National Missile Defense

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A payload launch vehicle carrying a prototype exoatmospheric kill vehicle is launched from Meck Island at the Kwajalein
Missile Range on Dec. 3, 2001, for an intercept of a ballistic missile target over the central Pacific Ocean.
National Missile Defense (NMD) is a military strategy and associated systems to shield an entire
country against incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The missiles may be intercepted
by other missiles, or possibly by lasers. They may be intercepted near the launch point (boost phase),
during flight through space (mid-course phase), or during atmospheric descent (terminal phase).

The term "National Missile Defense" has several meanings:

 Most common, but now deprecated: The U.S. ground-based nationwide

antimissile system in development since the 1990s. In 2002 this system was
renamed to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), to differentiate it from
other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, laser, or high-
altitude intercept programs. As of 2006, this system is operational with limited
capability. It is designed to intercept nuclear-armed ICBMs in the mid-course
phase, using interceptor missiles launched from Alaska. They use non-nuclear
kinetic warheads.

 Current definition: The overall U.S. nationwide antimissile program in

development since the 1990s. After the renaming in 2002, the term now refers to
the entire program, not just the ground-based interceptors and associated facilities.
Other elements yet to be integrated into NMD may include sea-based, space-
based, laser, and high altitude missile systems.

 Any national ICBM defense by any country, past or present. The Russian A-135
antimissile system is currently operational around Moscow. It uses nuclear
warheads to intercept incoming missiles. The U.S. Safeguard ABM system was
deployed and briefly operational in 1976, but is currently deactivated. It also used
nuclear warheads.

 Any national missile defense (against any missile type) by any country. Israel
currently has a national missile defense against short and medium-range missiles
using their Arrow missile system.

The role of defense against nuclear missiles has been a heated military and political topic for several
decades.
History of NMD
In the late 1950s, the Nike-Zeus program investigated the use of Nike nuclear missiles as interceptors
against Soviet ICBMs. A Nike warhead would be detonated at high altitudes (over 100 km /60 miles)
above the polar regions in the near vicinity of an incoming Soviet missile. While rocket technology
offered some hope of a solution, the problem of how to quickly identify and track incoming missiles
proved intractable, especially in light of easily envisioned countermeasures such as decoys and chaff.
The Nike-Zeus project was cancelled in 1961.

Project Defender
The Nike-Zeus use of nuclear warheads was necessary given the available missile technology. However
it had significant technical limitations such as blinding defensive radars to subsequent missiles. Also,
exploding nuclear warheads over friendly territory (albeit in space) was not ideal. In the 1960s Project
Defender and the Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept concept replaced land-launched Nike missiles with
missiles to be launched from satellite platforms orbiting directly above the USSR. Instead of nuclear
warheads, the BAMBI missiles would deploy huge wire meshes designed to disable Soviet ICBMs in
their early launch phase (the "boost phase"). No solution to the problem of how to protect the proposed
satellite platforms against attack was found, however, and the program was cancelled in 1968.

The Sentinel Program

In 1967, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced the Sentinel Program which would have
a goal of providing a "thin umbrella" of protection against a limited nuclear strike, such as might be
launched by People's Republic of China. The system consisted of a long range Spartan missile, the short
range Sprint missile, and associated radar and computer system. However U.S. military and political
strategists recognized several problems with the system:

 Deployment of even a limited defensive ABM system might invite a pre-emptive

nuclear attack before it could be implemented
 Deploying ABM systems would likely invite another expensive arms race for
defensive systems, in addition to maintaining existing offensive expenditures
 Then-current technology did not permit a thorough defense against a sophisticated
attack
 Defended coverage area was very limited due to the short range of the missiles
used
 Use of nuclear warheads on antimissile interceptors would degrade capability of
defensive radar, thus possibly rendering defense ineffective after the first few
intercepts
 Political and public concern of detonating defensive nuclear warheads over
friendly territory
 An ICBM defense could jeopardize the Mutually Assured Destruction concept,
thus being a destabilizing influence
The Safeguard Program

Safeguard was a scaled-down version of Sentinel designed to defend U.S. ICBM sites against attack,
rather than protecting cities. Safeguard used the same Spartan and Sprint missiles and the same radar
technology as Sentinel. Safeguard solved some problems of Sentinel:

 Less expensive to develop due to limited geographic coverage and fewer required
missiles
 Avoided public concern of defensive nuclear warheads detonated nearby
 Provided better intercept probability due to coverage by short range Sprint
missile, which was unable to cover the entire defended area under Sentinel.

