Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Archaea
Bacteria
I. INTRODUCTION
Bacteria, one-celled organisms visible only through a microscope. Bacteria live all
around us and within us. The air is filled with bacteria, and they have even entered outer
space in spacecraft. Bacteria live in the deepest parts of the ocean and deep within Earth.
They are in the soil, in our food, and on plants and animals. Even our bodies are home to
many different kinds of bacteria. Our lives are closely intertwined with theirs, and the
health of our planet depends very much on their activities.
Bacterial cells are so small that scientists measure them in units called micrometers (µm).
One micrometer equals a millionth of a meter (0.0000001 m or about 0.000039 in), and
an average bacterium is about one micrometer long. Hundreds of thousands of bacteria
would fit on a rounded dot made by a pencil.
Bacteria lack a true nucleus, a feature that distinguishes them from plant and animal cells.
In plants and animals the saclike nucleus carries genetic material in the form of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Bacteria also have DNA but it floats within the cell,
usually in a loop or coil. A tough but resilient protective shell surrounds the bacterial cell.
Biologists classify all life forms as either prokaryotes or eukaryotes. Prokaryotes are
simple, single-celled organisms like bacteria. They lack a defined nucleus of the sort
found in plant and animal cells. More complex organisms, including all plants and
animals, whose cells have a nucleus, belong to the group called eukaryotes. The word
prokaryote comes from Greek words meaning “before nucleus”; eukaryote comes from
Greek words for “true nucleus.”
Bacteria inhabited Earth long before human beings or other living things appeared. The
earliest bacteria that scientists have discovered, in fossil remains in rocks, probably lived
about 3.5 billion years ago. These early bacteria inhabited a harsh world: It was
extremely hot, with high levels of ultraviolet radiation from the sun and with no oxygen
to breathe.
Descendents of the bacteria that inhabited a primitive Earth are still with us today. Most
have changed and would no longer be able to survive the harshness of Earth’s early
environment. Yet others have not changed so much. Some bacteria today are able to grow
at temperatures higher than the boiling point of water, 100oC (212oF). These bacteria
live deep in the ocean or within Earth. Other bacteria cannot stand contact with oxygen
gas and can live only in oxygen-free environments—in our intestines, for example, or in
the ooze at the bottom of swamps, bogs, or other wetlands. Still others are resistant to
radiation. Bacteria are truly remarkable in terms of their adaptations to extreme
environments and their abilities to survive and thrive in parts of Earth that are
inhospitable to other forms of life. Anywhere there is life, it includes bacterial life.
Much of our experience with bacteria involves disease. Although some bacteria do cause
disease, many kinds of bacteria live on or in the human body and prevent disease.
Bacteria associated with the human body outnumber body cells by ten to one. In addition,
bacteria play important roles in the environment and in industry.
We have all had bacterial diseases. Bacteria cause many cases of gastroenteritis,
sometimes called stomach flu. Perhaps the most common bacterial disease is tooth decay.
Dental plaque, the sticky film on our teeth, consists primarily of masses of bacteria.
These bacteria ferment (break down) the sugar we eat to produce acids, which over time
can dissolve the enamel of the teeth and create cavities (holes) in the teeth.
Tooth decay provides a good example of how multiple factors contribute to bacterial
disease. The human body hosts the bacteria, the diet supplies the sugars, and the bacteria
produce the acid that damages the teeth.
In most cases the bacteria that cause disease are not part of the bacteria that normally
inhabit the body. They are picked up instead from sick people, sick animals,
contaminated food or water, or other external sources. Bacterial disease also can occur
after surgery, an accident, or some other event that weakens the immune system.
When the immune system is not functioning properly, bacteria that usually are harmless
can overwhelm the body and cause disease. These organisms are called opportunistic
because they cause disease only when an opportunity is presented. For example, cuts or
injuries to the skin and protective layers of the body enable normally friendly bacteria to
enter the bloodstream or other sterile parts of the body and cause infection. Surgery may
enable bacteria from one part of the body to reach another, where they cause infection. A
weakened immune system may be unable to prevent the rapid multiplication of bacteria
and other microorganisms.
Opportunistic infections became more important in the late 20th century because of
diseases such as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), a viral disease that
ravages the immune system. Also contributing to an increase in opportunistic infections
is the wider use of cancer-fighting drugs and other drugs that damage the immune
system.
Some dramatic infectious diseases result from exposure to bacteria that are not part of our
normal bacterial community. Cholera, one of the world’s deadliest diseases today, is
caused by the bacterium Vibrio cholerae. Cholera is spread in water and food
contaminated with the bacteria, and by people who have the disease. After entering the
body, the cholera bacteria grow in the intestines, often along the surface of the intestinal
wall, where they secrete a toxin (poison). This toxin causes massive loss of fluid from the
gut, and an infected person can die of dehydration (fluid loss) unless the lost fluids, and
the salts they contain, are replaced. Cholera is common in developing regions of the
world that lack adequate medical care.
Another major bacterial killer is Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which causes tuberculosis
(TB), a disease of the lungs. Tuberculosis is responsible for more than 2 million deaths
per year worldwide. Although antibiotics such as penicillin fight many bacterial diseases,
the TB bacterium is highly resistant to most antibiotics. In addition, the TB-causing
bacteria readily spread from person to person.
While tuberculosis and cholera have been with us for centuries, in recent decades new
bacterial diseases have emerged. Legionnaires’ disease, a severe form of pneumonia, was
first recognized at an American Legion convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in
1976. It is caused by a previously unknown bacterium, Legionella pneumophila, which is
most often transmitted through infected water.
Lyme disease, a form of arthritis caused by the bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi, was first
recognized in Lyme, Connecticut, in 1975. A bite from a deer tick that carries the bacteria
transmits the disease to human beings.
A food-borne disease currently causing major concern in the United States, Canada, and
Western Europe is caused by a particular variant of the common intestinal bacterium
Escherichia coli, or E. coli for short. Although E. coli is normally present in the human
intestines, the variant E. coli O157:H7 produces toxins that cause bloody diarrhea and, in
some cases, far more severe problems, including kidney failure and death. A person can
become infected by eating contaminated meat. Thorough cooking kills the bacteria.
Our immune system is designed to protect us against harmful bacteria. It works to keep
our normal microflora in check and also to eliminate invaders from outside the body.
Some immune-system defenses are built in: The skin acts as a barrier to bacterial
invaders, and antimicrobial substances in body secretions such as saliva and mucus can
kill or stop the growth of some disease-causing bacteria. We acquire another immune-
system defense through exposure to disease-causing bacteria.
After recovering from many bacterial infections, people have the ability to resist a second
attack by the same bacteria. They can do so because their immune system forms disease-
fighting proteins called antibodies designed to recognize specific bacteria. When next
exposed to those bacteria, the antibodies bind to the surface of the bacteria and either kill
them, prevent them from multiplying, or neutralize their toxin. Vaccines also can
stimulate the immune system to form disease-fighting antibodies. Some vaccines contain
strains of the bacterium that lack the ability to cause infection; others contain only parts
of bacterial cells.
