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Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch
Vol. XLVI, No.
i, Septemberi985
Hegel's CritiqueofKant's
TheoreticalPhilosophy
KARL AMERIKS
of Notre Dame
University
Z KARL AMERIKS
dentalidealityof what is coveredby thosepropositions.8 But whilethis
meansthatto a certainextenttheDialecticis anticipatedearlierintheCri-
tique,thefactremainsthattheidealityof Kant'sprinciplesis nota partof
the argumenttowardtheirvaliditybut is ratheran explanationoffered
onlyaftertheyhave been shownto be valid and therefore seen as in need
of a metaphysicalaccount.Moreover,Kantindicatesthatitis theDialec-
tic which nails down the strongclaim that our (objectivetheoretical)
knowledgeis absolutelylimitedto spatiotemporalpropertiesand that
affirming theidealityof thespatiotemporalgivesus not merelya "best"
accountbutratheran absolutelynecessaryone.9More specifically, while
theAestheticarguesthatthereis a varietyof particulardifficulties with
each of thetraditionalaccountsof space and time(theNewtonian,Leib-
nizian,and Berkeleyan),and thatthereis thegeneralproblemthatnoneof
them"makes intelligible"synthetic a prioriknowledge,it is onlyin the
Antinomiesthat Kant shows transcendentalidealism is inescapable
because withoutit we are leftin contradiction.This is Kant's ultimate
groundfor(z), and it is onlyvia thisclaim and (3)10 thathe concludes
withhisrestrictionthesis.Hence forKanttherestriction thesiscan be nei-
therconflatedwithnorwhollycut offfromthededuction:thededuction
alone does not provethespatiotemporaldata we deal withare onlyphe-
nomenal,and theAntinomiesalone does notprovethattherealmofthese
data exhaustswhat we can know.
Hegel was not veryclear about theserelationsbetweenKant's basic
argument.For example, he says repeatedlythat in using the term
"transcendental" intheproofofthecategories,Kantmeansto be express-
ingtheirideality."This is simplyto overlookthetwo stagesin thededuc-
4 KARL AMERIKS
nomenalsimplyin thesensethattheydo not have theirgroundin them-
selves(as an absolutelyfreebeingsupposedlydoes).'8 In thisway Hegel
can manage to hold on to the metaphysicaldowngradingof space and
time'9thatis at theheartoftranscendental idealism,whileavoidingcom-
mitment thesisor anyof thespecificargumentsto it.
to Kant's restriction
As a consequence,however,it becomes all the easier forHegel to miss
what is reallyinvolvedin Kant's deductionand idealism."
II. We can now beginto considerthethreemajorweaknessesthatHegel
findsin Kant's deduction:(A) thetreatment ofthe"I", (B) theaccountof
necessityin our knowledge,and (C) thenotionthata preliminary studyof
knowingis feasible.
The firstobjectiondemonstratesFichte'sinfluence,forHegel repeat-
edlyremarksthatFichteis to be givencreditforbeingmoreconsistent and
rigorous,forat leasttryingto deduceall of thecategoriesfromthe"I"."
17
F. W. Schelling,Werke,(Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1856), Vol. I, p. 340. Cf. Hegel, I: z34.
Note thatwhereasFichteand Schellingagreethatour practicalfeelingof freedomitself
provesidealism,Kantarguesthatunlessone firstcan makeroomforthetheoreticalpos-
sibilityof idealism,the impressionof freedommustbe givenup as an illusion(B xix).
Note also thatHegel, like Fichte,seems to believethatallowingthingsin themselves
would threatenour freedom,as if our receptivity vis-A-vissome thingswould have to
entailultimatepassivity.
8See Hegel, Encyclopedia,?45, Zusatz, VIII: izz, Wallace, p. 73: "The thingsimmedi-
atelyknownare mereappearances- in otherwords,thegroundoftheirbeingis not in
themselvesbut in somethingelse." The same pointis made at ?50, VIII: 13, Wallace, p.
8z, butthetranslationis misleading.Hegel is notsaying,"thebeingwhichtheworldhas
is onlya semblance,no real being"- as ifit onlyappearedthattheworldexists,butit
reallydoesn't. On the contrary,he is saying,"the world does [indeed]have being,but
onlythe beingof appearance." That is, its beingis foundedon something, namely,the
self-grounding reason whichHegel calls God.
9 Cf. Hegel's downgradingof matterat II: 104, The Difference BetweentheFichteanand
theSchellingianSystemof Philosophy,trans.J. P. Surber(Resida, California:Ridgway
Press,1978), p. 8o. Cf. also hisapprovaloftheidea thatspatiotemporalcausal relations
have onlythebeingof appearances,at II: 338, Faithand Knowledge,trans.WalterCerf
and H. S. Harris (Albany:StateUniversity of New York Press,I977), p. IOI.
20 Here I suspectHegel was influenced bythetendencyof thoselike Reinhold,who stated
thathis philosophywould "finallyprovidefullconfirmation fortheessentialresultsof
the Critique of Pure Reason independentlyof those profoundmeditationsthrough
whichtheyhave been establishedin Kant's own works" (Versucheinerneuen Theorie
des menschlichenVorstellungsverm6gens, 1789, reprintedition,Darmstadt:Wissen-
schaftlicheBuchgesellschaft, i963), pp. 67-68. The remarkis cited and translatedby
Daniel Breazeale in "Reinhold's ElementaryPhilosophy,"Review of Metaphysics35
(1982), p. 789.
