public hearings and moments in recruitment may also occur passively, providing
which regulators (experts) make decisions on their structural incentives that make participation more
own. Decision making in a complex urban develop- attractive to those who are ordinarily less likely to
ment project, for example, often results from interac- participate in politics. Some venues that address crime
tions among multiple arenas, such as planning or sewers, for example, are particularly inviting to
agencies, stakeholder negotiations, neighborhood disadvantaged citizens because those issues are less
councils, and public hearings. The space is also delin- urgent to the wealthy. Those who have special interests
eated to include arenas in which there is no public in some question—for example, senior citizens in
participation at all—for example, areas in which discussions about the future of Social Security—may
public officials in insulated agencies operate without nevertheless exploit the open-to-all character of
direct public oversight or input. This space is a tool public meetings to stack participation in their favor.
for considering governance choices, and so it is Randomly selecting participants from among the
Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance 67
general population is the best guarantee of descriptive participation implicitly presume that it should
representativeness. Initiatives such as deliberative approximate some deliberative ideal: participants
polling, Citizens Juries, and Planning Cells randomly engage with one another directly as equals who reas-
select participants to discuss public issues (Fishkin on together about public problems. But the vast major-
1995; Gastil 2000; Leib 2004; Smith and Wales ity of institutionalized public discussions do not occur
2000). in this way, nor is it clear that they should. For ex-
ample, if the main reason for direct participation is
A fourth method engages lay stakeholders in public one that John Dewey once gave—that the man who
discussions and decisions. Lay stakeholders are unpaid wears the shoe, not the shoemaker, knows best where
citizens who have a deep interest in some public it pinches—then participants need do no more than
concern and thus are willing to invest substantial complain to policy makers (Dewey 1981–90, 264).
time and energy to represent and serve those who have
similar interests or perspectives but choose not to There are six main modes of communication and
participate. Many neighborhood association boards decision making in participatory settings. The vast
and school councils, for example, are composed of majority of those who attend events such as public
lay stakeholders. Finally, some governance processes hearings and community meetings do not put forward
that have been described as regulatory negotiation, their own views at all. Instead, they participate as
grassroots environmental management, and collabora- spectators who receive information about some policy
tive planning bring together professional stakeholders. or project, and they bear witness to struggles among
These participants are frequently paid representatives politicians, activists, and interest groups. There are few
of organized interests and public officials. public meetings in which everyone is a spectator.
Almost all of them offer opportunities for some to
These five mechanisms of popular participation have express their preferences to the audience and officials
been conceived as “mini-publics” that intentionally there. Think of the citizens and activists who line up
gather citizens in discrete bodies to discuss or decide at the ubiquitous microphone to pose a pointed ques-
matters of public concern (Fung 2003). These tion or say their piece. Other discussions are organized
devices contrast with two more familiar mechanisms in ways that allow participants to explore, develop,
of selecting individuals who occupy positions in the and perhaps transform their preferences and perspec-
state: competitive elections that select professional tives. They encourage participants to learn about
politicians who supposedly represent our interests issues and, if appropriate, transform their views and
and professional civil service mechanisms that select opinions by providing them with educational materi-
the technical, expert administrators who staff our als or briefings and then asking them to consider the
public bureaucracies. They also contrast with the merits and trade-offs of several alternatives. Partici-
public (perhaps “macro-public”) at large—the pants usually discuss these issues with one another
diffuse public sphere of mass media, secondary (often organized in small groups) rather than simply
associations, and informal venues of discussion listening to experts, politicians, or advocates.
that has been analyzed by Jürgen Habermas
(1989, 1996) and others. These eight mechanisms Mechanisms employing these first three modes of
for identifying or selecting the actors who participate communication often do not attempt to translate the
directly in discussions or decisions about public views or preferences of participants into a collective
matters can be arrayed schematically from most view or decision. At most public hearings, for exam-
exclusive to most encompassing in a single ple, officials commit to no more than receiving the
dimension (figure 1). testimony of participants and considering their views
in their own subsequent deliberations.
