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The Correlatesof Nuclear Proliferation
A QUANTITATIVE TEST
SONALI SINGH
BainandCompany
CHRISTOPHERR. WAY
Departmentof Government
CornellUniversity
Since the adventof the atomic age, nuclearweapons proliferationhas been one of the
majorsecurityissues facing the world. After the end of the cold war, concerns about
proliferationhave grown ratherthansubsided:the withdrawalof superpowersecurity
guaranteeshas created incentives for smaller powers to acquire nuclear weapons, a
handfulof "rogue"stateshave soughtnucleararms,Pakistanand Indiahavejoined the
ranks of overt nuclear powers, the technological threshold necessary to develop
atomic weapons is in reach of ever more nations, and the possibility of new nuclear
powers selling weapons to terroristorganizationshas focused concerns. Controversy
rages aroundthe worldover U.S. plans to build a nationalmissile defense (NMD) sys-
tem to fend off emerging nuclearthreats,and scholars debate whetherNMD will fan
the fires of proliferationor reduce the incentive for more states to acquire nuclear
weapons. Thus, more thana half centuryinto the nuclearweapons era, the problemof
proliferationis even more pressing than at the dawn of the atomic age.
This is troubling,given our lack of reliable knowledge about the determinantsof
nuclearproliferation.Although there is no shortage of academic theories to account
for the spreadof nuclearweapons, few agree on the validity or generalizabilityof the
variousalternatives.Policy makersand scholarsof internationalrelationssuffer from
an embarrassmentof riches in the diverse attempts to explain decisions to acquire
nucleararms, matchedby a correspondingpoverty of consensus about the empirical
supportenjoyed by various perspectives. Authors frequently find existing explana-
tions unable to account for the details of a case of particularinterestand then seek to
redressthe shortcomingby offering yet anotheralternative.Even as explanationspro-
liferate,we do not know which of these perspectivesprovidesthe best guide to under-
standingdecisions to "go nuclear"and for forecastingpotential futureproliferators.
We enterthe debateby suggesting thata quantitativetest of theoriesof nuclearpro-
liferationcan providea useful complementto the qualitative,comparativecase study
methodsthatpredominatein this researchagenda.'We highlightthreereasonsa quan-
titativetest is an appropriate,and indeed perhapsnecessary,supplementto the prolif-
erationliterature.First,by samplingon the dependentvariable,most qualitativestud-
ies ignore or underemphasizethe large numberof countries that have never pursued
nuclear weapons. Ignoring nonproliferatorsruns the risk of underestimatingthe
strengthof causal effects or, more rarely,erroneously accepting a relationshipthat
does not hold up in a wider sample (Collier and Mahoney, 1996; Dion 1998; Geddes
1990; King, Keohane,and Verba1994). Forexample, as Sagan(2000) points out, ana-
lysts can almost always identify an ex-ante securitythreatafterthe fact of a prolifera-
tion episode. Yetthey often fail to acknowledgethatsecuritythreatsare ubiquitousby
the ratherelastic standardsoften employed by realists. In this situation,sampling on
the dependent variable may create a bias toward overemphasizingthe explanatory
power of security threats.More prosaically,but equally important,sampling on the
dependent variable simply discards much valuable information useful in drawing
inferences about the correlates of proliferation.Quantitativeanalyses that include
observationscovering the full rangeof varianceon both the dependentand independ-
ent variablescan provide a useful complement to qualitativeapproachesthat delve
deeply into a limited numberof cases.
Second, theories of nuclearweapons proliferationoften offer, either explicitly or
implicitly,probabilistichypotheses, yet theories are frequentlytested as if they make
deterministicclaims. For example, the simplest realist claim-that the more severe
and immediatea securitythreat,the more likely a state is to pursuenucleararms-is
clearly based on a probabilisticlogic. Yet studies of nuclear proliferationoften find
realismwantingby identifyingone or a handfulof cases thatfail to conformto the real-
ist logic. Statisticalmodels based on a probabilisticlogic of inferenceoffer a betterfit
with theoreticallogic thanthe deterministiclogic associatedwith the Millian methods
underpinningcomparativecase studies (Lieberson 1992, 1994).
