NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES IN

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

A Thesis Presented to

The Faculty of the

Fritz J. and Dolores H. Russ

College of Engineering and Technology

Ohio University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science

by

Dan Suriyamongkol

November 2002
 THIS THESIS ENTITLED

“NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES IN

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS”

by Dan Suriyamongkol

has been approved

for the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences

and the College of Engineering and Technology

___________________________________________________
Brian Manhire, Professor

___________________________________________________
Richard Dennis Irwin, Dean
College of Engineering and Technology
 iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank Dr. Brian Manhire, my advisor, for all of his support,

insight and invaluable help during the preparation and information collection for this

thesis.

There is a large amount of information in this thesis that would not be available

without the help from the following persons. Mrs. Prachumporn Bunnak, Acting Director

of the Department of Power Economics, the Provincial Energy Authority of Thailand

(PEA), authorized unprecedented access to PEA information and operations. Mr. Barvorn

Phattanak, Assistant Manager of the Power Economics Division, who coordinated my

information gathering effort at PEA excellently. Mr. Youngyuth Sonjaiyuth, Head of the

Three-Phase Meter Installation and Inspection Group at PEA, who provided me with

great insight into electricity theft and a priceless view from the field.

At American Electric Power, I was fortunate to receive insights from William A.

Randle, John H. Provanzana, and Jack E. Carr. The World Bank proved an invaluable

resource through the report [2] by the Energy Sector Unit, sent to me by Alfred B.

Gustone.
 iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………..…………………………………...………………...iii

LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………..……………....vi

LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………...........vii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Losses in Electrical Power Systems

1.2 Loss Analysis in Power Systems
1.3 Electricity Theft
1.4 Past Documentation of Non-Technical Losses
1.5 Conclusions and Future Work

CHAPTER 2 ANALYSIS OF LOSSES IN

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 6

2.1 Technical Losses in Power Systems 6

2.2 Technical Losses: Measurement and Practical Cases 11
2.3 Losses With Non-technical Losses Present 19

CHAPTER 3 NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES:

ELECTRICITY THEFT 27

3.1 Brief Background on Electricity Theft 27

3.2 Methods of Electricity Theft 30

CHAPTER 4 PAST DOCUMENTATION OF

NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES 35

4.1 Provincial Energy Authority of Thailand 36

4.2 American Electric Power 46
4.3 World Bank – Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union 47
 v

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

FOR FURTHER WORK 55

BIBLIOGRAPHY 58

APPENDIX A
Principles of Power Systems Analysis:
Basic Load Flow and Loss Calculations 59

APPENDIX B
Two-Bus Load Flow Analysis Programs in MATLAB 68

APPENDIX C
Transmission Line Specifications for PEA 79

ABSTRACT
 vi

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Single-Line Diagram of a Simple Two-Bus Power System 9

2.2 Three-Bus Power System 11

2.3 Single-Line Diagram of a Two-Bus, Two-Load Power System

with Known Load and Known Transmission Line Data
(Each bus can be the Slack Bus) 12

2.4 Load Demands for the Two-Bus Power System from Figure 2.3 12

2.5 Profile of Load Power Factors for Test Power System in Figure 2.3 14

2.6 Energy Losses Calculated Using the Two-Bus Test System with
Bus 1 as the Slack Bus and then with Bus 2 as the Slack Bus 16

2.7 Energy Losses in the Two-Bus Test System and a Comparison

between the Average Losses Computed Using the Detailed
Load Schedule and Losses Computed from Average Power 18

2.8 Demand and Power Factor Changes at Load 2 Caused by

Non-Technical Losses 23

2.9 Effects of NTL on Transmission Line Losses 24

3.1 Basic Components of a Watt-hour Meter.

3.2 Early recording meters: Sangamo Gutmann type A (c. 1899-1901)

watt-hour meter, left, and Westinghouse ampere-hour
meter by Shallenberger

3.3 Modern recording meters: Schlumberger J5S (1984),

and General Electric I-70S (1968)

3.4 Three-phase Watt-hour Meter Connection

3.5 Parts of a Single-phase Watt-hour Meter Where Tampering Often Occur

 vii

4.1 Breakdown of PEA Consumers Sorted by Consumption, October 2000 41

4.2 Breakdown of PEA Consumers Sorted by Numbers of

Individual Consumers, October 2000 41

A.1 A General Connection Situation at an Arbitrary Bus

(denoted Bus A, where G denotes a generator unit). 66

B.1 Single-line diagram of a two-bus, two-load power system with

known load and known transmission line data.
Each bus can be the slack bus. 73

B.2 Information Flow Through the MATLAB Load Flow

Analysis Program. 75
 viii

LIST OF TABLES

2.1 An Example of a Load’s Consumption Information 20

2.2 Summary of Effects of Adding NTL to the Two-Bus Test System 26

4.1 PEA Policies for Billing Customers

Who Perpetrated Electricity Theft 43

4.2 Meter Inspection Protocols and Schedules for PEA 44

4.3 PEA Guidelines and Schedules for Reporting

Meter Inspection Results 45

4.4 Meter Tampering Found Among High Voltage Consumers

in Thailand Between October 2000 and June 2001. 46

4.5 Meter Tampering Found Among Low Voltage Consumers

in Thailand Between October 2000 and June 2001. 47

4.6 Extent of the Electric Utility Non-Payment Problem

in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Nations 52

4.7 Capacity Utilization in the Power Sector of FSU 53

 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A news article estimated that electricity theft in the United States costs billions of

dollars a year1. Such estimates were the beginning of this research. Electricity theft is part

of a phenomenon known as “non-technical losses” (NTL) in electrical power systems.

This research aims to investigate the nature of non-technical losses in power systems,

their sources, the measurement of non-technical losses, some measures taken by selected

utilities to reduce them, and possibly their impact on the system.

In this introduction, a summary of the main parts of this thesis will be presented.

Chapter 2 deals with the simulation and calculation of losses in power systems and the

effects that NTL have on those losses. Various forms of NTL and the utilities’ measures

to counter them are presented and discussed in Chapter 4. Before that, special attention

will be given to the watt-hour meter and various ways to tamper with it in chapter 3. The

study of utilities’ handling and recording of NTL cases was made possible by the

cooperation provided by the Provincial Energy Authority of Thailand (PEA) for

information obtained in rural Thailand, while information on NTL and utilities’ reactions

in the United States was based on a series of e-mail correspondences with officials of

American Electric Power. Also, the World Bank provided some information on the

1
Bill Nesbit, "Thieves Lurk - The Sizable Problem of Electricity Theft", Electric World T&D,
www.platts.com/engineers/issues/ElectricalWorld/0009/, September/October 2000
 2

effects of wide-scale occurrences of NTL in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union

(FSU) nations.

1.1 LOSSES IN ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

In order to study non-technical losses, which constitute a portion of the total

losses in electrical power systems, the logical first step is to understand the complete

picture of power systems losses. Power system losses can be divided into two categories:

technical losses and non-technical losses.

Technical losses are naturally occurring losses (caused by actions internal to the

power system) and consist mainly of power dissipation in electrical system components

such as transmission lines, power transformers, measurement systems, etc. Technical

losses are possible to compute and control, provided the power system in question

consists of known quantities of loads. In this thesis, it will be argued that the distortion of

load quantities caused by NTL will distort the computations for technical losses caused

by existing loads, thereby rendering any results ineffectual.

Non-technical losses (NTL), on the other hand, are caused by actions external to

the power system, or are caused by loads and conditions that the technical losses

computation failed to take into account. NTL are more difficult to measure because these
 3

losses are often unaccounted for by the system operators and thus have no recorded

information. The most probable causes of NTL are:

• Electricity theft

• Non-payment by customers

• Errors in technical losses computation

• Errors in accounting and record keeping that distort technical information

The most prominent forms of NTL are electricity theft and non-payment, which

are thought to account for most, if not all, of NTL in power systems. However, the other

two sources of NTL listed above are not analyzed thoroughly in this thesis, so their

contribution to NTL is unknown.

The methods used to perpetrate electricity theft are discussed in Chapter 3. A few

examples of documented cases of customer non-payment and the measures used to

handle them are discussed in Chapter 4.

Other forms of NTL may exist, such as unanticipated increases in system losses

due to equipment deterioration over time, but are usually ignored in any calculations.

System miscalculation on the part of the utilities, due to accounting errors, poor record

keeping, or other information errors may also contribute to NTL. These losses are

discussed in this thesis due to insufficient background information.

 4

1.2 LOSS ANALYSIS IN POWER SYSTEMS

Technical losses in power systems are caused by the physical properties of the

components of power systems. The most obvious examples are the power dissipated in

transmission lines and transformers due to their internal electrical resistance. Technical

losses are easy to simulate and calculate; computation tools for calculating power flow,

losses, and equipment status in power systems have been developed for some time.

Improvements in information technology and data acquisition have also made the

calculations and verifications easier.

In this thesis, a simple power flow calculation is used to study relevant aspects of

technical losses in a very simplified power system. The results of those simulations are

presented and discussed in chapter 2. The technical principles of power flow calculations

and loss analyses are briefly discussed in Appendix A, but more useful treatments of the

subject can be found in [1].

Also discussed in this thesis is the required information for successfully analyzing

power systems using load flow analysis, the practical availability of the said information,

and the effects of adding known non-technical losses to the simulated power system

analysis. Results from simulations in Chapter 2 suggest that the use of traditional

technical losses calculation tools would not be useful in NTL calculations. This is due to
 5

the lack of information on NTL loads attached to power systems, as well as the lack of

information on legitimately recognized loads themselves.

1.3 ELECTRICITY THEFT

All of the utilities and sources contacted by this author agreed that the dominant

component of NTL is electricity theft and non-payment [2], [5], [6], [7]. Electricity theft

is defined as a conscience attempt by a person to reduce or eliminate the amount of

money he or she will owe the utility for electric energy. This could range from tampering

with the meter to create false consumption information used in billings to making

unauthorized connections to the power grid. Common methods of electricity theft are

discussed in Chapter 3.

1.4 PAST DOCUMENTATION OF NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES

Non-payment, as the name implies, refers to cases where customers refuse or are

unable to pay for their electricity. Non-payment cases, magnitudes and some solutions are

presented in Chapter 4. All of the non-payment information provided here are courtesy of

the World Bank Energy Sector Unit [2]. Some solution approaches reported by various

organizations that contributed to the World Bank report [2] are also included.
 6

Electricity theft is a problem that has long been known to utilities. Chapter 4

provides summaries of policies implemented by two utility companies: the Provincial

Energy Authority of Thailand, and American Electric Power, based in the United States

of America. The summaries include the impact of electricity theft on each company, their

procedures for dealing with electricity theft, and results of revenue recovery efforts by

PEA and AEP.

1.5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The conclusions from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are given in Chapter 5 and can be

generally stated as follows:

• NTL are nearly impossible to measure using traditional power system analysis

tools. This is due to the lack of information on both NTL and the legitimate loads

in the system, which translates to insufficient inputs for any meaningful loss

calculations.

• Electricity theft, a common form of NTL, involves tampering with meters to

distort the billing information or direct connections to the power system. Each

type of theft is well documented by utilities [2], [5], [6], [7].

• Utilities contacted for this thesis all agreed that electricity theft is the most

prominent form of NTL, while customer non-payment can also lead to significant

problems in areas that fail to handle the situation properly [2], [5], [6], [7].
 7

• All of the personnel interviewed for this thesis (listed in the Acknowledgement

section) also stated that due to reasons given in Chapter 2, there have been no

attempts to calculate for NTL using current measurement techniques.

Possible future work on this topic is also discussed in Chapter 5. The possible

future topics include: use of newer technologies to increase measurement capabilities,

possible cost-benefit analyses on the current measures favored by the utilities compared

with other possible measures, and more detailed examinations of the NTL causes listed

above that are not discussed here.

 8

CHAPTER 2

ANALYSIS OF LOSSES IN POWER SYSTEMS

Losses incurred in electrical power systems have two components: technical

losses and non-technical losses. Technical losses mean losses that happen because of the

physical nature of the equipment and infrastructure of the power systems, i.e., I2R loss–

or copper loss – in the conductor cables, transformers, switches, and generators. Loads

are not included in the losses because they are actually intended to receive as much

energy as possible. Technical losses can be calculated based on the natural properties of

components in the power system: resistance, reactance, capacitance, voltage, current, and

power are routinely calculated by utility companies as a way to specify what components

will be added to the systems. Though the data and tools needed for calculating losses in

power systems are available, current techniques have certain drawbacks regarding such

calculations. This issue will be addressed in the section “Technical Losses in Power

Systems” below. The effects of adding non-technical losses to a power system will be

examined in the section “Losses with Non-technical Losses Present” later in this chapter.

2.1 TECHNICAL LOSSES IN POWER SYSTEMS

Technical losses in power systems mean power losses incurred by physical

properties of components in the power systems’ infrastructure. A common example of

 9

such losses is the power loss caused by resistance of transmission lines. The average

power loss in a transmission line can be expressed as

Ploss = Psource – Pload (2.1)

where Psource means the average power that the source is injecting into the transmission

line and Pload is the power consumed by the load at the other end of the transmission line.

This is a simple enough calculation, except that power and current are both time-

dependent functions and that energy – not power – is the quantity that gets translated into

money. Energy is power accumulated over time, or

b
Wloss = ∫ Ploss (t )dt (2.2)
a

with a and b as the starting and ending points of the time interval being evaluated,

respectively. As a result, we need a fairly accurate description of Ploss as a function of

time to make a reliable prediction of energy loss (Wloss). And power, in a single-phase

case, with sinusoidal current and voltage can be represented by

P1-φ = IVcos θ (2.3)

with P, V and I being the average power, rms voltage and rms current of the element in

question, respectively. The term cosθ is the power factor of the element in question,

while θ is the phase difference between the voltage and the current waveforms.

