Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Stephen Campbell
When I first came across Lee's list of supposed Asian values, I saw values that
were not so much specific to Asian culture but good British upper class Tory
values dear to threatened elites everywhere.
Walden Bello,
(The Nation, 20 July 1998, Bangkok)
Since its inception during the Cold War, through the early post-Cold War and
subsequent Asian financial crisis and into the present post-9/11 era, ASEAN has
The subversion of human rights within Southeast Asia and within ASEAN as an
institution is reflective of the general tendency of political regimes towards
authoritarian governance and of domestic populations towards political
emancipation. Despite changes in the international and regional environment,
the rhetoric and policies of ASEAN demonstrate an historical continuity in the
At the time of ASEAN’s creation, with the imposition of US Cold War jargon onto
disparate domestic conflicts, Southeast Asian political elites were able to
reframe contextually specific internal dissent in the language of geopolitical
bipolarities and collapsing dominoes (Glassman 2005: 5). The non-communist
states of which ASEAN was composed could thereby inflame and harness Cold
War paranoia and the legitimising effect of US backing to bolster the position of
their respective regimes (Berger 2003: 426). It was out of this Cold War
context that ASEAN states could justify the language of non-intervention and
non-coercion that formed the basis of their regional diplomatic relations.
Where domestic civil and political rights were curtailed by presiding regimes,
national security concerns in the face of communist subversion, propounded ad
nauseam, functioned as a legitimising mantra (Caballero-Anthony 1995: 46).
At the end of the 1980s, the sudden decapitation of ASEAN’s Cold War
legitimacy left member states deprived of their traditional justificatory polemics.
Within the framework of George Bush’s ‘New World Order’ the United States
Disregard for human rights was undermining ASEAN’s relations with Western
states which felt these issues needed to be placed on the diplomatic agenda.
However, ASEAN continued to avoid formal statements on regional abuses.
The Thai military’s May 1992 massacre of pro-democracy protestors in Bangkok,
for example, failed to get the slightest response from the organisation (Acharya
2001: 59). ASEAN, if it was to continue as a bastion of regime security, needed
to adapt its rhetoric to the changing international order.
The second defence against foreign criticism of regional human rights abuses
was that the Western predilection for civil and political rights was culturally
The strong interventionist state authority in this view plays a fundamental role
in protecting traditional values and also in providing “a stable political
environment” conducive to economic development and national prosperity
(Tang 1995: 6). Adopting a Western focus on civil and political rights would
therefore not only be culturally inappropriate but also detrimental to national
political stability and economic advancement.
Backed by the economic successes of certain East Asian states and the ‘Asian
values’ doctrine, ASEAN member states sought to challenge the direction of the
international human rights regime at the 1993 Vienna conference on human
rights. To that end, the Bangkok Declaration, a statement on human rights
through the filter of ‘Asian values’ asserted that human rights standards must
be neither a conditionality for foreign aid nor an “instrument of political
pressure” (Bangkok Declaration 1993: articles 4, 5 and 8). The Declaration
further maintained that, although human rights may be universal, their
The penchant for liberalism in certain Southeast Asian states, afforded by the
Asian financial crisis, came to an abrupt end following September 11, 2001.
With the expansion of the U.S.’s ‘War on Terror’ to Southeast Asia, ASEAN
member states have been able to capitalise on a return to the over-simplified
polemics of national security doctrine reminiscent of the Cold War. As one critic
notes, “today many of these [Southeast Asian] elites are cooperating – if
somewhat hesitantly – in packaging locally-rooted conflicts as exemplars of the
global terrorist threat in order to take advantage of the climate created by the
U.S. response to 9/11” (Glassman 2005: 5). By adopting the language of the
global ‘War on Terror’ ASEAN member states have justified a return to
repressive measures, principally “abuses associated with personal integrity or
personal security: the use of torture, detention without trial, execution,
disappearances, and the like” (Foot 2005: 415). Human rights abuses, when
Although ASEAN and its members continue to use the principle of non-
intervention to defend against external criticism over human rights abuses, the
rise of an increasingly critical domestic and regional civil society severely
challenge the legitimacy of such rebuttals (Kraft 2001: 179). Southeast Asian
NGOs have, for example, rejected the position taken in the 1993 Bangkok
Declaration (Caballero-Anthony 2004a: 181); challenged ASEAN’s ‘constructive
engagement’ approach to Burma’s human rights situation (Acharya 1995: 176);
and lobbied for a greater focus on human security within regional diplomacy
(Caballero-Anthony 2004a: 179).
