Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410

www.elsevier.com/locate/jaa

Transcending the ‘‘Obnoxious Spectator’’: a case

for processual pluralism in ethnoarchaeology
Jerimy J. Cunningham*
Department of Anthropology, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Que., Canada H3A 2T7
Received 18 February 2003; revised 13 May 2003

Abstract

Several commentators have argued that ethnoarchaeology will only become a productive part of archaeological
research once both archaeology and ethnoarchaeology are unified by the axioms of a single theory of behavior. Through
an examination of the different roles that ethnoarchaeological research has adopted, I demonstrate that ethnoar-
chaeology is already theoretically unified by a general concern with analogy. I argue that the problems that many
commentators have recognized with ethnoarchaeologyÕs apparent eclecticism arise from an over-reliance on ‘‘core
universals’’ by both processual and postprocessual researchers. Instead of implementing a single unified theory of
behavior, I suggest that ethnoarchaeologists should adopt a pluralistic orientation that is sensitive to the contextual
applicability of specific causal processes.
Ó 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Ethnoarchaeology; Analogical reasoning; Pluralism; Causal process; Universals

Introduction terms, ethnoarchaeology is a ‘‘Rosetta Stone: a way of

Perhaps more than any other branch of archaeology,
ethnoarchaeology is reaping the rewards of its own
ambiguity. While most archaeologists know that ethn-
oarchaeologists study modern cultural life in order to
develop interpretive frameworks specifically designed
for archaeology, ethnoarchaeologyÕs methods, objectives
and governing theories remain generally misunderstood.
Ethnoarchaeology developed as a response to a ten-
dency among ethnologists to ignore archaeological
questions in their research (Longacre, 1991a; Papousek,
1984; Watson, 1980; but see Pastron, 1974). Archaeol-
ogists have thus taken to the field to make their own
ethnographic observations—observations that are di-
rected explicitly at an ‘‘archaeological purpose’’
(Thompson, 1991, p. 231). In BinfordÕs (1983, p. 24)
*
Fax: (519) 398-4758.
E-mail address: jerimy.cunningham@mail.mcgill.ca.
ÔtranslatingÕ the static, material. . .found on an archaeo-
logical site into the vibrant life of a group of people who
in fact left them there.’’ Yet, despite frequent historical
reviews (Charlton, 1981; David and Kramer, 2001,
Chapter 1; Dillon, 1984; Trigger, 1978) and attempts to
re-conceptualize ethnoarchaeology by developing ty-
pologies of ethnoarchaeological research (e.g., GouldÕs,
1971 ‘‘levels of ethnoarchaeology’’; see Kirch, 1978, p.
109; and again David and Kramer, 2001, Chapter 1),
little consensus exists even among ethnoarchaeologists
as to the place ethnoarchaeology should have within the
larger discipline (see Longacre, 1978, p. 357 for an early
discussion; and then Stark, 1993).
In recent years, ethnoarchaeology has been forced
to weather internal and external critiques and re-
evaluations. Stahl (1993), for example, has taken both
archaeologists and ethnoarchaeologists to task for rein-
troducing elements of unilinear evolutionary thought to
archaeology. She argues that the preoccupation with
testing that was typical of the New Archaeology resulted

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doi:10.1016/S0278-4165(03)00042-4
390 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
in the use of boundary conditions for analogy that were
‘‘. . .historical continuities, and/or societies occupying
comparable environments pursuing similar subsistence
strategies, hence in comparable stages of evolutionary
development. . .’’ (Stahl, 1993, p. 244, emphasis added).
Other commentators have pointed to the astounding
degree of variability that exists in ethnoarchaeologyÕs
current research practices. P. Arnold (2000, p. 120) notes
that ‘‘. . .it is time to call attention to the uncomfortable
hodgepodge of protocol and purpose subsumed within
the increasingly ambiguous arena of ceramic ethnoar-
chaeology.’’ Likewise, MacEachern (1996) has shown
that ‘‘African ethnoarchaeology’’ includes detailed eth-
nographic field research in a single location and com-
parative studies, involves long term commitments to a
native population, occurs in controlled laboratory con-
ditions removed from any ethnographic subject, focuses
explicitly on the technicalities of archaeological research,
and examines human activities that are all but archaeo-
logically invisible. Elsewhere, significant differences have
emerged in the theoretical perspectives that ethnoar-
chaeologists seem to hold regarding ethnographic anal-
ogy. Despite the central role often ascribed to analogy in
all archaeological and ethnoarchaeological research (see
David and Kramer, 2001, Chapter 2), a commentator has
made recently the bewildering claim that postprocessual
researchers do not make analogical inferences (Porr,
1999, pp. 7–8). Two of the most recent volumes on
ethnoarchaeology and ethnographic analogy (David and
Kramer, 2001; Owen and Porr, 1999a; see especially
Biehl, 1999, p. 172; David and Kramer, 2001, pp. 43–50;
Owen and Porr, 1999b; Porr, 1999, p. 6; Roux, 1999, p.
154) demonstrate that processual and postprocessual
researchers rely on formal or structural similarities in
their analogical inferences rather than on the causal
regularities that—20 years ago—Wylie (1982, 1985) noted
as the most desirable form of ethnographic analogy.
Perhaps the most memorable critique of ethnoar-
chaeologyÕs eclecticism comes from SimmsÕ (1992)
characterization of contemporary ethnoarchaeological
work as little more than an ‘‘Obnoxious Spectator’’ and
a ‘‘Trivial Pursuit.’’ Like OÕConnell (1995), Simms has
suggested that the solution to ethnoarchaeologyÕs ills lies
in a more nuanced consideration of high level theory. In
order to become a productive area of research, both
authors have argued that archaeology and ethnoar-
chaeology must become integrated under a unified the-
oretical perspective, preferably one based in behavioral
ecology. After unification, Simms believes ethnoar-
chaeology can reach its true potential, becoming the key
to the ‘‘Time Machine.’’ The obvious response to
SimmsÕ and OÕConnellÕs suggestion is to ask why ethn-
oarchaeology should be theoretically unified under be-
havioral ecology, especially since Hodder (1986) would
like ‘‘material culture studies’’ to unify ethnoarchaeo-
logical research. But the far more relevant question
would seem to be why the solution to ethnoarchaeol-
ogyÕs problems will suddenly be found in a single high
level theory. The concern with general theorizing seems
antithetical to ethnoarchaeologyÕs long association with
middle-range theorizing—with the attempt to develop
low level linking principles between archaeological data
and human behavior. Indeed, the independence of ethn-
oarchaeologyÕs middle-range propositions from general
theory has often been taken by archaeologists to mean
that these middle-range propositions could be used to
employ archaeological findings to test the accuracy and
reliability of broader propositions about human activi-
ties (Binford, 1978; see Raab and Goodyear, 1984;
Wylie, 1995, for discussions). For these researchers, the
eclecticism of ethnoarchaeology—its disinterest in broad
range problems—is perhaps its greatest contribution to
the discipline. The suggestion that ethnoarchaeology
should abandon its diverse, middle-range focus and in-
stead should cling tightly to the directives of a specific
theoretical paradigm is a significant development.
In what follows, I develop my own reanalysis of
ethnoarchaeologyÕs eclecticism and the proposed solu-
tion that would see ethnoarchaeology unified by a single
theory of human behavior. There are, I would suggest,
two distinct facets to the ‘‘senseless eclecticism’’ we see
in current ethnoarchaeological research. First, I suggest
that at least some of the diversity in ethnoarchaeologyÕs
methodological programs is a response to the episte-
mological requirements of analogical reasoning. To
make this point, I first present an overview of the dif-
ferent ‘‘roles’’ that ethnoarchaeology has adopted within
archaeology. I then review WylieÕs (1982, 1985, 1988)
treatment of analogy and focus on her suggestions that
ethnoarchaeologists should (1) combine an ever-ex-
panding knowledge of how causal processes operate in
ethnographic contexts with (2) explicit programs of
testing. I argue that the diverse methodological roles
that ethnoarchaeology has within archaeology reflect, at
least in part, these two suggestions. However, there is a
second facet to ethnoarchaeologyÕs eclecticism that
crosscuts its existing methodological programs. More-
over, I would suggest that this aspect of ethnoarchae-
ologyÕs diversity is responsible for many of the problems
and misconceptions the plague the field. Competing
partisan interests in archaeology have proposed distinct
and often mutually exclusive models of culture. As is the
case with behavioral ecology and material culture stud-
ies, most of these theories are considered by their pro-
ponents to be candidates for an emerging monism—to be
the theory that will unify ethnoarchaeology and solve
ethnoarchaeologyÕs eclecticism. At the heart of these
models are to what I refer as ‘‘core universals’’—causal
processes that proponents of the different models in
ethnoarchaeology assume have a near universal affect on
behavioral, cultural and material patterning. Because of
their uniform causal affect, these processes should be the
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
foundation on which analogical inferences are based.
My point here is not—as has so often been done in the
processual–postprocessual debates—to advocate one
model over another, but to show how the very idea that
specific processes are immutable interferes with our
understanding of how causal processes interact and
combine in the creation of material patterns. I suggest
that rather than a single broad level theory of behavior,
ethnoarchaeology needs a more nuanced and pluralistic
understanding of how diverse causal influences create
material variation.
The roles of ethnoarchaeology
Four different roles have at one time or another been
proposed for ethnoarchaeology within the broader dis-
cipline. None of these roles is discrete, in that it reflects
an isolated research tradition or a distinct school of
thought. Indeed, elements of all four roles are almost
always combined in the research programs proposed by
specific individuals (Gould, 1971; Kirch, 1978; Long-
acre, 1978, p. 362; MacEachern, 1996, p. 248). The four
are: (1) ethnoarchaeology aimed at identifying law-like
‘‘translations’’ of the archaeological record; (2) ethn-
oarchaeology that tests archaeologically derived propo-
sitions; (3) ethnoarchaeology as a form of ‘‘interpretive
discovery’’; and (4) ethnoarchaeology aimed at ‘‘raising
analogical consciousness.’’