Communication and Decision
The second crucial dimension of institutional design
Some venues, however, do attempt to develop a col-
specifies how participants interact within a venue of
lective choice through a combination of three meth-
public discussion or decision. Informed by the politi-
ods of decision making. The most common of these is
cal imaginary of the Athenian forum or the New
aggregation and bargaining. In this mode, participants
England town meeting, many treatments of citizen
know what they want, and the mode of decision mak-
ing aggregates their preferences—often mediated by
Representatives
Open, Targeted
Administrators
Public Sphere
Self-Selection
Stakeholders
Stakeholders
Recruiting
Selection
Random
Diffuse
Expert
Open,
Lay
Deliberate and
and Expertise
Preferences
Preferences
Negotiate
Listen as
Develop
Express
Bargain
Authority
Benefits
Consult
Individual Education
Communicative Influence
Targeted Recruitment
Sphere/ Everyone
Advise/Consult
Representatives
Administrators
fuse Public
Stakeholders
Stakeholders
Professional
Professional
Co-Govern
Open, Self-
Open, with
Randomly
Selected
Selected
w
Expert
Direct Authority
xpe
Difz
Lay
Pro
Ad
Ex
x
Agencies
Technical Expertise Public Participants
Hearings
Deliberate and Negotiate
Develop Preferences
Express Preferences
Listen as Spectator
Communication &
Decision Mode
ones (e.g., producers versus consumers) (Stigler 1971; elected to the city executive based partly on its prom-
Wilson 1980). While many strategies to increase ises to empower the city’s community organizations
political equality focus on directly improving the and social movements. Over the next two years, the
nature of the electoral or group system, participatory party developed a highly innovative mechanism called
mechanisms can increase the justice of democratic the Orçamento Participativo (participatory budget).
governance in two ways. They can either replace The mechanism shifts decisions about the capital por-
authorized decision makers whose actions have be- tion of the city’s budget from the city council to a
come systematically unjust with direct citizen partici- system of neighborhood and citywide popular assem-
pation, or they can create popular pressures that blies. Through a complex annual cycle of open meet-
compel authorized officials to act justly. ings, citizens and civic associations in the city meet to
determine local investment priorities. These priorities
One celebrated example of the first kind of justice- are then aggregated into an overall city budget.
enhancing reform is the budgeting process of the city Though it is a procedural reform, it was born of a
of Pôrto Alegre in Brazil (Abers 2000; Avritzer 2002; substantive political objective: to invert public spend-
Baiocchi 2003; de Sousa Santos 1998). In 1989, the ing priorities by shifting them away from the wealthy
left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) was areas of the city to poorer neighborhoods. It has
Authority &
Power
1
Individual Education
Communicative Influence
Recruitment
Sphere/ Everyone
Advise/Consult
Representatives
Administrators
Diffuse Public
Study
Targeted Rec
Stakeholders
Stakeholders
Professional
Professional
Co-Govern
Open, Self-
Circles
, with
Randomly
mly
Professio
Selected
d
wi
Stakehol
ehol
Selected
w
Stakeho
Expert
Open,
Polls
O
T
Public
Public
ubli
Technical Expertise Hearings
earings
arings
aring Participants
Deliberate and Negotiate
Develop Preferences
2
Express Preferences
Listen as Spectator
Communication &
Decision Mode
Individual Education
Communicative Influence 1
Targeted Recruitment
Sphere/ Everyone
Advise/Consult
Representatives
Administrators
Diffuse Public
Stakeholders
Stakeholders
Professional
Professional
Co-Govern
Open, Self-
Open, with
Randomly
Selected
Selected
Expert
Open
Direct Authority
Exp
Lay
Ad
E
A
P
Traditional
Technical Expertise Budgeting Participatory Participants
Budget
Deliberate and Negotiate
Develop Preferences
Express Preferences
Listen as Spectator
Communication &
Decision Mode
achieved this substantive goal remarkably well. The incentive, which mitigates the participation bias favor-
poor residents of Pôrto Alegre enjoy much better pub- ing the better-off, the participatory budget is plotted as
lic services and goods as a result of the participatory having an open structure of participation with targeted
budget. The percentage of neighborhoods with run- recruiting (structural incentives that target the poor).
ning water has increased from 75 to 98 percent, sewer
coverage has grown from 45 to 98 percent, and the As a general matter, participatory mechanisms that
number of families offered housing assistance grew enhance justice by altering who makes particular deci-
16-fold since the initiation of the participatory budget. sions and policies occupy a region of the democracy
cube near that of the participatory budget in figure 6.
In the framework of the democracy cube, the partici- On the dimension of who participates, they respond to
patory budget increases justice in public governance by the failure of experts or politicians to respect political
changing the actors who are authorized to make deci- equality by shifting decision making toward citizens.
sions. The participatory budget shifts the site of deci- Institutions of open participation with incentives for
sion making from bodies—expert financial bureaus the disadvantaged to participate—exemplified by the
and an elected city council— participatory budget—offer one
that once were corrupted by strategy for equalization. Participa-
clientelism to a structure of Participation mechanisms that tion mechanisms that employ
open citizen participation that employ random selection or random selection or even lay stake-
affords more equal opportuni- even lay stakeholder involve- holder involvement may also en-
ties for political influence. In ment may also enhance political hance political equality if they are
figure 6, the “who” of participa- equality if they are properly properly implemented.
tion shifts from a closed group
of experts and professional
implemented. On the influence and empowerment
politicians to open forums for dimension of institutional design,
direct citizen engagement. Though the structure is mechanisms that increase justice in this way can only do
formally open and participants select themselves, ac- so if they exercise direct authority over relevant decisions.
tual participation patterns in the participatory budget Because they typically address structures of corruption
do not exhibit the familiar patterns of overrepresenta- and exclusion that generate benefits for the advantaged,
tion of those who are wealthier, better educated, and the recommendations offered by merely advisory mecha-
otherwise advantaged. Indeed, those who have lower nisms are typically ignored.
incomes are more likely to participate (Baiocchi 2003).
