Katharsis

Author(s): Jonathan Lear

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1988), pp. 297-326
Published by: BRILL
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 Katharsis
JONATHAN LEAR

I
1. Tragedy,says Aristotle, is a mimesisof a seriousand complete action,
havingmagnitude,whichthroughpity and fear bringsabout a katharsisof
such emotions.' But what Aristotle meant by what he said, in particular,
what he meant in claimingthat tragedyproducesa katharsis,is a question
which has dominatedwestern philosophyand literarycriticismsince the
Renaissance.2In the last hundredyearsit has been widelyacceptedthat by
katharsisAristotlemeanta purgationof the emotions.3Now thereis a sense
in which the interpretationof katharsisas purgationis unexceptionable:
havingarousedthe emotionsof pity andfear, tragedydoes leave us with a
feeling of relief; and it is naturalfor humansto conceive of this emotional
process in corporealterms: as havinggotten rid of or expelled the emo-
tions.4But at thislevel of generality,the interpretationis as unhelpfulas it is

See Poetics 6, 1449b22-28.

2 See Baxter Hathaway, The Age of Criticism:The Late Renaissancein Italy (Ithaca:
Comell University Press, 1962), pp. 205-300.
3 This is largely due to Jacob Bernays' influential Zwei Abhandlungen uber die aristote-
lische Theoriedes Drama (Berlin, 1880, first publishedBraslau, 1857). A chapterof this
book has been translated as "Aristotle on the Effect of Tragedy" by Jonathan and
Jennifer Barnes in Articleson Aristotle, v. 4 (J. Barnes, M. Schofield & R. Sorabji eds.,
London, 1979). Bernays' interpretation had a wider influence than on Aristotelian
scholarship alone; for Bernays was Freud's wife's uncle and it seems that Freud and
Breuer were awareof the interpretationand relied on it when formulatinghis conception
of catharsisin the early stages of the formationof psychoanalytictheory. (See Bennett
Simon, Mind & Madnessin Ancient Greece(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978, pp.
140-143).) The katharsis-as-purgemetaphoris used by Plato in the Sophist (230C-231E)
where the Socratic elenchus is represented as purgingone of false beliefs.
4 See e.g. SigmundFreud, The StandardEdition of the CompletePsychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, (London: Hogarth Press, 1981), X:233-34, XII:218-26; XIII:78-90;
XIV:73-102, XIX:235-9; Wilfrid Bion, Learning From Experience (London: Karnac,
1984) and Second Thoughts, (London: Karnac, 1984); Melanie Klein, Narrativeof a
Child Analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1961) pp. 31ff, Contributionsto Psycho-An-

Phronesis 1988. Vol. XXXIII/3 (AcceptedFebruary1988) 297

unexceptionable.For what we wish to know is how Aristotleconceivedof
the processof katharsisas it occursin the performanceof a tragedy.Even if
we acceptthat Aristotledrewon the metaphorof purgationin namingthis
emotionalprocess"katharsis",whatwe wantto knowis: didhe reallythink
that this process was an emotional purgationor did he merely use the
metaphorto name a processthat he understoodin some differentway?At
the level of mere metaphorthereseems little reasonto choose betweenthe
medical metaphor of purgationand its traditionalreligiouscompetitor,
purification,not to mentionmore generalmeaningsof "cleansing","sep-
aration"etc.5 In fact, the preponderantuse whichAristotlemakes of the
word"katharsis"is as a termfor menstrualdischarge.6As faras I know, no
one in the extendeddebate about tragickatharsishas suggestedthe model
of menstruation.But why not? Is it not more compellingto think of a
naturalprocessof dischargeof the emotionsthan of theirpurging?
It is only when we shift from the questionof what metaphorsAristotle
mighthave been drawingon to the questionof whathe took the processof
katharsisin tragedyto be that there is any point in choosing among the
variousmodels. Of course,the taskof figuringout whatAristotlemeantby
katharsisis made all the more alluring,as well as frustrating,by a passing
remarkwhichAristotlemakesin the Politicswhile discussingthe katharsis
that music produces: "the word 'katharsis'we use at present without
explanation,butwhenlaterwe speakof poetrywe willtreatthe subjectwith
more precision."7 We seem to be missing the section of the Poetics in which
Aristotle explicitlyset out what he meant.8

alysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1948), pp. 140-151, 303, Developments in Psycho-
Analysis (Ldndon: Hogarth Press, 1952); W.R.D. Fairbairn,"Schizoid Factors in the
Personality", in Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1984); Richard Wollheim, "The Mind and the Mind's Image of Itself', in
On Art and the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), "Wish-
Fulfilment",in RationalAction (ed. Ross Harrison, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1979), The Threadof Life (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1984).
s The idea that purgationand purificationneed not be treatedas contrariesis arguedby
Humphrey House, Aristotle's Poetics (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1956), p. 104-111,
and by Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle'sPoetics (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina
Press, 1986), pp. 184-201.
6 See e.g. Generationof Animals I.20, 728b3, 14; IV.5, 773b1; IV.6, 775b5; Historyof
Animals VI.18, 573a2, a7; VI.28, 578b18; VII.2, 582b7, 30; VII.4, 584a8; VIII.11,
587b2, b30-33, 588al. For the use of "katharsis"to describe seminaldischarge, Genera-
tion of Animals II.7, 747a19; for the discharge of urine: History of Animals VI.18,
573a23; for birth discharge:History of Animals VI.20, 574b4.
7 Poltcs VIII.7, 1341b37-39.
8 Aristotle uses the word "katharsis"only twice in Poetics:once, as we have seen, in the

298
 In this paperI will firstisolate a series of constraintswhichany adequate
interpretationof katharsismust satisfy. These constraintswill be derived
from a considerationof Aristotle'sextendeddiscussionof the emotions, of
the effect of tragedy, and of how tragedyproducesthis effect. The con-
straintsmay not be tight enough to delimit a single acceptableinterpreta-
tion, but I shall argue that they are strong enough to eliminate all the
traditionalinterpretations.Second, I will offer an interpretationof tragic
katharsiswhichsatisfiesall the constraints.

2. Let us begin with the suggestionthat a katharsisis a purgationof the

emotions.To takethissuggestionseriouslyone mustthinkthat, for Aristot-
le, katharsisis a cure for an emotionallypathologicalcondition: tragedy
helps one to expel or get rid of unhealthilypent-up emotions or noxious
emotional elements.9The only significantevidence for this interpretation
comes fromAristotle'sdiscussionof the katharsiswhichmusicproducesin
the Politics:10
definition of tragedy and once to refer to the ritual of purificationat which Orestes is
recognized by his sister, Iphigenia, Poetics 17, 1455b15).
9 Bernays is explicit that katharsisis a cure for a pathological condition.
'0 See Politics VIII.5-7. Bemays argues persuasivelythat to understandthe concept of
tragic katharsis, we must look to Aristotle's discussion in the Politics of the katharsis
whichmusicproduces;though, as we shallsee, he is less persuasivein his interpretationof
that discussion. G.R. Else and, following him, Leon Golden have arguedthatone should
not look outside the Poetics for the meaning of tragic katharsis. (G.F. Else, Aristotle's
Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) p. 439ff; Leon
Golden, "Catharsis",Transactionsand Proceedingsof the American Philological Asso-
ciation, 1962;and "Mimesisand Catharsis",ClassicalPhilology, 1969.) This, I believe, is
a misapplicationof a principle from new criticism. The Poetics was not meant to be a
self-containeduniverse;it was an integralpartof Aristotle's philosophy. If, for example,
we were trying to determine what Aristotle meant by art (techne) or poetry (poiesis) in
the Poetics, there would no plausibilityto claiming that we should completely restrict
ourselves to the Poetics' discussion. Of course, Aristotle does use "poiesis"in a special
way in the Poetics:it is to be translatedas "poetry"ratherthan as a "making"which is the
appropriatetranslationin the Metaphysics.However, if we ignore all other Aristotelian
works we remainblind to the philosophicallyimportantfact that, for Aristotle, poetry is
a special type of making. There is no doubt that we must approachother texts with care,
for, to return to our current concern, Aristotle's use of "katharsis"when discussing
medical purging may be different in significantrespects from his use of the term when
discussing tragedy. But such interpretive difficulties are not sufficient grounds for
ignoring other texts altogether. (Indeed, Else's and Golden's stricture led them to
formulatea highlyimplausibleaccountof katharsis,in which katharsisis not an effect on
the audience of tragedy, but a resolution of the events in the play. This implausible
interpretationdepends upon an even more implausibletranslationof Aristotle's defini-
tion of tragedy. For an excellent criticismof this interpretation,see Stephen Halliwell,

299
 We accept the division of melodies proposed by certain philosophersinto ethical
melodies, melodies of action, and passionateor inspiringmelodies, each having, as
they say, a mode correspondingto it. But we maintainfurtherthat musicshould be
studied, not for the sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say, with a view to
education, to katharsis(the word katharsiswe use at present withoutexplanation,
but when hereafterwe speak of poetry we will treatthe subjectwith more precision)
- music may also serve for intellectualenjoyment, for relaxationand for recreation
after exertion. It is clear, therefore, that all the modes mustbe employed by us, but
not all of them in the same manner. In education the most ethical modes are to be
preferred,but in listeningto the performancesof others we mayadmitthe modes of
action and passion also. For emotions such as pity and fear, or again enthusiasm,
exist very strongly in some souls, and have more or less influence over all. Some
persons fall into a religiousfrenzy, whom we see as a resultof the sacredmelodies -
when they have used the melodies that excite the soul to mysticfrenzy- restoredas
though they had found healing and katharsis.Those who are influencedby pity or
fear, and every emotional nature, must have a like experience, and others in so far
as each is susceptible to such emotions, and all receive a sort of katharsisand are
relieved with pleasure. The katharticmelodies likewisegive an innocentpleasureto
men. Such are the modes and melodies in which those who perform music at the
theatre should be invited to compete."I

It does seem that Aristotle distinguisheskatharticmelodies from those

"ethicalmelodies"whichhelp to trainand reinforcecharacter- and thus
that the point of katharsiscannot in any straightforwardway be ethical
education."2But the only reasonfor thinkingthat katharsisis a cure for a
pathologicalconditionis that Aristotle'sprimaryexampleof katharsisis as
a cure for religious ecstacy.3 However, even if we accept that religious
ecstacyis a pathologicalcondition,the idea that katharsisis meantto apply
to a pathologicalconditioncan only be sustainedby ignoringan important
claim which Aristotle makes in the quoted text. Having begun his dis-
cussionof katharsiswiththe exampleof those who are particularlysuscept-
ible to religiousfrenzy, Aristotle goes on to say that the same thingholds

Aristotk's Poetics Appendix 5, esp. pp. 354-356.)