A4b. Vaccines
Immunization through vaccines is important in the prevention of infectious diseases
caused by bacteria. Vaccines expose a human being or other animal to a disease-causing
bacterium or its toxins without causing the disease. As a result of this exposure, the body
forms antibodies to the specific bacterium. These antibodies remain ready to attack if
they meet the bacteria in the future. Some immunizations last a lifetime, whereas others
must be renewed with a booster shot.
Tetanus provides a good example of a successful vaccine. The bacterium Clostridium
tetani, found in soil and ordinary dirt, produces one of the most lethal toxins known. The
toxin affects nerves, resulting in muscle rigidity and death. Tetanus infection has become
very rare in developed countries such as the United States where nearly everyone is
immunized against the toxin. The vaccine immunizes the body by means of toxins that
have been chemically treated so they are no longer toxic. Health officials recommend
getting a tetanus shot every ten years. In less developed countries where vaccination is
not so common, tetanus is a major cause of death, especially of babies.
B3. Chemosynthesis
Bacteria are major players in cycles of other elements in the environment.
Chemosynthetic bacteria use chemical energy, instead of the light energy used by plants,
to change CO2 into something that other organisms can eat. Chemosynthesis occurs in
vents at the bottom of the ocean, where light is unavailable for photosynthesis but
hydrogen sulfide gas, H2S, bubbles up from below Earth’s crust. Life can develop around
these vents because bacteria use the H2S in changing CO2 into organic nutrients. The
H2S coming up from Earth’s mantle is extremely hot, but bacteria in these vent
communities are adapted to the high temperatures. Bacteria’s ability to react chemically
with sulfur compounds is useful in certain industrial processes as well.
B4. Bioremediation
Bioremediation refers to the use of microorganisms, especially bacteria, to return the
elements in toxic chemicals to their natural cycles in nature. It may provide an
inexpensive and effective method of environmental cleanup, which is one of the major
challenges facing human society today.
Bioremediation has helped in cleaning up oil spills, pesticides, and other toxic materials.
For example, accidents involving huge oil tankers regularly result in large spills that
pollute coastlines and harm wildlife. Bacteria and other microorganisms can convert the
toxic materials in crude oil to harmless products such as CO2. Adding fertilizers that
contain nitrogen, phosphorus, and oxygen to the polluted areas promotes the
multiplication of bacteria already present in the environment and speeds the cleanup
process.
Bacteria are so small that they can be seen only under a microscope that magnifies them
at least 500 times their actual size. Some become visible only at magnifications of 1,000
times. They are measured in micrometers (µm) and average about 1 to 2 µm in length.
One micrometer equals one-millionth of a meter (0.0000001 m or about 0.000039 in).
Bacteria not only have many uses, they also occur in diverse shapes and types. As a
group they carry out a broad range of activities and have different nutritional needs. They
thrive in a variety of environments.
A. Types of Bacteria
Scientists use various systems for classifying bacteria into different types. One of the
simplest systems is by shape. Other systems depend on oxygen use, source of carbon, and
response to a particular dye.
Scientists long had difficulty classifying bacteria in relation to each other and in relation
to other living things. Because bacteria are so small, scientists found it nearly impossible
to identify characteristic structures on or in the organisms that would help in
classification. For many years bacteria were considered to be plants and named according
to the botanical system of classification, by genus and species. For example, Escherichia
coli belongs to the genus Escherichia and to the species coli within that genus. The genus
name starts with a capital letter; the species name, with a small letter. Both are written in
italic letters. For convenience, people often use only the letter of the genus name, as in E.
coli, for example.
A. A New Classification System
The development of the field of molecular phylogeny in the 1970s changed our view of
bacteria. Phylogeny relates organisms through their evolutionary origins. In molecular
phylogeny, scientists look for similarities in the molecules of organisms to figure out
relationships. Initially, scientists looked at proteins, which are made up of long strings of
amino acids. They figured that if a particular protein in two organisms contained exactly
the same amino acids in the same order, then the two were very closely related or even
identical. If there were only a few differences, the organisms were closely related. The
more differences there were, the more distant the relationship would be.
Carl Woese, a microbiologist at the University of Illinois, discovered that it was easier to
work with nucleic acids, such as DNA and RNA. He found that the best molecules were
ribonucleic acid molecules from ribosomes (rRNA). Ribosomes are the biochemical
machines inside cells that coordinate the synthesis of proteins. It was relatively easy to
obtain rRNA, to identify its chemical building blocks known as nucleotides, and to
determine the order of the nucleotides in the molecule. Because rRNA shows relatively
little variation from one generation to the next, it proved to be an excellent tool for
determining evolutionary relationships.
Molecular phylogeny indicated that there are three major groups, or kingdoms, of
organisms. One kingdom, called Eukaryotae, consists of all organisms with a true nucleus
and includes all plants and animals. The two other kingdoms, called Archaea and
Eubacteria, consist of prokaryotic bacteria without a true nucleus. Archaea, or
archaeabacteria, were once classified with other bacteria and the two kingdoms share
many characteristics. Many of the archaea are extremophiles and can live in extremely
hot, salty, or acid environments, but so can many eubacteria.
The classification of bacteria into two kingdoms, a system proposed by Woese, is based
almost entirely on the structure of ribosomal RNA. But it appears to agree with other
findings regarding the basic structures of the organisms, their metabolism, and their
evolution.
V. EVOLUTION OF BACTERIA
The oldest fossils of bacteria-like organisms date back as many as 3.5 billion years,
making them the oldest-known fossils. These early bacteria could survive in the
inhospitable conditions when Earth was young, extremely hot, and without oxygen. With
the help of molecular phylogeny, scientists have pieced together a view of the evolution
of bacteria. They believe that the kingdoms Archaea and Eubacteria had a common
ancestor but separated very early on, a few billion years ago. Archaea may be the most
common organisms on Earth today. Many of them can live without oxygen and without
sunlight and inhabit such places as deep-sea vents. However, scientists currently know
much more about the kingdom Eubacteria than the kingdom Archaea, because humans
have more contact with disease-causing Eubacteria, such as streptococci and E. coli, and
with Eubacteria such as lactobacilli used in food processing and other industries.
Over time, bacteria evolved to capture energy from the Sun’s light and thereby carry out
the process of photosynthesis, converting sunlight into nutrients. Next they developed the
sort of photosynthesis that plants today carry out by splitting water molecules to produce
oxygen. With oxygen available, organisms that require it, such as animals, could inhabit
Earth.
Recent discoveries suggest that Eukaryotae (plants and animals) probably evolved from
Eubacteria. Many of the organelles (structures within the cytoplasm) of plant and animal
cells are actually bacterial. Among organelles derived from bacteria that invaded plant or
animal cells are mitochondria and chloroplasts. Mitochondria in plants and animals
convert nutrients into energy-storage molecules. Chloroplasts house the photosynthetic
machinery of plant cells. Not only do bacteria live on us and in us, but we ourselves are
in a way partly bacterial.
Before the development of the microscope, some people speculated that small, invisible
particles caused diseases and fermentations. But not until the late 1600s did anyone
actually see bacteria. In the 1670s Dutch lens maker Antoni van Leeuwenhoek first saw
what he called “wee animalcules” under his single-lens microscopes. Leeuwenhoek
noticed cells of different shapes within a variety of specimens, including scrapings from
his teeth and rainwater from gutters. His findings laid the foundation for the growth of
microbiology.