The explanation is that the participatory budget pro- On the third dimension of communication and deci-
cess addresses public problems that are much more sion, justice-enhancing participatory mechanisms
urgent for the poor—sanitation, basic urban infra- need not be fully deliberative. The distinctive feature
structure, housing, and other “rice and beans” issues— of the participatory budget is that poor people and
than for the wealthy. Because of this structural other previously excluded groups are included in
72 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue
sublocal processes of fiscal allocation and planning. officers to look beyond standard, comfortable, but
Justice results from the proper counting of their voices ineffective approaches such as preventative patrolling,
rather than from deliberation. emergency response (answering 911 calls), and retro-
spective investigation of crimes (Goldstein 1990).
Effectiveness Second, when citizens engage in searching delibera-
Even when public decisions are just and legitimate, tion with police officers, they often develop different
state agencies may be incapable of implementing priorities and approaches than professional police
those decisions. Public hierarchies may lack the infor- officers would have developed on their own. Third,
mation, ingenuity, know-how, or resources necessary neighborhood residents provide distinctive capabilities
to address social problems effectively (Cohen and and resources that make different kinds of public
Sabel 1997). Nonprofessional citizens possess distinc- safety strategies possible. For example, residents can
tive capabilities that may improve public action. In monitor hot spots such as parks, liquor stores, or
the provision of public services such as education and residential drug houses with greater scrutiny and
human development, for example, the involvement of frequency than a handful of thinly spread police of-
clients in coproduction may dramatically increase the ficers. Finally, the discipline of deliberative problem
quality of some services. Properly structured public solving focuses and coordinates a host of other rel-
participation may belie the common view that direct evant but previously unharnessed city resources such
democracy, whatever its other merits, is highly inef- as city attorneys, building regulation, streets and
ficient. In areas such as public safety and environmen- sanitation, and the parks department to address public
tal regulation, citizens may possess essential local safety concerns. In the rubric of the democracy cube,
knowledge that comes from close exposure to the the Chicago community policing reforms enhance
context in which problems occur. In all of these areas effectiveness by creating institutions in which a core of
and others, public participants may be able to frame active residents who have taken a deep interest in
problems and priorities in ways that break from pro- public safety in each neighborhood constitute lay
fessional conceptions yet more closely match their stakeholders who deliberate with one another and
values, needs, and preferences. Similarly, nonprofes- cogovern the use of policing and other city resources.
sionals may be able to contribute to the development
of innovative approaches and strategies precisely Some features of participatory forums that enhance
because they are free from the received but obsolete the effectiveness of governance may not lend them-
wisdom of professionals and the techniques that are selves simultaneously to enhancing justice. In particular,
embedded in their organizations and procedures. making public action effective can require extensive
involvement from relatively small numbers of citizens
Beginning in 1994, for example, the Chicago Police who are willing to invest many hours and to acquire
Department shifted its organizational structure from a substantial expertise in specific policy areas. The most
classic hierarchy designed to execute traditional polic- active residents in Chicago’s community policing
ing strategies to a form of accountable autonomy (Fung program invest many hours per month and gain a
2004). Now, rather than insulating professional opera- facility with police procedures, the courts, and city
tions from public scrutiny and influence, residents in services. Therefore, participatory institutions geared
each of 280 neighborhood police beats meet with the toward enhancing effectiveness are likely to draw a
police officers who serve their areas in open “beat meet- relatively small number of lay stakeholders who have a
ings.” The program has been quite well received by city sufficiently deep interest in the problems at hand to
residents. In surveys, more than 1 in 10 residents claim make the required sacrifices. On the other hand,
to have attended a community policing beat meeting. participatory mechanisms that produce justice often
However, on most beats, a few residents are heavily do so by organizing extensive participation that
involved, while others participate only occasionally. includes many diverse perspectives.