"L ?42, VIII: II7, Wallace,p. 69; ibid.,?6o, Zusatz2, VIII: 141,
Hegel,Encyclopedia,
Wallace, p. 94; Scienceof Logic, VI: 505, trans.W. H. Johnsonand L. G. Struthers(z
vols., London: GeorgeAllenand Unwin,I929), vol. 2, pp. 431-3z ; XX: 386-401. It is
clearthatFichtein turnowes thisproject- as well as anotherconceptcentralto Hegel's
6 KARL AMERIKS
propriate.It is preciselyforthisreasonthatKant stresses(as Hegel may
see elsewhere"7)thatthe formof the individualempiricalego is just as
limitedto theconditionofmerephenomenality as is therestofthespatio-
temporalrealm,and thatthephenomenality ofthisrealmrestsultimately
on thedistinctive quantitativefeaturesofspace and time,featuresthatare
a prioriand not imposedby humansin anyimaginablesense."8Thus ifit
is wrongto beginwithto connectKant'sdeductiondirectly withidealism,
itis evenmoreunfairto connectitat all witha subjectiveversionofideal-
ism.
This all stillleavesitunclearjustwhyHegel believedone shoulddevote
the deductionto an argumentforabsoluteidealism.In generalterms,I
believetheanswerhererestson theidea thatifthecategoriesofthingsin
themselves werecompletelydeterminable fromwhatis involvedin a pure
representation of the I, thenthis would demonstrate the basic subject-
objectidentity to whichHegel is committed. Thentheworldwould notbe
themereimageof a particularself,as in egoisticidealism(solipsism),nor
would its ultimatefeaturesbe beyondthe reach of all such selves,as in
Kantianidealism,'9but it would ratherbe distinctfromus and yet (in
essence)whollyaccessibleto our mind.Expressedsimplyin theseterms
Hegel's positionis not all thatimplausible,althoughforit to be distin-
guishablefromordinaryrealism,as Hegel surelytakes it to be, he also
needs to show how the "pure" representation withwhichhe wants the
deductionto begincan have some kindof mentalor subjectivemeaning
withoutbeing identicalwith the notionof a mereempiricalego. Here
everything restson preciselywhat Hegel understandsby thepure repre-
sentationof the I.
In so faras Hegel criticizesKant fornot havingmovedproperlyfrom
thisnotion,itwould seemthatone could findout whatthenotionis sim-
plybylookingat whatKant says.Yet, thefactthatKant reachesconclu-
sionsverydifferent fromwhatHegel expectsalreadysuggeststhatKant's
own starting pointmaybe unlikeHegel's,and whathas alreadybeenseen
of Hegel's interpretation would support such a suggestion.Further
confirmation forit can be foundin thefactthatat one pointHegel takes
thenotionoftheI to standforan absoluteidentity whichis expressednot
is
in what called the "shallowness"3" of the argument of the deduction
itself,but ratherin Kant's referenceto the "productiveimagination,"
8 KARL AMERIKS
have such a startingpointand thatthisis at least in some way strongly
hintedat by what Kant has to say.
The mainclue forhandlingthiscomplexquestionhas to do withsome
basic ambiguitiesin thenotionof apperceptionin thepurerepresentation
oftheI. For Hegel,as forKant,thenotionofa purerepresentation oftheI
is mostcommonlyexpressed as the notionof a necessarysyntheticunity
of apperception.However,bysayingthereis necessarysynthetic unityof
apperception,one could mean either:
(i) mustbe able to belongto one self-con-
(a) all representations35
sciousness;
the unity
(b) since thereis a manifoldof such representations,
even when it involvesanalytic
here can be called synthetic,
relationsamong-thecontentsof the representations;
(c) and sinceit is a unitywithin(and potentiallyfor)a self-con-
scious being,it can be called apperceptive,even ifthereis at
no pointan actual all-encompassing thoughtof the form,"I
think . .
or
in our cognitionare componentsof judg-
(ii) (a) all representations
ment and express an objectiveunityof terms,which can
always be formulated,"I think . . . is .
(b) sincethereis a manifold . (as above);
representations
(c) and sinceit is a unity . . . "I think"(as above).
Note that(i) stressesa conditionon thoughtsas representations simply
had byus, whereas (ii) a
stresses conditionon themas cognitive elements,
i.e., stateswhich at least make a claim that can be trueor false.They
emphasizeinturnwhatI willcall thepossessiveand theepistemicrelation
of representations to consciousness.Keepingthese relationsdistinctis
important, especiallyin viewofthefactthatKantmaymeaneventuallyto
arguethatforus thesetsofitemsto whichtheyapplyturnout to be coex-
tensiveand necessarilyrelated.That is, he maywantto show thatall the
representations we can possess must be cognitiveeitherdirectly,as in
judgments experiencesuchas "x is y," or indirectly,
of as in judgmentsof
IO KARL AMERIKS
timesspeaks as ifhis principleof apperceptionhas an ontologicalmean-
ing,as ifthepointis how all our possiblerepresentations are necessarily
relatedto our beingone and thesame thinkerhavingthem.Fortunately,
Kant also says enoughelsewhereto indicatethe difficulties withresting
the deductionon the possessivesense of apperception.4" In the Paralo-
gisms he indicatesthat the argumentwould go througheven on the
hypothesis thatthereis an ultimatepluralityofsubstancesunderlying the
act in whichthoughtis synthetically united.42 And withinthe deduction
itself,he stressesthat'itis theepistemicconditionofthe"objectiveunityof
apperception"whichis reallythepremiseof his argument,43 and not the
merefactthatrepresentations belongto one consciousness,as obtainsina
subjectiveunityof associativerelations.