The microscope was improved over the following centuries, but bacteria still appeared as
tiny objects, even with magnifications of 1,000 times. In the 1930s, the first electron
microscopes were developed. Using beams of electrons instead of light, these
microscopes could magnify objects at least 200 times more than light microscopes could.
With magnifications of 200,000 times actual size, it became possible to see structures
within bacterial cells in detail.
Early studies of bacteria were difficult. In any environment many types of bacteria
compete and cooperate, and all this activity makes it nearly impossible to figure out what
each organism is doing. The first step was to separate different types of bacteria. One
way of isolating bacteria was to grow them on a solid surface. Scientists first used kitchen
foods, such as a potato slice cut with a sterile knife, on which to grow bacteria that attack
plants. This method was not very convenient, however.
The perfect medium (environment) for growing bacteria also came from the kitchen,
although its usefulness was demonstrated in the laboratory of German scientist Robert
Koch. The medium was agar, a gel-forming substance that comes from seaweed. A
coworker of Koch’s noted that his wife’s puddings remained solid in summer heat,
whereas the gelatin on which he grew bacteria dissolved or got eaten by the bacteria. The
firm puddings contained agar.
Agar dissolves in water only at temperatures close to boiling. When it cools, it forms a
stable gel. Most bacteria cannot digest it. Bacteriologists could transfer a bacterial
specimen onto a plate of agar using sterile wires or loops, and obtain a colony of
organisms. If more than one type of bacteria formed a colony, the scientists could repeat
the process, growing each type on a separate agar plate to obtain a pure culture
(laboratory-grown specimen) for study. They could also add nutrients to agar to provide
the bacteria with the food they need for growth. In addition, they could add substances to
suppress the growth of unwanted bacteria but not the growth of those the bacteriologist
wished to isolate. Growing bacteria on agar has become routine in laboratories.
Bacteriologists have become accustomed to studying individual types of bacteria in pure
cultures. In nature, however, bacteria usually live in diverse communities, often with
hundreds of types of organisms. These communities form sticky masses called biofilms
on soil particles, ocean debris, plants and animals, and just about any solid or liquid
surface. In our bodies, biofilms develop on teeth, on the soft tissues of the mouth and
throat, on the membrane lining the nose and sinuses, in the gut, and on all other exposed
body surfaces. In nature, organisms form microbial mats on surfaces between water and
air. In sewage treatment, bacteria clump together in masses. All these communities are
highly diverse, harboring many kinds of organisms. They can be compared to cities in
which the different members have different functions, all important to maintaining the
community.
Bacteriologists are realizing more and more the need to move from studying pure cultures
containing only a single species to the study of communities in biofilms and microbial
mats. The growth of molecular biology and the capacity to study bacteria in molecular
detail have demonstrated that the bacterial world is far more diverse than previously
thought. It seems possible that we currently have discovered only a small fraction of
existing types of bacteria in the world. Perhaps as many as 95 percent of total types
remain unknown.
Scientists have already sequenced the entire genome for many bacteria. Researchers can
cut pieces from bacterial DNA and replicate it in many copies. Through DNA transfer,
the pieces can be inserted in bacterial cells. The cells with the new DNA may then start to
make new proteins they were unable to make previously. Thus, bacteria can be
genetically engineered to make a whole range of products and to develop new functions.
Genetic engineering has opened up a new world of biology and a tremendous opportunity
to explore bacteria and other microorganisms and to benefit humanity from the resulting
knowledge.
Contributed By:
Robert E. Marquis
Cyanobacteria
Cyanobacteria or Blue-Green Algae, members of a group of photosynthetic prokaryotes
single-celled organisms that lack an enclosed nucleus and other specialized cell
structures. Like green plants, cyanobacteria contain chlorophyll but the chlorophyll is not
located in chloroplasts; rather it is found in chromatophores, infoldings of the plasma
membrane where photosynthesis is carried out. In many species, other pigments mask the
chlorophyll and impart a bluish or sometimes reddish color. Some species are free-living,
but most aggregate in colonies or form filaments. Reproduction is by simple cell division
or by fragmentation of the filaments.
Cyanobacteria are found throughout the world in diverse habitats. They are abundant on
tree bark and rocks and in moist soil, where they carry on nitrogen fixation. Some
symbiotically coexist with fungi to form a lichen. In hot weather some species form large
and occasionally toxic blooms on the surfaces of ponds and coastal waters. In shallow
tropical waters, mats of the cyanobacteria grow into humps called stromatolites. Fossil
stromatolites are found in rocks formed more than 3 billion years ago, during
Precambrian time. They suggest that cyanobacteria played a role in changing the ancient
carbon dioxide-rich atmosphere into the oxygenated mixture that exists today.
Scientific classification: Cyanobacteria make up the phylum Cyanophyta, in the kingdom
Prokaryotae.
The statements made by Jake’s friends and family about what actions will help him
remain healthy (for example, his mother’s advice to wear a hat) are in some part based on
the advice-giver’s understanding of how our bodies resist colds.
Ideas about “how things work” are called hypotheses. Or, more formally, a hypothesis is
a proposed explanation for one or more observations. All of us generate hypotheses about
the causes of some phenomenon based on our understanding of the world (Figure 1.1).
When Jake’s mom tells him to dress warmly in order to avoid colds, she is basing her
advice on her belief in the fol lowing hypothesis: Becoming chilled makes an individual
more susceptible to becoming ill.
“Biodiversity” is often defined as the variety of all forms of life, from genes to species,
through to the broad scale of ecosystems (for a list of variants on this simple definition
see Gaston 1996). "Biodiversity" was coined as a contraction of "biological diversity" in
1985, but the new term arguably has taken on a meaning and import all its own. A
symposium in 1986, and the follow-up book BioDiversity (Wilson 1988), edited by
biologist E. O. Wilson, heralded the popularity of this concept. Ten years later, Takacs
(1996, p.39) described its ascent this way: "in 1988, biodiversity did not appear as a
keyword in Biological Abstracts, and biological diversity appeared once. In 1993,
biodiversity appeared seventy-two times, and biological diversity nineteen times". Fifteen
years further on, it would be hard to count how many times "biodiversity" is used every
day by scientists, policy-makers, and others. The global importance of biodiversity now
is reflected in the widely accepted target to achieve a significant reduction in the rate of
loss of biodiversity by the year 2010 [see 2010 Biodiversity Target].
While the history of this term is relatively short (compare it to other terms covered in this
encyclopedia), it already has raised important, distinctive, philosophical issues. Some of
these are entangled in the very definition of "biodiversity", an issue treated in the first
sections below. A challenge is the reconciliation of process-based and elements-based
perspectives on biodiversity. Overall, the major issue for biodiversity is how its
conservation may be integrated with other needs of society.
• 1. Concepts of Biodiversity
• 2. From Species Values to Biodiversity Values
o 2.1 Species Values and Triage
o 2.2 Species as Equal Units and SMS
• 3. Alternatives to Unit-species
o 3.1 The Shift from Elements to Processes
o 3.2 Option Value and Hierarchy of Variation
• 4. Integrating Process and Elements Perspectives
• 5. Biodiversity and Growth of Knowledge
o 5.1 Phylogenetic Hypotheses
o 5.2 Species Hypotheses
o 5.3 Biodiversity and DNA barcoding
• 6. Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries
1. Concepts of Biodiversity
The sequel to that first biodiversity book, naturally titled Biodiversity II (Reaka-Kudla et
al. 1997), documents the rapid rise of the term "biodiversity" in importance and
influence. But it also traces the study of aspects of biodiversity back as far as Aristotle.