1. Quantitativelarge-nstudies of nuclearweapons proliferationhave been scarce, with few follow-
ing up on the early efforts of Kegley (1980) and Meyer (1984) to provide systematic studies.
Singh, Way/ THE CORRELATESOF NUCLEARPROLIFERATION 861
data using survival models and reportresults in the fourth section. The final section
discusses implicationsfor policy and futureresearch.
TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS
EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS
DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS
PROLIFERATION DATA
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Explorationof weapons. Casting the net even broader,we can include countries
that seriously considered building nuclear weapons, even if they never took major
steps towardthatend. This final andmost comprehensiveindicatorof nuclearprolifer-
ation codes every countryas a nuclearproliferatorfromthe year thatit firstconsidered
building nuclear weapons, as demonstratedby political authorizationto explore the
option or by linking research to defense agencies that would oversee any potential
weapons development.Therefore,this indicatorincludes all statescoveredby the first
two indicatorsas well as all countries that considered developing nuclear weapons
without following throughwith theirplans and crossing the thresholdto level 2. Tak-
ing Sweden as an example once again, we include it because (1) atomic researchwas
conductedby a semipublic companyexplicitly linked to and reportingto the defense
ministry,and (2) decisions were explicitly made by cabinet-level officials to develop
dual-use technology with high potentialutility for any futureweapons program(see
sources for Sweden in the countryappendix).
Foreach country-year,every statein our sample is assigned to one of the four cate-
gories. States thatclearly and convincingly renounceweapons or stop seriously con-
sideringthemcan move back down, from the explorationlevel to the no-interestlevel,
for example. Thus, when Sweden ceases to seriously consider nuclear weapons, it
drops back down to the no-interestcategory.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Technological Determinants
To assess a country's ability to develop and construct nuclear weapons, we
employed several variablesthattappedthe level of economic and industrialdevelop-
ment. We focus on indicatorsof the general level of economic and industrialdevelop-
ment, eschewing those thatarelikely to be endogenous to an interestin nuclearweap-
ons (such as numberof nuclearscientists or metallurgists).'o
Gross domestic product per capita. Gross domestic product (GDP) provides a
rough and ready indicatorof the level of economic development.Whereasaggregate
economic size indicates total resources available, per capita GDP more accurately
9. We omit ratificationof the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty(NPT) because of obvious and sub-
stantialendogeneity.Assessing the causal role of the NPT in affecting decisions towardnuclearweapons
poses a host of complex problemsthat we plan to treatseparatelyin a new study.
10. We also constructeda time series of knownuraniumdeposits, reasoningthatdomestic availability
of uraniumis likely to decreasethe difficultiesof mountinga weaponsprogram.However,in collecting these
data,it becameclear thaturaniumexplorationis endogenousto interestin nuclearweapons. Superficially,it
might appearthatdiscovery of domestic sources of uraniumspursthe startof a nuclearweapons program;
closer examinationof the cases reveals that an interestin nuclearweapons often spurs intensive uranium
prospecting.
868 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE 1
TheoreticalExpectationsand Measures
Anticipated
Direction
ExplanatoryVariable of Effect Operationalizations
Technological determinism
Level of development Positive Gross domestic product(GDP) per capita; energy
consumptionper capita
Industrialcapacity Positive Index based on steel productionand electrical-
generatingcapacity; aggregateand per capita
electricity and steel production
Externaldeterminants
Security threat Positive Participationin enduringrivalry;frequencyof
militarizedinterstatedispute (MID) involvement
Security guarantee Negative Alliance with great power
Internaldeterminants
Democracy Negative Polity IV democracyscale
Democratization Uncertain Change in Polity IV democracyscale (3-, 5-, and
10-yearperiods)
Global democracy Negative Percentageof democraciesamong states in system
Exposure to global economy Negative (Exportsand imports)/GDP
Economic liberalization Negative Change in traderatio (3-, 5-, and 10-yearperiods)
Dissatisfaction/symbolic Positive S score or Tau-bwith either global or regional
motivations hegemon
EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS
INTERNAL DETERMINANTS
Democracy and democratization.We use the Polity IV data (Jaggers and Gurr
1995) to create three differentvariablesrelated to argumentsabout regime type and
proliferation.One variablemeasures democracy for each country-year:we create a
derived measure of the level of democracy within each state by combining the two
the Correlatesof War project's Composite Index of Capabilities (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972),
extractedusing EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000) and updatedthrough2000, using the United Nations's
Statistical Yearbook.
