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International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1, Fall 2003 (°
C 2003)

The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society:

Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia
Florian Bieber

The article discusses the reasons for the ten-year delay in the democratic
transition in Serbia, focusing in particular on opposition parties and civil
society. It argues that the policy of opposition parties was partly responsible
for the failure of an earlier fall of the Miloševic regime. While civil society
has been similarly weak and divided, the article details how a number of
NGOs proved to be crucial in the coordinated campaign which lead to the
overthrow of the Miloševic regime in October 2000.
KEY WORDS: Serbia; party system; nationalism; civil society; NGOs; democratization;
transition.

The ten-year rule of Slobodan Milošević’s regime created a veritable

wasteland in Serbia. The country is biologically, materially, and morally ru-
ined. All the institutions required for society to function democratically have
been degraded and destroyed.1 Ten years after the other countries in Central
and Eastern Europe, Serbia was the last to see a peaceful and democratic
change of regime in October 2000.2 A specific type of a semiauthoritarian
regime, coupled with a high level of nationalism and a fragmented opposi-
tion, led to this delay in beginning the transition process. This article will
seek to explain why a democratic change of power did not take place in the
1990s and then turn to explore what had changed by September 2000 to allow
for the collapse of the rule of Slobodan Milošević. While one might choose
numerous perspectives in highlighting this development,3 we shall focus par-
ticularly on the role the alternatives to the regime—opposition parties and
civil society—played in first extending the rule of the regime and finally
bringing it to an end, as well as the domestic reasons for this development.4

Senior Non-Resident Research Associate, European Centre for Minority Issues,

Belgrade; Recurrent Visiting Professor, Central European University (Budapest). E-mail:
bieberf@gmx.net.

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0891-4486/03/0900-0073/0 °
C 2003 Human Sciences Press, Inc.
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74 Bieber

THE OPPOSITION WITHIN THE SERBIAN PARTY SYSTEM

Serbia during the Milošević era was marked by multiparty elections

that were neither free nor fair. In fact, the political system of the Milošević
period could be characterized as a hybrid regime, which, while maintaining
a democratic façade, was essentially authoritarian.5 Despite the governmen-
tal control of the media, public administration, and economic and security
resources, political opposition did exist and opponents could participate in
elections. The long delay of the democratic transition process alone can thus
not be explained solely by the autocratic nature of the regime. Instead some
aspects of the delay (and later success) of the transition to democracy have
to be located within the opposition parties.
In the party system, neither the conventional categorization into a left-
right ideological framework nor other aspects of established party systems
seem to adequately grasp the party landscape of Serbia. If we take (a) the
identity and nature of the party; (b) its relationship to other parties; and
(c) the relationship between government and opposition as the key measures
for party systems, Serbia during the 1990s was far removed from established
systems in Western Europe and consolidating systems in Central and Eastern
Europe.6 As we will see in the subsequent discussion, the difficulties the
opposition had in challenging the regime emerged from all three aspects of
the Serbian party system. From the first half of the 1990s until the first partial
electoral victory of the opposition in 1996, the most appropriate category was
the position of the parties toward nationalism, the war in neighboring Bosnia
and Croatia, and the support for reform. Between 1997 and 2000, with the
hardening of the regime’s authoritarian tendencies, the relationship between
opposition and the regime moved to the foreground.

THE SERBIAN OPPOSITION IN THE EARLY 1990S

Although Serbian voters were able to vote in fourteen parliamentary

and presidential elections between 1990 and 2000—caused by early elections
and elections for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia—the oppo-
sition did not succeed in attaining any political power before the fall of 2000,
with the exception of a number of cities and communes in the local elections
in November 1996. Unlike other transitional countries, which usually saw
a broad anti-Communist coalition in the first free election, the opposition,
with an extreme nationalist and a liberal wing, could not mount a unified
challenge to Milošević in the first elections,7 which confirmed the dominance
of the Socialist Party and extended the fragmentation of the opposition.8 De-
spite numerous attempts throughout the 1990s to create a broad antiregime
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The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society 75

coalition, these alliances were usually of short duration, broke up before the
elections, lacked a clear program, and, most important, never included all
major opposition forces.9
The opposition in the mid-1990s could be grouped into three different
streams: the extreme-nationalist, democratic national, and reform-
oriented.10 Some parties switched among the different streams, due to the
changing position of each on the war in Croatia and Bosnia and because of
erratic party leadership. In the first years of the multiparty system in Serbia,
the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO) led by Vuk
Drašković and the Serbian Radical Party (Srspka radikalna stranka, SRS) of
Vojislav Šešelj belonged to the extreme nationalist opposition.11 The Demo-
cratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije, DSS), which emerged
from a split with the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS) under
the leadership of Vojislav Koštunica in 1992, oscillated between the nation-
alist and democratic opposition. Other smaller nationalist opposition parties
emerged before the first multiparty elections in 1990, but failed to emerge
as important factors in Serbian politics.12
Parties in this grouping gave absolute priority to the “solution” of the
national question, including the use of force, and placed less emphasis on
the democratization of Serbia. This neglect of democracy only left such
groupings the options of joining the regime (implicitly or explicitly) or being
marginalized. As a result only the Radical Party continued as a represen-
tative of this political wing of the opposition (1993–1997) or as part of the
regime (1992–93, 1998–2000).13
The second group combined the most important political forces through
the 1990s and took a rather ambivalent position towards nationalism and in
its relations to the regime. The most important party here is the Democratic
Party and the parties that emerged from splits in it, such as the Democratic
Party of Serbia, the Democratic Center (Demokratski centar, DC) and oth-
ers. This group placed greater importance on the internal democratization
of Serbia than on the national question. Nevertheless, the Democratic Party
occasionally adopted a nationalist agenda, most notably in 1994–95 when it
supported Radovan Karadžić after Slobodan Milošević broke off contacts
with the political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. The most powerful oppo-
sition party of the 1990s, the Serbian Renewal Movement, also belonged to
this category after abandoning its radical nationalist position with the begin-
ning of the war in Bosnia. While maintaining strong nationalist symbols, it
actually advocated an end to Serbian involvement in the Bosnian war more
actively than did the Democratic Party.14
The last stream emerged from the reform-oriented parties, which sup-
ported the pro-Yugoslav agenda of the last Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante
Marković. These parties include the Civic Alliance of Serbia (Gradjanski
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76 Bieber