Translating the archaeological record
The first role often assigned to/adopted by ethnoar-
chaeology is to research technical questions about the
processes that resulted in the creation of the archaeo-
logical record. Rejecting any form of a ‘‘Pompeii pre-
mise,’’ Schiffer (1976) has initiated a widespread analysis
of taphonomy. Likewise, Binford (1978, 1981) argued
that archaeology needed to develop middle-range theory
that explained how archaeological patterns related to
cultural life (see Trigger, 1989, pp. 359–361). These ap-
proaches outline methodologies to identify law-like
generalizations that enable archaeologists to translate
human behavior from archaeological remains, taking
into account the natural processes that intervene be-
tween the past and present (also see Binford and Sabloff,
1982). Several lines of analysis have been thus con-
ducted, including taphonomic studies (e.g., Gifford,
1978; Gorecki, 1985), analyses of sampling (e.g., Gould,
1974, 1980; Skibo et al., 1989), usewear analyses (Hay-
den, 1977; Keeley, 1980; Odell and Odell-Vereecken,
1980; Tringham, 1978; Tringham et al., 1974), the ex-
amination of functional efficiency (Carneiro, 1979), and
analyses of ceramic use-life (e.g., David and Hennig,
1972; Longacre, 1985, 1991a; Mayor, 1994; Tani and
Longacre, 1999).
391
The propositions developed by ethnoarchaeology
often operate as middle-range propositions in the Bin-
fordian sense: as low-level bridging principles that can
be used by researchers following quite different theories
of behavior. If success is to be measured in the usability
of these propositions by different theories of cultural
behavior—i.e., by widespread acceptance—then the
success of this research has been limited almost exclu-
sively to ‘‘technical’’ areas like usewear, stratigraphy,
dating, or taphonomy. Other researchers have optimis-
tically pursued similar ‘‘law-like’’ relations in a wider
spectrum of cultural behaviors (e.g., Arnold, 1985;
contributions to Carr and Neitzel, 1995; Graves, 1981,
1985, 1991; Rathje, 1978; Schiffer, 1978; Schiffer and
Skibo, 1997). For example, Schiffer and Skibo (1997)
seek to develop law-like relations between artifact pro-
duction systems and their use contexts. These relation-
ships create a ‘‘correlative matrix’’ in which specific
performance characteristics are related to specific
physical attributes. However, the conclusions reached
have often been quite contentious (Cunningham, 2003;
David and Kramer, 2001, pp. 141–142), and many of
the critics have questioned how rigidly patterns in ma-
terial culture can reflect discrete elements of behavior
(also see DeBoer, 1984, 1991; Sullivan, 1978). Thus,
although there are active attempts to expand the list of
‘‘law-like translations’’ uncovered by ethnoarchaeology,
they appear limited to specific, technical areas of
research.
Testing archaeologically derived propositions
Binford and Sabloff (1982, pp. 148–151) note that
one major problem in trying to extend the number of
laws linking material culture to human behavior is that
the proposed relations can never be tested directly by
the archaeological record. Archaeological analogues
risk affirming the consequent (Binford, 1981; Wylie,
1982, pp. 389–390) by proposing linkages between be-
havior and patterns of material culture, and then in-
terpreting the archaeological record as if the very same
linkages applied. Binford (1981, 1983, Binford and
Sabloff, 1982, p. 137) thus suggests that ethnoarchaeo-
logical research needs to evaluate deductively proposed
linkages between dynamics and statics. Archaeology
provides the context for formulating hypotheses re-
garding human behavior, and ethnoarchaeological re-
search offers a separate context for the evaluation of
those hypotheses (e.g., D. Arnold, 2000; Charlton,
1981, pp. 151–152; Gosselain, 2000; Kramer, 1979, pp.
4–5; Stanislawski, 1978; Wiessner, 1983). At times, this
type of ethnoarchaeology can be narrowly defined and
highly operationalized, with the research directed to
target specific archaeological questions. Binford and
Sabloff (1982, p. 151), for example, state unequivocally
that ‘‘. . .we must learn to see the dynamics from a
392 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
perspective appropriate to the archaeological record.
Such a viewpoint should be (1) nonparticipating, (2)
outside, and (3) partitive.’’ Thus, ‘‘mentalist’’ (Schiffer,
1978, pp. 234–235) and/or ‘‘fortuitous ethnoarchaeolo-
gies’’ (Longacre, 1991a, p. 6) are rejected in favour of
formal programs of research directed at solving ar-
chaeological problems (e.g., Krause, 1985). Not infre-
quently, such testing has recognized equifinality and
produced ‘‘cautionary tales’’ that show how many of
the material patterns in which archaeologists are inter-
ested can be created by entirely different sets of causal
processes.
Interpretive discovery
As Ascher (1961) noted long ago, one of the prime
roles of ethnoarchaeology is to develop analogies that
can be used in archaeological interpretation (also see
Kleindienst and Watson, 1956). The realization that
analogies are used in all stages of research has prompted
Stanislawski (1974, p. 18) to define ethnoarchaeology as
‘‘the direct-observation field study of the forms, manu-
facture, distribution, meaning, and use of artifacts in
their institutional setting and social unit correlates
among living, non-industrial peoples for the purpose of
constructing better explanatory models to aid archaeo-
logical analogy and inference.’’ The goal of this type of
ethnoarchaeology is to use ethnographic research as a
form of ‘‘interpretive discovery’’ (Charlton, 1981, p.
152); as a way of identifying cultural practices and/or
processes that might have affected artifact variability in
the past, yet be difficult to identify from only from ar-
chaeological research (Longacre, 1991b, p. 95). In con-
trast to the above perspective, ethnoarchaeology offers
the context for discovery, creating and expanding upon
the list of analogies that can be used to interpret the past
(e.g., Costin, 2000; Kramer, 1992; LaViolette, 1995;
Lees, 1979; Muntoni, 1999; Riley, 1984). In order to
avoid affirming the consequent, these analogies are often
used to ‘‘predict the past’’ (Gould, 1980, p. 35); to act as
hypotheses that are deductive tested against archaeo-
logical remains (Atherton, 1983, pp. 96–97; Watson,
1980, p. 56).
Raising analogical consciousness
Ethnoarchaeology as interpretive discovery has a
second form that is not tightly bound to a program of
testing. The goal of this type of ethnoarchaeology is to
raise the ‘‘analogical consciousness’’ of their archaeo-
logical colleagues (after David, 1992). As Chang (1967,
p. 227) recognized over 35 years ago, the ‘‘general an-
thropologist’’ who has sufficient training in the four
fields of anthropology is a mythical hero. The rapid
expansion of the four subdisiplines makes it all but
impossible for researchers to stay abreast of major
developments outside their areas of specialization.
Consequently, most archaeologists now have only a
tenuous grasp of ethnographic methodology, the sorts of
data or processes in which social/cultural/postmodern
anthropologists are interested, or the complex proce-
dures by which ethnographic fieldwork becomes ethno-
graphic texts. Binford (1983, p. 14), for example, notes
his surprise at how few archaeologists working on
hunter-gatherer archaeology in Europe were even aware
of the relevant ethnographic literature. Likewise, Gould
(1974, p. 30) suggests that while archaeologists may
rigorously assess an interpretation of archaeological
data, there is a tendency to take ethnographic interpre-
tations as given. Archaeologists risk mistakenly applying
these analogues—treating, for example, the San Bush-
men as prototypical foragers without considering their
historical contexts (MacEachern, 1996, pp. 228–229)—
because they possess little ability to assess the validity of
ethnographic research.
Ethnoarchaeology that aims to develop archaeologyÕs
analogical consciousness tends to produce cautionary
tales, the goal of which is to alert archaeologists to the
complexity of ethnographic study. Gould (1978b, pp.
256–257) points out in an early paper that ‘‘It is the
fundamental task of ethnoarchaeology to heighten the
archaeologistÕs awareness of alternative human behav-
iors that could have occurred in order to explain the
pattern of archaeological facts.’’ Often, cautionary tales
simply remind archaeologists that the material culture
they study was created by living, breathing people. As
David (1992, p. 352, emphasis in original) notes:
‘‘EthnoarchaeologyÕs primary service mission is still the
raising of the analogical consciousness of archaeologists,
many of whom prefer their culture dead, sensitizing them
to dimensions of variability and the richness of the rela-
tionship between humans and their artifacts, including
their own bodies.’’ The audience for these cautionary
tales is, as often as not, other ethnoarchaeologists, spe-
cifically those who argue that ethnoarchaeology must be
‘‘non-participatory,’’ ‘‘outside’’ and ‘‘partitive’’:
Often, however, [archaeological] forays into ethnogra-
phy are limited in time and controlled in focus, cluttered
with specific questions to ask and measurements to be ta-
ken. What I want to argue here is that there is something
to be said for a fuller ethnographic experience that in-
cludes moments to pause and to be edified by aspects
of those ‘‘thousand kinds of life’’ we could have lived
(Geertz, 1973, p. 45). (Kus, 1997, p. 200).
The critiques from this area of ethnoarchaeology
have struck both sides of the processual and postpro-
cessual divide. Stark (1993, pp. 96–97; see also Kus,
1997) note that there is a paradox in postprocessual
research: these investigators examine symbolism,
meaning and power by, first, conducting relatively brief
field excursions and, second, by seeking to identify
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
broad cognitive frameworks that lie behind daily
practice. As Kus notes:
We need to wield carefully the vocabulary of ‘‘la longue
dure
e’’ so it does not encompass the entirety of causality
or wield too cavalierly the authority of explanation. Per-
haps more importantly we also need to be careful of the
vocabulary of ‘‘la courte dure
e.’’ The ‘‘midrange’’ vocab-
ulary of ‘‘power,’’ ‘‘belief,’’ ‘‘custom,’’ and ‘‘ideology,’’
for instance, is of a ‘‘contentlessness’’ and categorical ab-
straction so uncharacteristic of the ‘‘science of the con-
crete’’ (L
evi-Strauss, 1962, pp. 1–33) that it
underestimates and potentially simplifies other cultural
realities. To approach other cultural realities in terms
of ‘‘sensuous human practice’’ is evocative in a way that
‘‘meaning’’ and ‘‘symbol’’ are not, because meaning and
symbol reflectively distance themselves from experience
and from the ‘‘materiality’’ of the senses and emotions.
(Kus, 1997, p. 211).
