Ignorance & Ideology MPSA

Ignorance, Ideology, and International Politics:
Public Support for Missile Defense in Four Nations
A. Trevor Thrall, University of Michigan - Dearborn

Dominik A. Stecula, University of Michigan – Dearborn and McGill University
Michael Maclean, University of Michigan – Dearborn and University of Windsor
Prepared for the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association
Chicago, IL March 2010
1
Introduction
A 2008 survey found that 87% of Americans agreed that the United States should
develop “a missile defense system with the ability to protect the United States from an
attack by missiles that might contain weapons of mass destruction.1 This figure raises a
puzzling question for many security analysts. Since 1983 when President Reagan
challenged the scientific community to invent a defense alternative to Mutual Assured
Destruction, the vast majority of security analysts have opposed ballistic missile defense
(BMD). There is little evidence that BMD is technically feasible, it has been outrageously
expensive even though it has spent most of its life as research projects, it has scuttled the
ABM Treaty and upset relations with first the Soviet Union and now Russia and China,
and had the potential, even if it were to work, of being dangerously destabilizing to
international security by presenting the possibility that the US could safely attack its foes
without fear of nuclear retaliation.2 Since 9/11 when fears of nuclear proliferation and
terrorism rose to a peak, analysts have also noted that the primary nuclear threat comes
from weapons smuggled directly in to the US, rendering a missile shield irrelevant
(several cites here as well). Why, despite such an array of solid scientific and expert
arguments, do so many people keep supporting missile defense?
The standard hypothesis from the political communication and public opinion
literature would be that the American public likely supports missile defense either
because they are predisposed ideologically to support defensive security measures,

1
Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance July 24‐28, 2008
2
Glaser, York and Lakoff, Lewis et al. etc.
2
especially in the wake of 9/11, or because pro-missile defense elite cues have dominated
the public debate. Evidence from three of the nations approached by the Bush
administration to participate in the U.S. missile shield system, however, muddies this
picture considerably. In Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic, majorities of the public
opposed participation in the U.S. missile shield plan from the beginning despite broad
elite consensus in support of the program. And given the woeful technical history of
missile defense and considerable potential international turmoil the U.S. missile shield
might create, one also has to wonder why in the world these European political elites
supported the system in the first place.
In this paper we propose that instrumental calculations of the missile shield’s
value as a missile shield per se were almost completely irrelevant to both elite and public
attitudes towards the U.S. missile shield plan. Using case studies that combine content
analysis of leading national newspapers, close analysis of elite debates, and public
opinion polls in the United States, Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic, we propose
that instead, the critical question is how elites and their publics interpreted the U.S.
missile shield in light of a mix of international and domestic political considerations that
varied across countries and over time.
The importance of this topic is both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical
side, we believe that both explanations have merit but that a more satisfying approach is
to integrate the two. On the practical side, foreign policy has grabbed the U.S. with a
vengeance since 9/11. How well the U.S. public is able to discern the wisdom foreign
policy alternatives in the near future matters to the entire world. Just as critically, it has
also become more clear than ever that international opinion plays a large role in the U.S.
3
foreign policy process. From ensuring cooperation in the fight against terrorism, or
building alliances to confront Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, to deploying a missile shield
abroad, the United States needs to understand how and why international publics think
the way they do.
In the next section we present our analytical framework. In the four case studies
that follow, we apply that framework in an attempt to explain elite and public attitudes
towards the U.S. missile shield during the Bush administration. Finally, we conclude with
thoughts about the implications of the case studies.
How Do People Think about Missile Defense?
The starting point for discussion is to acknowledge that the mass public in these
four nations knows very little about the technical arguments involved and has very little
or no ability to adjudicate them. First off, most people aren’t very interested and pay little
attention to such issues. Second, in large part as a result of this, the commercial news
media in most countries, most of the time, also pays little attention to missile defense.
What news there is tends to provide information without enough context to make sense to
the average reader or viewer, or features academic experts criticizing each other on the
basis of claims that go well beyond what the average citizen can understand. Thus,
whether or not people might use such information about missile defense to come to an
opinion, the fact is that very few have the information necessary to assemble what one
might call a “well-informed” opinion.
4
In such a situation, the predominant scholarly view is that people are likely to rely
on their own worldviews and predispositions, or turn to elite cues to determine whether to
support a policy.3 In other words, with appropriate cross-national variations, we would
expect hawkish conservatives to support missile defense because it plays to their
inclination to view the world as a dangerous place and to support military spending of
various kinds. Likewise, where ruling governments are promoting missile defense, we
would expect their partisans to support missile defense on the same general principles
being espoused by party leaders, while opposing partisans should tend to oppose, having
adopted the contrary arguments articulated by opposing party elites.
The cases here, however, force us to amend this general theoretical approach and
offer some suggestions about how to do so. Though the U.S. case follows the pattern
fairly closely, the cases of Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic highlight significant
disconnects between the mass public and the ruling party. In all three nations a majority
of the public opposed participation in the U.S. missile defense system despite strong
support from the ruling governments and, in Poland and the Czech Republic, support
from elites across the political spectrum. And although conservatives tended to be more
supportive than others, only in Poland did a bare majority of conservatives ever support
the program. This disjuncture appears to run in the face of the theoretical expectations.
We attempt to resolve the puzzle here by adding the concept of framing. As we
will discuss in greater detail in the case studies, the theories are fine as far as they go.
What they miss, however, is a mechanism to help us understand when people will rely on
any particular predisposition, elite cue, or instrumental calculation to form an opinion.

3
Hurwitz and Peffley, Zaller, short cuts and heuristics people and similar stuff here
5
Framing theory provides just such a mechanism. Framing theory, of course, suggests that
the framing of a choice or a policy issue is critical for guiding people toward choosing
one or another element as the most salient concern of the moment, a choice which in turn
determines how people will make sense of available information in forming an opinion.4
The key question here, then, becomes: how did elites and their publics interpret
the U.S. missile shield and why? Asked another way: what did the shield mean to the
elites and publics thinking about it? Though as we will see in the case studies, the
answers are complex and highly varied, we discovered two important sets of factors
influencing their interpretations.
Before discussing those factors, we should briefly explain that our framework
does not include a rational calculation about the military value of a missile shield. As
noted above, after already spending roughly $60 billion on research and development, the
United States has yet to deploy anything resembling a national missile defense system,
and there remains little evidence to suggest that the central technical challenges will be
solved any time soon. As obvious a consideration as this might seem, however, we find
almost no evidence that this type of calculation has seriously affected attitudes towards
the U.S. missile shield plan. In fact, for example, when asked if the United States should
continue to develop missile defense even if scientists say that it is unlikely ever to work,
60% of Americans say that research should continue.
The first set of critical factors flowed from the international political context.
Here, the questions include: What are the key threats to the nation’s security, both

4
Various framing citations here…
6
historically and at present? What does the nation stand to lose or gain internationally
from participating in the missile shield system? And finally, what are the intentions of the
United States? Here we saw wide variation in what the shield meant to elites. For those in
Poland, the missile shield was a shield, not against missiles, but more broadly against
potentially hostile Russian intentions. In both Poland and the Czech Republic, the shield
also represented a badge of honor, a sign that both nations would play an important role
in the European Union and in NATO. For Canada, on the other hand, the shield was not a
shield at all. Dismissive of the actual threat of missile attack, for Canadian supporters the
shield represented a key link to the United States. For Canadian opponents the shield
represented an American leash with which the U.S. could dictate Canadian foreign policy
and many mistrusted U.S. intentions and viewed the missile shield as a tool the U.S.
might use to launch upon even more aggressive foreign policies.
The second set of factors emerged from the domestic political context. Here we
see the effects of ideology and partisan politics. In the U.S. case, missile defense has long
since become fairly polarized along party lines. As a much newer and less familiar issue
in other nations, however, other domestic political factors were more important. In
Poland the program became a test of the government’s general competence. In the Czech
Republic the shield came to be interpreted as a major environmental hazard. In Canada
the shield became an election issue thanks to the government’s inept handling of the
negotiations with the United States and its misreading of Canadian opinion.
Finally, we note a fairly obvious point that nonetheless helps explain the
disconnects between elites and the public. Simply put, elites and the mass public do not
always pay equal amounts of attention to various information sources and thus do not
7
always share the same frame on policy issues, especially ones fairly distant from public
attention or which get little attention in the press. Though elite cues have been shown to
be powerful predictors of mass opinion, their impact (as Zaller has shown) is mediated
significantly by public attentiveness. Elite cues can only impact those who attend them
and rate them as more salient than other incoming cues. Thus, the first source of the
disconnect between elites and the public in all four nations is the general lack of interest
and concern about missile defense. As we will show, the least informed citizens were the
least likely to follow their party’s position on missile defense.
The second source of the disconnect, however, is one that is less often mentioned
in the public opinion literature. Throughout the period in question here, elites and their
publics gave primary weight to different concerns despite elite efforts to sell the policy to
the public. Thanks to their intense exposure to the international arena, elites tended to be
most concerned with the international context of the missile shield. Status in the E.U.,
reputation, and their nation’s relationship with the United States across a wide range of
issues were foremost in their minds. The public, on the other hand, was far more likely to
view the shield through the lens of domestic politics or in light of the rising levels of anti-
American sentiment that had arisen in the wake of the invasion of Iraq. As a result of
these different foci, governments in Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic were never
able to win majority support for the missile shield despite very high levels of elite
consensus.
8
Support for Missile Defense in the United States
The Policy Process and Chronology
The Clinton administration, never enamored of the concept of missile defense,
nonetheless found itself pressed by a Republican Congress to push ahead with research
and testing of missile defense throughout the 1990s. In 1998 the pressure for missile
defense mounted in the wake of the Rumsfeld Commission’s report. The commission,
formed out of republican unhappiness with the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
on the missile threat facing the United States, issued a report that suggested the missile
threat facing the United States was much more urgent than the NIE had concluded.
Unable to avoid dealing with missile defense, Clinton signed the 1999 National Missile
Defense Act, which required the deployment of a limited national missile defense system
as soon as it was feasible. Although Clinton was initially supposed to make a
determination on the feasibility of deployment by the summer of 2000, the presidential
campaign and troubles in the testing of the system made it too politically charged a
decision to make. Clinton thus postponed the decision, leaving it to his successor to
make.
During the presidential campaign of 2000, George W. Bush and the other
republican candidates all supported national missile defense. As Bush cemented front-
runner status and sought to distinguish himself from his democratic opponent, Al Gore,
Bush announced that he supported a national missile defense far more expansive than the
9
one envisioned by the Clinton administration, one that would not only protect the entire
United States but also US allies in Europe.
"America must build effective missile defenses," Mr. Bush said, "based on the
best available options at the earliest possible date. Our missile defense must be designed
to protect all 50 states and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas from
missile attacks by rogue nations or accidental launches."5
In addition, Bush also indicated that he was ready to pull out of the Anti-ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty if it could not be amended with Russian approval, because the
treaty prohibited the development of missile defense beyond a single installation covering
a single small area.
“…I'll tell you this: If the president negotiates a treaty that really doesn't free up
the United States and or Russia to develop an anti-ballistic missile system, fully explore
the options of an anti-ballistic missile system, I would rather have no treaty."
Even during the campaign Bush’s readiness to leave the ABM Treaty behind was
widely criticized by liberals in the U.S. and governments around the world. Russia, in
particular, continued to view the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of its arms control
negotiations with the United States, and China worried about the impact of a missile
defense system on its relatively small arsenal of nuclear weapons.
As promised, Bush moved quickly on missile defense, despite (or perhaps spurred
on by) the events of September 11 and run up to the war in Iraq. On December 16, 2002
President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 23, calling for deployment
of a national missile defense system by 2004. Throughout 2002 the United States also
held informal discussions with both Poland the Czech Republic about hosting missile

5
Alison Mitchell, “Campaign 2000: The Texas Governor; Bush Says U.S. Should Reduce Nuclear Arms,”
New York Times May 24, A1, p. 1
10
interceptor sites. The formal negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic were
made public in 2007. Despite majorities in both nations opposing the bases, the
governments of Poland and Czech Republic signed agreements with the United States in
2008. A year later, after completing a review of the system, President Obama scuttled the
Bush missile shield plan in favor of a ship-based system that would not put interceptor
missiles so close to Russia. Though publicly Obama denied that he had altered the
program to get Russian cooperation on U.S. efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear
program, most observers believe that Obama used missile defense as the very bargaining
chip that many Republicans had claimed it could be back in the 1980s.
Shield, Bargaining Chip, Wedge Issue: Elites and Missile Defense
Republican perceptions of and plans for missile defense have changed very little between
1983 and today despite the sea changes in the international arena, despite the shift from
the Cold War to terrorism as the nation’s focal security concern, and despite decades of
failures to produce even a rudimentary missile defense capability.
In the 1980s, Republicans supported SDI for a mix of reasons. First, some believed that a
missile defense system was highly desirable and supported the pursuit of the long-term
goal of a perfect defense. Second, some realized that whether the project ever worked or
not, it could be a useful bargaining chip with the Soviet Union, which would have to
spend money to ensure that it did not accede any nuclear advantage to the U.S. or else
potentially make concessions in arms control negotiations. Finally, still others believed
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that the issue had political utility regardless of its military potential, both as a useful way
to counter the anti-nuclear movement and to peel off conservative Democrats and
independents at election time.
Democrats, on the other hand, saw the shield first as a science fiction folly (“Star Wars”),
then as a threat to arms control progress and to nuclear deterrence, and finally as an issue
that could cost them votes as Republicans built momentum for missile defense in the mid
to late 1990s. As of the late 1990s, Democrats agreed that some form of missile defense
system was a done deal, thanks to Republican pressure and success in Congress.6
The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat had little impact on
GOP enthusiasm for missile defense, merely shifting the rationales for the missile shield.
By the time of the Rumsfeld report in 1998, missile defense had a much narrower
portfolio, but Republican efforts in fact seemed to increase. In fact, the efforts
conservatives made to hype the threat and keep the issue alive in the wake of the collapse
of the Soviet Union suggest a commitment more religious than rational. Tellingly, the
missile defense system preferred by the Bush administration had not changed
substantially from Reagan’s initial vision despite the much more limited threat
environment facing the U.S. at that time. Republicans during the 2000 election decried
the limited missile defense plan being pursued by Clinton.