13. Energyconsumptiondata are from the Correlatesof Warproject'sComposite Indexof Capabili-
ties (Singer,Bremer,and Stuckey 1972), extractedusing EUGene (BennettandStam2000). Populationdata
coveringthe periodfrom 1945 to 2000 were gatheredfromthe PennWorldTable6.1 (Heston, Summers,and
Aten 2002), the Correlatesof Warproject,Maddison(2002), and the United Nations (Statistical Yearbook,
variousyears).
14. Although many authors,building on this logic, have emphasized bipolarity,because bipolarity
characterizesmost of our time period,we focus on the presence or absence of an explicit bilateralsecurity
guaranteeinsteadof systemic variablesto assess argumentsemphasizinggreat-powersecurityassurances.
15. Alliance data were extractedusing the EUGene softwareprogram(Bennett and Stam 2000).
870 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
METHODS
where h(t) is the hazardrate,t is time, and PO + are the estimatedcoefficients and
from
xiBx
the whenp equals 1, the baseline
variables. P is a shapeparameter estimated data:
hazard is constant over if
time; p is less than 1, it decreases monotonically;and if p is
greater than 1, hazard increases with time at risk.
Because survivalmodels arenonlinear,interpretationof coefficients is not straight-
forward.Unlike those in standardordinaryleast squares(OLS) regressionmodels, the
beta coefficients do not representthe marginaleffect on the dependentvariableof a
one-unit change in the independentvariable.To ease interpretation,we estimate the
models in both standardandlog relative-hazardforms;in the lattercase, the coefficient
can be readas the numberby which we would multiply the odds of, for example, the
initiation of a nuclear weapons programfor a one-unit increase in the independent
variable. For example, a coefficient of 4 on the enduring rivalry dummy variable
would imply a 300% increasein the likelihood of startinga nuclearweapons program
(in other words, the chance is four times as great). In interpretingresults, we present
the standardcoefficients andtheirstandarderrorsin main tablesbutdiscuss these rela-
tive risksin the text to ease interpretationof the substantivemeaningof the findings.
19. Because parametricmodels derived from contending distributionsare nonnested, we used the
Akaike informationcriteria to assess the relative appropriatenessof models using exponential, Weibull,
Gompertz,log-logistic, and log-normaldistributions.
872 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
RESULTS
TABLE 2
The Correlatesof Nuclear WeaponsProliferation
Dependent Variable
Technologicaldeterminants
GDP per capita 0.00052.119 0.001.017 0.0002.378
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
GDP squared -7.92e-08017 -2.36-08l
-3.66e-08"094
(2.19e-08) (3.1 le-08) (1.43e-08)
Industrialcapacity index 1.89.016 1.46046 3.19< .001
(0.78) (0.73) (0.91)
Externaldeterminants
Enduringrivalry 1.57002 1.83024 2.13.076
(0.50) (0.81) (1.77)
Dispute involvement 0.17?l1o 0.38<.ool 0.23.070
(0.07) (0.09) (0.13)
Alliance -0.67.260 -0.83.194 -1.01.225
(0.59) (0.64) (0.83)
Internaldeterminants
Democracy 0.02.525 0.070.084 0.092.123
(0.038) (0.038) (0.059)
Democratization -0.03 -0.080323 0.016895
(0.056) (0.081) (0.120)
Percentageof democracies -0.05204-0.186X)7 -0.094
(0.04) (0.069) (().101)
Economic openness -0.01.235 -0.0 1812 0.00029
(0.01) (0.012) (0.015)
Economic liberalization -0.037'30 0.35.l) -0.001.963
(0.017) (0.014) (0.018)'
.ol
Constant _-4.66< -6.34.016 -7.52.022
(1.32) (2.63) (3.29)
explore nuclearweapons acquisition. Sheer level of per capita income plays a some-
what smaller role here, which is not surprisingwhen one recalls the low levels of
income at which China, India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union exploded their first
weapons.28However,althoughGDP per capitais somewhatless importantthan in the
precedingmodels,29the industrialcapacityindex looms large,with a very largecoeffi-
cient and a vanishingly smallp value.30Even in the face of this strongeffect, variables
tappingthe security environmentretaintheir power. Enduringrivalriesare powerful
spurs,notjust to explorationand developmentbut to testing and deploymentas well.
