Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 35: 617–621, 2010

doi:10.1093/jmp/jhq050
Advance Access publication on November 12, 2010

At the Roots of Transhumanism: From the

Enlightenment to a Post-Human Future

FABRICE JOTTERAND*
University of Texas Medical Center, Dallas, Texas, USA

*Address correspondence to: Fabrice Jotterand, PhD, MA, Division of Ethics and Healthy
Policy, University of Texas Medical Center, 5323 Harry Hines Boulevard, Dallas,
TX 75390-9070, USA. E-mail: fabrice.jotterand@utsouthwestern.edu

Downloaded from jmp.oxfordjournals.org by guest on February 4, 2011

The development of emerging biotechnologies is on the verge of redesign-
ing the boundaries of human existence. Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs),
radical life extension, neuroenhancements, and bionic limbs constitute only
few instances of technologies that could potentially allow transcending hu-
man biological limitations. Among the strongest proponents of these emerg-
ing technologies, transhumanists seek the radical removal of the constraints
of our bodies and brains and the reconfiguration of human existence accord-
ing to technological opportunities. But transhumanism is more than a techno-
scientific project. It is also an ideological one with particular assumptions
rooted in Enlightenment philosophies. This special issue of the Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy provides an overview of the origin, the nature, and
the aims of the transhumanist movement as well as a critical assessment.
In the first contribution, James Hughes locates the roots of the transhu-
manist movement in the Enlightenment and its advocacy of the supremacy
of reason. Transhumanism, he writes, is “the belief that science can be used
to transcend the limitations of the human body and brain, . . . an ideological
descendent of the Enlightenment, a part of the family of Enlightenment
philosophies” (Hughes, 2010, 622). The Enlightenment encompasses various
interpretations and ideas, at times competing against each other, on ques-
tions concerning religion, political power, ethical norms, and personal iden-
tity. On Hughes’ account, the transhumanist movement inherited these
tensions and divisions due to the self-eroding of the project of reason and
created its own irrational validation to support core Enlightenment values. In
reading Hughes’ contribution, one can clearly see the continuum between
Enlightenment thought and transhumanism. However, it is important to note
that transhumanists reformulated what some Enlightenment philosophers
rejected concerning questions on (1) theology: scientific or materialist theology
replaces traditional theology, (2) state power: technocratic authoritarianism

© The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
618 Fabrice Jotterand

operates as a new form of state power, (3) teleology: self-directed evolution

toward a technocratic future replaces teleology, (4) moral authority: the
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights replaces traditional
sources of moral authority, that is church authority, and (5) immortality of
the soul: the hope to be able to upload the brain on a computational
substrate represents a new conceptualization of the religious notion of the
“immortality of the soul.” Transhumanism is not only an heir of the Enlight-
enment but also a radical move away from one of its core value: the auton-
omy of reason. The implications of this move away translate into ideological
variants that, paradoxically, reappropriate what the Enlightenment attempted
to disavow.
In the second contribution, Michael Bess raises critical questions related
to the use of the term enhancement and its elusiveness in debates about

Downloaded from jmp.oxfordjournals.org by guest on February 4, 2011

enhancement. He outlines six areas where the use of enhancement is con-
ceptually ambiguous: (1) enhancement versus normal or species-typical
functioning, (2) enhancement versus therapeutics or healing, (3) enhance-
ment versus natural functioning, (4) enhancement versus human nature, (5)
enhancement versus authenticity, and (6) enhancement, the ambiguity
between “more” and “better.” The main problem with the use of normal,
natural, human nature, authenticity, etc., lies in the lack of fixity of these
terms. Bess argues that we find ourselves in an “epistemological middle
zone” where we should avoid extremes, that is, either consider the term use-
less or assume it can do all the moral and epistemological work to set an
issue (Bess, 2010, 653).
In the third contribution, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu challenge
the idea that essential properties intrinsic to organisms confer species mem-
bership. In their view, we should abandon the notion of human species
membership as biologically determined. The traditional argument of interfer-
tility for species membership is problematic because “interfertility is not a
transitive relation” (Persson and Savulescu, 2010, 658). Interfertility might
occur between A and C even though they belong to the same species, B be-
ing the link between A and C. This leads to a paradox in the sense that A, B,
and C belong to the same species, but based on the interfertility argument
they actually do not. Hence, for Persson and Savulescu, we ought to give up
an essentialist approach to species membership and accept that an organism
could belong to different species throughout its existence and even at the
same time (Persson & Savulescu, 2010, 656–669). Their anti-essentialist ap-
proach to species membership provides, in their view, a justification for
human enhancement. Those concerned with the moral status of different
human and human-like beings (transhumans, cyborgs, etc.) should not worry
because species membership is irrelevant in the determination of their sta-
tus. Actually, transhuman beings could have a higher moral status based on
higher values, other than biological characteristics. In the latter part of their
contribution, Persson and Savulescu provide another justification for human
 At the Roots of Transhumanism 619

enhancement. The limitations of human moral psychology could endanger

the survival of the human future due to the emergence of power biotech-
nologies. Recognition of this fact puts a moral obligation on society to
“heighten moral sensitivity to reverse [a] descent of humanity down a spiral of
ever-increasing existential risks” (Persson & Savulescu, 2010, 666). Whether
or not emerging technologies pose a threat to humanity is beyond the scope of
this issue. However, we ought to ask the fundamental question whether indeed
we have a moral obligation to enhance ourselves. Disabled people might find
Persson and Savulescu’s claim threatening to their own identity.
Heather Bradshaw and Rudd ter Meulen tackle this question. They ask
whether disabled people have an obligation to enhance themselves. In other
words, does morphological freedom go both ways? Do people with disabili-
ties have the right not to enhance themselves the same way transhumanists