A furtherdifficulty with stressingthe possessive sense is that it is
unclearjustwhatcan be meantbysayingitis an actofoursthatmakesour
representations our own. As Hegel himselfindicates,in mockingtalk of
representations being merely"accompanied" by a mind," we have no
relevantnotionof a representation thatis not a representation had by a
mind. The dependentnatureof representations makes them ready to
belongto us quite independentof whateverwe do. Moreover,if there
weresomeact bywhichrepresentations weremadecapable ofbeingours,
it is remarkablethattheveryprincipleof apperception(on thisreading)
impliesthatthereis no special effector limitationthatthisactionwould
involve- any and all representations are subjectto it,and by beingput
intorelationwithoneselftheythemselvesare not supposedto change.(I
suspectthisfactis relatedto theearlierpointthatHegel stressedaboutthe
manifoldhavingto be whollyamenableto us. Thisis obviouslytruein the
sense that thereis nothingdata would have that would block thema
priorifromthiskindof "act" ofmind.)On theotherhand,ifitis said that
whatis meantbytheact of apperceptionis simplythefamiliarprocedure
of explicitlybringingsome specifictrainof representations to mindand
givingthema featureofvivacitythatotherrepresentations would lack,it
mustbe counteredthatthisis to invokean empiricalnotionof appercep-
tionwhichis preciselywhat was to be excludedby thenotionof a pure
representation oftheI. Suchapperceptionmightbe responsiblefora quite
intelligiblerelationto representations, but it would have no chance of
I2 KARL AMERIKS
ment,therebybringingin the epistemicsense of apperceptionwhich
Hegel avoids and whichis whatmakesKant's approachdistinctfromhis
own.47
AlthoughHegel's firstobjectionthusfailsbecause it restson an inter-
pretationwhichis inaccurateas well as intrinsically
inadequate(giventhe
limitedconsequencesof theHegelian notionof apperception),it should
be notedthatitat leastfitsintothemainstream ofrecentinterpretations
of
transendental arguments,and especiallyof themanyquasi-Strawsonian
reconstructions of the deductionwhich abstractfromthe featuresthat
eventuallyled Kant to an espousal of transendentalidealism.48In this
way Hegel's attack expresses a very influentialand understandable
responseto Kant thatin principle,ifnot in origin,is largelydetachable
fromany peculiarmetaphysics.Moreover,even ifHegel mayhave gone
too farin callingfora dialecticalargumentfromone categoryto all the
others,and evenifhe is unfairinchargingKantwitha merely"historical"
and "psychological"methodin the metaphysicaldeduction,49 one can-
nothelp but feelthatHegel has at least a strongersenseof theneed fora
completeand fullypersuasivemetaphysicaldeduction,and to thisextent
his call fora more rigorousproofof the categoriesis well taken.
III. The considerationsadvancedso farmakeitrelatively easyto deal with
Hegel's second objection,namely,thatwithKant the "universality and
necessitywe findin cognition . . . remains a presuppositionafter
all; . . . Kant did no morethanofferan explanationof thisfact."50The
heartof thisobjectionis theidea thatKant'smainpointis justthepicture
ofimposition,thatthedeductionamountsmerelyto a metaphysical story
ofhow thecategoriesare imposedbyus and so do nothave absolutereal-
ity.Here again Hegel is conflatingtheargumentof thedeductionproper
with(hisunderstanding of) Kant'sdoctrineofidealism,a conflationmade
understandable bythejustnotedfactthatHegel missedKant'sown argu-
mentto thecategories.This conflationmayalso havebeenencouragedby
thefactthatinKant'sProlegomenathe"necessityincognition"is ineffect
takenas a presupposition."We know,however,thatthemethodof the
I4 KARL AMERIKS
ancillaryconsiderations thatare to makepossiblethetransitionsfrom(a)
to (b) and from(b) to (c). The omissionin regardto thelatterinference
willbe stressedlater;themainoversights in regardto theformerconcern
not onlytheepistemicsenseof apperceptionbut also theuse of thepure
formsof intuition, whichis crucialto Kant's conclusionthatthecatego-
rieshave a fullyuniversalapplicabilitywithinour experience."