This is not surprisingwhen one recalls thatof the countries to acquirenuclearweap-
ons, all but two (South Africa and France) are coded as participatingin an enduring
rivalryat the time of acquisition.By alternatebut defensible coding rules, one could
make the case that both of these exceptions were involved in enduringrivalries.Fre-
quency of dispute involvementprovides a more nuancedindicatorbecause it actually
variesover time, even withinrivalries,andit provesboth statisticallyand substantively
significantonce again. Clearly,not just the existence of a rivalrybut also the ebb and
flow of the hostility level also play an importantrole in pushingstates over the nuclear
threshold.Moreovera country with an alliance has a hazardrate that is a fractionof
one without a great-powersecurity guarantee,although it falls short of significance.
Finally,the batteryof internaldeterminantsvariablesfalls below significance in these
models. The democracyvariable,however,does approachsignificance in these mod-
els andwith a positivecoefficient.3'Even controllingfor level of income andeconomic
development, countries that score high on the democracy scale are more likely to
acquirenuclearweapons. Finally, economic openness loses its significance.32
Although many of the variablesattainstatisticalsignificance, how significant are
they substantively in shaping the likelihood that a country explores and acquires
nuclearweaponscapability?Drawingon relativeriskratios,Table3 interpretsthe sub-
stantive role played by each variable for decisions to explore and acquire nuclear
weapons. The entriesrepresentthe percentagechange in the baseline hazardratefor a
given change in the explanatoryvariable.For example, a countrywith a great-power
militaryalliance has a hazardrate for exploring the nuclearoption that is 49% lower
thana similarcountrywithoutan alliance,as well as a riskof acquiringweapons thatis
28. In 1996 U.S. dollars, the averageGDP per capita at which countriesexploded/deployednuclear
weapons is $5,275. India,China, Pakistan,and (to a lesser degree) the Soviet Union were all considerably
below that average. No country has ever gone nuclear when its GDP per capita was above the $11,000
threshold.
29. If the 1998 test dates are used as alternatecodings for Indiaand Pakistan,thenGDP percapitaand
its squareare significant at betterthan the 5% level.
30. Everycountryto acquirenuclearweapons,withthe exceptionof Pakistan,was abovethe threshold
embodied in the index.
31. When the explosion dates are used as an alternatecoding for Pakistanand India,the coefficient on
democratizationfalls below statisticalsignificance.
32. We also ranmodels asking a slightly differentanddistinctbutrelatedquestion:given thata coun-
try has exploredthe nuclearoption, what determineswhetherit exercises thatoption?This greatly reduces
the numberof durationsfor study.In our view, this makes it less useful and tractablethanthe approachfol-
lowed here but yields some interestingresults. Although development and security still play a role, most
notableis thattradeliberalizationremainssignificant,whereasdemocracycontinues to have no discernible
effect. The multinomiallogit models reportedbelow allow us to deal with the kinds of issues raisedby this
multiple-stepquestion, thus complementingthe hazardmodels.
876 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE 3
SubstantiveEffects of the ExplanatoryVariables
on the Likelihood of ExploringNuclear Weapons
Percentage Changefrom
Baseline Hazard Rate
35. This examplecorrespondsroughlyto the changein Sweden's percapitaGDP from 1968to 1972.
36. Orderedlogit is not appropriateherebecauseof the possibility thatvariableshave differenteffects
acrossdifferentlevels of proliferation.Multinomiallogit is a flexible tool thatallows us to assess separately
the influenceof an explanatoryvariableon boththe explorationof nuclearweaponsand the subsequentsteps
up the proliferationladder.
