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M o r a l H e a l t h F r i d a y, 5 J u n e
2009
Plato versus Mill: Freedom and the Problem of
Self-Discipline
Filed under: Articles — Laurence Thomas @ 17:25

In the great debate regarding liberty, two of the

greatest minds in intellectual thought--namely Plato and John
Stuart Mill--are odds with one another.  Plato privileged
moral excellence above liberty.  John Stuart Mill held that the
exercise of liberty was necessary for the affirmation of the
humanity of each individual.  Mill, of course, was very much
committed to excellence.  It is just that he thought that it was
by way of liberty that excellence was best achieved. 
Plato, it will be recalled held that a just society needed to be
governed by a Philosopher-King. Thus, Plato had little
confidence that the individual members of society would
sustain general moral decency, in the absence of regular
prodding to that effect by a higher moral authority. 
Mill, on the other hand, maintained that there is no higher
moral authority—at least not one that takes the form of a
homo sapien.  What is more, he assumed that human beings
would naturally learn from their own mistakes and the
mistakes of their fellow human beings.  Finally, in this vein,
he thought that self-discipline would be anchored in this
learning.
The advent of modern technology would suggest that Plato
was right and that Mill was quite mistaken.  Consider, for
instance, the phenomenon of young teenagers sexting (that is,
sending sexually provocative (even nude) pictures of
themselves via their cell phone). 
With Plato, things would be quite simple: sexting would
simply not be allowed.  End of story.  Cell phones used by
adolescents would simply not be able to send pictures.  With
Mill, things are not so obvious.  The harm that children suffer
on account of sexting would have to be properly identified
and so forth, since sexting does not constitute a form of
physical violence. 
Now, it is conceivable that Mill would side with Plato
because, after all, adolescents are minors.  But what is
precisely the point here is that with Plato sexting would clearly
not be allowed, whereas with Mill this would open to debate.
In general, technology raises the issue of self-discipline.  And
one thing seems to be abundantly clear, namely that morality
flounders in the absence of self-discipline, Plato was on to this
truth; and held that society must do what is necessary in order
to insure that self-discipline generally prevails in society;
otherwise, a society had no chance of being just.
It is here that Mill and Plato part company.  Mill’s theory of
government does not allow for the possibility that society may
move to protect the moral character individuals.  The most
that society may do is protect citizens from physical harm and,
perhaps, certain forms of egregious psychological harms tied
to threats.  In particular, Mill is very clear that society is not
entitled to protect individuals from themselves; and from this
it follows straightaway that, on Mill’s view, society has no
right to cultivate self-discipline in its citizens. 
Accordingly, Mill’s theory of society and the individual
cannot respond to the challenge to self-discipline occasioned
by technology, whereas Plato’s theory can.
Of course, we tend to find repulsive the idea of a philosopher
king.  And one reason for why we are repulsed by the idea is
that we do not think for a moment that, with respect to being
moral, any human being is in some fundamental way
constitutionally superior to any other human being.  That is,
we reject the very premise of Plato’s theoretical edifice. 
Perhaps it is the rejection of this premise that was behind
Mill’s thinking.
But let us engage in a thought experiment momentarily. 
Suppose that we should have the option to choose between
two paths.  One is the Platonic one; the other is the Millian
one.  Which would we choose?  Would we prefer morality to
freedom?  Or, would we prefer freedom to morality? 
One obvious response is that this is surely a false dichotomy,
because certainly there is no incompatibility between being
free and being moral.  The real question, though, is whether
we would be willing to give up some freedom in order to have
the moral excellence of which Plato spoke.  For while it is
certainly true that there are those who freely make excellence
to the highest degree their mode of living, what we know
beyond any shadow of doubt is that most do not choose to so. 
Alas, what is striking is that most think that we would be
worse off if we traded freedom for moral excellence.  The
obvious question, though, is: In what sense would we be
worse off?  And to that obvious question, there is no obvious
answer.