6
An excellent history of missile defense under Reagan is Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue.
12
Missile defense continued to appeal to Republicans as another way to strengthen its hand
in international politics, extending U.S. military dominance and the unipolar moment
after the Cold War. Just as Reagan was willing to pursue SDI despite the highly negative
responses from Europe and the Soviet Union, Bush was also ready from the beginning to
pull out of the ABM Treaty despite the widespread concern and anger the issue had
already provoked in Russian, Chinese, and European circles.
As the 1990s and the 2000 presidential campaign showed, missile defense was still an
issue that worked for the Republicans. A poll in spring 2000 showed that 58% of the
public wanted missile defense, including many conservative democrats and independents
whose votes count so much at election time (CBS/NYT/Whatever Polls 2000).
The fact that Republican interest in missile defense has not dimmed despite the obvious
change in the threat and the huge cost of pursuing a non-viable system suggests that it
was conservative worldview and ideology, along with the continued usefulness of missile
defense as a political issue, that propelled the Bush administration to pursue the shield in
the way it did, rather than signals from the international arena.
How much emphasis one should put on each of those causes is unclear. Some cynics
might argue that Republicans are happy to spend money on defense that also helps them
win elections. Less cynically, it can be argued that Bush and supporters of missile
13
defense simply valued U.S. security from missile attack so highly that they were willing
to spend vast amounts of money to buy a small chance of successfully defending against
the very low probability that some nation would someday launch a nuclear tipped
ballistic missile at the United States.7 As a former Republican member of Congress said
in the documentary Missile Wars, “When people ask me, ‘How much are you willing to
spend on missile defense,’ I say, “How much are you willing to spend to save New
York?” (PBS Frontline 2003, Missile Wars).
We believe the answer likely lies somewhere in between. Even if Republicans truly care
that much about U.S. security, it does not follow that spending $60 billion or more on
missile defense is the best way to ensure national security, especially when there is such
good reason to doubt the effectiveness of missile defense and when so many other less
expensive alternatives to enhancing U.S. security can be imagined. The continued
Republican fascination with missile defense may thus stem from its political utility. Or,
more speculatively, it may be that nuclear weapons are such a vivid and dread threat that
they produce an irrational response from those predisposed to worry about them most.8
Don’t We Already Have One of Those? Wake Me When It’s Over. The US Public and the
Shield

7
This mind set is well summed up by a report by the Center for Security Policy, a pro‐missile defense think
tank. Missile Defense: A Bargain at Twice the Price – cite here
8
On how dread risks can produce irrational responses, see Jessica Stern, IS piece. Also see Paul Slovic, et
al, various foundational stuff on risk.
14
Historically a majority of the U.S. public has been supportive of the concept of
missile defense, but it has rarely followed the issue closely enough for opinions to
run very deep. As Figure US‐1 illustrates, over the period from 2000 to 2008, the
bulk of poll questions elicited majority support for missile defense but that support
was sensitive to question wording. On the one hand, Pew Research Center found
that over 70% of the public believed that building a missile defense system was an
important priority in a series of identical questions asked from 2001 to 2005.9
Similarly, the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance found greater than 80% support
when asking questions that asked whether the U.S. should have a system for
shooting down missiles armed with WMD.10 However, across the twelve questions
that offered respondents either zero prompting or presented arguments both for
and against missile defense, support was far more modest, averaging 51% between
February 2000 and February 2002.
Making analysis of those poll figures difficult is the fact that the U.S. public was
fundamentally ignorant of and unconcerned about the issue throughout the period.
In the heat of the 2000 presidential election campaign, more people thought Gore
was the candidate who had proposed to build a missile defense system, and 61%
acknowledged that they had no idea which candidate had done so. In September
2000, 58% of the public answered that they thought the United States already had a
missile defense system deployed, a figure that rose to 64% by March 2001, after

9
See Pew Research Center surveys from January 3‐7, 2001; August 21‐September 5, 2001; January 9‐13,
2002; January 8‐12, 2003; January 6‐11, 2004; January 5‐9, 2005.
10
MDAA surveys from July 19‐22, 2007; July 24‐27, 2008
15
Bush’s election and additional news coverage about the new administration’s plans
for missile defense.11 This ignorance is not surprising in light of the Pew Research
Center finding in February 2001 that roughly half of all Americans had never heard
anything about missile defense, a finding that Pew replicated several times over the
years.12 The public’s disinterest in following missile defense seems to have reflected
its priorities at the time. Even when offered a list of legislative priorities to consider
that included missile defense, just 3% said that missile defense should be the
highest priority, good for last on the list.13
The rough split in support and opposition for missile defense in the unprompted
and balanced argument questions suggests that most Americans simply did not have
strong opinions one way or the other and just guessed at an answer. At the very
least it is clear that most people could not be basing their answer on considered
analysis of the pros and cons of a system they had not heard of and knew nothing
about.
Figure US‐2 supports this interpretation. Here we see the polarization of
Republicans and Democrats over the issue of missile defense as people’s level of
knowledge about the missile defense debate rose. In this 2001 Pew Research Center
survey, among those partisans who were least aware, ideology (or at least

11
CBS News/New York Times surveys September 9‐11, 2000; March 8‐12, 2001
12
Pew Research Center survey February 14‐19, 2001
13
NBC/Wall Street Journal survey December 8‐10, 2001
16
partisanship) appears to play no role in directing attitudes toward missile defense,
as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all fall near the 50% support mark.
However, as partisans became more informed, Republicans and Democrats were
more likely to adopt the positions of their party elites. Independents’ attitudes
toward missile defense were unchanged with greater exposure to information.
Taken together, Figures US‐1 and US‐2 suggest that to the extent that U.S. citizens
spent any time considering missile defense, they did so primarily through a lens of
domestic politics, which is unsurprising in one sense, since the Republican party had
been beating the Democrats over the head with it since the mid‐1990s when Newt
Gingrich included it as the only military system in the famous Contract with
America. If the international context had been more important we might have
expected to see greater support for missile defense after 9/11 as Americans became
generally more security‐minded, regardless of whether they paid any attention to
missile defense and regardless of ideology. However, we see almost no change in
support after 9/11.
It is true, nonetheless, that Republicans and Democrats were also more likely to find
their own party’s arguments about missile defense most compelling when
confronted with them. In the 2001 Pew study, Republicans found the threat of rogue
state missile attacks more compelling, while Democrats tended to see the potential
for upsetting Russia and for a new arms race as more important. This suggests that
17
had there been a fuller debate about missile defense, the public would eventually
have polarized more firmly into competing camps on missile defense thanks to the
competition between Republican and Democratic elites over the issue.
18
Support for Missile Defense in Canada
Analytical framework for Canada:
Neither the Canadian elites nor the public spent much time interpreting the shield through
a military/technical lens. Most proponents and opponents seemed to feel that the threat
upon which the system was based was more or less irrelevant to Canada's decision to
participate or not. The other military benefits of participation may have been interesting
to the military, but not to anyone else. Neither opponents nor proponents worried much
about this (the weaponization of space argument that made an early appearance was not a
military argument, but an international political one - see below).
International political level:
1. With the background of 9/11 and the Iraq War and the view that Bush was out of
control in foreign policy, for opponents the shield represented a threat to Canada's
preferred international agenda (humanitarian, PK, multilateral, etc) and its sovereignty or
self-determination in foreign policy. This threat was all the more pointed because of how
distasteful Bush's policies were. For example, if Canada wanted to work on keeping
space free from weapons, how could it do so while participating in the US BMD system
which would potentially place weapons in space?
2. On the other hand, for proponents, the shield represented maintenance of the status quo
in the US/Canada relationship and, by extension, of Canada's ability to pursue its
19
economic and foreign policy goals. Being tight with the US meant not having to spend a
lot of money on defense, leaving Canada free to spend its money on humanitarian
missions, etc., as well having the freedom to export to the US market. Turning down the
shield meant risking that status quo (especially dangerous at a time when the status quo
was already under some duress).
Domestic Political Level:
1. The Canadian governments saw BMD as a toxic hot potato thanks to growing public
opposition and Martin tried to avoid it at every turn and to spin the issue carefully when
they could not avoid talking about it. This was especially problematic because of the
minority government situation and the Liberal scandals that made them weak at the polls.
Not a good time to go against public opinion.
2. The public saw BMD not only through the international sovereignty issue noted above,
but also and relatedly as an opportunity to define themselves politically as Canadian
through not being American.
America tilting at technologically based defense windmills is nothing new. From
the entertainingly named, but wholly inadequate Star Wars Missile Shield, to the recently
20
debunked nuclear “Bunker Buster” explosive14, useless technology has been a mainstay
of the American military industrial complex. If this is so, one cannot help but question
why Ballistic Missile defense (BMD) became such a serious issue to Canadians in 2004-
2005? Especially considering that Canada’s objections to weapons systems in the past
was noticeably absent, and that many more clandestine and sinister activities were being
agreed upon and implemented throughout these years and onwards in the name of
American security; boarder biometrics programs, American air security standards and
similar infringements on Canadian sovereignty and privacy.15 The glib answer to why
BMD became a national issue while others languished in obscurity would seem to be
domestic politics and Anti-American sentiment. A more in-depth deconstruction of this
event, though predominantly centering around these two issues, reveals the imposition of
identity politics fruitlessly expelled on a conflict that was essentially an exercise in
semantics.
The event itself was not a case of an informed public reaction to a flawed military
strategy. Rather, it was a political power struggle/Liberal strategic belly flop (one of
many to come) that was taken up by the media to propagate scandal (or ratings). This
media strategy met with easy success due to public susceptibility to any messages
holding anti-US-foreign policy/anti-Bush sentiments.16 A war of elite frames crystallized,
fueled by misinformation, political power struggles and unpopular American foreign

14
Scheer, Robert. Earning his nobel prize. in CBS News [database online]. New York, 2010 [cited 04/07
2010]. Available from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/07/opinion/main6373169.shtml
(accessed 04/07/10).
15
Sokolsky, Joel. 2006. Suspenders and a belt: Perimeter and border security in canada‐US relations.
Canadian Foreign Policy 12, (3).
16
Beier, J. Marshall. 2005. Canada: Doubting Hephaestus. Contemporary Security Policy 26, (3): 431.
21
policy which drove public opinion resolutely against missile defense and left the Liberal
government to play catch-up.
The Canada Case in Context
The issue of BMD compliance in Canada officially became notable after Prime
Minister Paul Martin, while on the campaign trail, responded to an innocuous question
about the BMD program by saying that he would not sign any document that would allow
the weaponization of space.17 It is unclear whether Mr. Martin was attempting to be
politically clever by playing on the widely held misconception that the BMD program
involved deploying weapons in space18 while having already agreed to comply with the
ground based BMD program, or whether it was merely a poor response to an unexpected
question. It is known that prior to Martin becoming PM he was openly in favor of the
BMD program19 but in light of a strained Canada/US relationship and a nation
disenchanted with all things American Military20, Martin’s modus operandi on the issue
remains unclear. Regardless of the motive behind the statement, it led to a veritable
media feeding frenzy in the following months and years.
The backdrop of the BMD debate in Canada came at a time when the government
was at its weakest. In the context of the Canadian/American relationship, tensions were
already high in part because the Americans had used an outbreak of mad cow disease in