KusÕ critique indicates that we should not fall into
the trap of seeing postprocessualism as the ‘‘subject
friendly’’ and ‘‘people laden’’ alternative to processual-
ism—of taking HodderÕs word when he claims that ‘‘In
so far as ethnoarchaeology limits itself to non-partici-
patory analysis Ôfrom the outsideÕ, it is simply Ôbad
anthropologyÕ from the postprocessual viewpoint’’
(Hodder, 1986, p. 95). Indeed, Kus demonstrates that, in
many ways, the ethnographic research enacted by
postprocessual archaeologists, offered under the rubric
of ‘‘material culture studies,’’ is as ‘‘outside’’ and as
‘‘nonparticipatory’’ as the ethnoarchaeology it would
seek to replace (see below). Transporting specific ar-
chaeological questions to an ethnographic setting re-
moves ethnoarchaeologists from the complexities of
their research settings, regardless of whether their focus
is ecology or power and ideology. These cautionary tales
are not simply warnings about equifinality but a re-
minder to archaeologists that the causal frameworks in
which material culture is created and used are complex
and often quite fleeting.
While some researchers see ‘‘the ethnoarchaeology of
cautionary tales’’ as little more than an obnoxious spec-
tator (to borrow SimmsÕ vocabulary), other researchers
have found cautionary tales to have an important role in
the development of analogical explanations. As an ele-
ment of discovery, Charlton (1981, p. 150) argues that
cautionary tales increase the amount of basic, factual
knowledge archaeologists can use to develop analogies.
Hole (1978, p. 129) likewise suggests that cautionary tales
aid in the development of general theory that can allow
archaeologists to develop increasingly accurate inter-
pretations of archaeological patterns. The key for eth-
nography aimed at raising an analogical consciousness is
not to ‘‘do ethnography’’ with a specific archaeological
problem in mind, but to seek a better understanding
of the diverse ways material culture operates in living
societies.
393
Analogy
No archaeologist is worth his salt, it can almost be said,
unless he [sic] makes an analogy or two in every mono-
graph he writes (Chang, 1967, p. 229).
At first blush, the diverse roles outlined above for
ethnoarchaeology appear haphazard and eclectic with
little evidence of an underlying unity. Yet they are linked
by a common concern with analogy. Wylie defines
analogy as:
the selective transposition of information from source to
subject on the basis of a comparison that, fully devel-
oped, specifies how the ‘‘terms’’ (elements) compared
are similar (positive components), different (negative
components) or of unknown likeness (neutral compo-
nents). . . An argument by analogy, proper, involves the
claim that given the similarities and differences specified
in the premises, some specific aspects of the neutral
analogy may also be assumed to be similar or, to com-
prise further points of positive analogy. . . (Wylie, 1985,
pp. 93–94).
One of the reasons that analogyÕs role in ethnoar-
chaeology has remained obscured is because archaeol-
ogists have been cautious about analogical forms of
reasoning, and particularly fearful of speciously af-
firming the consequent. Analogies were originally used
in accordance with unilinear evolutionary models of
culture that treated traditional societies as relics of
earlier stages of cultural evolution (Ascher, 1961;
Orme, 1981; Stahl, 1993; Trigger, 1989; Wylie, 1985).
The evolutionary stage formed the uniformitarianist
principle that linked the present to the past, often re-
sulting in the unwarranted and uncritical ‘‘mapping’’
of modern behaviors directly onto archaeological data.
Wylie (1985) argues that the rejection of unilinear
evolution resulted in a comparable rejection of analogy
and other forms of uniformitarianism. The outcome
was on the one hand to pursue research that avoided
any interpretation beyond archaeological remains
(cultural–historical archaeology, artifact physics) and,
on the other, an attempt to develop and employ non-
analogical (non-inductive) forms of inference (Wylie,
1985, 1988, p. 141). Rather than making inductively
based interpretations of archaeological remains, ar-
chaeologists were entreated to rigorously and deduc-
tively test hypotheses (Wylie, 1985, pp. 84–93). Under
a program of testing, ‘‘analogy’’ was replaced by
‘‘model’’ or ‘‘hypothesis,’’ marking the supposed
shift from a pre-scientific (inductive) to a scientific
(deductive) study of the past (see especially Schiffer,
1978, pp. 233–234).
The distinction between inductive and deductive
forms of argument, however, has proven more rhetor-
ical than real, and analogical inferences—blatantly
stated or veneered in scientific terms—are now generally
394 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
recognized as an inescapable part of archaeological
research (Gould and Watson, 1982, p. 360; Charlton,
1981; Wylie, 1982, p. 399). Rigid frameworks of testing
meant to counter an affirmation of the consequent when
interpretive hypotheses (analogies) are transferred from
present to past are misplaced because, being inductive,
archaeological interpretations always affirm the conse-
quent (see Graves, 1981, p. 86; Wylie, 1982, pp. 390–
391). This is not to demote archaeological inference to
mere speculation. As Ebert (1979, p. 60) reminds us,
‘‘. . .analogy is, in itself, no more precarious or dan-
gerous than any other inductive procedure.’’ If the pure
certainty of the sort sought through deductive testing is
out of reach, archaeologists are still quite capable of
identifying different degrees of plausibility in their in-
terpretations (Charlton, 1981; Ebert, 1979; Wylie, 1982,
1985, 1988). Wylie (1982, 1985) has identified two
techniques archaeologists can use to assess analogies
and her suggestions hint at how archaeologists can,
over time, build increasingly secure claims about the
past. First, while analogies can be, and have been,
based on formal relations or on constant conjunctions,
in order to escape the problem of simple analogy that
underwrote unilinear evolution, archaeologists and
ethnoarchaeologists should focus their research on the
causal relations behind observable patterns. As Ebert,
1979, pp. 60–61; emphasis added) notes, analogies can
be validated ‘‘. . .if it can be argued that the process in
operation on both sides is similar or in some way bear
upon another. . .it must be shown that certain processes
are in operation or determinant in the living case; these
processes are then applied to the archaeological case.’’
More importantly, in order to develop greater security
in our analogical inferences, source-side ethnoarchaeo-
logical research should be expanded as fully as possible
to identify valid relations between material, cultural,
and behavioral patterns and their underlying causal
mechanisms (Wylie, 1985, p. 101; 1988, p. 146). As
Wylie explains (1985, p. 101), ‘‘. . .[analogical] in-
quiry. . .must be specifically designed to determine what
causal connections hold between the material and cul-
tural or behavioral variables of interest, and under
what conditions these connections may or may not be
expected to hold.’’ Second, the degree of similarity and
difference between the processual frameworks operating
in the two contexts needs to be established by testing.
In the case of an ethnographic analogue applied to an
archaeological context: ‘‘This would [a] amount to a
specification of what (else) ought to be in the record as
a consequence of the postulated past processes and
conditions if they did in fact exist and operate as hy-
pothesized or, [b] more powerfully, if conditions were
different than postulated’’ (Wylie, 1982, pp. 396–398,
note 6). The goal of the testing is, in the case of a, to
seek additional similarities in the material record that
would be expected if the same causal processes operated
in source and subject contexts, or b, to identify material
patterns that could indicate that an alternate suite of
causal processes created the pattern for which the
analogy was originally made. Once again, the key to
testing the inference is to know from source-side eth-
noarchaeological research the affect different causal
mechanisms have on material, cultural, and behavioral
patterns. With this sort of knowledge, it becomes pos-
sible to reconfigure processes to explain behavior that
may differ substantially from any modern situation
(Wylie, 1985, 1988).
Discussion
WylieÕs description of analogy provides us with a way
to see how the different roles adopted by ethnoarchae-
ology relate to analogical reasoning. There are two
components to the program outlined above. The first
requisite is to develop knowledge about causal processes
and their affects on material variability in ethnographic
contexts, and the second is to enact testing procedures
that assess the validity of transferring analogical prop-
ositions between source and subject side contexts. The
different roles that ethnoarchaeology has adopted in
archaeology anticipate these two requirements.
The ethnoarchaeology focused on ‘‘interpretive dis-
coveries’’ and on the ‘‘raising of analogical conscious-
ness’’ are most specifically tied to developing our
understanding of how causal processes relate to material
and cultural patterns in ethnographic contexts. While
one element of this research is the quest to identify
previously unknown causal forces, much of the work
done by both these roles aims at developing a better
understanding of how previously identified processes
relate to their boundary conditions. Boundary condi-
tions are other factors in the causal environment that
have a direct bearing on the causal affects of the process
under investigation. Typically, boundary conditions are
other causal processes or structural conditions created
from the operation of past casual processes that facili-
tate, amplify or interfere with the operation of the pro-
cess being studied. BowserÕs (2000) study of decorative
variation on Conambo ceramics is perhaps the best re-
cent work that fits under the heading of ‘‘ethnoarchae-
ology as interpretive discovery.’’ Her study introduces
archaeologists to an entirely new relation between ma-
terial variation and cultural process. She demonstrates
that ceramic decoration is causally related to womenÕs
political factions within the village of Conambo rather
than to the discrete ethnic units that are present. In
addition to identifying this process, Bowser (2000, p.
244) is also careful to outline its boundary conditions for
archaeologists: ‘‘. . .it is precisely in small-scale societies,
where politics are consensus-driven, pottery is made in
the domestic contexts for domestic use, and there is
relatively little separation between public and domestic
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
contexts, that we should expect to find evidence of sig-
nification of political identity in domestic pottery style.’’
It is worthwhile noting that in outlining relations be-
tween political factions and decorative variability,
Bowser simultaneously adds to our understanding of
one of the boundary conditions for ethnic symbolism.
She reports that pottersÕ ethnic identities were recog-
nizable in the ceramic variation, but that political fac-
tions were identified with more accuracy by women in
the village (Bowser, 2000, p. 238). The point is not that
‘‘ethnic symbolism’’ fails to exert a causal affect on
variability, but seemingly that its effect is supplanted by
effects that engaged political factions exert on decorative
variability. In future cases where archaeologists suspect
that decorative variation is caused by ethnic symbolism,
they will need now to consider whether political factions
are also present and act as a limiting factor.