Downloaded from jmp.oxfordjournals.org by guest on February 4, 2011

have the right to enhance themselves? Bradshaw and ter Meulen examine
these questions in light of the work of Isaiah Berlin on questions of freedom
and oppression. They conclude that debate over enhancement and morpho-
logical freedom should consider a greater level of freedom while minimizing
abandonment and oppression.
Tom Koch takes a different and critical stand on issues of morphological
freedom. In his view, the transhumanists perpetuate the ideology of the eu-
genics movement of the 20th century: the quest for the betterment of humans
through technological means and the control of the vagaries of evolution.
The analogy between the 1921 Second International Eugenics Conference
and the work of enhancement enthusiasts such John Harris (2007) is striking.
The 1921 conference poster promises a “self-directed human evolution”
whereas Harris calls for the enhancement of human evolution. According to
Koch, both instances exhibit two simplistic and fallacious assumptions: (1) a
mechanistic view of human beings as machines whose components can be
easily manipulated and (2) a similar mechanistic view of human society
whose individuals are nonessential on behalf of the whole (Koch, 2010, 687).
This ideological posture is problematic because it undermines the lives of
people with physical differences. To deny the morphological freedom of
people with disabilities represents, according to Koch, “[an] arrogant and
dictatorial assertion that ‘I’ know what’s best, whatever ‘those’ people may
say.” Both, old and new eugenics, have similar agendas. However, the old
version was oppressive whereas the more recent is democratic and open
(Koch, 694). Koch concludes that the advancement of human society should
start with the enhancement of the social context that will allow “mere citi-
zens” to flourish.
In the final article of this issue, Jeffrey Bishop critically examines the meta-
physical assumptions of transhumanism. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s
work on metaphysics and his critique of technology, Bishop demonstrates
how transhumanist metaphysics attempt to dislodge prior accounts of human
existence and self-understanding. For Heidegger, metaphysics determines
620 Fabrice Jotterand

the nature of all things and includes two components: ontology and theol-
ogy. Ontology looks at the being of things in order to establish the basic
essence of reality. On the other hand, theology, not in the strict religious
sense of Heidegger’s account, is concerned with the ultimate foundation for
the existence of things. These two elements form a metaphysic called onto-
theology as a way to order and reveal the nature of human existence. This
new metaphysical framework captures the essence of what Hughes describes
in the first essay as “scientific or materialist theologies.” These emerging im-
manent theologies replace traditional transcendent theology in order to estab-
lish a new order of things. The metaphysic of transhumanism exerts the power
of creative forces to redirect human evolution according to its own will and
discredit competing metaphysical accounts. As Bishop points out, “for Hei-
degger the history of metaphysics is a history of founding onto-theologies,

Downloaded from jmp.oxfordjournals.org by guest on February 4, 2011

which were unable to secure their own ground. The history of metaphysics,
then, is a history of swinging between foundation and abyss, with the over-
turning of a previous ontotheology by the next ontotheology” (Bishop, 2010,
704). Ultimately, transhumanist philosophers seek to relieve us of the human
condition itself (Bishop, 2010, 702) to reach a higher level of existence. How-
ever, Bishop contends that the new onto-theology expressed in the synergy
between biotechnology and biopolitics has a dark side. It allows the creative
force of the human mind to express itself but it hampers the possibility for
deep questioning about the desirability of a post-human future. Indeed to
question the post-human future is to commit a sacrilege because it is question-
ing the post-human god (Bishop, 2010, 700–720).
Transhumanism is part a scientific endeavor and part an intellectual and
cultural movement that raises deep questions about the identity and the future
of the human species. The mistake, I think, would be to polarize the issues in
terms of the bioconservative resistance to embark on the enhancement train
and the blind acceptance of the transhumanist agenda. We cannot escape the
realities of technological and scientific progress. It is part of our nature to
discover, invent, and improve our lives and environment. It is also part of our
responsibility to assess how these emerging technologies could affect us and
future generations. This issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims
at setting the stage for further robust critical debates on transhumanism.

REFERENCES

Bess, M. 2010. Enhanced humans vs. ‘normal people’: elusive definitions. Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 35:641–55.
Bishop, J. 2010. Transhumanism, metaphysics, and the posthuman God. Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 35:700–20.
Bradshaw, H. G., and R. ter Meulen. 2010. A transhumanism fault line around disability: mor-
phological freedom and the obligation to enhance. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
35:670–84.
 At the Roots of Transhumanism 621

Hughes, J. 2010. Contradictions from the enlightenment roots of transhumanism. Journal of

Medicine and Philosophy 35:622–40.
Koch, T. 2010. Enhancing who? Enhancing what? Ethics, bioethics, and transhumanism. Journal
of Medicine and Philosophy 35:685–99.
Persson, I., and J. Savulescu. 2010. Moral transhumanism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
35:656–69.

Downloaded from jmp.oxfordjournals.org by guest on February 4, 2011