17
Indepth: Ballistic missile defence. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2006 [cited 01/17 2010].
Available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/timeline.html (accessed
01/17/10).
18
Wolfwood, Terry. "Wake up call" on BMD. in Vancouver Island Public Interest Research Group
[database online]. Vancouver, 2007 [cited 01/19 2010]. Available from
http://www.vipirg.ca/publications/pubs/speeches/0406_tw_missile_demo.html (accessed 01/19/10).
19
Staples, Steven. 2006. Missile defence: Round one. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company
Ltd., Publishers. p. 37‐38.
20
Beier, Marshall. 2005. Canada: Doubting Hephaestus. Contemporary Security Policy 26, (3): 431. p. 436.
22
Alberta to exclude Canadian beef and strengthen American domestic consumption.21
Similar controversies regarding Canadian softwood lumber exports to America were also
under scrutiny, with the free trade partner levying significant duties, which put pressure
on the Canadian government to take action in protecting a staple (and a government
subsidized) regional industry.22 These two trade disputes provided acute focal points to a
cross boarder relationship that was admittedly already under some stress.
Martin’s predecessor, Jean Chretien, had made a point of distancing himself from
the Bush administration, making top-level negotiation more difficult still.23 Relationships
were further strained by Chretien’s decision not to send troops to Iraq in 2003, and the
subsequent cancelling of Bush’s scheduled first official visit to Canada soon after.24
Though the Martin government was seen as a fence mender in this relationship he was
never properly able to champion the role. Growing anti-American sentiments within the
Canadian electorate,25 America’s unilateral and hard nosed trade policy with Canada, an
official visit in 2004 that was interpreted as an insult to America’s largest trading partner,
and a complete lack of understanding of Canada’s domestic political realities hindered
the improvement of relations.26

21
Cooper, Andrew F., and Dane Rowlands. 2005. Canada among nations 2005: Split images. 1st ed.
Montreal: McGill‐Queen's University Press. p. 211‐212.
22
Softwood lumber dispute. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/21 2010]. Available
from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/softwood_lumber/ (accessed 01/21/10).
23
Cohen, Andrew. 2005. The impact of the 2004 elections: On the canadian‐american relationship.
International Journal 60, (2): 351. p. 353. p. 353‐354.
24
Ibid. p. 354‐355.
25
Compas Inc. 2005. Missile defence: Small, soft, quebec‐based majority opposes it in practice while
backing it in principle, big majority condemns ottawa's lack of public discussion. Toronto, ON: National
Post, 1.
26
International Journal 60, (2): 351. p. 355‐356.
23
All of the tensions surrounding the Canadian/American relationship were
compounded by domestic political strife. The Liberal government was in the midst of a
sponsorship scandal that threatened to topple the government and siphoned away public
trust in the party.27 This controversy also eroded the public’s faith that its government
was acting with full transparency, making rumors of a public and private government
position on BMD more resonant. With all of this impacting the government it is
unsurprising that in the 2004 election Martin was reduced to a minority government,
which in turn created further problems for the Liberals. All of these factors made BMD a
more crucial public issue than it would otherwise be. However, this was not immediately
realized by the administration, as was made evident by the Martin government’s take note
debate in the House of Commons four months before the 2004 election.28 This debate (a
parliamentary practice developed in 1994 meant only to inform parliament of the
governments activities) exposed the government’s lack of concern for the issue as the
focus of the debate was to allay fears of a new arms race developing from the
construction (and presumed participation) of the missile defense system.29 Had the Martin
government to fully grasped the ultimate importance of this issue it is unlikely that the
liberals would have been so pacifying in tone or nonchalant about compliance.
Following the Liberal minority victory in 2004 the Martin government was quick
to sign an agreement with its NORAD partners, which allowed Canadian systems to share

27
Federal sponsorship scandal. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/17 2010]. Available
from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/groupaction/ (accessed 01/17/10).
28
Government orders: Ballistic missile defence. in The House Of Commons [database online]. Ottawa,
2004 [cited 01/17 2010]. Available from
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1200288&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl
=37&Ses=3#SOB‐813753 (accessed 01/17/10).
29
Ibid.
24
information with the BMD systems.30 This agreement was signed a little over a month
after the election, and is in keeping with the Martin government’s stand prior to the
election that BMD was a positive move for Canada. Though this stance made sense on
many levels, most notably strategic, trade, and foreign policy, the Martin government was
wary even at that time of public opinion and the anti-American sentiment growing in the
nation. To pacify such concerns, Canada’s Defense Minister explicitly noted that this
signing was not a step towards Canada joining the BMD system, but merely Canada
adhering to its NORAD obligations.31
The level of public disapproval for BMD hinted at by the Minister of Defense in
his statements manifested into a national day of protest against BMD in early October of
2004.32 Though this protest occurred throughout Canada, predictably the largest
representation was argued to be in Quebec.33 This result is consistent with the landscape
of displeasure in the nation. Quebec had a push back to this policy akin to issues in the
past like conscription, and maintained Quebec’s historic disapproval to militarism and the
escalation of hostilities in general.34 The protest alone would have been enough to get the
minority government’s attention, but the inclusion and strong showing from Quebec put
added pressure on the liberal government to take action. Indeed, these protests had an
impact as “…Defence Minister Bill Graham had stated that the government’s position

30
Fergusson, James. Shall we dance? the missile defence decision, NORAD renewal, and the future of
canada‐US defence relations. in National Defence and The Canadian Forces [database online]. Ottawa,
2008 [cited 01/19 2010]. Available from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no2/inter‐01‐eng.asp
31
01/17/10).
32
Ibid.
33
Martin, Pierre. 2005. All Quebec’s Fault, Again? Quebec Public Opinion and Canada’s Rejection of
Missile Defence. Policy Options 26, (4): 41. p. 41.
34
Ibid. 42.
25
had, in effect, been determined by a “peace camp” working within the Quebec wing of
the Liberal party.”35 Currying public favor in an attempt to return to a majority
government in the next election was heavily contingent on increased liberal support in the
populous francophone province.
Political opposition to the BMD plan was experienced across the political
landscape. Though the Bloc Quebecois and the NDP may have had ideological motives
for the stance, every party knew that with the prevailing public opinion resolutely against
BMD36 and a teetering minority government, the smart political stance was to oppose the
program. Even the Bush loving Conservatives, who were pro-BMD prior to and directly
after the controversy of 2004-200537, claimed that they would need to see “the details of
an agreement”38 before supporting it. Political posturing in light of public opinion was,
however, typified by the behavior of Liberal MP Carlyon Parrish.
Parrish, a Liberal backbencher, had made headlines in 2003 after being caught by
the press making disparaging remarks about Americans and the Iraq invasion.39 Having
received public support and national notoriety from the incident it was no surprise when
she spoke out about the BMD issue. In August of 2004 Parrish referred to those nations

35
Rudd, David. 2005. Muddling through on missile defence: The politics of indecision. Policy Options 26,
(4): 30. p. 30.
36
Post, 1.
37
Nossal, Kim. 2007. Defense policy and the atmospherics of canada‐U.S. relations: The case of the harper
conservatives. The American Review of Canadian Studies 37, (1): 23.
38
Barry, Donald. 2008. Defense against help: Explaining canada‐U.S. security relations. The American
Review of Canadian Studies 38, (1): 63. p. 79.
39
Parrish: The thoughts. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/17 2010]. Available from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdngovernment/parrish‐carolyn.html (accessed 01/17/10).
26
participating in the missile defense program as a “coalition of idiots.”40 Once again in this
case her comments were greeted with media attention and public support. The only party
to condemn these statements was the Conservative party.41 Parrish finally became a
victim of her own quest for attention and public approval two weeks after the 2004
presidential election when she appeared in one of Canada’s most popular political satire
programs brandishing more anti-American sentiment and stomping on an action figure of
the newly elected president.42 This lack of party discipline, and tact, got her removed
from the liberal caucus, but made her publicly popular both in her own riding and
beyond. The fact that an attention seeking liberal backbencher, who never put forward
any type of argument towards her beliefs, but rather floated her popularity based on
tactless anti-American sound bites speaks volumes to the prevailing sentiment of anti-
American/Anti-Bush within Canada. Though it is hard not to see Parrish as an
opportunistic buffoon, it is equally hard to deny that she would have remained in
obscurity if the sound bites she lobed over Canadian airways did not hold significant
resonance with the public she spoke to.
Turning a bad situation to worse for the liberal government was the first official
visit by President G. W. Bush. This visit was already contentious without the BMD issue.
Indeed there was controversy about the visit before any official agenda was announced as
Anti-Bush/Anti-American sentiment was exacerbated by the fact that Canada felt
snubbed for not having already received an official visit, dispensing with the tradition

40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
27
that Canada was the first national visit by any newly elected president.43 Added to this
was the tense Canada/American relationship at the time, with the mad cow scare stalling
Canadian beef exports and the ongoing conflict over softwood lumber. In light of these
problems it had been agreed before hand that the BMD issue was not to be discussed.44
Bush, however, in keeping with his self-interested and often obtuse diplomatic style
(remember his attempted backrub on Angela Merkel?) did not hesitate to bring up the
taboo issue in the private meeting of the two leaders, in the press conference following
those talks and in his address to the House of Commons.45 This inspired new outrage
from the Canadian public. Beyond the open protests wherever Bush traveled, his
comments sparked a declaration by Quebec Liberals (excluding Martin, who represented
La-Salla) that they would not support missile defense in Canada.46 This forced the Martin
government, already pushed into a corner by Bush’s tactless comments, even further
away from saying yes on the BMD issue. In his weak minority government position he
needed support from his MPs in the short term, and gains in Quebec in the long term if he
was to maintain power.47 This made BMD a necessary and symbolic sacrificial lamb.
The death rattle to Canadian participation in missile defense came in February of
2005 when the Martin government was meant to give its final decision. Canada’s
ambassador to the U.S., Frank McKenna, drew further negative attention to the issue.
Speaking with reporters in Washington, McKenna asserted that Canada’s participation in

43
International Journal 60, (2): 351. p. 353‐356.
44
Ibid. p. 356.
45
Ibid.
46
01/17/10).
47
Jones, David T.. 2005. When Politics Trumps Security: A Washington Vantage Point. Policy Options 26,
(4): 45. p. 46.
28
missile defense had already been decided in the 2004 agreement, which allowed the
missile shield systems access to Canadian satellite systems.48 This declaration was
countered two days later by Martin’s official announcement stating that Canada would
not participate in missile defense.49 The incongruity in message was predominantly
interpreted in Canada as either a miscommunication within the Liberal party (a
miscommunication that was likely shared by the Whitehouse), the exposure of a
government that was publicly against and privately complicit with missile defense, or
simple indecisive dithering by a government in trouble.50 Though any of these
assessments could hold some truth, the discrepancy in message was merely McKenna
properly interpreting the missile defense situation as it stood. Practically speaking, if the
Martin government was interested in halting missile defense they would not have signed
off on the one area of authority Canada possessed that could halt missile defense
expansion into Canada. After allowing the Americans access to Canada’s NORAD sites
all the official participation announcement meant was that Canada would have access to
the system and decision making about the use of the system, not whether the system was
going to be integrated and installed into Canada’s NORAD sites.51 Thus, Canada’s
decision to participate held no weight, as the system was going to happen with or without
the Canadians at that point. It was this reality that McKenna was outlining to reporters, it
was just not properly elaborated upon and came at the most inopportune time for the

48
Barry, Donald. 2008. Defense against help: Explaining canada‐U.S. security relations. The American
Review of Canadian Studies 38, (1): 63. p. 79.
49
Ibid.
50
Jones, David T. p. 46 – 48.
51
29
Liberal government. The perceived incongruity between the rhetoric of the liberal party
and their senior-most diplomat in America forced the Martin government to clarify their
position. The Liberals could not be seen as indecisive, nor could they allow McKenna’s
assertion that missile defense in Canada was a foregone conclusion to permeate through a
public resolutely against the system. Forced to take action, the Martin government made
the only decision available to it, and the die was cast against Canada’s official
participation in missile defense.
McKenna, in his comments to the media, exposed the reality of Canada’s missile
defense decision and its inconsequential resolution. As Andrew Coyne outlined in a
National Post article on December 4, 2004, “…all this hyperventilating is over a question
of the emptiest symbolism: whether we will support in principle a system we are already
support in practice.”52 Given this stark reality, the importance placed on the decision by
the Canadian public it implies either a flat ignorance as to what a ‘no’ from Canada
would result in, or indicates self-awareness in the statement/identity politics underlining
Canada’s BMD decision. This is because either the Canadian public did not understand
that its participation in BMD did not stop the system being deployed in Canada, or they
did and their decision on BMD was a symbolic political statement against America and
its policies. Given that political parties and the media were able to make such an issue out
of what was ultimately an inconsequential decision would imply a great deal of ignorance
on the part of the Canadian public. Ultimately, however, it was likely a healthy
combination of both ignorance and political statement on the part of the Canadian people
that motivated a lack of official participation on the part of the government.