Although it is more rarely concerned directly
with causal process, an ethnoarchaeology that ‘‘raises
analogical consciousness’’ likewise broadens our un-
derstandings of the causal influences operating in ethno-
graphic contexts. Rather than focusing on specific
processes, this approach to ethnoarchaeology tends to
reference the general ethnographic experiences of its
practitioners and the existing critical ethnographic lit-
erature. Here ethnoarchaeologists aim to tell their peers,
especially those archaeologists who advocate perspec-
tives reliant on cultureÕs simplicity and uniformity, of the
fluidity and complexity of their own experiences in eth-
nographic settings. It would be easy to dismiss these
critiques as simply the tropes of postmodern exuberance.
But, if we read process into them, we can see that they
are warnings to archaeologists that the processual ma-
trix that creates material variation is incredibly complex
and much of it remains unknown. These critiques are
not simply the provenance of ethnoarchaeologists. Stahl
(1993), for example, has pointed out that the New Ar-
chaeologyÕs focus on testing meant that many re-
searchers ceased to ask whether the propositions they
were testing in archaeological contexts had any ethno-
graphic validity. She echoes many ethnoarchaeological
critiques that target archaeological models which define
a priori structures of causal process. For example, the
quick jump to testing in the New Archaeology was
possible because BinfordÕs (1962) tri-part model of cul-
ture was widely believed to identify the basic structure of
the causal influences on material variability. In contrast,
ethnoarchaeology that aims at ‘‘raising analogical con-
sciousness’’ argues that even the basic structures of the
casual influences on material, cultural and behavioral
patterns have yet to be defined. Hence, ‘‘fortuitous
ethnoarchaeology’’ or ‘‘ethnoarchaeology for ethnoar-
chaeologyÕs sake’’ is not a trivial pastime, but, as
Charlton (1981), Hole (1978), and Kus (1997) note, an
important step toward understanding how processes
articulate in ethnographic contexts and create material
395
variation. In this regard, both ‘‘interpretive discovery’’
ethnoarchaeology and the ethnoarchaeology aimed at
‘‘raising analogical consciousness’’ elaborate source-side
research in the way that Wylie (1985, 1988) sees as
crucial to the development of analogical inferences.
The second element of the analogical program re-
quires less explanation. Analogical inferences are valid
when archaeologists can assume that the causal pro-
cesses they are investigating operate on both sides of an
analogical relationship—a validation that requires them
to demonstrate either that similar assemblages of sup-
porting processes (boundary conditions) also operate in
source and subject contexts, or that, while the sup-
porting processes vary, there is no significant change in
the causal effect of the specific processes in which they
are interested. For example, once an archaeological
pattern is attributed to specific causal processes, the
analogy is tested by looking for further patterning that
would be expected if the causal processes were operat-
ing as hypothesized. Testing of this sort is most often
found in the daily work of normal, hypothesis-driven
archaeology that seeks to establish independent lines of
evidence, or ‘‘horizontal independence’’ (Wylie, 2000, p.
232), for a given interpretation. However, the same,
basic procedures are followed in the ethnoarchaeologi-
cal testing of archaeological propositions. A well
known example is Polly WiessnerÕs (1983) assessment of
the archaeologically derived hypothesis that symbolic
information should be encoded in the ‘‘non-functional’’
elements of San projectile points. Wiessner tested this
hypothesis by asking San Bushman to tell her about the
sorts of information they could identify from attributes
on iron points. She discovered that social information
was communicated through point attributes that were
clearly utilitarian, nullifying the initial hypothesis.
Notably, both archaeological and ethnoarchaeological
testing are best considered always to be part of ongoing
programs of research. In contrast to the hypothetico-
deductive models that were originally associated with
processual testing programs, testing never ‘‘deductively
confirms’’ our propositions in a way that finalizes our
knowledge of a causal relation. More elaborate pro-
grams of testing and more innovative source-side
research will always be needed. As BowserÕs and
WiessnerÕs works demonstrate, archaeological testing
and ethnoarchaeological source-side research continues
to fine-tune our understanding of the causal relations
that tie ethnicity to material variability (also see
Cunningham, 2001). At its most basic, testing assesses
the validity of transferring information from one con-
text to another. Thus, testing reflects a key methodo-
logical element in archaeologyÕs epistemology that,
when combined with source-side research conducted by
the roles outlined previously, creates all the elements
necessary to advance archaeologyÕs ongoing investiga-
tion of the past.
396 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
I have not yet discussed one of the four roles for
ethnoarchaeology identified above, namely, the quest by
Binford, Schiffer and others to identify law-like relations
that translate directly the archaeological record. This
role for ethnoarchaeology is unique. In contrast to those
already described above, it is not tied to the general
requirements of analogical reasoning so much as it is to
the monistic aspiration of the processual cultural model
and a very particularistic notion of middle-range theory.
As a result, I will examine this role in more detail later in
the following section.
‘‘Core universals’’ and ethnoarchaeology
The above roles for ethnoarchaeology can be un-
derstood as components of archaeological epistemol-
ogy. As such, the roles possess a degree of theoretical
unity and, at least in this sense, they are free from
charges of eclecticism. However, ethnoarchaeology is
painfully eclectic in another area. Furthermore, this
eclecticism has stunted significantly the potential of the
methodological program outlined above. Much of the
present work in ethnoarchaeology rests on the idea that
only a limited range of processes have enough cross-
cultural uniformity to be used in analogy. I refer to
these processes as ‘‘core universals’’ because they are
generally assumed to have a universal or quasi-uni-
versal causal influence over material variability. ‘‘Core
universals’’ are used in analogy in two related forms:
sometimes they are the foundation of complete models
of culture that define a priori a structure of processes
and, at other times, they are low-level bridging princi-
ples that often rest on certain methodological ‘‘givens.’’
Different partisan interests in archaeology, specifically
those found in the processual–postprocessual opposi-
tion, have championed entirely different processes as
‘‘core universals.’’ Admittedly, significant variation
does exist within the processual and postprocessual
schools, yet each school shares the belief that specific
families of process primarily ‘‘drive’’ culture.1 For
1
I have elsewhere (Cunningham, n.d.) used Gross and
LevittÕs (1994) ‘‘driven’’ versus ‘‘influenced’’ distinction to talk
about the processual–postprocessual debate. For example, most
processualists and postprocessualists would recognise that
culture exhibits traits typical of both ‘‘materialist’’ and ‘‘ideal-
ist’’ cultural ontologies (see Cunningham, 2003 on this point).
The key difference lies in the relative importance assigned to
each—whether cultural behavior is ‘‘driven’’ by adaptive strives
or evolutionary requirements and ‘‘influenced’’ by ideology or
whether it is ‘‘driven’’ by ideological process (negotiation of
power, constitution of meaning) and ‘‘influenced’’ by material
constraints/opportunities. Despite the diversity within proces-
sual and postprocessual schools of thought, they each share a
common understanding of what processes ‘‘drive’’ behavior.
example, ecological/adaptive/evolutionary processes
typical of their common materialist orientation are of
primary importance in most processual applications of
analogy, while the cultural/historical processes are fore
fronted in postprocessual analogues. The presence of
‘‘core universals’’ at the heart of these different partisan
interests has splintered ethnoarchaeological research
in a way that limits its ability to illuminate how causal
processes combine in the creation of material patterns.
To make this point, in the following discussion I will
first outline how ‘‘core universals’’ have been used in
processual and postprocessual ethnoarchaeology, and
then I will examine the key problems that have been
created by the reliance on ‘‘core universals.’’
Processual ethnoarchaeology
The new New Archaeology and its rival siblings,
behavioral and evolutionary archaeology, are commit-
ted to the idea that universal principles of culture exist in
how humans meet the material requirements of their
existence. For the New Archaeology, similar environ-
mental settings created similar cultural responses, thus
comparable environments were identified as the most
important condition for the application of analogy.
AscherÕs original definition of the ‘‘New Analogy,’’
which predates but became an important element of the
‘‘New Archaeology’’ (Binford, 1967), states quite ex-
plicitly that ‘‘In summary, then, the canon is: seek
analogies in cultures which manipulate similar environ-
ments in similar ways’’ (Ascher, 1961, p. 319; also see
Atherton, 1983).2
The ethnoarchaeological work of Gould (1971, 1974,
1978a, 1978b, 1980; Gould and Watson, 1982) is the
most explicit and fully developed attempt to outline how
uniformities in meeting material requirements can be
used to develop analogical inferences. When compared
to other processualists, Gould is also quite moderate—if
inconsistent—in his commitment to materialism. In
keeping with the scientism of the New Archaeology,
Gould explicitly avoids referring to analogy except to
dismiss it as a useful methodology. Instead, he suggests
2
AscherÕs suggestion seems to emphasize relationships
between human behavior and ecology. In a footnote, for
example, Ascher (1961, p. 318) identifies a third category of
analogy based on ‘‘properties common to all men’’ which seem
to refer to biophysical continuities held across the entire species
regardless of their ecological context. He finds this, however,
generally uninteresting because they do not factor in ‘‘the
particular patterns of a prehistoric people in carrying out. . .ac-
tivities.’’ Interestingly, both biological and ecological of conti-
nuities are used by Binford to justify the paradigmatic
independence of middle-range theory (Wylie, 1995, p. 23; e.g.,
see Wallaert-P^etreÕs, 1999 work on handedness among potters).
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
that certain behaviors are analogous in the past and
present because they are determined by uniform opera-
tion of covering laws (see Gould, 1978b, 1980, pp. 37–
38). These covering laws are not general, but are found
in ‘‘low-level eco-utilitarian kinds of explanations’’
(Gould and Watson, 1982, p. 367; see also Gould,
1978a,b, 1980). As he explains:
. . .many principles developed in evolutionary biology
and ecology can safely be assumed to have operated uni-
formly in the past as they do in the present, and they can
usefully be applied to the study of the human species
providing one accepts the notion that human traditions
may expand the total ecosystem to include social and
symbolic components. So those aspects of human behav-
ior that are most closely related to the physical and bio-
logical processes are also those that most reliably lend
themselves to the uniformitarianist assumption (Gould,
1980, p. 50).
. . .one must look first at the eco-utilitarian relationships
that occur in the situation one observes and see to what
extent variation in the observed behavior can be ac-
counted for by these immediate circumstances. If one
has exhausted this level of explanation without totally
satisfactory results, then one is entitled to go on to the
next higher level of explanation, namely the ideational
realm of shared traditions (Gould and Watson, 1982,
p. 367).
