Impact Calculus Final Camp

Michigan 2009 Impact Calc
Classic Sophomores Polin/Alderete

Impact Calculus
Impact Calculus.............................................................................................................................................................................1
Rescher Indict................................................................................................................................................................................2
Terrorism.......................................................................................................................................................................................3
Kashmir.........................................................................................................................................................................................5
Iran.................................................................................................................................................................................................9
Great power wars.........................................................................................................................................................................10
Probability ..................................................................................................................................................................................13
Magnitude O/W Risk...................................................................................................................................................................14
1
Rescher Indict
[ ] Rescher is poorly developed and obscure in his writing
W. P. Birkettn University of Sydney Jul., 1970 [The Accounting Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 619-622
“review [NICHOLAS RESCHER, An Introduction to Value Theory]” American Accounting Association]
In quite a few instances, his argument uses (and even depends upon) unexplained distinctions, such as
"authentic value," "proper value," "genu- ine benefits," "real interests." The term "rationality" is used
in a variety of senses, often at key points in the argument (the necessity for an as- sumption of rationality in a
theory of individual decision making is mentioned only once [p. 43] and is not developed-unless an individual is assumed
to implement his highest valued alternative [rationality], there will be no necessary relation between order of valuation and
the action imple- mented). In a few instances, his argument is ob- scured by a failure to distinguish clearly
between "logical time" and "real time," and the different perspectives of an "actor" and an "observer."
[ ] Rescher consistently misinterprets other authors; making his claims completely

unsubstantiated
Zeno G. Swijtink; Proferssor at SUN Y at Buffalo; Sep., 1987 [“The Limits of Science by Nicholas Rescher” The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 392-396; Jstor]
My point is not that to invoke Kant on the basis of one side-remark he has made, is a kind of name-dropping which this idea
of Rescher's does not need. The point is that Rescher has completely misinterpreted this Kantian passage.
Ironically, Kant's argument is the very same argument for the incompleteness of science which is dismissed by Rescher in his
first chapter as "too facile-too quick and easy" (p. I7). It is the "something-is-always- left-out" route to charges of
incompleteness. A little earlier in the same section Kant wrote Experience never satisfies reason fully but, in answering
questions, refers us further and further back and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their complete solution. Kant argues
for the insuiciency of scientific explanations, especially of causal explanations of individual facts,
because they lead to an infinite regress of causal questions which will not "satisfy reason ". My second
critical coment concerns a similar misinterpretation by Rescher. On page I 50 he quotes approvingly a formal
argument which was first published by Fitch [I 962] and later put to philosophical use by Routley [I98I]
to the effect that there are truths which are unknowable. Rescher writes that, although "this sort of
argumentation for the incompleteness of knowledge is too abstract and "general principally" to carry
much conviction in itself (. . .) it does provide some suggestive stagesetting for the more concrete rationale of the
imperfectibility of science that has concerned us here", viz., that science will never be done with its job. But this is not
what the argument seeks to establish. Indeed? the conclusion of the argument should be unwelcome to
Rescher
2
Terrorism
The worst of terrorism is yet to come – nuclear conflict, chemical terrorism, and biological
terrorism are probable in the future
The West Australian; 10/22/08; (Quals: edited daily newspaper published in Perth, Western Australia, and is
owned by ASX-listed West Australian Newspapers Holdings Ltd); Grim report warns of a global war; Intelligence
services warn Obama he could have less global power to face growing threats from rogue nuclear states”; LexisNexus
The use of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly likely by 2025, US intelligence warns in a bleak
report on global trends that forecasts a tense, unstable world shadowed by war. The political, economic
and military influence of the US will decline substantially and the advance of western democracy was
far from guaranteed, the National Intelligence Council analysis, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,
says. "The world of the near future will be subject to an increased likelihood of conflict over scarce
resources, including food and water, and will be haunted by the persistence of rogue states and terrorist
groups with greater access to nuclear weapons," it said. The report predicts that some African and south Asian