savez Srbije, GSS), as well as the small Social Democratic Union and the
Social Democratic League of Vojvodina. These parties—whose influence
remained limited—were vocal critics of the predominant nationalist climate
and consistently criticized the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo (see
Table 1).

THE OPPOSITION FROM 1997 TO 2000

Through the continuing fragmentation of the opposition over the course

of the 1990s and the failure of the protests in the winter of 1996–97, a new
structure of the opposition parties emerged. Still, in the absence of strong
programmatic orientations, one cannot classify the parties along a traditional
left-right scheme, despite their names. Instead, the parties can be best under-
stood in their relationship to the regime. Between 1997 and the elections in
September 2000, one can identify the following groupings in the opposition:

radical opposition to the regime (rejecting the policies of and cooperation

with the regime);
moderate opposition (rejecting the policies, but accepting cooperation);
moderate opposition (rejecting cooperation, but supporting similar
policies).21

The breakup of the opposition coalition Zajedno in 1997 and the electoral
boycott of numerous opposition parties led to the emergence of the radical
opposition. The radical opposition rejected any cooperation with the regime
and supported a fundamental change of the policies in Serbia. The national
question did feature among the groups’ priorities, but they primarily focused
on economic and social issues. For example, Vladan Batić, president of the
Christian Democratic Party and at the time coordinator of the prime rep-
resentative of the radical opposition, the Alliance of Change, stated in an
interview in late 1999 that the issue of Kosovo played only a marginal role
on the political agenda, while poverty, corruption, democratization, and hu-
man rights, as well as the return of Serb refugees and the reintegration of
Yugoslavia into international organizations all were more significant.22
The Democratic Party stood at the heart of the Alliance for Change,
which also included the Civic Alliance, some smaller parties, and a number of
personalities (such as the former Prime Minister, Milan Panić, and the former
Head of the Central Bank, Dragoslav Avramović). The Alliance, founded
in 1998, also represented the core of the Serbian opposition coalition, the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).
The second group within the opposition also maintained some policy
differences with the regime, albeit not as strongly as the first group; it was,
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Table 1. Results of the Serbian and Yugoslav Parliamentary Elections, % of Votes, % of Seats, 1990–2000 (Governing Parties Shaded)20
SPS SRS SPO DSS DS
Serbian Elections, December 1990 46.1%, 77.6% 15.8%, 7.6% 7.4%, 2.8%
The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society

Yugoslav Elections,15 May 1992 43%, 69% 30%, 28%

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society [ijps]

Yugoslav Elections, December 199216 31.5%, 43.5% 21.8%, 27.8% 17.2%, 18.5% (DEPOS) 6,0%, 4.6%
Serbian Elections, December 1992 28.8%, 40.4% 22.6%, 29.2% 16.9%, 20.0% (DEPOS) 4.2%, 2.4%
Serbian Elections, December 199317 36.7%, 49.2% 13.8%, 15.6% 16.6%, 18% 5.1%, 2.8% 11.6%, 11.6%
Yugoslav Elections, November 199618 45.41%, 59.26% 18.78%, 14.81% 23,8%, 20.37% (Zajedno)
Serbian Elections, September 199719 34.2%, 44% 28.1%, 32.8% 19.1%, 18%
Yugoslav Elections, September 2000 32.2%, 40.7% 8.6%, 5.6% 4.7%, 0% 42.9%, 53.7% (DOS)
Serbia Elections, December 2000 13.5%, 14.8% 8.5%, 9.2% 3.7%, 0% 64.4%, 70.4% (DOS)
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78 Bieber

however, ready to enter into direct cooperation with the regime. That part
of the opposition was represented by the SPO and Vuk Drašković, which
sought to enter a coalition with the regime in 1997 and eventually joined the
Yugoslav government briefly in 1999. Despite harsh criticism of the Socialist
Party and its neocommunist partner JUL, the party dropped its antiregime
stance of the early 1990s for most of the period under consideration here.
Only as a consequence of the two assassination attempts in September 1999
and June 2000 against Drašković did it return to its radical antiregime stance.
It refused, however, any cooperation with the opposition parties.23
Similar to the first radical opposition, the third and last part of the
opposition opposed cooperation with the regime, but they supported some of
the regime’s more nationalist positions. The nationalist line, as represented
by the Democratic Party of Serbia, led the party to support some of the
policies of the regime toward Kosovo.24 Throughout the 1990s Koštunica and
the DSS adopted a nationalist line, which included support for the nationalist
Serb Democratic Party (Srspka demokratska stranka, SDS) in Bosnia.25 With
the exception of the party’s participation in the DEPOS coalitions in the
early 1990s, the DSS has been reluctant to join the opposition coalitions
and frequently has criticized the policies of the other opposition parties. In
January 2000, however, the DSS, somewhat reluctantly, joined together with
the opposition parties in the establishment of DOS.
DOS has essentially been a combination of the radical opposition with
the second stream of the moderate opposition, explaining the internal di-
visions over the national question. During the electoral campaign, most
parties of the radical opposition emphasized social and economic alterna-
tives to the policies of the regime. The presidential candidate, Koštunica,
on the other hand, placed more weight on the national question and criti-
cized the Serbian opposition for their failings in defending Serbian national
interests:

In Serbia . . . the national question will have a significant impact because of the situ-
ation Serbia is in because of the bombing, because of the propaganda of Milošević.
One cannot put it aside. We must have an answer to that. A large part of the Serbian
opposition is not aware of this fact. So it is underestimating the importance of the
national issue. We have to try to find, and this is the position of the DSS, to find
the possibility to compromise between the importance of the national issue and the
importance of Serbia being a normal member of international organizations, the EU,
etc. I think that part of the opposition underestimated this national issue of Kosovo.26

Despite his focus on “national” issues, Koštunica placed great importance on

the normalization of the country and did not engage in the sort of projections
of national grandeur that many nationalist politicians and intellectuals did
throughout the 1990s. Indicative of this change of tone was his last campaign
speech on September 2000 in Belgrade:
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The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society 79

I am an ordinary, average man. It has never occurred to me to see myself as some

historic greatness. I have never dreamed about some global historic mission of mine.
I only know that what you want, and what I want, of course, is to live in an ordinary,
average European country . . . Some would say: averages are boring, there is nothing
exciting about them, nothing vivid. Something is always going on here. Yes, indeed!
Something has been going on for more than half a century, more intensively so over
the last decade. These dramatic events of ours have made us all but unique in the
world. . . . I am absolutely sure that we have tired of all those stormy and tempestuous
events. . . . We need a kind of life in which excitements would be confined primarily
to the personal plane—let the public, political life be monotonous, even boring if you
like.27

The opposition—divided by many programmatic issues and personal

animosities—was united solely by its rejection of any cooperation with the
regime, symbolized by the choice of Koštunica, who was the only major party
leader not tainted by previous episodes of cooperation with Milošević.28
The defeat of the Socialist Party and its coalition partners, as well as the
SPO fundamentally transformed the party system in Serbia, which will lead
to a new party landscape in the years to come. In essence, the opposition
coalition provides for the core of future parties in Serbia. With the end of the
rule of Milošević and complete victory over the ancien regime, the unifying
factor disappeared and the former opposition coalition slowly disintegrated.
The track record of the Serbian opposition before the summer of 2000
was dismal and the parties that make up the political opposition were widely
identified as being responsible for standing in the way of achieving power.
Some analysts described the opposition as the fourth pillar of power of
the regime.29 Similarly, the Center for Policy Analysis came to the sober
conclusion that
. . . the Serbian opposition consists of writers, philosophers, historians . . . A question,
however, brings itself up there—isn’t it shameful to still be an amateur after ten years
of exercise in changing the authorities? On the other hand, there is a considerable
number of annalists who, although they are inclined against the regime, cannot help
pointing out that the opposition as such simply does not want to take over the rule.30

We cannot be satisfied with this (however tempting) explanation, as we

have to assume that parties are founded to enter government or at least
influence the policy making process in the country.31 In the case of Serbia,
the opposition accomplished neither before 2000.
The failure of the opposition throughout the 1990s and its subsequent
success in the Yugoslav and local elections in September 2000 can be at-
tributed to five factors:
1. Fragmentation of the Opposition: The extreme fragmentation of the
opposition into over twenty parties, most with no infrastructure and
little membership, rendered any concerted effort against the regime
more difficult. Although most parties had only a small following, they
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80 Bieber

were run by public figures that could command some attention, which
gave them weight beyond their numbers. The majority of the party
splits were the result of the personal differences of party figures, giv-
ing the opposition the appearance of being more concerned with per-
sonal power than with policy.32 The building of a broad coalition, initi-
ated with the January 2000 agreement between all opposition parties,
was a prerequisite not only in terms of combining the vote, but also in
demonstrating unity. The bad performance of the Serbian Renewal
Movement in the elections—down from a rather stable support of 15–
20 percent in the 1990s to less than 4 percent in 2000—can be partly
attributed to its unwillingness to join the larger coalition in 2000.
2. Lack of Internal Democracy: Closely tied to the problem of frag-
mentation is the apparent lack of democracy within opposition par-
ties throughout the 1990s. Those who opposed the party leader were
left only two options: marginalization within the party or splitting
to form a new one. The impact of this pattern on the Serbian oppo-
sition has been two-fold. Mostly the same party leaders dominated
the opposition throughout the 1990s, although many have been as-
sociated with political defeats and could not offer much to reach
new constituencies.33 Second, the parties’ internal authoritarianism,
in fact replicating the regime’s lack of democracy, did not bode well
for a fundamental shift in the political behavior of the opposition
once in power. These fears were partly confirmed by the behavior of
the SPO in administering Belgrade. However, the unwillingness of
Zoran Djindjić to run for the Yugoslav presidency, despite his being
the head of the dominant party in the DOS, symbolized a readiness
to subordinate personal politics to the larger aim of bringing about
a regime change. In addition, the exclusion of the SPO, more fre-
quently than other opposition parties associated with the personal
dominance of the party leader, Vuk Drašković, and with corruption
has in some ways improved the democratic credentials of the DOS.
3. Lack of Distance from the Regime: The Serbian opposition was
marred by frequent cooperation and co-optation by the regime in
the 1990s. This was particularly significant because the Socialist Party
could not rule without coalition partners after 1992. Formal and infor-
mal coalitions thus helped extend the rule of Milošević and blurred
the distinction between opposition and regime. In 1993, for exam-
ple, the New Democracy Party joined the government, together with
some members of the Democratic Party; in 1997, discussions with
the regime by some members of the Zajedno coalition led to its
breakup, followed by the negotiations of the Serbian Renewal Move-
ment with the regime in 1997–98, leading to its brief stint in the Yu-
goslav government in early 1999. The increasing repression of the
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The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society 81