While these quotes may be read as a belief that all
‘‘culture’’ is adaptive, Gould (1980, p. 43) is careful to
distance himself from this position, which he associates
with BinfordÕs statement that culture is ‘‘manÕs extra-
somatic means of adaptation’’ (Binford, 1962, p. 218).3
Instead, he argues that some behaviors may be largely
independent of eco-utilitarian concerns and that these
behaviors may also have an affect on archaeological
variability. The problem of identifying these non-utili-
tarian, non-uniform residues is solved by first identi-
fying ethnographically the covering laws that
determine eco-utilitarian regularities and then, when
the archaeological findings deviate from these laws, to
move on to more normative and particularistic expla-
nations. He deems this approach the ‘‘argument by
anomaly’’:
3
Gould uses ‘‘culture’’ in a very restricted fashion. Culture
refers specifically to norms which he distinguishes from the
animal-like eco-utilitarian concerns that generate uniformities.
It is also worth noting that the differences between Binford and
Gould are not nearly as marked as Gould would believe.
Binford likewise makes room for non-adaptive behaviors under
the definition of stylistic variation (see Cunningham, 2003). The
key difference between them is that Gould argues cultural–
historical factors do not simply emerge from ecological
constraints/opportunities, but in rare cases may actually influ-
ence the final character of ecological adaptation.
397
. . .there emerges a clear and convincing alternative to the
argument by analogy—namely, the argument by anom-
aly. . . Only by looking for and recognizing anomalies
to general patterns of conformity to utilitarian expecta-
tions in human behavior can we reliably infer when
and under what conditions symbolic and ideational fac-
tors make a difference in the ways people actually behave
(Gould, 1980, p. xi; emphasis in original).
GouldÕs critics have pointed out that the argument
by anomaly is as analogical as any other form of
ethnoarchaeology (Gould and Watson, 1982; Watson,
1980, p. 57; 1982, p. 446; Wylie, 1982, 1985; Charlton,
1981, p. 151). However, it is not GouldÕs analogy/
anomaly distinction that is most interesting. Rather, it is
how Gould uses the distinction between analogy/
anomaly to assign differing degrees of ‘‘security’’ to
different analogical inferences according to which cul-
tural processes they reference. With an important ca-
veat, the result is largely a rewording of the new
archaeologyÕs existing model of culture (Binford, 1962,
1965). Gould and Binford both share the assumptions
that (1) ecological processes are the foundation upon
which all cultural behavior rests and (2) that cultural–
historical processes (GouldÕs ideational factors) hold a
secondary (epiphenomenal) position in culture.
Eco-utilitarian processes—responding directly to the
ecological constraints/opportunities of the environ-
ment—operate as ‘‘core universals’’ that should be
unaffected by changes in non-ecological processes.
Cultural–historical processes are thus largely emergent
from eco-utilitarian processes. The implication in terms
of analogy is that law-like relations between ecological
contexts and eco-utilitarian behavior validate uniform-
itarianist assumptions and facilitate archaeological in-
vestigation. In the terminology of analogy, the similar
causal influences emanating from similar ecological
contexts are the only boundary conditions necessary for
analogical inference.
However, GouldÕs preoccupation with anomaly
suggests an interesting addition to the Binfordian model
of culture. Under the Binfordian model, cultural/his-
torical processes are not boundary conditions for eco-
utilitarian processes. While cultural/historical processes
may exist in the form of style, they have no influence
over adaptive processes, which are a direct and unme-
diated response to environmental potentials. However,
Gould insists that ‘‘anomalies’’ can occur when ‘‘idea-
tional factors’’ (cultural–historical processes) interfere
with a societyÕs direct response to an environmental
situation. The implication is that, under certain condi-
tions, a societyÕs response to an environment is not
unmediated (not at all law-like), but instead is depen-
dent on specific contextual factors; notably, the opera-
tion of other processes, including those typically
assigned to the realm of ideology. This is a significant
revision of the a priori structure of processes typically
398 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
asserted in processual orientations, and it would seem to
undermine the tight causal relationship between
environment and culture that Gould relies upon for
archaeological inferences. Indeed, rather than environ-
mental similarities, it would seem that other contextual
factors, including the operation of cultural–historical
processes, would need to be considered to validate any
eco-utilitarian analogy.
GouldÕs advocacy for nomological, eco-utilitarian
universals—and his reluctance to give them true uni-
versal status—brings into focus an important distinc-
tion. Although ‘‘process’’ has always been present in
the literature, archaeologists concerned with spuriously
affirming the consequent have argued quite strenuously
that archaeological inferences must be based on uni-
versal causal forces rather than watered down causal
regularities like process (e.g., Schiffer, 1978). Both
Schiffer (1978, p. 240) and Gould (1978b, p. 251), for
example, recognize processes as the temporal and
spatial manifestations of causal laws, and then state
that it is more important to identify the underlying
law-like operations.4 For them, process is always
identified through reference to laws, which are found
in a small number of ecological givens. As Schiffer
explains (1978, p. 240, emphasis in original), the laws
he seeks are a better basis for unifomitarianism than
are processes:
A statement of this doctrine which seems particularly
useful is that the laws of nature are constant. Thus, when-
ever or wherever the same process is operating, it is sub-
ject to the same law or laws. This approach differs from
the view that ‘‘the process found operating today also
operated in the past’’ in ways that make it better suited
for anthropological research. Quite clearly, the process
of urbanization and state formation observable today
were not in operation 10,000 years ago; whenever and
wherever they are found, however, some laws will apply
(laws that specify in their boundary conditions that cer-
tain processes, like urbanization, must be present). Our
notions of uniformitarianism must take into account
the fact that not all processes are distributed uniformly
among all sociocultural systems.
4
Gould is on record as stating that process should also be a
focus in research: ‘‘. . .the archaeologist is faced not only with
discovering laws that determine certain aspects of human
behavior. . . but, more importantly, with discovering the
processes of manipulation that allow people to adapt laws to
their purposes’’ (Gould, 1978b, p. 251). Elsewhere (Gould,
1980, p. 42) he has advocated that we focus on ‘‘propositions’’
rather than laws, with propositions closely resembling other
definitions of process. However, a close reading of his work
shows that process is defined according to his overall model of
anomaly, which maintains the law-like influence of ecological
stimuli (see text).
Likewise, Ebert (1979) and Krause (1985) have ex-
plicitly argued that causal processes should be the uni-
form cultural elements behind analogical inferences; but
at least for Krause (1985), processes are narrowly
identified with the material influences in ceramic pro-
duction. The causal regularities that are appropriate to
archaeological and ethnoarchaeological research are
thus restricted to only those that are thought to have a
widespread cross-cultural application because they are
unaffected by the causal forces affecting other areas of
culture. Gould himself seems to follow this general ad-
vocacy for eco-utilitarian universals. His concept of
anomaly, however, would seem to argue for a more
nuanced and process-based understanding of causal
regularities.
Postprocessual ethnoarchaeology
In contrast to processual research, postprocessual
researchers have selected an entirely different set of
uniformities that they believe to hold in the past and
present contexts. Postprocessualists have diligently
worked to challenge claims that the causal relation-
ships between material circumstances and human be-
havior can generate secure propositions useful for
archaeological interpretations. DeBoer (1984), for ex-
ample, undermines the use of least effort principle in
ceramic studies by suggesting that ‘‘the ultimate least
effort strategy. . .would be to make no pottery at all!’’
(p. 540). Similarly, Gosselain (1994, p. 106) has also
noted the flexibility of the material constraints acting
on artifact production systems, and concluded that
‘‘technological systems are completely embedded in
culture in much the same way as decorative motifs,
religious beliefs or kinship systems.’’ At the heart of
the postprocessual models is the assumed universality
of a hermeneutic involvement in the world, under
which power, hegemony and resistance replace
the processual reliance on adaptationist and Darwin-
ian approaches (Hodder, 1982a,b, 1985). Indeed,
postprocessual researchers have largely inverted the
model proposed by processual archaeology, placing
processes related to ideology and symbolism in the
foundational role in culture as ‘‘core universals,’’ and
relegating ecological concerns to a secondary and
non-deterministic position (see Cunningham, 2003 for
a discussion; e.g., Shanks and Tilley, 1982, 1987,
1992).
This shift is often described as the move from
ethnoarchaeology, which is usually defined as a
commitment to materialism, toward ‘‘material culture
studies,’’ which focus on the investigation of how
people construct their material worlds (Appadurai,
1986; Conkey, 1989; Hodder, 1986; Miller, 1983, 1985).
Rather than an adaptive response, culture and
material culture are understood in relation to meaning.
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
In ConkeyÕs terms (Conkey, 1989, p. 20; 1990),
culture is primarily a ‘‘constitutive process.’’ Hodder
explains:
Ethnoarchaeology, characteristically confined to the Ôar-
chaeologicalÕ, material dimension, has little to offer those
who wish to explore the relationships between culture
and material practices, between structured belief and ac-
tion. Even though. . .discussion of the material necessar-
ily employs assumptions about cultural meanings, the
latter are not brought to the surface and critically exam-
ined within a narrow ethnoarchaeology (Hodder, 1986,
p. 97).
Ultimately a reformulated ethnoarchaeology will con-
tribute to material culture studies since. . .the meanings
of material items can only be adequately understood
by placing them more and more fully into a cultural
and historical context (Hodder, 1986, p. 97).
Two main tendencies have emerged in material
culture studies. As mentioned above, the first is an
adherence to a form of idealism that forefronts his-
torically based cognitive processes. This often appears
in a concern with meaning (Conkey, 1989; Hodder,
1982a, 1986), information flows/decision making (van
der Leeuw, 1984), symbolic messaging (Biehl, 1999),
and the flexibility in technological choices (van der
Leeuw and Papousek, 1992). The second element is a
focus on cultural processes that influence behavior in
the short term. Long-term culture change, such as
longue dure
e shifts in subsistence or social organization,
are far less important to most postprocessualists than
understanding how individuals negotiate their place
within daily contexts. One of the important implica-
tions to follow from this line of reasoning is that ma-
terial culture—as a part of the constitutive process—is
not necessarily a direct reflection of social realities.