From the above it can be summarized that the information needed to calculate the

average power loss sampled at an instant of time in a transmission line or an arbitrary

 10

element in a power system has to be one of the following sets (all variables are single-

phase, rms values and average power):

1.) Voltage across the element, resistance, or P=V2/R

2.) Current and resistance, or P=I2R

3.) Voltage, current and phase difference between the two, or P=IVcosθ

These sets of data and choices of calculations are the options that an engineer will

have for computing power losses in a load-flow analysis2. But in order to gain V or I,

both rms values, the voltage must be known at two ends of the element that is evaluated,

at all times or as averages. This means the terminals that feed consumer loads must be

appropriately monitored at all times using some of the more sophisticated meters that

could store and compute average and instantaneous values that the load-flow analyst is

interested in.

The information about the power sources and loads listed above are needed to

determine expected losses in the power system using load-flow analysis software. The

actual losses are the difference between outgoing energy recorded by the source (e.g., at a

substation) and energy consumed by the consumers, which is shown on the bills. The

discrepancy between expected losses and actual losses would yield the extent of non-

technical losses in that system.

2
Load-Flow Analysis is a computational tool for calculating power flow in electrical power systems (more
details in [1]).
 11

Bus 1 I Bus 2
Load
G
Transmission Line

Figure 2.1 – Single-Line Diagram of a Simple Two-Bus Power System.

Figure 2.1 above shows a simple power system with two buses (nodes), one a

generator, and the other a load. For the simulations undertaken for this research, the

voltage, current, power, and power factor of the generator have known values at the same

time intervals, and, consequently, the current going through the transmission line. The

loss in the transmission line is easily computed using the current and transmission line

resistance values. Information of the load’s power and power factor are unknown, but at

this point the information at the generator is sufficient to determine what’s happening to

the transmission line using simple calculations:

Sload
I* = (2.4a)
Vload

and Ploss = (V)I* (2.4b)

With Sload, Vload, Ploss, I, and R are the load apparent power, load voltage, power

loss in the transmission line, current in the transmission line, and transmission line

resistance, respectively (all values are complex values), while I* is the complex conjugate

of the current. The same relationships hold when analyzing these quantities as phasors or

rms values. Any major calculations become unnecessary when I can be measured directly
 12

and the transmission line properties are known, which is never true for practical power

systems. Companies that generate and distribute electricity usually measure currents that

enter and leave their facilities in order to measure the energy that is bought or sold. For

areas outside the companies’ facilities, i.e., residential or business consumer areas, only

peak power and accumulated energy are usually measured.

However, the low voltage transmission systems (below 24,000 volts or 24 KV)

are not as thoroughly measured because of the costs of the added metering. This is the

reason power flow solutions are used to estimate the state the various points in the

system. Power flow analysis is generally used for specifying equipment ratings after

estimating the worst-case loading scenarios.

Finding the current in the one bus going out of a metered generator is simple, but

in reality there are often many interconnected buses and many more elements in the

system. Just expanding the two-bus characterization by one step would yield a three-bus

system shown in Figure 2.2 below. Using Kirchhoff’s Current Law to solve for the

currents at the bus where the two transmission lines meet,

I1 = I2 + I3 (2.5)

As in the two-bus case, the current in Transmission Line 1 is measured. To

determine the current in Transmission Line 2 (I2), however, the current going into Load 1

must to be known. This means there has to be a meter at Load 1 with the same

capabilities as the meter at the generator in order to compute I2 at desired times.

 13

Bus 1 Bus 2
I1 I3
G Load 1
Transmission Line 1
I2
Transmission Line 2
Load 2
Bus 3

Figure 2.2 – Three-Bus Power System

More detailed analysis of technical losses and their calculations in practical power

systems can be found in Appendix A and [1].

2.2 TECHNICAL LOSSES: MEASUREMENT AND PRACTICAL CASES

A more common case worth performing calculations for is a two-bus subsystem

with loads at both busses and one bus selected as a “slack bus”3 with constant voltage.

This configuration is chosen for simplicity. The bus with constant voltage is presumed, as

is the case with most systems, to be the one connected to the larger system that has a

relatively infinite supply of electrical energy with constant source characteristics. The

diagram for a two-bus system is shown in Figure 2.3 below where the electrical

3
The term “slack bus” refers to a reference bus (or node) in the system with known voltage and phase angle
necessary for analysis of the system. The slack bus is often treated as a source that can inject infinite
(relatively very large) power and energy into the system and maintain constant voltage and phase angle
throughout the analysis. In analyzing small power systems connected to larger systems, the slack bus would
be the point where the system is interconnected to the wider system that can inject large amount of power
and energy into the system of interest.
 14

properties needed to complete a load-flow calculation for power loss in the transmission

line are provided below and in Appendix C. The load profiles for each of the two loads

are shown in Figure 2.4 below.

Bus 1 Bus 2

Transmission Line Load 2

Load 1

Figure 2.3 – Single-Line Diagram of a Two-Bus, Two-Load Power System with Known
Load and Known Transmission Line Data (Each bus can be the Slack Bus)

Power Demands For The Two-Bus Test Power System

500
450
400
Power Demand (KVA)

350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
0:00
1:00
2:00
3:00
4:00
5:00
6:00
7:00
8:00
9:00
10:00
11:00
12:00
13:00
14:00
15:00
16:00
17:00
18:00
19:00
20:00
21:00
22:00
23:00

Time of day

Load 1 Demand, KVA Load 2 Demand,K VA

Figure 2.4 – Load Demands for the Two-Bus Power System from Figure 2.3

From the system specifications discussed below, it can be seen that this test

system is a very simplified one numerically and conceptually. Each load has its own

profile, i.e., each load varies with time and has a different pattern over a period of 24
 15

hours. To make the test loads more realistic they are represented as two sets of power

demands with different operation schedules comparable to residential and industrial

areas. The grey profile that peaks during the daytime and drops off at night represents an

industrial load, while the black profile represents a residential load.

The load peaks are at 500 KVA for load 1 and 350 KVA for load 2, which are

reasonable levels for loads connected through 750 KVA-rated and 500 KVA-rated

transformers, respectively. The average load demands are 291.67 KVA and 153.96 KVA

for load 1 and load 2, respectively. Load power factors are shown in Figure 2.5 below,

with average values of 0.83 and 0.78 for load 1 and load 2, respectively. Transformers are

omitted from the simulation program for simplicity’s sake. Transmission line resistance

and reactance values are taken from 22000-volt transmission line datasheets provided by

PEA (see Appendix C). The conductor size and line length were chosen arbitrarily from

the datasheet, with the maximum conductor size of 185 mm2 chosen to avoid overloading

the line. A line typical length of 2 kilometers (about 1.25 miles) was chosen arbitrarily.

Finally, the loads were assumed balanced between all three phases, to avoid

complex computing. This means that only the positive sequence impedance values need

be used in calculations and negative and zero sequences can be ignored.

 16

Load Power Factors

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Power Factor

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

10:00

12:00

14:00

16:00

18:00

20:00

22:00
0:00

2:00

4:00

6:00

8:00

Time of day

Load 1 Power Factor Load 2 Power Factor

Figure 2.5 – Profile of Load Power Factors for Test Power System
in Figure 2.3

Specifications of the two-bus test system (Source: see Appendix C)

• Base Values4: 22000 Volts, 100 Ampere, 2.2 MVA, 220 Ohms

• Transmission Line:

Resistance = 2 km * 0.175713 Ohms/conductor/km * 3 conductors

= 1.054278 Ohms = 0.004792 per unit (p.u.)

Reactance = 2 km * 0.334439 Ohms/cond./km * 3 cond.

= 2.006705 Ohms = 0.009121062 p.u.

4
The term “Base Value” is used in per-unit calculations; for more details, see [1].
 17

The test system has been used to be a source for a simple load-flow calculation

program written in MATLAB to determine the losses for the transmission line (see

Appendices A and B). The results were later compared to those obtained using the Power

Education Toolbox© [10], and Power System Simulator© [11]. The specifications

provided about the loads are the following: power demands of the loads at various times

of the day over 24 hours; power factor values over the same time period; the averages of

power demands and power factors. The incurred transmission losses are shown in Figure

2.6 below. The trends suggest that load number 1 is an office or workplace with a peak

demand of 400 kilowatts and the load level being high during office hours. Load number

2 is presumed to be a residential area with a peak demand of 241.5 kilowatts and load

levels that rise around time for breakfast and dinner times.

In the case where bus 1 is used as the slack bus, the average power loss in the

transmission line is around 74.53 watts, while the power loss calculated using the average

values of power and power factor is 51.69 watts.

As seen in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, the load profile changes according to the time of

the day and consumes a finite amount of energy. The load energy can also be represented

by a time invariant average demand value with the same amount of consumed energy

over the same amount of time. The point being made here is that since the utility bills

often only include energy, a number of vastly different chronological power profiles can

be introduced which end up consuming the same amount of energy.

 18

The MATLAB simulator was used to calculate the transmission losses for the

load demands and power factor for each hour, first using bus 1 as the slack bus, and then

with bus 2 as the slack bus. The results are shown in Figure 2.6 below. The losses based

on the average demand and power factor values were calculated only with bus 1 as the

slack bus, with results shown in Figure 2.7. The result is that the average of losses

calculated using the sum of data from individual times is not equal to the losses

calculated using the average values, as seen in Figure 2.7 below for the case where bus 1

is used as the slack bus. The reason for this inequality will be examined later in this

chapter.

Comparison of Losses Using Different Slack Buses

2500

2000
Losses(KWh)

1500

1000

500

Time of day

Losses Using Bus 1 as Slack Losses Using Bus 2 as Slack

Figure 2.6 – Energy Losses Calculated Using the Two-Bus Test System with
Bus 1 as the Slack Bus and then with Bus 2 as the Slack Bus

In the case where bus 1 is the slack bus, the total energy lost in the transmission

line each day is 6439.983 kilowatt-hours, while the energy computed using the average

power and power factor turns out to be 4466.707 kilowatt-hours. The difference is about
 19

1973.276 kilowatt-hours a day (30.64 % of actual loss) or, at February 2002 prices in

Athens, Ohio5, $98.68 a day.

Total Losses Calculated From Various Information

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
No. of Days With Identical Load Power Profiles (Days)

Total Daily Losses Using Hourly Demand (Bus 1 Slack)

Total Losses Using Average Demand (Bus 1)
Losses Using Hourly Demand (Bus 2 Slack)
Losses Using Average Demand (Bus 2)

Figure 2.7 – Energy Losses in the Two-Bus Test System and a Comparison between the
Average Losses Computed Using the Detailed Load Schedule and Losses Computed
from Average Power. (Note: data shown as straight line to illustrate the different levels
when using different slack busses)

This example illustrates how determining losses in transmission lines relies on

availability of information. And the information on the loads can be obtained either by

the customer monitoring the load or the utility monitoring the junction where the load is

connected. Either way, there has to be significant investment in measurement hardware

because average values are shown to be inaccurate for calculating real losses. The

5
Energy rates are published by American Electric Power at www.aepcustomer.com/tariffs/default.htm
 20

average values of power factor and voltages used to compute the losses in equation 2.4a

and 2.4b, for example, are meaningless because power factor and voltages may not peak

at the same time.

The nature of most loads means that the current values must be taken at intervals

small enough to make an accurate representation of the actual load characteristics. This is

where the measurement of loss in transmission lines gets complicated. The meters

required for useful measurements of current or power factor are significantly more

expensive than the simpler kind that only records consumption over time. Meters that can

record a load power profile are used mainly at substations, power plants, and by large

consumers that manage their consumption. Most locations with these meters give

accurate descriptions of losses in high-voltage power lines where there is very little, if

any, electricity theft.

Transmission and distribution line sections that are most vulnerable to theft are

the medium- and low-voltage lines that connect to most of the consumers. These lines are

numerous and usually highly interconnected, which means that isolation of an area for

calculation is difficult. The two-bus calculations above are done with one of the buses

held constant, and there must always be a slack bus with constant known properties in

order to run load flow analyses. In medium- and low- voltage subsystems, however, the

bus voltages are often shifting along with consumer demand changes and even voltage

levels at the incoming feeders sometimes fluctuate.

 21

At this point, it is getting clear that making calculations for expected losses

accurately is nearly impossible in practice. This is because the data required – at least in

Thailand’s case – is very difficult to gather. Once again, refer to the list of possible ways

to calculate power above to see the data needed. The obstacle here is that meters installed

and used by Thailand’s utilities are all old models that only record peak power and

energy in kilowatt-hours for household loads. Even the industrial meters only record the

worst-case power factor, which has no bearing on an average – much less record a profile

of – power and power factor. Some meters record demands (power) at peak hours, which

again have no relationships with an average value or values that are usable in load flow

analyses.

The way to obtain a fairly accurate value of average load demand is to utilize the

information the utilities use to calculate the electric bills. The calculation requires energy

consumption accumulated up to the beginning of the time period (usually a month) and

the consumption accumulated at the end of the time period. The accumulated

consumption at the end of the period is subtracted by the accumulated consumption at the

beginning of the period. The result is the total consumption during the time period in

kilowatt-hours, and the portion of the bill for energy consumption is based on this

number.

The average demand for that same time period is the total energy consumption

divided by the length of the time period, in seconds. This information is always available
 22

for metered loads, because it is what the utilities’ revenues are based on. For example, a

load that has the consumption information listed in Table 2.1 would have the average

demand as calculated below.