37. Interpretationof results from multinomiallogit models is not straightforwardbecause of their
multiple-equationnature.To understandthe full directeffect of a variableon, for example, the second out-
come, one has to take into accountits effect both on the conditionallikelihood of thatoutcome and on other
categories.Most of the time, the directionwill be the same as indicatedby the coefficient, butoccasional sur-
prises are possible. Here we are interestedmainly in significance levels and compatibilityof findings with
the hazardmodels.
878 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE4
Pathwaysto Proliferation:MultinomialLogit Models
Level
Technologicaldeterminism
GDP per capita 0.0003< .oo 0.0005< 0.0004<00
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GDP squared -1.55e-08< .00 -4.36e-08< 00' -1.00e-08<.00
(2.73e-09) (7.86e-09) (1.80e-09)
Industrialcapacity index 2.88< .001 2.41< .001 22.59< .001
(0.270) (0.280) (0.664)
Externaldeterminants
Enduringrivalry 0.43.017 0.67 1.61
(0.179) (0.221) (0.240)
Dispute involvement 0.31.002 0.77< . 01 0.86< .00'
(0.099) (0.105) (0.119)
Alliance -1.24< .00 -0.22.205 -1.25< .00
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Internaldeterminants
Democracy 0.020.073 -0.027 055 0.029018
(0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
Democratization -0.005.790 0.003.937
(0.020) (0.032) -0.023.334
(0.024)
Percentageof democracies -0.122< (xl 0.017.390 0.036066
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Economic openness -0.028< -0.012?x? -0.027<
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Economic liberalization 0.002 -0.007.299 0.003
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -1.47.)6 -6.95<. -28.31< .00
(0.538) (0.745) (0.339)
NOTE:Log pseudo-likelihood= -1874; pseudo-R2= 0.39; total observations= 6,125. The referencecate-
gory is no steps to pursuenuclearweapons.Coefficients areestimatesfor multinomiallogit regressionmod-
els, with robuststandarderrorsin parentheses.p values are superscriptedandarefor two-sided tests. Coeffi-
cients that are significant at betterthan the 10%level are in bold. GDP = gross domestic product.
38. In models includingsatisfactionwith the regionalleader,the S score has a positive but insignifi-
cant coefficient for levels I and 2; but a strongly negativecoefficient for level 3.
Singh, Way/ THE CORRELATES
OF NUCLEARPROLIFERATION 879
multinomial logit models produce results quite similar to the survival models,
althoughoffering greatersupportfor variablesassociated with internaldeterminants
perspectives,enhancingour confidence in the findings.
PUZZLING MISSES
These results suggest that, contraryto what some scholars have argued, existing
argumentsabout the determinantsof nuclear weapons proliferationdo a reasonable
job of accountingfor the data. One furtherway of seeing this is to examine instances
when the models miss by a fairly wide margin:thatis, which countriesdid not explore
the nuclearoption, althoughthe models suggest they shouldhave, and which countries
did explore the option, even though the model produces relatively low predicted
hazards.
To this end, Table 5 lists the countriesthathad a high predictedhazardfor several
years,yet never(to the best of ourknowledge) seriouslyexploredthe nuclearoption.It
is reassuringthatthe list correspondswith the countriesthatanalystsoften identify as
puzzling nonproliferators.Saudi Arabia'spresencemay surprisesome, but its combi-
nationof a high threatenvironment,substantialwealth, and minimallysufficient eco-
nomic and scientific infrastructuremake it a likely suspect.39 Still, our coding of secu-
rity guarantees is based on formal alliances and thus probably overstates the
temptationfacing Saudi Arabia.Althoughit enjoys no formalalliance with the United
States,the fact thatSaudiArabiahas (at least untilrecently)a de facto securityguaran-
tee was amplydemonstratedin 1990 and 1991. In a similarvein, Syria's inclusion may
surprisesome due to its low level of economic development,but our analyses suggest
that its frequentdispute involvement, participationin an enduringrivalry,relatively
low economic interdependence,and (barely)adequatelevel of economic development
made it a strongcandidatefor nuclearweapons proliferation.40 Japanand Germany's
presencecomes as no surprise:they are widely seen as powerful,economically devel-
oped states facing strong security threatsthatonly foreswore nuclearweapons under
duress and with the reassuranceof a highly credible American security guarantee.4'
Although lacking the same level of industrial/scientificdevelopment,Italy and Spain
are similar cases; moreover, rumors of interest in nuclear weapons have swirled
aroundboth countries at times.42Egypt's challenging securityenvironmentprovides
strongincentivescounterbalancedby relativelylow levels of economic development.