52
International Journal 60, (2): 351. p. 356.
30
The Intentions Behind the Influencers: the Motives and Meanings Behind the Missile
Defense Decision in Canada
It is certainly valid to assert that many practical compounding factors resulted in
Canada’s ultimate negative response to missile defense being a foregone conclusion. It is
equally valid to argue that the overarching frames espoused by those engaged in the
national debate identified what this issue was fundamentally about. The dominant frames,
likewise, are not so much stringently tied to the finer points of each frame’s individual
argument, but can be grouped into a few fundamental meanings relevant to the groups
engaged in the debate. These fundamental frames are synonymous with the motives on
which the Liberal government made its decision on national missile defense and expose a
decision made not on the merits and practicalities of the proposed program itself, but
rather a decision that acts as a proxy for domestic grievances.
Unsurprisingly the only positive voice in Canada for BMD was the military and
more hawkish members of the political right. The main arguments put forward by
supporters were military/treaty compliance, pragmatic defense realities, and improved
Canadian/American relations.53 The first of these reasons holds the most weight as an
argument. Canadian/American military integration and cooperation has been

53
Macdonald, George. Canada‐US defence cooperation: Where to from here? in National Defence and
The Canadian Forces [database online]. Ottawa, 2008 [cited 01/20 2010]. Available from
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no2/inter‐eng.asp (accessed 01/20/10).
31
institutionalized within the military’s modus operandi since the end of World War II.54 It
is that cooperative spirit that allows Canada to operate at such low capacity relative to its
size and boarder security realities. As such, the Canadian Forces (CF) is committed to a
strong cross boarder relationship and compliance on American military initiatives.55
The argument that NORAD made BMD an imperative was also heard from those
tied to, and in the rank and file of the CF.56 BMD was integrated into the NORAD
systems, and with the Canadians giving the use of their tracking systems to the project, it
was assumed that missile defense was the future of NORAD.57 Not signing on to the
project was both removing Canada from the future of the coalition and putting the
continuation of NORAD into doubt.58 Though this argument clearly overestimates the
precarious state of NORAD, exaggerates how easy it would be for Canada to be removed
from NORAD, and oversimplifies the future role of NORAD, it was still put forward as a
reason why Canadian BMD compliance was essential.
The rhetoric around the practical security benefits of the shield was also put
forward, mostly by right-leaning academics and officials. The argument here was
functionally reproduced from the American defense argument. Protection against rogue
states, the threat of Iran and North Korea, and the privatization of war producing

54
Ibid.
55
56
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
32
unforeseen continental threats feature prominently.59 Though supported by some
segments of the population, this motive for BMD compliance was quickly countered by
the fact that modern rogue states and extremist groups lack the sophistication, capability,
and motivation necessary for the missile defense system to be of use.60
Attached to these arguments is also the good neighbor motivation for BMD
compliance. Such reasoning works in tandem with the underlying reasoning for
unwavering military compliance, the countries’ mutual interests. Foremost of these
interests is a lucrative trading relationship that has a majority of Canada’s exports going
south, with the imperative being to safeguard this trade relationship by supporting
Canada’s trade partner in their time of need on projects of importance to them.61 This
cooperation is seen as important not just to maintain the lucrative partnerships Canada
and America share, but is argued to be the natural course for two states that have such
resonant ties and commonalities culturally.62 Underpinning this reasoning is that similar
experiences, cultures and values bind the two nations as strongly as their formal ties and
good cooperation between these two nations is not just good policy, but a strong tradition
that has served both nations well. Interestingly, it is this attitude that stands in direct
opposition to one of the most influential frames that decided the fate of BMD in Canada.
These pro-BMD frames, it should be noted, were quite sound and rational.
Though to some degree glib, on the whole Canadian compliance with American military
interests (at least domestically, if not internationally) is a sound policy strategy given

59
Harvey, Frank. 2001. National missile defence revisited, again: A reply to david mutimer. International
Journal 56, (2): 347.
60
Gizewski, Peter. 2001. The international politics of missile defence. International Journal 56, (3): 527.
61
Cody, Howard. 2003. U.S.‐canada trade, defense and border issues since september 11: The view from
canada. Canadian‐American Public Policy(54): 3. p. 3 – 4.
62
Ibid.
33
Canada’s defense capabilities. So too is the argument that cooperation with Canada’s
largest trading partner is in the best interest of the nation. These reasons hold more
weight when considering that relations between the two countries had become
increasingly adversarial as America’s self-interested unilateralism increased post-2001.
Indeed, this is the dominant frame responsible for Canada’s (and the Liberal
Governments) clandestine participation in more stringent boarder security protocols63, the
creation of the Ministry of Public Safety in Canada to liaison with American security
counterparts more easily, the Martin created and appointed Secretary for Canada-U.S.
relations,64 and up until it became a publicly debated issue, BMD.65 These frames were
ultimately not accepted in the case of the BMD decision however, because it was not
sound political reasoning that guided Canada’s no to BMD. Moreover, those presenting
this argument (i.e. the military and political right) were the antithesis of the groups
controlling the BMD debate; those in the peace lobby, the political left, and Canadian
nationalists/sovereigntists.
All the above arguments, sound as they may be, fail to fully encapsulate the
meaning missile defense had for its proponents. In this context missile defense was not
about continental security, military capability, or shared cultural ties, rather it was about
the continuation of a bilateral partnership that is integral to the nation; economically,

63
Sokolsky, Joel. 2006. Suspenders and a belt: Perimeter and border security in canada‐US relations.
Canadian Foreign Policy 12, (3).
64
Kitchen, Veronica. 2004. Smarter cooperation in canada‐US relations? International Journal 59, (3)
(Summer): 693‐710. p. 709.
65
Staples, Steven. 2006. Missile defence: Round one. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company
Ltd., Publishers. p. 37‐38.
34
militarily, and to a large degree a relationship that enables Canada’s foreign policy and
international persona.66
The frame presented by political parties at the time was one of sovereignty, the
BMD decision as a tool of bilateral negotiations with America, and concerns about
advancements in global militarization.67 In this case however, political elites were
referencing sovereignty in the larger context of Canadian identity, Canadian foreign
policy, and Canada’s incongruities with America.68 Contextualizing the BMD issue in
this light is extremely telling in relation to what groups held the most influence within the
debate, and what frames became dominant. Canadian identity and unconstrained
movement in making foreign policy and defense decisions was the core mantra of the
growing public unrest towards the issue,69 and adds to the growing evidence that the
missile defense decision was made for domestic political reasons (as opposed to being
motivated by sound and pragmatic foreign policy). Though it is true that political parties
were not without influence in the BMD debate, the fact that they used this position to
pander to the electorate implies that political authority was subjugated to popular opinion.
The frame that establishes BMD as a tool of statecraft has a lot of traction
publicly, but is much more contentious in a practical sense. At first glance this approach
has some traction politically, the softwood lumber dispute was languishing as the U.S.

66
67
Indepth: Ballistic missile defence, canada's role. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited
01/19 2010]. Available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/canadasrole.html
68
Cody, Howard. 2003. U.S.‐canada trade, defense and border issues since september 11: The view from
canada. Canadian‐American Public Policy(54): 3. p. 4.
69
Nossal, Kim. 2007. Defense policy and the atmospherics of canada‐U.S. relations: The case of the harper
conservatives. The American Review of Canadian Studies 37, (1): 23. p. 26.
35
refused to abide by multiple third party rulings on the matter, their was some bilateral
dancing-about on the mad cow issue, and given the general bullish approach America
took towards bilateral relations at the time; best demonstrated through the softwood
lumber dispute70 Add to this the growing displeasure the Canadian government was
showing towards America’s foreign policy, and American interference in Canadian
domestic matters like marijuana legalization,71 and the stage is properly set for a grand
gesture against America by way of a missile defense snub. When look at in depth
however, such justifications loose credibility. On the flat face of the issue BMD was not
the place to form a line in the sand, as the system would be constructed with or without
America’s northern partner.
In the context of Canada and America’s bilateral relationship the Canadian denial
makes about the same amount of sense. If the issue was about growing displeasure with
the softwood lumber and Mad Cow disputes then why after a year of none compliance by
the Americans on both issues did Canada allow its surveillance systems to be integrated
into missile defense?72 Surely refusal to share tracking information with the missile shield
system would be a more effective leverage point, as it actually puts into question the
system’s instillation. Further to this argument, if it was a foreign policy political
maneuver why did the U.S. believe that Canada was signing on to BMD up until the final

70
Softwood lumber dispute. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/21 2010]. Available
from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/softwood_lumber/ (accessed 01/21/10).
71
Kaste, Martin. In canada marijuana grows like, well, a weed. in National Public Radio [database online].
Washington, 2010 [cited 01/20 2010]. Available from
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4732092 (accessed 01/20/10).
72
Jones, David T.. 2005. When Politics Trumps Security: A Washington Vantage Point. Policy Options 26,
(4): 45. p. 46.
36
‘no’ was given?73 If the decision was a foreign policy tool why was Frank McKenna not
properly briefed and in lock step with the Martin Government? These questions cannot
find substantive and reasoned answers, thus these motives must be brought into question.
Political parties like the NDP and a majority of representation from Quebec
framed the missile defense program as a slippery slope to deploying weapons in space,
and ultimately offensive weapons in space. The Liberals were also publicly concerned
about the weaponization of space, and likely fueled the fire of these fears by stating early
in the missile defense debate that they would not agree to any deal that saw weapons
deployed there.74 These concerns were raised to address Canadian organizations that were
proponents of disarmament and international peace. Concerns from these groups centered
on missile defense leading to the aggressive militarization of space, and highlighted their
contention with America’s militaristic foreign policy.75 Thus, party positions on missile
defense could be viewed as a proxy statement against the assumption that Canada was
similar to, or in any way under the thumb of Washington. As outlined above, however, if
this was the fundamental intent of the choice, it was not well thought-out, as the act
applied no real pressure or penalty to the Americans. Thus it is necessary to look at the
practical benefit of such a position to the political parties, and indeed what fundamentally
BMD meant to them. Given that all the motives framed by the Canadian political

73
Ibid.
74
01/17/10).
75
Chappel, Stacy. Missile defence: Bad for people, bad for peace. in Vancouver Island Public Interest
Research Group [database online]. Vancouver, 2004 [cited 01/19 2010]. Available from
www.vipirg.ca/publications/pubs/clippings/0404_tc_missile_defence.pdf (accessed 01/19/10).
37
machine can either be brought into question our debunked outright the only pure practical
upshot of political opposition to missile defense is public favor and ultimately votes.
In a minority government situation, with elections looming and political party
support more malleable than normal due to Liberal sponsorship scandal and a general
disillusionment with the political process the one thing that was clear was Canadians
growing distaste for the Bush administration.76 With overall decent towards America and
President Bush the norm in Canada, every negative statement against that administration
was a popular one with the Canadian people. These statements served a double purpose
in this case, as it subtlety outlined candidates presumed foreign policy leanings, which
were decisively contrary to those of America. It is fitting then that sovereignty was used
as the main frame under which Canadian politicians posed their objection to BMD.
Functionally, sovereignty means national self-determination or self-interest, and the
position against missile defense can be seen most purely through the lens of political self-
interest. Though many different frames were pose by the political elite as to the motives
of an anti-BMD stance, ultimately it is hard to see that the missile defense issue meant
anything to the political elite beyond domestic political popularity; adding more credence
to the argument that this decision was motivated by public opinion more than sound
statecraft.
The public framed the issue in terms of sovereignty, international image, and arms
control. Fundamentally, however, it was an expression of belief – that Canada is not like,
nor does it condone, the unilateral, foolish, and dangerous policies of its largest trading

76
Post, 1.
38
partner.77 At its core then, the Canadian public made missile defense an argument about
identity. This is not to undermine the collective contributions of America-first policies,
the injection of support from peace activists, and a political landscape that had the Liberal
government on the defensive as significant influences in and of themselves, but even
these factors have aspects that connect to a larger sovereignty argument. Just as in the
political context, where sovereignty and disarmament were used as euphemisms of the
core motive of public support, these same avatars stand as proxies for what missile
defense truly meant to the Canadian public, complicity with American foreign policy. As
has often been the case in defining a national identity in Canada the public attempted to
establish what the nation believed in by saying who they were not rather than whom they
are. Kubbig addresses this when he states “Ottawa’s clear ‘No’ was meant to be a
politically powerful signal to its southern neighbour and to the international community,
opposing Washington’s hegemonic foreign policy in general and its MD policies in
particular.”78 Missile defense became a national symbol with which to saying no to an
American administration that Canadians did not support, while in a larger international
context the stance was an attempt to express to the world the nations belief structures.
Missile defense also presented the opportunity to stand up, however ineffectually; to a
bullish nation that Canada believed was treating them unfairly. With all these meanings
and messages being applied to BMD compliance there was little room for any Canadian
support on the issue.