Instead, material culture can be used actively in the
assertion of political and social power, and/or personal
identity (Shanks and Tilley, 1982, 1992). The active
role of material culture in these political strategies
suggests that archaeological patterns may indicate
imagined or even inverted versions of social reality
(Hodder, 1982a,b). The two elements together have
drawn material culture studies to BourdieuÕs (1977; also
see 1998) notion of practice. Practice theory is often
put forward as a solution to the major problems
in ethnoarchaeology, material culture studies and—
indeed—social theory. Both Conkey (1989, p. 22) and
Porr (1999, pp. 8–10), for example, have suggested
that BourdieuÕs notion of practice solves the material-
ist–idealist dichotomy, allowing for the eventual
dissolution of ethnoarchaeology within material culture
studies.
While the potential for rapprochement may exist
within practice theory, recent applications indicate
399
that the wish to dissolve ethnoarchaeology into
material culture studies is largely rhetorical. Closer
readings of Bourdieu (see contributions to Jarker et
al., 1990) suggest at least implicitly that much of his
work does not so much synthesize materialism and
idealism as it alternates between the two depending on
the specific cultural practice being analyzed (as is
found, for example, in BourdieuÕs [1984] opposition
between the necessity driven existence of the French
lower classes and ‘‘aesthetic life’’ of the elites; see
Gelbert, 1999 for an archaeological parallel). Collage-
building of this sort does little to solve the nuances of
the materialist–idealist and structure-agency dichoto-
mies in modern social theory (see Stern, 2003 for an
overview of the divisions in contemporary practice
theory). Moreover, despite several claims to the effect
that both ecological and cultural–historical processes
affect material culture (see Gosselain, 1994; Hodder,
1982a; but see David and Kramer, 2001), most post-
processual approaches that use practice theory remain
uninterested in exploring relations between ecological
processes and behavioral patterns (Ortner, 1984 notes
a similar tendency in how practice theory in used
cultural anthropology). Advocates of practice theory
like Hodder (e.g., 1982b, 1985) have tended to restrict
their analyses to the symbolic structures lying behind
experience and the reconstitution of these structures in
daily discourses of social power. Ethnoarchaeologi-
cally, these structures are found in analyses of ‘‘style
grammars’’ (e.g., Greenberg, 1975; for sources and an
overview, see Hardin, 1979, 1983, 1984). Hodder
(1991) notes that among the Ilchamus, calabashes in-
stead of grain pots are decorated because cattle pas-
toralism and milk have more symbolic import than
does grain and agriculture. While the calabashes are
decorated according to notions of identity and beauty
(1991, pp. 80–82), he argues that these decorations
also reflect a mental structure that oppose male to
female, red to white, and blood to milk. These op-
positions are then played out in daily practice and
mobilized in discourses about modernization and what
it means to be ‘‘a good wife.’’ Other studies, such as
van der Leeuw and PapousekÕs work in northern
Mexico (1992; also see Miller, 1985), use similar
techniques to look at morphological attributes on
ceramics.
Postprocessualism, then, is a substantial inversion of
the material assumptions that govern most processual
analyses. However, the two camps are remarkably
similar in their tendency to rely upon a limited number
of ‘‘secure’’ causal processes that they believe can be
used to develop analogical inferences that will hold
across cultural contexts. Despite postprocessualist re-
luctance to frame their analysis in terms of causes,
Wylie (1995, p. 22) has noted that the normative ori-
entation advocated by postprocessualism can be as
400 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
explanatory as the processual model ‘‘if, in fact, human
behavior is structured by conformity norms.’’ HodderÕs
consistency in referencing structural oppositions in his
analyses of stylistic behavior (e.g., 1982a, 1990a,b,
1991) indicates that he does seem to believe these
structures to have a causal effect on behavior and
material variation. When combined with other state-
ments claiming that all culture is ‘‘stylistic’’ (e.g., ‘‘the
economy is as much stylistic as the decoration on a
potsherd’’ [Hodder, 1985, p. 10]), the binary mental
structure and its reconstitution in daily life through
negotiations of power becomes both the primary causal
mechanism that impacts behavior and the cultural
continuity that enables inferences about the archaeo-
logical record (e.g., Hodder, 1991). In much the same
way that Gould relied upon eco-utilitarian universals,
Hodder and other postprocessualists rely on causal
regularities located in ideology to act as ‘‘core
universals.’’
Middle-range theory and low-level givens
In addition to differences in their respective foun-
dational processes, processual and postprocessual ar-
chaeologies are occasionally thought to adhere to
entirely different epistemologies. Processual ethnoar-
chaeology has long been identified with middle-range
theory, whereas postprocessual research has been de-
fined in terms of a hermeneutic approach (Kosso,
1991; Raab and Goodyear, 1984). Under processual-
ism, middle-range theory was aimed at developing
low-level, inductively based nomological propositions—
often about site formation processes—that translated
statics to dynamics (Binford, 1978, 1983; see Stark,
1993, pp. 94–95; Schiffer, 1976, 1978). Because this
theory was built up from ethnographic observations, it
was considered to be independent of governing ar-
chaeological theory, and thus could be used to test
broad range premises about cultural behavior (Wylie,
1995).
Processual archaeology has thus initiated a number
of studies that are explicitly ‘‘middle-range’’ in the
sense that they attempt to identify low-level universals
that can be used to test broad range theory (after
Wylie, 1988, p. 143). Artifacts are treated as ‘‘con-
gealed behavior’’ (Conkey, 1989, p. 19; following
Fenton, 1974, pp. 23–24) in a way that allows for the
investigation of law-like regularities in the production,
use, discard and postdepositional alterations of arti-
facts. The methodological basis of such studies has
meant that they remain generally unconcerned with
overarching questions about total cultural systems and
instead focus on ‘‘low-level’’ regularities. Uniformities
operating as law-like regularities below the level
‘‘cultural’’ have been sought in a number of more
recent studies of artifact production systems (e.g.,
contributions to van der Leeuw and Pritchard, 1984;
see especially Krause, 1985; Pritchard and van der
Leeuw, 1984, p. 10; Schiffer and Skibo, 1997; Vidale et
al., 1992). Roux (1999, p. 155) for example, attempts
to identify ‘‘universals of processes’’ which: ‘‘relate to
mechanisms or laws that explain physical, cultural or
biological regularities. They relate to principles that
have been established by higher level explanations in
other disciplines.’’ As she explains: ‘‘Searching for
transcultural regularities presupposes uniformitarian
principles. These are more specifically congruent with
a technological approach where both the constraints
and resources of the raw material and technical
practices are analyzed. . .’’ (Roux, 1999, p. 157). These
low-level technological factors include production se-
quences and the use of natural resources, which Roux
believes allows her to ‘‘. . .assess the technical part,
which does not vary between the past and the present’’
(p. 165).
As Raab and Goodyear (1984) have pointed out,
however, the preoccupation in archaeology with
middle-range theory as a methodological problem re-
lated to the translation of statics to dynamics is different
from the more hermeneutical way middle-range theory
was first defined in sociology (Raab and Goodyear,
1984, p. 262):
[Social science] theorists advanced the [middle range]
concept, not as a substantive theory of any particular
phenomenon, but rather as middle-range theorizing.
The essential point was to develop a strategy for inte-
grating research problems and data into cumulative bo-
dies of scientific knowledge in which theories of limited
scope, arrayed at different levels of generality, could be
subsumed under domains of increasingly general princi-
ples (Raab and Goodyear, 1984, p. 225, emphasis in ori-
ginal).
In this sense, middle-range theory is not independent
of high-level theory, but is intrinsically involved in
making vertical linkages between non-testable, high-le-
vel propositions about culture and low-level empirical
investigations. The movement up and down the theo-
retical ladder is both inductive (from data to middle-
range theory to high-level theory), and deductive (from
high-level theory to middle-range theory to data) (Raab
and Goodyear, 1984, p. 257; Trigger, 1989, Chapter 1).
The notion that middle-range theorizing is both circular
and bidirectional (from data to theory and theory to
data), is shared by the hermeneutic orientations found in
postprocessual archaeology. As a result, postprocessu-
alists like Hodder (1986, p. 95) and others (Raab and
Goodyear, 1984, p. 262 following Price, 1982 and
Goodyear, 1977) have rejected the supposed indepen-
dence postulated by BinfordÕs version of middle-range
theory despite the fact that some ethnoarchaeologists
continue to reference BinfordÕs original definition
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
(Stark, 1993).5 Current low-level methodological work
in archaeology is generally described in the literature as
intrinsically related to propositions found in higher
levels of theory and recently the very distinction between
middle-range theory and hermeneutics has been dis-
missed as a matter of terminology rather than real
substance (Kosso, 1991; Tschauner, 1996; VanPool and
VanPool, 1999).
However, despite the rhetoric of hermeneutics, both
processual and postprocessual archaeologists rely on
the ‘‘methodological independence’’ of their low-level
propositions in a way that validates ‘‘core universals.’’
Processual and postprocessual archaeology have each
outlined models of culture that define a hierarchy of
process: the first emphasizing material constraints and
the second cognitive operations. Following from this, a
suite of low-level, empirical investigations have tended
to operate as ‘‘givens’’ that are largely independent from
broader theoretical concerns. In processual research,
one primary ‘‘given’’ is the important distinction be-
tween function and style (e.g., Dunnell, 1978; Hurt and
Rakita, 2001; Sackett, 1977), while for postprocessual-
ists, ‘‘givens’’ are found in the ubiquitous structural
oppositions imbedded in style (see Tschauner, 1996, pp.
15–18). Missing in both cases are the mid-level theoret-
ical linkages that make plain how cultural models relate
5
A number of low-level propositions about behavior have a
universal-like application in archaeology, but they are best not
considered universals in the sense that their influence on
variability is the same regardless of other contextual factors.