states may wither and organised crime could take over at least one state in central Europe. Struggling to find a bright spot,
researchers concluded that terrorism could decline if "economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth
unemployment is reduced". However, "opportunities for mass-casualty terrorist attacks using chemical,
biological or, less likely, nuclear weapons will increase as technology diffuses and nuclear power
programs expand". Based on a survey of global trends by analysts from all US intelligence agencies, the report was more
pessimistic about the status of the world's superpower than in the four previous outlooks that were made public. The report
said the international system constructed after World War II would be almost unrecognisable by 2025
with new powers emerging in a globalising economy, the historic transfer of wealth from West to East
and the growing influence of "non-state actors". "Although the United States is likely to remain the single most
powerful actor, its relative strength, even in the military realm, will decline and US leverage will become
more strained," it said. The authors said they did not believe there would be a "complete breakdown of the international
system" but warned "the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks". While the authors
note nothing in their report is certain, they say it is an effort to stimulate thinking within the incoming US administration. "It
is not a prediction," Thomas Fingar, the deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, said. "Nothing that we have
identified in this report is determinative." Mr Fingar said these "trends, developments and drivers" were subject to
intervention and manipulation. The report is a sobering reminder to US president-elect Barack Obama of the challenges he
faces leading a country that might no longer "call the shots alone". The report has good news for some countries: ·\x{2002}A
technology to replace oil may be under way or in place by 2025. ·\x{2002} Multiple financial centres will be "shock
absorbers" for the world financial system. ·\x{2002}India, China and Brazil will rise, the Korean peninsula will be unified in
some form and new powers are likely from the Muslim non-Arab world. The report highlighted the risk of a Middle East
arms race with countries considering technologies useful for making nuclear weapons. The report said it was not certain the
same deterrents in the Cold War would emerge in a nuclear armed Middle East. Instead, a nuclear arsenal might be seen as
"making it safe" to engage in low-intensity conflicts, terrorism or even larger conventional attacks, the report said. "Those
states most susceptible to conflict are in a great arc of instability stretching from Sub-Saharan Africa
through North Africa into the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, South and Central Asia and parts
of South East Asia," the report said. While the appeal of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida was likely to wane
dramatically between now and 2025, violent extremists might become more lethal through access to biological
weapons or even nuclear devices, according to the report, which is designed to give policymakers a
"beyond-the-horizon" view
3
Terrorism
Terror groups in the near future will likely have some of the most lethal technologies within reach
and are probable to use them
The Atlantic Council; 10/20/08; (Quals: The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders and diplomats
who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas); ”Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”;
http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world
Terrorism, proliferation, and conflict will remain key concerns even as resource issues move up on the
international agenda. Islamic terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth
unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East. Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from
joining terrorists’ ranks, but others—motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become “martyrs”—will continue to turn to violence
to pursue their objectives. In the absence of employment opportunities and legal means for political expression, conditions will be ripe for disaffection,
Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination
growing radicalism, and possible recruitment of youths into terrorist groups.
of descendants of long-established groups—that inherit organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks—and newly emergent
collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized. For those terrorist groups that
are active in 2025, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s
most dangerous capabilities within their reach. One of our greatest concerns continues to be that
terrorist or other malevolent groups might acquire and employ biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear
device, to create mass casualties.
4
Kashmir
The probability of nuclear weapons being used will be substantially very soon due to proliferation
in Asia
The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years , although remaining very low, is likely to be greater
than it is today as a result of several converging trends. The spread of nuclear technologies and
expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the
acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups. Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and
Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those
nuclear powers. The possibility of a future disruptive regime change or collapse occurring in a nuclear
weapon state such as North Korea also continues to raise questions regarding the ability of weak states
to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.