regime in the aftermath of the failed civic protests in 1996–97 helped

deepen the divide between regime and opposition. In addition, the
successful mobilization of Otpor (see below) put an end to most in-
stances of cooperation with the regime and refocused the opposition
on toppling Slobodan Milošević.
4. The “National Question”: Most opposition parties, rooted in either
intellectual “dissident” circles or strong anticommunist ideas, strug-
gled throughout the 1990s with the “national question.” Many parties
frequently out-flanked the nationalist policies pursued by the regime,
allowing the regime to present itself as a force for moderation. In ad-
dition, the opposition allowed the regime to play on the territorial
insecurity that emerged from the open national question, which again
helped to consolidate the rule of the regime as a force for stability
and continuity. Finally, the national policies pursued by the politi-
cal opposition at times alienated the national minorities in Serbia,
which amount to over a third of the population. By defining them-
selves as parties of the Serbian nation, not of Serbian citizens, the
opposition parties—with few exceptions—promoted the creation of
minority parties or the electoral and institutional boycott of minori-
ties altogether. This deprived the opposition of a significant share of
the electorate, which had little sympathy for the repressive policies
of the regime.34 Part of the success of the DOS has been the inclusion
of regional and minority parties, most notably the Muslim/Bošniak
Sandžak Coalition and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians.
5. The Lack of Political Power: As the opposition failed to win any
election before 1996, the parties of the opposition never held any
political office, except when entering a coalition with the regime.
Political power was necessary to counter the predominance of the
regime structures on all levels. Thus, the victory of the opposition
in 1996 in many cities and communes throughout Serbia was crucial
in preparing the way for the victory in 2000. The opposition took
control of many local media that are under the control of the lo-
cal town councils, allowing for a more concerted challenge to the
media dominance of the regime. Despite the extremely high de-
gree of centralization of Serbia, a number of opposition coalitions
throughout Serbia (where the coalition Zajedno frequently survived
the break-up at the republican level) have been successful in running
cities and towns. However, as the sociologist and opposition intellec-
tual Nebojša Popov has pointed out, the opposition parties in power
on the local level often exhausted their popularity through internal
quarrels, offering few policies that could secure additional popular
support.35 It has, nevertheless, been remarkable that the most sig-
nificant protest against the regime emerged from the provinces and
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82 Bieber

small towns administered by the opposition (such as Čačak), artic-

ulating itself in citizen’s parliaments and other alternative forms of
protest.36
The opposition managed to overcome some of the crucial prob-
lems that prevented it from performing successfully against the
regime; however, the new governing parties remain weak and frag-
mented, as evidenced by the instability of the post-October 2002 rul-
ing coalition. In fact, the internal conflict between the Yugoslav and
Serbian authorities and the parties of the DOS after the change of
power resemble the conflictual relations between the parties through-
out most of the 1990s. Thus the cause for the parties’ success in tem-
porarily overcoming their conflicts needs to be explained through
other political actors and civil society.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PEACEFUL

REVOLUTION IN SERBIA

Civil society in Serbia has been much praised after the successful change
of regime in October 2000. It appeared that mass mobilization, based on the
support of strong civil-society organizations was a driving force behind the
collapse of the Milošević regime. However, for much of the 1990s, actors
of civil society concerned with democratization suffered from pronounced
structural weaknesses.
In fact, when discussing civil society in Serbia, we have to distinguish it
from Serbia as a civil society. Civil society often has a strong (positive) norma-
tive dimension,37 including opposition to militarism, safeguarding tolerance
and differences, secularization, and equality for all citizens irrespective of
their background.38 If one is it to accept such an approach to civil society
as a form of societal organization that is based on pluralism of power and
diversity of opinion in a setting of voluntaristic organization, one has to note
that civil society can exist in a system that may not be considered a civil
society on the whole. In fact, Ernest Gellner distinguishes between a “civil
society” and a society containing civil society.39 While such coexistence is
difficult, it is not impossible: a case is the Serbian opposition, a democratic
subsphere coexisting with a semiauthoritarian system.

CIVIL SOCIETY—DRIVING FORCE OR MARGINAL FACTOR

IN MILOŠEVIĆ’S SERBIA?