Table 2.1 –Example of Load Consumption Information

Date/Time (mm/dd/yy, hr:min:sec) Consumption, kilowatt-hours

Begin: 01/03/02 15:06:00 23,558,407
End: 02/01/02 13:55:30 23,634,462

Calculation results
Total time elapsed: 2,501,730 Seconds
Total energy consumed: 76,055 Kilowatt-hours
Average demand: 109,459 Watts

The average demand is not something difficult to find, as seen above, but the

problem for using this in load flow calculations is that the corresponding power factor

must be found. Power factor, as mentioned earlier, is not a quantity that is recorded by

most meters. The high-voltage or high-demand meters that record power factor exists

mainly in utilities’ installations or very large loads, while medium-sized loads often

record only the worst-case power factor for the purpose of billing, which is not useful

when it comes to finding the average power factor.

 23

2.3 LOSSES WITH NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES PRESENT

Non-technical losses are difficult to quantify. They refer to losses that occur

independently of technical losses in the power system. Two easy examples of sources of

such losses are component breakdowns that drastically increase losses before they are

replaced in time, and electricity theft. Losses incurred by equipment breakdown are quite

rare. These include losses from equipment struck by lightning, equipment damaged by

time, the elements and neglect. Most power companies do not allow equipment to

breakdown in such a way and virtually all companies maintain some form of maintenance

policies. Equipment failures due to natural abuses like snow and wind are also rare, for

equipment is selected and infrastructure designed with local weather and natural

phenomena considered.

Non-technical losses can also be viewed as undetected load; customers that the

utilities don’t know exist. When an undetected load is attached to the system, the actual

losses increase while the losses expected by the utilities will remain the same. The

increased losses will show on the utilities’ accounts, and the costs will be passed along to

the customers as transmission and distribution charges. In a simulation discussed below,

an NTL load is added to the load at bus 2, the load that exhibits patterns similar to a

housing load, as implied by the hours that load activities increase and decrease. The

reason this load is chosen is that most NTL cases in reality are found in residential areas

or light industrial areas [2], [5], [6], [7].

 24

From the technical loss analysis above, the effects of an undetected load attached

to one of the buses in the two-bus test system can be measured by adding extra demand

values to one of the loads and evaluating the changed losses. The extra load may be

simulated in a simplistic way by adding a profile of demands to the bus 2 load in the form

of adding VA values to the original demand and reducing the total power factors by

subtracting a power factor “contribution” for each value of added load. The pf

contributions chosen here were negative because the NTL load is assumed to be

inductive, i.e., motors or light fixtures. The profile of the added NTL and the total load

and the pf contribution to the load pf at bus 2 are shown in Figure 2.8 below. The

simulation is run with bus 2 as the slack bus. The NTL pf contribution is negative at all

times because the NTL load is assumed to be inductive.

After the simulation was completed and evaluated, some notable results were

evident. First, the increase in load demand and the increase in transmission losses were

not at the same levels. This is caused by the power factor contribution of the NTL load.

Indeed, the losses increased at a greater rate than the loads. On average, the load VA

increased by about 12.67 KVA, or about 7.9 per cent, while the losses had an average

increase of 23.39 per cent. The average loss here is computed by averaging the overall

loss increase for each hour.

It can be seen from Figure 2.9 below that the increase in demand caused by NTL

would also increase transmission line loss disproportionately. Even though the increase in
 25

transmission loss places a greater burden on the transmission equipment, the greater

cause for concern would be the NTL load itself. During a 24-hour period, the increase in

transmission losses amounts to about 771 kilowatt-hours a day, or about $38.59. The

costs of the NTL itself during the same time period is much higher at 675,953 KW-h a

day, or $ 33,797 a day.

(a) NTL Contribution to Load 2 of the Test System

400000
350000
300000
Demand, VA

250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
10:00

12:00

14:00

16:00

18:00

20:00

22:00
0:00

2:00

4:00

6:00

8:00

Tim e, Hrs.

Load 2 Demand, VA NTL Demand, VA

(b) Negative power factor Contributions by NTL

0:00 2:00 4:00 6:00 8:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
0
Contributions

-0.005
Negative pf

-0.01

-0.015

-0.02

Time, Hrs.

Figure 2.8 – Demand and Power Factor Changes at Load 2 Caused by Non-Technical
Losses
 26

(a) Effects of NTL on Loads and Losses

50
45
40
35
Increase, %

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
10:00

11:00
12:00

13:00
14:00

15:00
16:00

17:00

18:00
19:00

20:00
21:00

22:00
23:00
0:00
1:00

2:00
3:00

4:00
5:00

6:00

7:00
8:00

9:00

Time, Hrs.

Increase in Transmission Losses Due to NTL Increase in Load Due to NTL

(b) Effects of NTL on Transmission Line Losses

350

300

250
Losses, Watts

200

150

100

50

0
10:00
11:00

12:00
13:00
14:00
15:00

16:00
17:00
18:00
19:00

20:00
21:00
22:00
23:00
0:00
1:00
2:00
3:00
4:00
5:00
6:00
7:00

8:00
9:00

Time, Hrs.

Losses without NTL Losses with NTL

Figure 2.9 – Effects of NTL on Transmission Line Losses.

 27

The transmission line losses are very small compared to the loads themselves, but

the increased losses should not be ignored because they mean power dissipated in the

transmission lines as heat. When the lines get overheated, serious consequences can

follow, from loss of material strength to the weakening of insulation – possibly dangerous

if the lines are in a crowded area.

The most noticeable effects of NTL, of course, are the monetary costs. In the

simulation results above, the load at bus 2 amounts to about $ 503,604 a day and the NTL

costs the utilities about $ 33,797 a day. The transmission costs due to the NTL, about $

38.59 a day, are just the transmission costs for the two kilometers of transmission lines

used in the simulation. In reality, the transmission costs would be similarly increased all

along the supply path back to the power plant, which could mean a very significant

increase depending on the distance. Table 2.2 below provides a summary of the results

obtained by the simulation of the two-bus system and the effects of NTL.

Note that once the NTL itself is taken into account, the discrepancy caused by

using average power to compute transmission losses becomes small, $4 out of nearly

$34,000. This is one of the reasons that the utility departments that work on electricity

theft interviewed for this research did not seem interested in using load-flow software.
 28

Table 2.2 – Summary of Effects of Adding NTL to the Two-Bus Test System
Total daily losses Computed for each Computed using
hour in the load profile average demands & pf
Transmission losses without NTL, 6,439.98 4,466.70
KWH
Transmission losses with NTL, 7,211.57 5,169.48
KWH
Load demand at bus 2 without 10,061,280 10,061,280
NTL, KWH
Load demand at bus 2 with NTL, 10,737,230 10,737,230
KWH
Total increased losses, KWH 676,721.59 676,652.78
(increased load plus increased
transmission loss)
Total increased losses, $ 33,836 33,832

The last issue to be addressed in this section is who pays for the NTL costs. The

transmission and distribution costs in the United States are calculated as part of the

customers’ bills, while in Thailand the customers are usually charged a single flat energy

rate that includes all services. The US utilities have to “un-bundle” the charges because

widespread deregulation in various states has made the generation and distribution

companies split into separate entities [12].

This means that in the US, the transmission and distribution losses that increased

due to NTL would be charged either to the existing customer whose power lines are

illegally tapped, or the utility, depending on the method of theft (see Chapter 3 for

details). Who pays for the NTL loads depends on how the NTL loads are connected to the

power system. If the NTL loads are connected to the system’s transmission lines before

they reach the customers’ meters, the utilities will assume the costs of the NTL loads.

However, if the NTL loads are connected at a point beyond innocent customers’ meters,
 29

the customers will be stuck with the transmission costs and, more seriously, the increased

loads. In Chapter 3, there are lists of various types of electricity theft that include both

types of NTL described in the paragraph above.

In conclusion, the measurement of NTL and its effects on electrical power

systems as a whole using existing analytical tools would be possible only if information

about the NTL loads themselves is available to the analyst. The information would have

to include either the NTL loads’ power consumption profile comparable to the legitimate

loads being analyzed at the same time, as well as the NTL power factor, or power factor

contribution as in the case shown above. In interviews with experienced engineers,

technicians, and utilities officials mentioned in the acknowledgement, it is their opinion

that NTL cases cannot be directly measured because of the information gathering effort

required. After all, the people who make illegal connections to the power system are

unlikely to participate in any form of survey freely when their own illegal actions would

come to light.
 30

CHAPTER 3

ELECTRICITY THEFT:

A MAJOR COMPONENT OF NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES

3.1 BRIEF BACKGROUND ON ELECTRICITY THEFT

As shown in Chapter 2, non-technical losses (NTL) are difficult – if not

impossible – to detect using information that is typically collected by utility companies.

In some areas, the loads are not even metered or are metered communally [2], rendering

any loss calculations – technical or not – for that area useless. The approach used by both

utility companies contacted [2], [5], [6] involves primarily involves field staff monitoring

meters and access points in the system on a regular basis (see Chapter 4 for more details).

Sometimes this involves regular meter readers receiving special training for spotting

irregularities, and sometimes – when high voltage and large consumption is involved – it

involves meter technicians making dedicated meter and transformer inspection trips (see

Chapter 4).

The reason that meter inspection is the main method of NTL detection is because

the utilities consider electricity theft to be the major source of NTL and the majority of

electricity theft cases involves meter tampering or meter destruction [2], [5], [6]. The

term “meter” used in this and other chapters refers to the watt-hour recording meters used

in virtually every household to record and calculate electric bills by utility companies.
 31

The principles of operation for watt-hour meters essentially have not changed

since the 1880s and the 1890s, when the watt-hour meter was invented [3]. The basic

principle for a single-phase energy measurement meter, first commercially used in 1894,

is as follows. First, there are two coils that produce electromagnetic fluxes: a coil,

connected across the two leads, that produces a flux proportional to the voltage and a coil

connected in series with one of the leads that produces a flux proportional to the current.

The dot product of those two fluxes creates a force proportional to the load power. An

illustration of the basic components of the watt-hour meter is shown in Figure 3.1 below.

The development of these meters, technological improvements, and alternative designs,

which reflected the growing power industry in the late 19th century, is chronicled in detail

in [3].

In early designs, such as the ones shown in Figure 3.2 below, the meters were not

enclosed and all the parts and the meter installation were easily accessible to anyone.

However, as early as 1899, the minutes of meter committees of the Association of Edison

Illuminating Companies [meter paper] showed that electricity theft was a concern early

on. In response to the committees’ recommendations, the following improvements –

along with other efficiency and accuracy improvements – were added [3]:

“First, a dust- and insect-proof cover

“Second, a cover and frame so shaped and retained together
as to render dishonest and curious tampering with the internal
mechanism as nearly impossible as may be.
“Third, means for fully protecting from malicious tampering
the heads of all screws in the base which bind the damping
magnets, etc., in place without rendering them inaccessible to
those authorized to reach them.”
 32

Figure 3.1 – Basic Components of a Watt-hour Meter.

Clockwise from top left: coil connections for voltage and current sensing elements, the
rotating disc that records consumption, and the basic construction.
(Source: Bud Russell, http://www.themeterguy.com/Theory/watthour_meter.htm, 2002)

This suggests that the problem of electricity theft has obviously been around almost as

long as power systems have been around. Modern meters, such as those in Figures 3.3

below, are relatively well enclosed and have seals that would reveal tampering. However,

theft can and does occur. Most utilities train their staff to spot tampering, but sometimes

the access to the inner mechanisms can be achieved with a very small hole, possibly

drilled using small tools and done at less obvious parts of the enclosure [7].
 33

Figure 3.2 – Early recording meters: Sangamo Gutmann type A (c. 1899-1901) watt-hour
meter, left, and Westinghouse ampere-hour meter by Shallenberger (c. 1888-1897), right
(Source: David Dahle, www.watthourmeter.com, 2002)

Figure 3.3 – Modern recording meters: Schlumberger J5S (1984), and General Electric I-
70S (1968) (Source: David Dahle, www.watthourmeter.com, 2002)
 34

3.2 METHODS OF ELECTRICITY THEFT

There are two main categories for methods of electricity theft: directly connecting

an unregistered load to a power line, and tampering with a registered load’s meter in

order to reduce the size of the bill the utility charges that load. Once the meter seals are

broken, there are many things that can be done to the meter to slow or stop it. Below is a

list of various methods of electricity theft recorded by the Provincial Energy Authority of

Thailand (PEA) [6], [7].

High Voltage Meters (12kV or 24kV, 3-phase, 3 or 4-wire primary)

High voltage three-phase watt-hour meters are installed throughout the PEA

system to monitor loads that consume high volumes of energy requiring high voltage.

Three-phase watt-hour meters use the technique known as the “two watt-hour meters”

connection to measure consumption. Because the load is connected with high voltage and

consumes high current levels, the current and voltage sensing are achieved by using

current transformers (CT)6 and voltage taps, respectively. The schematic that illustrates

the connections is shown in Figure 3.4 below.

6
A current transformer is a device that outputs a current proportional to the load current being measured,
enabling the meter to measure the load without subjecting it to large current and power levels.
 35

Current
Transformers
(CT)
3-phase
Load

Incoming
Connection

Voltage Taps

Figure 3.4 – Three-phase Watt-hour Meter Connection.

(Source: Bud Russell, http://www.themeterguy.com/Theory/watthour_meter.htm, 2002)

Tampering with terminal seals is by far the most common method of meter

violations, because the terminal seals are easy to reach, located immediately below the

meter itself. Once the terminals were broken, it is be simple to connect one of the control

wires or CT wires to ground, making it appear to the meter that at lease one phase does

not show voltage or current. The cases of seal tampering, both terminal and meter seals,

refer to cases where seals were broken but no visible tampering was done to the meters or

the terminals themselves.