Bulgariais more of a surprise,but its statusas a relativelydeveloped economy on the
front lines of the cold war gave it a combinationof strong incentives and sufficient
39. Contraryto widely held images, Saudi Arabia produces steel domestically (since 1976, and in
fairly large quantities since 1984), has a large and modern electrical-generatingcapacity (well over the
10,000 MW thresholdsince 1983), and has a well-educateduppertier of researchers.
40. Indeed, Syria is also a "nearmiss" in our coding of proliferators.Despite some suggestive evi-
dence, we ultimatelydecided thatthereis not enough firminterestin serious or sustainedexplorationof the
nuclearoption to code Syria as a level 1 proliferator.
41. Among othereconomically advancedWesterncountriesnot on this list, Finlandprovidesthe big-
gest outlier but is not a surprisingmiss for fairly obvious reasons.
42. However,the evidence was too slim or the level of interesttoo ephemeralto warrantcoding as level
1 proliferators.
880 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE 5
Dogs That Didn't Bark?CountriesThat Did Not Seriously
Explore the Nuclear Option ... but Should Have
43. Ties to the Soviet Union were not sufficientto rendera countryimmunefrom the nucleartempta-
tion, as Romania'sflirtationwith indigenous nucleararms in the 1980s indicates.
44. However,it is worth noting that both also share a numberof unresolvedborderdisputes.
45. China's per capita GDP, in 1996 U.S. dollars at purchasing-powerparity exchange rates, was
lower, but it had a large domestic steel industryand a much more extensive electricity industrythan did
Pakistan.
Singh, Way/ THE CORRELATES
OF NUCLEARPROLIFERATION 881
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Special attentionto the robustnessof the estimatesof the coefficients and theirvari-
ances is warrantedbecause of the relatively small numberof proliferatorsand due to
disagreementsaboutcoding of the dependentvariablesfor severalcountries.To assess
the influenceof particularcountries,we rana series of models sequentially,deleting in
turneach case thatfeaturesa positive outcome on the dependentvariable.This proce-
durerevealedno stronglyinfluentialcases, althougha few slight sensitivities areworth
noting. Deleting Chinaand/orIndiastrengthensthe importanceof economic develop-
ment variables, whose estimated effects are clearly attenuatedby the (successful)
efforts of two of the world's poorer countries to develop nuclear weapons. Finally,
omitting India and/or Pakistan elides the effect of the enduring rivalry variable
somewhat.
Our second robustness check was to experiment with alternate coding of the
dependentvariablesfor countries where there is some disagreementamong sources
aboutthe timing of key events anddecisions. Althoughfor most countries,thereis sur-
prisingconvergencefromcredible sources on factualaccountsand assessments, some
codings are based on more divergent and difficult-to-reconcilesources and evalua-
tions, forcing us to make ajudgmentcall. North Koreaprovidesan extremecase, with
both its decisions to explore nuclearoptions anddates of firstserious efforts at a weap-
ons programshrouded in secrecy and controversy.Iran provides another example;
althoughthereis broadagreementwithina 5- or 10-yearrange,choosing a precise year
for programinitiationis more controversial.In these cases, we createdalternatever-
sions of the dependentvariables,using years across the temporalrangeof estimates in
turn.Runningdozens of models based on these variantsrevealsthatthe resultsare not
sensitive to codings thatdiffer by up to 10 years for the contentious cases.
CONCLUSION
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