" Politics VIII.7, 1341b32-42a18. Here I have made a few changes in the revised
Oxford translation:I use "ethical melodies" ratherthan "melodies of character"for "ta
ethika"; I use a transliterationof "katharsis"rather than translateit as "purgation";I
translate "pathos" as "emotion" rather than as "feeling"; and I translate "kouphid-
zesth/i meth' hedones"as "relieved with pleasure" rather than as "lightened and
delighted".
12 Bemays makes this point. Halliwell interpretsthis passagesso as to diminishAristot-
le's apparent contrast between education and katharsis. For a criticism of this inter-
pretation, see section 4, below.
13 See esp. PoliticsVIII.7, 1342a4-11.Bernaystakes religiousecstasyto be a pathological

condition.

300
for anyonewho is influencedby pity and fear and, more generally,anyone
who is emotionallyinfluencedby events.14In case thereshouldbe anydoubt
that Aristotle means to include us all under that category he continues:
"anda certainkatharsisandlighteningwithpleasureoccursforeveryone".15
But everyoneincludesvirtuouspeople and it is absurdto supposethat, for
Aristotle, virtuouspeople were in any kind of pathologicalcondition.
Nor does the idea of a purgationseem like a plausibleanaloguefor tragic
katharsis.In a medicalpurge, as the Aristotelianauthorof the Problems
says, "drugsare not concocted - they make their way out carryingwith
themanythingwhichgets in theirway:thisis calledpurging".16 The idea of a
purgationseems to be that of the introductionof a foreign substance, a
drug,whichlatergets expelledfromthe bodyuntransformedalongwiththe
noxious substances.But the idea of a purgationas it is suggested by the
commentatorsis of a homeopathiccure:we introducepity andfear in order
to purgethe soul of these emotions.1 The problemis thatthoughthe idea of
a homeopathiccure was availablein Aristotle'stime, there is no evidence
thathe wasawareof it andlots of evidencethathe thoughtthatmedicalcure
was effectedby introducingcontraries.18But once we abandonthe idea that
for Aristotle a medicalpurgationwas a homeopathiccure, there seems to
be little to recommendthe medical analogy. What foreign substance is
introducedto expel what contrarynoxious substancein the soul? Why
shouldone thinkthatthe virtuousmanhas anynoxiouselementsin his soul
which need purging?
Indeed, if we look to Aristotle'saccountof the emtions,they do not seem
to be the sort of thingswhichare readilyconceivedas purgeable.Fear, for
example, is defined as a pain or disturbancedue to imaginingsome de-
structiveor painfulevil in the future.19That is, the emotion of fear is not

14
1342al1-13: tauto de touto anagkaionpaschein kai tous eleemonas kai tous phobeti-
kous kai tous olos pathetikous.
'5 "kaipasi gignesthaitina katharsinkai
kouphidzesthaimeth'hedones" 1342al4-15; my
translationand emphasis. (By the way, this statement seems to me to provide absolutely
conclusive evidence againstHumphreyHouse's claim that, for Aristotle, a phronimosat
the theatre would experience no katharsis. See his Aristotle's Poetics, op.cit., chapter
VIII.)
16
Problems 42, 864a34.
17 See e.g. Franz Susemihl and R.D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle (London: Mac-

millan 1894, p. 651, n.1), who along with Humphrey House (op.cit. p. 110) quote
Milton's preface to Samson Agonistes. Cp. Halliwell, op.cit., pp. 1924.
1 Halliwell is aware of this: op.cit., p. 193, n. 37. See Nicomachean Ethics 1104b17f,
Eudemian Ethics 1220a36.
19 Rhetoric II.5, 1382a21ff.

301
exhaustedby the feeling one has when one feels fear. In additionto the
feeling, the emotionof fearalso requiresthe belief thatone is in dangerand
a state of mind which treats the danger as worthy of fear. All three
conditionsare requiredto constitutethe emotionof fear.' If, for example,
one believes one is in dangerbut one's state of mindis confidencein being
ableto overcomeit, one will not feel fear.2"An emotion,then, is not merely
a feeling, it is an orientationto the world. But if an emotion requiresnot
merelya feeling, but also a belief aboutthe worldone is in and an attitude
toward it, then it is hard to know what could be meant by purgingan
emotion. An emotion is too complex and world-directedan item for the
purgationmodel to be of significantvalue.

3. I do not wish to spend time on the idea that tragickatharsiseffects a

purificationof the emotions,for thoughthisview has hadproponentssince
the Renaissance,it is not seriouslyheld today.' The majorproblemswith
the idea of purificationare, first, that virtuouspeople will experiencea
certain katharsisin the theatre, but their emotional responsesare in no
sense impure;second, it is not clear what is meant by purifyingthe emo-
tions. One possibilitywas suggested by Eduard Muller: "Who can any
longer doubt that the purificationof pity, fear and the other passions
consistsin, or at least is very closely connectedwith the transformation of
the pain that engenderedtheminto pleasure?"23 The fact thatwe do derive
a certainpleasurefromthe pitiableandfearfuleventsthat are portrayedin
tragedy is, I think, of the greatest importancein coming to understand
tragickatharsis.However, it is a mistaketo think that, in tragedy,pain is
transformedinto pleasure.Pityandfearare not abolishedby the tragedy;it
is just thatin additionto the pity andfearone feels in responseto the tragic
events, one is also capableof experiencinga certainpleasure.Moreover,
even if there were a transformation,to conceiveof it as a purificationis to
assume that the originalemotional responseof pity and fear is somehow
polluted or unclean. But this isn't so. Aristotlemakes it abundantlyclear
thatpity andfear are the appropriateresponsesto a good tragicplot.2-The
I
See Rhetoric l.1 and 11.5.In addition,Aristotlebelievesthere are certainphysiological
changes which accompany an emotion. On the Soul, 403al6-19.
21 Rhetoric II.5, 1382b30ff.
I See Hathaway op.cit.
I Eduard Muller (Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten, Vol. 2, pp. 62, 377-88) quoted by
Bemays, op.cit., p. 156.
4 See e.g. Poetics, 13-14where plots are evaluatedon the basisof the type of emotional
response they tend to evoke in an audience.Those that do not producepity and fear, but,
for example, disgust are rejected as inadequatefor tragedy.

302
pain of pity andfear is not an impuritywhichneeds to be removed,it is the
emotional responsewhicha virtuousman will and ought to feel.

4. Perhapsthe mostsophisticatedview of katharsis,whichhasbeen power-

fully argued for in recent years, is the idea that katharsisprovides an
educationof the emotions.'5The centraltask of an ethical educationis to
train youths to take pleasureand pain at the right sort of objects: to feel
pleasurein actingnobly andpain at the prospectof actingignobly.26This is
accomplishedby a process of habituation:by repeatedly encouraging
youths to perform noble acts they come to take pleasure in so acting.
Virtue, for Aristotle, partiallyconsists in having the right emotional re-
sponse to any given set of circumstances:feeling pain at painful circum-
stances,pleasureat pleasurableones, and not feelingtoo muchor too little
pain or pleasure, but the rightamount.27
Tragedy,it is argued,providesus with the appropriateobjects towards
whichto feel pity and fear. Tragedy,one mightsay, trainsus or habituates
us in feeling pity and fear in response to events that are worthy of those
emotions. Since our emotions are being evoked in the proper circum-
stances, they are also being educated, refined,or clarified.By being given
repeated opportunitiesto feel pity and fear in the right sort of circum-
stances, we are less likely to experience such emotions inappropriately:
namely, in response to circumstanceswhich do not merit pity and fear.
Since virtue partially consists in having the appropriateemotional re-
sponses to circumstances,tragedy can be considered part of an ethical
education.
There are two overwhelmingadvantagesto this interpretationwhich, I
think, any adequate account of katharsisought to preserve. First, this
interpretationrelies on a sophisticated,and genuinelyAristotelian, con-
ception of the emotions. Tragedyprovides(a mimesisof) certainobjects
towardwhich it is appropriateto form certainbeliefs and evaluativeatti-
tudes as well as feel certain pains. Second, this interpretationoffers an
accountof the peculiarpleasurewe derivefroma performanceof tragedy.28
2 See Humphrey House, Aristotle's Poetics, Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics,
Leon Golden, "Catharsis"and MarthaNussbaum, The Fragilityof Goodness. Golden
and Nussbaum speak of a "clarification"of the emotions.
2 Nicomachean Ethics II.
2 NicomacheanEthicsI1.6, 1106b6-28.This is Aristotle's famous doctrineof the mean.
' Aristotle is clear that one need not actually see a performanceon stage in order to
experience the effect of tragedy;simply hearingit read out loud is sufficient. See Poetics
14, 1453b4-7;6, 1450b18-19,26, 1462all-12. For Aristotle's mention of the peculiarand
appropriatepleasureof tragedy, see Poetics 14, 1453bl-14; 23, 1459al7-24;26, 1462bl2-