Breaking control wires Control wires refer to the secondary wires of the current

transformer (CT). Meters for large loads measure high currents and must use CTs to step

the current level down to make it compatible with the components in the meter. Once the
 36

insulation of the control wire is broken, external taps could be connected to reduce the

current going into the meter, causing the meter to read less current than reality.

Tampering with meter seals is another common form of violation, tampering with

meter seals means the person now has access to the meter itself. There are many ways to

tamper with meters that will be discussed later.

Shorting control wires Like breaking control wires, this would divert the current

reading in the meter. In this case the current going to the meter would be zero. The effect

on the meter is immediate and obvious: with zero-current, the power and energy readings

become zero, or the accumulated consumption becomes stationary.

Breaking the voltage taps Voltage taps in the meter housing allows the meter to

read the voltage of the load. Once these are broken (or shorted to ground, or have another

line connected to it), the reading the meter gets is distorted from reality, reading a lower

voltage in cases of electricity theft. In the unlikely event that the person wants the meter

to read higher values, the voltage taps could be connected to a higher voltage level, and

result in higher consumption readings. Many meters would not work properly or would

be damaged by this type of action, because the internal equipment must operate within

rated conditions in order to function properly.

 37

Direct connections to the grid An obvious way to eliminate consumption records

is to bypass the meter altogether. The major obstacle to this is that most high voltage

loads are built and connected at the request of the customers, such as a new shopping

mall asking for 12-kV lines to run to the back of the property to keep the front clear.

Since the customers are the ones who ask for the connections, direct connections like this

would be fairly easy to discover. Also, not many electricians would like to subject

themselves to a “hot” high voltage line without the power company there to assist with

safety.

Tampering with the meter Once the meter seals are broken and there’s easy access

to the meter inside the housing, and there are several things that can be done to slow or

stop the meter readings. A common way is to mechanically obstruct the spinning disc and

the axis that does the recording. Another popular action is to turn back the dials that bill

collectors eventually read. Obviously this wouldn’t work for digital-display meters, but

all of the PEA-installed meters in Thailand are spinning disc type manufactured in the

1980s or before.

Switching CT wires This is a subtle and effective way to reduce electric bills.

Many models of three-phase meters use only two current transformers (CTs) to read

current data from phases A and B, and assume the load is balanced between all three

phases. In reality, large facilities like factories or offices have unbalanced loads.

Depending on the engineer who designed the load connections, this imbalance could vary
 38

between 10 and 20 percent of the most heavily loaded phase. C phase is almost always

the phase with the least load and lowest power factor, which is why CTs are connected to

the A and B phases. By switching the CTs or the wires from their secondary windings,

the meter’s current reading is altered. Switching A and B phases would result in a

reversal of phase difference seen by the meter, affecting the power factor reading, and

power/energy reading. If the CT from one of the phases is removed and placed on phase

C, the power reading is lowered.

Low Voltage Meters (220V single phase)

A low voltage watt-hour meter is based on the principles of operation discussed in

the beginning of the chapter. The parts of the meter where tampering often occur are

shown in Figure 3.5 below.

Voltage
Sensing
Element Tampering
with the
Neutral Line

Disrupting
Current
Spinning Disc
Sensing
Element

Figure 3.5 – Parts of a Single-phase Watt-hour Meter Where Tampering Often Occur.
(Source: Bud Russell, http://www.themeterguy.com/Theory/watthour_meter.htm, 2002)
 39

Direct connection to the power grid Since the meters and equipment in this

section are in the 220-volt system, where customers are mostly houses and small

businesses, a direct connection to the power grid is much easier than the high-voltage

system. Well, at least safer; a pair of rubber gloves could be all the necessary protection

and a ladder and knife all the necessary tools, as opposed to climbing up HV lines five

stories up on steel masts and being careful not to get tangled in other cables below or

inadvertent electrocution. This is by far the most common method here, used a lot by

street vendors and shantytowns. In fact, some of this writer’s temporary neighbors on a

construction site in Bangkok, Thailand do this.

Using alternate neutral lines The single-phase system often has only one wire

going into a house, the “hot” line. Neutral is usually grounded (electrically connected to

the earth) and is sometimes provided by the foundation of the house (or “location”, to be

more generic). So if a person could manage to use a small transformer and use that as the

“neutral”, the meter that uses the very same neutral source would read the incoming

voltage lower than it really is, resulting in a reduced unit count.

Phase-to-phase connection is similar to using an alternate neutral line, except that

the system voltage becomes the phase-to-phase voltage, at 240 or 380 volts, depending

on the location (240 volts for the United States).

 40

Meter tampering/breaking seal is basically the same thing that happens to the HV

meters, since PEA uses meters that are quite aged for the low-voltage consumers, too.

Other methods of electricity theft include: tapping off a nearby paying consumer,

damage done to meter enclosures, and using magnets to slow down the spinning discs in

the meter housing.

There are also many other methods for stealing electricity that have been

circulated on the Internet recently. Some of the suggested methods are not feasible, while

others may require too much effort or are outright dangerous [7]. This author has found

some Internet message boards full of possible methods to distort billing information at

the consumer end, such as using a “Tron Box” – a circuit to change the phase of one of

the leads passing through the meter [7].

Methods suggested in chat rooms even include some highly far flung ideas, such

as placing enormous coils around high voltage power lines to act as transformers with

ridiculously large air gaps [4]. Interestingly, these message boards were also used by

some utilities to detect electricity theft perpetrators and track them to see if any of the

individuals fall within their areas of coverage, in effect, operating an online sting

operation7.

7
International Utilities Revenue Protection Association (IURPA), www.iurpa.org, 2002.
41
 42

CHAPTER 4

PAST DOCUMENTATION OF NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES

Cases of non-technical losses (NTL) are acknowledged and dealt with by all of

the local utilities officials and international institutions contacted for this research. These

include: Thailand’s Provincial Energy Authority and Metropolitan Energy Authority

(PEA and MEA, respectively); USA’s American Electric Power (AEP); and the World

Bank.

Utility companies with transmission and distribution (T&D) operations that were

contacted by the author were all engaged in some form of NTL reduction policy. PEA has

a set of guidelines to prevent and respond to electricity theft that will be discussed in

further detail. AEP has a Revenue Protection department dedicated to recovering lost

revenues due to electricity theft. The World Bank is involved in infrastructure

development in many countries, which bring them in direct contact with utilities and NTL

in local service areas. A summary of the World Bank’s experience with NTL in Eastern

European and former Soviet Union countries in the 1990s will be provided. Finally, an

international organization, IURPA [7], focused on detecting, preventing, and reducing

NTL has been established with representatives from utilities around the world.
 43

4.1 PROVINCIAL ENERGY AUTHORITY OF THAILAND

The Provincial Energy Authority of Thailand (PEA) is the government-owned

utility company that provides electricity to consumers in every area of Thailand except

for Bangkok and its suburbs, which are serviced by the Metropolitan Energy Authority

(MEA). Virtually all of PEA’s electricity is bought wholesale from the Energy

Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT), another government-controlled entity. A very

small amount of electricity is sold to PEA and other consumers by local generators

located in a few industrial complexes; their effects on the PEA power system is negligible

because these local generators distribute power over very short power lines that seldom

extend beyond the industrial parks that they occupy [5], [6].

Since the companies that handle virtually all the electricity generation and

distribution in the country are government-owned, the electricity industry can be easily

described as fully regulated. Electricity rates for various regions are determined by a

board of appointed directors for each of the distribution utilities (MEA and PEA). Their

prices, in turn, are almost exclusively influenced by the supply rates governed by EGAT.

With Thailand being a net importer of crude oil – the fuel of choice for starting most

generators, as well as the primary fuel for some generation – the prices of crude oil often

plays a big part in EGAT’s pricing policies. In contrast, the coal and natural gas mines

are operated by other government entities, and hydroelectric dams are controlled by

EGAT.
 44

The various energy sources constitute the majority of factors that govern the price

of electricity, and all of the entities controlling the sources have political and economic

considerations unique to their own organizations. For example, the hydroelectric facilities

are constantly negotiating deals with the Department of Agriculture, which operate the

reservoirs, while refineries owned by other government and private entities can alter oil

and natural gas prices based on their own agendas and situations.

The PEA determines its prices at board-of-directors meetings, where the prices of

PEA’s suppliers are the chief concern. The prices are also partly based on reports from

the Power Economics Division, the primary source of information for this research. And

the Power Economics Division is also the collection center for all the statistical

information regarding consumer billing and payments to suppliers.

In the period from October 1999 to September 2000, PEA had a total of

11,399,150 individual paying consumers, sold 53,034 Gigawatt-hours of energy, and

earned 120,811 million baht (about US$ 2,730 million, by today’s exchange rates)

[5],[6]. The price of electricity averaged around 5.15 cents per Kilowatt-hour, nearly the

same per-unit price as American Electric Power’s residential prices in Athens, Ohio, in

January 20028.

8
AEP prices can be found on monthly statements to consumers, or at www.aep.com.
 45

The various types of consumers serviced by PEA include businesses of various

sizes, houses, temporary loads such as construction, agricultural irrigation loads that

include special releases of water from the dams, governmental and subsidized loads and

back-up energy sales to clients of other providers in cases of outages. A detailed

breakdown of number of consumers and consumption levels is shown in Figures 4.1 and

4.2 on the next page. It is worth noting that, in October 2000, businesses and industries

constituted about 7 per cent of the individual consumers, but consumed nearly three-

quarters of the energy sold by PEA.

SERVICE REGIONS AND SECTORS

PEA services include transmission and distribution [5] to all provinces and areas

in Thailand not including the area covered by the Metropolitan Energy Authority (MEA),

which is the province of Bangkok. This means PEA covers most of Thailand’s areas,

serving a total of 11,479,555 individual metered customers, including residential areas,

businesses, government installations, irrigation facilities, and temporary and back-up

loads. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below illustrate the breakdowns of PEA customers sorted by

consumption shares and customer types, respectively.

 46

Agricultural Temporary Loads

Irrigations 1%
Backup Energy Sales
under 1%
under 1%
Government and
Subsidized Homes, under 150
4% KWh.
11%
Homes, over 150
Special Businesses
Kwh.
3%
12%

Small Businesses
Large Businesses 8%
42%

Medium Businesses
19%

Figure 4.1 - Breakdown of PEA Consumers Sorted by Energy Consumption,

October 2000 (source: PEA, Internal Quarterly Report, 2000)
Government and
Large Businesses Subsidized Agricultural Irrigations Temporary Loads
under 1 % under 1% under 1% under 1%
Medium Businesses
under 1% Backup Energy Sales
Special Businesses under 1%
under 1%

Small Businesses
5%

Homes, over 150 Kwh.

20%

Homes, under 150

KWh.
73%

Figure 4.2 - Breakdown of PEA Consumers Sorted by Numbers of Individual Consumers,

October 2000 (source: PEA, Internal Quarterly Report, 2000)
 47

PROVINCIAL ENERGY AUTHORITY OF THAILAND:

PROCEDURES REGARDING ELECTRICITY THEFT

The Provincial Energy Authority of Thailand (PEA) is the state enterprise that is

responsible for providing electric utility services for end users of all sizes in provincial

Thailand. The area of service includes 72 provinces of Thailand, excluding Bangkok and

a few suburbs. Its customers include: low-voltage loads such as housing, small and

medium businesses, and small industrial sites; high-voltage loads such as large

businesses, office complexes, large industrial sites, industrial parks, large housing

communities, and government installations.

According to internal reports [5],[6], discovered incidents of meter violation – a

key indicator of NTL – remains relatively low. Between October 2000 and June 2001, a

total of 130 violations were found on high-voltage meters, and 2167 cases were found on

low-voltage meters. This number is very small compared to 11,399,150 total registered

users. Of course, this is a misleading presentation; registered users would not include

people who tap directly to the grid without meters. Some cases of violations may have

gone unnoticed, because inspection methods may not be sufficiently effective.

The PEA has a set of targets and schedules for inspecting meters. An inspection

team for high-voltage meters was observed for this research twice in July 2001; the team

includes inspectors from the central offices in Bangkok and drivers and local officials of

the PEA who are familiar with local sites and consumers. The local officials usually are
 48

selected from the group of people who conduct inspections for transformers installed for

customers, which are invariably located near the meters that are the targets of inspection.

METER INSPECTION PROTOCOLS

PEA has set guidelines and policies for dealing with electricity theft, as shown in

Table 4.1 below. Table 4.2 below shows the inspection schedules for the group

responsible for inspecting high-voltage (HV: 115 KV, 69 KV, 24 KV, and 12 KV) and

low-voltage (LV: loads with 380 V line-to-line) meters. The number of 220 V meters is

too great to make a dedicated inspection effort, so the inspection workload for those

meters goes to the unit-readers who are also trained to detect improprieties (see Chapter

3). Table 4.3 shows the regular schedule for reporting and deadlines for analyzing the

data on electricity theft collected in the field.

Table 4.1 - PEA Policies for Billing Customers Who Perpetrated Electricity Theft
(Source: PEA internal memorandum, June 2001)

Billing Services Target Timeframes

1.) Billing for fines, revised rates, and
meter depreciation for large consumers
2.) Billing for fines, revised rates, and
meter depreciation for small consumers
1.) Within 7 office days of receiving results
from the Evidence Department, the fines
are sent out. Revised rates and depreciation
bills are sent out within 15 office days.
2.) The revised rates and fines are both sent
out within 7 days of the reports of damaged
meters.
3.) If the fines and bills in items 1 & 2 do
not elicit any response from the consumer
within 3 months, the case is summarized
and sent on to the legal department of the
respective district office.