To some extent, biodiversity merely offers a new, emotive, term for some older ideas and
programs. In fact, "biodiversity" is now used sometimes to mean "life" or "wilderness" or
other conservation values. "Biodiversity" also has served on occasion as a catch-all for
"conservation" itself.
The scientific literature illustrates how most any conservation activity might use the label
"biodiversity". On the one hand, workers taking advantage of the acknowledged
importance of the term have expanded its meaning to capture concerns at a fine scale,
such as that focussing on a favourite single species. This focus might be referred to more
accurately as one of "biospecifics". At the coarser scale, one important interpretation,
discussed below, advocates a primary linkage of biodiversity to the maintenance of
ecosystem processes — what might be called the "bio-processes" approach.
The nub of the problem of defining biodiversity is that it is hard to exclude anything from
a concept that is taken so easily to mean "everything". Sarkar (2005) has argued that
interpreting biodiversity across all biological levels, from genes to ecosystems, amounts
to considering all biological entities, so that biodiversity absurdly "becomes all of
biology".
Callicott et al. (1999) examined "biodiversity" as one of the current normative concepts
in conservation. They concluded that it remains ill-defined, and that distinctions can be
made between "functional" and "compositional" perspectives in approaching biodiversity.
"Functional" refers to a primarily concern with ecosystem and evolutionary processes,
while "compositional" sees organisms as aggregated into populations, species, higher
taxa, communities, and other categories. Callicott et al. call for a better integration of
these different perspectives, an issue discussed below in the section on Integrating
Process and Elements Perspectives.
Norton (1994) has argued that there will never be a single "objective scientific definition"
of biodiversity, in the sense of a prescription for how to measure it. In fact, Norton claims
that any increase in our understanding of biodiversity will make it less likely that there
will be a single objective measure. This biodiversity pluralism is based on an argument
that inevitably there are many different "theory bound" versions of biodiversity and many
different ways to value it. This perspective is in accord with recognition of functional-
compositional perspectives on biodiversity. For example, Norton (1994; 2001) points to
recent emphasis on structure and process regarding ecological "health" or "integrity" that
is seen as going beyond a conventional elements-oriented perspective for biodiversity.
One cannot aggregate all these different versions of biodiversity. Instead, we are to
"describe in ways appropriate given certain purposes" and the choice among these
different biodiversity "models" will depend on what values are important to the decision-
maker.
This perspective is characterized as "post-positivist" because it recognizes biodiversity as
inevitably value-laden — there is no one, correct, measure of biodiversity to be
discovered but many, each having different values. Roebuck and Phifer (1999) lament
what they perceive as current "positivism" in biodiversity conservation, described by
them as based variously on processes of verificationism and falsificationism in seeking
facts. They argue that biodiversity conservation is rooted primarily in ethics and we must
not continue to back away from values and advocacy.
The idea that the choice of a measure of biodiversity depends on values finds support in
Sarkar (2005). He argues that biodiversity operationally amounts to whatever is the
valued target of conservation priority setting for different localities.
Biodiversity may be a catch-all for various aspects of conservation, but the fresh
perspectives arising from recognition of "biodiversity" suggest possible unifying
concepts. E. O. Wilson (1988) sees "biodiversity" as corresponding to a dramatic
transformation for biologists from a "bits and pieces" approach to a much more holistic
approach. Wilson describes this change in perspective as a realization that biological
diversity is disappearing and, unlike other threatened things, is irreversible. Wrapped up
in the term therefore is the idea of a "biodiversity crisis". Ehrenfeld (1988) similarly
reinforces this idea of the value of diversity in the aggregate. He argues that diversity
previously was never regarded in itself to be in danger, but that biodiversity now is
recognised as endangered in its own right. Wrapped up in the term therefore is the idea of
a "biodiversity crisis". While the case for such a crisis itself raises debates about
measures and definitions (see Sarkar, 2005), the definition of "biodiversity" sometimes
explicitly reflects these links to an extinction crisis. Takacs (1996) reviews cases where
the definition of biodiversity is wrapped up in the idea of strategies needed to preserve
variation. In accord with this perspective is a shift to a focus on valuing ecosystem
processes. This focus arguably will ensure maintenance and ongoing evolution of these
systems, and therefore all of biodiversity.
Holistic perspectives on biodiversity have emerged also through another important focus.
For Wilson (1988), biodiversity captures the idea of a "frontier of the future", presenting
a dazzling prospect of largely unknown variety, with unanticipated uses. Biodiversity is
seen by many as a symbol for our lack of knowledge about the components of life's
variation, and their importance to humankind (see Takacs 1996). These arguments
suggest that core biodiversity values might be based more on what we do not know than
what we do know. Biodiversity can be viewed as primarily capturing the two-fold
challenge of unknown variety, having unknown value.
Anticipated future uses and values of the unknown are captured in the idea of "option
values" (for definitions, see World Conservation Union 1980). A species, or other
element of biodiversity, has option value when its continued existence retains the
possibility of future uses and benefits. Option value corresponds not just to unknown
future values of known species, but also to the unknown values of unknown species (or
other components of variation). This concept is at the core of biodiversity because it links
"variation" and "value". Estimating and quantifying the largely unknown variation that
makes up biodiversity is one and the same as quantifying corresponding option values of
biodiversity. According to this emphasis, a basic definition of biodiversity might be
expanded as: the variety of all forms of life, from the scale of genes through to species
and ecosystems …so forming a "calculus" — a means for measurement and comparison
— of option values.
Focussing on this important aspect of biodiversity does not throw away the other possible
"biodiversity" values that might be listed (process-based "resilience" of ecosystems,
current commodity values of species, etc.), but facilitates integration of biodiversity's
option values with those other values. These possibilities are discussed further in the
section on Integrating Process and Elements Perspectives.
Given that holistic approaches may integrate functional and compositional aspects, the
following sections address these different biodiversity perspectives. The next section
addresses the early attempts to address values of biodiversity as a whole that emerged
from dissatisfaction with the "bits and pieces" focus on individual species. A later
section, Alternatives to Unit-species, presents attempts to address some weaknesses of
this initial approach.
In developing ideas about the overall value of biodiversity it has been natural to draw on
existing arguments about values of individual species (for review, see World
Conservation Union 1980; Norton 1988). Commodity value and other direct use values
have intuitive appeal because they reflect known values. But a key problem is that
species need to be preserved for reasons other than any known value as resources for
human use (Sober 1986). Callicott (1986) discusses philosophical arguments regarding
non-utilitarian value and concludes that there is no easy argument to be made except a
moral one. Species have some "intrinsic value" — reflecting the idea that a species has a
value "in and for itself" (Callicott 1986, p.140) — and there is an ethical obligation to
protect biodiversity.