For example, whether culture is defined in processual (least
effort principles, adaptive strives) or postprocessual terms
(power, structuralism), the actual trace generated by a chert
tool rubbing across a hide will be the same. But, changes in the
force applied, the hardness of lithic and/or worked material, the
duration of use, or the amount of grit in any context can
significantly change the character of a scraping residue. The
widespread acceptance of research tools like usewear analyses
comes from the fact that the theories central to usewear studies
are often independent from the governing propositions that
drive any one program of research. In other words, the
processes central to usewear studies are not derivatives of the
processes central in the processual or postprocessual models of
culture. As Wylie (1985, 2000, pp. 231–232) and Tschauner
(1996) have noted, this sort of independence allows alternate
models of culture to be tested against such low-level proposi-
tions. However, identifying propositions with this ‘‘universal-
like’’ application in archaeology—that can be middle range in
the Binfordian sense—requires knowledge of how specific
processes relate to their boundary conditions in both the low-
level propositions and in the higher-level processes that are
being tested.
401
to these ‘‘givens.’’6 In the processual stream, the absence
of such theoretical ties works to support claims that the
patterns uncovered by the low-level empirical research
relate to independent, and (often law-like) universal
phenomena. Therefore, a researcher may work on
methodological questions related to the style-function
distinction without buying into, or even recognizing,
that notions of style and function are dependent on
overarching, broad range propositions about culture
(Cunningham, 2003). It is worth noting that, notwith-
standing the overtly ‘‘hermeneutic’’ orientation, the
disjointedness in postprocessualism serves the same
purpose: structuralism and the analysis of style gram-
mars have an independent, methodological status often
quite similar to the original middle-range propositions
offered by processual researchers. Thus, researchers may
find themselves treating style grammars as a purely
methodological issue, without recognizing that the entire
notion of style grammars is dependent on a set of sus-
pect theoretical propositions about the relationship be-
tween language and cognition (see Hardin, 1983).7 Even
if the cultural models from which they are drawn appear
to many as ‘‘idealized’’ or ‘‘more hypothetical than
real,’’ the independent and insulated character of these
low-level ‘‘givens’’ supports the continued belief that the
processes upon which they are based are ‘‘core univer-
sals.’’
Historical analogy
By way of contrast, it is worth perhaps considering
briefly one type of analogy that has not relied on ‘‘core
universals.’’ Historical analogy often is thought to be a
distinct form of analogical inference because it relies
on historical continuities between source and subject
6
The recent rise of technological and/or la cha^ine op
eratoire
approaches probably best illustrates this point. Research on
technical systems is often thought to produce ‘‘low-level
uniformities’’ that are independent of specific cultural models.
However, postprocessualists have tended to draw from Lemo-
nnier (1986, 1992) in fore fronting the flexibility and cultural
dependency of all technological systems (e.g., Gosselain, 1994)
while Schiffer and SkiboÕs (1997) largely parallel research
examines the material constraints that limit exactly this sort
of flexibility (see Schiffer, 1994 for an illuminating discussion).
In both cases, the approaches taken to technological systems
(i.e., the causal processes that are referenced to explain
technological choices) are largely consistent with the cultural
models preferred by each analyst.
7
Interestingly, at the very point where Hardin (1983) was
beginning to question whether style grammars were analogous
to language and could be used to define cultural entities (in the
cognitive sense), the postprocessualists adopted the approach to
stimulate their research into prehistoric cognition, emphasizing
both its holistic character and its linguistic qualities.
402 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
contexts. Both Ascher (1961) and Chang (1967), for
example, draw a distinction between the folk-culture or
direct historical approaches and the general comparative
or ‘‘new analogy’’ approaches. Gould (1974, 1980, pp.
34–35) has identified discontinuous and continues
analogies, while Watson (1979) emphasis a distinction
between homologies and analogies (also see Trigger,
1989, 1998).
Archaeological research going back into the 19th
Century has relied on the use of both types of analogy
(see Charlton, 1981, pp. 133–134). However, historical
analogies are now receiving increased attention in ar-
chaeology because they are assumed to allow for a closer
and more nuanced reading of archaeological materials
(Agorsah, 1990; Kehoe, 1999; Trigger, 1998). In recent
years, archaeologists have also begun to work with de-
scendent communities that would like to see archaeology
become more historically sensitive. As a result, archae-
ologists are beginning to revisit the Direct Historical
Approach (Baerreis, 1961; Steward, 1942) which was
such an important part of the original work in archae-
ology, but then lost prominence under the New Ar-
chaeology and postprocessualism (Longacre, 1991a,b, p.
2; Trigger, 1989). In many cases, the use of historical
analogues is advocated as a way of rectifying the erro-
neous ‘‘frames of reference’’ perpetuated by the ethno-
archaeological use of general analogy (Gordon, 1992;
Wilmsen, 1989; see discussion in MacEachern, 1996, pp.
246–247).8
Watson (1980, 1982; Gould and Watson, 1982) has
noted that historical and general analogues are not re-
markably different. Citing Wylie, she claims that they
‘‘are logically the same when the materials are prior to
the memory of living informants’’ (Watson, 1982, p. 445;
also see Watson, 1980, p. 56):
Wylie. . .asserts that the strength of an analogical argu-
ment is indeed increased the more fully it meets criteria
of number and detailed nature of similarities in form,
and range of occurrences across a variety of archaeolog-
ical and ethnographic contexts. . . This means that an ar-
chaeologist working in a geographic area where cultural
continuity is marked has an advantage in acquiring test-
able and a priori strong analogies to use in final interpre-
tations over the archaeologists who must rely solely on
general comparative analogy. This is true because de-
scription of the physical and cultural activities, institu-
tions, and materials of the descendents of the people
whose remains are being excavated are more likely to
be analogous to past activities, institutions and materials
in multiple (often linked) ways than are analogies
8
StewardÕs original definition of the Direct Historical
Approach seems to have had much the same goal in mind,
being specifically formulated to redress a narrowly biological or
natural science view of artifact variation (see discussion in
Steward, 1942).
derived from anywhere else. Nevertheless, although [his-
torical analogies] may possess some higher degree of
prior probability than general comparative analogies,
the two kinds of analogy are on the same logical footing
as testable hypotheses; they are acceptable interpreta-
tions only after they have been confirmed (Gould and
Watson, 1982, p. 359, emphasis in original).
If we update WatsonÕs quote to figure in WylieÕs
later emphasis on causal relations, we see that the
number, nature, and range of formal similarities indicate
the operation of a similar causal mechanism. What
historical continuity offers, then, is an increase in the
likelihood that the same structure of causal processes
bridge modern and archaeological contexts. WatsonÕs
assertion that general and historical analogues are on
the same logical footing underscores the fact that his-
torical and general analogues are simply differences in
degree of similarity one can presuppose from the outset
in an analogical operation. However, because continu-
ity in the operation of specific processes cannot be
guaranteed—because the relevant boundary conditions
may have changed in the interim—both historical and
general analogues must be validated by the same level
of empirical testing. As Watson (Gould and Watson,
1982, p. 360) explains: ‘‘In fact, a case can be made that
one must be especially cautious of direct historical
analogues because the temptation is so great to accept
the contemporary populations as living prehistoric
peoples. . .’’9
Notably, historical analogy escapes the dependence
on ‘‘core universals’’ despite the fact that it is logically
similar to general analogy. The transfer of information
between source and subject contexts in historical anal-
ogy is validated by a homological relationship in the
causal structure. The actual configuration of specific
processes in this structure—whether ecological or cul-
tural/historical processes are more or less uniform—is
not an overriding concern. Historical analogy thus un-
dermines those perspectives that would see ‘‘core uni-
versals’’ as a necessary condition for analogy.
9
Ethnoarchaeologists have continued to apply direct his-
torical approaches in their interpretations despite ‘‘classroom
shifts’’ in archaeological theory (Kepecs, 1997, pp. 194–195;
also see Tschauner, 1994). For example, in areas like Franco-
phone West Africa, ethnographic research beginning with
Griaule and running to current logicistic orientations have
always integrated archaeological, historic and ethnographic
approaches (David, 1992; MacEachern, 1996; and Clifford,
1988, for discussions). Recent logicist approaches (e.g., Gallay,
1992; Gallay et al., 1992; Gallay and Huysecom, 1989;
Huysecom, 1992) have even combined a concern with historical
analogy with rigid (almost inflexible) testing strategies and the
highly technical analyses of production systems.
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
Discussion
The reliance on ‘‘core universals’’ creates a number of
problems for ethnoarchaeology. Wylie (1982, 1985) has
cautioned for two reasons against making strong dis-
tinctions between secure analogues—like those based on
‘‘core universals’’—and other seemingly tenuous ana-
logical propositions. First, even so-called secure propo-
sitions are analogous, inductive, and include a degree of
uncertainty.10 Hence, the assumption that specific pro-
cesses are ‘‘universal’’ may prematurely restrict source-
side investigation of the scope and those processes have
on material variability. Furthermore, during testing the
same assumption may leave researchers in a poor posi-
tion to recognize when the variation in the causal
frameworks between source and subject contexts nullifies
the analogy (Wylie, 1982, pp. 393, 399; e.g., HoleÕs, 1978
discussion of pastoralism). Second, the identification of
secure propositions directs research toward only those
hypotheses that appear amenable to a high degree of
certainty. In the processual case, research is directed to-
ward processes that seemingly involve natural laws, while
in postprocessualism, research is directed toward pro-
cesses that draw upon the assumed inherent structure of
meaning. Such restrictions in the goals of research re-
move other processes (and other analogies) from con-
sideration simply because they do not meet a priori
criteria. Recent calls for an expansion of middle-range
theory by archaeologists like Saitta (1992) and Trigger
(1995) indicates that the preoccupation with ‘‘core uni-
versals’’ has taken a toll in exactly this way.
The predicament of ‘‘core universals’’ in cultural
ontology is primarily a problem related to how specific
processes are insulated from critical analysis. In defining
‘‘core universals,’’ theorists establish limits on what the
processes or structural factors that can act as boundary
conditions for those universals. Thus, by treating eco-
utilitarian processes as ‘‘core universals,’’ processual
theorists have fixed the boundary conditions for these
processes in environmental variables alone. The causal
relationship between environment and culture is thought
to be so fundamental that non-eco-utilitarian processes
cannot significantly modify the causal effect of the en-
vironment. The same holds for the ‘‘core universals’’
outlined by postprocessualism. The meaningfulness of
the human endeavor means that all action must be
10
As Wylie notes, fully secure relations occur only when the
inference is based on an exclusive causal relation of the form ‘‘if
and only if x obtains, then y.’’ All archaeological inferences are
based on less secure causal relationships ‘‘because of the
possibility—especially present where human behavior is con-
cerned—that the same concatenation of environmental causes
might be capable of yielding a range of different behavioral
responses’’ (1982, p. 391).