The past two decades saw the emergence of numerous organizations,

primarily in Belgrade, that sought to act in support of broad societal issues,
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The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society 83

such as human rights, democratization, women’s rights, and opposition to the

wars. In the 1980s numerous human rights organizations sought to defend
freedom of speech by demanding the release of prominent political prison-
ers. While some organizations remained loyal to their human rights agenda,
some came to identify closely with the defendees, include such prominent
nationalists as Vojislav Šešelj. In addition, the plight of Serbs in Kosovo
dominated the agenda for human rights organizations in Serbia, further-
ing a move from the defense of individual human rights to collective na-
tional rights, defending them not against the state, but against a different
nation.40
The rise of Milošević and the emergence of nationalism as the dominant
social and political features in Serbia in the late 1980s triggered the emer-
gence of the “other Serbia.” This term has been used to describe a group of
NGOs and intellectual circles that sought to formulate a nonnationalist alter-
native to the regime and courageously oppose the war. These organizations
ranged from intellectual groups, such as the Belgrade Circle, to activists,
such as Women in Black and the Center for Anti-War action. Although
these organizations fulfilled an important symbolic function in challenging
the seeming homogeneity in intellectual and popular support for extreme
nationalist policies, their reach rarely extended beyond Belgrade (and some
other urban centers).41
With the exception of some antiwar protests, most organizations of the
“other Serbia” lacked the means to mobilize a number of citizens large
enough to challenge the regime. Serbia throughout the 1990s did see, how-
ever, significant civil protests, which were mostly, one could argue, a more
significant threat to the regime than opposition parties. There were seven
waves of significant protest during the rule of Milošević and a multitude of
smaller demonstrations and gatherings:
antiregime protests, March 1991;
student protests, June–July 1992;
the opposition Vidovdan assembly, June 1992;
protests against electoral fraud, November 1996–February 1997;
student protests, November 1996–March 1997;
antiregime protests, Fall 1999;
protests against election fraud and for a change of power, September–
October 2000.42
The protests, although essentially unsuccessful until Fall 2000,43 symbolized
the continuation of civil opposition against the regime. Their failure mostly
did not lie in the protests themselves (e.g., low turnout), but rather in the
inability of the political opposition to successfully challenge the regime on
the basis of these protests.
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84 Bieber

In this context the daily demonstrations in the winter of 1996–97 were

of tremendous significance for the development of civil society and the inter-
relationship with political parties. The break-up of the opposition coalition
Zajedno thoroughly disillusioned most politically active citizens and dimin-
ished the already feeble confidence in opposition parties. This effectively
strengthened civil society, as citizens chose to be active in NGOs and other
civil society movements, rather than in parties. The outcome of the protests
also demonstrated that the protests in the form in which they took place in
1996–97 can be successful, setting off a search for alternative means of mo-
bilizing citizens against the regime, eventually leading to the emergence of
Otpor. Finally, the protests showed the significance of a well-defined event in
triggering public dissatisfaction, leading to massive protests. Most opposition
politicians were surprised by the turnout at the beginning of the protests in
November 1996. The concrete event of election fraud turned out to be more
effective than the more serious, but less tangible, devastation of the economy
and society and the wars in Bosnia and Croatia.44 This has been visible in
the failure of protests at other moments throughout the 1990s to mobilize,
as they lacked a concrete event against which to rally citizens. However,
the failure of the protests also lay in the fact that the opposition’s demands
never went beyond the correction of the electoral fraud, which eventually
enabled the regime to fulfill the demands without having to surrender broad
political powers.

THE ROLE OF NGOS IN THE CHANGE OF REGIME

A number of organizations emerged from the experience of the 1996–

97 protests, which eventually helped bring about the change of regime in
October 2000. Otpor was one of the movements, which were very much a
product of the failed protests.45 It emerged in 1998 in response to the uni-
versity law, which in effect abolished the autonomy of the universities.46
Students, frustrated with the opposition’s infighting in 1997 and the fail-
ure of the student protests, adopted a different strategy, not seeking large
street protests, but mocking the regime through small, well-planned perfor-
mances.47 These acts revealed some of the fundamental weaknesses of the
regime and authoritarian regimes in general.48 By not possessing a hierar-
chical organizational structure, Otpor evaded both repression by the regime
and co-optation by the opposition, rendering it the force most harshly sup-
pressed by the regime throughout its rule. Frequent arrests of members and
those who simply wore Otpor T-shirts in early 2000 helped the movement
reach wider segments of the population throughout Serbia. By July 2000, it
could count on some 30,00–40,000 activists, 120 local branches, and seven
regional centers.49 Through its work, Otpor has consistently tried to not only
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to place the regime on the defensive, but also to force the opposition parties
to reject any cooperation with the regime.50
Next to Otpor, the Center for Free Elections and Democracy came into
being as a response to the election fraud and the subsequent protests. The
center took upon itself the task of observing elections and monitoring elec-
tion irregularities. In addition, the organization proposed alternative election
laws and produced the most detailed analyses of elections in Serbia.51 Most
important, the organization raised awareness of the importance of elections
and trained a large number of Serbs to monitor elections. Based on the as-
sumption that earlier elections had, in part, brought the regime to power as
a result of fraud, minimizing electoral fraud through monitoring was consid-
ered an important tool. Furthermore, uncovering any fraud had also been
demonstrated to be a key mobilizing factor for protests. Thus, a credible
organization was required to monitor elections, report fraud, and thus help
energize opposition protests.
Another nongovernmental organization resulting from the crucial
1996–97 period is G17, which brought together leading opposition econo-
mists in a think tank. The group sought to formulate an economic program
for Zajedno. After the disintegration of the coalition, it worked on eco-
nomic reform programs for Montenegro and the Republika Srpska.52 After
the Kosovo war, G17 expanded its activities, opening branches throughout
Serbia and creating G17Plus to include social scientists and intellectuals
more broadly in its work. Instead of limiting its work to advising the opposi-
tion, the group sought to mobilize popular support for social and economic
reforms. Shortly after the Kosovo war, G17 proposed a “Stability Pact for
Serbia” with the aim of creating a government of experts to bring about
an economic recovery and increase opposition influence. More important,
the group carried out a number of projects in 1999 and 2000 that sought to
alleviate the consequence of the war, sanctions, and the economic decline,
such as “energy for democracy,” “asphalt for democracy,” and “schools for
democracy.” These projects, mostly financed by the European Union and
Norway, provided concrete assistance to opposition-run towns and cities
across Serbia.53
These organizations, as well as a host of spontaneous groupings and
other NGOs, provided the network through which the united opposition
could win the elections in September 2000.54 We can identify at least four
aspects in which the role of the aforementioned organizations has been
instrumental:

1. Mobilizing Citizens: Otpor and many other organizations played a

key role both in encouraging voter participation and increasing peo-
ple’s willingness to protest against the regime.55 Part of the campaign
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was negative, continuing the previous strategy of Otpor by highlight-

ing the authoritarian character of the regime. A different stream
of the campaign was distinctly positive, encouraging the participa-
tion of young first-time voters through rock concerts and a poster
campaigns.56
2. Gathering Information: In the past the opposition, in addition to be-
ing fragmented, lacked information about popular opinion and pref-
erences. The electoral campaign in 2000 saw a shift in the strategy
of the opposition on the basis of increased information. The choice
of Vojislav Koštunica, for example, was very much based on opin-
ion polls, which demonstrated wider support for him than for other
opposition politicians.57 Organizations such as the Center for Policy
Analysis and other pollsters provided the opposition with the infor-
mation necessary to mount a successful campaign.
3. Formulating Alternatives: Throughout the 1990s the opposition suf-
fered from serious programmatic weaknesses. The party programs
were largely general in content and gave more attention to the “na-
tional question” than to concrete economic and social issues.58 Coali-
tion agreements throughout the decade contained very little
substance and mostly reflected the minimal consensus among the
parties engaging in the coalition, rather than a viable alternative to
the regime.59 In the summer of 2000 G17Plus helped the opposition
formulate a program. This program contained a concrete economic
and social agenda, as well as a timetable for the implementation of
new laws.60
4. Uniting the Opposition: As outlined above, the opposition did not
suffer only from consecutive splits. Internal divisions frequently
proved to be greater even than the parties’ hostility to the regime.
In-fighting led to the breakup of previous coalitions and increased
the fragmentation of the opposition. The unification of the opposi-
tion, first in January 2000 and later in the form of the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia, was largely the result of intensive pressure by
Otpor.61 Otpor insisted on the unity of the opposition, threatening to
shame any party breaking from the united front. The poor showing
of the Serbian Renewal Movement in September 2000 was not only
due to the increasingly erratic behavior of Vuk Drašković, but was
also a result of its unwillingness to join opposition ranks, for which it
was severely criticized by Otpor.
Civil society emerged as a formidable force through the elec-
toral process in 2000. In particular, some actors managed to mobilize
successfully, learning from the experience of other countries, most
notably Slovakia and Croatia, where get-out-the-vote and election
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The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society 87

monitoring organizations have been similarly instrumental in oust-

ing authoritarian rule. At the same time, the reach of most actors in
Serbian civil society remains limited in the post-Milošević era, as the
mass mobilization in the fall of 2000 was centered on one goal—the
ouster of Slobodan Milošević—and then subsided. With the begin-
ning of the democratization process, space for civil society increased.
At the same time, the organizations that helped to articulate societal
issues have faced three obstacles: First, they continue to be depen-
dent on external funding. Second, many have lost their raison d’être
with the fall of the Milošević regime. Finally, many activists from
the civil society sector have been absorbed by the new state struc-
ture, weakening some organizations in the short and medium run or
transforming them into political organizations.62

CONCLUSIONS

Both the political opposition and some new actors of Serbian civil soci-
ety managed to overcome some of the crucial hurdles in 2000 that had earlier
effectively prevented the democratization of Serbia. As has been shown, this
change was not a sudden development, but rather was the result of an often
painful learning process; in particular, the experience of the civic protest
in 1996–97 played a significant role in strengthening non-party opposition.
Underlying the developments is a slow change in public opinion, caused
by the continuing decline of the quality of life, the increasing repression the
regime, and the failure of extreme nationalism, which saw protracted territo-
rial insecurity.63 The Milošević regime, together with the previous communist
heritage, has had a profoundly negative impact on the political and public
sphere of Serbia, which could not be reversed by elections in themselves,
but only a by a long-term process of democratization. With the elections
in the fall and winter of 2000, this process merely began. The difficulties
in the post-Milošević democratization process have been reminiscent of the
aforementioned obstacles to the cohesion of the opposition under Milošević.
Thus, not only the legacy of the regime shapes post-authoritarian politics,
but the legacy of opposition and civil society in such a system also have a
far-reaching impact on the nature of the democratization process.