303
Aristotle,as is well known,believesin an innatedesireto understand,anda
specialpleasureattendsthe satisfactionof that desire.29If tragedyhelps to
provide an ethical education, then in experiencingit we come better to
understandthe world, as fit object of our emotionalresponses,and better
to understandourselves,in particular,the emotionalresponsesof whichwe
are capableandwhichthe events portrayedrequire.It is becausewe gaina
deeper insightinto the humanconditionthat we derive a specialcognitive
pleasurefrom tragedy.
This interpretationdoes have a genuinelyAristotelianring to it: it is a
position that is consonantwith much that Aristotle believed and it is a
positionhe mighthave adopted.But I don'tthinkhe did. First,as we have
seen, a virtuouspersonwill experiencea certainkatharsiswhen he sees or
hearsa tragedyperformed,but he is in no need of education30 Second,the
Politics'discussionof musicclearlydistinguishesmusicwhichis educative
of the emotions and should be employed in ethical trainingfrom music
which produces katharsis.31The best attempt I have seen to meet this
problemis by arguingthatthe type of katharsiswhichAristotleis contrast-
ing with ethical educationis only an extremeform derivedfrom orgiastic
music:
"Once attention is shifted to types of katharsis connected with more common
emotions and with those who do not experience them to a morbidly abnormal
degree (and both these conditions are true of the tragic variety), it is possible to
discern that katharsismay after all be in some cases compatible with the process
which Aristotle characterizesin Politics 8 as a matter of habituationin feeling the
emotions in the rightway and towardsthe rightobjects (1340al6-18) . .. Simplyto
identify tragic katharsiswith a process of ethical exercise and habituationfor the
emotions through art would be speculative and more than the evidence justifies.
But to suggest that these two things ought to stand in an intelligible relationto one
another (as the phrase 'for education and katharsis'at Pol. 1341b38encouragesto
see them), is only to arguethat tragickatharsisshouldbe capableof integrationinto
Aristotle's general philosophy of the emotions, and of their cognitive and moral
importance, as well as into the frameworkof his theory of tragedyas a whole."32

Of course, tragickatharsisand ethicaleducationmightstandin an "intelli-

gible" relation to each other even if they served completely different
purposes, but when one sees the phrase 'for education and katharsis'
quotedout of context,it is temptingto supposethateducationandkatharsis

14, cf. 1462al5-17.

29 MetaphysicsI.1.
I Nor, contra Golden and Nussbaum, do his emotions need to be clarified.
31 Politics VIII.7, 1341b32-1342a18(quoted above).

3 Halliwell op.cit., pp. 195-6.

304
 are part of a single project. Unfortunately, the text will not support this
supposition. Aristotle explicitly says that although one should use all the
different types of melodies, one should not use them for the same func-
tion.33And when he says that music may be used "for the sake of education
and of katharsis",34he is unambiguously listing different benefits that may
be derived from music.35Nor is it true that, in this passage, Aristotle is only
contrasting education with an extreme orgiastic form of katharsis. For
although, as we have seen, he begins by talking about the katharsis of
religious frenzy, he very quickly goes on to mention a certain katharsis had
by everyone, and the fact that two lines before he explicitly mentions those
who are susceptible to pity and fear suggests that he had tragic katharsis in
mind.36Thus the contrast which Aristotle draws between ethical education
and katharsis cannot easily be brushed aside.
Moreover, Aristotle continues by saying that vulgar audiences will have
vulgar tastes and that professional musicians ought to cater to those tastes,
since even vulgar people need relaxation.37But if even some melodies are
ethically educative, why doesn't Aristotle insist that the vulgar be confined
to such uplifting tunes? The answer, I think, is that it's too late. Aristotle
contrasts two types of audience: the vulgar crowd composed of artisans and
laborers on the one hand, and those who are free and have already been
educated on the other.38 In each case the characters of the audience have
been formed and ethical education would be either futile or superfluous.
Aristotle clearly thinks that tragedy is among the highest of art forms.
Aside from the fact that tragedy is the culmination of a teleological devel-
opment of art forms which began with dithyrambs and phallic songs,39and
aside from the fact that Aristotle explicitly holds it in higher regard than
epic, notwithstanding his enormous respect for Homer, Aristotle criticises
certain forms of inferior plots as due to the demands of a vulgar audience.

1342al-2.
My translationof 1341b38.
3S This is made clear by 1341b36-38:... ou mias heneken opheleias tei mousikei dein
alla kaipleionon charin(kaigarpaideiashenekenkai katharseos... .). But in case there is
anydoubt, it is settled by "triton"at 1341b40:clearly,education,katharsis,andintellectual
enjoyment are being listed as three distinct benefits obtainable from music.
36 1342bl1-15.
37 1342bl8-29. This passage is also cited by Bernays as part of his argument that
katharsisis not meant by Aristotle to be morallyeducative.
38 ho men eleutheroskaipepaideumenos(1342bl9). Cp. also Poetics 26 (esp. 1461b27-
28) which suggests that tragedywill be appreciatedby a better sort of audience.
39 Poetics 4, 1449alO-15.

305
 For example,Aristotlecriticizesthose allegedlytragicplotswhichend with
the good being rewardedand the bad beingpunished.
"It is ranked first only though the weakness of the audiences; the poets merely
follow their public, writingas its wishes dictate. But the pleasurehere is not that of
tragedy . . s

This would suggest that a proper tragicplot would be appreciatedand

enjoyedabove all by a cultivatedperson.It is hardto escapethe conclusion
that, for Aristotle, educationis for youths,tragickatharsisis for educated,
cultivatedadults.
The thirdreasonwhy the education-interpretation of katharsisought to
be rejected is that there is a fundamentalsense in which tragedyis not
evokingthe properresponsesto eventsportrayed.Shouldwe be spectators
to tragicevents whichoccurnot in the theatrebut in real life to those who
are close to us, or to those who are like us, the properemotionalresponse
wouldbe (the rightamountof) pity andfear. To take any kindof pleasure
from these events would be a thoroughlyinappropriateresponse. Thus
thereis a sense in whichtragedyprovidesa poor trainingfor the emotional
responsesof real life: first, we shouldnot be trainedto seek out tragedyin
reallife, as we do seek it in the theatre;second,we shouldnot be trainedto
find any pleasurein real life tragicevents, as we do find pleasure in the
tragicportrayalsof the poets. Althougha mimesisof pitiable and fearful
events must to a certain extent be like the real life events which they
represent,the mimesismust, for Aristotle,also be in an importantrespect
unlike those same events. For it is precisely because the mimesis is a
mimesis that a certaintype of pleasureis an appropriateresponse to it.
Were it not for the fact that Aristotle recognizeda salient difference
betweenmimesisand the real life events it portrays,Aristotlewould have
had to agreewith Plato that poetryshouldbe bannedfromthe ideal state.
AristotledisagreeswithPlato not over whethertragedycan be used as part
of an ethical educationin the appropriateemotionalresponses, but over
whethera mimesisis easilyconfusedwiththe realthing.Aristotle'spoint is
that althoughthe properemotionalresponseto a mimesiswould be inap-
propriateto the real event, a mimesisis sufficientlyunlike the real event
that there is no dangerof it havingan impropereducationaleffect on the
audience. From the point of view of ethical education alone, poetry is
allowedinto the republicnot becauseit has anypositiveeducationalvalue,
but becauseit can be shown to lack any detrimentaleffects. If poetry has
positivevalue, it mustlie outside the realmof ethicaleducation.
4 Poetics 13, 1453a33-36.

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 "Thereis not the samekindof correctnessin poetry,"Aristotlesays, "as
in politics, or indeed any other art."' The constraintson the poet differ
considerablyfrom the constraintson the politician.The politicianis con-
strainedto legislate an educationin which youths will be trainedto react
appropriatelyto real life events; in particular,to feel the rightamountof
pity and fear in response to genuinelypitiable and fearful events. The
tragedianis constrainedto evoke pity and fear througha mimesisof such
events, but he is also constrainedto provide a katharsisof those very
emotions. It is in the katharsisof those emotions that the emotional re-
sponse appropriateto poetrygoes beyondthat whichis appropriateto the
correspondingreallife events.Thusin comingto understandwhatkatharsis
is, we will be approachingan understandingof the special contribution
poetry makes to life.
The final reasonwhy the educationinterpretationof katharsisought to
be rejected is that in the end it does not explainthe peculiarpleasureof
tragedy.42 Of course, a properappreciationof tragedydoes requirea finely
tuned cognitive appreciationof the structureof the plot and there is no
doubt that the exercise of one's cognitivefacultiesin the appreciationof
tragedydoes afford a certainpleasure. But the pleasurewe derive from
tragedy is not primarilythat which comes from satisfyingthe desire to
understand.
In fact, there is little textualsupportin the Poeticsfor the hypothesisthat
the peculiarpleasureof tragedyis a cognitivepleasure.The mainsupport
comes from Poetics4, whereAristotleexplainsthe originsof poetry:
It is clear that the general originof poetry was due to two causes, each of them part
of human nature. Imitation [mimesis]is naturalto man from childhood, one of his
advantagesover the lower animalsbeing this, that he is the most imitativecreature
in the world, and learnsatfirst by imitation.And it is also naturalforall to delightin
works of imitation. The truth of this second point is shown by experience; though
the objects themselves may be painfulto see, we delightto view the most realistic
representationsof them in art, the forms for example of the lowest animalsand of
dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learning
somethingis thegreatestof pleasuresnot only to thephilosopher, but also to the rest
of mankind, howeversmall theircapacityfor it; thereason of the delightin seeing the
picture is that one is at the same time learningand reasoning[sullogidzesthai]what
each thing is, e.g. that this is that; for if one has not seen the thing before, one's
pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the
execution or coloring or some similarcause."43
41 Poetics 25, 1460b13-15.
42 Here I am particularlyindebted to Giovanni Ferrari.
43 Poetics,4,1448b4-19,my emphasis. I have altered the revised Oxford translationof
1448bl4-15: sullogidzesthai ti hekaston, hoion hoti houtos ekeinos which is rendered