77
Kubbig, Bernd. 2005. Introduction: The domestic politics of missile defence. Contemporary Security
Policy 26, (3): 385.
78

39
What have we learned?
Before the Missile defense issue became a public debate in Canada the Liberal
government were fully behind participation. Indeed, just at the time that the BMD debate
was heating up in Canada the government had already signed an agreement that made a
formal announcement of participation inconsequential in every practical and tangible
sense. Once the issue became publicly debated, however, the decision became of the
utmost importance. Canadian compliance still made the most sense strategically,
militarily and in light of the Canadian/American bilateral relationship, but participation
was put in significant doubt due to domestic political realities and identity politics. The
political landscape lent itself to a negative response to BMD, and consistently
deteriorated over the course of the issue. To attribute the failure of BMD in Canada solely
as a result of a weak minority government and a strained bilateral relationship, however,
is to miss a significant influence. Ultimately it was the frames espoused and the meaning
behind those frames that guided a non issue into a discourse on what Canadian identity is,
and what Canadian’s condone. When tested it becomes clear that public opinion was the
only influence of consequence, as the public outcry against BMD dictated the
government’s position. Moreover, this foray into populace statecraft was not an issue
argued on its practical merits, but rather on how Canadians felt about America, the Bush
administration, and growing militarism. As Frank McKenna outlined in February of 2005
Canada’s formal participation in missile defense had no impact on the Americans
deploying the system. This means that, either the Canadian public did not know what a
‘no’ to missile defense meant, or they did, and used it as a symbolic statement of decent
towards American foreign policy; likely both ignorance and political grandstanding
40
played their part in the final decision. Regardless of which was more prominent,
however, what is clear is that the decision was made based on domestic political issues
rather than a rational public making an informed decision based on the context and merits
of the proposed missile shield.
41
Support for Missile Defense in Poland

Poland’s leaders made clear early in the Bush administration that they would
willingly partner on missile defense. In 2001 Bronislaw Komorowski, the Minister of
National Defense and at that time the member of the Conservative People’s Party (SKL),
noted that “the geographical location of Poland would be an asset if the United States and
Europe decided to proceed with the construction of a missile shield.”79 The feeling was
mutual. Key members of the Bush administration saw Poland as a good fit both
geographically and politically as the leader of “New Europe” and a strong supporter of
the United States in Europe more generally.80 Over the next seven years of official and
unofficial negotiations, Polish political leaders pursued a remarkably consistent path
toward missile defense despite three governments and sustained public opposition to the
plan.
Unofficial talks between the U.S. and Poland began in 2002, three years after
Polish accession into NATO and just months after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the
two reengaged on missile defense again in 2004 after the invasion of Iraq.81 More
concrete unofficial talks took place in December of 2005, two months after voters ousted

79
“Polska z Tarcza, “ Gazeta Wyborcza, May 18, 2001, Kraj Section, Pg. 8.
80
Poland, as the largest among new member states of the EU, was often mentioned by Donald Rumsfeld
as the leader of the so called “New Europe” because of its support of the United States (see Andrzej Rocki,
“Sojusz racji stanu,”Wprost, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/78267/Sojusz‐racji‐stanu/, accessed March 20,
2010).
81
According to Witold Waszczykowski, former Polish chief negotiator (see “Amerykanska tarcza
antyrakietowa a interes narodowy Polski – dyskusja,” Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego,
www.batory.org.pl/doc/tarcza‐antyrakietowa.pdf, Pg. 4.).
42
the government led by SLD and replaced it with a government dominated by the
conservative and pro-U.S. Law and Justice party (PiS) led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, whose
twin brother Lech won the presidential elections.82 After years of secrecy of the previous
cabinets, it was the PiS government that officially declared that hosting the U.S. missile
shield is one of the government’s goals.83
These talks, for the first time, led to a discussion of the desired U.S. commitments
to Poland that the Polish government expected in return for the potential hosting of the
base for ten interceptor missiles as part of the missile shield system.84 During the meeting
with Donald Rumsfeld, new Minister of National Defense Radek Sikorski sought money
to help modernize the Polish military and a battery of Patriot missiles to enhance Polish
air defenses. The negotiations did not get far and Sikorski was disappointed by the lack of
American understanding of Polish positions and the “poor cousin” treatment. He was
dissatisfied with how little Poland would receive in return for hosting the base and with
the U.S overconfidence in assuming that Poland would accept the deal without
discussion.85 Sikorski later wrote an op-ed piece in the Washington Post in which he
described the American offer for the missile shield as having a long list of obligations
with “few corresponding US commitments” and that the US could either generate a

82
Marcin Bosacki, “Amerykanska pycha i polskie piekielko,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 12‐13, 2008, Pg. 19.
83
New Prime Minister, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, expressed this in the official program of his government
(see Marcin Gadzinski, “Amerykanska baza antyrakietowa w Polsce?” Gazeta Wyborcza, November 12‐13,
2005, Swiat Section, Pg. 7.).
84
Marcin Bosacki, “Amerykanska pycha i polskie piekielko,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 12‐13, 2008, Pg. 19.
85
The Bush administration had been thoughtful enough to compose and include a Polish draft reply letter
with the initial U.S. offer (see Radek Sikorski, “Don’t take Poland for granted,” The Washington Post,
March 21, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐
dyn/content/article/2007/03/20/AR2007032001427.html, accessed April, 25, 2008.
43
security partnership or “weaken NATO, deepen Russian paranoia and cost the US its last
friends on the continent.”86
After this short episode the talks stalled while both nations focused on other
issues. The missile shield offer returned officially on January 19, 2007 when both Poland
and the Czech Republic received an offer from the United States to begin the
negotiations.87 From there talks proceeded on and off over a year and a half, through
another round of parliamentary elections in Poland and the formation of a new, more
Europe-oriented government led by Donald Tusk and his Civic Platform party (PO).
Prime Minister Tusk, who unlike the Kaczynski twins was convinced that Poland could
not agree to a deal with the U.S that did not include significant security guarantees,
rejected the U.S proposal on July 4, 2008. In the wake of Russia’s incursion into the
South Ossetia region of Georgia during the Summer Olympics, Poland saw little
alternative but to sign on the U.S. proposal. The agreement was reached on August, 14,
2008 and documents were signed on August 20, 2008. According to the former Polish
chief negotiator Witold Waszczykowski, the agreement that was signed did not differ

86
Radek Sikorski, “Don’t take Poland for granted,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2007/03/20/AR2007032001427.html, accessed
April, 25, 2008.

87
Tomasz Pawluszko, “System obrony przeciwrakietowej USA a stosunki polsko‐amerykanskie,” in Wplyw
tarczy antyrakietowej na pozycje miedzynarodowa Polski, eds. Michal Chorosnicki and Artur Gruszczak,
http://www.kssm.pl/images/stories/file/publikacja/03_%20Stosunki%20polsko‐amerykanski%20‐
%20T_%20Pawluszko.pdf, Pg. 162; see also Lukasz Kudlicki, “Tarcza antyrakietowa w Republice Czeskiej:
Strategia Informowania Opinii Publicznej,” Biuro Bezpieczenstwa Narodowego,
www.bbn.gov.pl/download.php?s=1&id=937, Pg. 201.
44
significantly from the previously rejected offer. US negotiator John Rood failed to
comment on the differences between the two offers.88
Three Governments, Two Presidents, One Shield: Polish Political Elites and Missile
Defense
From 2002 onward Polish elites were prone to support the American missile
shield across ideological and party lines. As a result, all three Polish governments of the
period supported continuing negotiations with the U.S., including the center-left SLD, the
conservative PiS, and the Euro-centric Civic Platform party. During the earliest stages of
the elite debate about the missile shield in Poland, the left-wing government of SLD and
President Aleksander Kwasniewski (also of SLD) was not particularly interested in
missile defense, but was willing to discuss the shield with the US government simply
because it was consistent with their policy of supporting the United States and
strengthening the relationship with America. It was under their leadership that Poland
became engaged in the US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it was during that time
that Poland remained a close ally of the United States on the continent submerged by a
wave of anti-Americanism. Throughout the period a majority of the left-wing politicians
in Poland took a pragmatic approach to the issue.89

88
Tomasz Pugacewicz, “System obrony przeciwrakietowej USA a stosunki polsko‐rosyjskie,” in Wplyw
http://www.kssm.pl/images/stories/file/publikacja/04_%20Stosunki%20polsko‐rosyjskie%20‐
%20T_%20Pugacewicz.pdf, Pg. 228
89
Center‐left former Ministers of National Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Jerzy Szmajdzinski, said that
they oppose the shield, but could support it if they knew more about it and the negotiations (see Maria
Wagrowska, “Tarcza antyrakietowa z polskiej perspektywy,” in Amerykanska tarcza antyrakietowa w
Europie. Koniecznosc, warunki, akceptacja, ed. Stephan Raabe, www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_14083‐544‐8‐
30.pdf, Pg. 46.) Former President, Aleksander Kwasniewski also chose a pragmatic approach. He was in
favor of the shield if Russia would be somehow included and hence less irritated about the project, as well
45
This consensus was largely the result of their shared interpretation of Poland’s
international political situation, which can by summarized by its unfortunate geographical
location and half a century of vegetation behind the “Iron Curtain.”90 Despite the
changing international political landscape of Europe in the late 20th and the early 21st
centuries, Poland’s historical experiences, and particularly Russia’s influence on the
region, continued to be a major concern of the Polish politicians and elites across most of
the ideological spectrum and led directly to the Polish push to become a member of
NATO and the European Union. Issues such as the German-Russian cooperation on the
Nord Stream pipeline, which highlighted Polish energy dependence and the Russian
embargo on the import of Polish meat served to keep Polish leaders alert to the potential
Russian threat. Perceived weakness within NATO, lack of progress on a unified defense