Randall (1988, p. 218) has argued that preference is the basis for value and that it is
possible to treat all species values as preferences of humans. Preferences-based
approaches to valuation can provide economic (dollar) estimates of value. This valuation
process may include methods for assessing and quantifying option values. A claimed
advantage of such approaches is that the only good way to protect species is to place an
economic value on them. Randall argues that such quantification is advantageous because
the species preservation option will fare well when the full range of values is included in
conservation priority setting.
The context for many of these arguments has been a consideration of various criteria for
placing priorities among species for conservation efforts. These considerations have led
to debates about the role of "triage" based on species prioritization. Triage recalls the
medical context in which priorities are set for investments in saving patients. Applied to
conservation, individual species are differentially valued and assessed relative to
differential opportunity costs. The best conservation package is to be found through a
process of calculating costs and benefits of protection of individual species.
Many biologists have rejected the idea of triage and argue that we must try to save all
species (Takacs 1996). Philosophical issues arise in the debate as to whether biodiversity
should be approached through the process of differentially valuing species, so that
choices could be made in the face of a budget, or regarding species as the fundamental
unit and trying to protect them all. The latter option is arguably more holistic and in
accord with a focus on all of biodiversity (the individual species focus is sometimes
viewed as the first of three phases of growth in biological resources assessment; see the
section on The Shift from Elements to Processes).
This perspective demands some alternative to species-based triage that will still
accommodate the reality of limited resources. The idea of a "safe minimum standard"
(SMS) for biodiversity has been proposed as a suitable alternative to triage. Norton
advocates an SMS based on unit-species, interpreted to mean that all species are saved
unless costs are intolerable; he argues for "preservation of species as a general policy".
Wilson (1992, p. 310) also has advocated an SMS in which all species are to be protected
unless costs are too high. He argues that we "treat each as an irreplaceable resource for
humanity". This is directly in preference to a cost-benefit approach, characterized as
examining single species and their properties and deciding how much to invest.
The SMS leaves the idea of "too high a cost" open to different interpretations. These vary
with philosophical perspectives about the nature of values. For example, "deep ecology",
where biodiversity is independent of human value, responds differently to
"utilitarianism", where biodiversity might be preserved to extent that measurable benefits
to humans exceed costs (see The Preservation of Species). Randall's (1986, p. 103)
utilitarian position considers intrinsic or option value of unit-species in conjunction with
any recognized utilitarian value: all species not already distinguished in having
recognised human-use values "would be treated as having a positive but unknown
expected value; implicitly all would be treated as equally valuable."
3. Alternatives to Unit-species
We can recognize two alternatives to the use of species as equal-weight units for an SMS.
One of these (see the section on The Shift from Elements to Processes) consciously
moves further away from units or items of any kind. Here, the valuation of species is seen
as problematic, with arbitrary solutions. Valuation is to encompass all of biodiversity but
through a functional perspective, shifting the focus to ecosystems processes (Norton
1994, 2001).
The other alternative [see the section on Option Value and Hierarchy of Variation] might
be viewed as going to the other extreme. Units or elements of biodiversity are seen (at
least implicitly) at every level of biological variation, and the quantification of variation
is to provide relative valuations (e.g. of different places) for priority setting.
These two perspectives provide different responses to the issues concerning taxonomic
distinctiveness valuations on species — so providing one benchmark for comparisons. In
the ecosystem processes case, this has provided a prototype example of problems with
attempts to value species-units. In the hierarchical variation case, it has provided a
prototype example of the quantification of unknown variation and option value at one
nominated scale of biodiversity.
Norton argues that the inadequacy of this second phase, being "ill-suited" to an emerging
process orientation, has lead to the third phase based on ecosystem processes. Here,
values are not to be attached to objects; instead, we should value (or "abhor") processes.
This approach is characterised as more dynamic in its perspective, as systems oriented,
and therefore more "holistic". The focus is on maintaining functions of healthy
ecosystems, such as provision of clean air and water. This process orientation is
compatible with much recent work internationally on ecosystem services [Takacs 1996;
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment].
The term "biodiversity" is used in this context largely as an assumed foundation for
ecosystem processes. Norton (2001) sees the process focus as replacing, not
complementing, the "increasingly obsolete" inventory/items perspective of biodiversity,
arguing that we "will likely move away from the inventory-of-objects approach
altogether". The processes perspective is to determine how we look at biodiversity: "…
applied to biodiversity policy, we can focus on the processes that have created and
sustained the species and elements that currently exist, rather than on the species and
elements themselves" (2001; p. 90). Further, "it is reasonable to interpret advocates of
biodiversity protection as valuing natural processes for their capacity to maintain support
and repair damage to their parts" (2001; p. 91).
Related arguments are found in the advocacy of "biological integrity" (Karr 1991), in
preference to biodiversity, as a focus for conservation management. Biological integrity
is primarily concerned with the persistence of biogeographic, evolutionary, and
ecosystem processes, such as those relating to energy flows. For Angermeier and Karr
(1994), "integrity is reflected in both the biotic elements and the processes that generate
and maintain those elements, whereas diversity describes only the elements." They
conclude that "resource policy would be most effective if based on the more
comprehensive goal of protecting biological integrity." Biological integrity is discussed
further in the section Integrating Process and Elements Perspectives.
The other alternative to the unit-species approach departs from it by increasing not
decreasing our focus on items or elements. The unit-species perspective has been justified
through option values and a response to a lack of knowledge — we do not know enough
to differentially value species. But consideration of option values also has been used to
justify a move away from a species-as-units approach, to embrace a whole hierarchy of
possible units. Suppose, for example, that the units of interest are features of species (a
feature might be some morphological characteristic shared by all members of that
species). These features in general have unknown future values. It follows that total
option value would be increased by having more features protected. If we apply the
rationale that all these features should be treated as units of equal value, then some
species (those that are phylogenetically distinctive; see below) will make larger
contributions to the overall feature diversity represented by a set of species. thus, equal
value at the fine scale among features leads to differential values at the coarse scale
among species. We see that the same argument used to justify species as equal-value
units can be used to justify differential valuation of species (Faith 1994).
Feature diversity can provide a basis for valuation, but it raises measurement challenges.
Not only do we not know, in general, the future value of different features, but also we
cannot even list the features for most species. Phylogenetic pattern provides one way to
estimate and quantify variation at the feature level. A species complements others in
representing additional evolutionary history (Faith 1994), as depicted in the branches of
an estimated phylogeny. The degree of complementarity reflects the relative number of
additional features contributed by that species. For example, given some subset of species
that are well-protected, and two species in that taxonomic group that are endangered, the
priority for conservation investment may depend on the relative gains in feature diversity
(the complementarity values) expected for each species. We do not know in practice what
all the actual features are, but can make a prediction about relative gains and losses. The
predicted total feature diversity of a set of species is referred to as its "phylogenetic
diversity" (PD; Faith 1994).
This phylogenetic diversity perspective can be reconciled with the rejection (Takacs
1996) of "intricate" calculations of phylogenetically based valuations of species. Some
proposed taxonomic distinctiveness methods indeed simply have been species-based
attempts to assign differential values. But when the focus is on biodiversity units at a
lower level, it is not an attempt to apply differential values to species as fundamental
units of biodiversity, but equal values to those lower-level units. The focus on these units
rather than conventional species is highlighted by the fact that for subsequent priority
setting on places, species sometimes are ignored altogether (Faith 1994). We return to
this issue below, in discussing ways to side-step contentious species designations in DNA
barcoding (see the section on Biodiversity and DNA barcoding).