307
It is importantto note that Aristotleis here concernedwith the originsof a
processwhich culminatesin the developmentof tragedy. Childrenbegin
learningby theirearlyimitationsof the adultsaroundthem, andin learning
they derive a rudimentaryform of cognitivepleasure:but this is only an
explanationof how elementaryforms of imitationnaturallyarise among
humans.It is not an explanationof the peculiarpleasureof tragedy.
One must also be cautious in interpretingAristotle's claim about the
pleasurein learning.Aristotle is tryingto explainwhy we take pleasurein
viewingimitationsof objects that are themselvespainfulto look at. Now it
is temptingto assimilatethis passage with Aristotle's admonitionin the
Partsof Animals that one should not shy away "with childish aversion"
from studyingblood and guts and even the humblestof animals:for the
studyof even the lowest of animalsyields a pleasurewhich derives from
discoveringthe intelligible causes of its functioningand the absence of
chance."For Aristotlethere contraststhe cognitivepleasurederivedfrom
comingto understandcausesfromthe pleasurederivedfrom an imitation:

For even if some [animals] are not pleasing to the sense of sight, nevertheless,
creating nature provides extraordinarypleasures for those who are capable of
understandingcauses and who are by nature philosophical. Indeed, it would be
unreasonable and strange if mimetic representations of them were attractive,
because they disclose the mimetic skill of the painteror sculptor, and the original
realities themselves were not more interesting, to all at any rate who have eyes to
discernthe reasons that determined their formation.45

Aristotleis sayingthat there are two distinctpleasuresto be derivedfrom

animalsthatare in themselvesunpleasantto look at: a cognitivepleasurein
understandingtheir causes, and a 'mimeticpleasure'in appreciatingan
artist'sskill in accuratelyportrayingthese ugly creatures. It is this dis-
tinctively'mimeticpleasure'that Aristotleis concentratingon in Poetics4.
Thereasonwhyhe focuseson the artisticrepresentationof an uglyanimalis
that he wants to be sure he is isolating the pleasure derived from the
mimesis,ratherthanthe pleasureone mightderivefrom the beautyof the
animalitself. In explainingthis 'mimeticpleasure',Aristotledoes alludeto
the pleasurederived from learning.But that Aristotle has only the most
rudimentaryform of 'learning'in mindis made clear by his claim that this
pleasurein learningis availablenot onlyto the philosophicallyminded,but

there as "gatheringthe meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so". My
translationis more literalwhich I think is importantto the interpretationof this passage.
44 Partsof Animals 1.5, 645a4-37.

45 Partsof Animals 1.5, 645a8-15.

308
to all of mankind however small theircapacityfor it. What one is 'learning' is
that this is that: i.e. that this (pictureof a dead mouse) is (an accurate
representationof) that ([a] dead mouse). The 'reasoning'one is doing is
confined to realizingthat one thing (an artisticrepresentation)is an in-
stance of another. The pleasure, Aristotle says, is precisely that which
wouldbe unavailableto someoneincapableof formulatingthis elementary
realization:that is, to someone who had never seen a mouse.6 Such a
person would not be able to recognizerepresentationas a representation,
and thus his pleasure would be confined to appreciatingthe colors and
shapes in the painting. Thus it is a mistake to interpretthis passage as
suggestingthat the reasoningis in any sense a reasoning about causes.
Poetics 4, then, is about the most elementary pleasures which can be
derivedfromthe most elementaryof mimeseis.Althoughthis is a firststep
towardsan understandingof tragicpleasure,it does not lend supportto the
thesis that tragicpleasureis a speciesof cognitivepleasure.
Now Aristotle does repeatedlyinsist that a good tragedymust have an
intelligibleplot structure.There mustbe a reasonwhy the tragedyoccurs:
thusAristotlesaysthatthe eventsmustoccurplausiblyor necessarily,47 that
the events must occur on account of one another rather than in mere
temporalsuccession,48andthatthe protagonistmustmakea certainmistake
or error(hamartia)whichis responsiblefor andexplainshis downfall.49 And
I thinkthere is no doubtthatthe propereffect of tragedyon an audienceis
4 Poetics 4, 1448bl7-19. Such a person, presumably,would not have heard a sufficient
descriptionto recognize a mouse: the person Aristotle has in mind, I think, is someone
who has no idea of a mouse: so he is in no position to recognize of any paintingthat it is a
painting of a mouse.
4 See e.g. Poetics 9, 1451a37-38;10, 1452al7-21; 15, 1454a33-36;16, 1455al6-19; 25,
1461bll-12.
4 E.g. Poetics 9, 1452a3-4;10, 1452a20-21.
49 Poetics 13, 1453a8-30.Nussbaumarguesthat the point of a hamartiais to render the

protagonist sufficiently like us that we can identify with him to the extent required to
experiencethe tragicemotionsof pityandfear (op.cit., pp. 382ff.). Her reasoningis based
on her more generalinterpretationthat, for Aristotle, the point of tragedyis to explore the
gap which inevitably exists between being good and living well. I do not think that the
generalinterpretationcanbe correct.AlthoughAristotle does acceptthatbeingvirtuousis
not sufficientfor happinessand that externalmisfortunecan ruina thoroughlygood man
(NicomacheanEthics1.10), it is quite clearthatAristotle does not thinkthatsuchan event
could be the basis for a tragedy. Consider for example Poetics 13, 1452b30-36,where
Aristotle says thattragedycannotportraythe fall of a good manfromgood to badfortune,
for such an event does not arouse the tragicemotions of pity and fear but a thoroughly
non-tragicemotion of disgust.Aristotle does reluctantlyadmitthat a virtuousman can be
destroyedforno reasonatall, thatis, throughmisfortune,but he denies thatthisis the stuff
of tragedy. Tragic events always occur for a reason.

309
 broughtaboutvia the audience'scognitiveappreciationof the intelligible
plot structure.The question,then, is notwhetheran audiencemustexercise
its cognitivefaculties, nor whether it may find pleasure in so doing; the
questionis whetherthis cognitiveexerciseand its attendantpleasureis the
propereffect of tragedy.Is this cognitivepleasurethe pleasureappropriate
and peculiarto tragedy?To see that the answeris "no", considerone of
Aristotle'sclassicstatementsof the demandfor intelligibility:
"Tragedyis a mimesisnot only of a complete action, but also of fearful and pitiable
events. But such events occur in the strongestform when they occur unexpectedly
but in consequence of one another. For the events are more marvellous (thaumas-
ton) when they occur thus than if they occur by chance . . "50

Aristotle'spoint is that a plot structurein whichthe events do not merely

succeedeach other in time, but standin the relationof intelligiblecause to
intelligibleeffect, albeit a relationin whichthe intelligibilityonly comes to
lightwitha reversalandrecognition,is the best plot structurefor portraying
trulypitiableandfearfulevents. Whatit is to be a pitiableandfearfulevent
is to be an event capableof inducingpity andfear in the audience.But pity
and fear is clearlynot the propereffect of tragedy:it is merelya necessary
step along the route towardsthe propereffect. For Aristotlesays that it is
from pity and fear that tragedyproducesa katharsisof these emotions.5
Therefore, the audience'scognitive appreciationof the plot's intelligible
structureand attendantpleasure are important,but they are causal an-
tecedentsof the proper effect and proper pleasure of tragedy.
Aristotle does say that events are more marvellous(thaumaston)when
they occurunexpectedlybut in an intelligiblerelationto each other. And
this fact is invoked by those who wish to argue that tragic pleasure is a
cognitivepleasure.For in the MetaphysicsandRhetoric,Aristotlelinksthe
wondrousor marvellouswith our desire to understand.52 It is owing to
wonder,Aristotlesays, thanmanfirstbeganto philosophize:the risingand
setting of the sun, for example, provokesman'swonderand this wonder
sets him on a journeyto explainwhy this phenomenonoccurs.53Thus it is
suggested that the wonder that is produced in a tragedy provokes the

50 Poetics 9, 1452a1-6[my trans. except for two phrases from Oxford].

51 Poetics 6, 1449b27-28.Literally, Aristotle says a "katharsisof such emotions" (ton
toiouton pathematon), but Bernays has argued convincingly that "such" should be
understood demonstratively,as referringexclusively to pity and fear.
52 Metaphysics982bl2ff, 983al2ff; Rhetoric 1371a31ff.
53 Metaphysics982bl2ff.IdiscussthisatsomelengthinAristotle: TheDesireto Understand
(Cambridge, 1988).

