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Culture Documents
Sam Cowling
Abstract
1 Introduction
Nietzsche’s thesis of eternal recurrence (hereafter, ER) finds its most vivid
presentation in the form of a thought-experiment:
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into
your loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live
and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumer-
able times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every
pain and every joy and every thought and sight an everything
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you,
2
This objection holds, in keeping with the concern requirement, that the
normative significance of ER is a function of our concern for “ourselves” in
other epochs. But, if we are merely qualitatively indiscernible from “our-
selves” in other epochs, this relation of indiscernibility does not provide
adequate grounds for concern. As a result, something stronger than the
qualitative conception of uniformity is needed for ER to satisfy the concern
requirement. To establish this, Soll argues that something like continuity
of consciousness or perhaps numerical identity is required for the concern
requirement to be satisfied. But, given the numerical distinctness of indi-
viduals across epochs as well as the lack of causal connections between these
individuals, Soll holds that there is no way to ground the needed concern
for individuals across epochs.18
Viewed solely as argument to show that individuals cannot be “appropri-
ately” concerned for individuals in other epochs, Soll’s argument is unsatis-
factory. It simply assumes that either identity or continuity of consciousness
is what grounds the “appropriate” level of concern for individuals, but these
assumptions are highly controversial. One could, for example, accept the
Simple View of personal identity and hold that, although there is no psy-
chological or physical criterion for personal identity, individuals are, as a
matter of brute fact, identical across epochs.19 Alternatively, if personal
identity were to be understood in terms of psychological dispositions like
desires, personality, or behaviour rather than continuity of consciousness,
17
Soll (1967: 340).
18
For an endorsement of Soll’s argument, see Clark (1990: 267): “[Soll’s] argument may
require slight modification because some will find it as reasonable to have a special concern
for the destiny and suffering of the person qualitatively identical to myself in the next cycle
as to have such concern for the person I would be after an operation or an accident that
removed all memory connection to my present self. But if there is not continuity of
consciousness in the latter case, there is a kind of continuity. It still makes sense to think
of my present life as in some (perhaps limited) kind of continuity with my life after the
memory loss. In the case of eternal recurrence, on the other hand, no continuity exists.
There is neither continuity of consciousness nor any kind of continuity or traceability
through time and space.”
19
See Partfit (1984: 209).
9
Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally,
and we ourselves, too; and that we have already existed an eter-
nal number of times, and all things with us I myself belong to
the causes of the eternal recurrence. I come again with this sun,
with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpentnot to a new
life or a better life or a similar life: I come back to this same,
identical life.21
Given this passage and its focus upon one and the same individual com-
ing back to “this same, identical life”, there is reason to believe that Ni-
etzsche holds numerical identity rather than qualitative indiscernibility to
ground the concern for individuals across epochs.
A second objection to the qualitative conception of uniformity is put
forward by Magnus (1978) and also suggested by Simmel (1920). This argu-
ment proceeds as a thought-experiment: Suppose that, instead of eternally
recurring epochs, the demon told you that there were instead an infinite ar-
20
Among the prevailing views in contemporary metaphysics, the denial of numerical iden-
tity as a prerequisite for the relevant kind of concern is commonplace. For example,
both stage theory and perdurantism—two of the leading contenders—reject the view that
our persistence across times requires the numerical identity of a single object located at
distinct times. See Sider (2001) for discussion.
21
Thus Spoke Zarathustra [hereafter, TSZ] III: 13
10
dent upon material objects.28 Their existence is sui generis and independent
of the existence of the objects that occupy them. According to relationalists,
spatial and temporal regions are dependent upon material objects. Spatial
and temporal regions are therefore merely complexes of relations that hold
between objects. For this reason, relationalists hold that space and time
depend for their existence upon the existence of objects.29
On the mixed view, substantivalism is an extremely natural assump-
tion.30 Not only does it allow for the desired objective distinction between
temporal regions—a distinction that is not reducible to facts about objects—
it also allows for a fairly intuitive conception of ER: Imagine the sum of
spatial and temporal regions as an enormous “container” for objects. These
objects come into being and pass away over the course of an epoch, but,
in subsequent epochs—differentiated by occurring at numerically different
times—they merely reappear within the container and behave just as they
did previously. In this way, the distinctness of temporal regions allows for
the existence of distinct epochs, but the identity of objects also provides an
account of how the concern requirement is met. You care about “yourself”
in future epochs because you yourself will come into being and pass away
over and over again.
This mixed conception of uniformity is a plausible solution to the dilemma
above. For example, Clark (1990) remarks that, in explaining how epochs
are to be distinguished, “Only a difference in temporal position fits the bill—
28
One might worry here that substantivalism is in immediate conflict with Nietzsche’s
claim that “there are no eternally enduring substances”. (GS §109) It is worth noting,
however, that such a claim stands in opposition to a metaphysics of substantial matter
rather than space or time.