as making sure that the shield would eventually become a NATO system (see radio interview,
“Kwasniewski o tarczy antyrakietowej,” Radio TOK FM,
http://www.tok.fm/TOKFM/10,94829,5094723,Kwasniewski_o_tarczy_antyrakietowej.html, accessed
March 20, 2010.) Kwasniewski’s foundation Amicus Europae published a report in March of 2007 in which
the authors underline that the debate in Poland should be rid of all political and ideological aspects, since
it is a strategic matter for the future of Poland that does not simply affect one government (Tomasz
Otlowski and Ireneusz Bill, “Amerykanski project system obrony przeciwrakietowej. Implikacje dla Polski,”
Fundacja Aleksandra Kwasniewskiego Amicus Europae,
www.kwasniewskialeksander.pl/.../RAPORT_MISSILE_DEFENSE_000.pdf, pg 21).
90
The far‐left groups in Poland did oppose the missile shield for ideological reasons. Those groups
included the New Left (Nowa Lewica), Polish Communist Party (Komunistyczna Partia Polski), Workers’
Democracy (Pracownicza Demokracja), Young Socialists (Mlodzi Socjalisci) and the Polish Labor Party
(Polska Partia Pracy). For them, the shield was a weapon system installed by the imperialistic and war‐
mongering Americans (see Jaroslaw Niemiec, “Apel o wspolna akcje przeciw tarczy USA,” Centrum
Niezaleznych Mediow Polska, http://pl.indymedia.org/pl/2007/05/28682.shtml, accessed March 26,
2010). However, those marginal groups have little to no political clout in Poland, which was dominated
since 2005 by right wing political parties. Their arguments were almost invisible among the elite debates
during the period studied here. The parties who enjoye or enjoyed some political clout, populist and
agrarian Self‐Defense Party (Samoobrona, coalition member in PiS government) and Polish People’s Party
(PSL, coalition member in the current PO government) both oppose the project. PSL on the grounds that
building Polish security entirely around the United States could be dangerous (see Marek Iwaniszyn, “PSL
przeciw tarczy antyrakietowej,” Wiadomosci24.pl, 13 February, 2007,
http://www.wiadomosci24.pl/artykul/psl_przeciw_tarczy_antyrakietowej_19133.html?sesja_gratka=07b
bea57a942b956a28196cf220ba809, accessed March 26, 2010) and Samoobrona on the grounds that they
lack any information on the issue and the public is against it (see “Na dzis Samoobrona przeciwko tarczy
antyrakietowej,” Wirtualna Polska, 13 February, 2007, http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,43116,title,Na‐dzis‐
Samoobrona‐przeciwko‐tarczy‐antyrakietowej,wid,8729374,wiadomosc.html, accessed March 26, 2010).
46
strategy for the EU, and eventually the Russian-Georgian conflict only highlighted these
concerns.91
Thus, from the beginning, the most important thing about the missile shield was
its implied promise of a broader security guarantee from the United States. Polish elites
generally agreed that the EU was too divided to generate a coherent defense strategy and
provide Poland with security guarantees. It was widely accepted that the United States
was the only real guarantor of Polish security. The position of the Law and Justice (PiS)
government of 2005-2007 illustrates how central this was. The President, Lech
Kaczynski, and the leader of PiS (his twin brother Jaroslaw) were strident
anticommunists and ardent supporters of the United States. The Kaczynski brothers
believed that negotiating additional items for the NMD would be good, but Poland should
host the shield no matter what, even if the country had to shoulder some of the costs of
the installation. President Kaczynski said, “It is not that we are concerned with the
Russian tanks. This matter concerns closer ties with the United States, which are
indispensible for us. It is also not the case that I am particularly pro-American. I am a
pro-Polish politician and I know perfectly well, and so do the Russians, how much
stronger the missile shield makes Poland. I was ready to give up a lot for it. But finally it

91
Tomasz Pugacewicz, “System obrony przeciwrakietowej USA a stosunki polsko‐rosyjskie,” in Wplyw
http://www.kssm.pl/images/stories/file/publikacja/04_%20Stosunki%20polsko‐rosyjskie%20‐
%20T_%20Pugacewicz.pdf, Pg. 285.
Also, political elites agree that Georgian‐Russian conflict played a role in the Polish decision on the missile
shield. It was widely discussed in the media and such people as President Kaczynski and President
Medvedev confirmed the belief that the Polish‐US agreement on the shield was reached as a result of the
Russian‐Georgian conflict.
47
was the events in Georgia that propelled the deal.”92 To them, it was hosting a US
military installation that was a security guarantee in itself. As a result they kept
negotiations secret from both the public and potential opponents and moved to oust
officials in their government who did not agree and who might have put Polish
participation in the system at risk.93 At that time, the opponents of the government
criticized the secrecy of the negotiations, the lack of any information campaign, and the
government’s submissive approach to Americans.
Secondarily, Poland’s leaders sought to host the interceptor base to elevate
Poland’s status on the international stage. Pawel Zalewski, a former head of the
parliamentary committee on foreign affairs illustrated that point by stating that “Poland,
by agreeing to the installation of the missile shield, would become a support for the
security of the United States and Europe.” As a close ally of the United States and a host
nation of an important global security system, Polish elites believed that Poland would
play a more important role in international politics and would be seen as a leader of
Eastern Europe and increasingly, the European Union in general.94

92
“Prezydent Kaczynski potwierdza: Smialem sie podczas przemowienia Tuska, “ Gazeta Wyborcza,
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80708,5620258,Prezydent_Kaczynski_potwierdza__Smialem_
sie_podczas.html, accessed March 26, 2010.
93
Radek Sikorski, who did not see eye to eye on the Missile Shield and many other issues, especially
pertaining to military intelligence, resigned on February 5, 2007 and joined the opposition, PO (see
“Sikorski potrzebny i Macierewicz potrzebny,” Gazeta Wyborcza, February 5, 2007, Kraj Section, Pg. 4). It
was also speculated in Poland that Prof. Roman Kuzniar, the head of the government sponsored think
tank PISM (Polish Institute of International Affairs) was dismissed by the PiS government after circulating
a memo about the negative aspects of the missile shield and multiple critical appearances in the media
(see “Odwolano go bo nie chcial tarczy antyrakietowej?” Gazeta Wyborcza, February 9, 2007,
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80269,3909551.html, accessed March 26, 2010).
94
“Zalewski: Tarcza antyrakietowa potrzebna Europie i Polsce,” Gazeta Wyborcza, March 10, 2008,
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80708,5007393.html, accessed March 20, 2010.
48
What Polish elites were not worried about, however, was the threat supposedly
propelling the U.S. development of missile defense in the first place. During a debate
hosted by a leading national newspaper in Poland, Gazeta Wyborcza, in March of 2007,
Radek Sikorski stated that “I am not a supporter of the Iranian regime, but Poland enjoys
very normal diplomatic relations with Iran. Here in Warsaw, we do not anticipate any
attack of Iranian missiles.”95 Similarly, the majority of Polish leaders were not concerned
the threat of a missile attack from rogue states and they spent almost no time at all
debating the system’s technical effectiveness, ability to deter missile attacks, or impact on
arms control.
From a domestic perspective, a successful negotiation with the United States
represented a potential political success, but one that looked potentially elusive for two
reasons. First, the three governments in question faced a cynical and skeptical Polish
public. Polish leaders and their governments enjoyed only brief moments of majority
support from the public and more typically suffered under relatively high levels of
mistrust.96 Second, from the first public mentions of the issue in 2006, a majority of the

95
Marcin Bosacki, “Debata Gazety: Po co nam tarcza antyrakietowa?” Gazeta Wyborcza, March 3, 2007,
http://wyborcza.pl/dziennikarze/1,84208,3959278.html, accessed March 27, 2010.
96
The Polish public does not trust the political elite. For example, a recent CBOS poll from January of 2010
shows that Radek Sikorski is the most trusted politician with 52% of the public declaring their trust for
him. 49% of the people trust Prime Minister Tusk and 38% of the public trusts President Lech Kaczynski.
Very rarely does a politician enjoy the trust of more than 50% of Poles. (Agnieszka Cybulska, Komunikat Z
Badan CBOS, Zaufanie do Politykow w Styczniu, BS/9/2010,
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_009_10.PDF). Similarly, very rarely does a ruling government,
prime minister, or president receive majority approval from the Polish public. For the past decade, only a
few times did a ruling government approval rating exceed 50%.

49
public opposed the idea of hosting a U.S. missile base and had become increasingly
disillusioned with the United States since its invasion of Iraq in 2003.97
Though most Polish politicians did not seem to worry much about public opinion,
it is clear that the preferred outcome was a successful deal that included as many concrete
benefits for Poland as possible and that public opposition raised the bar for success. The
trick was to balance a tough negotiating stance against the prospect of losing the deal,
which was particularly tricky with a lack of a uniform negotiating strategy and constant
competition between President Kaczynski and Prime Minister Tusk. However, not to
achieve a deal would mean losing the chance to bring home tangible results, while getting
the base without substantial additional guarantees risked convincing the public that the
missile shield had turned into blank check to the Americans and that the Polish
government was weak and incompetent. Most of the news coverage of the issue in 2007
and 2008 centered on the perceived strength or weakness of the Polish government in its
negotiations with the United States.98
Despite the potential for political gain, none of the governments spent much time
communicating with the public about the plan to build support. The Polish public,
opposed to the project from the earliest polls, was never an issue for the governments,
which tended to support the shield from the beginning. On few occasions, the mention of
public opinion in general being opposed to military projects was made, but the lack of
worry about public opposition can be encapsulated by the statement of PiS Vice-Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Pawel Kowal, who, when presented with a poll in which 55% of the

97
ADD FOOTNOTE from polls HERE with specific poll drop figure.
98
Can cite percentages here if good; otherwise just cite a couple examples like so: Typical articles include
“X” and “Y”
50
public opposed the shield explained that the public simply does not understand some
issues and that, “I wouldn’t worry about it.”99 President Kaczynski hit on a slightly
different note when he stated that he does not count on the public support for the shield
because Poles are pacifists.100
What Shield? No Thanks. Polish Public Opinion and the Missile Shield
The issue of the American missile shield was a distant subject for a large section
of the Polish public. The project received little to no press coverage in the early stages of
the talks between the governments. Accompanied by the lack of any real information
campaign of any government involved in the negotiations, the ruling elites and the media
in effect successfully shielded the public from...the shield.101 The issue only gained some
media prominence in the late stages of the negotiations and during the Russian-Georgian
War and the subsequent signing of the deal. With that brief exception, the shield was not
a major concern of the media. This demonstrates how determined the members of the
public had to be to gather any significant information about the project or the

99
“Kowal o tarczy: Nie przejmuje sie wynikami opinii,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 18, 2007,
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80269,4322052.html, accessed March 10, 2010.
100
Adam Kirpsza, “Tarcza antyrakietowa z perspektywy wybranych teorii stosunkow miedzynarodowych,”
in Wplyw tarczy antyrakietowej na pozycje miedzynarodowa Polski, eds. Michal Chorosnicki and Artur
Gruszczak,
http://www.kssm.pl/images/stories/file/druga%20wersja%20publikacji/01_%20Teoria%20stosunkow%20
miedzynarodowych%20‐%20A_%20Kirpsza.pdf, Pg. 77
101
Make mention here of how much coverage on average and that it fell far below attention given to
other issues of the time.
51
negotiations.102 It also helps to explain the disconnect between the elites and the public on
the missile shield issue.
Despite the almost uniform elite support for the missile shield base in Poland, the
Polish public did not share their enthusiasm and consistently opposed the project from the
earliest polls (see Figure X – omit first poll because of wording issues). The only time
when the majority of the public supported the shield came in the immediate aftermath of
the signing of the deal, which coincided with the Russian invasion of South Ossetia. The
brief and lukewarm support subsided almost immediately thereafter.103 Unlike in the
United States, where partisanship and ideology appeared to structure support, the unusual
disconnect between Polish elites and the public did not find its root in fierce ideology or
partisanship, since majorities of the voters of all the major parties opposed the project.104
Instead, for the majority of the public it was ignorance that predicted opposition to
the shield. The polls conducted by CBOS over the period of negotiating and signing the
deal with the United States demonstrate clearly that the best predictor of support for the
American missile shield project was political engagement. As Figure XX illustrates, the
people who followed the news most closely tended to support the shield, while people
who did not follow the news tended to oppose it and were far more likely to respond
“don’t know” to questions about support for the shield. That those Polish voters attentive

102
Definitely the number of articles with other issues juxtaposed shows that it was buried in there. Also, a
poll of Warsaw University International Affairs and Political Science students demonstrates that even
those people really interested in global affairs rated their knowledge of the missile shield at about 3 (in a
1‐5 scale with 5 being most knowledgeable). The students rated the government’s information efforts at
about 2 (in a 1‐5 scale with 5 being the best). (see Urszula Ciolko, “Zespol badawczy ds. tarczy
antyrakietowej w Polsce: Wyniki ankiety wśród studentow,” KSSM UJ,
http://www.kssm.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=74&Itemid=35&limit=1&limitstart=8
&lang=en, accessed March 20, 2010.
103
Polls here!
104
The slight exception is at the extremes, with rightists somewhat more supportive and leftists less so.
52
to the news would be more supportive makes sense: they were the most heavily exposed
to elite arguments in favor of the shield, such as they were, and to the same cues from the
international political context that elites themselves were responding to at the time.
Given this, an important question to ask is why the Polish public so consistently
opposed the shield when we might have expected more evenly split opinions about an
issue that people truly knew so little about. We believe that this opposition can be
explained by three factors. The first factor was the fear of upsetting Russia and causing
Poland to become a target not only for Russian missiles but also potential terrorist
attacks. Polls conducted during the period of time in which the governments of Poland
and the United States negotiated the missile shield demonstrate that the people of Poland
feared the possibility of Russian retaliation and an increased threat from terrorists
(Islamic fundamentalists). As the negotiations became more prominent in 2007 and 2008,
very specific and consistent Russian threats circulated in the media, all of them outlining
different scenarios that would follow the potential Polish agreement to host the US
missile shield base. All of those scenarios mentioned Poland as a target of Russian
missiles.105 As a result, the polls conducted throughout 2008 demonstrate that the number
of Poles worried that the shield will result in a serious threat of missile attack from Russia
increased from 56% in February to 65% in September of 2008.106 Similarly, the threat of
becoming a target of terrorists (and Islamic fundamentalist specifically) was consistently