310
 audience to try to understandthe events portrayedand the pleasurethat
attendscoming to understandis tragicpleasure.54
If there were alreadya strongcase for thinkingthat tragicpleasurewas
cognitive pleasure, then the link between the marvellousand tragedy,on
the one hand, and with the desire to understand,on the other, would be
suggestive. However, in the absence of a strong case, there are three
reasonswhy Aristotle'sremarkson the marvellouscannotbe used to lend
any significantsupportto the idea thattragicpleasureis cognitive.First,in
the Poetics passagejust quoted Aristotle seems to be suggestingthat the
relationbetweenwonderandunderstanding is preciselythe oppositeof that
suggestedby the Metaphysics:it is by cognitivelygraspingthat the events,
though unexpected, are intelligiblylinked to one anotherthat wonderis
producedin us. So while in the Metaphysicswonderprovokesus to under-
stand, in the Poetics understandingprovokes us to experiencewonder.
Second, althoughin the quoted passageAristotle associatesintelligibility
with wonder, towards the end of the Poetics Aristotle also associates
wonder with irrationality.55 One advantageof epic over tragedy,he says
there, is that it is better suited to portrayingirrationalevents (to alogon).
For since the audienceof an epic narrativedoes not actuallyhaveto see the
irrationalityacted out on stage, it is less likely to notice it as irrational.
However, Aristotle says, it is the irrationalwhichchieflyproduceswonder
(to thaumaston).And he says that the experienceof wonderitselfis pleas-
ant.56So in thiscase it cannotbe thatwonderprovokesunderstanding which
is pleasant- for irrationalityultimatelyresistsunderstanding.And at the
end of the Poetics, Aristotle suggeststhat the pleasureproperto epic and
the pleasureproperto tragedyareof the sametype,57even thoughtragedyis
a higherform of the art. Yet if the pleasureproperto epic can be derived
from a plot containingirrationalities,it hardlyseems thatthispleasurecan
be cognitive. Finally,even if one grantsa-link betweenwonderand cogni-
tive pleasure, this in itself does nothing to supportthe thesis that tragic
pleasure is cognitive. For an anti-cognitivistlike myself does not believe
thatthere is no role for cognitionandits attendantpleasurein the apprecia-
tion of a tragedy;he only denies that cognitivepleasureis to be identified
with tragic pleasure. For the anti-cognitivist,cognitivepleasureis a step
that occursen route to the productionof the properpleasureof tragedy.
54 See e.g. Halliwell, op.cit., pp. 70-74.
5 Poetics 24, 1460a11-17.
56 Poetics 24, 1460a17.
57 Poetics 26, 1462bl3-14. See the note on the passage in D.W. Lucas, Aristotle's
Poetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 257.

311
 The finaltext whichis cited in supportof the cognitivistthesis is Aristot-
le's claim that poetry is "morephilosophical"than history:
Poetry is more philosophicaland more serious than history:for poetry speaks more
about universals, while history speaks of particulars.By universal is meant what
sort of thingsuch a sort of person would plausiblyor necessarilysay or do - which is
the aim of poetry though it affixes propernames to characters;by a particular,what
Alcibiades did or had done to him.58

Of course, philosophyis an exercise of man'scognitivefacultiesand, as is

well known, Aristotle repeatedly insists that it is universalswhich man
understands.59However, even if we interpretthis passagejust as cogniti-
vists would like us to - as suggesting an intimate link between the apprecia-
tion of tragedyand the exercise of our cognitiveabilities- nothingin this
passagewould help us decide between the cognitivistand the anti-cogniti-
vist theses. For, as we have seen, the anti-cognitivistdoes not deny that a
cognitiveunderstandingof the plot is essentialto the properappreciationof
a tragedy, he only denies that tragic pleasure can be identifiedwith the
pleasurethat attendsunderstanding.
But, more importantly,I don't thinkwe shouldinterpretthis passageas
the cognitivistswouldlike us to. Thereis a certainplasticityin the idea of a
universalwhichfacilitatesthe transitionfrompoetryto cognition.The true
objects of knowledge, for Aristotle, are essences and these essences are
'universal'in the sense that two healthyhumanbeingswill instantiatethe
same essence: human soul. But the reason that essences are linked with
knowledgeis that in coming to understanda thing'sessence we come to
understandwhat that thing is reallylike. In comingto understandhuman
essence, we come to understandwhatit is to be a humanbeing. Now when
Aristotle says that poetry is "more philosophical"than historybecauseit
deals with universals, it is tempting to read him as saying that poetry
providesus withdeeperinsightsinto the humancondition.Thisis a tempta-
tion which ought to be resisted.' If we look to what Aristotle means by
"universal"in the passageunderdiscussion,it is clearthathe does not mean
'universalwhichexpressesthe essence of the humancondition',but some-

58
Poetics 9, 1451b5-11.
59At MetaphysicsXIII. 10, 1087alO-25,Aristotle does qualifyhis claimthat episteme is of
universals. See my "Active Episteme" (in Mathematicsand Metaphysicsin Aristotle:
Proceedingsof the Xth SymposiumAristotelicum(A. Graeser ed., Bern, 1986) ) for an
analysis of this passage.
60 Although I am certainlywilling to accept that Aristotle thoughtthat tragedyprovides
deeper insight into the human condition than history does, I don't think that is the
immediate point he is making in the passage under discussion.

312
thing much less grandiose:that poetry should refrainfrom describingthe
particulareventsof particularpeople andinsteadportraythe sortsof things
a giventype of personmightsayor do. Aristotlegivesan exampleof whathe
means by the universalelement in poetrylater on:
The following will show how the universalelement in Iphigenia, for instance, may
be viewed: a certainmaidenhavingbeen offered in sacrifice, and spiritedawayfrom
her sacrificersinto another land, where the custom was to sacrificeall strangersto
the Goddess, she was made there the priestess of this rite. Long after that the
brother of the priestess happened to come; the fact, however, of the oracle having
bidden him go there, and his object in going, are outside the plot of the play. On his
coming he was arrested, and about to be sacrificed,when he revealed who he was -
either as Euripides puts it or (as suggested by Polyidus) by the not improbable
exclamation, 'So I too am doomed to be sacrificed as my sister was'; and the
disclosureled to his salvation.This done, the next thing, aftertheproper nameshave
beenfixed as a basis for the story, is to turn to the episodes.6'

Aristotle'spointis simplythatpoetrydealswithtypesof actionsandtype of

persons,even thoughthe poet, afterhavingconstructedthe 'universal'plot
later assigns names to the characters.62 Aristotle does say that such a
universalplot is "morephilosophical"than history,but by this he did not
mean that poetrygives us ultimateunderstandingof humanity.Rather,he
meantthat it has emergedfromthe mireof particularityin whichhistoryis
trapped and thus has taken a step along the way towards philosophy.
Whetherfairlyor unfairly,Aristotle had a very low opinionof history(he
seemed to hold historyin the sameregardas we hold newspapers)andthus
somethingdoesn't have to be very philosophicalto be more philosophical
than history.63
What then is the point of Aristotle'srequirementthat poetry deal with
universalsif it is not to insistupon poetry'sultimatecognitivevalue? If we
read Poetics9 throughto the end it becomes clear that Aristotle'soverall
concernis with the formationof a plot that effectivelyproducespity and
fearin the audience.' But in orderfor an audienceto feel pity andfearthey
must believe that there is a certainsimilaritybetween themselvesand the
characterin the tragedy:andthe reasonthey mustbelieve in this similarity

6' Poetics 17, 1455b2-13(Oxford trans.). See also Aristotle's descriptionof the plot of
the Odyssey at 1455b16-23.
`2 Poetics 17, 1455b, 12-13; cf. 9, 1451b8-16.

3 Aristotle does not seem to have been familiar with Thucydides. One cannot but
wonder how Aristotle would have changedhis mind about historyif he had carefullyread
the History of the Peloponnesian War.
' As we have seen, that is why Aristotle says at the
end of Chapter9 that the events in a
tragedy should occur unexpectedly but on account of one another.

313
is that they must believe that the events portrayedin the tragedymight
happento them. For a personto feel pity and fear he mustbelieve that he
himself is vulnerableto the events he is witnessing.That is why Aristotle
saysthatthe poet'sfunctionis not to portrayeventsthathavehappened,but
events that might happen - and that these possible occurrencesseem
plausibleor even necessary.65 The pointof portrayingplausibleevents that
mighthappenis that the audiencewill naturallycome to believe that these
events mighthappento them.And thisis a crucialstep in the productionof
pity and fear in their souls. Poetry uses universalsfor the same purpose.
Becausepoetryis not miredin particularity,butconcernsitselfwithtypesof
events whichoccurto certainsortsof people, it is possiblefor the audience
to appreciatethat they are the sort of people to whom this sort of event
could, just possibly,occur.The universalityAristotlehas in mindwhen he
talks about the universalityof poetryis not as such aimingat the depth of
the human condition, it is aiming at the universalityof the human
condition.'

Enough has been said, I think, to make it clear that the education-
interpretation,howeverattractiveit is, mustbe rejectedasanaccountof what
Aristotlemeantby tragickatharsis.But havingalreadyrejectedthe purga-
tion-andpurification-interpretations, we haveabandonedallthe important
traditionalaccounts.What,then, didAristotlemeanbytragickatharsis?It is
to this question that I now turn.

II
5. Althoughthe workso far has been largelycritical,I thinksomethingof
positivevalue has emerged.For in seeing how previousinterpretationsfall
short, we have isolated a series of constraintswhich any acceptablein-
terpretationof katharsismust satisfy. These constraintsmay not be so
constrainingas to isolatea single,definitiveinterpretation,butthey at least
set out a field in whichthe truthmustlie. In thissectionI wouldlike to state
the constraintson any acceptableinterpretationof katharsisand I would
like to offer an interpretationwhichfits those constraints.
One of the majorconstraintson any interpretationis:
(1) There is reasonfor a virtuousmanto experiencethe performance
of a tragedy:he too will experiencea katharsisof pity and fear.67
6 Poetics 9, 1451a36-38,repeated again at 1451b4-5,just before Aristotle claims that
poetry is more philosophicalthan history because it deals with universals(1451b5-7).
I Among humans, that is.