5
Kashmir
Kashmir and surrounding South Asia tensions continue to rise, pointing to a probable war
Nick Bryant; 6/3/09; “Where Empires Go To Die”; The Australian; LexisNexis
In recent months, militant attacks have been ever more audacious and alarming . The already frail notion of jihadist
self-restraint has become firmly oxymoronic. As with the ambush on the Sri Lankan cricketers, new thresholds have been crossed, new
security weaknesses exposed and new swaths of territory seized. In Pakistan, the Taliban captured
Buner, a district 90km northwest of the capital, Islamabad. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has moved into
two provinces, Logar and Maidan Wardak, on the fringes of Kabul, the first time it has been able to get
so close to the capital since 2001, when the US-led coalition drove it from power. Since 2006, jihadists
have attacked Mumbai, Delhi, Varanasi, Hyderabad and Bangalore, India's commercial, political,
spiritual and hi-tech capitals respectively. For journalists who have covered the region, this worsening security climate
has come as no great surprise. At times, it has also come dangerously close to home. The Marriot, Islamabad, that long-time journalistic
haunt, was bombed. So was Mumbai's Taj Palace. Roads in what used to be the Tamil Tiger-controlled regions of Sri Lanka are patrolled by the national
army rather than Tamil Tiger traffic cops. Four years ago military commanders at Camp Salerno, the US's main
forward operating base for the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, provided up-beat briefings that the number of Taliban fighters
coming over the border had slowed to a trickle. Las t August, the Taliban tried to storm the camp . The dean of the South Asian press
pack is Lahore-based journalist and scholar Ahmed Rashid, whose 2001 book, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia went from
academic obscurity to the top of The New York Times bestseller list as the US launched into its post-9/11 quest for understanding. Charming, erudite and
fun-loving, he can also be excoriating, as in his new book, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,
``Afghanistan is once again staring
Afghanistan and Central Asia. Few who have spent time in the region would dispute his analysis that
down the abyss of state collapse'' and Pakistan ``has undergone a slower but equally bloody meltdown'' .
Since 9/11, South Asia has become a testing ground for a broad range of counter-terrorist and
counterinsurgency strategies, some the product of intricate planning, others of rushed expediency. They have ranged from the
promotion of democracy (Afghanistan) to its temporary suspension (Pakistan and Nepal); from the
opening of peace talks (India and Pakistan) to their termination (Sri Lanka); from nation building (Afghanistan) to
fiefdom destroying (Eelam, the Tamil enclave in the north and west of Sri Lanka); from fragile truce agreements (the Swat Valley) to shadowy diplomatic
from the scaling back of military operations (Indian-controlled Kashmir) to their
back channels (India and Pakistan);
escalation to the point of war (Sri Lanka). The shared aim of all of these strategies has been to improve
internal security and promote regional stability. But few have yielded long-lasting improvements, while
others have been extraordinarily counterproductive. Claims of success rarely hold up under close
scrutiny. So while Sri Lanka's hardline President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brother Gotahbaya, the Defence Secretary, may boast of their triumph over
the Tamil Tigers, it has come at an awful cost: 4500 civilian lives alone, according to the latest UN estimate. Moreover, few observers think it will
ultimately lead to the peaceful coexistence of the Tamil minority with the Sinalese majority. More likely it has re-radicalised a new generation of Tamils at
home and among the diaspora, prolonging the conflict.With the region in such turmoil and perpetual danger, it is no
wonder Barack Obama's administration has reoriented the focus of US diplomacy from the Middle East
to South Asia. The President has chosen as his envoy to the region Richard C. Holbrooke, a black belt in the art of regional
problem solving. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said that the deteriorating situation in Pakistan
poses a ``mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world'', echoing the apocalyptic
language of her husband Bill, who once described Kashmir as ``the most dangerous place on earth''. She
has even raised the spectre of Islamabad's atomic arsenal falling into the hands of the Taliban and al-
Qa'ida. These pointed public musings have been directed at Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari and his recent strategy of containment: a policy of
ceding pockets of sovereign territory to the Taliban. Though it was Pervez Musharraf who first pursued truce agreements in the semi-autonomous tribal areas
of North and South Waziristan, his democratically elected successor Zardari extended that policy in February to the Swat Valley. The area is just 150km
from Islamabad and it is where 12,000 Pakistani troops failed in their year-long campaign to crush 3000 Taliban militants. In unusually stinging language,
Clinton claimed it amounted to abdicating to the Taliban. Just as Afghan President Hamid Karzai became known as the ``mayor of Kabul'', since his writ did
not extend far beyond the capital, the fear is that Zardari may become the ``mayor of Islamabad'', leader of a fast-shrinking state. Islamabad will not fall but
it runs the risk of becoming irrelevant. Far from pacifying the militants, the creation of these Taliban sanctuaries appears to have emboldened them. In early