The value of all of biodiversity is in this full hierarchy of variation — measuring one
measures the other. These values may also encompass intrinsic values of biodiversity.
Callicott (1989) and others have followed Aldo Leopold's (1949) work in arguing that all
levels of biological organization (species, biotic communities, ecosystems) have intrinsic
value. This suggest that any calculus of relative option values (indicating relative value
contributions made by species, places, etc) is also a calculus of relative intrinsic values.
For conservation priority setting, each new place (for example) adds some biodiversity to
the total for a set of places. This open-endedness means we must consider costs; there is
no possible policy position that can ask to "save all the pieces". However, this
comparison among places is arguably made easier also because we only require
complementarity — marginal gains in variation — rather than total amounts. Sarkar and
Margules (2002, p. 302) argue that, if we are considering conservation actions in different
places, then "an absolute concept or measure of biodiversity is not needed," and "the
relative concept of biodiversity built into the definition of complementarity has the level
of precision needed to undertake conservation planning."
This perspective, while useful, may be too narrow. Sarkar and Margules (2002) describe
biodiversity as rooted in place, but this is just one scale of decision making. We can apply
the same complementarity principle to species not places, as in the example of
complementarity values at the underlying feature level estimated from phylogenetic
pattern (a general conceptual model for complementarity at different levels of
biodiversity is found in Faith 1994).
Sarkar and Margules describe the use of a relative concept of biodiversity based on
complementarity as "philosophically uncharted territory." At issue are the empirical and
"conventional" elements involved in estimating complementarity values. These issues are
addressed in the section on Biodiversity and Growth of Knowledge.
The perception of conflict between process and elements perspectives appears sometimes
as a tension between global and local aspects of biodiversity. For example, Vermeulen
and Koziell (2002) see global biodiversity values as ignoring important local values of
biodiversity, relating to ecosystem services. They argue that treating biodiversity as one
composite property corresponding to global values is not helpful, and is a consequence of
the fact that "the global consensus is that of wealthy countries" (2002, p. 89). They
recommend the consideration of biodiversity in terms of services derived from it, and not
as an end in itself. Thus, the claim is that "the most useful biodiversity assessments are
those based locally" (2002, p. 83).
Recent work has suggested that the most effective pathway to achieving the 2010
biodiversity target for a significant reduction in the current rate of biodiversity loss [see
2010 Biodiversity Target] is to find balanced trade-offs and synergies between
biodiversity and other needs of society. (See “Actions for the 2010 biodiversity target in
Europe: How does research contribute to halting biodiversity loss?”) The Global
Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) has a major campaign to address the 2010
target, based on mobilising extensive museum species collections data to form the
biodiversity calculus needed for exploring trade-offs and synergies in different regions
[see GBIF 2010 Campaign]
Sarkar and Margules (2002) discuss the role of biodiversity surrogates, arguing that even
the relative concept of complementarity has a "conventional" element built into it because
it relies on "estimator" surrogates (say, a set of butterfly species) for "true" surrogates
(say, the use of species as the basis for assessing complementarity of places). Whereas
estimator surrogates, they argue, are subject to empirical justification, true surrogates are
still dependent on convention. They defend this conventional element: "a philosophical
point, widely appreciated by philosophers of science, but often not explicitly
acknowledged by scientists, deserves to be noted in relation to this: conventional
elements almost always enter into theoretical reasoning in science (Nagel 1961; Sarkar
1998). But ‘conventional’ does not mean ‘arbitrary’: it means that there were choices to
be made, no single option was dictated by the facts at hand, and a choice was justified
instrumentally by its ability to achieve the purpose for which it was intended" (2002, p.
307).
Popperian corroboration provides one pathway to assess evidence for such hypotheses.
Corroboration is attractive because it does not attempt to assign probabilities of truth to
hypotheses (Popper 1982, p. 346), but instead focuses on the evaluation of the particular
evidence at hand. Proposals have focussed on the idea that corroboration assessment asks
whether apparent good evidence for an hypothesis is "improbable" without the hypothesis
— it cannot easily be explained away by other explanations (possible explanations
suggested by our "background knowledge"). Popperian background knowledge is
assigned an important role in this interpretation — the investigator is obligated to try to
discover any background knowledge that would suggest that the evidence is probable
even without the hypothesis (for discussion, see Faith and Trueman 2001; Faith 2006).
The interest in the role of corroboration in biodiversity studies has prompted debates
about its role and meaning. As background to these issues, it is revealing to examine one
of Popper's own examples of falsification/corroboration, as presented in the entry on Karl
Popper. This example, based on the discovery of the planet Neptune, effectively
highlights the limited prospects for actual falsification, but may be under-appreciated as
an example of corroboration. The hypothesis of interest in this example is Newton's
theory, and the evidence is the observation of the new planet, in a position predicted by
this hypothesis. Popper (1982, p. 247) argues that "a moving star, planet, would have
been significant, because unexpected." Popper argues, "the unexpectedness of an event
can be identified with a low probability, in the sense of the calculus of probability, on the
background knowledge" and that the "predictions which lead to the discovery of Neptune,
were such a wonderful corroboration of Newton's theory because of the exceeding
improbability that an as yet unobserved planet would, by sheer accident, be found in that
small region of the sky where their calculations had placed it". Corroboration was
achieved because "the success of the prediction could hardly be due to coincidence or
chance".
This example supports the idea that Popperian corroboration for a biodiversity hypothesis
arises only if the evidence is judged to be improbable — in spite of attempts to identify
background knowledge that suggests that the evidence is probable even without the
hypothesis. For biodiversity surrogates, a common hypothesis is that the pattern of
species "turnover" over different geographic areas for one taxonomic group will indicate
the pattern for all biodiversity. Good evidence for the surrogacy hypothesis is typically
claimed when the pattern for the surrogate taxonomic group is congruent with that of
some target set of taxa. However, on many occasions such evidence can be explained
away as probably arising simply because of a shared bias in the geographic sampling of
the surrogate and target taxonomic groups (for review, see Faith 2003). The evidence
based on congruence can be explained away as a probable result even without the
hypothesis. Based on such evidence, corroboration for the surrogacy hypothesis is low.
The following sections address the potential role of such corroboration assessments in
two other areas of biodiversity assessment: phylogenetic inference and species inference
(discussion of corroboration assessment in the context of biodiversity monitoring can be
found in Downes et al. 2002). The section, Biodiversity and DNA barcoding, then links
all these issues to the controversies surrounding an emerging area of biodiversity
assessment, called “DNA barcoding”.
The problem of inferring phylogenetic patterns within a taxonomic group from character
data has long raised philosophical issues. Popperian falsification has been used to argue
for the justification of one inference method over others (one out of many ways of
measuring goodness-of-fit of characters to phylogenetic trees is claimed as uniquely
capturing the idea of falsification; for review, see Faith and Trueman 2001). An
alternative perspective is that Popperian corroboration embraces all inference methods in
phylogenetics. In this interpretation, the Popperian evidence for a phylogenetic tree
hypothesis is a measure of the goodness-of-fit (as defined by any given inference
method) of observed character data to that hypothesis. Degree of corroboration of a
phylogenetic tree hypothesis is given by improbability of that goodness-of-fit — that is,
the difficulty in explaining fit that good by other factors, including elements of chance,
that make up our "background knowledge". This reflects the obligation to try to explain-
away evidence through identification of some background knowledge that implies that
the evidence was probable anyway (Faith and Trueman, 2001; Faith, 2006). The goal of
the search is a high probability of the evidence given only background knowledge, even
while the desired outcome may be a low probability.