IV. Hegel's thirdobjectionto Kantdoes notappearto be so closelyrelated
to detailsofthededuction,forin Hegel's originalpresentation itis stated
as a very general problem that applies just as well to Locke.57The
objectionis directedagainst all philosopherswho tryto set down the
scope and limitsof knowledgeby firstexaminingour cognitivefaculties
and forgettherebythatsuch a preliminary inquiryis itselfa part of the
processof knowledge.In the PhenomenologyKant's name is not men-
tionedwhenthisobjectionis made in itsmostfamousform,butitis obvi-
ous thatitis theCritiquethatHegel meansto referto whenhe attacksthe
projectof a preliminary inquiryas motivatedby a conceptionof knowl-
edge as a "medium"or "instrument" to be examinedbeforehandforits
The problemsthat such a criticalphilosophyis taken to
reliability."8
emphasize,thatthemediumof our cognitionmay,as passive,be obscure
or partial,and thattheinstruments of our knowledgemay,as active,be
distorting,are surelymeantto correspondto Kant's conceptionof our a
prioriformsof sensibility and understanding.59
Hegel's explanationof thedifficulty withthisconceptionis veryindi-
rect;his favoriteway of expressingitis thatthecriticalphilosophercom-
mitsthe errorof "refusingto enterthe water untilyou have learntto
swim.,,6, If that is the difficultyinvolved,then it appears it could be
expressedless metaphorically in termsof what RoderickChisholmhas
discussedas the "problemofthecriterion."6' Roughlyspeaking,it seems
thatin orderproperlyto advance a cognitiveclaim, one firstoughtto
knowthattheclaimmeetstheconditionsforbeinga cognition,and yetit
62 Chisholm,Foundations,pp. 69ff.
63 Cf. Hegel,Encyclopedia 4I Zusatz, VIII: 114, Wallace,p. 66: "True,indeed,theforms
ofthoughtshouldbe subjectedto a scrutiny beforetheyare used; yetwhatis thisscrutiny
but ipso factoa cognition?"
64 Actually,all it needsto do is ask whatfollowsifthereare suchstatements,butI am sure
thatKant,like therestof us, believedtherereallyare such. On thesimilarities between
Chisholmand Kant here,see K. Ameriks,"CurrentGermanEpistemology,"Inquiryz5
(i982): I25-38.
i6 KARL AMERIKS
Kant supposedlygetsintohereis mostfrequently explainedby Hegel by
sayingthat in assumingsuch a "tool" conceptionof knowledgeKant
overlookedthe greatdifference betweenit and real tools." Whereasan
ordinarytool can be testedindependently to see if it is proper(e.g., to
check a hammer we do not have to use it, alone hitit witha hammer),
let
our cognitionis such thatit seemsthereis no testforit whichdoes not
itselfappeal to theuse of our cognition.Thus thereis somethingfunda-
mentallyquestionableabout assumingcognitionis a meretool,and once
we have droppedthisassumption,we have droppedwhatHegel givesas
themotivationforthe criticalphilosophy(namely,the idea of checking
beforehandhow thistool works).
Unfortunately, thisnewway of formulating Hegel's objectioninvolves
themisleadingsuggestionthatthetool conceptionof knowledge(as just
explained)is a presupposition -ofKant'sphilosophy.Perhapsitdoes func-
tionthisway forsome philosophers,butin Kant's case it mustbe reiter-
ated thatthetalk of formsof intuitionand understanding is meantpre-
ciselyas the conclusionratherthan the startingpoint of his argument.
Kant no doubt believesit would be wrongto assumethatour empirical
representations directlyrevealthingsin themselves,"forthe groundof
suchan assumptionis hardlyevident,and he also surelybelievesthatthe
historyof metaphysicalcontroversies warrantssome initialwithholding
about thereliabilityof reasonwhen it goes beyondtheempiricalrealm,
but all thisdoes not mean thatfromthestarthe is sayingthatwhat we
have to workwithare onlyour formsof access to objects. On the con-
trary,once theseformsare discoveredand elaborateditbecomesan extra
point to show that theyare only our forms,only our instruments for
tryingto get at somethingin itselfquite distinctfromus.
Here one mightinsistthatHegel's objectionis independentof when
one holds thatthereis such a thingas a tool of cognitiondistinctfrom
thingsin themselves(whatHegel calls "theAbsolute").For as longas itis
truethatknowledgecannotbe likean ordinarytool,thenthiswould seem
to be enoughto make improperany talk of knowledgeas a mediumor
instrument, and so evenifcriticalphilosophyis not offbaseat thebegin-
ning,itis ultimatelyoffbase.The Kantian'sreplyto thispointis thatall he
is evercommitted to is an analogybetweencognitionsand tools,an anal-
ogywitha particularmeaningresultingfroman argumentto a particular
kindof independenceof thingsfromour mind.More specifically, he can
replythatwhilethereflexive capacityof our facultyof cognitionin gen-
eraland theabsolutelyuniversalscope of a certainpartofthatfacultydo
i8 KARL AMERIKS
This it does notdo, foralthoughitgivesa kindof absolute
in themselves.
knowledge,thisis quite negativeand indeterminate and notinconsistent
withany thesisKant wants to hold.
The mostfamousHegelian treatment of thisreplyis in thePhenome-
nology'sintroductory attackon critical
philosophy,whereHegel suggests
Kant's inquirygivesnews thatis not so muchillicitas vacuous:
It seems . . . a remedy. . . to removefromtheresultthepartwhich,in our idea of the
Absolutereceivedthroughthatinstrument, belongsto theinstrument,and thusto getthe
truthin itspurity.Butthisimprovement would,as a matteroffact,onlybringus back to the
pointwherewe werebefore. . . . thethingstandsbeforeus once morejustas itwas previ-
ous to all thistrouble,which,as we now see, was superfluous.68
68
Hegel, III: 69, Baillie,p. 132.