the Pakistan
April, Kalashnikov-wielding fighters swept with startling speed into Buner, an advance that went unchecked by the military. Since
army has long been viewed as the one institution capable of preventing the country from sliding into
6
Kashmir
anarchy, its failure to contain the Taliban is of particular concern. With the creep of the Taliban now a
headlong rush and with Washington signalling its discontent, the Pakistan army has launched a counter-offensive in the Swat
Valley and the policy of truce agreements presumably has been jettisoned.The fashion for conciliation is over. Yet elsewhere on the Indian subcontinent
conciliatory tactics have been more fruitful. In Indian-administered Kashmir, Delhi has sought to undercut support for Islamic separatists by lightening its
[Continued, nothing removed]
military footprint and offering the people of the country's only Muslim majority more people-to-people contact with relatives and friends over the long-
disputed Line of Control, the de facto border. A bus runs twice a month between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, despite the threats of militants to turn it into a
``coffin on wheels''. Certainly, there has been a decline in armed militancy in the Kashmir Valley, which is also the result of American pressure on
Islamabad to stop incursions from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Indian officials also point to the strong turn-out in state elections last year -- 60 per cent,
Still, last year also saw the biggest street protests against
according to the Government -- despite a boycott call from separatists.
Indian rule for more than a decade, which ended in bloodshed when Indian troops opened fire , and turn-out in
the recent federal election was a low 24 per cent. Although jihadist groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Army of the Pure, are not
operating so freely in the Kashmir Valley, they have struck elsewhere in India: Bangalore, Hyderabad,
and repeatedly in Mumbai and Delhi. In 2001, they even managed to penetrate the gates of the
Parliament of India, an attack that sparked a nuclear showdown with Islamabad that came perilously
close to war. The policy of conciliation, along with earlier peace overtures towards Pakistan in a now-stalled talks process, may have brought a
measure of relative calm to India's most troubled state but offers little defence from attack to its vital centres of governmental, commercial and hi-tech
power.Hopes that democracy could be part of a cure-all have not always been borne out. The first Afghan
presidential election in 2004 was a deeply flawed process, which by lunchtime on polling day had
collapsed into chaos because of the delible qualities of the supposedly indelible ink. By early afternoon, all of Karzai's rivals had boycotted the
election. A far more serious deficiency of that first direct poll was that it institutionalised the power of the regional warlords, thus creating a fractured
cabinet with a feeble presidency at the apex of Afghan power. It did not help that by 2004 Karzai's sponsors in the Bush administration had made Iraq their
myopic focus. In
August, Afghanistan will go to the polls again, with the security situation worse than it was
five years ago. Nearly half the country is a danger zone and a map prepared by the interior ministry
shows that 156 out of 364 electoral districts are high-risk. Ten are coloured black, signifying they are
under Taliban control. In neighbouring Pakistan, elections have given Zardari the boast of moral legitimacy but have not marked a breakthrough
in the campaign against violent Islam. Nor, after nine years of near dictatorial rule by Musharraf, have they brought about the emphatic resumption of
civilian rule. Zardari has been unable to wrest control of the country's all-powerful intelligence agency, the ISI, from the army, renegade elements of which
have long been suspected by the US and India of sponsoring jihadist groups. For all the shortcomings of democracy, the
autocratic alternative has failed. Its two main proponents, Musharraf and king Gyanendra of Nepal, have
been deposed. Gyanendra's decision in February 2005 to declare a state of emergency and suspend democracy proved a miscalculation of immense
scale. Nepal is now a republic, the king has been stripped of power and driven unceremoniously from the royal palace where his family had lived for more
than a century. To compound the insult, his great nemesis, Prachanda, the enigmatic Maoist leader, came to head the new coalition Government, although he
stepped down last month in a row with the country's new President. Certainly, this is a region where effective and sustainable
counterinsurgency strategies are exceptional. Disaggregating the threat, as Australian military strategist David Kilcullen argues in
sections of The Accidental Guerilla (reviewed on Page 10), may offer some hope: the tactic of breaking big, nationwide insurgencies into small, localised
rebellions and dealing with them accordingly. Before the fresh assault on the Taliban that started in 2006, as NATO launched new operations in the south,
this approach had delivered a measure of progress in small villages close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In what was then the most dangerous corner of
Afghanistan, US forces tried to deal with tribal leaders in a localised rather than regionalised context, seeking their allegiance with a blend of soft and hard
But in this
power, such as the promise of new schools and roads and the threat of military action if villages became Taliban safe havens.