Table 4.2 - Meter Inspection Protocols and Schedules for PEA (Source: PEA internal
memorandum, June 2001)
Item
1.) Regular Inspections
1.1) 69 KV and 115 KV meters
1.2) HV and LV meters with CTs
1.3) LV meters
2.) Inspections of large customers with
violation records and customers in
“high risk” businesses such as ice
factories, hotels, etc.
3.) Inspections for large customers that
are recently installed/changed
4.) Large customers with irregularities
4.1) Checking and isolating cases with
irregular consumption or irregular
behaviors for future meter checks
4.2) Checking for irregular
consumption
5.) Checking small consumers with 0
unit readings
49
Goal/Schedule
1.1) All meters inspected twice a year
1.2) All meters inspected once a year
1.3) Each year, at least 50% of all
meters in each district will be
inspected
2.) PEA’s task forces will compile a list
and inspect all meters in these groups once
a quarter.
3.) All cases will be inspected within 30
days of the installation/change
4.1) The comptroller reviews consumption
and separate the irregularities within 15
days of meter readings
4.2) – Consumers with irregularities and
usage over one million baht
($25,000) a month will be checked
immediately
– Low voltage meters are to be
checked within 15 days of the
request for checks
– High voltage meters are to be
checked within 30 days
5.) – A list of consumers with 3
consecutive months of 0 unit
readings is compiled each trimester
– Within the following trimester, the
meters will be checked and the
reasons for the 0 unit reading would
be reported
 50

Table 4.3 - PEA Guidelines and Schedules for Reporting Meter Inspection Results
(Source: PEA, internal memorandum, June 2001)

Operations and Results Report Due Dates

1. PEA operations:
1.1 Reports for routine meter checks 1. Reports of results in items 1.1 through
1.2 Reports for meters with past violations 1.6 are to be submitted to the district
and suspicious business groups offices for each month within the 7th of
1.3 Major consumers with recent meter the following month.
installation/changes
1.4 Results from checking large
consumers with irregularities
1.5 Results from checking meters with
zero unit reading
1.6 Results from fine and revised rates
collections for large and small
consumers

2. Every meter-checking activity results

2. Results reports for each district,
combined with reports from item 1.
and results from fines/revised rates for
each month are to be summarized and
reported to the deputy head of each
district. The deputy heads of districts
then follow up and make necessary
changes in operations, then a report is
submitted for each month to the
Electricity Economy Department by the
15th of the following month.
 51

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF NON-TECHNICAL LOSSES FOR

THE PROVINCIAL ENERGY AUTHORITY OF THAILAND

According to PEA estimates [6], the 127 high-voltage meter violations found

between October 2000 and June 2001 resulted in the recovery of 4,904,021.45 units lost,

or about $245,000. The low-voltage meter violations in the same time period added up to

about $155,000 in lost revenues. These numbers reflect only the cost of producing the

stolen energy without taking into account the cost of equipment damage and payments

for the staff charged with detecting these thefts. These numbers also do not reflect energy

lost due to undetected theft. Details of electricity theft are shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5

below.

Table 4.4 - Meter Tampering Found Among High Voltage Consumers in Thailand
Between October 2000 and June 2001.
(Source: PEA, internal memorandum, June 2001)

High Voltage Consumers (Oct. ’00 – Jun ’01)

Violation Type Cases Found
Tampering with terminal seals 69
Breaking control wires 12
Tampering with meter seals 30
Shorting control wires 5
Breaking the voltage taps 5
Direct connections to grid 3
Tampering with the meter 2
Switching control wires 3
Total 127
 52

Table 4.5 - Meter Tampering Found Among Low Voltage Consumers in Thailand
Between October 2000 and June 2001.
(Source: PEA, internal memorandum, June 2001)

Low Voltage Consumers (Oct. ’00 – Jun. ’01)

Violation Type Cases Found
Direct connections to grid 677
Using alternative neutral lines 541
Phase-to-phase connections 270
Meter tampering/ breaking meter seals 270
Other 409
Total 2,167

The total amount of estimated recovered loss due to electricity theft in the period

between October 2000 and June 2001, about 8 million units [6], is very small compared

to the total losses of the system. The total losses of the PEA system is characterized by

subtracting the energy generated and purchased (system input) with the energy sold and

provided to some consumers without charge (system output), and the total losses amounts

to about 2.5 billion units, approximately 5.69 per cents of the system input. This means

the electricity theft found only accounts for about 0.32 per cent of the system losses, or

about 0.018 per cent of the system’s energy input.

Though the NTL energy costs recovered seem to make up an insignificant

proportion of the system or even the total system losses, interviews with members of the

PEA inspection team observed for this research revealed that there are undoubtedly some

undiscovered cases of electricity theft. The undiscovered cases may be more or less than

the recovered costs. Also, the recovered costs only include the stolen energy. Other
 53

related costs that were not mentioned were maintenance costs, equipment damages, labor

costs, and the administrative costs for pursuing electricity theft cases.

4.2 AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER (AEP)

AEP is a utility company that services a large area in the USA, covering nearly

200,000 square miles spanning eleven states. AEP is the largest investor owned utility in

the United States9. At AEP, the Revenue Protection department is directly responsible for

personnel training, receiving information on electricity theft from customers and staff,

analyze consumer load profiles for drastic changes compared to past trends, assessing

charges for electricity theft and equipment tampering, and – if necessary – prosecute

clients who endanger themselves or AEP field staff.

The main source of information AEP uses to detect and prevent electricity theft is

the meter reading staff, which is routinely trained by the Revenue Protection Department

to detect tampering with AEP equipment. According to Mr. Bill Daniel, manager of the

Revenue Protection program, AEP had revenue protection-related billings exceeding $

3.2 million annually. In the 2001 annual report available on the AEP website, AEP sold

over $41 billion worth of electricity – and bought over $37 billion – in the year ending

December 31, 2001. Interestingly, the same report lists $109 million under “allowance

for uncollectible accounts”.

9
American Electric Power, www.aep.com, 2002.
 54

The charges that constitute these billings include lost energy, tampering fees,

investigation fees, and interest. Customers are prosecuted under the following

circumstances:

1) the customer threatens (implied or actual) an AEP employee

2) repeat offenders

3) professionals who tamper with another’s meter for a fee

4) if law enforcement is already involved

5) the customer accesses any high voltage compartments or equipment (2.4 kV

or above)

6) the customer climbs or accesses a pole with the intent to steal electricity.

It should be noted again that the main sources of information regarding electricity

are field employees and trend analysis of customer load profiles. In his correspondence

with the author, Mr. Daniel stated that, regarding using power system analysis software

for detecting electricity theft, AEP has “a large number of unmetered (flat rate)

installations that would render the resulting calculations unusable.”10

In addition to AEP, a search for the phrase “electricity theft” on any search engine

on the Internet would yield information sites posted by utilities companies all over the

world.

10
Quoted from an electronic mail correspondence with Mr. Daniel from AEP, May 2002.
 55

4.3 WORLD BANK – EASTERN EUROPE AND FORMER SOVIET UNION

The World Bank provides financial assistance to public utilities in many

developing countries, including countries in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern

Europe. The World Bank studied NTL in these areas in an effort to increase the

efficiency and profitability for local utilities. The results of the World Bank’s studies are

the sources of the summary below.

In a 1999 publication [2], the World Bank Energy Sector Unit reported on non-

payment in the electrical sector in various countries in Eastern Europe and the FSU

nations. The study covered various time spans for different countries ranging from 1992

to 1998. The main stated reason for the significant – in some places very large – amount

of non-payment, is the political and economic turmoil caused by the collapse of

communism and the response of the governments and the public to those changes.

The extent of the non-payment problem varies from country to country, and the

cause of the problem also varies. For example, countries with large natural energy

resources such as Russia and Ukraine continue to have problems collecting from

consumers, while countries that are dependent on energy imports have greater incentives

to solve the problem of non-payment. Household consumers are the main area of concern

in Albania, Georgia, and Armenia, while industrial consumers are the bigger problem in

Russia and Ukraine. An interesting type of non-payment is the use of cash substitutes that
 56

can’t be converted to liquid assets by the utilities, which is a problem seen in Russia,

Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. The dimensions of the non-payment problem in these

countries are illustrated in Table 4.6 below.

IMPACTS

Large-scale non-payment by consumers has led to enormous consequences both at

the micro and macroeconomic level [2]. Payment default at the consumer end resulted in

transmission and distribution companies defaulting on their dues to the generating

companies, which in turn accumulate unpaid debts to energy suppliers, banks, and

employees. In some cases, the inability to pay for energy has led to rationing, such as

Georgia, which had only a few hours of electricity supply each day in 1995 [2], or

Armenia, which had supply for only two hours a day because its gas utility could not

settle debt with Turkmenistan suppliers.

 57

Table 4.6 - Extent of the Electric Utility Non-Payment Problem in Eastern Europe and
Former Soviet Union Nations (Source: World Bank Energy Sector Unit, Non-Payment in
the Electricity Sector in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1999)

Country Year Collection as % Cash as

of billings % of collections
Albania 1997 58 97
Armenia 1992 – 1995 30 25
1996 65 60
1997 62 64
Bulgaria 1992 75 100
1997 91 100
Georgia 1996 57 --
1997 (Grid Co. Level) 70 37
1997 (Distribution Co. Level) 68 36
Hungary 1992 85 100
1997 96 100
Poland 1994 90 100
Lithuania 1993 87 100
1997 96 100
Russia 1996 70 16
1998 84 17.6
Ukraine 1994 83 --
1996 86 20
1997 91 18

In Russia, the utilities owe the government significant sums in taxes, while it is

estimated that the government owed even more for energy supplies. This situation created

a vicious cycle that resulted in Russian utilities being unable to pay for fuel supplies and

maintenance. Many large consumers also bartered or provided other cash substitutes for

electricity, forcing the utilities to do the same for fuel, resulting in inflated fuel prices

paid by utilities. This coupled with a drop in demand, ultimately led to a steep drop in

electricity generation utilization, the ratio of actual generation to total generation

 58

capacity, in Russia as well as other FSU nations with similar problems, shown in Table

4.7 below.

Table 4.7 - Capacity Utilization in the Power Sector of FSU

(Source: World Bank Energy Sector Unit, Non-Payment in the Electricity Sector in
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1999)

Country Capacity (GW) Utilization %, 1990 Utilization %, 1994

Russia 205.6 60.1 46.9
Ukraine 16.9 62.8 42.8
Lithuania 5.1 59.0 46.7
Georgia 5.1 63.6 31.8
Armenia 3.8 31.2 17.1

CAUSAL FACTORS

Many factors contributed to the emergence of non-payment in the power sector in

Eastern Europe and FSU. The causes that were listed in [2] as the main causes of the

problems include: effects of stabilization measures after regime changes in most of the

countries; the inability of the utilities to disconnect supplies for non-payment;

unsustainable subsidies installed by governments; tax laws and their enforcement; poor

corporate governance; tensions between federal and local agencies; and the concept of

property rights.

The non-payment problem emerged and grew to serious proportions at the same

time as the region-wide governmental, political and economic changes took place. The

political and economic changes resulted in economic collapse or severe contraction in

 59

many countries [2], [9]. Governments had to implement stabilization measures to

complete the transition period, with the following results:

• bail out funds for energy enterprises were cut

• government entities could no longer afford the same level of energy consumption

• industrial enterprises lost access to financial support and loans that would have

paid for operating costs, and

• declining incomes, high inflation, high unemployment and rising energy prices

severely eroded the ability of households to pay for energy and heat

Most utilities in the world have one standard remedy for accumulated unpaid

consumer debts: disconnection or reduction of the number of clients. This remedy was,

and probably still is, significantly restricted in the FSU [2], [9]. In Russia, Ukraine and

Georgia in particular, the traditional legal concepts relating to the provision of energy

appear to stand in the way of the utility trying to disconnect supplies for non-payment. In

many countries, governments maintain a number of “strategic” customers that cannot be

disconnected despite continued non-payment. This list of strategic customers is prepared

by the government, and is naturally politicized and abused [2]. In an extreme example

[2], some customers in Albania had threatened to shoot utility officials for attempting to

disconnect power supplies. In most countries, the absence of adequate metering and poor

location of meters effectively prevented any action against theft and non-payment.
 60

Energy companies in the FSU also started the practice of cancellation of mutual

debts and barter trades for energy bills with government and other industries. In many of

these countries, taxes were based on cash accounting, giving these energy companies to

accept non-cash payments. Non-cash payments also provides another way for officials to

personally profit, resulting in stagnant cash collection rates in Ukraine and Russia [2] (see

table 4.4).

SOLUTION APPROACHES

Various solutions have been tried by local utilities and governments in Eastern

Europe and the FSU in response to high levels of non-payment in the energy sector.

Listed below are some of the approaches taken at the utility level and at the government

level [2].

Approaches at the Utility Level

• Metering: Adequate metering is essential to prevent electricity theft and non-

payment at the utility level. Meters had been installed at substations, feeders, and

consumer blocks have finally been added to the system in Armenia, Albania and

Georgia.

• Organization of Commercial Functions: Utilities have organized the functions of

meter reading, billing and collection, customer accounting, and follow up. These
 61

functions have been separated to avoid collusion and to enable greater control [2].

The practice of mailing checks or paying in cash at financial facilities instead of

just hading cash to the meter man – long taken for granted elsewhere – were only

beginning to be implemented in the FSU.

• Elimination of Intermediaries: In Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine [2],

utilities widely outsource the meter reading, billing, and collection through

resellers. These resellers are being phased out in most areas because of past

records of indiscipline.