5.2 Species Hypotheses
This "primary" concept arguably is compatible with most other proposed species
concepts (for discussion, see Mayden 2002). However, a difficulty is that this seems to
simply produce many so-called "secondary concepts", corresponding to all the previously
proposed ways of detecting and/or defining species. For example, Mayden (1997) refers
to these as "operational concepts" that are "tools" for discovering all the different ways to
realize the primary concept. The unconstrained use of these tools suggests a "grab-bag"
that amounts to reliance as much as ever on expert opinion. An issue therefore is whether
a unified species concept can be matched by some unified operational framework for
identifying species. Mayden (2002) does claim that there is Popperian "testability" and
possible "falsification" for species hypotheses. He argues that the typical process is one in
which we do not reject species status if there is no falsification.
DNA barcoding programs can address two different goals. First, such programs may be
concerned about diagnosis and identificaiton of already-known species (e.g., invasive
species that are difficult to identify by morphological characters). Second, such programs
may be interested in the discovery of new species, including "cryptic" species that may
not be revealed by morphological or other characters. The second goal raises issues about
species concepts and the nature of DNA bracoding based evidence for species status.
The use of limited molecular data for inferences about species identification and
discovery points to some interesting philosophical issues. For example, “hypothesis-
driven science” is seen as abandoned through the adoption of degree-of-difference
thresholds and other simple recipes for DNA-barcoding-based species delimitation
(deSalle et al, 2005). A related concern is that the scientific requirement for “total
evidence” is neglected when DNA barcoding is used on its own for species inference
(Fitzhugh, 2006, citing Carnap 1950). Fitzhugh argues that "for one to rationally believe
a conclusion on the basis of some set of evidence, then all available relevant evidence
must be taken into consideration. Barcodes cannot be used, even initially, to understand
biodiversity because they are incomplete and often incongruent with other sources of
data." Similar arguments are used in calling for an "integrative taxonomy" that includes
DNA barcoding in combination with other lines of evidence (e.g., Dayrat, 2005).
The philosophical arguments for total evidence would seem to place severe limits on the
role of DNA barcoding for biodiversity assessment. An alternative argument is that DNA
barcoding, in providing one form of valid evidence for species hypotheses, clearly can be
charactersied as “hypothesis driven”. The limited evidence from DNA barcoding here is
not taken to be the only possible evidence, but nevertheless is regarded as potentially able
to provide some degree of corroboration for a species hypothesis. This corroboration
assessment process does not strictly require "total evidence", because the focus (as
described in the overview on Popperian corroboration above) is about probing the current
evidence to see if it can be explained away. The different ways that barcode data
potentially can mislead should be integrated into such assessments. Only evidence from
DNA barcoding that is improbable — not easily explained away — provides high
corroboration.
Missing from emerging DNA barcoding programs is any well-defined process for such
Popperian corroboration assessments of species hypotheses. This limits the capacity to
combine corroborated evidence for species hypotheses from DNA barcoding with
corroboration derived from evidence from other data sources.
While the definition of “the barcode of life” is clearly focused only on the species level
("a short DNA sequence from standardized portions of the genome, used as an aid in
identifying species"; see the Consortium for the Barcode of Life — CBOL), others have
suggested that this wealth of new information need not be tied to species hypotheses in
order for it to be useful for biodiversity assessment. One proposal is that it is possible to
side-step the contentious species designations and make use of corroborated phylogenetic
patterns (e.g., Faith and Baker, 2006). Such an approach then uses PD calculations (see
the section on Option Value and Hierarchy of Variation) to quantify gains and losses in
biodiversity, without counting changes in species numbers. Such an application of PD
makes an assumption that the limited DNA sequence data provides useful information
about phylogenetic pattern.
The vast biodiversity knowledge gap suggests that DNA barcoding applications makes it
tempting to consider barcoding data for any one taxonomic group as valuable information
for making predictions about other taxonomic groups. Application of PD to inferred
phylogenetic patterns may boost surrogacy in reflecting historical processes and
relationships among geographic areas that are shared by many different taxonomic
groups. For example, the phylogeny for one taxonomic group may reflect historical
processes/relationships among geographic areas that are shared by other taxonomic
groups, so that observed differences among areas in PD-complementarity values also
reflect the values that would have been calculated for the other groups. Such a surrogacy
hypothesis remains largely untested, and requires corroboration assessments (see the
section on Biodiversity and Growth of Knowledge).
6. Conclusions
There is a nice parallel to be found in the debates about the definitions/concepts of
species and the broader definitions/concepts of biodiversity. In both cases, an
unnecessary pluralism has developed because operational issues have become intertwined
with definitions (for species — the meaning sometimes is to include information about
the process of species detection; for biodiversity - the meaning sometimes is to include
information about the process of biodiversity protection). In both cases, there is perhaps a
good case for monism regarding the concept, with pluralism welcomed at the operational
level (for species — many kinds of evidence for hypotheses; for biodiversity — many
kinds of protection strategies and many kinds of values of society to be traded-off).
Despite a wide range of usage, biodiversity remains a concept strongly linked to the idea
of biological variation that is largely unknown in its extent, and its future values. Any
"calculus" of biodiversity providing quantitative estimates of this unknown variation
automatically provides at the same time a measure of those values that link to the need to
maintain variety — option values and intrinsic values. Such values broadly reflect values
of elements of biodiversity having unknown present value. These quantified values
typically will not be in conventional units (e.g. dollars), but nevertheless can be balanced
with other values of society. Decision making (for example, deciding whether we should
invest in conservation of area A or area B) may require only estimates of relative gains in
represented variation offered by different places (their "complementarity" values).
Complementarity helps integrate biodiversity option values with other values attributed to
biodiversity, and with values of society more generally. This integrative process, together
with processes for the growth of knowledge about components of biodiversity, provide an
alternative to the "post-positivism" perspective that sees biodiversity conservation as
predominantly value-laden.
The perspective that biodiversity reflects option and intrinsic values, to be balanced with
other values, appears to be compatible with the broader discipline of conservation
biology: "the field is rooted in a philosophy of stewardship rather than one of
utilitarianism or consumption. The latter has been the basis of traditional resource
conservation, that is, conserving resources solely for their economic use and human
consumption" (Meffe 2000).
Bibliography
• Angermeier, P. L. and Karr, J. R., 1994, "Biological integrity vs. biological
diversity as policy directives: Protecting biotic resources", Bioscience, 44: 690-
697.
• Callicott, J. B., 1986, "On the intrinsic value of nonhuman species", in The
preservation of species: the value of biological diversity, B. G Norton (ed),
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Callicott, J. B., 1989, In defense of the land ethic: essays in environmental
philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.