graveyard of empires, these techniques could not be applied universally for lack of troops, resources and
strategic commitment from the US-led coalition. And commonly there were mission-related mistakes, such as attacks on the Taliban
that resulted in civilian deaths, which generated a groundswell of disfavour. Because of that, localised successes often remained just that: localised. The
history of that resonant phrase, the graveyard of empires, is part of the problem. For the Taliban and al-Qa'ida it fuses a belief in preordained victory with a
refusal to countenance defeat. For jihadists, the struggle is centuries old and eternal. The region remains captive to that violent history and religious fervour,
which speaks of another problem confronting South Asia: there is no reset button to press.
7
Kashmir
India and Pakistan recognize Kashmir will never realistically go nuclear and are close to peace
Steve Coll; 3/2/09; (Quals: Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist and writer. Coll is currently president and
CEO of the New America Foundation.); “The Back Channel; India and Pakistan's secret Kashmir talks.”; The New
Yorker; LexisNexis
The agenda included a search for an end to the long fight over Kashmir, a contest that is often described
by Western military analysts as a potential trigger for atomic war. (India first tested a nuclear weapon in 1974,
and Pakistan did so in 1998.) Since achieving independence, in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars and
countless skirmishes across Kashmir's mountain passes. The largest part of the territory is occupied by India, and Pakistanis
have long rallied around the cause of liberating it. The two principal envoys-for Pakistan, a college classmate of Musharraf's
named Tariq Aziz, and, for India, a Russia specialist named Satinder Lambah-were developing what diplomats refer to as a
"non-paper" on Kashmir, a text without names or signatures which can serve as a deniable but detailed basis for a deal. At
the Rawalpindi meetings, Musharraf drew his generals into a debate about the fundamental definition of Pakistan's national
security. "It was no longer fashionable to think in some of the old terms," Khurshid Kasuri, who was then
Foreign Minister, and who attended the sessions, recalled. "Pakistan had become a nuclear power. War
was no longer an option for either side." Kasuri said to the generals that only by diplomacy could they
achieve their goals in Kashmir. He told them, he recalled, "Put your hand here-on your heart-and tell me
that Kashmir will gain freedom" without such a negotiation with India. The generals at the table
accepted this view, Kasuri said. They "trusted Musharraf," he continued. "Their raison d'être is not permanent enmity
with India. Their raison d'être is Pakistan's permanent security. And what is security? Safety of our borders and our
economic development." By early 2007, the back-channel talks on Kashmir had become "so advanced
that we'd come to semicolons," Kasuri recalled. A senior Indian official who was involved agreed. "It
was huge-I think it would have changed the basic nature of the problem," he told me. "You would have
then had the freedom to remake Indo-Pakistani relations." Aziz and Lambah were negotiating the details for a visit
to Pakistan by the Indian Prime Minister during which, they hoped, the principles underlying the Kashmir agreement would
be announced and talks aimed at implementation would be inaugurated. One quarrel, over a waterway known as
Sir Creek, would be formally settled
8
Iran
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technologies in the middle east will drive surrounding neighbors to an
arms race of nuclear weapons
Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, other countries’ worries about a
nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external
powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear
that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold
War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear-weapons capable Iran. Episodes of low-
intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and
broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.
If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15 years, the risk of them being used ever again is gone –
global disarmament would follow
If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15-20 years, the international system will be shocked as it
experiences immediate humanitarian, economic, and political-military repercussions. A future use of
nuclear weapons probably would bring about significant geopolitical changes as some states would seek
to establish or reinforce security alliances with existing nuclear powers and others would push for global
nuclear disarmament.