314
Preciselybecause of (1), it follows that
(2) Tragickatharsiscannotbe a processthatis essentiallyandcrucially
corrective:that is, it cannotbe a purgation,insofaras purgationis of
somethingpathologicalor noxious;it cannotbe a purificationof some
pollution;it cannotbe an educationof the emotions.
Thisis not to deny that a catharticexperiencemaybe corrective.Aristotle,
as we have alreadyseen, thoughtthatcatharticmelodiescanhelp to restore
those who are particularlysusceptibleto religiousfrenzy; and one might
similarlysupposethat a tragiccatharsiscould restorethose who are partic-
ularlysusceptibleto the tragicemotionsof pity andfear. Nor do I mean to
denythata virtuouspersonmayexperiencereliefin a catharticexperience-
a relief that it is naturalto conceive of in terms of the release of pent-up
emotions.However,the virtuousmanis not in a pathologicalcondition,nor
is he pollutedwithsome impureelementwhichneedsto be removed.Nor is
he in need of anyfurthertrainingof the emotions:indeed, it is becausehe is
alreadydisposedto respondappropriatelyto the situationsof life, both in
judgement,actionandemotion, that he is virtuous.The idea that provides
an educationof the emotionssuffersfurtherfrom the fact:
(3) What one feels at the performanceof a tragedyis not what one
wouldor should feel in the real life counterpart.
For althoughtragedyprovokespity and fear in the audience,it also elicits
an appropriatepleasure:this pleasurewould be thoroughlyinappropriate
to real life tragicsituations.But the fact that a good person (at least) feels
pleasurein the performanceof a tragedy,but would not do so in real life,
suggests
(4) A properaudiencedoes not lose sightof the fact thatit is enjoying
the performanceof a tragedy.
Althoughthe audiencemay identifyemotionallywith the charactersin the
tragedy,this identificationmust remainpartial.Throughoutits emotional
involvement,the audiencekeeps trackof the factthatit is an audience.For
in a real life tragedya person would feel fear and, if he stood in the right
relationto the tragicevent, pity, but he would deriveno pleasurefromthe
tragicevent. This implies:
(5) The mere expressionor releaseof emotionsis not in itself pleasur-
able.
67
See Politics VIII.7, 1342b14;and the numerousreferencesin the Poetics in which the
plot of a good tragedyis distinguishedfrom that which will appeal to a vulgar audience:
e.g. Poetics 13, 1453a30-36(cp. 9, 1451b33-1452aland 6, 1450b16-19)and Poetics 26, in
which Aristotle seems to accept the principlethat tragedyis a higher art form than epic
precisely because it appeals to a better audience.

315
ForAristotle, pityandfearare unadulteratedpains.' The mereopportuni-
ty to feel these painfulemotionsdoes not in itselfproviderelief:everything
depends on the conditionsin which these painfulemotionsare to be felt.
Those who have assumedthat a katharsis,for Aristotle, was a release or
dischargeof pent-upor unexpressedemotionshave assumedthatthe mere
experienceof emotions, even painfulones, has a pleasurableaspectto it.
There is pleasureto be had in a good cry. Suchan idea may have a certain
plausibilityto it, but it is foreignto Aristotle. For him, it dependson what
one is cryingabout. If one is cryingin the theatre, a certainpleasuremay
ensue, but there is, for Aristotle, no pleasureto be had in cryingover real
life tragicevents. This is the problemwith takingkatharsisto be the mere
releaseof emotion. For Aristotlethereis nothingpleasurableaboutexperi-
encingpity and fear per se.
These conditionsunderwhichwe can derivepleasurefrompity and fear
and the conditions under which a katharsisof pity and fear occurs are
intimatelylinked, for
(6) Katharsisprovidesa relief:it is eitheritself pleasurableor it helps
to explainthe properpleasurethat is derivedfrom tragedy.!'
Constraints(3)-(6) together suggest that if we are to understandtragic
katharsis,we shouldlook to the specialwaysin whichtragedyproducesits
emotionaleffects.
Aristotle, as we have seen, definestragedyin partby the effect it has on
its audience:it is a mimesisof an action which by arousingpity and fear
producesa katharsisof those emotions.70It mightseem odd to a modern
readerto see Aristotledefinetragedyin termsof its effect, for in a modem
climatewe tend to thinkthat a work of art shouldbe definablein its own
terms,independentlyof whatevereffectit mighthaveon its audience.But it
wouldbe anachronisticto insistthatAristotlecouldnot have been defining
tragedyin termsof its effecton the audience.Poetry(poiesis),forAristotle,
is a type of making(poiesis), and the activityof any makingoccursin the
person or thing towardswhichthe makingis directed.7" For example,the
activityof the teacherteachingis occurring,not in the teacher,but in the
studentswho are learning;the activityof the builderbuildingis occurring,
not in the builder,but in the house beingbuilt. It standsto reasonthat, for
I
See RhetoricII.5, 8; cp. the account of anger as a composite of pain and pleasure:
Rhetoric 11.2.
69 Aristotle, as we have seen, says that everyone undergoes a "certain katharsisand
lightening with pleasure": Politics VIII.7, 1342b14-15.
7 Poetics 6, 1449b24-28;see p. 297 above.
71 Physics III.3.

316
Aristotle,the activityof the poet creatinghis tragedyoccursultimatelyin an
audienceactivelyappreciatinga performanceof the play.72
Not only does Aristotledefinetragedyin termsof its effect, he thinksthat
various tragic plots can be evaluated in terms of their effects on an
audience.
"We assume that, for the finest form of tragedy, the plot must be not simple but
complex; and further, that it must imitate actions arousingfear and pity, since that
is the distinctivefunction of this kind of imitation. It follows, therefore, that there
are three forms of plot to be avoided. A good man must not be seen passing from
good fortune to bad, or a bad man from bad fortune to good. The first situation is
not fear-inspiringor piteous, but simplydisgusting.The second is the most untragic
that can be; it has no one of the requisitesof tragedy;it does not appeal either to the
human feeling in us, or to our pity, or to our fears. Nor, on the other hand, should
an extremely bad man be seen fallingfrom good fortune into bad. Such a story may
arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is
occasioned by undeservedmisfortune,and fear by that of one like ourselves;so that
there will be nothing either piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation."73

The importantpointto note aboutthispassageis thatAristotleis evaluating

plots not on the basis of feelings, but on the basis of the emotions. The
reasonwe do not feel pity andfear in witnessingthe fall of a bad manfrom
good to badfortune,is becausepityrequiresthe beliefthatthe misfortuneis
undeserved, fear requiresthe belief that the man who has suffered the
misfortune is like ourselves.74 (Presumably Aristotle assumed that the
properaudienceof tragedywouldnot believe themselvesto be sufficiently
like a bad personto believe that the thingsthat befallhim (most likely as a
consequenceof his badness)mightbefall them.)
Similarlywith the disgustwe feel when watchinga good man fall from
good to badfortune:suchdisgustisn'ta purefeelingwhichcanbe identified
on the basis of its phenomenological properties alone. Disgust requires the
belief that there is no reason at all for this good man's fall. It is sometimes
thought that Aristotle contradicts himself for he elsewhere seems to suggest
that tragedy is paradigmatically about admirable men falling to bad for-
n I say "ultimately"because there is a two step processinvolved: (1) the poet's creating
the muthosand writingthe play, (2) the performanceof the play before an audience. I am
using the word "performance"widely to cover both the enactmentof the play on stage by
actors and the simple reading or recital of the play out loud. Aristotle is explicit that a
tragedy can have its proper effect even when it is not acted out on stage: a person who
merely hears the tragedy read out loud will experience pity and fear. See Poetics 14,
1453b3-7;6, 1450b18-19;26, 62all-12, a17-18.
7 Poetics 13, 1452b30-1453a8(Oxford trans. except that I use "disgusting"for "mia-
ron" rather than Oxford's "odious").
4 Poetics 13, 1453a4-6.

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tune.75But if we take the rest of Chapter13 as explicatingwhat Aristotle
means when he denies that the fall of a good man can be the basis of a
properlytragic plot, I think we can see a consistentpoint emerging. In
tragedy,Aristotleinsists,the centralcharactermustmakesome mistakeor
error (hamartia)which leads to his fall.76The hamartiais a mistakethat
rationalizesthe fall. So what Aristotle is excludingwhen he prohibitsthe
fall of a good manis a totallyirrationalfall:one thatoccursthroughno fault
of the good man at all. Aristotlecertainlydoes allowthe fall of a good man
to be the subjectmatterof tragedy:but not of a manwho is so good that he
has made no mistakes which would rationalizehis fall. This distinction
illuminateswhat is meantby disgust:disgustis an emotionthat is partially
constitutedby the belief that there is no reason at all for the misfortune.
Disgust is somethingwe feel in response to what we take to be a total
absenceof rationality.
Aristotlethinksthatthe merefact thattragedymustarousepityandfear
in the audiencejustifieshimin severelyrestrictingthe rangeof tragicplots.
"It is not necessary to search for every pleasure from tragedy, but only the
appropriatepleasure. But since it is necessaryfor the poet to producethe pleasure
from pity and fear througha mimesis, it is evident that he must do this in the events
in the plot. We should investigate, then, what sorts of events appearto be horrible
or pitiable. In respect to such actions, it is necessary that the people involved be
either friends with each other or enemies or neither of these. But if enemy acts on
enemy, there is nothing pitiable about this- neitherin the doing of the deed, nor in
intendingto do it - except in relationto the terribleevent itself (kat'auto topathos).
The same is true when the people stand in neither relation. But whenever the
terrible events occur among loved ones [friends, kin], for example if a brother
should kill or intend to kill or do some other such thing to a brother, or a son to a
father, or a mother to a son, or a son to a mother: we should search for these
things."'n

Aristotle is clear that the peculiar pleasure of tragedy is produced by

evoking pity and fear in the audience and that this is accomplished by
constructing a mimesis of a special type of terrible event (pathos).Aristotle
uses the same word, "pathos",both to signifya terribleevent, catastrophe
or seriousmisfortuneandto signifyemotion.When,for example,Aristotle
cites pathos as one of the three ingredients needed in a plot, along with
reversal and recognition, in order to produce pity and fear, he is not
requiringa certainmotion to be portrayedon stage, he is requiringthat
there be a destructiveact.78So one mightsay that, for Aristotle,thereis an
"
See e.g. Poetics 15, 1454b8-13.
76
Poetics 13, 1453a8-17.
" Poetics 14, 1453bl-22 (my trans.).