Like the Pôrto Alegre reforms, residents from poor
neighborhoods participate at rates greater than those On the communicative and decision-making dimen-
from wealthy ones because the institution addresses a sion, institutions such as the Chicago community
problem—crime—that plagues the disadvantaged policing program operate through a kind of problem-
(Skogan and Hartnett 1999). solving deliberation in which citizens engage in a
searching discussion of alternative strategies, settle on
Case studies have shown that when these deliberative those that seem most promising, and compose beat
processes are well facilitated and supported by the plans or neighborhood action plans that render those
police department and community organizations, they strategies into sublocal policy. Finally, on the dimen-
produce innovative and effective problem-solving sion of influence and authority, these community
strategies that harness the distinctive capacities and policing reforms shift substantial authority to the
local knowledge of residents.4 Four factors make this citizens who participate. This sort of empowerment is
structure of citizen participation effective. First, the important because citizens may be reluctant to make
dramatic shift to participatory policing has forced the required sacrifices of time and energy unless they
Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance 73
are confident that their deliberations will be translated nance. Specifying and crafting appropriate roles for
into action. Furthermore, deliberation and action are participation, however, demands forward-looking em-
so deeply intertwined in these processes that merely pirical sensitivity and theoretical imagination.
advisory deliberations would be ineffective. For
example, residents in community policing delibera- Acknowledgments
tions often try one strategy, observe its effects, learn I would like to thank John Gerring, Philippe Van
from success or failure, and shift course. These three Parijs, and Kenneth Winston and for their thoughts
institutional design characteristics—lay stakeholder on participatory institutions in complex governance.
participants who deliberate about how best to solve David Barron, Mark Warren, and the participants at
public problems and are empowered to act—mark a two workshops—“Representation of Marginalized
substantial shift from traditional policing in which Groups,” held at the 2005 Midwest Political Science
expert administrators address crime and disorder Association meetings, and “Theorizing Democratic
through technical procedures and possess direct au- Renewal: The B.C. Citizens Assembly and Beyond,”
thority to act on their decisions. held June 10–11, 2005—provided important correc-
tives and suggestions on an earlier draft of this chap-
Conclusion ter. This work is an outgrowth of research conducted
Citizens can be the shock troops of democracy. Prop- at the John F. Kennedy School of Government by a
erly deployed, their local knowledge, wisdom, com- team that included Abigail Williamson, Joseph
mitment, authority, even rectitude can address wicked Goldman, Elena Fagotto, and Christopher Gibson.
failures of legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness in Tissa Hami provided editorial assistance. This work
representative and bureaucratic institutions. The con- has been made possible through generous support
temporary ways in which citizens make these contri- from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation,
butions, however, assume neither the forms, purposes, the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and
nor rationales of classical participatory democracy. Innovation, and the A. Alfred Taubman Center for
These accounts fail to capture what is most attractive State and Local Government.
about the cases (and many others besides) described
here. Their appeal does not lie primarily in shifting Notes
sovereignty from politicians and other political profes- 1. I use the phrase citizen participation throughout
sionals to a mass of deliberating citizens (Pitkin and this article. By citizens, I do not mean to indicate
Shumer 1982). Less still does their attractiveness individuals who possess the legal status of formal
reside in their potential to educate, socialize, train, or citizenship but rather individuals who possess the
otherwise render the mass of citizens fit for democ- political standing to exercise voice or give consent
racy. Instead, these cases mobilize citizens to address over public decisions that oblige or affect them.
pressing deficits in more conventional, less participa- Therefore, undocumented immigrants whose
tory governance arrangements. children attend public schools are citizens in this
sense because they can make claims over the ways
Reaping—indeed, perceiving—these pragmatic benefits in which schools treat their children, just as native-
for democracy, however, requires a footloose analytic born American parents can make such claims.
approach that jettisons preconceptions about what par- 2. For those who count, the Social Science Citation
ticipatory democracy should look like and what it should Index lists 491 works citing Arnstein’s piece,
do in favor of a searching examination of the actual compared for example to 131 works that cite
forms and contributions of participation. Toward that Benjamin Barber’s Strong Democracy (1984).
end, I have offered a framework for thinking about the 3. Many have offered intrinsic reasons to favor greater
major design variations in contemporary participatory public participation in politics. This article does
institutions. I have argued that participation serves three not assess those reasons but instead relies on the
particularly important democratic values: legitimacy, instrumental consequences of participation for
justice, and the effectiveness of public action. Further- democratic governance.
more, no single participatory design is suited to serving 4. Similar participatory and deliberative governance
all three values simultaneously; particular designs are reforms have also emerged in diverse policy areas
suited to specific objectives. I have attempted to identify such as primary and secondary education, environ-
the distinct regions of the democracy cube that are suited mental regulation, local economic development,
to advancing each of these. The reasoning in that diffi- neighborhood planning, and natural resource
cult stage of the analysis proceeded inductively. I identi- management (Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen 2000;
fied actual participatory mechanisms that advanced each Weber 2003).
of these values, traced the institutional design character-
istics that enabled them to do so, and mapped these References
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from unfeasible or obsolete, direct participation should Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil. Boulder,
figure prominently in contemporary democratic gover- CO: Lynne Rienner.