9
Great power wars
Great power wars are no longer realistic – great powers don’t exist
Foreign Affairs; August ’94; “Where are the great powers?”; https://www.msu.edu/course/iss/325/stein/read-325-
1.htm
During the Cold War as before it, local and regional conflicts were often instigated or at least
encouraged and materially supported by rival great powers. Now, by contrast, the absence of functioning
great powers is the cause of the world's inability to cope with all manner of violent disorders. The result is
that not only groups of secessionists and aggressive small powers, such as Serbia, but even mere armed bands can now
impose their will or simply rampage, unchecked by any greater force from without. Today there is neither the danger
of great power wars nor the relative tranquillity once imposed by each great power within its own sphere
of influence. By the traditional definition, great powers were states strong enough to successfully wage war
without calling on allies. But that distinction is now outdated, because the issue today is not whether war
can be made with or without allies, but whether war can be made at all. Historically, there have been tacit
preconditions to great power status: a readiness to use force whenever it was advantageous to do so and an acceptance of the
resulting combat casualties with equanimity, as long as the number was not disproportionate. In the past, those preconditions
were too blatantly obvious and too easily satisfied to deserve a mention by either practitioners or theoreticians. Great powers
normally relied on intimidation rather than combat, but only because a willingness to use force was assumed. Moreover, they
would use force undeterred by the prospect of the ensuing casualties, within limits of course.
10
Great power wars
The international order is drastically changing – a multipolar world will violently break out by
2025 unless the U.S. takes steps to increase their dominance militarily
The international system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost
unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic
transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of
nonstate actors. By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national
power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries. Concurrent with the shift in
power among nation-states, the relative power of various nonstate actors—including businesses, tribes,
religious organizations, and criminal networks—is increasing. The players are changing, but so too are the
scope and breadth of transnational issues important for continued global prosperity. Potentially slowing global economic
growth; aging populations in the developed world; growing energy, food, and water constraints; and worries about climate
change will limit and diminish what will still be an historically unprecedented age of prosperity. Historically, emerging
multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. Despite the recent financial
volatility—which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends—we do not believe that we are
headed towards a complete breakdown of the international system—as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier
phase of globalization came to a halt. But, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with
risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, and technological
innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial
expansion, and military rivalries. This is a story with no clear outcome, as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use
to map out divergent futures. Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the
United States’ relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become
more constrained. At the same time, the extent to which other actors—both state and nonstate—will be willing or
able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear. Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a
growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the
incomplete transition from the old to a still forming new order.
11
Great power wars
Economic growth China and India will assert them as dominate poles of the world by 2025 unless
the U.S. drastically increases growth
In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now
under way—roughly from West to East—is without precedent in modern history. This shift derives from two
sources. First, increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf States and Russia. Second, lower costs combined with
government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.
Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.
China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If
current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading
military power. It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the biggest polluter. India probably will
continue to enjoy relatively rapid economic growth and will strive for a multipolar world in which New
Delhi is one of the poles. China and India must decide the extent to which they are willing and capable
of playing increasing global roles and how each will relate to the other. Russia has the potential to be
richer, more powerful, and more self-assured in 2025. If it invests in human capital, expands and
diversifies its economy, and integrates with global markets, by 2025 Russia could boast a GDP approaching
that of the UK and France. On the other hand, Russia could experience a significant decline if it fails to take these steps and oil and gas prices remain in the
$50-70 per barrel range. No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global
clout. We expect, however, to see the political and economic power of other countries—such as Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey—increase. For the most part,
China, India, and Russia are not following the Western liberal model for self-development but instead are using a different model, “state capitalism.” State
capitalism is a loose term used to describe a system of economic management that gives a prominent role to the state. Other rising powers—South Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore—also used state capitalism to develop their economies. However, the impact of China following this path is potentially much
greater owing to its size and approach to “democratization.” Nevertheless, we remain optimistic about the long-term prospects for greater democratization,
even though advances are likely to be slow and globalization is subjecting many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures
with the potential to undermine liberal institutions. Many other countries will fall further behind economically. Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region
most vulnerable to economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability. Despite increased global demand for commodities for
which Sub-Saharan Africa will be a major supplier, local populations are unlikely to experience significant economic gain. Windfall profits arising from
sustained increases in commodity prices might further entrench corrupt or otherwise ill-equipped governments in several regions, diminishing the prospects
for democratic and market-based reforms. Although many of Latin America’s major countries will have become middle income powers by 2025, others,
particularly those such as Venezuela and Bolivia which have embraced populist policies for a protracted period, will lag behind—and some, such as Haiti,
will have become even poorer and less governable. Overall, Latin America will continue to lag behind Asia and other fast-growing areas in terms of
economic competitiveness. Asia,
Africa, and Latin America will account for virtually all population growth over
the next 20 years; less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the West. Europe and Japan will
continue to far outdistance the emerging powers of China and India in per capita wealth , but they will struggle to
maintain robust growth rates because the size of their working-age populations will decrease. The US will be a partial exception to the aging of populations
in the developed world because it will experience higher birth rates and more immigration. The number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged to
relatively privileged countries is likely to increase.