ENDNOTES

1. Joint Statement of the Serbian Opposition, January 2000, Betaweek, January 13, 2000.
2. Montenegro has not seen a change of government in the sense that the successor party
to the League of Communists, the Democratic Party of Socialists, maintained power. The
party did, however, transform itself and fragmented in 1997.
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88 Bieber

3. Additional factors to be taken into account, beyond the discussion here, are the weakness
of the Milošević regime by late 2000 and the degree of negotiation between elements of
the regime and the opposition before 5 October 2000. See Slobodan Antonić, “5. Oktoba
i izgladi za demokratizaciju Srbije,” Posebno izdanje, Srbija posle Milošević, Nova Srpska
Politička Misao No. 1 (2001):9–25; Zoran Avramović, “Zašto je DOS uspeo da pobedi
24.9.2000,” ibid., 29–32.
4. External factors have been instrumental, but will not be discussed here. The opposition
and civil society organizations received considerable material and logistical support, as
well as training from Western donors. See Vladimir Goati, “The Nature of the Order and
the October Overthrow in Serbia,” in R/Evolution and Order. Serbia After October 2000,
ed. Ivana Spasić and Milan Subotić (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory,
2001), 54.
5. On hybrid authoritarian regimes, see Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,”
Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002): 21–36.
6. On this, see Nick Sitter, “When is a Party System? A Systems Perspective on the Devel-
opment of Competitive Party Systems,” Central European Political Science Review 3, 1
(2002):75–97.
7. Furthermore, Milošević had a considerably greater degree of legitimacy through the na-
tionalist mobilization of the late 1980s than most other Communist leaders in Yugoslavia
or Central and Eastern Europe. Slobodan Antonić, “Vlada Slobodana Miloševića: Pokušaj
tipološkog odredjenja,” Srpksa politička misao, No. 1 (1995):92–97.
8. Zoran Slavujević, “Borba za vlastu u Srbiji kroz prizmu izbornih kampanja,” in Izborne
borbe u Jugoslaviji (1990–1992), ed. Vladimir Goati, Zoran Dj. Slavujević, and Ognjen
Pribićević (Belgrade: Radnička Štampa & Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1993), 84–89.
9. Milan Milošević, Politički Vodič kroz Srbiju 2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), 165–67.
10. Dijana Vukomanović, “Nastanak političkih partija,” in Partijski mozaik Srbije, 1990–1996,
ed. Vladimir Goati (Belgrade: Beogradski Krug & AKAPIT, 1997), 29–39.
11. The Radical Party never was a full-fledged opposition party. In 1991–92 it was built up with
the help of the regime through positive media reporting and possibly through financial
support. In 1992–93 the SRS supported a socialist minority government and between 1998
and 2000 it joined first the Serbian and later the Yugoslav government and thus became a
regime party.
12. Robert Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999), 52–59.
13. Ognjen Pribićević, Vlast i opozicjia u Srbiji (Belgrade: B92, 1997).
14. Ibid., 54–59.
15. Results shown only for the Serbian members of the House of Citizens, the lower chamber
of the parliament.
16. In 1992 SPO and DSS both participated together the with Civic Alliance in DEPOS.
17. In 1993 SPO, Civic Alliance, and New Democracy formed as the coalition DEPOS.
18. In 1996, DS, DSS, SPO, and Civic Alliance formed Zajedno. 1996 SPS ran in coalition with
JUL and New Democracy
19. SPS ran in coalition with JUL and New Democracy in the 1997 elections. Both the Demo-
cratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia boycotted the elections.
20. Vladimir Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998. Volja Gradjana ili Izborna Manipulacija
(Belgrade: CeSID, 1999), 285–99; idem, Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998. Addendum
Elections 2000 (Belgrade: CeSID, 2001), 269–71.
21. The terms moderate and radical opposition are used in the surveys of the Center for Policy
Alternatives in order to differentiate between the DS and the other parties grouped around
the Alliance for Change on one side and the SPO and DSS on the other. Srećko Mihailović,
“Politička i stranačka identifikacija,” in Javno mnenje Srbije. Izmedu- razočarenja I nade,
ed. Srećko Mihailović (Belgrade: CPA, 2000), 47.
22. Vreme, Nov. 13, 1999.
23. Zoran Kusovac, “Serbia’s Inadequate Opposition,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 27,
2000.
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The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society 89

24. The extensive criticism of NATO air strikes by Koštunica, for example, brought him more
attention in the regime media in 1999. This rendered any attacks against him during the
presidential campaign by the regime more difficult, as his nationalist credentials were
beyond doubt. As a result the regime media engaged in personal attacks. Politika, Sept.
17–18, 2000.
25. Željko Cvijanović, “Kostunica’s ‘Middle Way,’” IPWR Balkan Report, August 8, 2000;
Democratic Party of Serbia, “Why does our party exist? What are our aims? How do we
plan to achieve them? Excerpts from the program of the Democratic Party of Serbia”
(Belgrade, n.d.), 40–41.
26. Interview with Vojislav Koštunica, July 20, 2000.
27. Speech by Vojislav Koštunica at the last DOS pre-election convention, DSS Press Service,
Sept. 20, 2000.
28. Political Team 2000, Newsletter 13 (2000).
29. Dušan Pavlović, “Svuda lako, u Srbiji nikako,” Reporter, March 1, 2000.
30. CPA Weekly Analysis, May 28, 2000. In early 2000, the prominent Center for Euro-
pean Policy Studies was more optimistic: see Nicholas Whyte “Is the End Nigh? Change
is Possible in Serbia,” CEPS Commentary, Feb. 25, 2000. Also the International Cri-
sis Group was somewhat more optimistic and put some the opposition weaknesses in
perspective. See International Crisis Group, “Serbia’s Embattled Opposition,” May 30,
2000.
31. See Giovanni Satori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1976).
32. The disunity of the opposition as a major hurdle in Serbia has been more frequently
conceded by the opposition leaders themselves. See, for example, the statement of the
president of Socialdemocracy, Vuk Obradović, in Danas, June 28, 2000.
33. Only Vesna Pešić of the Civic Alliance resigned voluntarily from her position as party pres-
ident in 1999. Djindjić’s takeover of the Democratic Party in 1993 was just one successful
“coup” within a party, of which there were many throughout the 1990s.
34. This issue is more complex in the case of Kosovo Albanians, whose political system is
completely separate from the Serb party system, with no co-operation. In addition, the
exclusion from Serbian institutions by the regime, in combination with tolerating the Al-
banian parallel state structures, created an situation where both the political elite of Kosovo
Albanians and the Serbian regime supported the status quo. See Shkelzen Maliqi, “The
Albanian Movement in Kosova,” in Yugoslavia and After. A Study in Fragmentation, De-
spair and Rebirth, ed. David D. Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda (London & New York: Longman,
1996), 147.
35. Blic, Feb. 7, 2000.
36. Milan Milošević, Politički Vodič kroz Srbiju 2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), 62–64;
International Crisis Group, “Serbia’s Embattled Opposition,” May 30, 2000.
37. I have argued elsewhere that there is a need to strive for a broader and less norma-
tive definition of civil society. See Florian Bieber, “The Other Civil Society in Serbia:
Non-Governmental Nationalism. The Case of the Serbian Resistance Movement,” in Un-
civil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe, ed. Petr Kopecky and Cas
Mudde (London: Routledge, 2003).
38. Stejpan Gredelj, “The (Im)possibility of Establishing Civil Society in Serbia,” in Serbia
between Past and Future, ed. Dušan Janjić (Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences & Forum
for Ethnic Relations, 1995), 415.
39. Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and its Rivals (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 193.
40. See Florian Bieber, Serbischer Nationalismus vom Tode Titos zum Sturz Miloševićs (Vienna:
Peter Lang, forthcoming, 2003).
41. See Obrad Savić, “Die Parallele Welt. Die Belgrader NGO-Szene,” in Verschwiegenes
Serbien. Stimmen für die Zukunft, ed. Irin Šlosar (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 1997), 41–42. A
number of articles by and on the “other Serbia” have been published in “Une Autre
Serbie,” Les Temps Modernes 49, no. 570–571 (1994).
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90 Bieber