ZO KARL AMERIKS
noumenalmaterialtruthsabout thecharacterofthingsin themselves. But
I see no problemhereas longas Kantgives,as he surelydoes,someindica-
tionabout how thesetruthsare to be distinguished, such as by different
proceduresof verification transcendental
(respectively: arguments,for-
mal logic, science,intellectualintuition),and as long as it is clear that
thesedistinctions neednotbe meantto implythattruthitselfis ofdifferent
kinds (ratherthan just that thereare different kinds of itemsthat are
foundtrue,and different routesto them).
It is hardto determine Kant'sopinionon thecharacteroftruthitself,as
opposed to thatof knowledgeor itsobjects,72but thereis no reasonthis
should amount to a weakness specificto criticalphilosophy.At most,
Hegel can chideKant fornot beingquite open enoughabout thelimita-
tionsof "empiricaltruth,"sinceforKantitis afterall thecase thatwhatis
empirically trueofx, e.g.,thathisexistenceis temporally limited,does not
entail,as one mightsuppose,a correspondent or basing(in a Leibnizian
way) facttrueofx in itself.On thecontrary, thenoumenaltruthabout x,
e.g.,thathisexistenceis withouttemporallimits,can be quitetheopposite
of what we would empiricallyassertand of what anyonecould analyze
out of such assertions.But thisjust means thatforKant our empirical
truthis truthonly in a particularirreduciblebut limitedcontext,73 and
thisshouldnot be a thoughtwhich,in our linguisticage, mustbe held to
put Kant intospecialdifficulty.74 Thus, evenifin some deep sense "truth
is one," thereis, for all Hegel says, still an understandablepoint and
meaningto thedistinctions betweenthedifferent kindsof truthsthatthe
Kantianwants to introduce;it is hardlyall "randomtalk."75
V. As we turnnow to assessHegel's secondgroupofobjections,hisrejec-
idealism,it mustbe admittedthatthishas
tionof Kant's transcendental
alreadybeen in view forsome timebecause of theway Hegel tendedto
connectitwithhis firstgroupof objectionsto Kant's theoreticalphiloso-
phy.Nonetheless,we have yetto look at Hegel's moredirectattackson
22 KARL AMERIKS
self-grounded notionof reason."8Appearanceshave truthinsofaras they
are groundedin reasonin a way thatcan be revealedeitherfromthebot-
tom up, as in thePhenomenology, wherelimitedconceptionsof limited
thingslead us to an all embracingexplanation,or fromthetopdown,as in
theLogic,wherethesequenceof basic logicalcategoriesunfoldsin sucha
way as to disclosethestructure of theempiricalworld.For theKantian,
on theotherhand,thegap betweenappearancesand thingsin themselves
is absolute,forin neitherdirectionare we able to derivethe (particular
positive)qualitiesoftheone fromthoseoftheother.Similarly, thetruthof
theempiricalliesnotin itsbeinggroundedin an ultimately finalexplana-
tion,a knownIdea, butratherin an internalconsistency withthelimited
(thougha prioristructured) proceduresof our empiricalinquires.
Whatthismeansis thatapartfromthegeneraloppositionto Kant'sdis-
tinctionof truthlevels,reviewedin theprevioussection,Hegel's ultimate
objectionto Kantrestson a veryelaborateclaimabout how appearances
and realityentaileach other.Thereis no wayto testthisclaimnow,and so
I will admitto be challengingHegel onlywithrespectto thoseaspectsof
his critiquethatare detachablefromthedetailsof hisown positivemeta-
physicalsystem.Sucha challengewillno doubtstrikean orthodoxHegel-
ian as incompleteand unfair,but I will assumethereare understandable
reasonsforit,and thatifa Hegelian is reallyto hope somehowto break
into contemporarydiscussionsin theoreticalphilosophyit must be by
somearguments thatdo notalreadyrequireappeal to the(moreelaborate
partsof theHegelian) system.Moreover,I presumeHegel himselfwould
nothaveto regardmytacticas whollyunfair,for,as our manyquotations
fromtheearlyJenapublicationshaveshown,Hegel clearlyformulated his
basiccritiqueofKantbeforedevelopinghisown system,and (as theparal-
lel citations from much later texts show) what he formulatedthen
remainedto the end the core of his directcritique.
Thereremainto be examinedthreebasicaspectsofthiscritique:(A) the
generalattackon theconceptionof a thingin itself;(B) thegeneraltreat-
mentofKant'sbasic argumentforidealismin theAntinomies;and (C) the
specifictreatment of individualdoctrinesin theTranscendentalDialectic
thatare developedin line withtranscendental idealism.
The first-kind
of objectioncomes in variousforms, buttheseall appear
to reston thepresumptionthatKant's categoriesare to be equated with
theirsensiblemeaning.79 Thus therestrictionthesisis read in such a way
78
See Hegel, Encyclopedia?13i, Zusatz, VIII: z6zf, Wallace, p. i87.
79 It is notablethatanotherway in whichHegel expressestheprincipleoftrueidealismis in
termsoftheidea thatrelateditemshave no sensein isolation,and he takesas an expres-
sion of thisview Kant's doctrinethatconceptsand intuitionsalone are each insufficient
(II: 30zf, Cerfand Harris,p. 68). Here Hegel (like manycurrentinterpreters) already
24 KARL AMERIKS
Hegel is notunawareofthisKantianresponse,forhe triesto blockitby
remarking, "it is no escape to turnaround and explainthatreason falls
intocontradictionsonlyby applyingthe categories."8"This suggestsan
acceptancethattheKantainneednotbelievethatthingsin themselvesare
directlyunreasonable,and therefore fully"beyondthought."Nonethe-
less,Hegel does not allow thispointto make any difference, forhe adds
immediately, "applicationofthecategoriesis maintainedto be necessary,
and reasonis not supposedto be equippedwithanyotherformsbutcat-
egoriesforthe purpose of cognition.But cognitionis determining and
determinate thinking:so that if reason be merelyemptyindeterminate
thought,it thinksnothing."86This chargeinvolvesserious confusions.