12
Probability
[ ] Risk should be evaluated towards the overall welfare
Zeckhauser, Richard-, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Gov ’96[Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, “The economics of
catastrophes”, vol 12, P. 127-128]
Let us consider a stylized version of the river-flood example. Individual landowners or cities can take
actions, such as filling in marshes for real estate developments or building protective levees, that make
the flood more likely. 32 Let us say that there are n decision makers with a binary choice, where a 1 promotes the flood
probability, and a 0 does not. With m players choosing 1, we have p = P(m). Even ifp or P(m) were directly observable, we
would have a severe incentives problem if the number of decision makers is large. Say there are ten equal-sized decision
makers on the river. By choosing 1, they would reap any increase in expected benefits, but would bear only 1/10 of the extra
costs. Too much risk would be taken, too many l's would be chosen. Figure 2 shows the average and marginal costs of being
an m, judged from the standpoint of the individual taking the action. Here M -- 100. Say the benefit of choosing a 1 is
constant at 1.33 Then we will have six players choosing a 1 in equilibrium. Note that there will be a race to choose, since the
six who choose 1 get a higher payoff than the four who choose 0. What is efficient, however, is to have only one
person choose 1. Beyond that, for a gain of 1, there is a greater than a .01 chance of loss of 100.Given
such a situation, assuming rational choice, an absolute increase in the P(m) function may be desirable,
because it may deter some risk-imposing behavior, lead to a lower level of risk, and improve overall
welfare. For example, if there were a critical mass point, a point at which the probability of the catastrophe rose rapidly, this
would curtail risk-imposing behavior beyond that point. Tilting a portion of the P(m) curve upwards could reduce the
equilibrium probability of a catastrophe. Of course, some ways of raising the curves could make matters worse.
The general point, however, is that, to cut off risk-imposing behavior in the uncoordinated equilibrium,
we need to have the marginal cost sufficiently high at some point. Any increases in the P(m) curve offer
a gain in deterrence but a loss in terms of increased risks created by the actions which we fail to deter.
13
Magnitude O/W Risk
[ ] The greater magnitude needs to be weighed over risk – even .0001 magnitude is enough to
pull the trigger.
RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER; Political economy professor at Harvard University; May, 1996; [W. KIP VISCUSI
ABSTRACT “The Risk Management Dilemma” American Academy of Political and Social Science; Jstor]
When the magnitude of the risk is unclear, what should the government do? The current procedure is to
focus on the worst-case scenario.15 Unfor- tunately, this leads to policies that pay the greatest attention to the risks
about which least is known. If chemical Aposes a lifetime fatality risk that is known to be .00002, whereas
equally widely used chemical B poses a risk that might be .00003 but probably is zero, current practice
would first address the risks from chemical B, though we could save a greater expected number of lives if we fo-
cused on A.
14

Impact Calculus Final Camp

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Michigan 2009 Impact Calc

Classic Sophomores Polin/Alderete

[ ] Rescher consistently misinterprets other authors; making his claims completely

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