An ASEAN regional human rights mechanism has garnered even less support
from member regimes, challenging as it does state power from outside national
boundaries (Mohamed 2002: 247). The absence in Southeast Asia, of any kind
of codified regional human rights standards is conspicuous given the global
trend to establish such measures (Campbell and McDonald 2000: 268).
Notwithstanding a declaration in 1993, in which ASEAN foreign ministers
“agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate
regional mechanism on human rights” (ASEAN 1993: 18) and the continued
lobbying by the unofficial Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism, observers suggest that no such instrument will be established until
national mechanisms are more pervasive throughout ASEAN states (Verma
2002: 113). Moreover, such a mechanism “is difficult to foster in the region
because its very existence will be seen to undermine the concept of the strong,
autonomous and economically-sound nation-state that Southeast Asian
governments have traditionally promoted” (Mohamed 2002: 231). National
The economic growth of ASEAN countries has been a significant factor in the
democratisation of member states. With the concomitant expansion of a more
self-confident middle class, political elites within some ASEAN states have had
to address popular demands for political reform (Ahmed and Ghoshal 1999:
It is not so much that these challenges to Southeast Asian regime security have
been effective in raising human rights to the forefront of ASEAN diplomacy.
Indeed, the above evidence suggests the contrary. Rather, the resistance
shown by regional political elites demonstrates the continuing reluctance of
these groups to give ground on human rights claims that threaten their illiberal
rule.
Conclusion
This examination highlights the measures taken by Southeast Asian political
elites to further the longevity of their respective fiefdoms. Since the
establishment of ASEAN at the height of the Cold War in 1967; through the
post-Cold War era and the Asian financial crisis; and into the present ‘War on
Terror’, the organisation’s role has been primarily an instrumental one in
bolstering the security of member regimes. There are, however, factors that
have begun to challenge ASEAN’s traditional state-centric policies; namely:
external criticism over illiberal rule, transnational crises, a burgeoning domestic
The long road to social justice through political equality, not to mention
economic equality, requires determined contestation of the justificatory rhetoric
of entrenched illiberal regimes. Although ASEAN member states continue to
manipulate the organisation for self-serving ends, cynical responses seem
myopic. The historical continuity of ASEAN’s subversion of human rights is only
half the picture, as resistance to such practice has been increasingly
demonstrated throughout the region. While the emancipatory project of the
international human rights regime is threatened by the corruptive character of
power politics, the entrenchment of illiberal regimes is undermined by collective
solidarity in the name of such rights and continued vigilance against
authoritarian rule.
Ahmed, Zakaria Haji and Baladas Ghoshal. 1999. ‘The Political Future of ASEAN
after the Asian Crisis’. International Affairs 75(4):759-778.
Capie, David. 2004. ‘Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The “War on
Terror” and Southeast Asian-US Relations’, The Pacific Review 17(2):223-248.
Christie, Kenneth. 1995. ‘Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia’.
Political Studies 43:204-218.
Cotton, James. 1999. ‘The “Haze” over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN
mode of Regional Engagement’. Political Affairs 72(3):331-351.
Haacke, Jürgen. 2005. ‘“Enhanced Interaction” with Myanmar and the Project of
a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and
Security Culture?’. In Contemporary Southeast Asia 27(2):188-216.
Kraft, Herman Joseph S. 2001. ‘Human Rights, Regional Institutions, and the
Asian Way’. In Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society in South East Asia,
Langlois, Anthony J. 2001. The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: Southeast
Asia and Universalist Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rowse, Ben. 2004. ‘Quiet diplomacy expected to resolve ASEAN-EU spat over
ASEM summit’. Agence France Press 21 March, [accessed on 17 May 2006].
Available at: www.aseansec.org/afp/29.htm.
Tan, See Seng and Kumar Ramakrishna. 2004. ‘Interstate and Intrastate
Dynamics in Southeast Asia’s War on Terror’. SAIS Review 24(1):91-105.
Tan, See Seng. 2005. ‘Non-Official Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: “Civil Society”
or “Civil Service”?’. Contemporary Southeast Asia 27(3):370-389.
Tang, James T.H. 1995. ‘Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region: Competing
Perspectives, International Discord, and the Way Ahead’. In Human Rights and
International Relations in the Asia-Pacific, ed. James T.H. Tang. London: Pinter.