• Callicott, J. B., Crowder, L. B. and Mumford, K., 1999, "Current normative
concepts in conservation", Conservation Biology, 13: 22-35.
• Carnap R., 1950, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
• Claridge, M.F. Dawah, H.A. and Wilson, M.R., (eds), 1997, Species: the Units of
Biodiversity, London: Chapman Hall Ltd.
• Dayrat B., 2005, "Towards integrative taxonomy", Biol J Linn Soc., 85: 407-415.
• DeSalle, R., Egan, M. G. and Siddall, M., 2005, "The unholy trinity: taxonomy,
species delimitation and DNA barcoding", Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B,
doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1722.
• Downes, B. J., Barmuta, L. A., Fairweather, P. G., Faith, D. P., Keough, M. J.,
Lake, P. S.. Mapstone, B. D. and Quinn, G. P., 2002, Assessing Ecological
Impacts: Applications in flowing waters, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Ehrenfeld, D., 1988, "Why put a value on biodiversity?", in E.O. Wilson (ed),
Biodiversity, Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
• Faith, D. P., 1994, "Phylogenetic pattern and the quantification of organismal
biodiversity", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series
B, 345: 45-58.
• Faith, D. P., 2003, "Environmental diversity (ED) as surrogate information for
species-level biodiversity", Ecography, 26: 374-379.
• Faith D. P., 2004, "From species to supertrees: Popperian corroboration and some
current controversies in systematics", Australian Systematic Botany, 17: 1-16.
• Faith D. P., 2006, "Science and philosophy for molecular systematics: which is
the cart and which is the horse?", Molec. Phylog. Evol., 38: 553-557.
• Faith D. P., Trueman, J. W. H., 2001, "Towards an inclusive philosophy for
phylogenetic inference", Systematic Biology, 50: 331-350.
• Forest, F., Grenyer, R., Rouget, M., Davies, T. J., Cowling,R.M., Faith, D.P.,
Balmford, A., Manning, J.C., Proches, S., van der Bank, M., Reeves, G.,
Hedderson T.A.J. and Savolainen, V., 2007, "Preserving the evolutionary
potential of floras in biodiversity hotspots", Nature, 445: 757-760.
• Frankel, O. H. and Soule, M. E., 1981, Conservation and evolution, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
• Fitzhugh, K., 2006, "DNA Barcoding: An Instance of Technology-driven
Science?", BioScience, 56: 462-463.
• Gaston, K. J. (ed)., 1996, Biodiversity: a biology of numbers and difference,
Oxford: Blackwell.
• Karr, J. R., 1991, "Biological integrity: a long neglected aspect of water resource
management," Ecological Applications, 1: 66-84.
• Leopold, A. A., 1949, A sand county almanac, London: Oxford University Press.
• Mayden, R. L., 1997, "A hierarchy of species concepts: the denouement in the
saga of the species problem", in Species: the Units of Biodiversity, M. F. Claridge,
H. A. Dawah and M. R. Wilson (eds),f London: Chapman & Hall Ltd.
• Mayden, R. L., 2002, "On biological species, species concepts and individuation
in the natural world", Fish and Fisheries, 3: 171-196.
• Meffe, G., 2000, in Nature and Human Society: The Quest for a Sustainable
World, National Research Council (NRC).
• Nagel, E., 1961, The structure of science, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
• Norton, B. G. (ed), 1986, The preservation of species: the value of biological
diversity, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.
• Norton, B. G., 1988, "Commodity amenity and morality: the limits of
quantification in valuing biodiversity," in E. O. Wilson (ed), Biodiversity,
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
• Norton, B. G., 1994, "On what we should save: the role of cultures in determining
conservation targets," in P. Forey, et al. (eds), Systematics and conservation
evaluation.
• Norton, B. G., 2001, "Conservation biology and environmental values: can there
be a universal earth ethic?," in C. Potvin, et al. (eds), Protecting biological
diversity: roles and responsibilities, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
• Noss, R. F., 1990, "Indicators for monitoring biodiversity: a hierarchical
approach," Conservation Biology, 4: 355-364.
• Popper, K., 1982, Realism and the aim of science: from the ‘Postscript to the
logic of scientific discovery’, W. W. Bartley (ed), London: Routledge, 1992
(reprint).
• Randall, A., 1986, "Human preferences, economics, and the preservation of
species", in B. G Norton (ed), The preservation of species: the value of biological
diversity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Randall, A., 1988, "What mainstream economists have to say about the value of
biodiversity", E. O. Wilson (ed), Biodiversity, Washington, DC: National
Academy of Sciences/Smithsonian Institution.
• Reaka-Kudla, M. L., Wilson, D. E. and Wilson, E. O. (eds), 1997, Biodiversity II:
Understanding and Protecting Our Biological Resources, Joseph Henry Press.
• Regan, D. H., 1986, "Duties of preservation", in B. G Norton (ed), The
preservation of species: the value of biological diversity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986.
• Roebuck, P. and Phifer, P., 1999, "The persistence of positivism in conservation
biology", Conservation Biology, 13: 444-446.
• Rubinoff, D., Cameron, S. and Will, K., 2006, "A Genomic Perspective on the
Shortcomings of Mitochondrial DNA for ‘Barcoding’ Identification", Journal of
Heredity, 97: 581-594.
• Sarkar, S., 1998, Genetics and reductionism, New York: Cambridge University
Press.
• Sarkar, S., 2005, Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy: An Introduction,
(Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology), New York: Cambridge
University Press.
• Sarkar, S. and Margules, C. R., 2002, "Operationalizing biodiversity for
conservation planning", Journal of Biosciences, 27: 299-308.
• Sober, E., 1986, "Philosophical problems for environmentalism", in B. G Norton
(ed), The preservation of species: the value of biological diversity, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
• Takacs, D., 1996, The idea of biodiversity: philosophies of paradise, Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Turner, R., 1999, "Environmental and ecological economics perspective", in
J.C.J.M. van den Bergh (ed), Handbook of environmental and resource
economics, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 1001-1036.
• Vermeulen, S. and Koziell, I., 2002, Integrating global and local values: a review
of biodiversity assessment, London: IIED.
• Vogler, A. P. and Monaghan, M. T., 2007, "Recent advances in DNA taxonomy",
Journal of Zoological Systematics and Evolutionary Research, 45: 1-10.
• Wiley, E. O., 1981, Phylogenetics: The Theory and Practice of Phylogenetic
Systematics, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
• Will, K., Mishler, B.D., Wheeler, Q.D., 2005, "The Perils of DNA Barcoding and
the Need for Integrative Taxonomy", Syst. Biol., 54: 844-851.
• Wilson, E. O. (ed), 1988, Biodiversity, Washington, DC: National Academy of
Sciences/Smithsonian Institution.
• Wilson, E. O., 1992, The diversity of life, Cambridge: Belknap Press.
• Witting, L. and Loescke, V., 1995, "The optimization of biodiversity
conservation", Biological Conservation, 71: 205-207.
• World Conservation Union, 1980, World conservation strategy: living resource
conservation for sustainable development, Gland: IUCN- UNEP-WWF.
• Yesson, C., and Culham, A., 2006, "A phyloclimatic study of Cyclamen", BMC
Evol. Biol., 6: 72.
Related Entries
ethics: environmental | Popper, Karl | species