Hegel appearsto conflatethefactthat(forKant) theapplicabilityof the
categoriesis necessaryin thatit is indispensableforour empiricalcogni-
tion(see quote above),withtheidea thatsomehowwithoutsuchan appli-
cationthecategoriesthemselveswould be senseless.Thereis no basis for
concludingthat withoutapplyingthe categoriesreason is absolutely
empty,it "thinksnothing."When I considerGod as the groundof the
world,I do not cognizehim in accord withthe principleof the Second
Analogy,I do notapplythecategoryofcausalityin itsschematizedmean-
ing,and yetI stillhave somethingotherthana "merelyempty"represen-
tation.In particular,I can be thinking- perhapswithoutjustification,
but stillwithsense - thatsomehowGod standsin at least thatgeneral
relationto theworld in whichany necessaryreal conditionof a thing's
beingstandsto thatbeing.
There are two othertextswhichcan help explainwhyHegel did not
appreciatethis point. In one passage he remarksthat "transcendental
idealism,carriedmore consistently to its logical conclusion,has recog-
nized the emptinessof thatspectreof the thingin itself."8"This implies
Hegel mayhave begunby simplyacceptingtheverdictof his contempo-
raries,i.e., acceptingthefamouscritiqueofJacobiand Fichte(thephilos-
opherswho carriedtranscendental idealismto "its logical conclusion")
thatKant could notconsistently use causalityas a principleof experience
and as a principlethatholds fora relationinvolvingthingsin themselves.
88
This obviouslyraisestheso-calledproblemof "double affection."See Ameriks,Kant's
Theory,pp. z84-86, and M. Westphal,"In Defenseof theThingin Itself,"Kant-Studien
59 (i968), pp. 135-41.
89
Hegel,XX: 3 53. Cf. V: 39, Johnstonand Struthers,vol, I, p. 56, whereKantis attacked
fortheerrorofsupposingitis reasonthatis in contradiction withitself,and fornotreal-
izingthatthecontradictions arise"justfromtheliftingofReason above thelimitations of
the Understanding."
90 Hegel, Encyclopedia,?48, VIII: iz6, Wallace, p. 77. Cf. XX: 359.
9' Actually,althoughthisis his officialsolutionforthesetopics,Kant says preciouslittle
26 KARL AMERIKS
topics are taken to forceone to transcendentalidealism: theysimply
encourageit as an option to be keptin mind.On the otherhand, when
Kantdiscussesspace and time,thereis no roomevento entertaina sepa-
ratenoumenalcharacter.WhereastheThirdAntinomy, forexample,can
introducethe idea of noumenalfreedom,thereis no idea of a separate
noumenalfinitudeor infinitude of thespatiotemporaldimensionsof the
world forthe FirstAntinomyto encourage.
In his basic argumentKant presumesthatif spatiotemporalrelations
were transcendentally real, thenthe world would have to have eithera
determinateand infinitely or a determinateand finitespatiotemporal
magnitude.93The particular argumentsof the First Antinomyare
advanced to show that neitherof these disjunctsare possible, and
preciselyratherthanassertthatreasonitselfis contradictory, Kant con-
cludesonlythatthepremiseof transcendental realismmustbe givenup
(unfortunately he does notconsidergivingup insteadwhathe presumesto
followfromthispremise,i.e., thesupposedlyexhaustivedisjuncts).None
of the stepsto thisconclusion,questionableas theymay be, invokethe
claim thatthenotionof theinfinite itselfentanglesus in contradictions,
and Kant evenseemswillingto allow an infinite future.Thereis no asser-
tionofa singleand basic difficulty withreason;rather,thereis a sequence
of verydifferent considerationsabout space and timewhichsupposedly
lead to conclusionsabout theworld's dimensionsthatin turninvolvea
certainlimitedrestriction of reason.
Hegel neveracknowledgedtheroleand structure ofthebasic argument
of theFirstAntinomy.In a letterof I 8I 2, he explainsthatas faras he is
concernedthe contentof the Antinomiesshould be explicatedlogically
withoutany reference to cosmology:"indeed,all further contentabout
theworld,matter,etc.,is a uselessballast,a confusingimage(Nebelbild)
of the imagination."94 The same view is expressedin the Logic, where
Hegel makes no basic distinctionbetweenthe various antinomiesand
assertsthatall conceptsof the sensibleworld involvecontradictions
becausetheyare about mereparticulars,notbecausetheyare conceptsof
reason.95His casual attitudeto the textmay again explain whyHegel's
secondobjectionto Kant's idealism,likehis first, appliesonlyagainstan
absurdidea in theone case, thatofan unthinkable
- object,in theother,
28 KARL AMERIKS
poral as suchbutratherreason,whose reflexivity "penetratestheconcept
and essenceof the world.""'0This is, of course,one of Hegel's favorite
ideas - thatreflection has thepeculiarkindof endlessnesssuggestedby
theformofa circle,everturningupon itself,whereasthenon-spiritual has
a merelylinearform(and "bad infinity"). But whateverthevalue of this
idea, it too simplybypassestheoriginalproblem,thefactualquestionof
theworld'sphysicaldimensions,whichremainsevenifthereis thekindof
necessaryrelationHegel stressesbetweentheconceptsof thelimitedand
the endless.