However Safeguard still retained several of the previously-listed political and military problems.

ABM treaty

These above issues drove the U.S. and USSR to sign the ABM Treaty of 1972. Under the ABM treaty
and a 1974 revision, each country was allowed to deploy a single ABM system with only 100
interceptors to protect a single target. The Soviets deployed a system named A-35 using a missile code-
named Galosh, designed to protect Moscow. The U.S. deployed Safeguard to defend ballistic missile
sites at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, in 1975. The U.S. Safeguard system was only briefly
operational. The Russian system (now called A-135) has been improved and is still active around
Moscow.

Homing Overlay Experiment

Given concerns about the previous programs using nuclear tipped interceptors, in the 1980s the U.S.
Army began studies about the feasibility of hit-to-kill vehicles, where an interceptor missile would
destroy an incoming ballistic missile just by colliding with it head-on.

The first program, which actually tested a hit-to-kill missile interceptor, was the Army's HOE (Homing
Overlay Experiment) which used a Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) . The KKV was equipped with an
infrared seeker, guidance electronics and a propulsion system. Once in space, the KKV could extend a
folded structure similar to an umbrella skeleton of 4 m (13 ft) diameter to enhance its effective cross
section. This device would destroy the ICBM reentry vehicle on collision. After test failures with the
first three flight tests, the fourth and final test on 10 June 1984 was successful, intercepting the
Minuteman RV with a closing speed of about 6.1 km/s at an altitude of more than 160 km.
The Strategic Defense Initiative

On March 23, 1983 President Reagan announced a new national missile defense program formally
called the Strategic Defense Initiative but soon nicknamed "Star Wars" by detractors. President Reagan's
stated goal was not just to protect the U.S. and its allies, but to also provide the completed system to the
USSR, thus ending the threat of nuclear war for all parties. SDI was technically very ambitious and
economically very expensive. It would have included many space-based laser battle stations and
nuclear-pumped X-ray laser satellites designed to intercept hostile ICBMs in space, along with very
sophisticated command and control systems. Unlike the previous Sentinel program, the goal was to
totally defend against a robust, all out nuclear attack by the USSR.

A partisan debate ensued in Congress, with Democrats questioning the feasibility and strategic wisdom
of such a program, while Republicans talked about its strategic necessity and provided a number of
technical experts who argued that it was in fact feasible (including Manhattan Project physicist Edward
Teller). Advocates of SDI prevailed and funding was initiated in fiscal year 1984. The motivation
behind this effort largely collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
Current NMD program

The logo of the Missile Defense division of the U.S. National Guard

In the 1990s and early 21st century, the stated mission of NMD has changed to the more modest goal of
preventing the United States from being subject to nuclear blackmail or nuclear terrorism by a so-called
rogue state. The feasibility of this more limited goal remains somewhat controversial. Under President
Clinton some testing continued but the project was not given much funding. Some have considered this
surprising, in light of Clinton's supportive remarks on 5 September 2000. He said that "such a system, if
it worked properly, could give us an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has
complicated the task of preserving peace."

The current NMD program consists primarily of ground based interceptor missiles and radar in Alaska
which would intercept incoming warheads in space. A limited number of interceptor missiles (about 10)
are operational as of 2006. These would possibly be later augmented by mid-course SM-4 interceptors
fired from Navy ships and by boost-phase interception by the Boeing YAL-1.

The NMD system would be deployed in three phases. The first phase is called Capability 1 (C1), and
was originally designed to counter a limited threat from up to about five warheads with either simple or
no countermeasures. More recently this phase has been upgraded to include the deployment of up to 100
interceptors and would be aimed at countering tens of warheads. This would require radar upgrades.
Since North Korea is perceived to be the earliest missile threat, the interceptors and radar would be
deployed in Alaska.