318
objectivepathosanda subjectivepathos:andthe two are related.Forwhat
Aristotle is trying to do in this passage is delimit the precise type of
objective pathos which is adequate to bring about a particulartype of
subjective pathos - pity and fear - in response.79
The objectivepathosrequiredto producethe tragicemotionsis a terrible
deed done betweenkinor loved ones. Thatis whythe greattragedianshave
correctlyfocusedin on just a few families,the familiesof Oedipus,Orestes,
Medea etc., for these are the families that have been ripped apart by
terribledeeds.' But what is it about the portrayalof a terribledeed done
among kin that makesit particularlywell suited to evokingpity and fear?
Perhapsa start may be made in answeringthis questionby recognizing
that at least a necessaryconditionfor the audiencefeeling pity and fear in
responseto such terribledeeds is that they believe that such events could
happento them. Forfearthisis obvious.Aristotle,as we haveseen, defines
fear as a pain due to imaginingsome painfulor destructiveevent befalling
one. And he furtherrequiresthat the fearfulevent be both imminentand
capable of causing great pain.81For we do not fear distant pains, for
example death, nor do we fear imminentbut minorpains.
"Fromthe definition it will follow that fear is caused by whateverwe feel has great
powerof destroyingus, or of harmingusin waysthattendto causeusgreatpain."I
Aristotle is explicit that we feel fear only when we believe that we are
ourselvesvulnerableto an imminentand gravedanger:"we shall not fear
thingsthatwe believecannothappento us".' A furtherconditionon fearis
that we must believe that there is at least a faint possibilityof escape from
the danger.8'

8 Poetics 11, 1452blO-11.For other 'objective uses of "pathos"in the Poetics, see e.g.
13, 1453b18, b19-20, b39, 54a13. See also Rhetoric 11.5, 1382b30; MetaphysicsV.21,
1022b20-21;Nicomachean Ethics 1.11, 1101a31.
`9 It is tempting to speculate that, for Aristotle, there is also an objective as well as a
subjective katharsis. For the katharsisreferredto in the definition of tragedy is clearly
subjective- i.e. somethingthat goes on withinthe souls of the membersof the audience;
while the katharsisat which Orestes is saved (17, 1455bl4-15) is clearly objective: viz. a
ritual sacrifice. It goes beyond the evidence of the texts to construct a theory of the
relation of objective to subjective katharsis. But it is worth noting in passing that if
Aristotle believed that a subjectivekatharsisoccursin response to an objective katharsis,
then the entire debate over where the katharsisis occurring,withinthe play itself or in the
audience, would be idle. It would be occurringin both places (albeit in differentforms).
? Poetics 13, esp. 1453al7-22; 14, 1454a9-13.
81 Rhetoric11.5, 1382a22-30.
8 Rhetoric 11.5, 1382a28-30.
R RhetoricII.5, 1382b31-31;cp. b28-1383al2.

319
 At first sight, it appearsthat pity is the paradigmof an other-regarding
emotion. We feel pity for others when they sufferwhat we believe to be
undeservedpain.95However, Aristotle makesit clear that in orderto feel
pity for others we must also believe that the terrible event which has
befallenthemmightbefallus or ourlovedones and, moreover,mightbefall
us soon. Thusin orderfor us to feel pityfor others,we mustbelievethatthe
others'situationis significantlysimilarto our own. One mightat firstthink
that pity can be felt for those who are in some relevantrespect like us -
eitherin socialstanding,character,or age - even thoughwe do not believe
we couldend up in theirsituation,but Aristotledeniesthis. We do feel pity
for those who are like us, but the reasonwe do, Aristotlethinks,is because
in such cases we think it more likely that the misfortunethat has befallen
them can befallus."6ThisexplainsAristotle'sotherwisepuzzlingremarkin
the Poeticsthatwe fear for someonewho is similarto us.' Why,one might
ask, shouldone fear for someoneelse - even if he is like us? The appropri-
ate emotion to direct towardsanother, especiallytowardanotherwho is
similarto us, should(we mightthink)be pity. Aristotle'spointis thatfearis
an appropriateemotionto feel in responseto a similarperson'smisfortune:
for throughhis similaritywe recognizethatwe standin the samedangerhe
did.
Likewisewith pity. Aristotle'sonly caveatis that the perceiveddanger
cannot be too immediate:for in that case fear (for oneself) will driveout
pity (for others)88Pity will also be drivenout of the souls of those who,
alreadyruined, believe that no bad can furtherharmthem, and of those
who believe themselves omnipotentand imperviousto harm.'
Thosewho thinkthey maysufferare thosewho havealreadysufferedandhave
safely escaped from it: elderlymen, owing to theirgood sense and theirexperience;
andalsoeducated
weakmen,especiallymeninclinedto cowardice; people,for they
are able to reason well."'

Aristotle clearlyrecognizespity as a reasonableemotion for an educated

and thoughtfulperson: and since good tragedyis ideallyfor an educated

91
RhetoricII.5, 1383a5-8.Those who have lost all hope of escape grow resigned and
callous.
11 Poetics 13, 1453a5;Rhetoric11.8, 1385bl4ff.
16 RhetoricI.8, 1386a24-27.
87 Poetics 13, 1453a5-6.
88 RhetoricI1.8, 1386a24-25.
19 Rhetoric 11.8, 1385bl9ff.
9 RhetoricIL.8,1385b23-27.Cp. PoliticsVIII.7, 1342b19,where an educated audience
(hoi pepaideumenoi)is contrastedwith a vulgarone.

320
audience, it follows that, for Aristotle, the pity whichgood tragedyevokes
is a reasonableemotionalresponseto the events portrayed.

6. It followsthata normal,educatedaudience,goingto a performanceof a

good tragedy, believes that the terrible events portrayed- infanticide,
parricide, matricide, the tearing apart of the most primordialbonds of
familyandsociety- couldhappento them. Had they lackedthatbelief they
would, in Aristotle's eyes, be incapableof experiencingthe tragic emo-
tions. This allows us to impose a further constraint, at least upon the
emotions from which a tragickatharsisis produced:
(7) The events whichin a tragedyproperlyprovokethe pity and fear
from which a tragickatharsisoccurs must be such that the audience
believes that such events could happento them.
Beforeproceeding,I wouldlike to disposeof two objectionswhichmightbe
raisedagainstthis conclusion.The most seriousobjectionis that the audi-
ence need not believe that the terribleevents could happento them: they
are able to experiencethe tragicemotionsbecausethey are able to identify
imaginativelywith the centralcharacterandthusempathicallyfeel whathe
feels. WithinAristotle'sworld,it is clearthatthe objectionhasthe situation
the wrongwayaround:for Aristotle,it is onlybecausewe thinkourselvesto
be sufficientlylike anotherthatwe canidentifywithhim.9"ForAristotle,we
cannotidentifywiththe verybador withthe gods:it is preciselybecausewe
are so distant from such beings that our emotions must retain a similar
distance from theirs. That is why, for Aristotle, there is no important
distinctionto be made between our feeling our fear and our feeling Oedi-
pus'sfear. The verypossibilityof ourimaginativelyfeelingOedipus'sfearis
groundedin the recognitionthat we are like him: that is, it is groundedin
the possibilityof our fearingfor ourselves.92Moreover,this objectiondoes
not take seriouslythe emotionof pity. We cannotfeel pity in imaginatively
identifyingwith Oedipus:part of what makes Oedipussuch a remarkable
andadmirablefigureis his lackof self-pity,his willingnessto acceptrespon-
sibility for his acts. But if our pity isn't an imaginativere-enactmentof
Oedipus'sself-pity,then it must, as we have seen, be groundedin the belief
that his fate could be ours.93
91 Since it is an incredibly complicated subject, I would like to reserve for another
occasion a discussion of the general conditions required for emotional identification.
9 Poetics 13, 1453a5-6;Rhetoric11.5, 1383al0-13.
9 One might lamely try to keep the objection alive by saying that when we feel pity we
are identifyingwith the chorus. But then the question arises:why should we identifywith
the chorus? The only plausible answer is that the chorus is in some way expressing our

321
 The less serious objection is that the audience doesn't come to the
performancebelieving that the terrible events portrayedin the tragedy
couldhappento them:they arepersuadedthatthisis so by the performance
itself. The shortestanswerto this objectionis also the best: tragedyis not
rhetoric, it is poetry. Because fear sets us thinkingabout how to escape
from the perceiveddanger, an oratormay wish to persuadehis audience
that they are in danger,' but a tragedydoesn'ttryto persuadeits audience
of anything.The only effect on the audiencethata tragedyaimsto produce
is a certain emotional response (the content of which we are trying to
uncover). Of course, if tragedyis to succeedin this, it mustportrayevents
whichare convincing,plausible,events whichplausiblycould occur.95But
Aristotle'spoint in insistingthat the poet constructplausible,convincing
plots is not so that he maypersuadethe audienceof anythingbut so thathe
may portrayan event whichthe audiencecan recognizeas one that could,
just possibly, happento them.
Now if a normal,educatedaudience,goingto the performanceof a good
tragedy,believes that the terribleevents to be portrayedcould, just pos-
sibly, happento them, thereseemsto be a strikingfactwhichis trueof them
both beforethey enter andafterthey leave the theatre:they aremissingthe
feelingswhichtogetherwith theirbeliefs wouldconstitutethe emotionsof
pity and fear. One might like to say that they are cut off from their
emotions, but that can't be quite right.Since, for Aristotle, emotionsare
partiallyconstitutedby beliefs, it is more accurateto say that the distinct
elements that conjointlyconstitutean emotion- belief and feeling- seem
split off fromone another.Anotherway of puttingit is to say that normal
educatedpeople in normalcircumstancesandoutsideof the theatreseem to
have certainbeliefs that they do not feel.'
A misleadingway of putting an importanttruth is this: that when a
normal,educatedpersonexperiencesa performanceof a good tragedy,he
is able to unify certainbeliefs he has with feelings that are appropriateto
those beliefs. He came to the theatre believingthat he could commit or
suffer terribledeeds. In the theatre he is able to feel those beliefs. But
beforewe jumpto the conclusionthatkatharsisis a unificationof belief and
feeling, a unificationof the tragicemotions,let us stop to considerwhythis

views. And if that is so, we are againled back to the conclusionthat we believe that what
happened to Oedipus could happen to us.
9' RhetoricII.5, 1383a7-12.
9I E.g. Poetics, 9, 1452a36-38,b5-7, b15-19.
9' I use "outside the theatre" in the widest possible way: even the oral recitation of a
tragedy counts for the purposes of this essay as going on "inside the theatre".