Similarlyfrustrating is the treatmentin the Encyclopedia,wherethe
FirstAntinomyis describedsimplyas implying"recognitionof thedoc-
trinethat space and time presenta discreteas well as a continuous
aspect . . . we can go beyondeverydefinitespace and beyondevery
definite time,butitis no lesscorrectthatspace and timearerealand actual
onlywhentheyare definedor specializedinto'here'and 'now'.""'0 Here
thesubjecthas changedagain- and in a thirdnewway- forthereis no
reasonto presumethatanypartyto theAntinomywould have to dispute
the"discreteness"of timeand space in theway thatitis introducedhere.
The questionat issue,though,is how largetheworldis, and to thisHegel
is givingeithera strangedogmaticanswer,namely,thatwe reallycan go
beyond "everydefinite"point,or no answerat all. In his finallectures
Hegel takes the same ambivalentline. He repeatsthe points made in
Nurembergand concludesthat"theworld,as theuniverse,is thewhole;it
is thusa universalIdea, and therefore can be determined eitheras limited
or unlimited.`02
VII. The distinctiverole of the FirstAntinomymakes Hegel's indirect
approachto itespeciallydisturbing, and all themoreso becausehe might
wellhave madespecificobjections(e.g.,to theexhaustiveness ofthebasic
disjunctionKant poses) that would have blocked Kant's argumentto
transcendentalidealism. Hegel's treatmentof the otherAntinomiesis
even briefer,and the evaluationof the treatment is even moredifficult.
Since Hegel believesthatthe argumentof the Second Antinomyis basi-
callythesame as thatof theFirst,'03and thatthatof theFourthis basi-
cally the same as thatof the Third,'04we shall examineonly his treat-
100
Hegel, IV: 386.
"' Hegel,
Encyclopedia,?48, Zusatz, VIII: iz9, Wallace, p. 79. Cf. Encyclopedia,?ioo,
VIII: ZIAf,Wallace, p. ioo.
102 Hegel,XX: 357.
103
Hegel,IV: I87-89. Cf.V: z'7ff,Johnstonand Struthers,
vol. i,pp. z05ff;VI: 171,John-
ston and Struthers,vol. z, p. 146; XX: 357.
104 Hegel, IV: 19z; XX: 357f.
105
Hegel,Encyclopedia,?48, Zusatz, VIII: i29, Wallace, p. 79; cf. ?35 Zusatz, VIII: Io0,
Wallace p. 55f.
i06 See Ameriks,Kant's Theory,pp. i85-233.
107
See thesketchfor"a proofthatthewill is free"in Hegel's Philosophyof Right,?S4-5,
VII: 48-50, trans.T. M. Knox (Oxford: ClarendonPress,1952), pp. zi-zz.
Io8 Ibid. I believethispointis notstressedenoughin R. Schacht'sfineessay,"Hegel on Free-
dom," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre(Garden City:
Doubleday Anchor,1972), pp. 289-3z8. For example,Schachtsays,"The experienceof
freedomis takenbyHegel . . . to reflect thefactthatwhatare commonlyreferred to as
the laws of naturedo not governthe whole of phenomenalreality"(ibid., p. 301).
Schachtdoes notpointout how importantthisclaimis and how nonethelessHegel fails
to say it clearlyand failsto offerjustification.
30 KARL AMERIKS
as an uncausedcause butalso theabilityto choose in thisway to followa
rationallaw. His disputewithKantarisesonlywiththeissueofhow such
a law is to be understood,for Hegel believesthat it can and must be
explainedin a muchless formalway than Kant would accept.
Whatis disturbing about Hegel's positionis that,whilehe does appear
to allow thatabsoluteor "negativefreedom"is at leastpartofwhatman
has,he does notputanyeffort intoarguingforthepossibilityofsuchfree-
dom (he appears to thinkit is obvious on introspection).'09 Kant's doc-
trineoftranscendental idealismis at leastaddressedto thisissue,and itat
least takes seriouslythe deterministic implicationsof scienceand social
life.Thus KantusestheThirdAntinomy to introducetheidea that,despite
universalnaturalnecessity,theremay be some uncaused causality.Of
coursehisargumentmaybe faulty,and itstillprovidesno theoreticalrea-
son to affirm we have suchcausality,but at leastit makesa starttoward
theargumentneeded.Hegel, on theotherhand,simplytriesto have the
bestof bothworlds,thatis,he buildson themetaphysicaldoctrineofour
absolutenegativefreedom,whileimpugningtraditionalmetaphysics and
dismissingall particularargumentsto the doctrine.