29
One might defend the interpretation of Nietzsche as a relationalist on the strength of
his remark that “the world... does not exist as a world ‘in-itself’; it is essentially a world
of relations.” (WP §625). See also Richardson (1996: 105).) Here, I incline to take
Nietzsche’s talk of “the world” to denote the totality of putative objects, which, given his
power ontology, emerges as a vast complex of relations embedded with the container of
space and time.
30
The question of whether relationalism can accommodate ER is, I believe, an open one.
For our purposes, substantivalism proves useful, since the distinctness of temporal regions
is “built into” the metaphysics.
14
For Nietzsche, time is said to be infinite and plays the role of a container
“through which this total energy works”. This suggests a background con-
ception of time along substantivalist lines, where we can deduce features
about the recurrence of energy-states from metaphysically independent facts
about the objective temporal order. Given these remarks, I take it that the
we are not out of place in developing a metaphysics of ER along substantival-
ist lines even while Nietzsche’s ultimate metaphysical commitments remain
contentious.
Although the mixed conception of uniformity provides a prima facie
satisfactory treatment of ER, I contend that it is an inadequate interpreta-
tion. The problem faced by the mixed view arises when we recall the initial
thought-experiment:
This life as you now live and have lived it, you will have to live
once more and innumerable times more; and there will be noth-
ing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and
sight an everything unutterably small or great in your life will
have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—
even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even
this moment and I myself.34
sue that we will focus upon: the reality of non-present times. According
to presentists, the present is metaphysically significant since the only time
that exists is the present time. Understood atemporally, presentism holds
there are no past or future times and, therefore, no past or future entities
like dinosaurs or the 2050 World Series Champions. On such a view, the
present is privileged by being coextensive with the domain of all entities. On
the contrasting view, eternalism, past, present, and future times all exist.
Presently existing entities are, therefore, a mere subset of all the entities that
exist, since, in some atemporal sense, both dinosaurs and the 2050 World
Series Champions exist. They simply fail to exist now.
Of the above described views, two natural package deals emerge: privi-
leged presentism and unprivileged eternalism. For the privileged presentist,
the metaphysical importance of tense is explained by noting that only in
virtue of being present can something exist. For the unprivileged eternalist,
the temporal features of reality can all be explained in terms of the various
relations that hold between past, present, and future individuals.
In addition to these views, two other heterodox views remain. The first
view, unprivileged presentism, borders on triviality or incoherence. It holds
that there is no fundamental distinction that the present enjoys, but denies
that non-present entities exist. The second view, privileged eternalism, is
more interesting.37 On this view, past, present, and future entities exist,
but presently existing entities are held to instantiate a fundamental property,
being present, that distinguishes them from past or future entities.
What I want to now suggest is that the metaphysics of ER is best un-
derstood as one according to which privileged eternalism is true. I take this
proposal to square with the central features of ER Nietzsche outlines in the
passages surveyed above. In particular, it succeeds in capturing the require-
ment that temporal regions and individuals recur in the same fashion. Such
a view is also forced upon us by the dilemma considered above. Earlier,
we saw the qualitative conception of uniformity to fail. Here, I will argue
37
There is some issue over which philosophers actually endorse such a view. Perhaps
the only uncontroversial proponent is Smith (1993). See Zimmerman (2006) for further
discussion.
18
present.39 Here, our present view of ER ought to follow suit and grant
that the distinction between present and non-present times is conceptually
primitive and that no appeal to higher-order temporal dimensions is needed.
A notable virtue of the present view of ER is that it makes good on
Nietzsche’s repeated remarks that time is, in some respect, “cyclical”. Notice
that, on the competing mixed view, time is not itself cyclical, but, instead,
material objects exhibit a bizarre kind of regularity. On the present view,
however, the cyclical character of time is a function of the spotlight of the
present shining over the entire temporal region of the universe ad infinitum.
In this respect, better sense can be made of a salient feature of Nietzsche’s
talk regarding ER.
I have suggested that we can understand ER in terms of a single “uni-
verse” that exhibits a peculiar pattern of instantiation with respect to a
fundamental property, being present. I have indicated that such a view
accommodates the perpetuity, concern, and uniformity requirements. In
the next section, I consider the interpretive consequences for the view just
sketched and the broader question of whether it might comport with Niet-
zsche’s broader metaphysical commitments.
4 Conclusion
In considering the metaphysics and interpretation of ER, Long (1987) states:
Long’s passage typifies a natural strategy for reconciling ER with other Ni-
etzschean commitments: A broader commitment that is borne out in the
39
For discussion, see Sider (2001).
40
Long (1987: 440).
21
References
[1] Adams, R.M. 1979. “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity.” Jour-
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[2] Black, Max. 1952. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Mind 61: 153-164.
[5] Della Rocca, Michael. 2006. “Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the
Identity of Indiscernibles.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86.4: 480-
492.
22
[6] Hatab, Lawrence. 2005. Nietzsches Life Sentence. New York: Rout-
ledge.
[7] Kain, Philip. 1983. “Nietzsche, Skepticism, and the Eternal Recur-
rence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13: 365-387.
[8] Kripke, Saul. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
[14] Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
[17] Smith, Quentin. 1993. Language and Time. New York: Oxford Univer-
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