• Incentive Mechanisms for Utility Staff: In some cases where the utility staff have

more incentives to be dishonest, the companies have developed payment schemes

to reward good performance in bill collection.

• Working with Large Consumers: As in the case with Bulgaria, the largest

consumers were seen as business partners as well as customers by the utilities,

which developed payment schedules to suit the customers to ensure payment.

• Price Discounts: In addition to regular discounts, some utilities have offered

longer supply durations or guaranteed supplies for customers who were willing to

pay in advance. A Russian utility has tried offering discounts for customers who

are willing to pay cash.

 62

Approaches at the Government Level

• Broader Focus for Stabilization: In this respect, the World Bank observed that

most of the FSU and Eastern Europe, at the time of the report, were still focusing

on macroeconomic stability measures while neglecting some serious damages

done to certain sectors such as energy [2]. The World Bank then went on to urge

governments to reduce subsidies and implement effective privatization to stabilize

and organize the energy market.

• Legal Framework and Exit Policies and Practices: The World Bank pointed out in

[2] that most nations covered in the report seriously lacked legal frameworks and

law enforcement infrastructure to change the legal concepts of property, property

rights, financial laws and regulations, and enterprise laws, as well as banking and

trade reforms. This financial chaos is cited as a major reason of the continuation

of non-payment problems throughout the region. In both the context of legal

frameworks and governmental economic policies, most countries were considered

to be in the beginning stages of reforms by the World Bank, with some exceptions

[2].

• Approach to Non-Cash Settlements: Governments were encouraged, sometimes

demanded as loan provisions, by the World Bank to discourage non-cash

settlements of debts, taxes, wages, and bills. This requires some law and political

reform to reduce the incentives for using non-cash transactions. Some nations

such as Russia and Armenia have banned non-cash transactions, but taxes based
 63

on cash transactions rather than assets and accruals continue to provide incentives

for non-cash payments [2].

• Approach to Government Budget Entities: Government agencies and departments

were urged by the World Bank to manage their budgets and their energy

consumption, in order to reduce the strain placed on utilities and the power

systems. Lithuania, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, were

cited as successful cases in this area [2].

• Enabling Disconnection of Supply for Default: Legal reform, more clarity in the

current laws for most countries, as well as the enforcement of the rule of law are

required to provide utilities with the option of disconnecting non-paying

customers. Several Eastern European countries, Lithuania, and Kazakhstan have

made progress in this regard [2].

 64

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK

Non-technical losses (NTL) in all forms are very real and significant problems for

utilities companies. The vast majority of detected cases of NTL are caused by electricity

theft. The affected utilities and authorities have developed methods to reduce NTL,

primarily based on detection by utility companies’ meter reading employees and

statistical analysis of customer information.

Despite the best efforts by utilities, the current results of NTL measurements are

often inaccurate at best, because the figures rely heavily on the records of detected cases,

rather than by actual measurement of the electrical power system. The reason that

measurement or monitoring the power system is not the preferred method of measuring

NTL is because the infrastructure of the system, specifically the metering of the system,

makes accurate and detailed loss determination impossible.

Currently, the majority of measurement equipment in electrical power systems

does not facilitate time-varying calculations of system losses, which makes accurate

determination of NTL impossible. In fact, any given power system would have some

loads that are not metered at all, which would affect the outcome in any calculations as

NTL.
 65

The obvious solution to this is to install meters at every billed load and to use

meters that sample load power or voltage values at reasonable intervals. This solution is

nearly impossible to implement in medium or large service areas simply because of the

logistical and economical prices of the meters. Small-scale implementation remains a

possibility because of the lower costs and the added application of real-time pricing.

Meters that can perform the required duties, which includes somehow sending

data to the computing facility, would be much more expensive than the regular kind of

meters currently in use. In some cases where people are already stealing electricity, the

new meters would simply be more valuable targets. The technical difficulties of acquiring

data from countless meters would also make a continuous NTL measurement effort a

Herculean data processing task.

In the end, the utility must decide whether the costs of accurately measuring NTL

be worth the returns in the form of recovering the NTL costs that were not recovered by

the processes already in place. The fact that the departments charged with revenue

recovery at both PEA and AEP do not use any power system loss analysis to aid their

work provides some hint about the companies’ choices.

Some important factors that affect the overall impact and magnitude of NTL are

the political and economic situations in the local areas. In poor and unstable areas, such
 66

as Former Soviet Union nations, NTL cases are so widespread that the operations of

utilities are adversely affected and sometimes continuation of services is jeopardized.

In the end, NTL is a recognized problem that creates costs for utilities in the form

of lost revenues and damaged equipment. In most areas where NTL has not reached

significant dimensions, containment can be achieved by regular inspection and

reasonable enforcement of property rights laws. Other areas where NTL, usually in the

form of non-payment, has reached a significant level, the impact on utilities services and

the overall economy is nontrivial. In such areas, NTL is usually a byproduct of larger

economic and social turbulence. The solutions taken at the utility and local levels are thus

short-term measures to limit the damage.

FUTURE WORK

1.) Use of statistical analysis methods for detecting electricity theft by

analyzing utility billing information. Specific issues could include the optimal methods

for analyzing the information and costs of related operation.

2.) Cost analysis for utilities’ theft detection and prevention efforts compared

to the recouped revenues, as well as cost analysis for efforts to measure NTL more

accurately. Costs for extra staff and resources were not addressed by the utilities
 67

contacted for the research. A cost analysis study on NTL prevention and detection would

help explain the companies’ decisions regarding NTL, especially electricity theft.

3.) The possible use of newer metering technologies on an experimental basis.

For example, some meter manufacturers have developed meters that could be read

remotely by the utilities staff. Such meters could be fitted with diagnostics equipment to

detect meter tampering. Or a small section of the system could be used for an experiment

in reading power and energy values at regular intervals in order to provide sufficient

inputs for a loss analysis on the subsystem.

 REFERENCES

[1] Charles A. Gross, Power System Analysis (Second Edition). John Wiley & Sons,
New York, 1986; pp. 255 – 298, and pp. 304 – 322.

[2] Energy Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, Non-Payment in the
Electricity Sector in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, World
Bank Technical Paper No. 423. The World Bank, June 1999; pp. 3-33.

[3] Electricity Metering Subcommittee of the IEEE Committee on Power System

Instrumentation and Measurements, Progress in the Art of Metering Electric
Energy (Third Edition), IEEE, 1969; pp. 1- 5.

[4] A.E. Fitzgerald, Charles Kingsley, Jr., and Stephen D. Umans, Electric
Machinery (Fifth Edition), McGraw Hill, 1992; pp. 51 – 87.

[5] Provincial Energy Authority of Thailand Department of Power Economics,

Internal Annual Report, 2000; pp. 20 – 54.

[6] Provincial Energy Authority of Thailand Department of Power Economics,

Internal Annual Report, 2001; pp. 24 – 60.

[7] International Utilities Revenue Protection Association (IURPA), “Electricity

Theft Related NewsGroup Posts”, Vol. 1, www.iurpa.org, 2002

[8] David Dahle, “Watthour Meters”, www.watthourmeters.com, 2002

[9] The Economist, “Survey: Russia”, www.economist.com, July 19, 2001

[10] Izudin Dzafic, Mevludin Glavic and Fernando L. Alvarado, “Power System
Simulator 1.0”, http://www.untz.ba/idzafic/powersimulator.htm, University of
Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 2002

[11] Ali Abur, “Power Education Toolbox”, www.ee.tamu.edu/~abur/pet.html, Texas

A&M University, 2002

[12] Public Utility Commission of Ohio, “Electric Consumer Bill of Rights”,

www.puco.ohio.gov, 2002
 APPENDIX A

PRINCIPLES OF POWER SYSTEMS ANALYSIS:

BASIC LOAD FLOW AND LOSS CALCULATIONS

A.1 Basic Principles

Electrical power that flows through power systems consist of real (P) and reactive

(Q) power and the two components combine to make apparent power (S):

S = P2 + Q2 (A.1)

The apparent power S generated or consumed by a given element in the power system is

the product of the phasor voltage across it and the complex conjugate of the phasor

current through it. The real and reactive power, in turn, can be calculated using the

apparent power and the angle representing the phase difference between the current and

voltage, known as the power factor angle (φ).

S = VI * (A.2)

P = S cos φ 
Q = S sin φ  (A.3)
S = P + jQ 

The last equation is the complex cartesian number form where j is the imaginary number

defined as the square root of -1 ( − 1 ).

 65

The voltage and current have their own relationships based on Ohm’s Law:

V = IZ 
 (A.4)
Z = R + jX 

Z, R and X are the element’s impedance, resistance and reactance respectively.

It is worth noting that all the quantities represent steady state, single-phase

operation. Though all power systems that operate with more than 220 volts are three-

phase systems, the discussions and calculations here will treat the values as single-phase

equivalents. In order to be able to do this, the three-phase system is assumed balanced,

i.e., all three phases have exactly the same amount of power flowing through each of

them. In reality, three-phase power systems are rarely, if ever, perfectly balanced. The

analysis of unbalanced three-phase systems is discussed in [1]. Also, the values of

voltages and currents are all stated in root mean square (rms) values, while power values

are average powers. The electrical quantities discussed in this thesis are all assumed to be

smooth sinusoid waves, which means the rms values are equal to the peak values divided

by the square root of two.

A.2 The Load Flow Problem

In this section, the underlying principles involved with calculating the values of

the power that flow through elements of power systems will be briefly discussed. For

more in depth analysis and discussion of results and applications, see [1].
 66

The first premise of the power flow (or load flow) calculation involves an

extension of Kirschoff’s Current Law, which states that the sum of currents that flow in

and out of a node is zero. The application to load flow problems is that the sum of

electrical powers that flow in and out of a node – or bus – is zero:

n n n
Ptotal , A = −∑ PG ,i + ∑ PL ,i + ∑ PTL ,i = 0 (A.4)
i =1 i =1 i =1

where Ptotal,A is the total power at node A, PG,i, PL,i and PTL,i are the various values of

generated power, load power and power flowing through the transmission lines,

respectively. The index i signifies the ith generator, load, or transmission line connected

to bus A. Equation A.4 only shows the steady state equilibrium for real power, but the

same would hold true for reactive power (Q) and complex power (S). A visualization of

equation A.4 can be seen in Figure A.1 below.

G
• Transmission
•
• STL,A
Generators
G
SG,A •
•
•
• Loads
G • SL,A
•

Bus A

Figure A.1. A General Connection Situation at an Arbitrary Bus (denoted Bus A, where
G denotes a generator unit). (Source: C.A. Gross, Power System Analysis, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1986, 2nd Edition, p. 257.
 67

The next component that is necessary for load flow analysis is the system

admittance array (Ybus). The system array is a matrix that consists of admittance values

between buses in the system, which are the inverse values of system impedances. The

system array is based on applying Ohm’s Law to a vector of voltage and current values

V1   I T ,1 
   
V  I T ,2 
 
2

M M 
Vˆ =   and IˆT =   , with Vi and I T ,i representing the complex values of bus
V
 i  I T , i 
M  M 
V   
 n  I T , n 

voltage and total transmission current at bus i, respectively. The voltage Vi is a complex

value with the magnitude Vi and the phase angle δi. The number n signifies the total

number of buses in the system. The system array can be characterized as

Iˆ = [Y] Vˆ (A.5)

where [Y] is an n×n matrix. Each element of [Y], vector Yi,j represents the admittance

between bus i and bus j, with the impedance size yi,j and the phase angle γi,j. The

formulation and manipulation of [Y] is further discussed in [1].

With all the variables above in place, the total real and reactive transmission

power (P and Q) at bus i can be written [1] as

n

PTLi = ∑ViV j cos(δ i − δ j − γ i , j ) 
j =1 
n  (A.6)
QTLi = ∑ViV j cos(δ i − δ j − γ i , j ) 
j =1 
 68

which, in a steady state, should yield the total power at bus i

Ptotal ,i = − ∑ PG ,i + ∑ PL ,i + ∑ PTL,i = 0 (A.7)

i =1 i =1 i =1

A.3 Power Flow Computation Using Iterative Methods

Virtually all power flow calculations are done using iterative numerical methods.

In this thesis, the MATLAB simulation that is used to find the solutions to the test system

power flow is based on the Newton-Raphson method [1]. For power flow applications,

the Newton-Raphson method is used for two n-dimension vector functions, P and Q, with

two n-dimension vector variables, V and δ. The method used to solve for the final values

of the V and δ vectors is briefly described below.

First, an initial set of estimated values (“guesses”) for the values of V and δ are

entered with one bus voltage and angle kept constant – the slack bus. The initial estimates

are then used to compute the variation of the variables results from the initial iteration,

∆V and ∆δ. The variations ∆V and ∆δ are then used to make the next estimate.