322
mode of expressionis misleading.It is misleadingbecauseit suggeststhat
what we feel in the theatreis what we ought to feel in real life: that in real
life the appropriatefeelingsaresomehowkept at bayfromthe beliefswhich
would rationalizethem.
But this cannot be right. For constraint(1) requiresthat the virtuous
person experience a katharsisin the performanceof a tragedy, but his
emotional reactions are alreadyappropriateto the real life situationsin
whichhe lives; and constraint(3) requiresthat our emotionalresponseto
tragedyis not whatwe wouldor shouldfeel in responseto real life counter-
parts.Tragicpleasuredependscruciallyon the belief thatone is emotional-
ly respondingto a mimesisof tragic events.' Without this belief, tragic
pleasureis impossible.Therefore,constraint(7) - thatthe audiencebelieve
that tragic events could happen to them - must be interpretedin a way
whichdoes not suggestthatthe virtuousperson,in not feelingpity and fear
in ordinarylife, is somehowcut off froma properemotionalresponseto his
situation.It is completelyunAristotelianto supposethatwhatwe feel in the
theatreis whatwe ought to feel in real life, but for some reasondo not. In
real life the virtuousman feels just what he ought to feel. But, then, how
could he believe that terrible,tragicdeeds could, just possibly, befall him
and not feel fear and dread?
Everythingdependson the strengthof the modaloperator.The virtuous
man believes that terrible,tragicevents could happento him, true, but the
possibilityof those thingshappeningis, in his opinion, too remote for the
actualfeelingof fearto be warranted.9Althougha tragicbreakdownof the
primordialties of humanlife is possible, the virtuousman also recognizes
that this is less likely to happento him than almost anythingelse. That is
why it is misleadingto say that tragedyrestoresthe appropriatefeelingsto
our alreadyexisting beliefs. Our belief that tragicevents could, just pos-
sibly, befallus alreadyhas the appropriatefeelingattachedto it outsidethe
theatre. No unificationis needed for, at least in the case of the virtuous
person, there is no split that needs to be overcome.
And yet the belief that tragicevents could, just possibly, happen to us
does exert some pressureon our souls - even on the souls of us virtuous

9' See constraints(3)-(6).

9 If I may for a moment indulge my desire to be droll, let me put this in the languageof
modal semantics: In the virtuous man's opinion (and thus: in truth) the worlds in which
he kills his mother, is killed by his mother, etc. are possible worlds and thus stand in an
accessibilityrelationto the real world. All tragicworldsare possibleworlds. However, all
such tragicworlds are sufficientlyremoved from the actualworld of a virtuousperson (in
ordinarycircumstances)that they do not fall within the set of legitimatelyfeared worlds.

323
people. This is preciselythe pressurewhichtakes us to the theatre. For in
the theatre we can imaginativelybring what we take to be a remote
possibilitycloser to home. As Aristotlehimselfsaid:
". . . thosewho heightenthe effectof theirwordswithsuitablegestures,tones,
appearance,and dramaticactiongenerally,are especiallysuccessfulin exciting
pity:theythusputthe disastersbeforeoureyes, andmakethemseemcloseto us,
justcomingor justpast."I
The tragicpoet, for Aristotle, playsa role in the worldof emotionssome-
what similarto the role of the skeptic within the world of beliefs. The
skepticawakensus to the factthatwe ourselvesbelievein certainepistemic
possibilitieswhichin ordinarylife we ignore:for example,thatwe couldbe
asleep, dreaming,or perhapsdeceivedby an evil demon. On the one hand,
these possibilitiesare extremely remote, so we are justified in ignoring
themin ordinarylife;on the otherhand,theylendcontentto the ideathatin
ordinarylife we are living"insidethe plain":andthey fuel our desireto get
outside the plain of everyday life and see how things really are,
absolutely."
The tragicpoet awakensus to the fact that there are certainemotional
possibilities which we ignore in ordinarylife. On the one hand, these
possibilitiesare remote,so it is not completelyunreasonableto ignorethem
in ordinarylife; on the other hand, they lend content to the idea that in
ordinarylife we are living "inside the plain": and they fuel our desire
imaginativelyto experiencelife outsidethe plain. Even if tragedydoes not
befallus, it goes to the root of the humanconditionthatit is a possibilitywe
must live with. And, even if remote, the possibilityof tragedyis not only
much more imminent than the skeptical possibilities, it is much more
threatening.Forwhileskepticalpossibilitiesareso designedthattheymake
no differenceto the experienceof our lives, in tragedyour lives are ripped
asunder.
But there is a genuineproblemabout how to experiencetragicpossibil-
ity. On the one hand,the possibilityof tragedyin ordinarylife is too remote
to justify real fear, on the other hand, it is too importantand too close to
ignore. Tragic poetry provides an arena in which one can imaginatively
experiencethe tragicemotions:the performanceof a play "capturesour
souls".01However,it is crucialto the pleasurewe derivefromtragedy,that

9 RhetoricII.8, 1386a32-35.Of course, Aristotle is here taLkingwithin the context of

rhetoricalpersuasion, but his point obviously carriesover to the theatre.
' See Thompson Clarke, 'The Legacy of Skepticism",Journal of Philosophy, 1972.
10 psuchagogei: cf. Poetics 6, 1450a33-36.

324
we never lose sight of the fact that we are an audience,enjoyinga workof
art. Otherwisethe pleasurablekatharsisof pityandfearwouldcollapseinto
the merely painful experience of those emotions." Aristotle is keenly
awareof the importantdifferencebetweena mimesisof a seriousactionand
the seriousactionof whichit is a mimesis.The emotionalresponsewhichis
appropriateto a mimesis- tragicpleasureand katharsis- would be thor-
oughly inappropriateto the real event.
It is thisexperienceof the tragicemotionsin an appropriatelyinappropri-
ate environmentwhich, I think, helps to explainour experienceof relief in
the theatre. We imaginativelylive life to the full, but we risk nothing.The
relief is thusnot thatof 'releasingpent-upemotions'per se, it is the reliefof
'releasing'these emotions in a safe environment.But to say that it is this
experienceof relief to whichAristotle gave the name "katharsis"is not to
characterizeit fully:one needs also to knowthe contentof our relief, what
our relief is about.
Here I will only mentionbrieflycertainconsolationswhichare integralto
Aristotle'sconceptionof tragedy.The worldof tragicevents must, Aristot-
le repeatedlyinsists,be rational.The subjectof tragedymaybe a good man,
but he mustmake a mistakewhichrationalizeshis fall."0The mere fall of a
good manfromgood fortuneto badfortunefor no reasonat all, isn'ttragic,
it's disgusting.10The eventsin a tragedymustbe necessaryor plausible,and
they must occur on accountof one another."0Insofaras we do fear that
tragicevents couldoccurin our lives, whatwe fear is chaos:the breakdown
of the primordialbondswhichlinkspersonto person.For Aristotle, a good
tragedyoffers us this consolation:that even when the breakdownof the
primordialbonds occurs, it does not occur in a world which is in itself
ultimatelychaoticand meaningless.
It is significantthat, for Aristotle, OedipusRex is the paradigmtragedy
ratherthan, say, Antigone."0Forthe pointof tragedy,in Aristotle'seyes, is
not to portraya worldin whicha personthroughno faultof his own maybe
subjectto fundamentallyirreconcilableand destructivedemands.In Aris-
totle's conceptionof tragedy,the individualactor takes on the burdenof
badness,the worldas a whole is absolved." And there is furtherconsola-

10
See constraints (4)-(6) above.
03 Poetics 13, 1453a7-17;15, 1454b8-13.
104
Poetics 13, 1452b30-36.
105
Poetics 9, 1452a3-4; 10, 1452a20-21;15, 1454a33-36;16, 1455al7; 9, 1451a36-38.
106
Which was, of course, Hegel's choice.
107
See W.R.D. Fairbaim'saccountof "the moraldefense" in "The Repression and the
Return of Bad Objects", PsychoanalyticStudiesof the Personality,op.cit.

325
tion in recognizingthat even when they are responsiblefor their mis-
fortunes, humansremaincapable of conductingthemselveswith dignity
and nobility.1' Even in his humiliationand shame, Oedipusinspiresour
awe and admiration.
In the RhetoricAristotle says that those who have alreadyexperienced
great disastersno longer feel fear, for they feel they have alreadyexperi-
enced every kind of horror.109 In tragedy, we are able to put ourselves
imaginativelyin a positionin whichthereis nothingfurtherto fear. Thereis
consolationin realizingthatone hasexperiencedthe worst,thereis nothing
furtherto fear, and yet the world remainsa rational,meaningfulplace in
whicha personcan conducthimselfwith dignity.Even in tragedy,perhaps
especially in tragedy, the fundamentalgoodness of man and world are
reaffirmed.110

Yale University

1" Aristotle makes a related (though different) point at NicomacheanEthics I.10: he

reluctantlyadmits that even a virtuous person can suffer great misfortunehowever he
offers the consolation that the virtuouspersonwill at least bear his misfortunesnobly and
with greatness of soul.
109 Rhetoric11.5, 1383a3-5.
110 For another treatment of skepticism and its relationshipto tragedy see, of course,
Stanley Cavell, The Claimof Reason (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1979). I would like to
thank Giovanni Ferrariboth for the many lovely evenings in which we translated and
discussedthe Poetics together and for his criticismsof an earlier draft.

326