The second phase is called C2 and designed to counter an attack by warheads with more complex
countermeasures. It would deploy additional radars and more interceptors, plus a missile-tracking
satellite system. The C3 phase is supposed to counter threats consisting of many complex warheads. It
would deploy additional radars as well as additional interceptors, including some at a second site,
bringing the total to 200 or more. Although the C3 system is the current final deployment goal, the
system design permits further expansion and upgrades beyond the C3 level. A Pentagon study concluded
that the NMD system could be upgraded by integrating the hundreds of interceptors to be deployed as
part of the ship-based Navy Theater Wide missile defense system. These interceptors would be
integraded into the sensor infrastructure of the NMD system.
Recent developments

On 14 October 2002, a ground based interceptor launched from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile
Defense Site destroyed a mock warhead 225km above the Pacific. The test included three decoy
balloons.

On 16 December 2002 President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 23 which outlined
a plan to begin deployment of operational ballistic missile defense systems by 2004. The following day
the U.S. formally requested from the UK and Denmark use of facilities in Fylingdales, England, and
Thule, Greenland, respectively, as a part of the NMD program. The projected cost of the program for the
years 2004 to 2009 will be 53 billion U.S. dollars, making it the largest single line in The Pentagon's
budget.

Since 2002, the US has been in talks with Poland and other European countries over the possibility of
setting up a European base to intercept long-range missiles. A site similar to the US base in Alaska
would help protect the US and Europe from missiles fired from the Middle East or North Africa.
Poland's prime minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said in November, 2005 he wanted to open up the
public debate on whether Poland should host such a base.

In 2002, NMD was changed to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), to differentiate it from other
missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, and defense targeting the boost phase and the
reentry phase (see flight phases).

On 22 July 2004, the first ground-based interceptor was deployed at Ft. Greely, Alaska (63.954° N
145.735° W). By the end of 2004, a total of six had been deployed at Ft. Greely and another two at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Two additional were installed at Ft. Greely in 2005. The system
will provide "rudimentary" protection.

On 15 December 2004, an interceptor test in the Marshall Islands failed when the launch was aborted
due to an "unknown anomaly" in the interceptor, 16 minutes after launch of the target from Kodiak
Island, Alaska. "I don't think that the goal was ever that we would declare it was operational. I think the
goal was that there would be an operational capability by the end of 2004," Pentagon representative
Larry DiRita said on 2005-01-13 at a Pentagon press conference. "There has been some expectation that
there will be some point at which it is operational and not something else, and I just don't think people
should expect that for the near term." DiRita said the system might never actually be declared
operational.

On 18 January 2005, the Commander, United States Strategic Command issued direction to establish the
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. JFCC IMD, once activated, will
develop desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for
missile defense.

On 14 February 2005, another interceptor test failed due to a malfunction with the ground support
equipment at the test range on Kwajalein Island, not with the interceptor missile itself.
On 24 February 2005, the Missile Defense Agency, testing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System,
successfully intercepted a mock enemy missile. This was the first test of an operationally configured
Standard missile 3 interceptor and the fifth successful test intercept using this system. On 10 November
2005, the USS Lake Erie detected, tracked, and destroyed a mock two-stage ballistic missile within two
minutes of the ballistic missile launch.

Deployment of the Sea-based X-band Radar system is presently underway.

July 2003 Report of the American Physical Society

There has been controversy among experts about whether it is technically feasible to build an effective
missile defense system. One technical criticism came from U.S. physicists and culminated in the
publication of a critical study on the subject by the American Physical Society (APS).

This study focused on the feasibility of intercepting missiles in the boost phase, which the current NMD
system does not attempt. The study found it might be possible to develop a limited system capable of
destroying a liquid-fuel propelled ICBM during the boost phase. This system could also possibly destroy
some solid-propellant missiles from Iran, but not those from North Korea, because of differences in the
boost time and range to target. However there is a trend toward using solid-fueled ICBMs which are
harder to intercept during boost phase.

Using orbital launchers to provide a reliable boost-phase defense against solid fuel missiles from Iran or
North Korea was found to require at least 1,600 interceptors in orbit. Intercepting liquid-fueled missiles
would require 700 interceptors. Using two or more interceptors per target would require many more
orbital launchers.

The only boost phase system the U.S. contemplates for near term use is the Airborne laser (ABL). The
study found the ABL possibly capable of intercepting missiles if within 300 km for solid fuel missiles or
600 km for liquid fuel missiles, however solid fuel missiles are more resistant to damage.

While the APS report did not address the current U.S. mid-course NMD system, it concluded that were
the U.S. in the future to develop a boost-phase ABM defense, there could be significant technical
problems limiting effectiveness.