42. Some additional protests could be mentioned: for example a number of rallies and protests
took place between the end of the Kosovo war and the fall of Milošević, such as the protests
in response to the closing of Studio B and B292. Milan Milošević, Politički vodič kroz Srbiju
2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), 58–59.
43. Although the protests in 1996–97 achieved the immediate goal, the recognition of the
electoral success by the regime, the change of the regime failed and the opposition coalition
dissolved. It would be thus misleading to label them successful.
44. On the protests, See Mladen Lazić, ed., Protest in Belgrade (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999).
45. For a general study of Otpor, see Vladimir Illić, Otpor. In or Beyond Politics (Belgrade:
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001).
46. The university law, in return, was a response of the regime to the student protests in
1996–97. See Sreten Vujović, “The Society, State and University in Crisis,” Sociologija 60
(October-December 1997):481–507.
47. Otpor for example distributed “medals” to Belgrade citizens after the regime began
to honor “heroes” of the Kosovo war. For further examples see http://www.otpor.net;
http://www.otpor.com.
48. The usage of the clenched fist as a symbol consciously evokes fascist/communist symbology,
reminiscent of the Slovene band Laibach and the “Neue Slowenische Kunst” (New Slovene
Art) movement, which used similar techniques in the early 1980s in Slovenia. See Mark
Thompson, A Paper House. The Ending of Yugoslavia (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992),
43–44.
49. Interviews with the Otpor activists Slobodan Homen (July 21, 2000) and Milja Jovanović
(July 25, 2000).
50. Otpor, “Declaration on the future of Serbia,” August 25, 1999; “Kongres Studentskog
Pokreta Otpor: Ostao je bljutav ukus,” Republika, March 5, 2000, 36.
51. See http://www.cesid.org.yu.
52. Miša Brkić,“Some Other Serbia: Group G 17 Plus,” AIM Podgorica, June 28, 2000.
53. Glas Nedelje, October 19, 1999; Blic, July 19, 2000; Danas, April 15–16, 2000.
54. For a list of all the NGOs active in the campaign, see Izlaz 2000. Nevladine organizacije
za demokratske i fer izbori (Belgrade: Fond Centar za demokratiju & Centar za razvoj
neprofitni sektora & Gradjanske inicijative, 2001), 30–52.
55. This has been a particular challenge. While in other countries that saw the end of a semi-
authoritarian regime, such as Slovakia and Croatia, voter participation in itself proved
to be sufficient, Serbian experience with the electoral fraud in 1996 demonstrated the
need for protests and other civil action to supplement the simple process of voting for the
opposition.
56. This campaign was called “Vreme je” (It’s time). See http://www.vreme-je.net.
57. Beta, July 28, 2000. In addition, Koštunica also attracted less hostile responses than many
other opposition figures, such as Zoran Djindjić. See interview with Djindjić in Danas,
August 26–27, 2000.
58. For a detailed analysis, see Dejan Guzina, Nationalism in the Context of an Illiberal Multi-
nation State: the Case of Serbia, Ph.D. diss, Carleton University, Ottawa, January 2000.
59. The opposition agreement concluded in January 2000 was still a reflection of this. Betaweek,
January 13, 2000.
60. G17plus, “Program Demokratske Opozicije Srbije za Demokratsku Srbiju” (Belgrade,
2000).
61. Additionally, Western donors and governments also have been instrumental in forging a
united opposition.
62. One member of G17, Miroljub Labus, for example, became deputy prime minister of
Yugoslavia, while the former executive director of the organization heads the Central
Bank.
63. See for example NDI, Serbia Issue Poll, October 24, 1999.