Thereis thusin all ofHegel's systematic and textualdiscussionsa kind
of strategicsilenceabout thebasic issue of theexistenceof absolutefree-
dom. In thefirst Jenawritings, forexample,he presentsno detailsof the
discussionsin the Third Antinomyand simplydeclares,"Freedomand
necessityare ideal factors,and thusare not in real opposition . . . Free-
dom is the characterof the Absolute when the Absolute is posited as
something inner . . . Necessityis thecharacteroftheAbsoluteinsofaras
it is observedas somethingexternal . . . Free will (Willkfir)and acci-
dent,whichhave a place onlyin subordinatestandpoints,are banished
fromtheconceptof thescienceof theAbsolute.""0.The firstpartof this
statement sidestepsthefundamental pointthatin one sensefreedomand
necessitymustbe in "real opposition,"forto hold to transcendental or
negativefreedomis to hold to theexistenceof uncausedcausality,and to
holdto transcendental or absolutenecessityis to assertthedirectdenialof
this.The latterpartof Hegel's statement, theremarksabout an arbitrary
32 KARL AMERIKS
themisapplicationof our reasonbutis rathera truthabout our natureas
finitethings,i.e., justwhat one shouldexpectfromitemswhichare only
I willpresume,however,thatwhenHegel seemsto be talkingin
finite."I4
thiswaywe areto saynotthathe is ascribinga literallycontradictory rela-
tionto things,but ratherthathe has in mindsome kindof lesserand at
leastcomprehensible contrastlikethatbetweenwhathe calls thecontinu-
ityand discreteness ofspace and time.Butofcoursethisis onlyto saythat
at bestHegel's treatment of theThirdAntinomyis no betterthanthatof
theFirst;it leavestheoriginalquestion,as well as Kant's treatment of it,
untouched.
VIII. A similarand finalexample of Hegel's treatmentof Kant can be
foundin hisdiscussionoftheParalogisms.The mainissuethatHegel dis-
cusseshere,thesoul's simplicity,is treatedjustliketheissuesoftheAntin-
omies (notinappropriately, forI suspectKantoriginallymeantto treatit
undertheSecondAntinomy).We are to see how bothsidesof thedebate
can be affirmed, for the soul is both simple and complex: "Thus, for
example,whilethesoul maybe admittedto be simpleself-sameness, itis
at the same timeactiveand institutesdistinctionsin its own nature.""15
Here again we finda shiftfromtheoriginalissue,forneitherpartyto the
traditional question need dispute that the soul involves some
"distinctions."The questionis ratherwhetherit is a simplebeingor a
complexof beings;whicheverit is, it can involve"distinction"and need
not be what Hegel calls "a meredead thing."To talk about thesoul as
simpleand somethingelse besides,is to ignorediscussinghow we are to
resolvethe originalquestionof whetherthe soul is simpleat all.
In the same paragraph in which he appears to encourage the
assumptionof thesoul's simplicity, Hegel also seemsto say thatsuch an
assumptionis false,that"predicateslikesimplicity, permanence,etc.,are
inapplicableto the soul.""6 Taken literally,this impliesHegel thinks
thatwhatis simpleand complexis not evensimple,whichis of coursean
absurdthought.Taken morecharitably, hispositionmustbe thatwhatis
simpleand complexin a sense,is not merely simple,i.e., is not "a dead
thing,"and in thatsensealoneis notto be said to be simple.But again,it
would seemthereis no needto makethispoint,forno partyto theParalo-
gismholds such a "dead" view. In fact,however,Hegel ascribedsome-
thingverylikethispositionto Kant.Hegel givesthename "dogmaticsub-
jectivism"to theKantianpositionwhichsupposedlyholds thatthesoul
(qua simple) is only a form,in contrastto the rationalistposition of
34 KARL AMERIKS
basic methodon whichsuchclaimswerebased,namely,via an appeal to
an allegedlyprivilegedinnerperception.The mainlocus of thischallenge
is in thedoctrineof apperceptionand theRefutationof Idealism,where
Kantarguesthatour self-knowledge notonlyrequiresjudgmentand gen-
eral rules but also is parasiticupon spatial data and externalobjects.
Hegel practicallyignoresthisargument,and whenhe does come to it he.
seriouslymisrepresents it,sayingthatitspointis thattemporaldetermina-
tion requires referenceto somethingpermanentin oneself."' Thus
Hegel missesKant's mostsignificant challengeto themetaphysicaltradi-
tion,thechallengeto explainhow mereself-reflection can giveus determi-
nateknowledgewithoutreference to a publicrealm.Hegel did challenge
theCartesiantraditionin manyways,buthe oftenremainedboundto its
presumptionthatself-perception (as in the metaphysicalarticulationof
theformsof Geist)has a specialprivilege.In thisrespecthis treatment of
of
theParalogismsinvolveshis mostseriousunderestimate Kant's work,
and in thisway his critiqueof theDialecticsuffersfromthesame weak-
nessas thatof his critiqueoftheAnalytic:an overconfidence about what
is obvious fromthe mererepresentation of the I.
IX. In describingand evaluatingHegel's attackon Kant, I have triedto
presentthesimplestand moststraightforward Kantianresponses.These
responsesshould be familiar,but recentdiscussionsindicatethatit has
notbeenappreciatedhow fartheygo to meetthepointsin Hegel's explicit
critique.If thispaper does no morethanprovokea Hegelian counterat-
tack thatattemptsto meettheseresponsesin a comparablystraightfor-
ward way, I would considerthisworkquite justified.In themeantime,a
Kantiancannothelp but draw attentionto the obvious implicationsfor
"Hegel's entireprogramand conceptionof philosophy."