105
Quote a few in here
106
Citation
53
present in the public psyche. The concern level of becoming a target of terrorism rose
from 10% in February of 2007 to over 50% in 2008.107
The second factor is the growing disillusionment with the United States and the
public disappointment with the relationship of the two countries, which caused the Polish
pro-Americanism to drop by 20% between the 1990’s and present day. Despite the
proclamations of Poland as the last bastion of pro-Americanism in Europe, we believe
that it was Polish mistrust of the US that played a significant role in shaping public
attitudes towards the missile shield. The Polish support of all things American finds its
root in the Polish historical experience. USA was an enemy of the Soviet Union and the
United States played a key role in shaping the newly democratic Poland in the 1990’s,
helping Poland becoming a member of NATO. Poles, from the earliest polls in the 1990’s
declared overwhelming love for the United States, which, at one point, reached almost
70%. After Poland joined the coalition of the willing in Iraq, however, those numbers
began to drop. Currently, the Polish pro-Americanism stands 20% below the 1990’s
numbers at mid 40%s.108
The reasons for this growing dissatisfaction are multiple. For many years Polish
officials fought to include Poland in the US visa waiver program, allowing Poles to travel
to the United States without a visa, like all of the other members of the EU. In 2008,
more countries were added to the program, including former Soviet satellites like the
Czech Republic, but Poland was still excluded, causing a disappointment of the public.
After Polish troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, Polish people expected to get

107
Citation
108
CBOS polls
54
the right to see their family in the US hassle free. Polish public also noted the failed offset
purchase of F-16s, lack of important contracts in Iraq for Polish companies, lack of
noteworthy funding for the Polish army, lack of significant US investment in Poland and
rare visits of significant American politicians to Poland.109 Polish commitments to the US
came at a price of Polish position in the EU, which was weakened as Poland was
sometimes seen as a US “Trojan horse” within the Union.110 This was hard to justify for
the public, as the benefits of membership in the EU were visible to every Pole, with easy
travel in the Schengen Zone, EU subsidized infrastructure improvements and open labor
markets, while the benefits of cooperation with the US were largely invisible to the
public eye. The issue of the missile shield placement in Poland was therefore a synonym
for the Polish-US relations in general for the public and a test to see if the US considers
Poland as an important ally.
The growing dislike of the Americans was visible in a February 2007 poll, in
which people were asked to justify their position on the missile shield issue. Only 2% of
the respondents mentioned closer relations with the US and Polish duty as an ally as a
justification for hosting the shield. 6% of all respondents and 11% of the opposition to the
shield mentioned anti-American themes such as “I don’t trust Americans” as a
justification for their position.111 Similarly, later polls demonstrated that a strong plurality
of Poles think that the shield would be a better idea if it was not a US only project but a
NATO-wide cooperation. Interestingly, in a 2008 study, more Poles signaled the desire to

109
Quote 162 !!
110
Get this Also, Polish mission in Afghanistan is very unpopular (70% of respondents oppose Polish
presence there)
111
Cite
55
improve the Polish-Russian relations than to cultivate the strategic partnership with the
US.112
The third factor is the missile shield debate took place within a contentious
domestic political sphere. The dueling political parties accused each other of mishandling
the negotiations with the US in front of a public that was rarely impressed with its
leaders. Polish governments since 2000 have rarely reached favorability ratings above
50%. The trust in politicians is similarly low, with only a few prominent politicians
enjoying trust levels of more than 50% of the public. The Polish public’s assessment of
the missile shield deal reflects this pessimistic foundation: In a study released in October
of 2008, after Poland and the US reached an agreement on the shield, 46% of
respondents, a significant plurality, described the negotiations as ineffective and 67%
pointed to the lack of uniform government strategy among the cabinet and the president
as problematic.113 Given this more fundamental disconnect, the Polish public’s skepticism
on the missile shield seems more understandable, especially for those who were least
trusting and the most dialed out of politics as a result.
For the above reasons, the Polish public and the Polish elites did not see eye to
eye on the issue of the shield. The elites sought Patiot missiles and security guarantees for
the hosting of the shield and largely agreed that the American missile shield base in
Poland would boost Polish status on the international stage. The public saw the shield
itself as a threat and as another project that would benefit the Americans and not Poles.

112
When asked about the key goals of Polish foreign policy, 58% said that the priority should be
cooperation within the EU, 47% mentioned improving relations with Russia and 34% mentioned
maintaining the strategic cooperation with the US. Cite
113
Cite
56
The public was concerned that the Polish status will in fact decrease on the international
stage and will negatively impact relations with the EU and Russia. The most important
issue for the public, the visa waiver for Polish citizens, was not even brought up in the
negotiations, even though a poll that was conducted demonstrated that 31% of Poles
wanted visa waiver in return for the shield, the most desired US commitment.114 There
were more disconnects between the public and the elites on what constituted a “good
deal.” The political elites desperately sought Patriot missiles, but polls show that Patriot
missiles themselves did not significantly impact the public perception of the shield.115

114
In the same poll, only 10% of Poles wanted Patriot missiles. Cite here.
115
Cite here
57
Support for Missile Defense in the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic interest in the missile shield program started to develop in the
summer of 2002, when the former Minister of Defence, Jaroslav Tvrdik, participated in political
consultations in Washington. One of the topics discussed was the potential Czech involvement in
the missile shield project. Prior to this, the Czech position on missile defense was largely
nonexistent, and tended to follow the official NATO position. The eagerness of the Bush
administration to proceed with the missile shield and the possibility for greater participation of
the US European allies in the project presented itself as an opportunity for the Czech government
and triggered their attention. Much like in Poland, the possibility of closer strategic ties with the
United States seemed like too great of an opportunity for the Czech government to pass on.
However, not everyone was as excited about the NMD as Minister Tvrdik. When the
press revealed his enthusiasm for Czech participation in the US project, the result was political
turmoil within the parliament and a demand that all such important strategic projects and
negotiations should be discussed on the parliamentary forum and not in secrecy. This, however,
did not deter Tvrdik, a minister in the CSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party) government, to
accompany Czech President Vaclav Havel on his visit to the United States and further discussing
the missile shield with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Those more detailed and
technical discussions resulted in the decision that perhaps the Czech Republic will become a host
of upgraded early warning or X-band radar stations. Again, the Czech parliament was furious
and Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla had to issue a formal statement on December 4, 2002 that no
58
formal decision on the shield was reached and any results of official talks will be submitted to
the government and parliament for approval.
In 2003, the United States provided CR with additional technical information regarding
the missile shield. At that time, the US also began to educate the Czech side about the official
purpose of the shield, explaining that the system is intended as a “defensive” mechanism and that
its main goal is to protect US and Europe from a ballistic missile attack from the Middle Eastern
rogue states. After another round of talks in Washington in November of 2004, where more
technical information was shared with the Czech side, the selection of the possible radar sites
was made. Those potential sites included the military bases at Libava, Brdy and Boletice.
After a two year period of non-action on the issue of the shield, the missile defense
returned officially on January 19, 2007. However, both sides returned to the negotiating table
after a period of elections and significant political changes. In the United States, the Democratic
Party won a majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld was replaced with Robert Gates. In the Czech Republic, the left wing Czech
Social Democratic Party (CSSD) conceded power to the center-right Civic Democrats led by
Mirek Topolanek. After months of political instability following the June 2006 legislative
elections, the center –right Civic Democrats formed a coalition with the centrist Green Party
(SZ) and the conservative Christian and Democratic Union – Czech People’s Party (KDU-CSL),
gaining the confidence on January 19, 2007. The first task faced with the new Czech government
was the missile shield issue.
As Prime Minister Topolanek received the “non-paper” from the United States, he
decided to immediately go public with the news, breaking from the more secretive strategy taken
59
by his predecessors and ignoring the U.S. plea not to do so. This strategy of transparency was
continued, as the government and military officials held multiple press conferences, promoting
the missile shield and highlighting its benefits to the world and Czech Republic. The government
also introduced an internet website that hosted information about the shield, the benefits it would
bring to the country, the progress on the negotiating process and other information, such as
special reports prepared by experts on health related issues pertaining to the radar installation.
The bulk of the negotiations took place in May of 2007, culminating with high level talks
between the Presidents of both countries took place during President Bush’s visit to the CR in
early June. After the US goal of reaching an agreement by the end of the year proved
unsuccessful in the late 2007, both sides were sure to reach an agreement within few months, by
the end of spring. In early April of 2008, the Czech and U.S. governments reached an agreement
regarding the missile shield installation in the Czech Republic. On July 8, 2008, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice and Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg signed the
agreement at the Černínský Palace in Prague.
Missile Shield: Only False Pacifists Oppose It. Czech Elites and the Missile Shield
As the Bush administration grew serious about expanding the missile shield system to
Central Europe, many members of Czech political elites seemed pleased with the idea. As was
the case with Poland, the Czechs, as a former Soviet satellite state, spent the majority of the
1990’s looking westward, joining NATO and the European Union. The possibility of
participation in an important security project seemed very appealing, both as a status symbol of
the country, but also as a way to tighten relationship with the United States, which many of the
euro-skeptic members of the government favored.
60
When the talks with the American side took place in the early 2000’s, it appeared that the
issue of the missile shield placement in the Czech Republic was not ideological in nature. As a
matter of fact, it was the Minister of Defense in the left wing CSSD party, Jaroslav Tvrdik, who
was enthusiastic about the project. Former Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek of CSSD did not have a
concrete opinion on the issue, suggesting that he is not ideologically prone to support or oppose
the shield. He initially supported the shield in Czech Republic without the need for a referendum,
an unpopular position within his party, to oppose it after a wave of Russian criticism, only to
support the shield again after meeting with U.S. Ambassador in the Czech Republic.
However, as the elections in the Czech Republic took place and the government was
formed by the conservative ODS party led by Mirek Topolanek, the contrast between the right
and the left started to develop. Although it is difficult to say what was the result of these attitudes
without further analysis of the issue and an in-depth analysis of the news media coverage of the
missile shield in the Czech Republic, we believe that it was a combination of the ideology that
triggered opposition to the American project and domestic politics. After all, no political
opposition would be willing to support an unpopular project.
Members of the ruling coalition, despite the ideological differences among them, tended
to support the project. The centrist Green Party, a member of the ruling coalition during the years
of PM Topolanek, supported the missile shield, but only if it was to be completed as a NATO
project and not as a bilateral agreement between the US and CR. Christian Democrats from
KDU-CSL also expressed some support for the project. It was the left, led by the Communist
Party, that was the loudest opponent of the shield in the CR.
This confusing picture of elite support for the shield can find its root in international
61
politics and ideology. Czech elites, much like Polish elites, did not worry about the threat of
missile attacks from Middle Eastern rogue states. It was the Czech international political context
that provided the elites with the interpretation of the US missile shield. Some, mainly on the
right, viewed the shield as an extension of the bilateral relationship with the United States and
continuation of the policy of pushing westward. To those people, very conscious about the
troubled Czech past, like Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, hosting the missile shield was in
Czech national interest because a close alliance with the US strengthens Czech independence and
ultimately makes it safer. Former President and anticommunist leader, Vaclav Havel, supporter
of the missile shield, reminded the Czech public about the “false pacifists” who failed to oppose
Hitler on the eve of World War II. To parts of the elites, shield was also a sign of the maturity of
Czech democracy and acknowledgment of its place on international scene.
The opponents of the shield, mainly from the left, identified the US project with the
deeply unpopular Bush administration and had no desire of supporting it in any way. This belief,
rooted in raising Czech anti-Americanism, was highlighted by the fact that many politicians were
prone to supporting the project if it was a NATO installation and not a bilateral agreement with
the US. The worry about the potential threat from Russia and ruining the relations between the
two countries also played an important role, especially considering that the Czech Republic
Communist Party is an important player on the Czech political scene. The shield was also seen as
a divisive factor within NATO and the EU and an item that could hurt the Czech position within
those structures.
On the domestic political lever, the supporters among the elites saw the shield as a
serious source of revenue. Prime Minister Topolanek, in the press conference from January 19,
2007, presented a shield as an opportunity for Czech companies and the labor market to reap
62
benefits from the U.S. military spending. Hence, the shield was seen as a potential economic
boost to the region where the base was supposed to be hosted. The opponents, on the other hand,
focused on the environmental harm and health hazards potentially caused by the radar
installation as well as on their opposition to hosting foreign troops on Czech soil, which brings
back the memories of the Soviet military presence.
The Czech ruling elite, in an effort to warm the public and opponents of the shield
towards that project, engaged in a vibrant information campaign. There were frequent press
conferences of public officials and an internet website that featured positive information about
the shield. This strategy, chosen mainly because of the limited power of the ruling coalition, had
the goal of promoting the shield and securing its passage through Parliament when the agreement
was signed. The information campaign, however, failed to generate support and break through
ideological and political barriers, and the ratification of the signed missile shield agreement was
never secured. When Topolanek’s position further weakened with losses in local and senatorial
elections in the fall of 2008, the ratification looked unlikely. In March of 2009, Topolanek
withdrew the signed agreements from parliament’s lower house to prevent the chamber from
striking the treaties down.
Could we be any clearer? Czech public and the Missile Shield
The Czech elites were divided over the issue of the US missile shield. Many of the
opponents of the installation expressed a desire for a national referendum on the issue,
proclaiming that the people should have the right to decide on such an important matter. The
opposition’s desire for the referendum could be explained by one simple fact: the public
opposition for the missile shield was overwhelming and remarkably consistent over the past few
63
years.
As the Topolanek government announced the U.S. offer during a press conference and
engaged in an information campaign in order to win over the public, it was believed that once the
Czechs became familiar with the details of the proposed installation and its supposed benefits,
they would support the U.S. radar base in their country. Remarkably, the Czech public did not
budge, expressing almost uniform disdain for the American military installation. The question
was why did the Czech public, despite the concentrated efforts of the government, remained so
opposed to the American project.
The Czech public opinion on the issue of the missile shield remained steady throughout
the period of negotiations. From the earliest polls taken in September of 2006, over 60% of the
public expressed their opposition to the project, while only 24% supported the shield. Those
patterns were maintained until the last poll, taken in May of 2009. Throughout the period, the
opposition oscillates between 60-70% while support between 20-30%. For the majority of the
period, less than 10% of Czechs were “not sure” about the project. The local polls taken in the
areas adjacent to the potential base were even clearer in expressing the public opposition to the
shield. The 2007 polls show that in Hvozdany 93% of the public opposed the shield, in Tene and
Zajecov 98% opposed the shield and in Trokavec 79% of the residents opposed the American
project.
One of the explanations of this almost universal rejection is ideology. Czech people,
according to the recent surveys, express growing anti-American sentiment. As was mentioned in
the discussion of the Czech elites above, the support for US foreign policy among Czech people
dropped by over 25%. Additionally, polls and experts demonstrate the high levels of pacifism
64
among Czech society, which also contributes to the NMD attitudes. The missile shield was
largely seen by Czechs as an invention of the unpopular Bush administration, which was behind
highly unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The shield was therefore rejected. Political
ideology also played a role, since majorities of electorates of every party, with the exception of
Prime Minister Topolanek’s ODS, expressed opposition to the issue. (Graph of support by Party
electorate)
Another influential factor in the public attitudes towards the missile shield was the level
of organization of the opposition. Just as the government produced press conferences, reports
and websites, the opposition was consolidating. The process began prior to the official U.S.
offer. In July of 2006, “No To Bases” (Ne Zakladnam) group was formed, immiediately finding
widespread support and organizing successful protest rallies around Czech Republic. There were
multiple protests held, each featuring few thousand people, in May, June and July of 2007, many
of the during the visits of important US officials. Overall, the opposition to the shield managed to
collect over 130,000 signatures in a petition to conduct a national referendum on the missile
shield.
Czech government attempted to discredit the opposition by claiming that the Russian
intelligence community has been active in agitating the public opposition to the missile shield.
Czech Security Information Service (BIS) revealed that Russian agents contacted NGOs,
members of the media and politicians in an attempt to organize opposition to the issue. However,
even if the Russians attempted to influence the opposition, it seems highly unlikely that they
would manage to build such consistent and uniform opposition to the issue. Rather, it was an
attempt by the government to play an anti-Russian card in order to generate support of the shield.
65
Last factor that played the role in shaping of the public opinion in the missile shield
debate was the perceived environmental harm that the radar would cause. The government
attempted to tackle the issue of the potential harmful radiation emitted by the radar that could
cause health and environmental problems by publishing special report on its information website.
Many people, however, still believed that the radar would cause people harm.
It is important to note that the Czech public opinion remained indifferent to international
political stimulants. When the Russian-Georgian war was taking place in the summer of 2008,
there was no significant change in the public perception of the shield, unlike was the case with
Poland. Also, the US government made some provisions in an attempt to win over the hearts and
minds of the Czech people. In 2008, the Czech Republic was included in the visa waiver
program, allowing Czech citizens hassle free travel to the United States. That gesture also failed
to change the public attitudes about the shield.
The issue of the missile shield placement in the Czech Republic was a divisive one for
Czech people and its politicians. The Czech ruling elites misinterpreted the problem behind the
lack of public support for the NMD. They believed that uninformed people were opposed to the
shield because they simply did not posses enough information. But it was not the information
that drove the public opposition but the ideology that drove the public opposition. Therefore,
despite the ruling elite’s best efforts, they failed to convince the Czech public and their political
opponents of the merits of the US radar base on Czech soil.
66
Conclusion
The extended analysis of elite and public opinion toward the U.S. missile shield plan
offers insight in two directions. First, it helps us gain a deeper appreciation of the opinion
formation process toward critical yet less visible security policies. Elites, thanks to greater
exposure to the international and diplomatic aspects of policy, tend to weigh those factors far
more heavily in their thinking. The mass public, on the other hand, relies on sporadic domestic
news media coverage of such issues which more often focuses most heavily on the partisan and
domestic political aspects. The result of this dual opinion formation process is the tendency for
disjunctures between governments and their publics, except at times like on 9/11 or when
Russian forces moved into the South Ossetia region of Georgia, international threats dominate
everyone’s attention. This finding suggests that the ability of elite cues to frame international
security issues and thus to shape or mobilize domestic public opinion is more limited than the
literature seems to suggest.
The second insight provided by the cases is that the United States, to the extent that its
own national security depends on creating policies requiring extensive international cooperation
like missile defense (or the war on terrorism), is at the mercy of the opinion formation process in
other nations. The result, it appears, is that the United States will have difficulty energizing
majorities in Europe to support its efforts. Getting majority support around world is not a simple
matter of gaining the support of fellow governments, at least not when the American president
and its foreign policies are unpopular, as they were during the Bush administration from 2003
onward.
67
On the theoretical front, we believe that this paper provides more evidence in favor of the
usefulness of framing theory in explaining public opinion formation, at both the elite and mass
public level. A shield is the classic defensive device, except of course, when it enables offensive
military action. Like Trojans looking at the shield Haphaestus made for Achilles, every nation
saw in the U.S. missile shield an interpretation of their own making, based on frames that
emerged from their nation’s unique domestic and international context.
68
Figure US-1. Support for Missile Defense in the United States 2000-2008
Poll Organization Balanced/No Critical Positive Important