V k +1  V k   ∆V 
 k +1  =  k  +   (A.8)
δ  δ   ∆δ 

The vectors Vk+1 and δk+1 are values for the k+1th iteration, Vk and δk are results

from the previous kth iteration. The variations vectors ∆V and ∆δ are computed by using

the following equation [1]:

 69

 ∆V   ˆk 
k −1 P
 ∆δ  = −[ J ]  ˆk (A.9)
  Q 

Where P̂ k and Q̂ k are n-dimension vectors containing the total real and reactive power

values at each bus stacked on top of each other to make a 2n-dimension vector. The

matrix [Jk] is called the system Jacobian matrix, a 2n×2n matrix that can be divided into 4

quadrants as follows:

  ∂P   ∂P  
  ∂δ   ∂V  
[J ] =    (A.10)
  ∂Q   ∂Q  
  ∂δ   ∂V  


And elements for each quadrant are computed as follows:

 ∂P 
a.)   is an n×n matrix where the elements are calculated as follows:
 ∂δ 

∂Pi n
= − ∑ViV j yi , j sin(δ i − δ j − γ i , j ) for diagonal elements, and
∂δ i j =1
j ≠i

∂Pi
= ViVk yi ,k sin(δ i − δ k − γ i ,k ) for i≠ k (A.11a)
∂δ k

 ∂P 
b.)   is an n×n matrix where the elements are calculated as follows:
 ∂V 

∂Pi n
= Vi yi ,i cos γ i ,i + ∑V j yi , j cos(δ i − δ j − γ i , j ) for diagonal elements, and
∂Vi j =1

∂Pi
= Vi yi ,k cos(δ i − δ k − γ i ,k ) for i≠ k (A.11b)
∂Vk
 70

 ∂Q 
c.)   is an n×n matrix where the elements are calculated as follows:
 ∂δ 

∂Qi n
= ∑ViV j yi , j cos(δ i − δ j − γ i , j ) for diagonal elements, and
∂δ i j =1
j ≠i

∂Qi
= −ViVk y i ,k cos(δ i − δ k − γ i ,k ) for i≠ k (A.11c)
∂δ k

 ∂Q 
d.)   is an n×n matrix where the elements are calculated as follows:
 ∂V 

∂Qi n
= −Vi yi ,i sin γ i ,i + ∑V j yi , j sin(δ i − δ j − γ i ,i ) for diagonal elements, and
∂Vi j =1

∂Qi
= Vi yi ,k sin(δ i − δ k − γ i ,k ) for i≠ k (A.11d)
∂Vk

Once the components described above are set in place, the iterative process is

V 0 
started. The initial estimate of the solutions are entered as  0  and then used to
δ 

 ∆V 
calculate the first variation vector   . The second iteration’s estimates are thus
 ∆δ 

obtained and then used to calculate the next estimates. The process is repeated until the

solution converges. The solution is generally considered converged once the variation

vector becomes small enough to fall within a tolerance value set by the user. Also, the
 71

initial values entered for the slack bus (see Chapter 2) is 1∠0o , or one per-unit in

magnitude and zero degrees in phase shift.

Remarks

1.) There are several other established methods to formulate an iterative solution for

power flow analysis, most of which would yield the same results with less

processing time11. Other techniques are discussed in [1].

2.) While writing the program for the two-bus test system, the author found that

monitoring ∆V or the total P or Q at any given bus is sufficient for the

convergence of viable solutions.

A.4 Loss Calculation

Now that the concepts needed for calculating power flow in an electrical power

system has been developed, the next step is to use the information obtained above to

calculate for losses in the system. Power loss in the system is actually quite simple to

derive: the total power in the system must equal zero, i.e., input should equal output.

The losses would then equal the discrepancies between the total powers at the buses. In

the form of an equation [1],

11
Asif Selim, "An investigation of the use of Broyden's method of load flow analysis", Ohio University,
March 1994
 72

n n n n
PLoss = Re[∑Vˆi ( ∑VˆiYi , j ) ∗] = ∑∑ViV j yi , j cos(δ i − δ j − γ i , j ) (A.12)
i =1 j =1 i =1 j =1

where Re[ ] represents the real part of the complex value inside the bracket in (A.12),

Vˆi and Yi,j are the vector form of the voltage and impedance, respectively.

Equation (A.12) yields the sum average power losses throughout the power

system. Other calculation methods are available for losses in subsections of large power

systems. However, (A.12) is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis because the test

power system used is a two-bus system with only one transmission line and no

transformers. In this case, the total power loss in the system and the loss in the

transmission line are identical.

The loss calculations performed on the two-bus test system were carried out using

a MATLAB program using the principles discussed above. The program itself is shown

and further explained in Appendix B.

 APPENDIX B

Two-Bus Load Flow Analysis Programs in MATLAB

B.1 Program Overview

The following program was written with MATLAB Release 12 for the specific

purpose of calculating bus voltages, power flow, and ultimately power losses in the

hypothetical two-bus power system specified in Chapter 2: Loss Analysis and shown

in Figure B.1 below. The system specifications, also listed in Chapter 2, are as shown

below.

Bus 1 Bus 2

Transmission Line Load 2

Load 1

Figure B.1 – Single-line diagram of a two-bus, two-load power system with known
load and known transmission line data. Each bus can be the slack bus.

Specifications of the two-bus test system

• Base Values: 22000 Volts, 100 Ampere, 2.2 MVA, 220 Ohms

• Transmission Line:

Resistance = 2 km * 0.175713 Ohms/conductor/km * 3 conductors

= 1.054278 Ohms = 0.004792 per unit (p.u.)

Reactance = 2 km * 0.334439 Ohms/cond./km * 3 cond.

= 0.009121062 p.u.
 74

The transmission line reactance and resistance values per unit length were

taken from transmission line specifications provided by the Provincial Energy

Authority of Thailand. The full datasheets, written in Thai and English, are shown in

Appendix C. The profiles of the loads at the two buses are shown in Figure 2.4 in

Chapter 2.

The calculation methods are those briefly explained in Appendix A. The block

diagram in Figure B.2 in the next page shows the information flow within the

MATLAB program. The ultimate results are the final voltages at the buses, the final

phase angles, the power flow between the buses, and the power losses. In the next

section, the codes for the MATLAB program are shown.

 75

Initial estimates Ybus(i,i) Power System

information

Formulate ΣPTL, Σ QTL equations V k +1  V k   ∆ V 

 k +1  =  k+  
δ  δ   ∆ δ 

Ptotal = - ΣPgen + ΣPload + ΣPTL

Qtotal = - ΣQgen + ΣQload + ΣQTL

∆V   ˆk 
k −1 P
 ∆ δ  = −[ J ]  ˆ k 
  Q 

Ptotal Î 0?
No
Yes
  ∂P   ∂P  
  ∂δ   ∂V  
RMS Voltages & Phase [J k ] =    
  ∂Q   ∂Q  
angles (V, δ) found   ∂δ   ∂V  
 

Calculate Power Losses

and Power Flows

Figure B.2 – Information Flow Through the MATLAB Load Flow Analysis Program.

B.2 MATLAB Codes

Two MATLAB programs are shown below: the first program calculates the

power losses in the transmission line under normal circumstances; the second

calculates the losses and then compares those losses to a scenario where non-technical

losses were inserted. In MATLAB codes, any line that begins with the “%” symbol

means that line is a “comment” – documentations or explanations that will not be

evaluated when the program is run. Lines that end with “…” are lines that contain

texts too long to fit the page and are continued on the lines immediately below them.
 76

The First Program: Non-technical Losses Not Included

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%
% TWO-BUS TEST SYSTEM LOAD FLOW CALCULATIONS
%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% The following program calculates the final voltage values at the
% two buses of the test system described in Chapter K, without
% technical losses.
% Once the system voltages are determined, the power losses are then
% calculated.
% The mathematical calculations are briefly discussed in Appendix A.
% The values for Z12 below represents the impedance (resistance plus
% reactance) of the transmission line in the system. The values are
% taken from actual datasheets shown in Appendix C, with specific
% calculations shown in Chapter K.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Z12 = 0.004792+0.009121j ; Y12 = 1/Z12;
% NOTE: All values above are per-unit with the following base
% values: Vbase = 2400 Ibase = 100
% Load schedule begins in the following format:
% Time(hrs) Power Reactive Power Reactive Power Factor
% Load 1 power Load 2 power 1 2
%
%
% Load schedule is arraged as [hour,Load1,pf1,Load2,pf2] for each
% row in row_sched.
Load_sched = [ 1, 0.045455, 0.9, 0.022727, 0.8;
2, 0.045455, 0.9, 0.022727, 0.8;
3, 0.045455, 0.9, 0.022727, 0.8;
4, 0.056818, 0.85, 0.025 , 0.85;
5, 0.068182, 0.88, 0.027273, 0.83;
6, 0.079545, 0.89, 0.034091, 0.75;
7, 0.113636, 0.85, 0.056818, 0.7;
8, 0.159091, 0.8, 0.090909, 0.72;
9, 0.227273, 0.75, 0.113636, 0.77;
10,0.227273, 0.75, 0.034091, 0.81;
11,0.227273, 0.75, 0.034091, 0.83;
12,0.227273, 0.75, 0.054545, 0.79;
13,0.227273, 0.75, 0.056818, 0.78;
14,0.227273, 0.75, 0.036364, 0.83;
15,0.227273, 0.75, 0.036364, 0.86;
16,0.227273, 0.8, 0.090909, 0.77;
17,0.227273, 0.8, 0.113636, 0.73;
18,0.159091, 0.82, 0.159091, 0.69;
19,0.113636, 0.85, 0.147727, 0.71;
20,0.068182, 0.88, 0.136364, 0.68;
21,0.045455, 0.89, 0.136364, 0.77;
22,0.045455, 0.9, 0.113636, 0.78;
23,0.045455, 0.89, 0.079545, 0.82;
24,0.045455, 0.89, 0.069981, 0.87];
% Average loads for Load1, Load2
Load_avg = [0.132576*0.83, 0.132576*sin(acos(0.83)),…
…acos(0.83),180*acos(0.83)/pi,0.069981*0.780833,…
…0.069981*sin(acos(0.780833)),acos(0.780833),180*acos(0.780833)/pi];
% The following loop is to create a power profile for the loads in
% this format:
 77

% [Real Power load 1, Reactive load 1, delta 1 (rad), delta 1

% (degrees), Real 2, Reactive 2, delta 2 (rad), delta 2 (deg)]
% for each row.
for i=1:24
Load_Powers(i,1) = Load_sched(i,2)*Load_sched(i,3);
Load_Powers(i,2) = Load_sched(i,2)*sin(acos(Load_sched(i,3)));
Load_Powers(i,3) = acos(Load_sched(i,3));
Load_Powers(i,4) = 180*Load_Powers(i,3)/pi;
Load_Powers(i,5) = Load_sched(i,4)*Load_sched(i,5);
Load_Powers(i,6) = Load_sched(i,4)*sin(acos(Load_sched(i,5)));
Load_Powers(i,7) = acos(Load_sched(i,5));
Load_Powers(i,8) = 180*Load_Powers(i,7)/pi;
end
Load_Powers(25,:)=Load_avg;

%DECOUPLED LOAD FLOW - NEWTON-RAPHSON METHOD

% establishing values for the transmission line admittances
y(1,1) = Y12; Y(1,1)=abs(y(1,1)); gamma(1,1)=angle(y(1,1));
y(1,2) = -Y12; Y(1,2)=abs(y(1,2)); gamma(1,2)=angle(y(1,2));
y(2,2) = Y12; Y(2,2)=abs(y(2,2)); gamma(2,2)=angle(y(2,2));
y(2,1) = -Y12; Y(2,1)=abs(y(2,1)); gamma(2,1)=angle(y(2,1));

tol = 0.0000001;
final_voltage_2=zeros(25,2);
for j2 = 1:25
V(1) = 1;delta(1)=0; %slack
V(2) = 1;delta(2)=0;
count= 0;
P2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,5);
Q2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,6);

while abs(Q2)>tol
P2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,5);
Q2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + … \
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,6);
Power(1,1) = P2;
Power(2,1) = Q2;
% Below is the calculation of the Jacobian Matrix (Appendix A)
J(1,1) = -V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(1,2) = 2*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(2,1) = V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(2,2) = 2*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
% Below, the Jacobian Matrix is used to calculate the voltage values
Power = [P2;Q2];
d = -inv(J)*Power;
dDelta = d(1);
dV = d(2);
V(2) = V(2) + dV;
delta(2)= delta(2) +dDelta;
count = count + 1;
end
final_voltage_2(j2,1) = V(2);
final_voltage_2(j2,2) = delta(2);
end
for j2=1:25
% Using equations stated in Power Systems Analysis (C A Gross,
% p 319) for calculating power losses, then converting to watts and
 78

% vars.
P_loss(j2) = Y(1,1)*cos(-gamma(1,1)) +…
…(final_voltage_2(j2,1)^2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(2,1)*cos(final_voltage_2(j2,2) - …
…gamma(2,1)) + final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(1,2)*cos(-…
…final_voltage_2(j2,2)-gamma(1,2));
Q_loss(j2) = Y(1,1)*sin(-gamma(1,1)) +…
…(final_voltage_2(j2,1)^2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) +…
…final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(2,1)*sin(final_voltage_2(j2,2) - …
…gamma(2,1)) + final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(1,2)*sin(-…
…final_voltage_2(j2,2)-gamma(1,2));
P_loss_watt(j2) = P_loss(j2)*2200000;
Q_loss_var(j2) = Q_loss(j2)*2200000;
LOSSES(j2,1) = P_loss_watt(j2);
LOSSES(j2,2) = Q_loss_var(j2);

end

The Second Program: NTL Included

% Effects of Non-technical Losses(NTL) on a simple,

% two-bus power system. A normal load profile is used,
% based on a previous set of programs.

% The profile of NTL contributions to the load is shown below.