403
understood through reference to the structure inherent
in systems of meaning. The causal affect of these struc-
tures cannot be altered by ecological forces emanating
from the environment. By elevating specific processes to
the status of ‘‘core universals,’’ researchers shield the
essential character of these causal regularities from
critical evaluation and significant revision. Defining
some processes as a priori more secure than others ren-
ders nonsensical investigations of how those secure
processes are modified by more ‘‘contextually sensitive’’
causal forces, even those that may be included in the
same cultural model. At a broader scale, the shielding of
‘‘core universals’’ in this way leaves competing cultural
models in a state of theoretically incommensurability.
Despite the commonalities identified in their epistemo-
logical stances (see Wylie, 2000, p. 228), processual and
postprocessual archaeologies remain diametrically op-
posed in the causal regularities that they find to be se-
cure.11 These core processes becomes further insulated
as competing theoretically perspectives move from sim-
ple differences in opinion to full-fledged theoretically
schools mired in disciplinary politics. The net result is an
unhealthy eclecticism that allows for little critical eval-
uation of these core processes.12
One only needs to look at the analytical cul-de-sac in
which ethnoarchaeology has been trapped to see the
consequences. Consider, for example, the cautionary
tales that often derive from testing programs. Proposi-
tions have often been tested in order to elaborate upon
the existence of the ‘‘core universals’’ advocated by a
11
The one exception lies in the ongoing discussions by
processualists and postprocessualists over the processes respon-
sible for stylistic variation. Style represents an interesting
element of variability because, even under strongly ecologically
driven conceptions of material variability like that we see with
processual archaeology, style is an area of variation that is
considered to be caused by the cultural/historical processes
central to the postprocessual critique (see Cunningham, 2003).
As a result, ‘‘stylistic analysis’’ is one area where processualists
and postprocessualists have found common ground. Note that
this small zone of commensurability is created by effectively
partitioning material variability into areas of ‘‘style’’ and
‘‘function’’ which in turn further insulates ‘‘core universals’’
from significant critical evaluation. See Hegmon, 2003 for a
recent discussion of other postprocessual insights that have
been grafted onto the processual model.
12
Although I have dealt with processual and postprocessual
archaeology to this point, it should be noted that the eclecticism
is made worse by the different camps that are encapsulated by
these two broad perspectives. For example, although behav-
ioral, processual and Darwinian archaeologies are equally
committed to materialism, and thus can be opposed to
postprocessual archaeology, there are significant differences in
the core universals they each propose. The nested character of
these core universals further exacerbates the eclectic state of
ethnoarchaeology.
404 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
given cultural model. In these testing programs, the
immutability of these ‘‘core universals’’ is never to be in
question—the low level givens and cultural models that
define the structure of causal processes should be con-
firmed through testing. The results, however, have rarely
been so accommodating. Testing programs have often
returned a cautionary tale that indicate that the core
universal was not nearly as universal as was originally
proposed and, instead, was subject to a wider range of
boundary conditions. Rephrased, the effect of the pro-
cess being investigated on behavioral, material and cul-
tural patterning is shown through testing to be modified
or even nullified by other causal forces in the local
context—including causal forces considered ‘‘epiphe-
nomenal’’ under the governing cultural model. Ironi-
cally, rather than allowing this new knowledge to
contribute to our understandings of the causal deter-
minants of variability, many researchers dismiss such
‘‘cautionary tales’’ as proof of ethnoarchaeologyÕs inef-
fectiveness. However, such testing programs are fulfill-
ing precisely the role they are supposed to play.
Archaeologists and ethnoarchaeologists have assumed
that ‘‘core universals’’ and their associated cultural
models have a universal presence and effect on material
variability, and testing programs have prevented them
from spuriously affirming the consequent. The problem
has less to do with ethnoarchaeological testing than it
does with the politically charged preconceptions implicit
in the analyses. Simply put, when a cautionary result
emerges from testing, many researchers find fault with
the testing program instead of revisiting the original
proposition. Testing programs may be poorly conceived
and this can produce spurious results, but the consis-
tency with which ethnoarchaeological testing is blamed
for cautionary tales is far out of hand. If ethnoarchae-
ologyÕs overriding goal is to develop knowledge of the
processes that cause material variability, so that
knowledge can be extended via analogy into the past,
then knowing how any causal processes is modified by
other processes should be an essential element of eth-
noarchaeological work. Cautionary tales are a principle
aim of ethnoarchaeological testing, not its greatest
quandary.
The problem, I would suggest, lies ultimately in a
fundamental misunderstanding of how the causal forces
that determine material variation should be character-
ized. I would propose two related conceptual adjust-
ments. First, ‘‘core universals,’’ like those outlined
above, should be exposed consistently to wider critical
analyses. Rather than insulated as ‘‘core universals,’’ all
causal regularities should be understood as processes
that may vary according to context. Second, the existing
structures of process that make up archaeologyÕs oper-
ating cultural models should be thought of heuristically
rather than fixed as competing eternal truths. In time,
the primary causal role of specific processes—and the
cross-contextual uniformity of the causal structures in
which they are found—may be warranted, but this needs
to be built up by reflexive empirical research. These two
adjustments will do much to moderate the walls that
create ethnoarchaeologyÕs eclecticism. I should under-
score that I am not naively suggesting here that current
differences in archaeological theory should be squeezed
into one large, genial and theoretically unified research
venture. Disciplinary unity will always remain a fantasy
in archaeology. On the other hand, there are ways we
can make more productive use of our existing hetero-
doxy. Wylie has already shown how archaeologists ex-
ploit the disunities in science to build better
understandings of the past (Wylie, 1992, 2000; see
Dupr
e, 1993; Longino, 2002, Chapter 8 for broader
discussions). Tempered versions of our existing cultural
models and research emphases can provide a compara-
bly robust foundation for crosscutting and competing
analyses of variability. But in order for our choking
eclecticism to be transformed into a theoretically in-
formed pluralism, we need to find at least some path-
ways toward commensurability that can allow us to take
better advantage of these disunities. Once ‘‘core uni-
versals’’ are recognized as processes, theoretically op-
posed conceptions of processes can be recast as
pluralistic standpoints that have relevance for the dis-
cipline as a whole in a way that is presently lacking.
Gould (1980, p. 34; also see Watson, 1980, p. 55) per-
haps says it best: ‘‘Instead of assuming that uniformities
always exist, why not develop ways of finding out when
and under what conditions different kinds of human
behavior can be expected to occur?’’
Once devoid of universalist assumptions, ethnoar-
chaeology can gain the ability to look more closely at
how a mutable and fluid sets of cultural processes relate
to behavioral, cultural and material variability. Rather
than perpetuating ‘‘negative’’ cautionary tales, ethn-
oarchaeology can produce positive knowledge of causal
relationships. And freed from partisan political interests,
ethnoarchaeology can also investigate the enormous
number of causal processes that affect artifact patterning
(see Carr and Neitzel, 1995; Schiffer and Skibo, 1997 for
lists), not as placeholders in mutually exclusive cultural
ontologies, but as part of a complex causal milieu. Of
course, none of these processes need to be truly wide-
spread in effect; indeed, they may operate only under
very specific circumstances (similar to urbanization or
state formation as discussed by Schiffer above). But their
fleeting nature should not reduce their importance as
potential analogues.
Conclusion
How, then, are archaeologists to understand the
claims by Simms and OÕConnell that archaeology and
 J.J. Cunningham / Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 22 (2003) 389–410
ethnoarchaeology should be unified by a universal
model of culture based on behavioral ecology, or Hod-
derÕs desire to see ethnoarchaeology metamorphose into
material culture studies and become focused on an
analysis of meaning? At its most general, these claims
reflect the na€ıve assumption that ethnoarchaeology
should be unified by something specific, that it is a single
area of research rather than a tool that has been used by
different and quite distinct partisan interests in archae-
ology (David and Kramer, 2001, pp. 411–412). The
suggestions that we find unity through a specific cultural
model would be easy, therefore, to dismiss as simply
another attempt by different partisan interests to gain an
upper hand. But, I suspect that this reading would miss
the very important problem that motivates their claim.
To date, the research done even by partisan interests in
ethnoarchaeology has rarely developed synthetic un-
derstandings of the causal processes behind material
variability. By seeking to refocus research through a
unified model, these commentators would seem to hope
to moderate ethnoarchaeologyÕs eclecticism while si-
multaneously developing the critical mass of research
necessary to advance such synthetic understandings.
Nevertheless, reintroducing ‘‘core universals’’ embedded
in one-size-fits-all cultural models will neither ‘‘correct’’
ethnoarchaeologyÕs diversity nor provide the needed
critical gaze on causal regularities. Transcending ethn-
oarchaeologyÕs depiction as an obnoxious spectator thus
requires ethnoarchaeology to find ways of working
with—rather than against—its diversity. Ethnoarchaeol-
ogy may need to disassemble the more extreme positions
in archaeology, but the result will be a frank and pro-
ductive analysis of how processes affect each another
and articulate in the creation of behavioral, cultural and
material patterns.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Aubrey Cannon, Neal Ferris,
Scott MacEachern, Farid Rahemtulla, and Michael
Spence for reading drafts of this paper. Bruce Trigger
commented extensively on the ideas outlined herein,
provided essential advice when I needed it and encour-
aged me to seek publication for the paper. Two anon-
ymous reviewers for JAA provided insightful
commentaries that greatly helped me reconfigure the
argument to its current form. Farid Rahemtulla and
Scott MacEachern also provided last minute and sub-
stantive commentaries on the final version of my dis-
cussion. Gerry and Terri Cunningham lent me the
basement space in which I wrote this paper in December
of 2001, and I thank them and other members of my
family for understanding my preoccupation with this
project during our Christmas holiday. An abstracted
version of this argument was presented under the title of
405
‘‘Ethnographic Analogy and Processual Pluralism: West
African Examples’’ in a session titled Global Advances in
Ethnoarchaeology at the 2003 Society for American
Archaeology Meetings in Milwaukee.
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