& Date Prompt Prompts Prompts Priority to
Only Only Build
Zogby 2/1/00 61
ABC 5/2/00 44
CBS/NYT 5/10-13/00 82
Gallup 5/23-24/00 48
NBC/WSJ 6/14-18/00 45
CBS/NYT 9/9-11/00 79
Pew 10/4-8/00 47
Pew 1/3-7/01 73
ABC/WP1/11-15/01 57
Pew 2/14-19/01 54
Pew 2/14-19/01 49
LAT 3/3-5/01 59
CBS/NYT 3/8-12/01 67
Time/CNN 3/21-22/01 41
Pew 5/15-28/01 51
NBC/WSJ 6/23-25/01 43
Pew 8/21-9/5/01 74
CBS 8/28-31/01 47
Pew 10/15-21/01 54
Pew 1/9-13/02 74
LAT 1/31-2/3/02 67
TIPP/CSM 2/5-9/02 59
Pew 1/8-12/03 76
Pew 1/6-11/04 79
Pew 1/5-9/05 73
MDAA 7/19-22/07 83
MDAA 7/24-27/08 87
Note: All cells report percent supporting development of missile defense except for the
priority questions, which report the percent indicating that building a missile defense
system was a top or important priority.
69
Figure US-2 Information Polarization Effect among Partisans
0.9
0.8
0.7
Percent Supporting NMD
Republicans
0.6
0.5 Independents
0.4
0.3
Democrats
0.2
0.1
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Knowledge Index Score
70
Figure X. Support for NMD in Poland by Political Party Affiliation
This is the closest we can get to Conservative-Centrist-Liberal measure
70
60
50
40 PO
30 PiS
SLD*
20
PSL
10
Undecided
0
71
Figure X. Czech Support Over Time116
80
70
60
50
40 Favors
30 Opposes
Not Sure
20
10
0
Figure X. Czech Opposition to NMD by Political Party (DATE?)
Opposition to NMD by Political Party
Af>iliation
100
80
60
40
20
0
No Party Undecided KCSM (Far CSSD SZ (Centrist) KDU‐CSL ODS (Center
Left) (Center Left) (Right Wing) Right)

116
http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100938s_pm90713.pdf
72
Figure X. Czech Support for NMD by Political Party
NMD Support by Political Party
Not Sure Strongly Opposes Somewhat Opposes Somewhat Supports Strongly supports
6
16
ODS (Center Right) 24
37
17
7
29
KDU‐CSL (Right Wing) 29
26
9
6
34
SZ (Centrist) 28
26
6
4
49
CSSD (Center Left) 31
12
4
2
77
KCSM (Far Left) 13
6
3
11
32
Undecided 35
18
4
9
55
No Party 22
10
4
73

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Ignorance, Ideology, and International Politics:

Public Support for Missile Defense in Four Nations

A. Trevor Thrall, University of Michigan - Dearborn

challenged the scientific community to invent a defense alternative to Mutual Assured

arguments, do so many people keep supporting missile defense?

because they are predisposed ideologically to support defensive security measures,

supported the system in the first place.

In this paper we propose that instrumental calculations of the missile shield’s

varied across countries and over time.

the way they do.

thoughts about the implications of the case studies.

How Do People Think about Missile Defense?

might call a “well-informed” opinion.

support a policy.3 In other words, with appropriate cross-national variations, we would

expect hawkish conservatives to support missile defense because it plays to their

adopted the contrary arguments articulated by opposing party elites.

We attempt to resolve the puzzle here by adding the concept of framing. As we

any particular predisposition, elite cue, or instrumental calculation to form an opinion.

influencing their interpretations.

60% of Americans say that research should continue.

might use to launch upon even more aggressive foreign policies.

Republic the shield came to be interpreted as a major environmental hazard. In Canada

least likely to follow their party’s position on missile defense.

The Policy Process and Chronology

The Clinton administration, never enamored of the concept of missile defense,

as soon as it was feasible. Although Clinton was initially supposed to make a

determination on the feasibility of deployment by the summer of 2000, the presidential

United States but also US allies in Europe.

a single small area.

defense system on its relatively small arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Shield, Bargaining Chip, Wedge Issue: Elites and Missile Defense

failures to produce even a rudimentary missile defense capability.

independents at election time.

the limited missile defense plan being pursued by Clinton.

already provoked in Russian, Chinese, and European circles.

whose votes count so much at election time (CBS/NYT/Whatever Polls 2000).

York?” (PBS Frontline 2003, Missile Wars).

expensive alternatives to enhancing U.S. security can be imagined. The continued

Analytical framework for Canada:

military argument, but an international political one - see below).

International political level:

which would potentially place weapons in space?

in the US/Canada relationship and, by extension, of Canada's ability to pursue its

was already under some duress).

Domestic Political Level:

Not a good time to go against public opinion.

but also and relatedly as an opportunity to define themselves politically as Canadian

through not being American.

America tilting at technologically based defense windmills is nothing new. From

domestic politics and Anti-American sentiment. A more in-depth deconstruction of this

identity politics fruitlessly expelled on a conflict that was essentially an exercise in

holding anti-US-foreign policy/anti-Bush sentiments.16 A war of elite frames crystallized,

fueled by misinformation, political power struggles and unpopular American foreign

government to play catch-up.

The Canada Case in Context

the weaponization of space.17 It is unclear whether Mr. Martin was attempting to be

BMD program19 but in light of a strained Canada/US relationship and a nation

media feeding frenzy in the following months and years.

on the Canadian government to take action in protecting a staple (and a government

and a complete lack of understanding of Canada’s domestic political realities hindered

the improvement of relations.26

parliamentary practice developed in 1994 meant only to inform parliament of the

liberals would have been so pacifying in tone or nonchalant about compliance.

Ignorance & Ideology MPSA

Ignorance & Ideology MPSA