% The second column is the VA added to the overall load and
% the third column is the power factor contribution.
% Note that the pf contribution is negative, suggesting an
% inductive load, i.e., motors, light fixtures, air-conditioners,
% etc. The magnetudes are generated arbitrarily with the plots shown
% in Chapter K.
NTL_prof = [ 1, 0.003636, -0.003;
2, 0.003864, -0.004;
3, 0.003636, -0.003;
4, 0.004091, -0.005;
5, 0.004545, -0.006;
6, 0.005, -0.0075;
7, 0.005682, -0.0085;
8, 0.005909, -0.01;
9, 0.006364, -0.012;
10, 0.006591, -0.013;
11, 0.006818, -0.014;
12, 0.007273, -0.017;
13, 0.007045, -0.015;
14, 0.007045, -0.015;
15, 0.006818, -0.014;
16, 0.006818, -0.014;
17, 0.006136, -0.011;
18, 0.006364, -0.012;
19, 0.005909, -0.01;
20, 0.005455, -0.008;
21, 0.005, -0.0075;
22, 0.004545, -0.006;
23, 0.004318, -0.006;
24, 0.003864, -0.004];
NTL_avg = [25, 0.0053, -0.0094];
NTL_prof(25,:) = NTL_avg;
% Below, the transmission line values are generated.
 79

% The calculation of Z12 is shown in the chapter

% discussing loss analysis.
Z12 = 0.004792+0.009121j ;
Y12 = 1/Z12;
% NOTE: All values above are per-unit with the following base
% values:
% Vbase = 2400 Ibase = 100
%
% Load schedule:
%
% Time(hrs) Power Reactive Power Reactive Power Factor
% Load 1 power Load 2 power 1 2
%
%
% Load schedule is arraged as [hour,Load1,pf1,Load2,pf2] for each
% row in row_sched.
Load_sched = [ 1, 0.045455, 0.9, 0.022727, 0.8;
2, 0.045455, 0.9, 0.022727, 0.8;
3, 0.045455, 0.9, 0.022727, 0.8;
4, 0.056818, 0.85, 0.025 , 0.85;
5, 0.068182, 0.88, 0.027273, 0.83;
6, 0.079545, 0.89, 0.034091, 0.75;
7, 0.113636, 0.85, 0.056818, 0.7;
8, 0.159091, 0.8, 0.090909, 0.72;
9, 0.227273, 0.75, 0.113636, 0.77;
10,0.227273, 0.75, 0.034091, 0.81;
11,0.227273, 0.75, 0.034091, 0.83;
12,0.227273, 0.75, 0.054545, 0.79;
13,0.227273, 0.75, 0.056818, 0.78;
14,0.227273, 0.75, 0.036364, 0.83;
15,0.227273, 0.75, 0.036364, 0.86;
16,0.227273, 0.8, 0.090909, 0.77;
17,0.227273, 0.8, 0.113636, 0.73;
18,0.159091, 0.82, 0.159091, 0.69;
19,0.113636, 0.85, 0.147727, 0.71;
20,0.068182, 0.88, 0.136364, 0.68;
21,0.045455, 0.89, 0.136364, 0.77;
22,0.045455, 0.9, 0.113636, 0.78;
23,0.045455, 0.89, 0.079545, 0.82;
24,0.045455, 0.89, 0.069981, 0.87];
% Load_sched_avg = average values of load demands and pf.
Load_sched_avg = [25,0.0132576, 0.83,0.069981,0.780833];
Load_sched(25,:)=Load_sched_avg;
% Average loads for Load1, Load2
Load_avg = [0.132576*0.83,0.132576*sin(acos(0.83)),…
…acos(0.83),180*acos(0.83)/pi,0.069981*0.780833,…
…0.069981*sin(acos(0.780833)),acos(0.780833),…
…180*acos(0.780833)/pi];
% The following loop is to create a power profile for the loads in
% this format:
% [Real Power load 1, Reactive load 1, delta 1 (rad), delta 1
% (degrees), Real 2, Reactive 2, delta 2 (rad), delta 2 (deg)]
% for each row.
for i=1:25
Load_Powers(i,1) = Load_sched(i,2)*Load_sched(i,3);
Load_Powers(i,2) = Load_sched(i,2)*sin(acos(Load_sched(i,3)));
 80

Load_Powers(i,3) = acos(Load_sched(i,3));
Load_Powers(i,4) = 180*Load_Powers(i,3)/pi;
Load_Powers(i,5) = Load_sched(i,4)*Load_sched(i,5);
Load_Powers(i,6) = Load_sched(i,4)*sin(acos(Load_sched(i,5)));
Load_Powers(i,7) = acos(Load_sched(i,5));
Load_Powers(i,8) = 180*Load_Powers(i,7)/pi;
end
% establishing values for the transmission line admittances....
y(1,1) = Y12; Y(1,1)=abs(y(1,1)); gamma(1,1)=angle(y(1,1));
y(1,2) = -Y12; Y(1,2)=abs(y(1,2)); gamma(1,2)=angle(y(1,2));
y(2,2) = Y12; Y(2,2)=abs(y(2,2)); gamma(2,2)=angle(y(2,2));
y(2,1) = -Y12; Y(2,1)=abs(y(2,1)); gamma(2,1)=angle(y(2,1));
tol = 0.0000001;
final_voltage_2=zeros(25,2);
for j2 = 1:25
V(1) = 1;delta(1)=0; %slack
V(2) = 1;delta(2)=0;
count= 0;
P2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,5);
Q2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,6);
while abs(Q2)>tol
P2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,5);
Q2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers(j2,6);
Power(1,1) = P2;
Power(2,1) = Q2;
J(1,1) = -V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(1,2) = …
…2*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2))+Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(2,1) = …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(2,2) = 2*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));

Power = [P2;Q2];
d = -inv(J)*Power;
dDelta = d(1);
dV = d(2);
V(2) = V(2) + dV;
delta(2)= delta(2) +dDelta;
count = count + 1;
end
final_voltage_2(j2,1) = V(2);
final_voltage_2(j2,2) = delta(2);
end
for j2=1:25
% Using equations stated in Power Systems Analysis (C A Gross, p
% 319) for calculating power losses, then converting to watts and
% vars.
P_loss(j2) = Y(1,1)*cos(-gamma(1,1)) + …
…(final_voltage_2(j2,1)^2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(2,1)*cos(final_voltage_2(j2,2) …
…- gamma(2,1)) + final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(1,2)*cos(…
…-final_voltage_2(j2,2)-gamma(1,2));
 81

Q_loss(j2) = Y(1,1)*sin(-gamma(1,1)) + …
…(final_voltage_2(j2,1)^2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(2,1)*sin(final_voltage_2(j2,2) - …
…gamma(2,1)) + final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(1,2)*sin(-…
…final_voltage_2(j2,2)-gamma(1,2));
P_loss_watt(j2) = P_loss(j2)*2200000;
Q_loss_var(j2) = Q_loss(j2)*2200000;
LOSSES_reg(j2,1) = P_loss_watt(j2);
LOSSES_reg(j2,2) = Q_loss_var(j2);
end
%%% The NTL loads are then added to the regular load.
Load_sched2(:,1) = Load_sched(:,1);
Load_sched2(:,2) = Load_sched(:,2);
Load_sched2(:,3) = Load_sched(:,3);
Load_sched2(:,4) = Load_sched(:,4) + NTL_prof(:,2);
Load_sched2(:,5) = Load_sched(:,5) + NTL_prof(:,3);
%%%% Below is the calculation of losses with NTL introduced.
for i=1:25
Load_Powers2(i,1) = Load_sched2(i,2)*Load_sched2(i,3);
Load_Powers2(i,2) = Load_sched2(i,2)*sin(acos(Load_sched2(i,3)));
Load_Powers2(i,3) = acos(Load_sched2(i,3));
Load_Powers2(i,4) = 180*Load_Powers(i,3)/pi;
Load_Powers2(i,5) = Load_sched2(i,4)*Load_sched2(i,5);
Load_Powers2(i,6) = Load_sched2(i,4)*sin(acos(Load_sched2(i,5)));
Load_Powers2(i,7) = acos(Load_sched2(i,5));
Load_Powers2(i,8) = 180*Load_Powers(i,7)/pi;
end
% establishing values for the transmission line admittances....

y(1,1) = Y12; Y(1,1)=abs(y(1,1)); gamma(1,1)=angle(y(1,1));

y(1,2) = -Y12; Y(1,2)=abs(y(1,2)); gamma(1,2)=angle(y(1,2));
y(2,2) = Y12; Y(2,2)=abs(y(2,2)); gamma(2,2)=angle(y(2,2));
y(2,1) = -Y12; Y(2,1)=abs(y(2,1)); gamma(2,1)=angle(y(2,1));
tol = 0.0000001;
final_voltage_2=zeros(25,2);
% Below is the same thing with the other bus as slack
for j2 = 1:25
% Initial values and estimates
V(1) = 1;delta(1)=0; %slack
V(2) = 1;delta(2)=0; %initial estimate
count= 0;
P2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers2(j2,5);
Q2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers2(j2,6);
while abs(Q2)>tol

% The P2 and Q2 are the sum of powers at bus two

% which should be zero in a steady state.
P2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers2(j2,5);
Q2 = V(2)*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1)) + Load_Powers2(j2,6);
Power(1,1) = P2;
Power(2,1) = Q2;
% Construction of the Jacobian matrix to be used in
% calculating the errors of the previous estimate.
 82

J(1,1) = -V(2)*Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(1,2) = 2*V(2)*Y(2,2)*cos(…
…-gamma(2,2))+Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(2,1) = V(2)*Y(2,1)*cos(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));
J(2,2) = 2*V(2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…Y(2,1)*sin(delta(2)-gamma(2,1));

% Computation of the error of the previous estimate.

Power = [P2;Q2];
d = -inv(J)*Power;
dDelta = d(1);
dV = d(2);
% By adding the errors to the previous estimate,
% the next estimate is used for the next calculation
% until the solution converges, i.e., the total power
% is as close to zero as specified.
V(2) = V(2) + dV;
delta(2)= delta(2) +dDelta;
count = count + 1;
end
% Final voltage and angle values for each hour period.
final_voltage_2(j2,1) = V(2);
final_voltage_2(j2,2) = delta(2);
end
for j2=1:25
% Using equations stated in Power Systems Analysis (C A Gross, p
% 319) for calculating power losses, then converting to watts and
% vars.
P_loss(j2) = Y(1,1)*cos(-gamma(1,1)) + …
…(final_voltage_2(j2,1)^2)*Y(2,2)*cos(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(2,1)*cos(final_voltage_2(j2,2) - …
…gamma(2,1)) + final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(1,2)*cos(-…
…final_voltage_2(j2,2)-gamma(1,2));
Q_loss(j2) = Y(1,1)*sin(-gamma(1,1)) + …
…(final_voltage_2(j2,1)^2)*Y(2,2)*sin(-gamma(2,2)) + …
…final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(2,1)*sin(final_voltage_2(j2,2) - …
…gamma(2,1)) + final_voltage_2(j2,1)*Y(1,2)*sin(-…
…final_voltage_2(j2,2)-gamma(1,2));
P_loss_watt(j2) = P_loss(j2)*2200000;
Q_loss_var(j2) = Q_loss(j2)*2200000;
LOSSES_NTL(j2,1) = P_loss_watt(j2);
LOSSES_NTL(j2,2) = Q_loss_var(j2);
end
% Below, the effects of adding an NTL element are studied...
% Each loss/load variable contains 25 elements representing
% data from each hour of the day and the average value in
% the 25th element.
Losses_increase = LOSSES_NTL(:,1)-LOSSES_reg(:,1);
% Net per unit increase of losses.
Load_increase = (Load_Powers2(:,5)-Load_Powers(:,5));
% Net per unit increase of loads at bus 2 where the NTL element is
% added.
% In the loop below, the increases in loads and losses are
% computed in percents and in watts.
for i=1:25
Load_increase_pct(i) = ((Load_Powers2(i,5)-…
…Load_Powers(i,5))/Load_Powers(i,5))*100;
 83

Load_increase_W(i) = (Load_Powers2(i,5)-…
…Load_Powers(i,5))*2200000;
Losses_increase_pct(i) = …
…(Losses_increase(i)/LOSSES_reg(i,1))*100;
Losses_increase_W(i) = Losses_increase(i);
end

time = [1:24];
% The loop below computes the real power (watts) consumed
% by the NTL.
for i = 1:25
NTL_real_power_pu(i) = Load_Powers2(i,5)-Load_Powers(i,5);
NTL_real_power_W(i) = (Load_Powers2(i,5)-…
…Load_Powers(i,5))*2200000;
NTL_pct_of_load(i) = …
…(NTL_real_power_pu(i)/Load_Powers(i,5))*100;
end
% Total losses are sums of the real power consumed by the NTL
% and the loss increases that are caused by the addition of
% NTL.
Total_Losses = NTL_real_power_W+Losses_increase_W;
% In watts.

AVG_NTL = NTL_real_power_W(25)*ones(24);
AVG_TOT_LOS = Total_Losses(25)*ones(24);
 APPENDIX C

Table of Sequence Impedance for 11 kV and 22 kV Lines

(Courtesy of the Power System Analysis Department, PEA, Thailand)
85
 ABSTRACT

SURIYAMONGKOL, DAN. MS. September, 2002

Electrical Engineering

Non-Technical Losses in Power Systems

Director of Thesis: Brian Manhire, Professor

The purpose of this thesis is to perform an introductory investigation of non-

technical losses in power systems. There are losses in power systems that cannot be

predicted or calculated beforehand: non-technical losses. The bulk of these losses are

likely caused by electricity theft, rather than the other possibilities such as poor

maintenance, and calculation and accounting mistakes, though some power systems

may suffer from both. This thesis will investigate the loss-related statistics of one

specific power system market: Thailand’s rural regions. Information presented here

would include the magnitude and characteristics of electricity theft, as well as the

utility company’s measures to curb such losses. Other topics that will be discussed

include a comparison with other nations’ systems and if – and how – can software

simulations of power systems account for non-technical losses. How popular load

flow analysis methods can or cannot account for non-technical losses would be the

focus of the latter topic.

Approved: _________________________
Brian Manhire, Professor